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Top managers education and R&D investment
507
Top ma~agers~ education and R&D investment * FM. Scherer JohnF. Kennedy School
of Gouerttmeni, Harvard Uniuersi~~, Cambridge, Ml,
USA
Final version received July 1991
This paper analyzes data spanning 17 years on R&D expenditures and the educational background of top managers for 221 relatively research-intensive U.S. corporations. The fraction of companies for which at least one of the top two executive officers was educated in science or engineering peaked at 71.5 percent in 1980 and declined slightIy thereafter. Controlling for profitability and the industrial fields in which the companies operated, having a science or engineering-educated leader is associated with more intensive support of R&D. A positive interaction between technical and tegaf education is detected.
In a widely cited article, Abernathy and Hayes [l] attributed short-sighted investment policies by U.S. business corporations in part to the growing replacement of technically trained managers by specialists in finance and law. This paper taps a ~~rres~~de~ce to: F.M. Schemr, Center for Business and Government, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 79 John F. Kennedy Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. * This paper is based upon research supported by the National Science Foundation under grant SES 87-13643, “‘Qn-Site Research To Improve the Government-Generated Social Science Data Base.” The research was conducted at the U.S. Bureau of the Census while the authors were participants in the American Statistical Association/ Census Bureau research program. The findings and conclusions expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or Census Bureau, Co-author Scherer benefitted from support under an O’Melveny and Myers Centennial research grant. We thank Judith Chevalier for assistance in tracking and coding executive biographies.
Research Policy 21 (1992) 507-511 North-Holland 00487333/92/%05.00
unique new data base to investigate trends in the educational backgrounds of 221 U.S. companies’ top executives and to determine how company R&D spending is related to the university educational experiences of top managers.
The sampfe
The data came as a by-product of a broader study [2] analyzing U.S. firms’ reactions to rising import competition. From Census Bureau surveys for the National Science Foundation, essentially continuous time series on annual company-financed research and development expenditures over the period 1971-87 were assembled for 308 corporations. The sample was limited to companies principally occupying Standard IndustriaI Cfassification groups 26, 28, 30, and 32-39, in al1 of which appreciable expenditures for R&D on new and improved product and/or process tcchnology are customary. 1 For the sampled companies, an attempt was made to determine the educational backgrounds of the top two executive officers (usually the chairman and president, or in ambiguous cases, the chief executive officer and chief operating officer ‘1 for each year from i SIC group 29, petroIeum and retated industries, was excluded despite substantial R&D activity because its import experience was distorted by OPEC shocks and government crude oil and refined product price regulations. z In many cases, there was only one leader who served both as CEO and COO. For those cases, on& the single leader’s educational background was coded. Reaching into the ranks of vice presidents to find a “secundum inter pares”’ was infeasible.
0 1992 - Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. All rights reserved
F.M. Scherer and K. Huh / Education and R&D investment
508 80
1
,,.I /-,..”
MBA
O/
1971
1980
1975
1985
or university level in science or engineering and (at the graduate level) in business administration and law. Contrary to the implication drawn by Abernathy and Hayes [l, p. 751 for a less technology-oriented sample of companies, there is an upward trend in the presence of technically educated leaders, at least until 1980, after which a reversal materializes. In the peak year, 71.5 percent of the sample companies had leaders trained in science or engineering. On average, 30.7 percent of the firms had MBAs in at least one of their top positions. The presence of MBAs has been rising at an increasing rate. For legally trained executives, the trend was downward, with an average of 18.7 percent over the 17 year period.
Year
Fig. 1. Educational
background
of company
leaders,
1971-87.
Education
biographies published in who’s who in Finance and Industry. In 87 cases, the biographical coverage was insufficient to develop an adequate educational profile, so the companies, usually small or foreign-owned, had to be dropped from the sample analyzed in this paper. The 221 remaining companies accounted for 57.2 percent of total U.S. company-financed industrial R&D expenditures in 1971, 57.6 percent in 1980, and 49.3 percent in 1985. 3 Because the sample was confined to industries in which R&D is relatively important and because, to be included continuously in Census surveys, reporters had to exceed certain absolute R&D spending thresholds, the companies are more R&D-intensive than the average manufacturer. Thus, in 1985, the simple average of company-financed R&D in relation to sales was 3.76 percent for sample members, compared to 3.0 percent for all R&D-performing industrial corporations [4, p.371.
Educational
background
trends
Figure 1 presents annual averages for the fraction of companies in which at least one of the top two executive officers was educated at the college 3 For three companies, biographical information was not available for 1987, and for one, there was a gap also for 1986.
and R&D
Our remaining objective is to determine how R&D spending was related to the educational background of company leaders. Here we must be wary of spurious inferences, for the more heavily involved in high-technology industries a company is, the more likely it is that technically educated persons will occupy leadership positions. We must therefore control for companies’ industrial occupancy. This is done by defining a variable: RDINDEXi,
= 5 Wijt(RD/S)j,TT. j=l
(RD/S) here is the ratio of aggregate companyfinanced research and development outlays to sales in the jth industry during the base year 1977, 4 as ascertained from the Federal Trade Commission’s Line of Business survey for that year [3]. The weighting factor wijt measures the fraction of company i’s total domestic manufacturing establishment sales (or more exactly, value of shipments) contributed by its activities in industry j during year t. RDINDEX in effect tells what a company’s R&D/sales ratio would be, if it pursued R&D exactly as intensively in each of the industries it occupied as the members of those industries generally. 4 The gated
year 1977 was the last of four for which highly disaggreLine of Business data on R&D were available.
F.M. Scherer and X Huh / Education and R&D investment Table 1 Regression equations with R&D/sales dent variable and relevant explanatory
(in percent) variables a
as depen-
Independent variable
Equation (1)
(2)
(31
(4)
Intercept
-0.17 (2.78) 1.383 (65.38)
- 0.81 (5.20) 1.301 (58.72) 2.521 (9.43) . ..
- 1.01 (6.08) 1.289 (57.48) 2.537 (9.49)
- 0.90 (5.45) 1.289 (57.59) 2.515 (9.42)
RDINDEX PCM 16.year
dummies
DTECH
. 0.302 (3.84) - 0.034 (0.47) 0.246 (2.82) - 0.006 (0.04)
DMBA DLAW DUNC ONLYTECH ONLYMBA ONLYLAW TECH-MBA TECH-LAW MBA-LAW R2 N a T-ratios
0.5350 3718 are presented
0.5608 3718 in subscripted
0.5634 3718
0.138 (1.49) - 0.181 (1.22) - 0.040 (0.29) 0.117 (1.13) 0.757 (5.90) -0.122 (0.76) 0.5660 3718
parentheses.
R&D/sales ratios have also varied with business conditions and secularly over the time period covered by our sample. Equations (1) and (2) in table 1 show how well the RDINDEX variable, dummy variables for each year, and a measure of company gross profitability, the price-cost margin variable PCMjl, 5 fare in explaining the variation of company R&D/sales ratios. RDINDEX is by far the most powerful regressor, explaining more than half the variance in the dependent variable. Small but statistically significant year effects (not individually reported) are found in
eqn. (2). R&D/sales ratios are also observed to be significantly higher, the larger are companies’ gross profit margins (before deduction of capital costs and central office, central laboratory, selling, and other expenditures incurred outside operating establishments). In eqn (3), one-zero dummy variables distinguish whether a company’s top two executives included a person with an educational background in science or engineering (DTECH), law (DLAW), and graduate business administration (DMBA). Also included is a dummy variable DUNC with unit values for the 239 cases in which it could not be determined with certainty whether one of the company heads had a scientific or engineering background. The increase in explanatory power from these variables, with R2 rising from 0.5608 to 0.5634, is statistically significant; F(4, 3695) = 5.30. The significant coefficient for DTECH reveals that, all else equal, having a top executive with a scientific or engineering background adds 0.30 percentage points to R&D as a percentage of sales, which for the sample as a whole averaged 3.12 percent. Having a top officer with legal training added an almost equivalent amount, while the effects for MBAs and uncertain cases are quite small and statistically insignificant. The legal background result is surprising, calling for further clarification. In many companies, leadership was shared between a lawyer and a technologist, and in others, a single executive had undergraduate science or engineering training plus graduate work in law. Equation (4) categorizes the data more richly, as follows: 6 ONLYTECH ONLYLAW ONLYMBA TECH-MBA
6 To 5 PCM
= ((Value of shipments - materials costs - payroll supplementary employment costsI/value of shipments) for all domestic establishments of a company. It is derived from Annual Survey of Manufactures and Census of Manufactures records.
509
Technically trained leader, no lawyer or MBA. Legally trained leader, no TECH or MBA. MBA leader, no lawyer or TECH. Leaders had both technical and MBA backgrounds.
expand, the “ONLY” variables cover companies in which at least one leader had the specified educational background and no other leader had the other two categorized backgrounds. The interaction variables designate companies whose leaders had a combination of at least two educational backgrounds, embodied either in a single executive or two diferent executives.
510
TECH-LAW MBA-LAW
F.M. Scherer and El Huh / Education
Leaders had both technical and law backgrounds. Leaders had both MBA and law backgrounds, but no technical education.
The base case consists, as in eqn (31, of companies whose leaders had only non-technical bachelors’ degrees, or where there was no evidence that the leaders had received other than honorary degrees. In eqn (4) we find the combination of technical and legal education to be especially conducive to the support of R&D, adding 0.76 points on average to R&D as a percentage of company sales. ’ Technical backgrounds without augmentation from other advanced degrees (comprising 39.6 percent of all cases) added 0.138 percentage points - a result significantly different from zero only at the 93 percent confidence level in a one-tailed test. Having officers with legal or MBA training alone or a combination of legal and MBA training (6.7, 8.2, and 4.9 percent of the cases respectively) was negatively related to R&D/sales ratios, although none of the three effects is statistically significant. It is conceivable, as a referee pointed out, that the educational background coefficients, and especially the technical effects, reflect the influence of company size rather than the orientation that comes from education. DTECH is positively but weakly correlated with the logarithm (to base 10) of current-year company sales, with r = +0.036. A tenfold increase in company size was associated with a 1.3 percentage point increase in the likelihood of having an engineering- or sciencetrained leader. However, when log,, SALES was introduced as a separate explanatory variable, the values of the technical background coefficients were altered only trivially. Thus, the results do not appear to be affected by a size bias. Despite this, the regression equations cannot prove a causal relationship running from technical education to more vigorous support of research and development. Companies might have opted for some independent reason to be more
and R&D investment
research-intensive than the industries in which they operated, and hence to appoint technically educated individuals to leadership positions. But it seems implausible that companies would pursue R&D more intensively than industry norms over a period of 17 years without conscious decisions to do so by those who set company policy. When the sample was split into two time periods of nearly equal length, 1971-79 and 1980-87, the DTECH (and DLAW) coefficients were positive and statistically significant in both analogues to eqn (3). In the analogues of eqn (41, DTECH was positive and significant in 1980-87 but not for 1971-79. Its interactions with LAW were positive in both subperiods, but statistically significant only in 1971-79, while the interactions of TECH with MBA were insignificant in both years, turning negative in 1980-87. Thus, a chain of causation running from education to R&D choices appears to be the most plausible interpretation of our results.
Conclusion
Assuming that the vigorous support of research and development in technology-oriented industries is something to be applauded, our analysis provides both good news and bad news. An educational background in science or engineering for top executives, perhaps complemented by legal and business skills, appears conducive to more intensive R&D spending, all else equal, and at least until 1980, the fraction of top executives with such educational backgrounds was rising. However, since 1980 the educational background trend has reversed, with possibly adverse consequences for R&D spending in years to come. And since the proportion of college and university graduates receiving technical degrees has been stagnant during the past decade, a further reversal of the trend may be difficult to achieve.
References
7 Although
the addition to RZ from adding tions is small, it is statistically significant level; F(3, 3692) = 7.37.
the three interacat the 1 percent
[l] William J. Abernathy and Robert Hayes, Managing Our Way to Economic Decline, Harvard Business Review (July-August 1980) 74-75.
F.M. Scherer and K. Huh / Education and R&D investment [2] F.M. Scherer and Keun Huh, R&D Reactions to HighTechnology Import Competition, Review of Economics and Statistics, forthcoming (1992). [3] U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, Statistical Report: Annual Line of Business Report, 1977 (Washington, D.C., 1985).
511
[4] U.S. National Science Foundation, Research and Deuelopment in Industry: 1987. NSF89-323. (Washington, D.C., 1989).
Top ma~agers~ education and R&D investment * FM. Scherer JohnF. Kennedy School
of Gouerttmeni, Harvard Uniuersi~~, Cambridge, Ml,
USA
Final version received July 1991
This paper analyzes data spanning 17 years on R&D expenditures and the educational background of top managers for 221 relatively research-intensive U.S. corporations. The fraction of companies for which at least one of the top two executive officers was educated in science or engineering peaked at 71.5 percent in 1980 and declined slightIy thereafter. Controlling for profitability and the industrial fields in which the companies operated, having a science or engineering-educated leader is associated with more intensive support of R&D. A positive interaction between technical and tegaf education is detected.
In a widely cited article, Abernathy and Hayes [l] attributed short-sighted investment policies by U.S. business corporations in part to the growing replacement of technically trained managers by specialists in finance and law. This paper taps a ~~rres~~de~ce to: F.M. Schemr, Center for Business and Government, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 79 John F. Kennedy Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. * This paper is based upon research supported by the National Science Foundation under grant SES 87-13643, “‘Qn-Site Research To Improve the Government-Generated Social Science Data Base.” The research was conducted at the U.S. Bureau of the Census while the authors were participants in the American Statistical Association/ Census Bureau research program. The findings and conclusions expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or Census Bureau, Co-author Scherer benefitted from support under an O’Melveny and Myers Centennial research grant. We thank Judith Chevalier for assistance in tracking and coding executive biographies.
Research Policy 21 (1992) 507-511 North-Holland 00487333/92/%05.00
unique new data base to investigate trends in the educational backgrounds of 221 U.S. companies’ top executives and to determine how company R&D spending is related to the university educational experiences of top managers.
The sampfe
The data came as a by-product of a broader study [2] analyzing U.S. firms’ reactions to rising import competition. From Census Bureau surveys for the National Science Foundation, essentially continuous time series on annual company-financed research and development expenditures over the period 1971-87 were assembled for 308 corporations. The sample was limited to companies principally occupying Standard IndustriaI Cfassification groups 26, 28, 30, and 32-39, in al1 of which appreciable expenditures for R&D on new and improved product and/or process tcchnology are customary. 1 For the sampled companies, an attempt was made to determine the educational backgrounds of the top two executive officers (usually the chairman and president, or in ambiguous cases, the chief executive officer and chief operating officer ‘1 for each year from i SIC group 29, petroIeum and retated industries, was excluded despite substantial R&D activity because its import experience was distorted by OPEC shocks and government crude oil and refined product price regulations. z In many cases, there was only one leader who served both as CEO and COO. For those cases, on& the single leader’s educational background was coded. Reaching into the ranks of vice presidents to find a “secundum inter pares”’ was infeasible.
0 1992 - Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. All rights reserved
F.M. Scherer and K. Huh / Education and R&D investment
508 80
1
,,.I /-,..”
MBA
O/
1971
1980
1975
1985
or university level in science or engineering and (at the graduate level) in business administration and law. Contrary to the implication drawn by Abernathy and Hayes [l, p. 751 for a less technology-oriented sample of companies, there is an upward trend in the presence of technically educated leaders, at least until 1980, after which a reversal materializes. In the peak year, 71.5 percent of the sample companies had leaders trained in science or engineering. On average, 30.7 percent of the firms had MBAs in at least one of their top positions. The presence of MBAs has been rising at an increasing rate. For legally trained executives, the trend was downward, with an average of 18.7 percent over the 17 year period.
Year
Fig. 1. Educational
background
of company
leaders,
1971-87.
Education
biographies published in who’s who in Finance and Industry. In 87 cases, the biographical coverage was insufficient to develop an adequate educational profile, so the companies, usually small or foreign-owned, had to be dropped from the sample analyzed in this paper. The 221 remaining companies accounted for 57.2 percent of total U.S. company-financed industrial R&D expenditures in 1971, 57.6 percent in 1980, and 49.3 percent in 1985. 3 Because the sample was confined to industries in which R&D is relatively important and because, to be included continuously in Census surveys, reporters had to exceed certain absolute R&D spending thresholds, the companies are more R&D-intensive than the average manufacturer. Thus, in 1985, the simple average of company-financed R&D in relation to sales was 3.76 percent for sample members, compared to 3.0 percent for all R&D-performing industrial corporations [4, p.371.
Educational
background
trends
Figure 1 presents annual averages for the fraction of companies in which at least one of the top two executive officers was educated at the college 3 For three companies, biographical information was not available for 1987, and for one, there was a gap also for 1986.
and R&D
Our remaining objective is to determine how R&D spending was related to the educational background of company leaders. Here we must be wary of spurious inferences, for the more heavily involved in high-technology industries a company is, the more likely it is that technically educated persons will occupy leadership positions. We must therefore control for companies’ industrial occupancy. This is done by defining a variable: RDINDEXi,
= 5 Wijt(RD/S)j,TT. j=l
(RD/S) here is the ratio of aggregate companyfinanced research and development outlays to sales in the jth industry during the base year 1977, 4 as ascertained from the Federal Trade Commission’s Line of Business survey for that year [3]. The weighting factor wijt measures the fraction of company i’s total domestic manufacturing establishment sales (or more exactly, value of shipments) contributed by its activities in industry j during year t. RDINDEX in effect tells what a company’s R&D/sales ratio would be, if it pursued R&D exactly as intensively in each of the industries it occupied as the members of those industries generally. 4 The gated
year 1977 was the last of four for which highly disaggreLine of Business data on R&D were available.
F.M. Scherer and X Huh / Education and R&D investment Table 1 Regression equations with R&D/sales dent variable and relevant explanatory
(in percent) variables a
as depen-
Independent variable
Equation (1)
(2)
(31
(4)
Intercept
-0.17 (2.78) 1.383 (65.38)
- 0.81 (5.20) 1.301 (58.72) 2.521 (9.43) . ..
- 1.01 (6.08) 1.289 (57.48) 2.537 (9.49)
- 0.90 (5.45) 1.289 (57.59) 2.515 (9.42)
RDINDEX PCM 16.year
dummies
DTECH
. 0.302 (3.84) - 0.034 (0.47) 0.246 (2.82) - 0.006 (0.04)
DMBA DLAW DUNC ONLYTECH ONLYMBA ONLYLAW TECH-MBA TECH-LAW MBA-LAW R2 N a T-ratios
0.5350 3718 are presented
0.5608 3718 in subscripted
0.5634 3718
0.138 (1.49) - 0.181 (1.22) - 0.040 (0.29) 0.117 (1.13) 0.757 (5.90) -0.122 (0.76) 0.5660 3718
parentheses.
R&D/sales ratios have also varied with business conditions and secularly over the time period covered by our sample. Equations (1) and (2) in table 1 show how well the RDINDEX variable, dummy variables for each year, and a measure of company gross profitability, the price-cost margin variable PCMjl, 5 fare in explaining the variation of company R&D/sales ratios. RDINDEX is by far the most powerful regressor, explaining more than half the variance in the dependent variable. Small but statistically significant year effects (not individually reported) are found in
eqn. (2). R&D/sales ratios are also observed to be significantly higher, the larger are companies’ gross profit margins (before deduction of capital costs and central office, central laboratory, selling, and other expenditures incurred outside operating establishments). In eqn (3), one-zero dummy variables distinguish whether a company’s top two executives included a person with an educational background in science or engineering (DTECH), law (DLAW), and graduate business administration (DMBA). Also included is a dummy variable DUNC with unit values for the 239 cases in which it could not be determined with certainty whether one of the company heads had a scientific or engineering background. The increase in explanatory power from these variables, with R2 rising from 0.5608 to 0.5634, is statistically significant; F(4, 3695) = 5.30. The significant coefficient for DTECH reveals that, all else equal, having a top executive with a scientific or engineering background adds 0.30 percentage points to R&D as a percentage of sales, which for the sample as a whole averaged 3.12 percent. Having a top officer with legal training added an almost equivalent amount, while the effects for MBAs and uncertain cases are quite small and statistically insignificant. The legal background result is surprising, calling for further clarification. In many companies, leadership was shared between a lawyer and a technologist, and in others, a single executive had undergraduate science or engineering training plus graduate work in law. Equation (4) categorizes the data more richly, as follows: 6 ONLYTECH ONLYLAW ONLYMBA TECH-MBA
6 To 5 PCM
= ((Value of shipments - materials costs - payroll supplementary employment costsI/value of shipments) for all domestic establishments of a company. It is derived from Annual Survey of Manufactures and Census of Manufactures records.
509
Technically trained leader, no lawyer or MBA. Legally trained leader, no TECH or MBA. MBA leader, no lawyer or TECH. Leaders had both technical and MBA backgrounds.
expand, the “ONLY” variables cover companies in which at least one leader had the specified educational background and no other leader had the other two categorized backgrounds. The interaction variables designate companies whose leaders had a combination of at least two educational backgrounds, embodied either in a single executive or two diferent executives.
510
TECH-LAW MBA-LAW
F.M. Scherer and El Huh / Education
Leaders had both technical and law backgrounds. Leaders had both MBA and law backgrounds, but no technical education.
The base case consists, as in eqn (31, of companies whose leaders had only non-technical bachelors’ degrees, or where there was no evidence that the leaders had received other than honorary degrees. In eqn (4) we find the combination of technical and legal education to be especially conducive to the support of R&D, adding 0.76 points on average to R&D as a percentage of company sales. ’ Technical backgrounds without augmentation from other advanced degrees (comprising 39.6 percent of all cases) added 0.138 percentage points - a result significantly different from zero only at the 93 percent confidence level in a one-tailed test. Having officers with legal or MBA training alone or a combination of legal and MBA training (6.7, 8.2, and 4.9 percent of the cases respectively) was negatively related to R&D/sales ratios, although none of the three effects is statistically significant. It is conceivable, as a referee pointed out, that the educational background coefficients, and especially the technical effects, reflect the influence of company size rather than the orientation that comes from education. DTECH is positively but weakly correlated with the logarithm (to base 10) of current-year company sales, with r = +0.036. A tenfold increase in company size was associated with a 1.3 percentage point increase in the likelihood of having an engineering- or sciencetrained leader. However, when log,, SALES was introduced as a separate explanatory variable, the values of the technical background coefficients were altered only trivially. Thus, the results do not appear to be affected by a size bias. Despite this, the regression equations cannot prove a causal relationship running from technical education to more vigorous support of research and development. Companies might have opted for some independent reason to be more
and R&D investment
research-intensive than the industries in which they operated, and hence to appoint technically educated individuals to leadership positions. But it seems implausible that companies would pursue R&D more intensively than industry norms over a period of 17 years without conscious decisions to do so by those who set company policy. When the sample was split into two time periods of nearly equal length, 1971-79 and 1980-87, the DTECH (and DLAW) coefficients were positive and statistically significant in both analogues to eqn (3). In the analogues of eqn (41, DTECH was positive and significant in 1980-87 but not for 1971-79. Its interactions with LAW were positive in both subperiods, but statistically significant only in 1971-79, while the interactions of TECH with MBA were insignificant in both years, turning negative in 1980-87. Thus, a chain of causation running from education to R&D choices appears to be the most plausible interpretation of our results.
Conclusion
Assuming that the vigorous support of research and development in technology-oriented industries is something to be applauded, our analysis provides both good news and bad news. An educational background in science or engineering for top executives, perhaps complemented by legal and business skills, appears conducive to more intensive R&D spending, all else equal, and at least until 1980, the fraction of top executives with such educational backgrounds was rising. However, since 1980 the educational background trend has reversed, with possibly adverse consequences for R&D spending in years to come. And since the proportion of college and university graduates receiving technical degrees has been stagnant during the past decade, a further reversal of the trend may be difficult to achieve.
References
7 Although
the addition to RZ from adding tions is small, it is statistically significant level; F(3, 3692) = 7.37.
the three interacat the 1 percent
[l] William J. Abernathy and Robert Hayes, Managing Our Way to Economic Decline, Harvard Business Review (July-August 1980) 74-75.
F.M. Scherer and K. Huh / Education and R&D investment [2] F.M. Scherer and Keun Huh, R&D Reactions to HighTechnology Import Competition, Review of Economics and Statistics, forthcoming (1992). [3] U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, Statistical Report: Annual Line of Business Report, 1977 (Washington, D.C., 1985).
511
[4] U.S. National Science Foundation, Research and Deuelopment in Industry: 1987. NSF89-323. (Washington, D.C., 1989).