- Email: [email protected]
Towards a coherent remote sensing data policy
Towards a coherent remote sensing data policy
Lisa R. Shaffer and Peter Backlund
The USA is facing a major challenge in Earth science and remote sensing data policy. A new generation of remote sensing satellites is being developed and prepared for launch in the US and its space partners. Within the US the Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS), the joint US-French Topex/Poseidon, the continued and enhanced operational environmental satellite series provided by the US Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the NASA EOS/Polar platforms will combine to create a new set of technical capabilities in Earth observation. The vast increases in technical capability, data flow and US government investment in data analysis and related research require a careful consideration of how remotely sensed data are managed and distributed. Capabilities will be increasing quickly outside the US as Lisa Shaffer is a Research Scientist at the well, with the launches of the European Space Agency's Earth George Washington University's Space Resources Satellite (ERS-1), the Japanese Earth Resources Satellite Policy Institute, Washington, DC 20052, USA. Peter Backlund is the International (JERS-1), and Advanced Earth Observations Satellite (ADEOS), the Affairs specialist for SM Systems and Research Corporation (SMSRC), European and Japanese polar platforms, and others. The fact that remote sensing by satellite is an inherently international activity Washington, DC 20024, USA. performed by national and regional entities provides additional opporThis paper was prepared with support from NASA Headquarters and submitted to the tunities and challenges, particularly in data policy. Nevertheless, the Environmental Research Institute of Michi- existence of common scientific goals and the considerable influence of gan's September 1989 conference, 'Earth the US offer hope that data policies can be developed that satisfy the observations and global change decision needs of both the US and its allies. making: a national partnership', The challenge is twofold: The US must develop a consistent internal system of data management and dissemination while leading an effort to create a similar system on an international scale. This article focuses on the first step, development of domestic policy, which is necessary for the US to be able to exert a positive influence on the development of an international system which meets our needs. It assumes that developing a sensible data policy for the NASA Earth Observing System (EOS) is the major part of developing a US domestic data policy, for the EOS Data and Information System (EOSDIS) will be the distribution mechanism for a major portion of space-based data acquired by the US in the 1990s. The approach suggested contributes to the objectives of
Access to space-based remote sensing data is critical for Earth science and the study of global change. This article summarizes a variety of US government Earth science data policies and problems. The authors examine current efforts to develop data policies for the next generation of US remote sensing programmes, noting likely problems based on pest experiences. They argue that the goal of US Earth science data policy should be to provide the widest possible dissemination of data. Setting such a goal permits the development of a simple, coherent data policy that serves scientific, commercial and US government interests.
0265-9646/90/010045-08 $03.00 © 1990 Butterworth & Co (Publishers) Ltd
45
Towards a coherent remote sensing data policy
supporting research and development, encouraging widespread use ~t satellite remotely sensed data and the growth of appropriate and viable commercial enterprises associated with space applications.
Basic problem Throughout the US government, data collected from publicly funded programmes are being distributed to different users in accordance with a wide range of policies, at different prices, with varying restrictions. As the Earth science/global change community becomes more coherenl, and as interagency and international programmes develop and arc implemented, the need for a consistent, sensible policy basis for data dissemination becomes more critical. Currently, the principle of "non-discriminatory' access to data is given wide verbal acceptance, but in fact current policies are blatantly and explicitly discriminatory. There is universal acceptance of the concept of open data availability, meaning that all data are available to all users under some terms. The issue is what classes of users are defined and what access terms are offered. This article asserts that the original Landsat approach of making all data available to all users on the same terms best meets US objectives. The authors contend that true non-discriminatory pricing, with differentiation based not on the type of user but only on whether or not the user's country/agency is contributing to the programme providing the data, is the most beneficial and cost-effective approach. Current attempts to achieve commercialization and cost recovery in remote sensing are inhibiting the wide dissemination of data. Limiting the distribution of data interferes with global change research and encourages survival of unsustainable business ventures through government subsidy while inhibiting potential economic growth which could result from the widespread applications of results from satellite remote sensing. The latest innovation in data policy, 'two-tiered pricing', allows research users to obtain data at the cost of reproduction and distribution, while charging ~commercial' prices to other users. This represents an ill-conceived attempt to protect the research community's needs while preserving the fiction of commercialization. The result is likely to further complicate the situation without alleviating the primary problem. The goal of US Earth science data policy should be to provide the widest possible dissemination of data. This permits the development of a simple, coherent data policy that serves scientific, commercial and [IS government interests.
Current domestic situation NASA NASA has generally provided data at no cost to its designated principal investigators (PIs), many of whom were in fact involved in the design of the instruments generating the data of interest. PIs received a period of exclusive access to the data, often a year or more. If the PI eventually produced a 'clean' and documented data set and provided it to the N A S A archive, the data were then offered to the research community at a nominal cost. PIs often make copies of data sets available to colleagues directly as well. Users from outside the NASA community were required to wait until the P1 released data, and had to accept the
46
SPACE POLICY February 1990
Towards a coherent remote sensing data policy
data set in the condition it was made available. In the absence of a comprehensive directory system, and with little pressure put on PIs to make their data available, much data has never been easily available even within the scientific community. Those data sets which have been released often lack adequate documentation to make them readily understandable to an outside user. The general community, including state and local government and private sector interests, has had little opportunity to become aware of the existence of potentially useful data and it has not been easy to use data if they were available. In addition, the provisions of Public Law 98-365, the Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984, restrict NASA's dissemination of data from remote sensing research and development programmes to non-commercial users, and require an en bloc sale of distribution rights for other users. This approach comes from the desire to protect fledgling commercial remote sensing space segment operators (who would be licensees under the Act) from having their market undermined by dissemination of comparable NASA data at lower prices. NOAA
NOAA operates three data centres which serve as national archives for climatic, geophysical and oceanographic data, from many sources including satellites. In response to long-standing budget problems NOAA has undertaken several efforts at serious cost recovery at its data centres. As a result of decisions by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), NOAA has been required to support its basic mission in part with funds obtained from data sales. OMB policy until 1988 required that data collected for an agency's primary mission be made available to other users with recovery of only those incremental costs associated with making the data available. This meant there could be no recovery of costs associated with initial data collection or processing. The rationale for this approach is that if the taxpayers have already paid for weather satellite development, operation and product generation as part of the public service of providing weather observations and forecasts, the same taxpayers should not have to pay again for the same activities through purchases of retrospective weather data to be used in other pursuits such as projecting demand for air conditioning in a particular region or conducting research on global climate change. Thus the only costs which could be passed on to non-NOAA users are the costs of specialized processing, if any, some portion of the user services staff, the computer time and material costs to copy a tape or print out the data from a file, and the shipping costs. The NOAA data centres also serve as World Data Centers (WDCs) under an arrangement established after the International Geophysical Year in 1957, administered by the International Council of Scientific Unions and by the National Academy of Sciences for the US. Through the World Data Center System data can be exchanged at no cost among participating organizations on a quid pro quo or barter basis. In exchange for providing data to be included in the archive at a WDC, users may obtain a comparable amount of other data for their own use. There have been significant problems with the NOAA approach. NOAA's cost recovery efforts, even limited as they are, have resulted in a situation where it is more economical for some users of NOAA data to capture and process the data on their own by receiving satellite transmissions at their own ground stations rather than paying NOAA to
SPACE POLICY February 1990
47
Towards a coherent remote sensing data policy
do the work. N O A A ' s cost recovery effort has led to a rcducliorl ~ d e m a n d for N O A A services, which in turn has led to less revenue and ~l lesser degree of cost recovery. Meanwhile the cost of maintaining N O A A operations is not significantly reduced by a diminished demand for N O A A data and the agency remains a victim of chronic undcrfund ing. The national mandate to maintain a historical record of envirtmmental data is a public service which requires a certain level of funding regardless of the level of demand for data products from the user community in any given year, D e p e n d e n c e on revenues from cost recovery has contributed to the decay in capabilities at the N O A A archives, and the increasing difficulty for users in identifying and obtaining data of interest. For example, there is no central directory ~t what data N O A A holds. There are not even comprehensive catalogues and directories at each centre. The government must ensure that the nation's environmental archives are well maintained, and no( rely on data policy and cost recovery to fund these long-overdue improvements. If the government makes the necessary investment, data use is very likely to increase, with resulting economic growth and increases in the overall revenue base for the nation. In 1988, in an effort to increase income and support the philosophy ol privatization, Congress passed a new provision in the N O A A authorization bill, permitting the establishment of a 'two-tiered' pricing policy for retrospective data from the N O A A archives. Certain categories ol users, including government-funded researchers and international organizations with which N O A A has exchange agreements, would continue to have access to data on existing terms (marginal cost of reproduction and delivery), and other users would be charged a higher price based on a 'fair market value' to be determined by N O A A . This is likely to m a k e the situation even worse, since those users who arc most likely to apply the data for economic advantage (and thus generate more taxes and contribute to the national economy) ~re being discriminated against through differential pricing and are discouraged from using available, existing information already collected and paid for through general tax revenues. Landsat
Landsat data, which are collected by a private company, Eosat, under a contract with N O A A , are sold to all users on a non-discriminatory basis at prices set by Eosat based on its market assessment. A separate law governing the commercialization of remote sensing, the Land R e m o t e Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984, imposes requirements to be non-discriminatory in pricing data (ie to offer the same data and services to any user on the same terms), but allows the commercial entity to set prices at any level. A special a m e n d m e n t to the law provides for "data grants' to be offered to research users in exchange for the open availability of research results and provision of periodic reports to the D e p a r t m e n t of C o m m e r c e . This is another example of 'official' price discrimination based on usage which has been sanctioned. The revenues from the sales of Landsat data have proven insufficient to fund the development of new satellites, or even to cover the operating costs of the satellites currently in orbit and the processing and archiving system on the ground. On the other hand, the prices charged by Eosat for the data are sufficiently high to inhibit scientific use of the
48
SPACE POLICY February 1990
Towards a coherent remote sensing data policy
data. The data grants idea has not worked in practice, since Eosat has been very reluctant to use its authority in this regard. We are left with a situation where, as Dr Francis Bretherton says, 'We have the worst of all possible worlds: we are both spending the money and making sure we get nothing out of it. '1 The widely publicized 'Landsat rescue' carried out by the National Space Council has merely put off the inevitable day of reckoning for the system for another year. The fact remains that demand for satellite data is highly elastic, while the cost of producing, processing and archiving the data is quite expensive and unlikely to be reduced. There is no possible way to make money by developing and operating a satellite remote sensing system without subsidy from the government.
Wrong solution
1Eliot Marshall, 'Bringing NASA down to Earth', Science, Vol 244, p 1250.
SPACE POLICY February 1990
As things stand now, non-research users can be charged 'commercial' prices for retrospective data from NOAA's archives, and NASA has proposed a two-tiered pricing policy for EOS. For Landsat there is a 'commercial' price, with the provision of data grants to research users on a limited basis. The rationale is that scientific users will publish their research results, and in the case of EOS return algorithms, models, etc, to NASA for further dissemination to the scientific community. For NOAA, researchers either provide other data sets to the archives for redistribution, or publish results in the scientific literature. This constitutes a quid pro quo contribution to the programme, in lieu of paying a share of the programme cost in the data sales price. NOAA's motivations are strictly economic - to shift as much of the cost of data management as possible to the users to reduce budget requirements, consistent with the 'user fee' approach adopted during the Reagan Administration. Mindful of international obligations through the World Data Center system and other agreements, NOAA's legislation permits continued free or low-cost data provision in certain cases. Much effort has been spent within NOAA to determine the level of commercial potential represented by its data archives, with the overall conclusion that the task of maintaining and operating an archive is not a commercially viable venture. Some aspects of user services could be provided at a lower cost to the government through contracting out, and if there were some commercial incentives such as sharing some of the revenues as a function of increased sales, additional savings could possibly be realized. This does not begin, however, to resemble actual cost recovery, nor is it likely to generate enough revenue to make the significant improvements required to bring the NOAA data centres up to date with modern technology and ensure their ability to handle the large and increasing volumes of data anticipated. There are interagency efforts well underway to coordinate Earth observations data management and deal with the conflict between commercial and scientific objectives. The Interagency Working Group on Data Management for Global Change has developed a concept for a 'virtual' national data system to interconnect the various agency systems and archives in support of global change. One of the top-priority items on this group's agenda is pricing policy and data access. The current thinking at the technical working level is also to move to a two-tiered pricing policy, with the scientific/research community having access to data for the incremental cost of reproduction and transmission and the
49
Towards a coherent remote sensing data policy
remainder of users paying a price related to market charactcris[ic,, (which would vary with data type). This approach represents :t significant departure from past government practices, and is in lact similar to what was hoped would work for Landsat once the system was 'commercialized'. What is likely to make it work any better this tin-le':' The effect of the two-tiered pricing policy and other atlempts at "commercial' cost recovery is to limit the benefits realized from lhc analysis and application of remote sensing data and to penalize those prospective users who might make the most direct return to lhc [iS economy, ie the private sector. Commercial uscrs are taxpayers, to~, and their tax dollars funded the research and development and operations of remote sensing systems. They are among the intended beneficiaries of publicly funded research efforts to develop new sensing techniques and new processing algorithms, extract maximum intornmtion content from data and integrate data from multiple sources to develop and test models of various elements of the Earth system. The proposed continuation and extension of the two-tiered pricing policy now in effect for retrospective data from N O A A to EOS and other NASA Earth science mission data will hinder the achievement of the objectives of the Global Change Program and of EOS, and will be detrimental to the national interest. True non-discriminatory access, regardless of the user's intended end use, will generate more revenue and contribute to economic growth more than attempts at cost recovery through commercial data sales. The key issue is al what point policy makers measure costs and benefits. As an example, if the rationale for developing better understanding of hydrologic cycles and ecological processes includes helping farmers use their land more productively and manage water resources more efficiently, but farmers cannot afford to buy data to apply the techniques nor buy the analysis from value-added intermediaries who have to buy the data, who are we helping? The public benefits of increased agricultural productivity in terms of taxes paid, employment provided, pollution and soil erosion reduced, and increased exports should far exceed any revenues from charging a higher price for EOS or N O A A data to agribusiness than to a research ecologist. Similarily, if commercial housing developers want to understand earthquake risks and geological structure in an area, should they have to pay more for that understanding (directly in buying data or through value-added firms) than a scientist who is publishing an article in a scientific journal? Each user is contributing something to the public good - the developer may provide safer housing by avoiding potential quake zones in addition to creating jobs and generating tax revenues. while the scientist is advancing scientific understanding. Furthermore, there is a cost to having two separate distribution systems. Coordinating the science data system with a commercial system introduces complexities including: •
•
•
50
the initial en b l o c sale procedure, preparation of background documents, market assessments, procurement process, evaluation of bids, etc; the administrative process for determining for the life of the programme which category users fit into, explaining the differences, obtaining research user pledges to eschew commercial applications: coordinating data acquisition and production in parallel systems. For EOS it is not clear if the commercial distributor is intended to
SPACE POLICY February 1990
Towards a coherent remote sensing data policy
establish a separate processing system and obtain a data stream at the raw data source, or to depend on the EOS Data and Information System to provide the products which the commercial vendor sells at a higher price. In either case there is an impact on NASA. The provision of a raw data stream needs to be designed into the ground system and scheduling and engineering information needs to be provided to two processing systems. If the commercial vendor relies on EOSDIS, there needs to be a conflict resolution/ priority system between the two parties to ensure that resource allocations are made appropriately.
Simple, coherent policy We propose a single, low-cost access policy for users from within participating countries, with a higher price to non-participants. (There might be some circumstances under which the US would wish to grant 'participant' prices to a non-participant nation, eg for development purposes, but this is a foreign policy rather than data policy issue and should be dealt with in a separate analysis.) Data distribution should be considered a governmental function, with consideration given to contracting out the necessary services if this is a more cost-effective approach. For new satellites and data systems, planning, from the start, for a single, integrated and efficient system (which may involve more than one physical location, but has centralized management) should be more cost effective. For example, the EOSDIS operator would have only one criterion for discrimination: whether the requestor was from a country which was a partner in the programme or not. Any requestor from a member state of ESA would have favourable terms. A requestor from the USSR would not. There does not need to be an independent commercial distribution system to implement this practical distinction. For NOAA, where the programmes are already in place, the users would all be treated the same. Fortunately, one of the lessons of Landsat and the past NASA missions seems to have had a real effect on NASA planning. There is nearly universal agreement that data systems are one of the critical elements of a global change monitoring system, and that a much higher percentage of overall programme resources must be devoted to creation of a highly capable data and information system. Protection of prospective commercial space segment operators has turned out to be an empty objective. The hopes for commercial viability in this area have been proven to be unrealistic. Among the serious obstacles to commercial investment is the ever-changing US government policy and the ripple effect as other countries respond in kind. The US government should state its intention clearly and strongly to provide truly non-discriminatory data access with cooperative partners having access to all data for any purpose at a nominal cost, and users from non-participating countries paying a multiple of that cost. The government should commit itself to maintaining that policy for at least 20 years. This should make a significant contribution to the growth of remote sensing. Commercial entities would have confidence in knowing what government policy is. There are undoubtedly market niches which the government's programmes cannot and should not fill, since R&D programmes are driven by considerations different from
SPACE POLICY February 1990
51
Towards a coherent remote sensing data policy
those of commercial programmes. With knowledge of wh~t~ ~h~' government's role is, the private sector would have the ability to come up with creative commercial approaches to serving the other market segments. If we value research and science as the highest prioritic~ thct~ let the government define the baseline as what Earth science requirc~. and stick to that, and let the private sector have ~ccess to the dater th;:~l result in a fair and non-discriminatory way and fill in around it wilh commercial activities. Let us not punish a user who wants to take the results of a research and development programme and apply it to Ihc greater economic good. Despite the demonstrated impossibility of making money operating ~l whole system, there is a clear market for 'custom" value added products produced from satellite data. In fact, this 'spin-off' market is one of the public goods resulting from the public investment in remote sensing technology. There is no valid argument to be made against stimulation of growth in private industry, especially clean, high-tech, knowlcdgcbased service industry. The US government has ;~ long and successful history of making large public investments in infrastructure that allow whole fields of private commerce to flourish. The need for a maiol government initiative to study global change is already established, and the political decision to fund large parts of the infrastructure has already been made. The incremental cost of allowing commercial users access t~, data at the same price is negligible, and the likely benefits ;~rc substantial.
Conclusions The key to a coherent data policy lies in establishing a hierarchy of goals. Clearly, the widest possible dissemination of data should be the primary goal. This is based on the assumption that distribution of all space-based remote sensing data is a public good, extending the argument already applied to weather data. The political decisions have already been made to increase the input into the system. This makes it imperative to reform the system itself, which is already breaking down under the current load. This is not to argue that efforts at cost recovery should be abandoned, but rather to make the point that cost recovery should not interfere with the dissemination of data. C o s t recovery is not a valid goal in and of itself for a system designed to achieve the widest possible dissemination of data and to increase the production of knowledge.
52
SPACE POLICY February 1990
Lisa R. Shaffer and Peter Backlund
The USA is facing a major challenge in Earth science and remote sensing data policy. A new generation of remote sensing satellites is being developed and prepared for launch in the US and its space partners. Within the US the Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS), the joint US-French Topex/Poseidon, the continued and enhanced operational environmental satellite series provided by the US Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the NASA EOS/Polar platforms will combine to create a new set of technical capabilities in Earth observation. The vast increases in technical capability, data flow and US government investment in data analysis and related research require a careful consideration of how remotely sensed data are managed and distributed. Capabilities will be increasing quickly outside the US as Lisa Shaffer is a Research Scientist at the well, with the launches of the European Space Agency's Earth George Washington University's Space Resources Satellite (ERS-1), the Japanese Earth Resources Satellite Policy Institute, Washington, DC 20052, USA. Peter Backlund is the International (JERS-1), and Advanced Earth Observations Satellite (ADEOS), the Affairs specialist for SM Systems and Research Corporation (SMSRC), European and Japanese polar platforms, and others. The fact that remote sensing by satellite is an inherently international activity Washington, DC 20024, USA. performed by national and regional entities provides additional opporThis paper was prepared with support from NASA Headquarters and submitted to the tunities and challenges, particularly in data policy. Nevertheless, the Environmental Research Institute of Michi- existence of common scientific goals and the considerable influence of gan's September 1989 conference, 'Earth the US offer hope that data policies can be developed that satisfy the observations and global change decision needs of both the US and its allies. making: a national partnership', The challenge is twofold: The US must develop a consistent internal system of data management and dissemination while leading an effort to create a similar system on an international scale. This article focuses on the first step, development of domestic policy, which is necessary for the US to be able to exert a positive influence on the development of an international system which meets our needs. It assumes that developing a sensible data policy for the NASA Earth Observing System (EOS) is the major part of developing a US domestic data policy, for the EOS Data and Information System (EOSDIS) will be the distribution mechanism for a major portion of space-based data acquired by the US in the 1990s. The approach suggested contributes to the objectives of
Access to space-based remote sensing data is critical for Earth science and the study of global change. This article summarizes a variety of US government Earth science data policies and problems. The authors examine current efforts to develop data policies for the next generation of US remote sensing programmes, noting likely problems based on pest experiences. They argue that the goal of US Earth science data policy should be to provide the widest possible dissemination of data. Setting such a goal permits the development of a simple, coherent data policy that serves scientific, commercial and US government interests.
0265-9646/90/010045-08 $03.00 © 1990 Butterworth & Co (Publishers) Ltd
45
Towards a coherent remote sensing data policy
supporting research and development, encouraging widespread use ~t satellite remotely sensed data and the growth of appropriate and viable commercial enterprises associated with space applications.
Basic problem Throughout the US government, data collected from publicly funded programmes are being distributed to different users in accordance with a wide range of policies, at different prices, with varying restrictions. As the Earth science/global change community becomes more coherenl, and as interagency and international programmes develop and arc implemented, the need for a consistent, sensible policy basis for data dissemination becomes more critical. Currently, the principle of "non-discriminatory' access to data is given wide verbal acceptance, but in fact current policies are blatantly and explicitly discriminatory. There is universal acceptance of the concept of open data availability, meaning that all data are available to all users under some terms. The issue is what classes of users are defined and what access terms are offered. This article asserts that the original Landsat approach of making all data available to all users on the same terms best meets US objectives. The authors contend that true non-discriminatory pricing, with differentiation based not on the type of user but only on whether or not the user's country/agency is contributing to the programme providing the data, is the most beneficial and cost-effective approach. Current attempts to achieve commercialization and cost recovery in remote sensing are inhibiting the wide dissemination of data. Limiting the distribution of data interferes with global change research and encourages survival of unsustainable business ventures through government subsidy while inhibiting potential economic growth which could result from the widespread applications of results from satellite remote sensing. The latest innovation in data policy, 'two-tiered pricing', allows research users to obtain data at the cost of reproduction and distribution, while charging ~commercial' prices to other users. This represents an ill-conceived attempt to protect the research community's needs while preserving the fiction of commercialization. The result is likely to further complicate the situation without alleviating the primary problem. The goal of US Earth science data policy should be to provide the widest possible dissemination of data. This permits the development of a simple, coherent data policy that serves scientific, commercial and [IS government interests.
Current domestic situation NASA NASA has generally provided data at no cost to its designated principal investigators (PIs), many of whom were in fact involved in the design of the instruments generating the data of interest. PIs received a period of exclusive access to the data, often a year or more. If the PI eventually produced a 'clean' and documented data set and provided it to the N A S A archive, the data were then offered to the research community at a nominal cost. PIs often make copies of data sets available to colleagues directly as well. Users from outside the NASA community were required to wait until the P1 released data, and had to accept the
46
SPACE POLICY February 1990
Towards a coherent remote sensing data policy
data set in the condition it was made available. In the absence of a comprehensive directory system, and with little pressure put on PIs to make their data available, much data has never been easily available even within the scientific community. Those data sets which have been released often lack adequate documentation to make them readily understandable to an outside user. The general community, including state and local government and private sector interests, has had little opportunity to become aware of the existence of potentially useful data and it has not been easy to use data if they were available. In addition, the provisions of Public Law 98-365, the Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984, restrict NASA's dissemination of data from remote sensing research and development programmes to non-commercial users, and require an en bloc sale of distribution rights for other users. This approach comes from the desire to protect fledgling commercial remote sensing space segment operators (who would be licensees under the Act) from having their market undermined by dissemination of comparable NASA data at lower prices. NOAA
NOAA operates three data centres which serve as national archives for climatic, geophysical and oceanographic data, from many sources including satellites. In response to long-standing budget problems NOAA has undertaken several efforts at serious cost recovery at its data centres. As a result of decisions by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), NOAA has been required to support its basic mission in part with funds obtained from data sales. OMB policy until 1988 required that data collected for an agency's primary mission be made available to other users with recovery of only those incremental costs associated with making the data available. This meant there could be no recovery of costs associated with initial data collection or processing. The rationale for this approach is that if the taxpayers have already paid for weather satellite development, operation and product generation as part of the public service of providing weather observations and forecasts, the same taxpayers should not have to pay again for the same activities through purchases of retrospective weather data to be used in other pursuits such as projecting demand for air conditioning in a particular region or conducting research on global climate change. Thus the only costs which could be passed on to non-NOAA users are the costs of specialized processing, if any, some portion of the user services staff, the computer time and material costs to copy a tape or print out the data from a file, and the shipping costs. The NOAA data centres also serve as World Data Centers (WDCs) under an arrangement established after the International Geophysical Year in 1957, administered by the International Council of Scientific Unions and by the National Academy of Sciences for the US. Through the World Data Center System data can be exchanged at no cost among participating organizations on a quid pro quo or barter basis. In exchange for providing data to be included in the archive at a WDC, users may obtain a comparable amount of other data for their own use. There have been significant problems with the NOAA approach. NOAA's cost recovery efforts, even limited as they are, have resulted in a situation where it is more economical for some users of NOAA data to capture and process the data on their own by receiving satellite transmissions at their own ground stations rather than paying NOAA to
SPACE POLICY February 1990
47
Towards a coherent remote sensing data policy
do the work. N O A A ' s cost recovery effort has led to a rcducliorl ~ d e m a n d for N O A A services, which in turn has led to less revenue and ~l lesser degree of cost recovery. Meanwhile the cost of maintaining N O A A operations is not significantly reduced by a diminished demand for N O A A data and the agency remains a victim of chronic undcrfund ing. The national mandate to maintain a historical record of envirtmmental data is a public service which requires a certain level of funding regardless of the level of demand for data products from the user community in any given year, D e p e n d e n c e on revenues from cost recovery has contributed to the decay in capabilities at the N O A A archives, and the increasing difficulty for users in identifying and obtaining data of interest. For example, there is no central directory ~t what data N O A A holds. There are not even comprehensive catalogues and directories at each centre. The government must ensure that the nation's environmental archives are well maintained, and no( rely on data policy and cost recovery to fund these long-overdue improvements. If the government makes the necessary investment, data use is very likely to increase, with resulting economic growth and increases in the overall revenue base for the nation. In 1988, in an effort to increase income and support the philosophy ol privatization, Congress passed a new provision in the N O A A authorization bill, permitting the establishment of a 'two-tiered' pricing policy for retrospective data from the N O A A archives. Certain categories ol users, including government-funded researchers and international organizations with which N O A A has exchange agreements, would continue to have access to data on existing terms (marginal cost of reproduction and delivery), and other users would be charged a higher price based on a 'fair market value' to be determined by N O A A . This is likely to m a k e the situation even worse, since those users who arc most likely to apply the data for economic advantage (and thus generate more taxes and contribute to the national economy) ~re being discriminated against through differential pricing and are discouraged from using available, existing information already collected and paid for through general tax revenues. Landsat
Landsat data, which are collected by a private company, Eosat, under a contract with N O A A , are sold to all users on a non-discriminatory basis at prices set by Eosat based on its market assessment. A separate law governing the commercialization of remote sensing, the Land R e m o t e Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984, imposes requirements to be non-discriminatory in pricing data (ie to offer the same data and services to any user on the same terms), but allows the commercial entity to set prices at any level. A special a m e n d m e n t to the law provides for "data grants' to be offered to research users in exchange for the open availability of research results and provision of periodic reports to the D e p a r t m e n t of C o m m e r c e . This is another example of 'official' price discrimination based on usage which has been sanctioned. The revenues from the sales of Landsat data have proven insufficient to fund the development of new satellites, or even to cover the operating costs of the satellites currently in orbit and the processing and archiving system on the ground. On the other hand, the prices charged by Eosat for the data are sufficiently high to inhibit scientific use of the
48
SPACE POLICY February 1990
Towards a coherent remote sensing data policy
data. The data grants idea has not worked in practice, since Eosat has been very reluctant to use its authority in this regard. We are left with a situation where, as Dr Francis Bretherton says, 'We have the worst of all possible worlds: we are both spending the money and making sure we get nothing out of it. '1 The widely publicized 'Landsat rescue' carried out by the National Space Council has merely put off the inevitable day of reckoning for the system for another year. The fact remains that demand for satellite data is highly elastic, while the cost of producing, processing and archiving the data is quite expensive and unlikely to be reduced. There is no possible way to make money by developing and operating a satellite remote sensing system without subsidy from the government.
Wrong solution
1Eliot Marshall, 'Bringing NASA down to Earth', Science, Vol 244, p 1250.
SPACE POLICY February 1990
As things stand now, non-research users can be charged 'commercial' prices for retrospective data from NOAA's archives, and NASA has proposed a two-tiered pricing policy for EOS. For Landsat there is a 'commercial' price, with the provision of data grants to research users on a limited basis. The rationale is that scientific users will publish their research results, and in the case of EOS return algorithms, models, etc, to NASA for further dissemination to the scientific community. For NOAA, researchers either provide other data sets to the archives for redistribution, or publish results in the scientific literature. This constitutes a quid pro quo contribution to the programme, in lieu of paying a share of the programme cost in the data sales price. NOAA's motivations are strictly economic - to shift as much of the cost of data management as possible to the users to reduce budget requirements, consistent with the 'user fee' approach adopted during the Reagan Administration. Mindful of international obligations through the World Data Center system and other agreements, NOAA's legislation permits continued free or low-cost data provision in certain cases. Much effort has been spent within NOAA to determine the level of commercial potential represented by its data archives, with the overall conclusion that the task of maintaining and operating an archive is not a commercially viable venture. Some aspects of user services could be provided at a lower cost to the government through contracting out, and if there were some commercial incentives such as sharing some of the revenues as a function of increased sales, additional savings could possibly be realized. This does not begin, however, to resemble actual cost recovery, nor is it likely to generate enough revenue to make the significant improvements required to bring the NOAA data centres up to date with modern technology and ensure their ability to handle the large and increasing volumes of data anticipated. There are interagency efforts well underway to coordinate Earth observations data management and deal with the conflict between commercial and scientific objectives. The Interagency Working Group on Data Management for Global Change has developed a concept for a 'virtual' national data system to interconnect the various agency systems and archives in support of global change. One of the top-priority items on this group's agenda is pricing policy and data access. The current thinking at the technical working level is also to move to a two-tiered pricing policy, with the scientific/research community having access to data for the incremental cost of reproduction and transmission and the
49
Towards a coherent remote sensing data policy
remainder of users paying a price related to market charactcris[ic,, (which would vary with data type). This approach represents :t significant departure from past government practices, and is in lact similar to what was hoped would work for Landsat once the system was 'commercialized'. What is likely to make it work any better this tin-le':' The effect of the two-tiered pricing policy and other atlempts at "commercial' cost recovery is to limit the benefits realized from lhc analysis and application of remote sensing data and to penalize those prospective users who might make the most direct return to lhc [iS economy, ie the private sector. Commercial uscrs are taxpayers, to~, and their tax dollars funded the research and development and operations of remote sensing systems. They are among the intended beneficiaries of publicly funded research efforts to develop new sensing techniques and new processing algorithms, extract maximum intornmtion content from data and integrate data from multiple sources to develop and test models of various elements of the Earth system. The proposed continuation and extension of the two-tiered pricing policy now in effect for retrospective data from N O A A to EOS and other NASA Earth science mission data will hinder the achievement of the objectives of the Global Change Program and of EOS, and will be detrimental to the national interest. True non-discriminatory access, regardless of the user's intended end use, will generate more revenue and contribute to economic growth more than attempts at cost recovery through commercial data sales. The key issue is al what point policy makers measure costs and benefits. As an example, if the rationale for developing better understanding of hydrologic cycles and ecological processes includes helping farmers use their land more productively and manage water resources more efficiently, but farmers cannot afford to buy data to apply the techniques nor buy the analysis from value-added intermediaries who have to buy the data, who are we helping? The public benefits of increased agricultural productivity in terms of taxes paid, employment provided, pollution and soil erosion reduced, and increased exports should far exceed any revenues from charging a higher price for EOS or N O A A data to agribusiness than to a research ecologist. Similarily, if commercial housing developers want to understand earthquake risks and geological structure in an area, should they have to pay more for that understanding (directly in buying data or through value-added firms) than a scientist who is publishing an article in a scientific journal? Each user is contributing something to the public good - the developer may provide safer housing by avoiding potential quake zones in addition to creating jobs and generating tax revenues. while the scientist is advancing scientific understanding. Furthermore, there is a cost to having two separate distribution systems. Coordinating the science data system with a commercial system introduces complexities including: •
•
•
50
the initial en b l o c sale procedure, preparation of background documents, market assessments, procurement process, evaluation of bids, etc; the administrative process for determining for the life of the programme which category users fit into, explaining the differences, obtaining research user pledges to eschew commercial applications: coordinating data acquisition and production in parallel systems. For EOS it is not clear if the commercial distributor is intended to
SPACE POLICY February 1990
Towards a coherent remote sensing data policy
establish a separate processing system and obtain a data stream at the raw data source, or to depend on the EOS Data and Information System to provide the products which the commercial vendor sells at a higher price. In either case there is an impact on NASA. The provision of a raw data stream needs to be designed into the ground system and scheduling and engineering information needs to be provided to two processing systems. If the commercial vendor relies on EOSDIS, there needs to be a conflict resolution/ priority system between the two parties to ensure that resource allocations are made appropriately.
Simple, coherent policy We propose a single, low-cost access policy for users from within participating countries, with a higher price to non-participants. (There might be some circumstances under which the US would wish to grant 'participant' prices to a non-participant nation, eg for development purposes, but this is a foreign policy rather than data policy issue and should be dealt with in a separate analysis.) Data distribution should be considered a governmental function, with consideration given to contracting out the necessary services if this is a more cost-effective approach. For new satellites and data systems, planning, from the start, for a single, integrated and efficient system (which may involve more than one physical location, but has centralized management) should be more cost effective. For example, the EOSDIS operator would have only one criterion for discrimination: whether the requestor was from a country which was a partner in the programme or not. Any requestor from a member state of ESA would have favourable terms. A requestor from the USSR would not. There does not need to be an independent commercial distribution system to implement this practical distinction. For NOAA, where the programmes are already in place, the users would all be treated the same. Fortunately, one of the lessons of Landsat and the past NASA missions seems to have had a real effect on NASA planning. There is nearly universal agreement that data systems are one of the critical elements of a global change monitoring system, and that a much higher percentage of overall programme resources must be devoted to creation of a highly capable data and information system. Protection of prospective commercial space segment operators has turned out to be an empty objective. The hopes for commercial viability in this area have been proven to be unrealistic. Among the serious obstacles to commercial investment is the ever-changing US government policy and the ripple effect as other countries respond in kind. The US government should state its intention clearly and strongly to provide truly non-discriminatory data access with cooperative partners having access to all data for any purpose at a nominal cost, and users from non-participating countries paying a multiple of that cost. The government should commit itself to maintaining that policy for at least 20 years. This should make a significant contribution to the growth of remote sensing. Commercial entities would have confidence in knowing what government policy is. There are undoubtedly market niches which the government's programmes cannot and should not fill, since R&D programmes are driven by considerations different from
SPACE POLICY February 1990
51
Towards a coherent remote sensing data policy
those of commercial programmes. With knowledge of wh~t~ ~h~' government's role is, the private sector would have the ability to come up with creative commercial approaches to serving the other market segments. If we value research and science as the highest prioritic~ thct~ let the government define the baseline as what Earth science requirc~. and stick to that, and let the private sector have ~ccess to the dater th;:~l result in a fair and non-discriminatory way and fill in around it wilh commercial activities. Let us not punish a user who wants to take the results of a research and development programme and apply it to Ihc greater economic good. Despite the demonstrated impossibility of making money operating ~l whole system, there is a clear market for 'custom" value added products produced from satellite data. In fact, this 'spin-off' market is one of the public goods resulting from the public investment in remote sensing technology. There is no valid argument to be made against stimulation of growth in private industry, especially clean, high-tech, knowlcdgcbased service industry. The US government has ;~ long and successful history of making large public investments in infrastructure that allow whole fields of private commerce to flourish. The need for a maiol government initiative to study global change is already established, and the political decision to fund large parts of the infrastructure has already been made. The incremental cost of allowing commercial users access t~, data at the same price is negligible, and the likely benefits ;~rc substantial.
Conclusions The key to a coherent data policy lies in establishing a hierarchy of goals. Clearly, the widest possible dissemination of data should be the primary goal. This is based on the assumption that distribution of all space-based remote sensing data is a public good, extending the argument already applied to weather data. The political decisions have already been made to increase the input into the system. This makes it imperative to reform the system itself, which is already breaking down under the current load. This is not to argue that efforts at cost recovery should be abandoned, but rather to make the point that cost recovery should not interfere with the dissemination of data. C o s t recovery is not a valid goal in and of itself for a system designed to achieve the widest possible dissemination of data and to increase the production of knowledge.
52
SPACE POLICY February 1990