Toward a policy mix in conservation governance: A case of Gunung Palung National Park, West Kalimantan, Indonesia

Land Use Policy 88 (2019) 104108

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Toward a policy mix in conservation governance: A case of Gunung Palung National Park, West Kalimantan, Indonesia

T

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Hideyuki Kuboa, , Ari Wibawantob, Dicko Rossandac a

Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES), 2108-11, Kamiyamaguchi, Hayama, Kanagawa, 240-0115, Japan Ministry of Environment and Forestry, Manggala Wanabakti, Jalan Jendral Gatot Subroto, Senayan, Jakarta, 12190, Indonesia c Former Indonesia Japan Project for Development of REDD+ Implementation Mechanism (IJ-REDD+), Manggala Wanabakti, Jalan Jendral Gatot Subroto, Senayan, Jakarta, 12190, Indonesia b

A R T I C LE I N FO

A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Tropical forest Conservation governance Policy mix Policy interactions Multi-stakeholder platform

This paper aims to demonstrate the effectiveness of articulating a policy mix in conservation governance noting that various conservation policy instruments are currently under implementation elsewhere in tropical regions. However, an approach of strategically combining these policy instruments in their application as a policy mix is still limited. The paper finds, by referring to the case of Gunung Palung National Park, Indonesia, that interactions of different policy instruments can produce either positive or negative outputs depending on their processes so that a strategic coordination of policy instruments becomes essential. Also, non-conservation policy instruments for economic or business development under implementation by various stakeholders such as local governments or private companies sometimes have a significant impact on conservation governance. Therefore, incorporating such instruments into a policy mix should be part of strategic coordination. To realize an effective policy mix for mitigating anthropogenic disturbance on biodiversity and forest ecosystems, adopting a parallel approach of overall policy coordination through a multi-stakeholder platform and field-based experimentation of policy interactions prior to their scaling-up are suggested.

1. Introduction A protected area in tropical regions is considered a system to conserve tropical forests and their biodiversity despite inadequate institutional capacity, management processes, and funding (Laurance et al., 2012; Leverington et al., 2010). Although protected area systems are widely accepted (TEEB, 2009), the most effective policy instrument for managing protected areas is debatable. Some scholars have suggested law enforcement, whereas others have pointed to community-based or market-based neoliberal policies (Ament et al., 2017; Batavia and Nelson, 2017; Cetas and Yasue, 2017; Cooney et al., 2017; Critchlow et al., 2017). Law enforcement refers to the literal enforcement of laws and regulations. This may be a simple concept, but its execution is not easy because it would result in unacceptable negative impacts on rural livelihoods; therefore, a high degree of sensitivity would be required in the execution (Kaimowitz, 2003). Community-based conservation involves local communities in the decision-making process regarding conservation management. However, the degree of involvement is diverse, which is often a political choice by the authority (Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb, 2006; Campbell and Vainio-Mattila, 2003; Wainwright

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and Wehrmeyer, 1998). Neoliberal conservation is an emerging trend that transforms incentive structures for encouraging in situ preservation of forests and natural resources rather than their extraction (Fletcher, 2010). A typical example of this is the development of a market mechanism for the payment of environmental and ecosystem services (TEEB, 2009). The concept of a “policy mix” is emerging in the academic literature in the field of biodiversity conservation and sustainable management of forest ecosystems, which can be defined as the combination of several policy instruments with the processes of interactions among these policy instruments (Rogge and Reichardt, 2016; Ring and Barton, 2015; Flanagan et al., 2011). A key rationale for a policy mix is that the complex and dynamic nature of biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradation entails an approach capable of managing the multi-dimensional aspects of the problem. No single policy instrument is likely to address such multiple aspects effectively (Paavola, 2016; Ring and Barton, 2015; OECD, 1999). Besides, it is crucial to recognize the limitations of law enforcement, which has been a main policy approach for protected area management in tropical regions but which has often produced conflicts between authorities and local people who have lived

Corresponding author. Present/Permanent address: 1-17-1 Yurigaoka, Ninomiya, Kanagawa, 259-0133, Japan. E-mail address: [email protected] (H. Kubo).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2019.104108 Received 24 June 2018; Received in revised form 26 May 2019; Accepted 20 July 2019 0264-8377/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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2. Analytical framework for strategizing a policy mix approach

in these areas since before their designation as protected (Kaimowitz, 2003). A law enforcement approach alone cannot improve conservation governance, although it is effective as a short-term strategy, particularly when addressing organized illegal extractive operations led by external actors (Struhsaker et al., 2005). In a real-world setting, mixed policy has been implemented; for example, Aryal et al. (2017) described the case of the effectiveness of combining law enforcement and community involvement policy instruments to promote rhinoceros conservation in lowland forests of Terai, Nepal. By reviewing more than 1200 articles regarding forest governance, Agrawal et al. (2018) concluded that effective forest governance requires a flexible and multiple policy approach. In Indonesia, the State has taken a law enforcement approach for governing forests since the promulgation of Basic Forestry Law in 1967 without authorizing the resource use by local population at state forestlands although indigenous communities sustainably managed their customary forests without the State’s recognition on the ground (Peluso, 1995). During 1990s, the State introduced the participatory approach in managing conservation forests, which led to the promulgation of the regulation on collaborative management on conservation forests in 2004 (Ministry of Forestry, 2004; Wells et al., 1999). This regulation endorsed the participatory approach in conservation, although the final authority remained with the State. Kubo (2008) reported, in the context of a national park in Java, that this arrangement has caused local people living around conservation forests to conform actively to state policy discourse concerning conservation. In 2017, the State issued a new regulation on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+), one form of payment for environmental and ecosystem services (Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 2017). Although the term policy mix is not articulated, newly introduced policy instruments of collaborative management and REDD + can be simultaneously implemented in conservation forests with the law enforcement policy instrument. Bearing in mind that several policy instruments are already available in the context of conservation governance in Indonesia, this paper aims to demonstrate the effectiveness of articulating a policy mix and suggest a means to move forward to better conservation governance by referring to the case of Gunung Palung National Park (GPNP) in West Kalimantan province. At GPNP, the park management authority has implemented various conservation policy instruments that have led to reducing anthropogenic disturbances of forests. In addition, some private companies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and local governments have developed and executed project and business activities around national park areas. These projects and activities have positive impacts on conservation governance—although primary purposes of these activities are for economic development—and are independently implemented. Thus, the national park authority may strategically coordinate these projects and activities as part of a policy mix for effectively improving conservation governance. Academically, much of policy mix literature in the biodiversity and forest ecosystem fields have addressed topics regarding its conceptual clarity and analytical perspectives (Ring and Barton, 2015; Lambin et al., 2014; Ring and Schröter-Schlaack, 2011); however, the application of the concept for transition cases on the ground toward a policy mix approach in conservation governance remains limited. Hence, this paper contributes to the literature through the analysis of the GPNP case. Following this introduction, Section 2 provides an analytical framework for strategizing a policy mix approach. Section 3 describes the study method. Section 4 provides an overview of the case study area including potential issues and describes experiences of implementing various policy instruments. Section 5 discusses effects of such policy instruments including their interactions, and Section 6 draws conclusions.

2.1. Type of intervention policy instruments and their interactions in conservation governance Ring and Schröter-Schlaack (2011) identified three major categories of policy instruments that comprise a policy mix for biodiversity conservation and sustainable management of forest ecosystems: regulatory, information, and incentive. Agrawal et al. (2018) suggested that institution, information, and incentive are three fundamental means for governance interventions. Although their scopes are slightly different, what they suggest significantly overlap. Regulatory or institution is the coercive entity that imposes sanctions on stakeholders pursuing unsustainable practices (Agrawal et al., 2018; Ring and Schröter-Schlaack, 2011). Capturing illegal logging managers is a typical example. Information facilitates the self-control of stakeholders through the provision of increasing knowledge and awareness (Ring and Barton, 2015). Certification instruments are a good example, as they enable buyers and consumers to procure sustainably harvested commodities without deforestation (Takahashi and Todo, 2017). Incentives (such as subsidies) or disincentives (such as taxes) influence behavior through economic or financial means (Ring and Barton, 2015). Although the concept of institution in environmental governance is often used to mean broadly what enables or constrains human action (Paavola, 2007; Vatn, 2005; North, 1990), which indicates the inclusiveness of economic incentives, the terms used here distinguish incentive and institution. In addition to such policy instruments directly aimed at improving conservation governance, there are policy instruments implemented by concerned stakeholders, including governments, companies, or NGOs, for their purposes (i.e., mostly for economic development) other than conservation that result in a positive contribution to conservation governance. For example, an employment policy of an oil palm company that prioritizes local villagers engaged in farming practices within the national park area can contribute to mitigating disturbances to forest ecosystems. Although such policies are not recognized as conservation policy, a possibility exists that a conservation authority may use such an opportunity through strategic coordination as part of a policy mix for effectively improving conservation governance. A critical topic regarding a policy mix is on the processes of interactions among respective policy instruments, which can be positive, neutral, or negative, for achieving the purposes of a policy mix (Ring and Barton, 2015; Flanagan et al., 2011). Ring and Barton (2015) distinguished two types of positive interactions, namely, complementary and synergistic; the former is that policy instruments do not interfere with one another, or possibly one unilaterally supports the other, and the latter is that instruments mutually reinforce one another. Negative interactions indicate conflicting cases between policy instruments, and neutral would be cases of redundancy where functions of multiple policy instruments overlap but no positive or negative effects are observed. In the context of biodiversity and forest ecosystem conservation, such redundancy is often recommended because of the ignorance and uncertainties surrounding biodiversity and forest ecosystem policies (Ring and Schröter-Schlaack, 2011). Redundancy can act as an insurance against knowledge gaps or policy failures (OECD, 1999). Hence, when a policy mix is articulated in conservation, synergistic arrangement should be pursued and redundancy might be strategically installed; in a case when this is not possible, complementary arrangements must be made and conflicting cases should be avoided (Howlett et al., 2017; Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999). 2.2. Analytical framework of policy mix processes The purpose of the paper is not to assess an existing policy mix, but to demonstrate the effectiveness of articulating a policy mix for improving conservation governance and explore a means to facilitate concerned stakeholders to move forward toward a policy mix. Thus, the 2

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Fig. 1. Normative analytical framework toward a policy mix approach.

ecosystems. Semi-structured interviews were implemented by professional staff from a local NGO. Before the survey, a pretest was arranged by using a draft questionnaire and revisions were made based on its result. A training workshop was convened to ensure the survey skills of the NGO staff. From this survey, data from 1275 households were used for the analysis. One critical concern was regarding questions on shifting cultivation and logging within the GPNP area. This was because the villagers already knew the practice was against the government regulation, and therefore not sharing the correct information with interviewers was a possibility. To avoid sharing incorrect information, the confidentiality of the respective data was emphasized for respondents, and they were informed that only the aggregated data were used for the reports and papers. Although the possibility of sharing incorrect information cannot be denied if the respondents were engaged in cultivation or logging within the GPNP area, the interviewers had a sense that the interviews were conducted in an open manner and the possibility of hiding correct information by respondents was low. Second, key informant interviews were conducted in an open-ended manner with 24 people, including seven women, at six villages in 2018 and also with staff members of district governments, companies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for collecting data on the implementation of various policy instruments. The collected data were analyzed in such a way that statistical analysis was conducted with the data of 1275 households and content analysis for the data collected through key informant interviews. For the statistical analysis, a logistic regression model was applied in which a binary dependent variable was assigned as follows; 1 if (a) the household still practiced shifting cultivation within the GPNP area, (b) the household still conducted logging activities within the GPNP area, or (c) the household practiced shifting cultivation in 2002 but had already stopped by 2013. Otherwise, households were assigned 0. The independent variables used in the logistic regression model are defined in Table 1, and their descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. The free software R (version 3.3.2) was used for the analysis where the independent variables were chosen using the Akaike information criterion in order to identify better models. The results for (a), (b), and (c) above are presented in the tables.

paper adopts the following normative analytical framework, as shown in Fig. 1. There are three key points in the framework. First, the analytical focus is on policy intervention for mitigating anthropogenic disturbances on biodiversity and forest ecosystems and the authors argue how a strategic policy mix approach can deal with such disturbances effectively compared with a de facto situation where various policy instruments are implemented by different organizations without strategic coordination. Effectiveness, efficiency, and equity perspectives, which are well-established criteria for policy assessment, are used to analyze interventions by respective single policy instruments (Pasgaard et al., 2016; Rogge and Reichardt, 2016; Adger et al., 2005). Effectiveness is the perspective of whether anthropogenic disturbance is reduced or halted; efficiency is whether operations for reducing or halting anthropogenic disturbance are made with reasonable or lower costs; and equity is the investigation of whether the costs and benefits of operations are equitably distributed among stakeholders. Second, policy instruments are classified into two types: policies that recognize conservation as the policy target so that policy intervention is planned in advance, and policies that do not recognize conservation as policy target but impact conservation governance; in the latter case, policy intervention on conservation governance is not planned in advance but occurs as a result. Functionary roles of such policies on conservation impacts can also be classified into the aforementioned three types. Third, we assume that the protected area authority should coordinate all the concerned policies that could impact conservation, to enhance the effectiveness of conservation governance so that how to strategically coordinate them as a policy mix is the primary challenge. 3. Method This paper applies a case study method to discuss and depict the effectiveness of a policy mix approach for mitigating anthropogenic disturbance to forest ecosystems and biodiversity and a means to move forward to adopt the approach. GPNP was investigated as the target protected area for the analysis because of the following reasons: (1) various policy instruments classified under the regulatory, information, and incentive types have been implemented by different organizations and these policies have already had certain impacts on mitigating anthropogenic disturbances; (2) public sector organizations, private sector stakeholders, and local villagers have played a crucial role in conservation governance; and (3) sufficient data are available for most adjacent villages around the GPNP area. The data collection and analysis were organized as follows. First, a household survey with semi-structured interviews was conducted in 18 villages proximal to the GPNP in 2013–2014 to collect data regarding causes of anthropogenic disturbances on biodiversity and forest

4. GPNP in West Kalimantan province 4.1. Overview of GPNP Established in 1990, GPNP is located in Ketapang and Kayong Utara districts in West Kalimantan province, Indonesia, with a coverage of 108,043.9 ha (see Fig. 2). The area primarily comprises two ecosystem types, dry forest (70% of the GPNP area) and peat swamp (18% of the GPNP area). There are also other ecosystem types, such as mangrove 3

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Table 1 Description of independent variables used in the logistic regression model. Variable

Description

Melayu Local

Value 1 if the household is of Melayu ethnicity; 0 otherwise Value 1 if the household is from the local community; 0 otherwise Value 1 if the household has a satellite antenna; 0 otherwise Cash income per year (million Rp.) Cash income from livestock per year (million Rp.) Cash income from off-farm sources per year (million Rp.) Ratio of off-farm income out of total income (0.00 – 1.00) Fuelwood collection in the GPNP area (3 – intensive, 0 – none) NTFP collection in the GPNP area (3 – intensive, 0 – none) Farming area (ha) outside the GPNP area Value 1 if the household has wet paddy fields; 0 otherwise Value 1 if the household has irrigation; 0 otherwise Value 1 if the household has oil palm plantations; 0 otherwise Value 1 if a household’s member works at an oil palm company; 0 otherwise Value 1 if the household practiced shifting cultivation in 2002 but had stopped before 2013; 0 otherwise

Table 3 Land cover change within the Gunung Palung National Park area. Source: TNGP (2018) modified. Landcover

Satellite Income Livestock Off-farm Off-farm rate Fuelwood in GPNP NTFP in GPNP Farming outside Wet paddy Irrigation Oil palm plantation Oil palm worker Shifting stop

Forest Primary Forest Secondary Forest Seconday Mangrove Forest Shrub Agriculture Swamp Others

Mean

SD

Melayu Local Satellite Income Livestock Off-farm Off-farm rate Fuelwood in GPNP NTFP in GPNP Farming outside Wet paddy Irrigation Oil palm plantation Oil palm worker Shifting stop

0.70 0.74 0.70 33.14 1.34 21.70 0.61 0.47 0.23 0.49 0.47 0.08 0.05 0.21 0.04

0.46 0.44 0.46 28.09 5.76 25.71 0.37 0.99 0.71 0.71 0.50 0.27 0.21 0.41 0.21

2017

ha

%

ha

%

(84,287) 20,298 63,430 559 3,256 1,927 37 493

(94) 23 70 1 4 2 0 1

(80,891) 22,240 58,267 384 4,932 2,885 712 579　

(90) 25 65 0 5 3 1 1

Remark: Initially, the total area of the national park was 90,000 ha. The area was expanded to 108,043.9 ha in 2014. The figures for 2017, however, cover only for the original area.

2011 and 2017. Forest cover decreased from 94% to 90%. The area of primary forest increased by around 2000 ha and that of secondary forest decreased by around 5000 ha. These figures can be interpreted to mean that around 2000 ha of secondary forest grew into primary forest and that around 3000 ha of those forests was degraded or deforested, becoming shrub or farmland. It is also likely that some secondary forests were degraded because of logging activities, although the land cover category continued to be secondary forest.

Table 2 Descriptive statistics for the independent variables. Variables

2011

4.2. Conservation governance over GPNP The legal framework of the Indonesian government stipulates that a national park is managed on the basis of a zoning system, which includes the core zone, traditional use zone, special zone, and others (Ministry of Forestry, 2006). Local people are entitled to use forest resources on a sustainable basis in the traditional use zone and special zone; however, any physical resource use is prohibited at other zones. On the basis of this legal framework, the GPNP office assumes the responsibility for executing concerned government regulations. The office was directed by the head of GPNP and included 76 staff members as of May 2018. About half of them were engaged in field-based work, and the rest worked in office administration. Less than 10% of the staff members were women. Organizationally, there are two division offices and six subdivision offices under the headquarters. Each subdivision office has three to four professional staff members and is directly responsible for conserving ecosystems and biodiversity in the field through monitoring ecosystems and biodiversity, patrolling against illegal activities, and communicating with and educating local people. Although the GPNP office is responsible for managing the GPNP area, the district governments of Ketapang and Kayong Utara directly support the development of the local economy around that area. The main support offered by the district governments is to improve basic

forest, freshwater swamp forest, and mountain forest. GPNP is known for its orangutan (Pongo satyrus) habitats, with a population of more than 2000, proboscis monkey (Nasalis larvatus), Sunda clouded leopard (Neofelis diardi), and sun bear (Helarctos malayanus). Adjacent to the GPNP area, 20 villages exist, with a total population of about 45,600 people (JICA, 2016). Agriculture is the primary economic activity around the GPNP area, and the main products include rubber, wet and dry paddy, and durian. Table 3 indicates the land cover change in the GPNP area between

Fig. 2. Location of Gunung Palung National Park. Source: Wibawanto (2018) modified. 4

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infrastructures, such as roads, bridges and irrigation, and to provide various social services. Although they do not allocate their budget and human resources for conservation work within the GPNP area, their duties in relation to local people and economy have the potential to change the resource extractive activities of the concerned stakeholders in the field. Aside from government institutions, NGOs, international agencies, and private companies are also playing roles in the governance of the GPNP. ASRI (Alam Sehat Lestari or Health in Harmony), one of the local NGOs, has attempted to halt illegal logging operations by raising awareness through offering economic incentives. Yayasan Palung (Palung Foundation), another local NGO, supports local economic development in order to mitigate the dependency of local people on forest resources within the GPNP area. Indonesia Japan REDD + Project supports the capacity development of GPNP staff, through which some staff members have become equipped with skills to facilitate and support local people in moving away from depending for their sustenance on natural resources within the GPNP area. It is also crucial to look at roles played by private companies—oil palm plantation companies, in particular. Although they have legally engaged in massive deforestation outside GPNP areas, employment opportunities at plantation companies have made it possible for some local people to move away from resource-dependent livelihoods. In addition, some local villagers have raised the awareness of their fellow villagers to stop logging activities within the GPNP area. Although the number is small, such villager-to-villager extension can be quite effective in transforming the behavior of fellow villagers.

Table 5 Characteristics of households still cultivating within the GPNP area.

Melayu ethnicity Income Livestock income Rate of off-farm income Collect fuelwood from the GPNP area Collect NTFP from the GPNP area Holding farms outside the GPNP area Cultivating wet paddy Have irrigation at paddy field Have some oil palm plantation at own lands

Rate of off-farm income Collect NTFP from the GPNP area Holding farms outside the GPNP area Cultivating wet paddy Have irrigation at paddy fields Working at an oil palm company

Cultivating in the GPNP area Rate of off-farm income Collect fuelwood from the GPNP area

Owning farmlands Cultivating at farmlands Collecting fuelwoods Collecting NTFPs Extracting timbers

Households

256 157 255 142 18

20% 12% 20% 11% 1%

0.275 0.004 0.043 0.289 0.080 0.107 0.237 0.226 0.429 0.386

* * *** *** * *** * ***

Estimate

Std. Error

2.252 0.427 0.379 −0.913 0.962 0.955

0.669 0.189 0.140 0.385 0.526 0.293

*** * ** * **

Estimate

Std. Error

0.414 −1.989 0.690

0.541 0.757 0.204

** ***

(2) 20% of them are collecting fuelwood, and 11% are doing so for nontimber forest products (NTFPs) from inside the GPNP area; and (3) 1% of them are engaged in (illegal) logging within the GPNP area. Table 5 shows that those 12% of households who are still engaged in shifting cultivation tend to engage in less off-farm income sources and less farmlands at lowlands that are located outside the GPNP area. Interestingly, there is no statistically valid relationship between engagement in shifting cultivation and income level. This indicates that people engaging in shifting cultivation are not necessarily from poor households but simply have fewer assets in the lowland and less off-farm economic opportunities aside from traditional farms on mountains. This is also supported by the data in Table 6, which shows characteristics of households who used to work on mountains but had already stopped shifting cultivation and moved away from the mountain. According to the analysis, those who stopped shifting cultivation have more off-farm income sources, more employment at oil palm companies, and more paddy cultivation at lowlands. Thus, the provision of off-farm income sources, including employment at plantations, and lowland farms can lead to a decrease in anthropogenic disturbance to ecosystems and biodiversity within the GPNP area. An opposite interpretation of the result is also possible (i.e., those who stopped shifting cultivation were obliged to seek alternative livelihood opportunities and found off-farm sources and lowland farms). However, this scenario is not likely the primary case because the GPNP staff did not force them to stop shifting cultivation and move, but only informed them of the government regulation that prohibited shifting cultivation within protected areas in a polite manner as described in Section 4.4.2 (1). Hence, a more likely scenario is that the villagers engaging in shifting cultivation did not stop and move unless they found alternative livelihood opportunities. In addition to such findings, some villagers maintain their upland farms because they have inherited them from their ancestors and thus feel

Table 4 Summary of households’ access to forest resources within the GPNP area.

Percentage

0.553 0.001 −0.091 −1.711 0.652 0.226 −1.113 0.438 −0.874 1.219

Table 7 Characteristics of households still engaged in logging within the national park area.

As in other tropical regions, there are local villagers around the GPNP area who have lived in forested landscapes and utilized natural resources to sustain their livelihoods. One of their common resource uses is the practice of small-scale shifting cultivation, which has much less impact on deforestation when compared to industrial plantations and logging activity (Lawrence et al., 1998). Even though these local villagers have had a long history of shifting cultivation, dating back to before the area was designated as a national park, the practice was prohibited in principle when the area became a park and villagers have been obliged to stop engaging in it. Meanwhile, illegal logging operations have been taking place within the GPNP area. These operations have often been directly linked to outside networks, as discussed below, and they have been the main policy target of efforts to mitigate anthropogenic disturbances within the GPNP area. The results of the household survey are shown in Tables 4–7. Table 4 is the summary of households’ access to forest resources within the GPNP area, and Table 5 and Table 7 indicate the characteristics of those who are still engaged in resource use within the GPNP area in terms of shifting cultivation (Table 5) and logging activities (Table 7). Table 6 explores the characteristics of those who were engaged in shifting cultivation (at any location–not necessarily within the GPNP area) but had stopped their shifting practices. Table 4 shows the following as of 2013; (1) 20% of the local villagers hold farmlands within the GPNP area and 12% are still cultivating;

Number

Std. Error

Table 6 Characteristics of households having ceased upland shifting cultivation.

4.3. Anthropogenic disturbances within the GPNP area

Type of access by households to resources

Estimate

5

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south-east part of the GPNP area and continued logging activities, and others got a job opportunity at oil palm companies. Logging activities at the sub-village then stopped. As described in Section 4.3, a logging operation is often organized by a broker who does not live in villages proximal to the GPNP. These brokers usually appear in the area and make contact with operating members to ensure that an operation proceeds without serious interruptions. This scenario is particularly the case when the scale of operation is sufficiently large. For example, in early 2018, in the northern part of the GPNP area, a broker with three members arranged four ships and transported illegally harvested timbers from the GPNP area. The broker was captured by the special forest police from the provincial capital (SINDONEWS.com, 2018). This capture was possible because of the close observation by the GPNP office staff and their close collaboration with the special forest police.

that they cannot abandon them. They also feel more comfortable if they can produce their own staple food, which is upland rice, at their own upland farms partly because of their taste preference for upland rice rather than lowland paddy rice, particularly for the elder villagers. It should be noted that the current policy instruments that require villagers to stop shifting cultivation through the establishment of a new conservation governance mode, which emerged after the enactment on conservation forests and the national park, have not been historically endorsed by local people. During the last decade, however, these policy instruments have been gradually accepted by the local people proximal to the GPNP area. Furthermore, in 2018, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry declared a new direction in the management of protected areas: local communities are the subject of conservation and their cultural and customary values are duly respected (Wiratno, 2018); thus, it is possible that in the future, the practice of traditional shifting cultivation may become legally acknowledged. Although the results of the survey on logging show that 1% of local villagers are engaged in logging activities within the GPNP area, the logging operation is not only carried out by locals but also often organized by a logging broker who is from outside the area. Logging brokers mobilize villagers for various types of work, such as cutting, skidding, on-site processing, loading to a truck, and transporting. One key finding from Table 7 is that those engaged in logging activities within the GPNP area are not statistically relevant to those who are cultivating farmlands within the GPNP area. One finding from the interviews is that those who have farmlands and cultivate within the GPNP area are doing so because they and their parents have been doing so for a long time. The purpose of such farming is not mainly to earn money quickly. On the other hand, those who are involved in logging activities are primarily motivated by financial gain. Hence, their motivations and backgrounds tend to be different and do not overlap.

4.4.2. Information type 4.4.2.1. Communication and education. The action taken by the special forest police was aimed at directly terminating logging activities through capturing and punishing offenders–it was a coercive approach. However, law enforcement is not always coercive. There is a soft approach in which the regulatory framework of the government is communicated in a definite, consistent, and polite manner to target stakeholders, local villagers in particular, who have practiced shifting cultivation within the GPNP area for a long time. The patrolling staff at the GPNP office has taken such an approach since the end of “Wanalaga” in 2008. They visit communities and share the regulatory framework of the government, which is to prohibit resource extractions within protected areas. Although they refer to the possible punishment if the violation persists, the means to convey such messages is in the manner of ordinary conversation, and they never capture those villagers engaged in shifting cultivation. This is partly because the GPNP leadership and its staff understand that local villagers conduct small-scale shifting cultivation for their basic livelihood and that the resulting disturbances of the forest ecosystem are much less serious than the instances of massive conversion of forests into plantations that have been taking place around the GPNP area. However, the GPNP staff is nonetheless required to persuade local villagers to stop shifting cultivation because of the regulatory framework in place, which prohibits anthropogenic disturbances in principle. The effectiveness of this approach is supported by the results of open-ended interviews with local villagers who said that when the staff politely told them about the regulation, they moved farming areas from mountains to lowlands without any complaints. There are two main reasons for this acceptance by the villagers. First, the work of shifting cultivation is difficult, such that having lowland paddy fields is preferable. Second, although cultivation is prohibited, the GPNP staff members do not prohibit continuous harvests from existing durian and rubber trees planted by villagers, as long as no expansion or replanting is pursued. As a result, some villagers are still visiting the GPNP area to harvest durian fruits and rubber latex as NTFPs without further disturbance to ecosystems.

4.4. Implementation of conservation policy instruments Four policy instruments implemented by the GPNP office, including the special forest police from the provincial capital, and a local NGO, addressed the aforementioned anthropogenic disturbances in the GPNP area. Those policy instruments are described in the following section. 4.4.1. Regulatory type: capture and punish During the 2000s, there were massive illegal logging activities in the GPNP area, which involved senior local government officials (Tempo, 2008). The national government secretly organized a special task force (called “Wanalaga”) to eradicate illegal logging and dispatched the force to the area. The eradication operation was mostly successful and a number of people were captured and jailed. The intensive operation against illegal logging ended in 2008. Nevertheless, some illegal logging activities have continued, and the GPNP office periodically captures persistent illegal logging organizers and workers and punishes them. One of the critical events of capture and punishment that took place after the termination of “Wanalaga” was the case at Sub-Village TG. Relatively intensive logging activities, led by two bosses in the subvillage, emerged in the sub-village after “Wanalaga” ended. According to a study by Yayasan Palung, a local NGO, around 75% of the households in the sub-village were involved in illegal logging activities in 2013 (Rosadi, 2018). To halt those activities, GPNP staff adopted a facilitation approach at the sub-village, and one of the two bosses transformed his way of thinking and actions through communication with the GPNP staff and voluntarily stopped the logging activities (see 4.4.2 (2) below). However, the other boss was consistently refusing the approach of the GPNP staff. Hence, the GPNP office decided to call a special forest police force from the provincial capital and declared the boss “wanted.” He then ran away from the sub-village to avoid being captured and jailed and went to another province. Many villagers who worked under him also left the sub-village. Some of them moved to the

4.4.2.2. Facilitation. The main duty of field staff members at subdivision offices is patrolling against illegal activities, communicating with stakeholders, and collecting data on biodiversity. For the patrolling and communication work, the GPNP office introduced a new facilitation approach in 2013. Several staff members participated in intensive skills training and also received coaching support as follow-up. This training was characterized by one main difference from the conventional approach—although the conventional approach focused more on communicating the government’s protected area policy to stakeholders, the facilitation approach focused more on listening to the needs and expectations of stakeholders. One successful case emerged at Sub-Village TG soon after the 6

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provides them with cash and a no-interest loan for the initial investment, as well as with advisory and coaching support for their business development. After one year of implementation, there were already more than 60 people who gave up their chainsaw and started a new business, such as organic farming, paddy field farming, animal husbandry, and running a local shop. According to one GPNP staff member, one villager used to be engaged in logging activities in the GPNP area, and the staff members’ efforts to encourage him to stop his activities did not work. However, the villager brought his chainsaw to the NGO, received the investment and started a new business by terminating logging activities.

4.5. Opportunities created by non-conservation policy instruments In addition to the aforementioned conservation policy instruments, two other policy instruments are implemented for economic purpose—not conservation purposes. However, they affect conservation governance as described below. Fig. 3. Rate of the involvement of households in logging activities at SubVillage TG. Source: Rosadi (2018).

4.5.1. Job by local governments The local governments of Kayong Utara and Ketapang districts also played a role. They have commissioned private firms to complete construction projects on roads, bridges, and irrigation canals, and these companies hire local villagers for the work. Although this has not specifically targeted logging workers or shifting cultivators, there is still a high possibility of having motivated them to move away from resource extraction activities. In 2015, a new scheme called “Dana Desa” for village fund was developed. The national government allocates around $100,000 USD per year to each village and the village leadership can make a decision about its investment within a given framework. Although there has been no attempt to specifically target resource extractors by changing the incentive structure and providing economic opportunities, some good practices may be applied to villages around the GPNP. In one village in the southern part of the Ketapang district, through a series of community meetings, the village leadership decided to construct a much needed local bridge and organized a construction process by developing a supervising committee with technical assistance from the district government. The construction lasted for a year, and local villagers were hired for the work. Moreover, the finished bridge is highly appreciated by the villagers. Such needs-based projects with relatively long time frames and local villagers doing the work have the potential to encourage cash-strapped logging workers to immediately terminate their logging work. The GPNP office and the district government should support them to pursue new careers, while being engaged in a much appreciated local project, in order to prevent them from returning to logging operations after a project ends.

introduction of the facilitation approach. Unlike the conventional behavior, the GPNP staff approached the villagers saying that he wanted to be their friend. One former logging boss recalled, “I did not believe what he was saying at first, of course. But he did not mention anything about my logging activities. And at one night when I called him, he immediately came to my house by riding his motorbike for more than an hour. I was surprised and then I gradually started to open my mind to him.” However, it was difficult for this logging boss to find alternative income sources so that he could not quit timber business. The staff was continuously suggesting him to try something new, and, at some point, he attempted to start a new agriculture business and advised his fellow villagers to follow him. As of now, he and several of his followers are already successful in the business of agriculture, fishery, and construction material. Fig. 3 presents the results of the survey on the villagers’ involvement in logging activities at Sub-Village TG. Annual surveys were conducted by Yayasan Palung. Fig. 3 clearly indicates that the facilitation approach, together with the implementation of law enforcement policy, contributed to the decrease of logging activities from 75% in 2013 to 50% in 2015 and to none in 2017. 4.4.3. Incentive type: Chainsaw-Cash Swap ASRI has been operating in the health and conservation sector around the GPNP area for more than 10 years and has already demonstrated the successful implementation of logging reduction policies. Initially, they started with intensive interviews at 34 local villages around the GPNP area to gain sufficient understanding regarding their livelihood situation. As a result, they came up with the idea of linking health, agriculture, and ecosystem. They opened a local clinic where the medical charge varies depending on the level of villagers’ involvement in logging activities in respective sub-villages. If people at a subvillage are not engaged in logging activities, the medical charge for families of the particular sub-village is lower. If the engagement rate is higher, the charge is higher as well. Along with these clinics, they have implemented extension work at the village level for conservation education and to support agricultural techniques as alternative livelihood sources. After five years of operation, they observed a 68% drop in logging households from an estimated 1350 to just 450 in 2012 (ASRI, 2018). ASRI was successful in transforming the local incentive structure in relation to logging activities. In 2017, ASRI launched a new policy instrument—the swap of a chainsaw and cash for a livelihood investment. Local villagers who are or were engaged in logging operation and want to start a new business other than logging are eligible for the policy instrument. The NGO

4.5.2. Job by oil palm companies Three plantation companies operate around the GPNP area, and all of them accommodate social policy to support neighboring villages. This includes the provision of employment opportunities specifically allocated to such villages, the contract plantation scheme (called Plasma), technical and material support for farming, health support and others. The most influential policy instrument is direct employment. For example, one staff member at one of three companies stated, “We talked to loggers that if you join us, you can receive stable income, health insurance and other benefits. Look at your neighbors who are already working with us. Are they doing better, aren’t they? Then, after several days of thought, they decide to join us and commit for no more logging.” Although the number of villagers who have converted their job from logging and shifting cultivation to that of an employee at oil palm companies is unclear, this is one of the ways to change the jobs of loggers and shifting cultivators. 7

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Table 8 Analysis of individual policy instruments for conservation in the GPNP area with effectiveness, efficiency, and equity perspectives. Policy Instrument < Policy type > (a) Capture and Punish < Regulatory >

Effectiveness logging stopped at the TG Sub• Illegal Village after warning of capture and

• (b) Communication and Education < Information >

(c) Facilitation < Information >

(d) Chainsaw-Cash Swap < Incentive >

(e) Job by Local Government < Non-conservation (Incentive) >

(f) Job by Companies < Nonconservation (Incentive) >

• • • •

punishment was issued against a logging manager. A relatively large-scale illegal logging operation organized by a broker from outside the area was ceased by the special forest police. Behavioral changes in stakeholders depend on their acceptance of messages from park staff, but acceptance is not easy without tangible benefits. One former boss at the TG Sub-Village stopped illegal logging and became a business manager because of a facilitation process. Another former boss did not accept a facilitation process. At least those chainsaws already handed over to ASRI are no longer used.

opportunities enable • Employment villagers to be less dependent on upland

• • •

farming. Project-based employment by local governments lasts for only a limited period of time. Employment opportunities enable villagers to be less dependent on upland farming. The number of employees remains limited.

Efficiency

Equity

certain costs for the observation unfair distribution of benefits and • Itof required • No the situation and for the dispatch of the costs were observed and reported. special forest police but these costs were considered reasonable.

were required for routine patrolling • Costs by national park staff but they were

unfair distribution of benefits and • No costs were observed and reported.

considered reasonable. stakeholder’s learning process • Supporting required much time input by a facilitator.

this approach requires several • Asinputs, target villages are limited.

certain amount of cash is required for the eligible people are limited • Aswap. • Although to those who have a chainsaw, anyone who has this tool can access to the fund. In principle, all those who wanted to work were provided with employment opportunities on a rotational basis.

specific inputs for conservation are • No required.

•

specific inputs for conservation are • No required.

opportunities were • Employment offered to villages nearby plantations

•

5. Discussion

and this is considered reasonable and fair. Not all the villagers who wanted to work were employed because of limited opportunities.

an economic theory: market-based instruments minimize the aggregate cost of achieving a policy purpose (Keohane et al., 1998; Baumol and Oates, 1988). Third, the outcome of non-conservation policy instruments that provide incentives as employment opportunities to local villagers is significant. This outcome is the case for oil palm plantations (Obidzinski et al., 2012; Koh and Wilcove, 2007). As discussed in Section 4.3, those who stopped shifting cultivation have more off-farm income sources and more engagement at oil palm companies; thus, the intervention by non-conservation policy instruments is likely to be highly effective. Furthermore, costs of implementing non-conservation policy instruments are basically borne by their business or project framework; thus, no specific financial inputs for conservation are required. From the equity perspective, the distribution of employment opportunities is limited to the project village or neighboring villages of plantation areas; thus, these opportunities cannot be extended to the area surrounding the GPNP. Regarding the implementation processes of the instruments, the concerned local villagers accept them and consider them fair. This positive reaction is largely because of the presence of the ex-NGO staff or field workers as a skilled facilitator at the village office and plantation companies who understand the importance of a facilitation process to forge a sustainable agreement within a target group or village (Leeuwis, 2000).

5.1. Effects of individual policy instruments In the GPNP area, six policy instruments were identified that affect conservation governance. Four of the six are conservation policy instruments implemented by the GPNP office and one conservation NGO, and two are non-conservation policy instruments implemented by local governments and private companies. The survey results indicated that these policy instruments were effective at mitigating anthropogenic disturbances where logging operations were mainly addressed by Capture and Punish, Facilitation, and Chainsaw-Cash Swap policy instruments and small-scale shifting cultivation was by Communication and Education. Job by Local Government and Job by Private Companies provided opportunities for both loggers and shifting cultivators. Although all six instruments have certain effects, their effectiveness, efficiency, and equity are variable in addressing the causes of disturbance on biodiversity and forest ecosystems. Table 8 summarizes the qualitative findings regarding their effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. The notable findings are as follows. First, the effectiveness of the regulatory and incentive types is high, but the eligibility of target groups for the incentive type is limited. Policy instruments under the information type require human resource inputs for an effective operation because they depend on the extent and quality of communication between the field-based staff and villagers. However, if the operation is successfully implemented, its impact can go beyond achieving the policy purpose, for example, the case of the TG Sub-Village, where one former boss stopped illegal logging and became a business manager who contributed to the formal village economy. Second, the efficiency of the incentive type of instruments is high, which can be explained by

5.2. Effects of interactions among policy instruments Table 9 presents the interaction types of the policy instruments implemented in the GPNP area. No findings indicated conflicts in the field in the implementation of these six policy instruments; the cases were complementary and synergistic. Theoretically, however, conflicts 8

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Complementary Complementary Complementary Complementary Complementary (or Redundancy)

Complementary Complementary Complementary Complementary

Complementary Complementary (or Synergistic) Complementary (or Synergistic)

Complementary (or Conflict) (or Synergistic) Complementary (or Redundancy)

Complementary (or Synergistic)

may occur between some instruments and must be avoided. In addition, cases where one instrument can further reinforce another instruments are possible. Details are described below. First, Capture and Punish, a conventional command-and-control policy approach, may conflict with Communication and Education and Facilitation, participatory approaches (Sunderland and Campbell, 2008; Wilkie et al., 2006). This conflict is because, at a conceptual level, the command-and-control approach dismisses resource use within protected areas, whereas the participatory approach emphasizes the recognition of local needs and accommodates sustainable resource use such as NTFPs by local villagers (Negi et al., 2011). However, a different perspective emerges if the conceptual discussion is linked to the reality in the field. In the case of the GPNP area, most villagers engaged in shifting cultivation already had voluntarily stopped because the GPNP staff, under Communication and Education policy instrument, allowed them to secure their core interest, which was the continual harvest of durian fruits and rubber latex. From the command-andcontrol perspective, this change represents improvement because the short-term disturbance caused by shifting cultivation was under control and stopped. From the participatory perspective, the process duly accommodates the critical interest of the local people (Shackleton et al., 2002). In another case at Sub-Village TG where the Capture and Punish and Facilitation policy instruments were directly adopted, the GPNP staff temporarily refrained from executing straightforward law enforcement against the bosses of the illegal logging operations; instead, they created a relationship with the bosses to facilitate a process to transform the illegal logging bosses into formal business managers. One boss successfully transformed his career as expected, and the other did not; next, law enforcement was operationalized against the latter to stop the illegal logging. In both cases, flexibility was applied to the implementation of the Capture and Punish policy instrument; thus, the Communication and Education and Facilitation instruments successfully functioned. A highly likely scenario is that both instruments incurred conflict regarding Capture and Punish and failed to function unless this flexibility was applied (Gunderson, 1999). By pertinently coordinating the implementation of these policy instruments, no further disturbances were observed from many of local farmers, and no more illegal logging was realized by local bosses because of the synergistic interaction (Ring and Barton, 2015; Lambin et al., 2014). Second, potentially effective interactions between policy instruments have not occurred yet. For example, linking the Communication and Education and Chainsaw-Cash Swap policy instruments would be productive because the GPNP staff who execute Communication and Education can disseminate the latest information regarding the swap instrument and the follow-up monitoring of those who made the swap. Because these two policy instruments are implemented by different stakeholders, the arrangement for collaborative management is required (Ansell and Gash, 2008). Another notable potential case is the coordination of Communication and Education, Job by Local Government and Job by Companies. Currently, employment announcements are being made by local governments or companies. However, by collaborating with the GPNP office and its patrolling staff, employers such as local governments and oil palm companies can be aware of their direct contribution to conservation (Sayer et al., 2012; Koh and Wilcove, 2007) and they can articulate to their employees that the transformation of their work—from upland farming or logging to plantation employees or project workers—contributes to the enhancement of biodiversity and forest ecosystem conservation in the GPNP area. By providing explanations, the level of awareness regarding conservation can be enhanced and shared.

(a) Capture and punish < Regulatory > (b) Communication and education < Information > (c) Facilitation < Information > (d) Chainsaw-cash swap < Incentive > (e) Job by local government < Non-conservation (Incentive) > (f) Job by companies < Non-conservation (Incentive) >

(f)

Interaction type Policy instrument < Policy type >

Table 9 Interaction types between different policy instruments in the GPNP area.

(e)

(d)

(c)

(b)

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5.3. Toward policy mix: the need for strategic coordination by the national park authority As described, various policy instruments have been implemented by 9

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6. Conclusions

the national park authority, local governments, NGOs and companies, and all these instruments had positive effects on conservation governance in the GPNP area. Although respective instruments are independently implemented, not as a policy mix, interaction effects have already been observed between instruments such as Capture and Punish and Facilitation. In addition to the existing instruments, potential interaction effects would further improve conservation governance. Therefore, a rational assumption is that concerned stakeholders engaged in conservation, the national park authority in particular, would pursue the exploration and materialization of such potential. Although this paper defined a “policy mix” as the combination of several policy instruments with interactions, a notable argument is made in the literature that this strategic perspective of exploring a means of effective policy interactions should be incorporated as one element of a policy mix (Edmondson et al., Forthcoming). Rogge and Reichardt (2016) suggested that elements of a policy mix comprise the interacting policy instrument mix, as defined in this paper, and the policy strategy, which involves plans for achieving the objectives of the interacting policy instrument mix. At least two parallel processes must be managed to operationalize a policy mix (i.e., an interacting policy instrument mix) approach under the coordination of the GPNP office. One process is to design, monitor, and update an overall picture toward a policy mix. The core of this process is to first capture all the existing, emerging, and potential policy instruments, as well as their interactions that have or will affect conservation governance in the GPNP area, and then share this picture with concerned stakeholders. Hence, having an accountable stakeholder platform is essential for capturing and sharing (Achyar et al., 2015). Fortunately, there is a stakeholder forum called Sahabat Gunung Palung in the GPNP area, which is coordinated by the GPNP office with active participation by district governments, village governments, NGOs, and private companies (IJ-REDD+, 2018). Although coordination among multiple stakeholders is a difficult task, the GPNP office is already committed to the realization of the concept of a “learning organization;” thus, overcoming problems and constraints step by step would be possible (Wiratno, 2018). In the platform, different levels of stakeholders need to be involved. Because illegal logging is often organized by outsiders, and outsiders’ timber buyers are beyond the local level, the involvement of concerned stakeholders—at least at the provincial level—is required to hold and share a structured perspective on illegal logging issues. The other process is coordinating experiments regarding respective policy interactions at the field level. As discussed in Section 5.2, policy interaction may not be positive—even if that is potentially the case—because of the ignorance and uncertainties surrounding these policies (Ring and Schröter-Schlaack, 2011). These factors can result in a conflicting situation unless the process is appropriately coordinated (Flanagan et al., 2011; Bodin and Crona, 2009). To ensure that policy interaction is effective, field-based experimentation must be arranged regarding respective interactions among the concerned policy instruments; this process leads to a reduction in uncertainty (Allen et al., 2011). A satisfactory reference is the case of Sub-Village TG. The potentially conflicting policy instruments of Capture and Punish and Facilitation were pertinently implemented with careful coordination by the GPNP field staff. The eradication of illegal logging was successful. The action taken by the staff in this case was made possible by the facilitation training and the willingness of the staff with the endorsement by the GPNP office. This experimentation is a strategic process and a necessary part of the development and operationalization of a policy mix approach (Rogge and Reichardt, 2016; Ring and Barton, 2015). With the successful result of the experimentation, the GPNP office already established a new facilitation team and has since implemented policy instruments at other villages around the GPNP area for scaling-up.

By focusing on the case of the GPNP, this paper demonstrates the potential of improving conservation governance by articulating a policy mix strategically coordinated by the GPNP office. Although the existing policy mix literature has addressed conceptual clarity and analytical perspectives, the application for transition cases toward a policy mix on the ground is limited. This paper examines how a transition process can be coordinated toward a policy mix. The analysis resulted in several notable findings. First, several policy instruments for conservation have been enacted at the national level in Indonesia and implemented on the ground in the GPNP area. However, space remains to improve conservation governance by facilitating effective interactions among such conservation policy instruments and by incorporating non-conservation policy instruments within a scope of a policy mix. To materialize such processes, the function of a multi-stakeholder forum is essential. This forum should involve the different levels of stakeholders such as those at the provincial level. At this forum, ideas regarding the potential arrangement for synergistic interactions among conservation and non-conservation policy instruments can be proposed, shared, and facilitated. Second, an interaction of policy instruments can be positive or negative depending on the quality of coordination. As the case demonstrated, interactions between Capture and Punish and Facilitation and Communication and Education were successful because of the careful coordination of the interaction processes by the GPNP staff at TG SubVillage and other villages where shifting cultivation was practiced. As this coordination proceeded based on professional judgment by the respective GPNP staff with support from the leaders of their office for the process, the accommodation of a trial-and-error pilot process as a policy experiment was essential to its success. This process is in line with the adaptive management approach, in which iterative learning from on-going management processes occurs (Tompkins and Adger, 2004). As such, the transition toward a policy mix for effectively mitigating anthropogenic disturbance on biodiversity and forest ecosystems is not necessarily easy. In addition, the leadership role is essential to simultaneously oversee the overall governance and micro experimentation, and then to strategically coordinate both processes. Notably, this would be a path forward toward the realization of satisfactory conservation governance in tropical regions. The authors were/are involved in the management (or supporting) work at the case study national park. However, we declare that there's no financial/personal interest or belief that could affect our objectivity. No conflicts exist. Declaration of Competing Interest The authors were/are involved in the management (or supporting) work at the case study national park. However, we declare that there's no financial/personal interest or belief that could affect our objectivity. No conflicts exist. Acknowledgements The authors acknowledge and thank Ministry of Environment and Forestry, Indonesia and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in sharing the field data for the purpose of this paper. This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. References Achyar, E., Schmidt-Vogt, D., Shivakoti, G.P., 2015. Dynamics of the multi-stakeholder forum and its effectiveness in promoting sustainable forest fire management practices in South Sumatra, Indonesia. Environ. Dev. 13, 4–17. Adger, W.N., Arnell, N.W., Tompkins, E.L., 2005. Successful adaptation to climate change

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