- Email: [email protected]
Toward a comparative analysis of workers' movements
C. BRADLEY
SCHARF
Toward a Comparative Analysis of Workers’ Movements *
I In the general study of Communist political systems, problems of labor and labor organization have long been considered an esoteric focus of inquiry, far removed from the genuine dynamics of political power and social development. The ruthless uprooting of social democracy and the forced subordination of labor movements to the ruling party in all Communist party-states have been regarded as functionally equivalent to the GZeichschal&ng of Nazi Germany. “ Labor’s demise ” has therefore entered Western commentaries only as a footnote, as an unparalleled example of totalitarian oppression. Support for this view may be derived even from Lenin himself, who, while introducing the New Economic Policy, characterized the labor unions as “ transmission belts from the Communist Party to the masses.” Yet events have since demonstrated that this is hardly the definitive statement on the role of organized labor under Communism. * Professor Scharf, who served as discussant on the panel, prepared this essay expressly for Studies in Comparative Communism. The reader may be interested in his dissertation “ Labor Organizations in East German Society ” (BSM).
106
STUDIES
IN
COMPARATIVE
COMMUNISM
Resulting largely from the ubiquitous and pressing need for economic reform, fundamental questions of political and social life have come under renewed scrutiny in the Communist states. That the consequent introspection should extend to organized labor is for the Communists more than an afterthought. Ever since the Petrograd Soviet, the correct relationship between the Party and the labor unions has been a vital, continuing concern. The task of merging the ideological imperative of workers’ sovereignty with the practical exigencies of Party hegemony has proven nearly intractable. Building their political power and economic prowess upon the strength of the working class and often owing their original accession to at least partial social-democratic support, the ruling Communist parties have developed a schizophrenic attitude toward labor, engendering a sort of love/hate relationship. The sweeping political reverberations following the 1970 upheaval in Poland constitute only one in a series of similar incidents that illustrate the parties’ extreme vulnerability in attempting simultaneously to depend upon, and to control, this central social force. Where civilian control of the military is undergirded by watchful attentiveness and ideological precepts, organized labor remains the sole force in society wielding sufficient power to bring the regime to its knees. As a Party leadership looks at its precocious partner in the restyled labor movement, the dilemma persistently reappears : they can’t live with it, and they can’t live without it. This intensity of feeling undoubtedly goes far toward explaining past excesses in dealing with labor opposition in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. But a new stage may be imminent. As these stages grapple with the problems of contemporary development, with the need for greater rationality in economic and social relationships, with the task of capturing the elusive “technological revolution,” the answers to some critical questions suggest a more benign disposition toward organized labor. In the Communists’ marked enthusiasm for long-range (perspektiv-) planning, an enhanced labor role becomes apparent. Much stress is laid, for example, on the positive will of labor as a source for technical innovation and augmentation of technical skills. Far more important, however, may be the role of labor organizations in the unfolding economic reforms. The rational advantages of decentralized economic decisionmaking have been widely acknowledged in Communist circles. Yet the crucial question remains : how to enjoy the benefits of a. decentralized economic structure without intolerably relinquishing “ social ” (i.e., Party) control. A much-discussed solution involves upgrading the
COMPARATNE
ANALYSIS
OF WORKER?
MOVEMENTS
107
roles of non-Party social organizations-above all, the role of the labor unions. If the making of management decisions nearer the point of execution is demonstrably more efficient, then these lower levels (i.e., enterprises and kombinats) represent also the logical arena for effective social supervision. While the Party would certainly not abdicate this fundamental responsibility, the primary task would fall to those most immediately involved-that is, to the workers’ organizations. The objection that most workers are ill-equipped to assume such momentous burdens does not seriously undermine this proposal; it merely underscores the need to intensify the appropriate training at an accelerated pace. It is exceedingly difficult to speculate upon the eventual ramifications of present trends. My own reading of available discussions, with their incessant linkage of economic rationality and “ socialist humanism,” suggestsnothing less than a modest call for a participatory revolution in the economic sphere. And my urgent attention to this question derives essentially from the belief that, if the Communist experiment retains any vitality today, it will be manifested in the future role of organized labor. II The following papers represent the fruits of a panel devoted to workers’ decisiomnaking. The evident disparities in these efforts can be attributed to the widely divergent objects of study and to the authors’ varying professional dispositions. Under the forbidding conditions confronting students of Chinese politics, Professor Harper has compiled an illuminating account of the growth of China’s labor unions. The evident parallels with Soviet and East European experiences in structural experimentation, as well as in stages of development, are particularly edifying. More precise inquiries into the practical interactions of workers, unions, and regime are surely precluded in the absence of empirical observation. Professors Samardzija and Klein are not concerned with workers’ decisionmaking itself, nor even directly with the Yugoslav workers’ councils. Rather, they present a philosophical rationale-grounded in economic theory-for an embryonic social system of which the institutions of workers’ decisiomnaking are but a small part. By thus raising the focus of discussion, the authors provide a fine illustration of the magnitude of the questions involved. From a comparative standpoint, however, their emphasis upon the Yugoslav struggle with neo-Marxism obscures some broader problems. For example,
108
STUDIES
IN
COMPARATIVE
COMMUNISM
the underlying thesis that the workers’ council idea constitutes a pillar of the evolving social system indicates an unfortunately misleading emphasis on form at the expense of content; what is truly unique in the Yugoslav experiment is its hybrid political culture, and the workers’ councils stand more as a symptom than a cause of that cultural development. In distilling Soviet criticism of the Yugoslav deviation, Professor Sharp underscores the denial that the workers’ councils in any way represent an “ advance ” over the more hierarchical forms of labor organization. Noting that Soviet commentaries often proceed far from the specific issue of workers’ “ self-government,” he observes that the most attractive aspects of the Yugoslav innovations are almost incidental to the socialist purposes for which the workers’ councils were originally conceived. The structure of this panel was unfortunately not sufficient to the task of providing common reference points for future research into the place of workers’ organizations in Communist societies. This deficiency resulted from a failure, noted by the Chairman, precisely to define the topic and purpose of inquiry. III It seems to me necessary, first of all, to resolve the matter of systemic orientation. We may wish, on the one hand, to investigate the workers’ organizations within-and their impact upon-their respective larger political systems. Here I have in mind organized labor as an overt interest group, affecting political decisionmaking, or as a force for change toward limited pluralism. This approach may involve correlating specific workers’ interests with specific policy results; or it may be extended toward a broader political theoretical framework. The latter is illustrated by Professors Samardzija and Klein-albeit without an empirical base. On the other hand, it would be equally valid to investigate the workings of these organizations within their own boundaries, including their ability to aggregate demands and build consensus, to elicit support, and to instill a general pattern of behavioral norms. Here it should be possible, and even desirable, to draw upon studies of organizational behavior in other political systems. For comparative purposes there is potentially much to be gained by regarding Communist unions not as aberrations, but as bodies sharing basic functions with labor organizations in all modern industrial states. Having made this choice, it should then be possible to postulate
COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS
OF
WORKERS
MOVEMENTS
109
specific functions for these organizations and to derive from them standards against which performances may be measured. While we have been only too eager to judge most Communist labor organizations as “ failures ” or “ perversions,” the existing literature is astonishingly void of explicit standards of evaluation. Professor Harper’s conclusions, for example, indict the Chinese political system for denying organized labor any “ genuine powers ” or “ meaningful participation.” That neither term is explicitly defined suggests a serious defect not only in this particular work, but in the entire body of related studies. There remains a further need to distinguish three aspects of workers’ decisionmaking : as structures, as processes, and as outcomes. Given notable scarcities of information, there persists an understandable tendency to concentrate on orgunizutional structure as the definitive element. But to anyone who has compared Communist and Western constitutional and legal forms, for example, the hazards of concluding similarity of content from similarity of form are very evident. These hazards pertain in drawing comparisons within, as well as without, the Communist system. Such overemphasis on structure obscures the behavioral impact of political cultures and the tenor of political and interpersonal relationships. These less tangible social features should become more visible in the processes of workers’ decisionmaking. Unfortunately, it would require a rare Communist-area specialist sufficiently trained in the sociology of small groups adequately to exploit the meager opportunities for observing these processesat work. At the same time we should remember that, even in the most open of societies, the study of decisionmaking processesis tenuous and often unrewarding. Nevertheless, this reservation should not preclude our making full use of interviews and descriptive accounts (from whatever source) to piece together a perhaps ephemeral picture of this critical link. Systematic attempts to measure behavioral and attitudinal outcomes will be more fruitful, if not always wholly satisfactory. Where the opportunities to inventory policy decisions and to aggregate survey data are especially limited, it will again be necessary to rely on illustrative, anecdotal evidence. Quite probably, the growing concern for labor sociology and empirical research in nearly all Communist countries will soon provide better evidence against which to appraise our present tentative conclusions. The point of the above analytical distinctions, of course, is to facilitate the identification of independent and dependent variables from which testable hypotheses can be formulated. Such hypotheses constitute an obvious precondition for rational comparative study.
110
STUDIES
IN
COMPARATIVE
COMMUNISM
Apart from the rather sanguine views expressed at the outset, it is clearly too early to forward more specific directions. In the first place, there does not exist a requisite systematic gathering of information at even the basic structural level across a number of Communist states. Moreover, while some few fine studies of Communist labor problems do exist, they have tended to focus on attenuated structures, such as workers’ councils, or on partial problems, such as work stoppages. Consequently, for most of us it is still rather difficult to perceive the forest for the trees. The wide disparities among the political and economic systems now under the Communist rubric mean that these comments must be interpreted and applied in a variety of ways. But I would hope that this attempt to outline a common orientation will encourage objective and, above all, more comparable treatments of this critical subject.
SCHARF
Toward a Comparative Analysis of Workers’ Movements *
I In the general study of Communist political systems, problems of labor and labor organization have long been considered an esoteric focus of inquiry, far removed from the genuine dynamics of political power and social development. The ruthless uprooting of social democracy and the forced subordination of labor movements to the ruling party in all Communist party-states have been regarded as functionally equivalent to the GZeichschal&ng of Nazi Germany. “ Labor’s demise ” has therefore entered Western commentaries only as a footnote, as an unparalleled example of totalitarian oppression. Support for this view may be derived even from Lenin himself, who, while introducing the New Economic Policy, characterized the labor unions as “ transmission belts from the Communist Party to the masses.” Yet events have since demonstrated that this is hardly the definitive statement on the role of organized labor under Communism. * Professor Scharf, who served as discussant on the panel, prepared this essay expressly for Studies in Comparative Communism. The reader may be interested in his dissertation “ Labor Organizations in East German Society ” (BSM).
106
STUDIES
IN
COMPARATIVE
COMMUNISM
Resulting largely from the ubiquitous and pressing need for economic reform, fundamental questions of political and social life have come under renewed scrutiny in the Communist states. That the consequent introspection should extend to organized labor is for the Communists more than an afterthought. Ever since the Petrograd Soviet, the correct relationship between the Party and the labor unions has been a vital, continuing concern. The task of merging the ideological imperative of workers’ sovereignty with the practical exigencies of Party hegemony has proven nearly intractable. Building their political power and economic prowess upon the strength of the working class and often owing their original accession to at least partial social-democratic support, the ruling Communist parties have developed a schizophrenic attitude toward labor, engendering a sort of love/hate relationship. The sweeping political reverberations following the 1970 upheaval in Poland constitute only one in a series of similar incidents that illustrate the parties’ extreme vulnerability in attempting simultaneously to depend upon, and to control, this central social force. Where civilian control of the military is undergirded by watchful attentiveness and ideological precepts, organized labor remains the sole force in society wielding sufficient power to bring the regime to its knees. As a Party leadership looks at its precocious partner in the restyled labor movement, the dilemma persistently reappears : they can’t live with it, and they can’t live without it. This intensity of feeling undoubtedly goes far toward explaining past excesses in dealing with labor opposition in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. But a new stage may be imminent. As these stages grapple with the problems of contemporary development, with the need for greater rationality in economic and social relationships, with the task of capturing the elusive “technological revolution,” the answers to some critical questions suggest a more benign disposition toward organized labor. In the Communists’ marked enthusiasm for long-range (perspektiv-) planning, an enhanced labor role becomes apparent. Much stress is laid, for example, on the positive will of labor as a source for technical innovation and augmentation of technical skills. Far more important, however, may be the role of labor organizations in the unfolding economic reforms. The rational advantages of decentralized economic decisionmaking have been widely acknowledged in Communist circles. Yet the crucial question remains : how to enjoy the benefits of a. decentralized economic structure without intolerably relinquishing “ social ” (i.e., Party) control. A much-discussed solution involves upgrading the
COMPARATNE
ANALYSIS
OF WORKER?
MOVEMENTS
107
roles of non-Party social organizations-above all, the role of the labor unions. If the making of management decisions nearer the point of execution is demonstrably more efficient, then these lower levels (i.e., enterprises and kombinats) represent also the logical arena for effective social supervision. While the Party would certainly not abdicate this fundamental responsibility, the primary task would fall to those most immediately involved-that is, to the workers’ organizations. The objection that most workers are ill-equipped to assume such momentous burdens does not seriously undermine this proposal; it merely underscores the need to intensify the appropriate training at an accelerated pace. It is exceedingly difficult to speculate upon the eventual ramifications of present trends. My own reading of available discussions, with their incessant linkage of economic rationality and “ socialist humanism,” suggestsnothing less than a modest call for a participatory revolution in the economic sphere. And my urgent attention to this question derives essentially from the belief that, if the Communist experiment retains any vitality today, it will be manifested in the future role of organized labor. II The following papers represent the fruits of a panel devoted to workers’ decisiomnaking. The evident disparities in these efforts can be attributed to the widely divergent objects of study and to the authors’ varying professional dispositions. Under the forbidding conditions confronting students of Chinese politics, Professor Harper has compiled an illuminating account of the growth of China’s labor unions. The evident parallels with Soviet and East European experiences in structural experimentation, as well as in stages of development, are particularly edifying. More precise inquiries into the practical interactions of workers, unions, and regime are surely precluded in the absence of empirical observation. Professors Samardzija and Klein are not concerned with workers’ decisionmaking itself, nor even directly with the Yugoslav workers’ councils. Rather, they present a philosophical rationale-grounded in economic theory-for an embryonic social system of which the institutions of workers’ decisiomnaking are but a small part. By thus raising the focus of discussion, the authors provide a fine illustration of the magnitude of the questions involved. From a comparative standpoint, however, their emphasis upon the Yugoslav struggle with neo-Marxism obscures some broader problems. For example,
108
STUDIES
IN
COMPARATIVE
COMMUNISM
the underlying thesis that the workers’ council idea constitutes a pillar of the evolving social system indicates an unfortunately misleading emphasis on form at the expense of content; what is truly unique in the Yugoslav experiment is its hybrid political culture, and the workers’ councils stand more as a symptom than a cause of that cultural development. In distilling Soviet criticism of the Yugoslav deviation, Professor Sharp underscores the denial that the workers’ councils in any way represent an “ advance ” over the more hierarchical forms of labor organization. Noting that Soviet commentaries often proceed far from the specific issue of workers’ “ self-government,” he observes that the most attractive aspects of the Yugoslav innovations are almost incidental to the socialist purposes for which the workers’ councils were originally conceived. The structure of this panel was unfortunately not sufficient to the task of providing common reference points for future research into the place of workers’ organizations in Communist societies. This deficiency resulted from a failure, noted by the Chairman, precisely to define the topic and purpose of inquiry. III It seems to me necessary, first of all, to resolve the matter of systemic orientation. We may wish, on the one hand, to investigate the workers’ organizations within-and their impact upon-their respective larger political systems. Here I have in mind organized labor as an overt interest group, affecting political decisionmaking, or as a force for change toward limited pluralism. This approach may involve correlating specific workers’ interests with specific policy results; or it may be extended toward a broader political theoretical framework. The latter is illustrated by Professors Samardzija and Klein-albeit without an empirical base. On the other hand, it would be equally valid to investigate the workings of these organizations within their own boundaries, including their ability to aggregate demands and build consensus, to elicit support, and to instill a general pattern of behavioral norms. Here it should be possible, and even desirable, to draw upon studies of organizational behavior in other political systems. For comparative purposes there is potentially much to be gained by regarding Communist unions not as aberrations, but as bodies sharing basic functions with labor organizations in all modern industrial states. Having made this choice, it should then be possible to postulate
COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS
OF
WORKERS
MOVEMENTS
109
specific functions for these organizations and to derive from them standards against which performances may be measured. While we have been only too eager to judge most Communist labor organizations as “ failures ” or “ perversions,” the existing literature is astonishingly void of explicit standards of evaluation. Professor Harper’s conclusions, for example, indict the Chinese political system for denying organized labor any “ genuine powers ” or “ meaningful participation.” That neither term is explicitly defined suggests a serious defect not only in this particular work, but in the entire body of related studies. There remains a further need to distinguish three aspects of workers’ decisionmaking : as structures, as processes, and as outcomes. Given notable scarcities of information, there persists an understandable tendency to concentrate on orgunizutional structure as the definitive element. But to anyone who has compared Communist and Western constitutional and legal forms, for example, the hazards of concluding similarity of content from similarity of form are very evident. These hazards pertain in drawing comparisons within, as well as without, the Communist system. Such overemphasis on structure obscures the behavioral impact of political cultures and the tenor of political and interpersonal relationships. These less tangible social features should become more visible in the processes of workers’ decisionmaking. Unfortunately, it would require a rare Communist-area specialist sufficiently trained in the sociology of small groups adequately to exploit the meager opportunities for observing these processesat work. At the same time we should remember that, even in the most open of societies, the study of decisionmaking processesis tenuous and often unrewarding. Nevertheless, this reservation should not preclude our making full use of interviews and descriptive accounts (from whatever source) to piece together a perhaps ephemeral picture of this critical link. Systematic attempts to measure behavioral and attitudinal outcomes will be more fruitful, if not always wholly satisfactory. Where the opportunities to inventory policy decisions and to aggregate survey data are especially limited, it will again be necessary to rely on illustrative, anecdotal evidence. Quite probably, the growing concern for labor sociology and empirical research in nearly all Communist countries will soon provide better evidence against which to appraise our present tentative conclusions. The point of the above analytical distinctions, of course, is to facilitate the identification of independent and dependent variables from which testable hypotheses can be formulated. Such hypotheses constitute an obvious precondition for rational comparative study.
110
STUDIES
IN
COMPARATIVE
COMMUNISM
Apart from the rather sanguine views expressed at the outset, it is clearly too early to forward more specific directions. In the first place, there does not exist a requisite systematic gathering of information at even the basic structural level across a number of Communist states. Moreover, while some few fine studies of Communist labor problems do exist, they have tended to focus on attenuated structures, such as workers’ councils, or on partial problems, such as work stoppages. Consequently, for most of us it is still rather difficult to perceive the forest for the trees. The wide disparities among the political and economic systems now under the Communist rubric mean that these comments must be interpreted and applied in a variety of ways. But I would hope that this attempt to outline a common orientation will encourage objective and, above all, more comparable treatments of this critical subject.