Towards a centerpiece for ecological economics

Ecological Economics 49 (2004) 287 – 301 www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon

METHODS

Towards a centerpiece for ecological economics William M. Hayes a, Gary D. Lynne b,* b

a British Columbia College of Teachers, 405-1385 8th Avenue W, Vancouver, Canada V6H 3V9 Department of Agricultural Economics and School of Natural Resources, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 102 H.C. Filley Hall, Lincoln, NE 68583-0922, USA

Received 9 July 2003; received in revised form 26 January 2004; accepted 28 January 2004 Available online

Abstract This paper offers a hypothesis with cognitive claims for a social theory that is relevant for ecological economics. As background, a fable has Ego metaphorically viewed as a horse driven to problematic extremes with the solution becoming an integration and balance of means with the other horse, Empathy: the Ego’n’Empathy Hypothesis. Starting with a new root metaphor which is extended with a pre-analytic vision, the main support for the cognitive claims is with a mathematical model and a metaeconomic analysis. Armed with both scope and precision, along with an assortment of corroborative evidence from different disciplines, the paper provides support for establishing a new center. Cognitive claims have ego and empathy apart giving value and possibilities, and together, as ego-empathy, giving an emergent value possibility. This possibility suggests a rallying point for transdisciplinary work and a theoretical centerpiece for ecological economics. Suited as such, the economic ego of homo economicus is distinguished from the political ego of sacro egoismo. Corroboration with Adam Smith’s moral philosophy – political economy is highlighted: the individual person of an empirical ethics stemming from both ‘self-interest’ and ‘fellow feeling’ is resurrected to support the Hypothesis. Awareness emerges like a complementary consciousness, an added value, strikingly similar to Smith’s ‘impartial spectator’. Empirical demonstration concludes this integration of interests with a metaeconomic analysis for the case of soil and water conservation policy in the North American farming population. Taken together, the root metaphor with reasonable scope and precision, corroboration and demonstration help to structure the Ego’n’Empathy Hypothesis. D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Keywords: Ego; Empathy; Neuroscience; Evolutionary biology; Metaeconomics

1. Proposing a hypothesis relative to a common goal We share a common goal in establishing ecological economics with the implication of a world-wide * Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-402-472-8281; fax: +1-402472-3460. E-mail address: [email protected] (G.D. Lynne). 0921-8009/$ - see front matter D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2004.01.014

scope, and agree with So¨llner (1997, p. 196), ‘‘it is doubtful whether things will change for the better unless a new social value theory is postulated which is indispensable as the centerpiece. . .’’ of that economics. In going for this goal, the primary problem faced is not a strictly scientific one. We do not sequentially develop a single point of view inductively or deductively. Nothing new in science is claimed, nor is a purely scientific, conventional

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Fig. 1. Vision of the social spheres (from the Fable of Ego’n’Empathy, Hayes, 2003) is structured elementally with Society, Community, Nature, Culture; and foreseen with four forces: Need, Want, Ego, Empathy.

hypothesis asserted. The challenge is to find a solution that would simultaneously process a number of views around a pivotal point: negating what is essentially a background world theory and entrenched system—and, on the other hand, knowing how to positively move beyond the entrenchment (continually being excavated by mainstream economics) by structuring a hypothesis with cognitive claims useful to transform theory and further practice. This challenge was the origin of the authors’ partnership and the Ego’n’Empathy Hypothesis is its culmination. It asserts that value emerges from ego and empathy apart, and together, as ego-empathy form a third type of emergent value. A root metaphor, pre-analytic vision, corroboration with refined knowledge and the metaeconomic model are the supports that put the Hypothesis front and center on the table of ecological economics. Hypothetical development encompasses a philosophic method pushing the issue back to the interpretation of evidence to structure the hypotheses. The guide to this method of structuring and accompanying support is Stephen Pepper’s World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence. He uses the ‘‘root metaphor method’’ to develop ‘‘relatively adequate hypotheses’’ taken to account by tests of adequacy with the criteria of ‘‘scope’’ and ‘‘precision’’ (Pepper, 1942/1970, pp. 76 –77).

Realizing that a ‘true’ hypothesis finding full confirmation in a world theory is beyond our reach, we promote a working hypothesis for transdisciplinary usage that takes into account methods, types and adequacies (and inadequacies) relative to ‘world hypotheses’. The intention is to take a commonsense hypothesis as a vehicle for economics pack it with corroborative evidence and equip it with a metaeconomic analytical engine. Already, there is much theory that adds support with evidence from the fields of history, philosophy, biology, psychology and neuroscience. Structuring a hypothesis and staking out a territory would be impossible without that groundwork. The Hypothesis is implicit in the Fable of Ego’n’Empathy (Hayes, 2003), emergent in the pre-analytic vision (Fig. 1), and made explicit with the mathematics of metaeconomics. It is grounded with empirical support demonstrating value emerging from both ego and empathy, not just from ego as postulated (generally without empirical test) by tough-minded neoclassicists, or from empathy by tender-hearted environmentalists.

2. Ego as present root metaphor and world theory Ego, in the broad sense of Descartes’ famous formula Cogito, ergo sum (I think, therefore I am) is considered the cornerstone for modern philosophy, as self-interest is to partisan politics, ego is to psychology, homo economicus is to neoclassical economics and subtly selfish is to biology. And, ‘‘like a rose. . .’’, ego by any other name is still ego (i.e. I, cogito, das Ich, Geist, self-interest, ...Ego), the dynamo at the middle of modernism implying a theory worldwide in scope. In a nutshell, we propose to go beyond the world theory of egocentricity being solely presumed by balancing and integrating empathetic tendencies. As Sober and Wilson (1998, p. 8) note: ‘‘The idea that human behavior is governed entirely by self-interest and that altruistic ultimate motives don’t exist has never been supported by either a coherent theory or a crisp and decisive set of observations’’. Rather, there is likely a tendency toward both empathy– altruism and egoism – hedonism at the same time (as suggested in Sober and Wilson, 1998). There is the real possibility

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that people will sometimes pass on an opportunity, and perhaps make a true sacrifice for someone else, a cause or an ecosystem, as well as pursue self-interest. Also, Gintis (2002, p. 258) provides proof of genetically based altruism, supporting a similar theme in Sober and Wilson (1998) by saying: ‘‘The emotional basis of altruism lies in our possessing certain prosocial emotions, including empathy. . .’’. We see it much the same way, although like Rachlin (2002) also see how altruism can be learned, and thus how it is manifested by Angyal’s (1941/1967) ‘outside-governance’, a controlling influence from others and, then, can also result in an eventually internalized self-control. Also, because of the jointness and symbiosis between ego and empathy posited in this paper, we can also see how it may appear that empathetic-altruistic acts are selfdirected acts of self-interest (the reciprocal altruism of Trivers, 1971), in that empathetic interests are represented (albeit to a severely limited extent) even on the egoistic interest path. Yet, while we focus attention on empathy, we also disagree with the opposite implication that ego be regarded, as in traditional Eastern thought as merely ‘‘an illusion engendered by false seeing (Reese, 1980, p. 142)’’. While presently problematic, like the fabled Ego, it is valuable and necessary, simply in need of a complementary opposite, Empathy, together harnessed to the cart of carrying capacity. Avoiding extremes and seeking a balanced and stable means for discussion raises the possibility of creating consensus across different disciplines by denying dogmatic claims, negating ‘what’s in it for me’ as sole motive and working towards establishing a transdisciplinary theory to center ecological economics.

3. Hypothetical scope with the analogical method With cogito, Descartes introduced a method for investigating single objects to initiate theoretical treatment of a complex reality with a logical function, otherwise impossible. Generally, the rational method separates all external influences to regard a single object with reference to a purpose, and is rightly considered one of the great positive conscientious uses of the ego root metaphor. Hegel’s Geist is another—though Smith’s ‘self-interest’ is the out-

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right champion contributor to world theory utilizing the Ego root metaphor. Descartes’ method has been considered as a starting point for Adam Smith’s empiricism and is pervasive in Kant’s transcendentalism. Kant extended the method through as if theory: crucial to maxims of practical judgment, the ‘kingdom of ends’, and formulating the categorical imperative. Vaihinger’s (1924/1911) Philosophy of ‘As If’ extends Kant’s theory, differentiating figments of imagination and movement between useful fictions, valid hypotheses and asserted dogma. In differentiating scientific fictions from hypotheses, the latter assume a probable truth proved by further experience and verification; scientific fictions are known to be false, yet justified and employed because of their usefulness. According to Vaihinger (1924/1911, p. 20), Adam Smith’s political economy rests on the fiction of self-interest. Smith saw that pursuing one’s own advantage in the marketplace simultaneously furthered the good. This useful fiction was turned into the ‘‘dogmatism of egoism’’ by Smith’s followers (Vaihinger, 1924/1911, p. 184). Figments of imagination and as if fictions have further relevance to Smith’s philosophy, particularly Mandevilles’ Fable of the Bees of 1723 (see Hayek, 1978, pp. 249 – 266). Bentham and Mill used it to build the egoism – hedonism foundation for the utilitarian philosophy (see Sober and Wilson, 1998, pp. 1 –13), an underlying pattern of the neoclassical application of microeconomics and a big part of the picture in the background of that theory. The Fable of Ego’n’Empathy is a figment of imagination employing different fictions, heuristically bringing into view, simultaneously, a problem of great generality relative to the pivotal point of ego as sole motive. The social elements in the pre-analytic vision offer an explanation in different fields by moving beyond the scope of the traditional twofold Sophist categories of Society and Nature to include Culture and Community, ideally in equilibrium. It is positively considered causal to the fantastic growth of Society, yet an asymmetric reality reveals negative aspects by significant losses to the social elements of Culture, Community and Nature. The fourfold pattern of the social elements analogously hangs loose with the fundamental features of Adam Smith’s philosophy (political economy, natural

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right, ethics, natural theology: see Hoffding, 1900, p. 442). With strong correspondence between Society/ political economy, Community/natural right, the correspondence holds with Nature/ethics of an inherent ‘fellow feeling’ with the weakest connection appearing to be Culture/natural theology. In understanding, however, that Smith’s perspective did not rise in revelation but was reasoned from a set of values relative to experience and history, it is in the topical neighborhood of Culture. Further, So¨derbaum (2001) typifies four human roles as ‘‘consumers’’ and ‘‘professionals’’, ‘‘parents’’ and ‘‘citizens’’ and consequently the correspondence with the social elements of Nature and Culture, Community and Society. He posits a positive ideology identifying with democratic development. This evidence helps negate the dogmatism of ego and the strident political ego, represented by Hegel’s sacro egoismo (Cassirer, 1946, p. 269). Suited to purposes here, the political ego and larger picture of an ecological political economy, implied in the Fable is beyond this paper. The focus is on the ‘sovereign’ consumer, the individual person elucidated by the metaeconomic model. These correspondences provide scope for common orientation, a context, and are useful as a platform for metaeconomic analysis affirming the hypothesis that ego and empathy each give value, and together, a third type of value emerges. Herbert Gintis’ theoretical framework for ‘‘altruism equilibrium’’ (Gintis, 2001), on the face of it, adds justification for the pre-analytic vision of the social spheres and support for the Hypothesis. It perhaps fits with Culture arising in a preferential set of values and empathetic identification with others, especially the ‘elders’ who are necessary for developing higher norms. That humans adopt social norms from parents (vertical transmission) and from influential elders (oblique transmission) appears significant for explaining the social elements, where ‘parents’ in family are as foundational to Community as ‘elders’ are to Culture, with norms transmission and group internalization of a set of values. The result is a cultural phenomenon concluding, ‘‘the internalization of norms can sustain altruism in equilibrium if and only if there is a strictly positive rate of oblique [elders] transmission of norms’’ (Gintis, 2001, p. 13). This conclusion supports the fiction of Empathy as central to Community and Culture. It is also consistent with

Empathy as a value and norm and a complement to Ego. Amatai Etzioni likewise has relevance to the fiction, the extended scope and its justification, dwelling in Community and exploring Culture. He maintains, ‘‘Community is defined by two characteristics: first, a web of affect-laden relationships among a group of individuals, relationships that often crisscross and reinforce one another (rather than merely one-on-one or chainlike individual relationships), and second, a measure of commitment to a set of shared values, norms, and meanings, and a shared history and identity—in short, to a particular culture’’ (Etzioni, 1996, p. 127). With no major contradictions with the social elements, strong correlations appear with ‘metaeconomics’ an idea that was first suggested in Lynne (1999). A major distinction occurs between Etzioni and metaeconomics in working with the scope of as if philosophy with the context having Empathy pivotal to subjective awareness and the social domains of Community and Culture, as Ego is to objectivity in Nature and Society.

4. Corroborating with theory of moral sentiment In returning to the root of systematic economics in history, we review Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations (1776/1784) from the standpoint of Ego and The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759/1790) from the standpoint of Empathy. Rather than strictly separating the Inquiry from the Theory we take the view that they are two parts of an overall system—we connect the two sides to support the Hypothesis. Smith accomplished this connection through the notion of the ‘third station’ and the ‘impartial spectator’, and what appears like complementary consciousness. This brings to mind images of different bridges across the higher hemispheres of the brain. By focusing on ego, Smith in The Wealth of Nations was able to systematize a complex reality, investigate history, observe experience and develop a set of concepts exceedingly useful for science and productive for the theoretical treatment of provisional hypotheses. It was as if one factor alone was responsible for political economy, which Smith knew simply isn’t so—community feeling, habits, sympathy and altruism are also involved, as

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revealed in his other stance in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. The two stances were reconciled through the impartial spectator. Through this vehicle, economic justice and the true wealth of a nation(s) could be achieved. Wispe (1991) calls Hume, Smith and Schopenhauer the ‘‘heroes of sympathy’’, crucial to conceptions of morality and ethics. Hume opened the modern discussion of sympathy with his psychological philosophy of ‘moral sentiment’ which Smith developed in the Theory. Schopenhauer, likewise, saw sympathy as motivation and the foundation of morality. Further, Darwin (1871) regarded it as the most important ‘‘difference between man and lower animals’’ (cited in Wispe, 1991, p. 39). This 18th – 19th century position comes into sight with today’s language of ‘‘prosocial norms’’ and the proof that humans are unique in acquiring information giving rise to culture as evidenced by evolutionary theory (Boyd and Richerson, 1985) and empirical testing (Soltis et al., 1995). Historical evidence, particularly in the orient, discerns sympathy in contradistinction to causal laws. People accent a deep desire in identifying with others, as observed in aboriginal rites that emotionally bond people into a whole. Ernst Cassirer uses the example of men of a tribe when off hunting or at war, the women at home help them by participating in emotional rituals, quite contrary to the modern occidental attitude, and ideas of ego, and the particularly close connections to causal laws and objectivity so critically relevant for the modern constitution. Aboriginal rites, however, provide a social experience in contrast to physical causation. ‘‘This bond—a bond of ‘sympathy’, not of ‘causality’—is not enfeebled by the distance that lies between them; on the contrary it is strengthened’’ (Cassirer, 1946, p. 38). It is as if there is a balance between the egoistic objectives of the male hunters and the empathetic subjectivity of their spouses, although each has both. This is also a theme within holistic psychology. Angyal (1941/1967, 1965), who ‘‘proposed a holistic theory in much greater detail than any other scholar has done’’ (Lester, 1995, p. 79), saw a fundamental human motive in seeking unity, ‘‘homonomy’’, with others, with nature, or perhaps with some ideological orientation (for a similar theme, see So¨derbaum, 2000). This means that pursuing the unity represented

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in a homonomous other-interest is on par with pursuing an autonomous self-interest, and that the two tendencies had to be reconciled, ‘‘to be for oneself and for others’’ (his italics). This reminds us of Maslow’s (1954) call for ‘‘fusing the dichotomies’’—and that Maslow was a strong supporter of Angyal’s work (see the Foreward to the 1965 book). This all went on in an atmosphere of ‘‘heteronomy’’ a term Angyal (1941/1967, p. 39) used to express the degree of ‘‘outside governance,’’ reflected in our modern environmental regulations, and inherently in nature, at work to affect the integration and balance. The two motives are needed for full human functioning, which gives good reason to be inclusive of empathy and not exclusive of ego. There is also, then, a justifiable role for at least some regulation, as outside-governance is sometimes necessary in order to address failures in the self-control to integrate the tendencies. Smith, too, implicitly recognized homonomy, in his moral sentiment expressed through the vehicle of the impartial spectator resting on emotion based sympathy. When entering the situation of other people empathy led to virtue and identification with others in common purpose, like husband and wife establishing an emergent environment for children. The path towards the exclusiveness of ego paralleled increasing freedom from custom and tradition, coming into full public view in England with Mandeville’s ‘‘private vices are public virtues’’ (cited in Hayek, 1978, p. 258) and not unlike today’s mantra ‘greed is great’. Smith, in the Theory, saw the fable as confusing vice and virtue. He rejected and reversed this pessimistic view of necessary evil, and grounded a positive economics insisting the wealth of the overall state arises small scale from the sum of private propertied people, centering on households improving their circumstances which is implicit in the social categories of Community and Culture, and concepts of common-good. This was possible despite the problems of individual and collective self-serving interests infesting the state, corruption of joint stock companies, government mismanagement and warfare— strikingly similar to present-day discords, possibly avoided with sufficient empathy. The perspective that ego as self-interest is the only true principle of morality, or shifting the grounds of

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morality to ‘‘amorality’’ which in neoclassical economics means it is not considered at all (see Khalil, 1997, esp. 501 – 503), are both completely contrary to Smith. That is, the notion that the moral question is not to be raised to the surface in the technical analysis, and thus left as underground dogma, is not what Smith is about. In contrast, Smith’s philosophical reasoning placed great emphasis on empiricist ethics centered by feeling that arises socially. Reasoning about moral matters based in empathy and sympathy is to be an ongoing effort. We imitate the behaviors of others: with emotional sympathy we put ourselves in their situation, consciously reflect with empathetic feeling and perhaps even occasional altruistic behavior. This ethic rests on ‘‘an involuntary inclination, which not even the most egotistical of men can altogether suppress’’ (Hoffding, 1900, p. 443). According to Smith, we put ourselves in their place, and stand at a third station while we activate the ‘impartial spectator’, where ethics first arises seeing others judging behavior similarly. As Sen (2002, p. 46) notes, ‘‘The impartial spectator can place herself in different situations (without having to be present in any of them)’’. This makes Smith’s impartial spectator notion especially useful in achieving justice of all kinds, including environmental justice, even at a global scale. Smith rejects the view ‘‘of a moral sense, finished and complete once and for all, as also the explanation of all morality in egoism or in pure reason’’ (Smith, 1759/1790, p. 444). Rather, we find the moral sense through recurring reason. As Khahil (1990, p. 266) notes, in Smith’s view what emerges from having been to the third station is a ‘‘distinct entity’’, a kind of symbiotic, integrated and balanced outcome of ego affecting empathy and empathy affecting ego, to achieve what we see as an alternative kind of emergent value on a higher plane of complementary consciousness. This symbiosis is like spouses complementing each other in maintaining a household: each station is satisfied, with the total outcome more than what either could accomplish.

5. Centering with ego and empathy With all the complex swirl of simultaneous sequencing of a view around a pivotal point, what do we

simply mean by ego and empathy? When a baby first intentionally reaches for an object the situation presupposes a separation between object and child. That separation, grasping and manipulating simply defines ego, primitive objective thinking, the crux of cogito, considered crucial for individuality to develop and for reason to flourish. With empathy the father observes an empathetic mother cradling the baby, revealing sympathy and the arousal of the feeling function as conscious awareness, notably displayed in mutual smiling, the subjective unity of parent and child, central to family. To common sense, it reveals empathy as an important motive that reinforces Smith’s Theory. Thus separation of self and object as ego is seen arising in the lead role of natural sensibility and societal thinking. Analogously, empathy arising from the feeling function in community is considered foundational for culture. The latter is also supported by the contention that empathetic awareness is the core experience of aesthetics exemplified in all the arts (Reese, 1980, p. 306). Likewise this theme corroborates with the categorical social elements of the pre-analytic vision. Starting at around age 2, we give the name ‘terrible twos’ with the assertive child, prototypal ‘I’ centered personality, the egoistic self emerges. Intriguingly, while most recognize the problems with the terrible twos, the neoclassical application applauds it throughout the lifetime. While the ‘terrible twos’ may dominate personality at that age, the emergence of empathy occurs, as illustrated in the following story: Little Aaron, aged 24 months, would routinely come to his mother saying things like, ‘‘I bump my head. Kiss it’’. But one morning, for the first time ever, the tables turned. While his mother was dressing him, she realized she had a bruise on her hand. Without really thinking she said, ‘‘Ow, my hand hurts’’. Aaron immediately responded, ‘‘I kiss it’’ (Holyoak and Thagard, 1997). As children become youths then adults, some develop a highly refined version of self-interest, and we say such people are egoistic, perhaps in the extreme even hedonistic, putting most life energy into ego and the ‘I’, the ‘self’. Others during this time

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refine the focus towards the empathic, putting most life-energy into empathy, perhaps even into altruism, forming a distinctive ‘‘We’’ (after Etzioni, 1988), the ‘‘other’’ (after Cory, 1999), strikingly similar to Smith’s ‘‘fellow-feeling’’ (Smith, 1959/1790), as revealed in the caring occupations, nurses, teachers, social workers, and perhaps environmental organizations focused on other, natural life forms. Perhaps most experience a tug-and-pull between the egoistic and the empathetic tendencies, a constant tension (following Cory, 1999), a natural harness as in the Fable. Empathy as a root metaphor is meant as an inclusive concept encompassing sympathy, feeling, compassion, consciousness, character, role taking, and gaining perspective. Historically, Empathy knows by way of ‘feeling with’ another, derived from the German Einfulung that was translated into ‘empathy’ in early 20th century American experimental psychology. Gemeinshaftsgefuhl, the core concept of Adler’s individual psychology, has been translated as ‘‘social feeling’’, centers on identification and empathy (Ansbacher and Ansbacher, 1956, p. 135). Likewise, it was cherished by social and developmental psychologists to explain altruistic behavior (Wispe, in Eisenberg and Strayer, 1987, p. 17). Empathy is significant for understanding what motivates social capital, which gives transformative capacity to groups of individuals, beyond what each can accomplish on one’s own: it is motivated by sympathy, a theme in Robison et al. (2002). In evolution, empathy has importance for communal value and inclusive fitness ‘‘that is probably based on innate schemata that are genetically determined’’ (Eisenberg and Strayer, 1987, p. 45), perhaps even leading to some true self-sacrifice as in altruism. And, as hedonism appears as an extreme in egoism, altruism appears as the extreme in empathy. Empathy and sympathy are fused by feelings and awareness though ‘‘empathy is a way of knowing, sympathy is a way of relating’’ (Wispe, 1991, p. 80). Sympathy is a subjective sharing of a negative experience with someone else, such as sorrow and suffering in emotional response. With ego in the background, empathy appears like Smith’s ‘impartial spectator’ observing experience, identifying with others, a way of knowing or subjectively sharing a positive or negative feeling state, as a mother’s

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equitable empathic knowledge of her child enables her to satisfy need in negative understanding or providing preferences in positive understanding. As consumer, economic sovereignty, due to addictions and bad habits, appears enslaved by emotions—unaware and in no condition to drive— goes over the limit with the consequence that Ego is agitated and socially out-of-control. Halting the emotional outrage of the sovereign is Solon in the Fable who vetoes, then, later as overseer, intervenes with practical sensibility and reflective feeling to develop a sustainable plan for reformation. Ego and Empathy are guided by practical judgments and the perspective of conscious mind functioning to seek an integration—an emergence, again, perhaps akin to Khalil’s (1990, p. 266) ‘distinct entity’ by working in tandem. A symbiotically balanced and reformed sovereign consumer ideally assumes impartiality, is ethical and moral, whether in choices of conservation practices or selling used cars, rather than always leading to the market for ‘‘lemons’’ and other ‘‘asymmetric information’’ problems. By not seeing empathy, Akerlof (1970) in the classic ‘‘lemons’’ paper missed a key point, that at least some seller’s may indeed inform the prospective buyer. Asymmetric information (and the ‘invisible hand of the market’) really has moral questions subject to the empathetic mare, as it is a central question of ethics and objective purpose with the egoistic stallion.

6. The bridge of neuroscience Cory sees neuroscience as the connecting discipline, bridging across evolutionary biology and behavioral ecology through evolutionary, cognitive psychology and other social sciences, and, ultimately, connecting to the humanities. Cory (1999, 2004) brings neuroscience to the table, especially MacLean (1990), deciphering it for us as social scientists, suggesting the evolutionary path for each human involves the continued development of a triune brain. At the core of the brain is the earliest protoreptillian complex from which emerges the egoistic part of our tendency to satisfy needs, the prototype of individuality that eventually founds the self-interest in the

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sphere of Society (Fig. 1). Need satisfaction seen in fundamental drives for survival emerge here—the competitive arena for Ego in Nature (Fig. 1). Manipulation and subtle selfishness, as Paradis and Williams (1989) reveal, is deemed supreme and overriding by modern biologists and neoclassical economists. In the sense that it is at the core of survival and satisfying need, we can see the partial and appealing truth content of that contention. As such, models and a world theory built on this belief have taken us a long ways. Yet, neuroscience (and our own common sense) demonstrates that far more than ego is positively at work. This science shows that self-interest is not generally separable from an empathetic other-interest (after Cory, 1999; Lynne, 2002) except perhaps in severely disturbed individuals, including the criminal mind leading to extreme violence such as torture and murder in a monstrous approach toward others. Excessive ego and avoiding the empathic implications has the appearance of societal states reinforcing disorders such as psychopathy, with key symptoms of psychopaths being ‘‘egocentricity’’ and ‘‘lack of empathy’’ (Hare, 1993, p. 34). Awareness of other-interest appears to arise in an independent and yet quite interdependent part of the brain represented in the first overlayer, the paleomammalian complex. This is where the beautiful mare, Empathy, was born (see the Fable in Hayes, 2003) motivating identification with others, with birth and nurturing of fellow feeling. Healthy people tend towards the true and good—want to do the right thing. These two semi-autonomous but yet interdependent parts demonstrate, like the two horses in the Fable, a balancing occurring in the neocortex neomammalian complex, largely situated in the frontal cortex of the brain (Cory, 1999, see esp. pp. 34 – 36), where the empathetic and egoistic forces converge and complement each other. An overlap occurs here with Angyal’s (1941/1967) two tendencies—autonomy and homonomy—that are integrated and balanced through the third part, represented in the degree of heteronomy, self-control with outside-influence (and, outside-control when the sovereign goes awry) in the environment. It is also in the neocortex area where diligence is at work giving focus and is what leads to this centering.

We also find in this balancing the phenomenon of reciprocity, with the real potential arising for a non-zero sum outcome in a distinct state of existence both within self and with others, including the entirety of the biosphere. We perhaps are hard-wired to find non-zero sums (see Wright, 2000) arising from this reciprocity between ego and empathy states, producing the emergent value. As Cory (1999, p. 47) notes, the universally observed norm of reciprocity has been shown to be possible in evolutionary theory, within Hamilton’s (1964) inclusive fitness theory; Trivers’ (1971) reciprocal altruism; as well as in game theory, e.g., Axelrod (1984). Cory (1999, p. 47) notes how these efforts have rested on the presumption that reciprocity is driven by the self-interest, but that evidence of it also being driven by empathy is coming to light in studies of primates, as well as in anthropological and sociological studies. Armed with the notion that reciprocity driven largely by empathy can be at work, we can also see how it may fail to occur. We can see more clearly why some environmentalists and ecologists call for regulatory controls due to the lack of ability and diligence by individuals to do their own balancing. Self-control can fail, and outside-control (Angyal’s heteronomy) takes precedence in those circumstances. At times, oversight is needed in order to reach the empathetically conditioned state, to keep ourselves from over pumping an aquifer; farming to cause excessive soil erosion; burning too much coal which enhances global warming; harvesting too many trees and too much fish. Without a symbiotic balance in the ego and empathy, we at best see the zero sum, and, in the case of deteriorating ecosystems even a negative-sum game. Ego, sovereign and chariot crash into the crowd (see Hayes, 2003), and violate the wall of ecological limits. Notably, negatives can occur on both sides. We can be emotionally addicted like the sovereign or agitated like Ego—and Empathy could easily be emotionally upset with lack of security and fear, which speaks to the problem of modern terrorism and tyranny. We see that eventually the key insights of MacLean and Cory hold the potential to be merged with evolutionary and holistic psychology, being on the same path to connect biology and psychology.

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Buss (1999, pp. 4 – 18) notes how the history of evolutionary psychology really starts with the history of evolutionary biology, going back to Darwin with natural selection; coming through Mendel with the discovery of genes as the inherited unit. The ethology movement asked how structure led to behavior, asking psychologists to consider how biology affected behavior. Hamilton’s (1964) inclusive fitness theory (also see Barash, 2001, on Hamilton’s role in the gene-centered theory of behavior), led to new explanations wherein the gene played a role in not only survival but also altruism, especially altruism toward kin, adaptation and natural selection. Triver’s (1971) theories on altruism and cooperation, again representing gene-level thinking, but going well beyond the gene centered self-interest thesis of Hamilton (and the Dawkins, 1976/1989, selfish gene), are something more akin to Sober and Wilson’s (1998) psychological altruism. The framework in Angyal (1941/1967, 1965), brought into the metaeconomics approach, suggests how this might be all put together. Finally, the sociobiology of E.O. Wilson viewing humans as part of the natural system, sees much in our social relationships reflected by biology (Wilson, 1998; also, see Cory, 2004).

7. Empirical testing of the Ego’n’Empathy hypothesis We seek a way to integrate the foregoing ideas to further theory, support the Hypothesis, and to point to an empirical approach used in testing it. The metaeconomic model has been subjecting the root metaphor to the test with respect to explaining conservation and eco-farming behavior in North American farming populations. Neoclassical economics persists in the fallacious economic story that farmers are in an egoistic –hedonistic pursuit of maximum profits. Our statistical evidence suggests, instead, that most farmers are at work balancing ego and empathy. Intriguingly, United States government conservation programs historically have focused on either the egoistic ‘financial risk’ or on appeals to the empathetic ‘doing-the-right-thing’ by conservation and eco-farming, and, when both approaches failed, have used coercive regulations

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and mandates, not seemingly realizing there could be a symbiosis. We can easily see why the failure of both ego-based market and empathy-based socially oriented conservation programs is documented each time a new study is done (see the continuing saga of policy failure in U.S. General Accounting Office, 1977; U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1989; and National Academy of Sciences, 1993, highlighted in Nowak and Korsching, 1998). Commercial fishers have also been found to be motivated by the joint pursuit of profit and moral obligation, as affected by social influences (see Kuperan and Sutinen, 1998; Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999). We do not doubt this extends beyond farmers and fishers as well. Metaeconomics has been testing the Hypothesis as depicted in abstract form in Eqs. (1) and (2), and Fig. 2 with a set of egoistic-hedonistic self-interest iso-curves and an overlapping set of empathetic-altruistic other-interest iso-curves. In particular, the centering argument suggests that every output and input, and every choice has two dimensions, an objective, material dimension arising in the egoistic self-interest; and a subjective, emotional dimension arising in the empathetic other-interest. So, we include emotion as a technical dimension of economics. We propose to think of the choice and mix of inputs described by the attributes of inputs Xj as oriented to the more industrial X2 technology or oriented to a more conservation and ecologically oriented technology X1 as represented in two jointly occurring interest functions: IG ¼ IG ðX1 ; X2 Þ

ð1Þ

IM ¼ IM ðX1 ; X2 Þ

ð2Þ

Notice the inputs are strictly non-allocable, a subtle but substantive difference from standard economics: by suggesting the inputs are non-allocable, we posit less possibility for complete control by individuals due to outside governance from both nature and society. We are drawing here on the ‘‘multi-ware’’ economics of Frisch (1965, pp. 269 – 278), a little practiced form of economics that recognizes a world wherein little to no substitution is possible (we lack control), like the ‘‘recipe’’ Georgescu-Roegen

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(1971) described. As we know, this reality of little to no substitutability and little hope for complete individual control has been largely ignored as demonstrated in the famous work of Solow (1974, 1997), and next to the presumption of only egoistic behavior, the next most troublesome part in the standard approach. Metaeconomics starts with multi-ware economics which focuses on production processes, and adds to it by suggesting it is human nature to also experience jointness and limited substitution as between the ego and the empathy; by placing the focus on centering; and by admitting multi-outcomes, both subjective (doing-the-right-thing) and objective (material). Also, the model highlights the inherent conflict and tension, which is not without precedence in other alternatives to standard approaches: a similar scene appears with the ambivalence framework of Opaluch and Segerson (1989, esp. pp. 90 – 91). Yet, metaeconomics is substantively different, in that in the ambivalence framework tension and conflict in the middle between values and tastes is still from the egoistic drive. Empathy is left out of the ambivalence model: there is only one indifference curve (see Fig. 4 in Opaluch and Segerson, 1989, p. 91). And, perhaps most importantly, metaeconomics allows that an individual could indeed act in empathetic-altruistic form with true sacrifice, a key difference. To illustrate, one simple form of a metaeconomics objective function is: U ¼ ipIG ðX1 ; X2 Þ þ sIM ðX1 ; X2 Þ þ cðIG ÞðIM Þ  jr1 X1  jr2 X2

ð3Þ

where the rj refer to the input prices paid for the attributes Xj by this firm; and p is the market generated price for the egoistic interest in providing this product, e.g., in producing corn or soybeans. Notice the subjective element of cost is represented in j; it is proposed that farmers also see costs in a subjective/ emotional/empathetic way. One could also add a capital (R) constraint, which we do later in moving to the interests frontier space; we leave it out at this juncture to simplify. For this simple case, a relatively large i indicates a decision maker balancing toward self-interest. We posit that a relatively high s can be taken to mean

balancing toward the empathetic other-interest, with said individual also then having strong tendencies toward building social capital with sympathy (again, see Robison et al., 2002), i.e., building networks with others (including other living creatures, which means that natural capital can interact positively with social capital) based on common and shared norms leading to trust. In other words, ‘‘it is just common sense’’, a phrase heard often in farming communities. The term (IG)(IM) illustrates the possibility of interdependence; the nature of the symbiotic integration and balancing at work; and jointness as between the two interests; recognizing the sum could be greater than the sum of the parts if empathy is included. We obtain the first order conditions, taking partial derivatives with respect to the perceived attributes of the technology: BU BIG BIM ¼ ðip þ cIM Þ þ ðs þ cIG Þ set jr1 AX1 BX1 BX1

ð4Þ

BU BIG BIM ¼ ðip þ cIM Þ þ ðs þ cIG Þ set jr2 BX2 BX2 BX2

ð5Þ

The least-cost, now integrated and balanced expansion path 0Z in Fig. 2 is represented in BIG BIM þ ðs þ cIG Þ jr1 BX1 BX1 ¼ BIG BIM jr2 ðip þ cIM Þ þ ðs þ cIG Þ BX2 BX2 ðip þ cIM Þ

ð6Þ

Notice how the microeconomics expansion path is the default case when i = 1, j = 1, s = 0 and c = 0, giving an unbalanced and non-integrated path 0G without empathy (the j is left in the expression to remind us that it could differ by input, and not cancel). Finding the expansion path equation from Eq. (6), X2 ¼ X2 ðjr1 ; jr2 ; p; i; s; c; IG ; IM ; X1 Þ

ð7Þ

Eq. (7), path 0Z in Fig. 2, is unusual in that product prices as well as the input prices, and also the integrative balancing i, s, c measures, all affect the

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path. Disciplined through the symbiotic balancing, the demand function for an ecologically oriented input like water saving technology becomes X1 ¼ X1 ðjr1 ; jr2 ; p; i; s; c; IG ; IM ; X1 Þ

ð8Þ

along the path 0Z. We can derive the ego-empathy frontier in Fig. 3 by inserting Eq. (7) into the objective function Eq. (3), and by staying on RR (which also represents the natural capital inherent in the ecosystem) in Fig. 2. We can then trace a curve in Fig. 3 of the form: U ¼ UðIG ; IM ; i; s; c; j; r1 ; r2 ; p; RÞ

ð9Þ

We can examine the distances across the iso-frontier curves in Fig. 3 with JGM, which indicates the kind of jointness, where JGM is calculated from (U is the integrated balance in the interests associated with some RR): B2 U ¼ JGM BIG BIM

ð10Þ

For the case illustrated in Fig. 3, JGM < 0, indicating technical complements, which is the only case for which regions RA and CRV of Fig. 3 exist. More

Fig. 3. Ego-empathy frontier representing symbiotic and integrated balancing in the joint pursuit of the egoistic self-interest (IG) and the empathetic other-interest (IM).

importantly, with technical complements, the distances between the curves in Fig. 3 become more expansive as we move through the space on 0Z. This is the mathematical representation of emerging as the distinct entity on a higher plane of reconciliation and fusion between the egoistic and the empathetic drives. In contrast, technical competitiveness is resident if JGM>0, and only the region AC will exist in Fig. 3. Distance between the curves becomes tighter as we move through the space on 0Z. Ego and empathy are not supporting each other, but rather are competing in non-complementary ways. The least likely case is JGM = 0, indicating technical independence, meaning that ego occurs separately from emotion and empathy; while not likely, only AC will appear, and the distance between the curves is identical on 0Z. This is the presumption in neoclassical economics. For the simple case in Eq. (3), JGM = c. We also need to pay attention to the derivative dIG/ dIM, as illustrated in Fig. 3 and reflecting the nature of the trade-off balancing, in contrast to the symbiotic balancing JGM. The trade-off, balancing equation is given by dIG =dIM ¼ 

Fig. 2. Jointly egoistic self-interest (IG) and empathetic otherinterest (IM) isoquants for farming with industrial inputs (X2) and conservation/ecological inputs (X1).

s þ cIg BU BU = ¼ ¼ TG=M BIM BIG i þ cIn

ð11Þ

Notice when c = 0, TG/M =  (s/i). In neoclassical economic theory TG/M = 0, so only the egoistic IG drives the decision at some point A on 0G in Fig. 2 (and A in Fig. 3). The firm acts as though community

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and ecosystem do not matter (no empathy for either), at least not in any significant or substantive way. In contrast, in ecological economic renditions, the firm is to subdue the self-interest and use input combinations only in the other-interest along path 0M acting as if TG/M = l at Point C in Fig. 3 (and, in extreme environmentalism, even where TG/M>0 in CRV, an irrational zone). Due to empathy and the new centering, a metaeconomics solution suggests the ratio l < TG/M < 0 in region AC of Fig. 3 (and region AC of Fig. 2). The firm acting with empathy chooses path 0Z, and moves toward point B in both Figs. 2 and 3. Metaeconomics posits that firms are satisficers at point B rather than maximizers at points A and C, consistent with the theme of ‘‘satisficing’’ behavior that Herbert Simon suggested some 40 years ago, with ‘‘satisficing’’ now expanded to include the centering on ego and empathy, rather than maximizing on only the base of ego. Simon, especially in his later writing, also emphasizes the role of altruism (arising from empathy) in satisficing (see Simon, 1997, esp. pp. 39– 43). The solution suggested points to seeking an eventual convergence, a coevolution (not unlike Norgaard, 1995) over time to an integrated and symbiotically balanced path 0Z. The new ecological path 0Z arises from empathetic reflection, like Adam Smith encouraged. As cases in point, we find strawberry farmers with TG/M =  40.43 (Table 1) as being quite empathetic, as indicated by the willingness to be influenced by Table 1 Empirical measurements of the balancing effect (TGM) and type of balancing (JGM) in farm use of soil and water conservation, ecologically oriented technologies Study

Lynne et al. (1995) Lynne and Casey (1998) Cutforth et al. (2001)

Contexta

Farm water saving in strawberry production Farm water saving in tomato production Farm crop diversity in corn – soybean production

Balance in the interests TGM

JGM

 40.43

<0

 0.22

<0

 0.82

0

a ‘Farm’ means ‘scale at the level of the farm’ in contrast to a particular field on a farm. The action, time, context, target must be in alignment to estimate such proxies, which for these estimates were all defined at the farm level.

others, and thus willing to adopt environmental technologies while sacrificing profits. We find tomato farmers with TG/M =  0.22, being quite egoistic, and less willing to be influenced to move to the environmental, resource conserving technologies. We find the corn-soybean farmers with TG/M =  0.82, and not too far from  1.00, which would suggest a point orthogonal to a 45-degree line out of the origin of Fig. 3, and a point of reasonable balance. Regarding complementarity of the symbiotic kind, we find JGM < 0 in two cases, both of which suggest symbiotic complementarity (and, find JGM = 0 in the third, suggesting no symbiosis at work; we see independence). Environmental and conservation policy needs to be about facilitating the complementary balance. We also see the need to do the empirical analysis as the basis for such policy, as not all firms will be at the same point on the balance scale. We would expect eco-policy in general would need to be fine-tuned to the egoempathy balancing and centering in a particular place.

8. Conclusions Our project is ambitious. We propose to put heart into standard neoclassical economics, complementing what has gone before. Where the primary premise of economics is applied to egoism, we hypothesize the same principle applied to ego and empathy in structuring the Ego’n’Empathy Hypothesis. Further, we assert the third part, an emergent value from them working together. There appear to be good grounds for adding empathy as a complement to the economic model, and thereby transforming it. We rally around the Hypothesis as the vehicle for this transformation, with metaeconomics as the analytical engine of this change. The vehicle and engine have been tested and work well. The Fable of Ego’n’Empathy dramatizes a root metaphor of ego with excessive behavior, addictions and overwhelming consumptive habits being out of control, to the point of threatening human existence. Greed is grotesque and egomania causal. Relative to an equilibrium of the social elements, we see an inflated and controlling Societal sphere with Nature separated out, at worst as a wasteland and at best as a value-less resource; a residual claimant on the national

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product. Community and Culture come into view impoverished, corrupted, and void of empathic space. In the Hypothesis, Empathy finds a place along side Ego, giving the real potential for a sustainable social equilibrium. As we move forward, metaeconomics starts to represent the root metaphor of the Fable and implicit values of the pre-analytic vision becoming explicit and put in technical terms. This has been the historical approach of development in economic theory and practice with some things left as metaphor and allegory perhaps due to the emotional loading they carry (see Lagueux, 1999). By teaming empathy to the standard economic model, by building on the base of an alternative root metaphor and pre-analytic vision, while drawing on biology, neuroscience, evolutionary psychology and numerous other sources, speaks well for the Hypothesis which metaeconomics works, and holds out potential for utilization in different fields. Affirming the Hypothesis also indicates an overall paradigm shift when making a place for empathy as an equal opposite and complement to ego. While being inclusive of paradigm-coexistence and providing a new metaphorical basis of economic behavior, Ego’n’Empathy shifts but does not stray far from the dominant neoclassical economic theory of the day in that we use similar analytical devices. It is also radical, though, as the root metaphor now includes Empathy as a main feature, a norm of real experience. Intriguingly, neoclassical economics and the microeconomic tool of homo economicus as we know it becomes a special case of the metaeconomic model. If empirical testing results in failure to reject the null hypotheses of ‘no empathic, other-interest at work’ and ‘no lack of substitution possibilities’, we are back to the standard neoclassical economic model. All testing to date, however, suggests we cannot go back. As a result, we believe the social philosophy and alternative way of integrating ideas represented in metaeconomics helps in better understanding, and converting concepts, moving metaphors and other images into technical economics. We also see metaeconomics as potentially inclusive of many other constructs, all related to empathy and the need for integration, as represented in: Sen’s (1977) ‘‘claims of others;’’ Elster’s (1986/1989) ‘‘multiple self’’ prob-

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lem, emphasized in Moldoveanu and Stevenson’s (2001) possibility of an ‘‘internally incoherent nature of selfhood;’’ Frank’s (1988) ‘‘commitments’’, George’s (1993) ‘‘metapreferences;’’ Lux’s (2003) call to ‘‘give up greed’’ while recognizing the humanistic side of human nature; and Schelling’s (1984) ‘‘egoeconomics’’. Earlier papers show how many of these ideas fit within metaeconomics (Lynne et al., 1995; Lynne and Casey, 1998; Lynne, 1999, 2002). So¨derbaum (1999, p. 162) points out how any particular scientific paradigm is as much about values and ideology and is ‘‘not exclusively a matter of truth’’. We agree, although it seems a reasonable goal to make such values and the ideology explicit, and also subject to reasoned scrutiny. We also see shortcomings in our proposal, even confess to evils of eclecticism considered necessary to structure a hypothesis with cognitive claims. We hope the greater evil of perverting or ignoring crucial evidence around the pivotal point of Ego is avoided in the transformation to Ego’n’Empathy.

Acknowledgements This is the University of Nebraska, Agricultural Research Division Journal Series Number 13543. We would like to thank the three different sets of anonymous reviewers and the encouragement of two different sets of editors, all helping to bring many substantive improvements in this paper.

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