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Training SWAT teams: implications for improving tactical units
Journal of Criminal Justice 28 (2000) 407 ± 413
Training SWAT teams Implications for improving tactical units Joanna G. Clarka, Mary S. Jacksona, Peggy M. Schaeferb, E. Gail Sharpea,* a
Criminal Justice Studies, East Carolina University, 200 B Ragsdale Building, Greenville, NC 27858, USA b North Carolina Justice Academy, Salemburg, NC, USA
Abstract As terrorism and other forms of violence continue to increase in American society, there is a growing need for law enforcement agencies to utilize Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) or Tactical Teams. There is, however, very little research available on SWAT units, and even less information on the training needs of these specialized divisions. This article describes the results of an exploratory study conducted to consider the training needs of SWAT units in North Carolina. A survey was administered to sixty-five law enforcement organizations. Results and implications are discussed. D 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction To serve and protect has traditionally been the motto of police departments throughout the United States, and the community policing (community residents aid in crime reduction efforts) approach has been received with great enthusiasm by citizens. In order, however, to protect law-abiding citizens from the dangers of rising crime, reactive law enforcement has become necessary and mandatory. This approach has received limited publication in ``scholarly'' journals primarily because the use of deadly force is not a topic that researchers willingly discuss unless it is within the context of constitutional issues. As America moves, however, into the next millennium, societal needs will have changed and thus created a need to consider the readiness of law enforcement's specialized units, such as Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) units, during acts of terrorism or in the war against drugs.
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-252-328-1447; fax: +1-252-328-4196.
The SWAT units are designed to resolve crisis situations that regular police officers may not be trained to handle, or may not be within the scope of their job responsibilities (Davidson, 1979). For example, special units such as SWAT teams are used for these unique situations involving hostages and barricaded hostile individuals, clearing dangerous areas, riotous situations, and events involving snipers (Snow, 1996). Extraordinary preparation is thus required for appropriately handling these occurrences. SWAT teams evolved in law enforcement in the late 1960s and 1970s, and were primarily utilized to assist local police and national guard units with social control in a society plagued with turbulence and violent crimes (Hillman, 1988; Lesce, 1996). Many times, their duties and responsibilities involved riot dispersion, crowd control and hostage situations. The last ten years, however, have shown that there has been an escalated need to use SWAT teams because of a dramatic increase in illegal drug activity, volatile barricaded incidents, and terrorist situations in American society. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has defined terrorism as any
0047-2352/00/$ ± see front matter D 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 0 4 7 - 2 3 5 2 ( 0 0 ) 0 0 0 5 5 - 6
408
J.G. Clark et al. / Journal of Criminal Justice 28 (2000) 407±413
act of violence by individuals or groups against the U.S. government. They have delineated terrorist acts into nine different categories (Kaplan & Skolnick, 1982) with each of the categories falling under domestic or international terrorism. Although American society has experienced acts of terrorism in the past, America has never been as vulnerable to terrorist acts as she is presently. This is primarily due to the country's conflictual encounters with Iraq's leader Saddam Hussein. There is also an increased need to not only recruit officers who have received specialized tactical training (prior military service) but also to ensure that ongoing training is available for these units. SWAT members are usually men and women with special skills in firearms, physical fitness and tactical maneuvering. Because SWAT teams are often called upon to respond to situations where the use of deadly force may be applied, continuous training of these officers is of paramount importance. Contrary to popular media portrayal, the effectiveness of SWAT teams is not based on the frequency of their use of force, but is assessed by the numerous tactical options used by the teams, as well as the response to their use received from the community, law enforcement officers and legislators. The United States had not experienced increased overt acts of terrorism on U.S. soil until the 1990s Ð with the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 and the Oklahoma City Federal building in 1995. As a result of these bombings, 175 American citizens died and over one thousand were injured. These incidents prompted federal law enforcement organizations to extend their recruitment and training of special tactical units. In addition, state and local law enforcement organizations had to enlarge the scope of their training due not only to local militia activities, but also to situations where large quantities of drugs are under investigation as well. With the increased drug trafficking and domestic terrorists acts, there has been a need for law enforcement organizations to ensure that their special tactical units' personnel receive ongoing training in tactical preparedness. These escalations are substantiated in North Carolina by the fact that twenty-eight out of the forty-two teams in existence are less than ten years old. Conceptual framework The conceptual thinking of Jiao (1998) for formulating a framework for policing will guide the conceptual process. Roberg and KuyKendell (1993) have placed policing in a scientific framework by delineating different types of policing. The scientific
practice of policing has been furthered by providing models that are used for research activities: crime control and due process. The due process model ensures that terrorist's individual rights are emphasized under the constitution while the crime control model stresses the need to apprehend suspects and repress terrorist activity while protecting citizens undergoing terrorist's attacks. Although the crime control model has been the model of preference in the 1990s, discussions have been limited to getting tough on drug dealers, young violent offenders and gang members. There has been limited overt discussion about controlling terrorists attacks against the United States and its citizens. With increased threats from Saddam Hussein and other terrorists and terrorist activities, the combination of both a proactive and a reactive approach seems to be in order. Proactive and reactive approaches to terrorism A proactive approach to terrorism is one of prevention in which collaborative efforts by agencies attempt to preserve the peace and prevent crime. Applying the principles of proactive policing strategies in situations where terrorism may be suspected would not only enhance the likelihood of reducing terrorist activity in the area, but would create a situation where the terrorist would really have to consider whether the risk is worthwhile. Proactivity entails constant dialogue with the suspect along with high visibility by law enforcement officers. While reactive police approaches have been criticized by some segments of the population, in situations of terrorist attacks, reactive policing may be the most appropriate approach. This approach is also termed problem-oriented policing by Goldstein (1990). According to Miller and Hess (1994), problemoriented policing occurs when law enforcement officers are faced with a problem and they decide how best to handle the problem (p. 464). In situations involving terrorism and/or sniper attacks on citizens, there is limited time to ponder over the situation. Why? Because the longer the officers ponder, the more lives are likely to be lost, and thus, the officer has to quickly make decisions about what to do in such a position. Often, the options are few. These officers must be trained to respond quickly and make the most efficient decision that will provide the most effective outcome for the majority of citizens involved. Efficiency and effectiveness are, thus, two major components of the approach as described by Goldstein (1990). The problem-oriented policing
J.G. Clark et al. / Journal of Criminal Justice 28 (2000) 407±413
model has four stages: scanning, analysis, response, and assessment. Scanning occurs when the organization or individual officers are alerted that there is a problem and the need exists to have special tactical units in place on the scene. Analysis of the situation occurs when the team leader must gather as much information as possible to determine the nature and scope of the problem that the unit has to control. Initially, the overall consideration is given to protecting citizens at all cost. Response implies the need to quickly remedy the issue with as few lives lost as possible. Alternatives are considered, and after weighing the pros and cons for each alternative, action can then be taken. Assessment is the period when the special units team will debrief and consider all actions taken in the situation. Participants will then consider the appropriateness of decisions made based on the circumstances. Consideration of techniques that may be implemented to improve the efficiency of response to future similar situations will also be discussed at this point. Finally, considerations will focus on whether they achieved the desired outcome from the situation, and how efficiently they did their job. Although problem-oriented policing does not receive as much notoriety in the media or from legislators as community-oriented policing, it is an extremely important approach that should not be dismissed. Federal agencies have continued to understand the importance of problem-oriented policing; this is evidenced by the fact that they have continued to provide ongoing training for agents in special tactical teams. Information about these special teams is usually based on FBI prototypes or media-depicted gun-crazed shooters. There is limited research offering a profile of the dedicated men and women who comprise these special tactical teams. It has only been recently, however, that local county and state law enforcement units have begun to offer training in special tactics. These escalations are substantiated in North Carolina by the fact that twenty-eight out of the forty-two teams in existence are less than ten years old. The first of these tactical units appeared in Charlotte, NC in 1974, and since then, teams of various sizes and capabilities have formed throughout the state. On the average, the number of officers per team is thirteen, with the smallest known team having only six officers and the largest, forty-two. There are also great variations in equipment and training. Presently, limited research providing information on the extent and nature of training procedures and requirements of SWAT teams exists. The purpose of this exploratory study was to determine the existence,
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training procedures, requirements and activation purposes of SWAT teams in forty-two law enforcement organizations in North Carolina. Method Sample The sample consisted of sixty-four SWAT team leaders at police departments across North Carolina. The departments varied greatly in size, ranging from 11 to 1251 officers. Of the respondents, nine were from metropolitan areas with populations of 100,000 plus, four came from remote rural locations of 10,000 residents or less, and the majority of the respondents (twenty-nine) came from middlesized cities with populations ranging from 10,000 to 100,000. The national trend for the naming of tactical teams has been to use more ``toned down'' terms instead of the high-profile SWAT, such as ERT or ESU (Emergency Response Team or Emergency Service Unit). That trend is well represented by the many different names used in North Carolina. Of the forty-two teams surveyed, only three teams are called SWAT, the other thirty-eight teams use Special Response Team (SRT) or other alternative names. The diversity of names in the state is further illustrated by the fact that besides SWAT and SRT, there are eleven other terms used to define tactical teams. Some examples of the other names used throughout the state are: Special Operations Team, Tactical Apprehension and Control Team, Selective Enforcement Unit and Problem Area Tactical Team. Presently, however, SWAT is understood and recognized more readily than the others. Procedure In order to begin the study, a compilation list of tactical teams within the state was needed. The base of the list of teams came from a mailing list compiled by the North Carolina Justice Academy (NCJA). This academy is responsible for providing the training of law enforcement officers as well as other criminal justice professionals in the state. In order to have as much participation as possible, a message was sent out on the Department of Criminal Information (DCI) terminal requesting that agencies that have tactical teams respond with an address. After the list was completed, a survey instrument was sent to sixty-four departments. The survey was designed by the NCJA and consisted of twenty-nine
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Fig. 1. Rationale for SWAT unit.
items. Each agency's SWAT/SRT Commander was responsible for responding to the survey items. The instructions to the commanders were to simply complete the survey and return it to the NCJA staff member as soon as possible. Approximately two weeks after the mailing, follow-up phone calls were made to the non-respondents. Key questions that the respondents were asked to answer included the following: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Where do you receive your training? What type of training do you need? How many hours per month do you train? Do you train with hostage negotiators? Do you train with snipers? What are the reasons for the activation of your tactical teams?
Data analysis Of the sixty-four surveys mailed, forty-two were completed and returned (65 percent response rate) within the requested time frame. There are varied reasons that departments initiated SWAT teams; the following list describes some of them. Seventyeight percent of the departments reported that they started their SWAT units due to interest expressed by the officers, while 52 percent noted that their SWAT teams were launched because of the drug problem in their area. Forty percent noted the increase in crime and specific violent incidents in their area as the rationale for initiating their SWAT units (see Fig. 1). Tactical teams in North Carolina showed considerable variations in the qualifications required for team members. Of the forty-two teams surveyed, 90 percent required a positive work history, 83 percent a minimum number of years in the department, 74
percent passing a firearms testing, 67 percent physical fitness testing, and 52 percent recommendation of a supervisor. Less than half of the teams in the state required either psychological testing (38 percent) or special testing. One aspect of training that was examined was a description of the type of training the team leaders believed their teams required. Seventy-six percent of team leaders expressed a need for incident command training, 76 percent for team building training, 73 percent for advanced SWAT training, 59 percent for flash bang, 57 percent for explosive entry, and 52 percent for basic SWAT training (see Fig. 2). Another aspect of tactical team training was ``Where do you receive your training?'' Of the teams surveyed, 76 percent has received training at community colleges, 50 percent at the NCJA, 38 percent at military institutions, 28 percent with private companies, and 33 percent from some other type of training provider (see Fig. 3). Data related to training hours, sniper training, and hostage negotiations indicated that North Carolina's tactical teams train an average 8.69 h/month, but the actual amount of time devoted to training ranged from as few as 0 hours in some departments to as many as 32 hours/month in others. Eighty-one percent of the respondents indicated that their teams train with snipers in the hope of learning from them and reaching a similar level of proficiency. The tactical teams in the sample trained with them. Of the teams surveyed, 48 percent trained with their department's hostage negotiators while 45 percent did not (7 percent of respondents did not answer). This indicates that twenty departments in the sample did not train with their hostage negotiators. Lastly, the study sought to learn the reasons for the activation of tactical teams. During the calendar year of 1995, the teams in the survey were activated a
Fig. 2. Type of training needed.
J.G. Clark et al. / Journal of Criminal Justice 28 (2000) 407±413
Fig. 3. Training provider.
total of 585 times. Of those 585 activations, 55 percent was drug-related, 51 percent was for warrant or high-risk fugitives, 21 percent was for barricaded subject incidents, and 6 percent involved hostages (see Table 1). Results The tactical teams in the study indicated several different reasons as to why their units were formed. The departments which had newer teams reported drug problems as their reason for creating a tactical team. In addition, 64 percent of teams that have been in existence for less than ten years also listed drug problems as the basis for starting their team. This is not true for the older teams of which only 29 percent began in response to a drug problem. This illustrates the effect of the drug boom of the 1980s, from which resulted the creation of several newer tactical teams. Seventy-one percent of the departments who have teams ten years or older cited the interest of the chief or the sheriff as a reason for creating a team, while only 40 percent of teams less than ten years old gave the same reason. From this information, it seems that there is an association between departments with newer teams and reasons for creating a new team.
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The data show that the newer teams seem to have been formed in reaction to social issues (i.e., drug problems), while the older teams were formed as the result of management decisions. Significant statistics regarding qualifications necessary to be a member of a SWAT team were cross-tabulated with the size of the department and considered. There are three qualifications which smaller departments use less frequently than larger departments. For example, of the forty-two teams surveyed, 83 percent of the departments with fifty or more officers requires a physical test, while only 44 percent of the smaller departments requires the same. Moreover, 75 percent of the large departments with more than 200 officers requires psychological screening, while only 34 percent of departments with less than 200 officers has the same requirements. Also, only 16 percent of the departments with less than 200 officers requires special testing (not physical or firearms testing) while 75 percent of the departments with 200 plus officers requires it. Conversely, none of the larger departments requires special tactical training as a qualification, but more than half (58 percent) of the departments with less than 200 officers do. This trend demonstrates that the larger departments require, in general, more testing than the smaller departments, and the smaller departments require previous training that the larger departments do not. An interesting relationship may also be found between the size of the department and type and length of previous training, collectively, for each team. The study shows that 94 percent of the small departments received their training at community colleges, whereas only 65 percent of middle-sized departments and only 50 percent of the large departments utilize community colleges as acceptable training facilities. The reverse is true when looking at agencies which receive training from private companies. Fifty percent of large departments, and 40 percent of middle-sized departments use private companies, but only 11 percent of small departments
Table 1 Activations Reason for activation
Number of activations
Percent of total activations
Barricaded subject incident Involved hostages Warrants of high-risk fugitives Drug-related Total call-outs
121 33 299 319 585
21 6 51 55 ±a
a Some of the categories overlap. A drug-related activation can also involve hostages of barricaded subjects. The percentages are based on 585 activations, which is the total without double counting activations. Consequently, the percentage column adds up to more than 100%.
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does. A similar relationship can be found with the agencies receiving training at military institutions. For example, 53 percent of larger departments with fifty or more officers obtains training at military institutions, but only 17 percent of small departments does so. A relationship between length and type of previous training and department size was observed, but not duplicated in the statistics, concerning the training received at the NCJA. Fifty percent of the large departments and 68 percent of the middle-sized departments utilized the NCJA for training, whereas only 33 percent of the smaller departments used the academy's resources. In addition to length and type of previous training, a relationship exists between training hours and the size of the department. The connection demonstrates that the increase in department personnel follows the increase in number of training hours. The mean number of hours that a small department trains is 6.91; the mean number of hours for a middle-sized department is 8.58; and the mean number of hours for large departments is 16.75. This shows that, on average, the number of hours spent training is higher for the larger departments than their smaller counterparts. Another conclusion can be drawn by looking at training hours in relationship to money allocated to each team. The data showed that when the team's budget was larger than US$1,000, their mean number of training hours (10.87) was about one third higher than if the budget was less than US$1,000 (7.38). This implies that agencies receiving more funding train more. The data also illustrated a relationship between training needs and department size. There were three training needs that seemed to relate directly to the department size. With explosive entry training, only 50 percent of the middle-sized departments listed a need for it, whereas 61 percent of small departments and 75 percent of the large departments listed a need for this type of training. The data also showed a similar relationship between incident command training and size of the department. Of the teams surveyed from middle-sized departments, 70 percent listed a need for incident command training, whereas 78 percent of small departments and 100 percent of large departments did not. This means that as far as explosive entry and incident command training is concerned, large and small departments have similar needs that middle-sized departments shared, but to a lesser degree. The association between the need for team building training, however, showed different results. Where 83 percent of small departments and 75 percent of large departments saw a need for team building training, only half (50 percent) of middlesized departments saw that need.
The numbers representing activations and department size are quite impressive for larger departments. The departments with 200 officers or more were activated in 57 percent of all of the total (585) SWAT activations in the state. The large departments were activated in 60 percent of all barricaded incidents, 64 percent of hostage situation, 69 percent of high-risk warrants or fugitive apprehensions and 62 percent of drug-related incidents. What makes this data even more revealing is that there are only four teams in North Carolina that come from large departments with 200 officers or more. Summary and implications This study explored the existence of SWAT team units in North Carolina focusing specifically on training needs. In line with what is occurring across the United States, North Carolina SWAT teams are emerging primarily as a need resulting from drugrelated activities. With a frightening increase in acts of terrorism, the need to have SWAT units in the U.S. has also increased. Although many of the newly surfaced SWAT teams in North Carolina have evolved due to societal needs, many have emerged due to interest expressed by the officers as well. Commanders felt that they wanted to be prepared in situations not only involving drugs, but terrorist attacks as well. Training needs was one of the major areas of focus in this study. It was discovered that the majority of the training for smaller SWAT units in North Carolina were provided by community colleges, whereas the larger units received their training through private organizations or the NCJA. The nature, scope, and frequency of interpersonal interactions is an area where future research is needed. The intense nature of SWAT actions requires not only equipment training, but interpersonal interactions among members should be included in their sessions as well. This will allow SWAT members an opportunity to continue to assess and enhance personal strengths and modify limitations as needed. In addition, other factors such as barriers, constraints and alternative methods of handling obstacles should be emphasized. Just as there is a need for these specialized SWAT units, there is also a need for more research about these units. This study offers broad organizational and individual implications for future SWAT research. Individual officers who volunteer and are trained for these SWAT units should receive ongoing training, be it at the community college level or through private resources. The training should not only focus on equipment use (e.g., firearms, etc.), but on inter-
J.G. Clark et al. / Journal of Criminal Justice 28 (2000) 407±413
personal interaction as well. Consideration should be given to explaining why some officers are interested in SWAT assignments and others are not. The compilation of a SWAT profile may also be useful for the supervisors of these units. Organizational implications would include the need for organizational policy as it relates to SWAT units. Policy dictates guidelines for need, use, and implications for the organization. Many law enforcement units appear to be guided by officer's interest in developing SWAT units, and consideration of organizational needs in an ongoing assessment process appears limited. The length of duty on the SWAT units should be a consideration by administrators and should be included as a part of the SWAT policy. Administrative staff should receive training regarding use of SWAT units and assessment tools useful in assessing the units. Finally, the creation of a centralized mechanism for establishing ongoing communications among SWAT units throughout the state may prove to be a helpful tool.
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References Davidson, P. (1979). SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics). Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas Publishing. Goldstein, H. (1990). Problem-Oriented Policing. New York: McGraw-Hill. Hillman, M. (1988). Tactical intelligence operations and support during a major barricade/hostage event. Police Chief 55(2), 18 ± 30. Jiao, A. (1998). Matching police ± community expectations: a method of determining police models. J Crim Justice 26(4), 292 ± 293. Kaplan, J., & Skolnick, J. (1982). Criminal Justice. Mineola, New York: The Foundation Press. Lesce, T. (1996). The rich history of SWAT. Law Order 44(4), 83 ± 89. Miller, L. S., & Hess, K. (1994). Community Policing: Theory and Practice. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing. Roberg, R., & KuyKendall, J. (1993). Police and Society. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing. Snow, R. (1996). SWAT Teams: Explosive Face Offs with America's Deadliest Criminals. New York: Plenum Publishers.
Training SWAT teams Implications for improving tactical units Joanna G. Clarka, Mary S. Jacksona, Peggy M. Schaeferb, E. Gail Sharpea,* a
Criminal Justice Studies, East Carolina University, 200 B Ragsdale Building, Greenville, NC 27858, USA b North Carolina Justice Academy, Salemburg, NC, USA
Abstract As terrorism and other forms of violence continue to increase in American society, there is a growing need for law enforcement agencies to utilize Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) or Tactical Teams. There is, however, very little research available on SWAT units, and even less information on the training needs of these specialized divisions. This article describes the results of an exploratory study conducted to consider the training needs of SWAT units in North Carolina. A survey was administered to sixty-five law enforcement organizations. Results and implications are discussed. D 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction To serve and protect has traditionally been the motto of police departments throughout the United States, and the community policing (community residents aid in crime reduction efforts) approach has been received with great enthusiasm by citizens. In order, however, to protect law-abiding citizens from the dangers of rising crime, reactive law enforcement has become necessary and mandatory. This approach has received limited publication in ``scholarly'' journals primarily because the use of deadly force is not a topic that researchers willingly discuss unless it is within the context of constitutional issues. As America moves, however, into the next millennium, societal needs will have changed and thus created a need to consider the readiness of law enforcement's specialized units, such as Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) units, during acts of terrorism or in the war against drugs.
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-252-328-1447; fax: +1-252-328-4196.
The SWAT units are designed to resolve crisis situations that regular police officers may not be trained to handle, or may not be within the scope of their job responsibilities (Davidson, 1979). For example, special units such as SWAT teams are used for these unique situations involving hostages and barricaded hostile individuals, clearing dangerous areas, riotous situations, and events involving snipers (Snow, 1996). Extraordinary preparation is thus required for appropriately handling these occurrences. SWAT teams evolved in law enforcement in the late 1960s and 1970s, and were primarily utilized to assist local police and national guard units with social control in a society plagued with turbulence and violent crimes (Hillman, 1988; Lesce, 1996). Many times, their duties and responsibilities involved riot dispersion, crowd control and hostage situations. The last ten years, however, have shown that there has been an escalated need to use SWAT teams because of a dramatic increase in illegal drug activity, volatile barricaded incidents, and terrorist situations in American society. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has defined terrorism as any
0047-2352/00/$ ± see front matter D 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 0 4 7 - 2 3 5 2 ( 0 0 ) 0 0 0 5 5 - 6
408
J.G. Clark et al. / Journal of Criminal Justice 28 (2000) 407±413
act of violence by individuals or groups against the U.S. government. They have delineated terrorist acts into nine different categories (Kaplan & Skolnick, 1982) with each of the categories falling under domestic or international terrorism. Although American society has experienced acts of terrorism in the past, America has never been as vulnerable to terrorist acts as she is presently. This is primarily due to the country's conflictual encounters with Iraq's leader Saddam Hussein. There is also an increased need to not only recruit officers who have received specialized tactical training (prior military service) but also to ensure that ongoing training is available for these units. SWAT members are usually men and women with special skills in firearms, physical fitness and tactical maneuvering. Because SWAT teams are often called upon to respond to situations where the use of deadly force may be applied, continuous training of these officers is of paramount importance. Contrary to popular media portrayal, the effectiveness of SWAT teams is not based on the frequency of their use of force, but is assessed by the numerous tactical options used by the teams, as well as the response to their use received from the community, law enforcement officers and legislators. The United States had not experienced increased overt acts of terrorism on U.S. soil until the 1990s Ð with the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 and the Oklahoma City Federal building in 1995. As a result of these bombings, 175 American citizens died and over one thousand were injured. These incidents prompted federal law enforcement organizations to extend their recruitment and training of special tactical units. In addition, state and local law enforcement organizations had to enlarge the scope of their training due not only to local militia activities, but also to situations where large quantities of drugs are under investigation as well. With the increased drug trafficking and domestic terrorists acts, there has been a need for law enforcement organizations to ensure that their special tactical units' personnel receive ongoing training in tactical preparedness. These escalations are substantiated in North Carolina by the fact that twenty-eight out of the forty-two teams in existence are less than ten years old. Conceptual framework The conceptual thinking of Jiao (1998) for formulating a framework for policing will guide the conceptual process. Roberg and KuyKendell (1993) have placed policing in a scientific framework by delineating different types of policing. The scientific
practice of policing has been furthered by providing models that are used for research activities: crime control and due process. The due process model ensures that terrorist's individual rights are emphasized under the constitution while the crime control model stresses the need to apprehend suspects and repress terrorist activity while protecting citizens undergoing terrorist's attacks. Although the crime control model has been the model of preference in the 1990s, discussions have been limited to getting tough on drug dealers, young violent offenders and gang members. There has been limited overt discussion about controlling terrorists attacks against the United States and its citizens. With increased threats from Saddam Hussein and other terrorists and terrorist activities, the combination of both a proactive and a reactive approach seems to be in order. Proactive and reactive approaches to terrorism A proactive approach to terrorism is one of prevention in which collaborative efforts by agencies attempt to preserve the peace and prevent crime. Applying the principles of proactive policing strategies in situations where terrorism may be suspected would not only enhance the likelihood of reducing terrorist activity in the area, but would create a situation where the terrorist would really have to consider whether the risk is worthwhile. Proactivity entails constant dialogue with the suspect along with high visibility by law enforcement officers. While reactive police approaches have been criticized by some segments of the population, in situations of terrorist attacks, reactive policing may be the most appropriate approach. This approach is also termed problem-oriented policing by Goldstein (1990). According to Miller and Hess (1994), problemoriented policing occurs when law enforcement officers are faced with a problem and they decide how best to handle the problem (p. 464). In situations involving terrorism and/or sniper attacks on citizens, there is limited time to ponder over the situation. Why? Because the longer the officers ponder, the more lives are likely to be lost, and thus, the officer has to quickly make decisions about what to do in such a position. Often, the options are few. These officers must be trained to respond quickly and make the most efficient decision that will provide the most effective outcome for the majority of citizens involved. Efficiency and effectiveness are, thus, two major components of the approach as described by Goldstein (1990). The problem-oriented policing
J.G. Clark et al. / Journal of Criminal Justice 28 (2000) 407±413
model has four stages: scanning, analysis, response, and assessment. Scanning occurs when the organization or individual officers are alerted that there is a problem and the need exists to have special tactical units in place on the scene. Analysis of the situation occurs when the team leader must gather as much information as possible to determine the nature and scope of the problem that the unit has to control. Initially, the overall consideration is given to protecting citizens at all cost. Response implies the need to quickly remedy the issue with as few lives lost as possible. Alternatives are considered, and after weighing the pros and cons for each alternative, action can then be taken. Assessment is the period when the special units team will debrief and consider all actions taken in the situation. Participants will then consider the appropriateness of decisions made based on the circumstances. Consideration of techniques that may be implemented to improve the efficiency of response to future similar situations will also be discussed at this point. Finally, considerations will focus on whether they achieved the desired outcome from the situation, and how efficiently they did their job. Although problem-oriented policing does not receive as much notoriety in the media or from legislators as community-oriented policing, it is an extremely important approach that should not be dismissed. Federal agencies have continued to understand the importance of problem-oriented policing; this is evidenced by the fact that they have continued to provide ongoing training for agents in special tactical teams. Information about these special teams is usually based on FBI prototypes or media-depicted gun-crazed shooters. There is limited research offering a profile of the dedicated men and women who comprise these special tactical teams. It has only been recently, however, that local county and state law enforcement units have begun to offer training in special tactics. These escalations are substantiated in North Carolina by the fact that twenty-eight out of the forty-two teams in existence are less than ten years old. The first of these tactical units appeared in Charlotte, NC in 1974, and since then, teams of various sizes and capabilities have formed throughout the state. On the average, the number of officers per team is thirteen, with the smallest known team having only six officers and the largest, forty-two. There are also great variations in equipment and training. Presently, limited research providing information on the extent and nature of training procedures and requirements of SWAT teams exists. The purpose of this exploratory study was to determine the existence,
409
training procedures, requirements and activation purposes of SWAT teams in forty-two law enforcement organizations in North Carolina. Method Sample The sample consisted of sixty-four SWAT team leaders at police departments across North Carolina. The departments varied greatly in size, ranging from 11 to 1251 officers. Of the respondents, nine were from metropolitan areas with populations of 100,000 plus, four came from remote rural locations of 10,000 residents or less, and the majority of the respondents (twenty-nine) came from middlesized cities with populations ranging from 10,000 to 100,000. The national trend for the naming of tactical teams has been to use more ``toned down'' terms instead of the high-profile SWAT, such as ERT or ESU (Emergency Response Team or Emergency Service Unit). That trend is well represented by the many different names used in North Carolina. Of the forty-two teams surveyed, only three teams are called SWAT, the other thirty-eight teams use Special Response Team (SRT) or other alternative names. The diversity of names in the state is further illustrated by the fact that besides SWAT and SRT, there are eleven other terms used to define tactical teams. Some examples of the other names used throughout the state are: Special Operations Team, Tactical Apprehension and Control Team, Selective Enforcement Unit and Problem Area Tactical Team. Presently, however, SWAT is understood and recognized more readily than the others. Procedure In order to begin the study, a compilation list of tactical teams within the state was needed. The base of the list of teams came from a mailing list compiled by the North Carolina Justice Academy (NCJA). This academy is responsible for providing the training of law enforcement officers as well as other criminal justice professionals in the state. In order to have as much participation as possible, a message was sent out on the Department of Criminal Information (DCI) terminal requesting that agencies that have tactical teams respond with an address. After the list was completed, a survey instrument was sent to sixty-four departments. The survey was designed by the NCJA and consisted of twenty-nine
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Fig. 1. Rationale for SWAT unit.
items. Each agency's SWAT/SRT Commander was responsible for responding to the survey items. The instructions to the commanders were to simply complete the survey and return it to the NCJA staff member as soon as possible. Approximately two weeks after the mailing, follow-up phone calls were made to the non-respondents. Key questions that the respondents were asked to answer included the following: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Where do you receive your training? What type of training do you need? How many hours per month do you train? Do you train with hostage negotiators? Do you train with snipers? What are the reasons for the activation of your tactical teams?
Data analysis Of the sixty-four surveys mailed, forty-two were completed and returned (65 percent response rate) within the requested time frame. There are varied reasons that departments initiated SWAT teams; the following list describes some of them. Seventyeight percent of the departments reported that they started their SWAT units due to interest expressed by the officers, while 52 percent noted that their SWAT teams were launched because of the drug problem in their area. Forty percent noted the increase in crime and specific violent incidents in their area as the rationale for initiating their SWAT units (see Fig. 1). Tactical teams in North Carolina showed considerable variations in the qualifications required for team members. Of the forty-two teams surveyed, 90 percent required a positive work history, 83 percent a minimum number of years in the department, 74
percent passing a firearms testing, 67 percent physical fitness testing, and 52 percent recommendation of a supervisor. Less than half of the teams in the state required either psychological testing (38 percent) or special testing. One aspect of training that was examined was a description of the type of training the team leaders believed their teams required. Seventy-six percent of team leaders expressed a need for incident command training, 76 percent for team building training, 73 percent for advanced SWAT training, 59 percent for flash bang, 57 percent for explosive entry, and 52 percent for basic SWAT training (see Fig. 2). Another aspect of tactical team training was ``Where do you receive your training?'' Of the teams surveyed, 76 percent has received training at community colleges, 50 percent at the NCJA, 38 percent at military institutions, 28 percent with private companies, and 33 percent from some other type of training provider (see Fig. 3). Data related to training hours, sniper training, and hostage negotiations indicated that North Carolina's tactical teams train an average 8.69 h/month, but the actual amount of time devoted to training ranged from as few as 0 hours in some departments to as many as 32 hours/month in others. Eighty-one percent of the respondents indicated that their teams train with snipers in the hope of learning from them and reaching a similar level of proficiency. The tactical teams in the sample trained with them. Of the teams surveyed, 48 percent trained with their department's hostage negotiators while 45 percent did not (7 percent of respondents did not answer). This indicates that twenty departments in the sample did not train with their hostage negotiators. Lastly, the study sought to learn the reasons for the activation of tactical teams. During the calendar year of 1995, the teams in the survey were activated a
Fig. 2. Type of training needed.
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Fig. 3. Training provider.
total of 585 times. Of those 585 activations, 55 percent was drug-related, 51 percent was for warrant or high-risk fugitives, 21 percent was for barricaded subject incidents, and 6 percent involved hostages (see Table 1). Results The tactical teams in the study indicated several different reasons as to why their units were formed. The departments which had newer teams reported drug problems as their reason for creating a tactical team. In addition, 64 percent of teams that have been in existence for less than ten years also listed drug problems as the basis for starting their team. This is not true for the older teams of which only 29 percent began in response to a drug problem. This illustrates the effect of the drug boom of the 1980s, from which resulted the creation of several newer tactical teams. Seventy-one percent of the departments who have teams ten years or older cited the interest of the chief or the sheriff as a reason for creating a team, while only 40 percent of teams less than ten years old gave the same reason. From this information, it seems that there is an association between departments with newer teams and reasons for creating a new team.
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The data show that the newer teams seem to have been formed in reaction to social issues (i.e., drug problems), while the older teams were formed as the result of management decisions. Significant statistics regarding qualifications necessary to be a member of a SWAT team were cross-tabulated with the size of the department and considered. There are three qualifications which smaller departments use less frequently than larger departments. For example, of the forty-two teams surveyed, 83 percent of the departments with fifty or more officers requires a physical test, while only 44 percent of the smaller departments requires the same. Moreover, 75 percent of the large departments with more than 200 officers requires psychological screening, while only 34 percent of departments with less than 200 officers has the same requirements. Also, only 16 percent of the departments with less than 200 officers requires special testing (not physical or firearms testing) while 75 percent of the departments with 200 plus officers requires it. Conversely, none of the larger departments requires special tactical training as a qualification, but more than half (58 percent) of the departments with less than 200 officers do. This trend demonstrates that the larger departments require, in general, more testing than the smaller departments, and the smaller departments require previous training that the larger departments do not. An interesting relationship may also be found between the size of the department and type and length of previous training, collectively, for each team. The study shows that 94 percent of the small departments received their training at community colleges, whereas only 65 percent of middle-sized departments and only 50 percent of the large departments utilize community colleges as acceptable training facilities. The reverse is true when looking at agencies which receive training from private companies. Fifty percent of large departments, and 40 percent of middle-sized departments use private companies, but only 11 percent of small departments
Table 1 Activations Reason for activation
Number of activations
Percent of total activations
Barricaded subject incident Involved hostages Warrants of high-risk fugitives Drug-related Total call-outs
121 33 299 319 585
21 6 51 55 ±a
a Some of the categories overlap. A drug-related activation can also involve hostages of barricaded subjects. The percentages are based on 585 activations, which is the total without double counting activations. Consequently, the percentage column adds up to more than 100%.
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does. A similar relationship can be found with the agencies receiving training at military institutions. For example, 53 percent of larger departments with fifty or more officers obtains training at military institutions, but only 17 percent of small departments does so. A relationship between length and type of previous training and department size was observed, but not duplicated in the statistics, concerning the training received at the NCJA. Fifty percent of the large departments and 68 percent of the middle-sized departments utilized the NCJA for training, whereas only 33 percent of the smaller departments used the academy's resources. In addition to length and type of previous training, a relationship exists between training hours and the size of the department. The connection demonstrates that the increase in department personnel follows the increase in number of training hours. The mean number of hours that a small department trains is 6.91; the mean number of hours for a middle-sized department is 8.58; and the mean number of hours for large departments is 16.75. This shows that, on average, the number of hours spent training is higher for the larger departments than their smaller counterparts. Another conclusion can be drawn by looking at training hours in relationship to money allocated to each team. The data showed that when the team's budget was larger than US$1,000, their mean number of training hours (10.87) was about one third higher than if the budget was less than US$1,000 (7.38). This implies that agencies receiving more funding train more. The data also illustrated a relationship between training needs and department size. There were three training needs that seemed to relate directly to the department size. With explosive entry training, only 50 percent of the middle-sized departments listed a need for it, whereas 61 percent of small departments and 75 percent of the large departments listed a need for this type of training. The data also showed a similar relationship between incident command training and size of the department. Of the teams surveyed from middle-sized departments, 70 percent listed a need for incident command training, whereas 78 percent of small departments and 100 percent of large departments did not. This means that as far as explosive entry and incident command training is concerned, large and small departments have similar needs that middle-sized departments shared, but to a lesser degree. The association between the need for team building training, however, showed different results. Where 83 percent of small departments and 75 percent of large departments saw a need for team building training, only half (50 percent) of middlesized departments saw that need.
The numbers representing activations and department size are quite impressive for larger departments. The departments with 200 officers or more were activated in 57 percent of all of the total (585) SWAT activations in the state. The large departments were activated in 60 percent of all barricaded incidents, 64 percent of hostage situation, 69 percent of high-risk warrants or fugitive apprehensions and 62 percent of drug-related incidents. What makes this data even more revealing is that there are only four teams in North Carolina that come from large departments with 200 officers or more. Summary and implications This study explored the existence of SWAT team units in North Carolina focusing specifically on training needs. In line with what is occurring across the United States, North Carolina SWAT teams are emerging primarily as a need resulting from drugrelated activities. With a frightening increase in acts of terrorism, the need to have SWAT units in the U.S. has also increased. Although many of the newly surfaced SWAT teams in North Carolina have evolved due to societal needs, many have emerged due to interest expressed by the officers as well. Commanders felt that they wanted to be prepared in situations not only involving drugs, but terrorist attacks as well. Training needs was one of the major areas of focus in this study. It was discovered that the majority of the training for smaller SWAT units in North Carolina were provided by community colleges, whereas the larger units received their training through private organizations or the NCJA. The nature, scope, and frequency of interpersonal interactions is an area where future research is needed. The intense nature of SWAT actions requires not only equipment training, but interpersonal interactions among members should be included in their sessions as well. This will allow SWAT members an opportunity to continue to assess and enhance personal strengths and modify limitations as needed. In addition, other factors such as barriers, constraints and alternative methods of handling obstacles should be emphasized. Just as there is a need for these specialized SWAT units, there is also a need for more research about these units. This study offers broad organizational and individual implications for future SWAT research. Individual officers who volunteer and are trained for these SWAT units should receive ongoing training, be it at the community college level or through private resources. The training should not only focus on equipment use (e.g., firearms, etc.), but on inter-
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personal interaction as well. Consideration should be given to explaining why some officers are interested in SWAT assignments and others are not. The compilation of a SWAT profile may also be useful for the supervisors of these units. Organizational implications would include the need for organizational policy as it relates to SWAT units. Policy dictates guidelines for need, use, and implications for the organization. Many law enforcement units appear to be guided by officer's interest in developing SWAT units, and consideration of organizational needs in an ongoing assessment process appears limited. The length of duty on the SWAT units should be a consideration by administrators and should be included as a part of the SWAT policy. Administrative staff should receive training regarding use of SWAT units and assessment tools useful in assessing the units. Finally, the creation of a centralized mechanism for establishing ongoing communications among SWAT units throughout the state may prove to be a helpful tool.
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