Transaction costs and the organization of CFEs: Experiences from ejidos in Quintana Roo, Mexico

Forest Policy and Economics 70 (2016) 1–8

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Forest Policy and Economics journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/forpol

Transaction costs and the organization of CFEs: Experiences from ejidos in Quintana Roo, Mexico Dora Carias Vega ⁎, Rodney J. Keenan School of Forest and Ecosystem Science, Melbourne Graduate School of Science, 221, Bouverie Street, Carlton, VIC, 3053, Australia

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history: Received 7 July 2015 Received in revised form 8 April 2016 Accepted 14 May 2016 Available online xxxx Keywords: Community forestry enterprises Community natural resource management Transaction costs Quintana Roo, Mexico Workgroups Ejidos

a b s t r a c t Forest areas owned by indigenous people, families, and communities are increasingly linking to markets and attempting to harness the benefits of timber commercialization by setting up community forestry enterprises (CFEs). The interaction between markets and commonly owned forests is only until now enjoying greater attention from researchers. Common property scholarship has normally been used to study community natural resource management but currently it is deemed insufficient for understanding market interactions. This paper adds to this growing area of scholarship through the application of transaction costs economics (TCE) to the organization of community forest enterprises. TCE proposes that under certain circumstances and depending on the nature of the production process and context of exchange, different forms of organization play a role in reducing transaction costs in market exchange. Through fieldwork carried out in the state of Quintana Roo, Mexico, this paper finds that hierarchical, collective organization is not the only way to reduce transaction costs for CFEs. Although market transactions can expose communities to opportunistic behaviour and hazards in many jurisdictions, capacity-building and skilling will decrease information costs and asymmetries for CFEs of organizational forms that rely on market contracting for production. Additionally, this research found that CFEs and their business partners value relationships that reduce the range of transaction costs even if this represents trade-offs in prices and making concessions such as informal loans. We recommend that policy should not focus on driving specific organizational forms in communities that attempt to eliminate intermediaries, contractors and service providers. Efforts should concentrate primarily on creating enabling environments by reducing transaction costs, particularly information costs and asymmetries that hinder productive relations between CFEs and their exchange partners. Better commercial relationships, social innovation and entrepreneurship can develop in conditions in which both CFEs and trading partners stand on even footing. Transaction cost theory should further investigate the role of learning in reducing transaction costs and its effect on organizational choice. It should consider that transaction costs may be experienced differently by individuals with different skills and abilities. © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction Community forestry has been widely pursued as a rural development strategy in tropical forest regions (De Jong et al., 2010). It is aimed at achieving goals of biological conservation and socioeconomic development (Kellert et al., 2000). Currently it is a consolidated alternative to state control and industrial management of forest resources (Barry et al., 2003). A recent trend is the formation of community forestry enterprises (CFEs) to produce and sell forest goods and services (Wiersum, 2009). Molnar et al. (2008) estimate that most of the 500 million low-income people living in or around forests are now integrated into market systems. The organization of production has shifted from privately-held, industrial forestry to landholder-based and community forestry (Molnar et al., 2007; Harrison et al., 2002; Forster et al., 2003).

⁎ Corresponding author.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2016.05.011 1389-9341/© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Market-linked common-property regimes have not been widely studied in community-based natural resource management (Morrow and Hull, 1996; Antinori and Bray, 2005; Taylor, 2003; Bray, 2005). Scholarship has concentrated on small-scale, isolated, self-organized institutions but the influence of outside actors and markets on institutional development has been neglected (Morrow and Hull, 1996; Benneker, 2008). This is impractical as few common property regimes (CPRs) today remain isolated from external actors, including markets, governments, donor agencies, and non-governmental organizations (Morrow and Hull, 1996). Research on CFEs provides an opportunity to update traditional views of CPR regimes and improve theory, practice and management. It can also shed light on the appropriateness of promoting specific forms of organization for commercial production, a common practice in community forestry (Pacheco et al., 2008). Research will provide a better understanding on the nature of relationships between community forest owners, and buyers, processors and timber companies, as these interactions are unlikely to disappear from community forestry (Medina et al., 2009).

2

D. Carias Vega, R.J. Keenan / Forest Policy and Economics 70 (2016) 1–8

This paper uses transaction cost economics (TCE) to study the relationship between local organization and broader institutions such as markets. We use TCE because it provides a framework to study the relationship between local organization and broader influences such as markets. The research used a qualitative approach to: • Identify the different ways in which CFEs organize production; • Assess whether these different organizational options have transaction cost advantages in the production forestry supply chain for community enterprises; • Obtain a more detailed picture in terms of transaction costs about the nature of business relationships between CFEs and their trading partners; • Extract key policy lessons for the organization of CFEs and the markets in which they operate.

The research is based on fieldwork carried out in Quintana Roo, Mexico, an area where communities have been able to produce and market common-pool resource products of diverse types for more than thirty years. The number of studies on market-linked common property regimes is growing, several applying TCE theory. In Mexico, Antinori (2005) and Antinori and Rausser (2008) find that contractual difficulties with downstream service providers and buyers, in combination with a range of other variables, explain community choices on external contracting or vertical integration. Antinori and Rausser (2010) look into the organizational variations that exist at each level of processing capacity: ejidal-level, workgroups, parcelized forests and unions of communities and find that vertical integration can in fact be managed through different forms of organization. They suggested that further research should look at the institutional (both formal and informal) characteristics shared by these different forms of internal organization that allows them to be viable. In a previous paper (see Carias Vega and Keenan, 2014), we analysed how different organizational modes for CFEs influence transaction costs for communities during the production of various timber products. In this study we use information collected in the field to go deeper into understanding what makes different organizational options viable from the point of view of transaction costs. We also look further into the relationships with trading partners, a perspective not widely discussed in the literature.

Typical transaction costs include information costs such as searching for information about products, prices, inputs, buyers and sellers, and their reputation. Information obtained may be imperfect and/or asymmetric and parties could also have different abilities to process it and to increase or decrease its asymmetry levels (Stiglitz, 2000). Bargaining and negotiation costs are transaction costs connected with reaching an acceptable agreement and writing a contract to support it. Negotiation costs may be substantial when exchange partners do not know each other (Pejovich, 1995). Monitoring costs are necessary to oversee the behaviour of a trading partner and quality of what they deliver. Taking appropriate action when there is non-compliance generates enforcement costs of using public or private enforcement mechanisms. Since public mechanisms may be expensive, ineffective or inexistent, alternative private mechanisms such as reputation, trust, and harassment to collect debts among others, can be implemented (Gow et al., 2000; Fafchamps, 1996; Macleod, 2007). Production can be arranged through different governance structures (Williamson, 1998). The choice of governance depends on the presence of transaction specific investments that can generate substantial transaction costs. Since transaction specific investments represent sunk costs with little value outside of the transaction, one of the parties may decide to behave opportunistically and attempt to reduce the gains of trade for the other party until they equal the value that the investment has outside of the proposed trade (Antinori and Rausser, 2008). This is known as a hold-up and can lead to underinvestment. In these situations coordinating production through the hierarchical governance of the firm is an efficient choice. If investments are more generic, long term contracts or spot market transactions suffice.

3. The Mexican social forestry sector The Mexican community sector exhibits great institutional complexity (Antinori and Rausser, 2010; Wilshusen et al., 2002) with community organizations serving as instruments for political control, production, and representation of peasants (De Janvry et al., 1997). The rise of Mexican CFEs is the result of pro-community forestry laws and programs and a highly autonomous rural sector comprised of ejido and indigenous community systems rich in social capital (Bray et al., 2003).

3.1. Organization and markets in the Mexican social forestry sector 2. Background 2.1. Common property management Ostrom (1990) developed eight principles associated with successful collective action in common property resource governance (Cox et al., 2010). Starting with this seminal work, the focus of scholarship has been on ‘getting the institutions right’ in community level organizational design for collective action (Dressler et al., 2015; Taylor, 2010). However, these principles have been unable to capture the influence of wider societal actors, such as markets, on resource use by common property regimes (Morrow and Hull, 1996; Benneker, 2008). 2.2. Transaction cost economics TCE proposes that under certain circumstances and depending on the nature of the production process and context of exchange, different forms of organization play a role in reducing transaction costs in market exchange (Williamson, 1998). Transaction costs are incurred when buyers and suppliers procure goods or services through the market. Trading partners are assumed to behave opportunistically when given the chance and thus increase transaction costs (Williamson, 1996). Transaction costs are detrimental for market exchange and socially inefficient.

Several CFE organizational forms have emerged in the Mexican context (Antinori and Bray, 2005; Antinori and Rausser, 2010; Humphries, 2010, Bray et al., 2006; Bray, 2004). The ejidal level organization has a hierarchical structure similar to that found in industrial forestry firms but where major decisions about the firm and use of the forest asset are made democratically in a General Assembly. Decisions are operationalised through a traditional community structure called the ‘comisariado ejidal’. The president of the comisariado ejidal serves as manager of the enterprise. Ejidal-level organization also has oversight councils that keep the comisariado ejidal in check. The workgroup and individual models are grassroots innovations to CFE organization that have emerged based on historical practices in managing the forest, relatively recent federal policy changes (1992), and frustration with corruption in unified enterprises (Bray et al., 2006; Antinori and Rausser, 2010). The comisariado ejidal loses control over commercial aspects of forestry, and groups of community members or individual parcel holders harvest an assigned volume and control all aspects of commercialization and revenues. Forest management however remains collective with some power in the comisariado ejidal to make decisions about these activities. There is one management plan per community and activities in the plan financed from workgroups or parcel holders contributing their share to overhead costs.

D. Carias Vega, R.J. Keenan / Forest Policy and Economics 70 (2016) 1–8

3

Table 1 Transaction costs with timber buyers/processors. Sources: Pacheco (2012), Carias Vega and Keenan (2014), Benneker (2008), Larson and Hardie (1989), Antinori (2005), Antinori and Rausser (2008), Vidal (2004), Ezzine De Blas et al. (2011), Holmes et al. (2002), Leffler and Rucker (1991), Forster et al. (2005). Type of transaction cost

Transaction cost in forestry activity

Comments

• Finding information about potential buyers, their reputation, and state of their equipment; • Finding information about markets and prices; • Finding and processing information about technical aspects of forestry (forest management practices, available technologies, best practices); • Finding and processing information about service providers, their reputation, and state of their equipment; • Finding and processing information on negotiation procedures/tactics with buyers; • Finding information on available enforcement mechanisms in case of breach of contract. Bargaining/negotiation • Negotiating about prices and contract conditions with buyers; costs • Negotiating about prices charged by service providers and contract conditions; • Negotiating about additional community investments and hiring of local labour; sharing of technical knowledge. • Renegotiations over extracted volumes, forest condition after harvest, prices, changes in quality requirements, social investments Monitoring and • Monitoring of timber buyer behaviour during tree marking, extraction, enforcement costs hauling, transportation; • Monitoring of external service providers during extraction, hauling, transportation, and milling; • Applying mechanisms to force buyers to comply with contracts. Information costs

3.2. Community forestry in Quintana Roo Forty-three percent of the land in Quintana Roo, Mexico is owned and controlled by ejido communal organizations (Snook et al., 2003). Agrarian reform in Quintana Roo arrived in tandem with the promotion of cooperatives for chicle1 production (Sierra Huelsz et al., 2014). Forestlands were initially assigned taking into consideration criteria for chicle production, but were eventually replaced by criteria for agricultural production. Land redistribution was also used as a colonisation mechanism in order to build sufficient population for Quintana Roo to receive statehood in 1974 (Sierra Huelsz et al., 2014). From 1953 to 1983 ejidos received only a harvesting right fixed by the government from forced timber sales to the parastatal logging company Maderas Industrializadas de Quintana Roo (MIQRO). MIQRO controlled and unsustainably exploited 550,000 ha of 25-year forest concessions (Sierra Huelsz et al., 2014), while smaller, independent contractors logged the ‘Mayan zone’ in the centre of the state (Santos Jimenez, 2009). The concession model ended in 1983 and was replaced with the Forestry Pilot Plan (PPF - Plan Piloto Forestal in Spanish). The PPF was a joint federal and state effort to work with local forest communities in central and southern Quintana Roo (Galletti, 1998). An unusual coalition of the Forestry Sub-secretariat, the state government, ejidatarios, and German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) made the PPF possible (Taylor, 2001). The PPF provided forestry technical teams and services that worked in autonomous fashion with communities, supporting 40 forest ejidos to establish local forestry enterprises and delimiting 500,000 ha as Permanent Forest Areas specifically for forestry activities (Taylor, 2001; Taylor and Zabin, 2000). Ejidos assumed responsibility for all aspects of management, harvesting, transport and sale of their timber and non-timber forest products (Wilshusen, 2006). Several secondary-level associations2 providing technical services emerged as an unintended consequence of the PPF and transformed

1

Chicle is the latex of the Manilkara zapota tree used in chewing gum production. Sociedad de Productores Forestales Ejidales de Quintana Roo, S.C (SPEFQR); Organización de Ejidos Productores Forestales de la Zona Maya, S.C. (OEPFZM); Organización de Ejidos Forestales de Quintana Roo Chaktemal S.C.; Sociedad de Pueblos Indígenas Forestales de Quintana Roo, Tumbén Cuxtal. 2

Information is usually controlled by a small number of traders and NGOs Asymmetric information increases possibility of hold-up

A few companies and buyers tend to dominate and exert influence over final price; hiring practices are at discretion of logging companies. Asymmetric bargaining power increases hold-up risk Hold-ups are common

Variations in extraction efforts affect erosion, fire prevention, value of the product and overall quality of the remaining forest Contractor behaviour notoriously difficult to monitor; Lack of legal enforcement mechanisms

ejidos into price setters that altered the existing industrial structure to their needs (Richards, 1992). Many of the large forest ejidos that were included in the PPF have left these associations because they either developed their own internal technical capacity or contract private individuals and firms (Sierra Huelsz et al., 2014). Ejidos have also broadened their scope of production from mostly timber to non-timber forest production, including payments for environmental services (Sierra Huelsz et al., 2014). The following section will describe the methods used for this research. 4. Method and approach As mentioned in the Section 1, a qualitative method was used for this research. Although qualitative, the approach was deductive since transaction cost theory guided research question development and coding logic. Transaction costs were classified into information costs; negotiation and bargaining costs; and monitoring and enforcement costs. Typical transaction costs from both point of views of CFEs and their exchange partners are listed in Table 1 and Table 2. The literature also guided the classification of the organizational forms (see Antinori and Rausser, 2010; Bray et al., 2006; Taylor, 2003; Wilshusen, 2005; Bray, 2004; Bray and Merino-Pérez, 2002; Taylor, 2001). This classification is provided in Table 3. A list of interviewees was developed through snowball sampling (Table 4). Thirty-one people were interviewed in Quintana Roo during the months of August and September 2014. The interview schedules asked about history of community forestry in Quintana Roo, legislation and its changes, current forms of organization and their advantages or disadvantages, main products and buyers, issues sustaining production, issues with other market players, current general difficulties and the advantages or disadvantages of community ownership of forests. None of the questions used the specific term ‘transaction costs’. Transaction costs were explored more generally using terms such as issues, difficulties, problems, or challenges in specific market exchanges. This was done because ‘transaction costs’ is understood differently by different individuals, but this research was aiming to explore specific types of costs, each with its own definition as detailed Tables 1–3. These difficulties or challenges in exchange relationships

4

D. Carias Vega, R.J. Keenan / Forest Policy and Economics 70 (2016) 1–8

Table 2 Transaction costs with CFEs. Sources: Vidal (2004), Nascimento and Mota Villanueva (2004), Forster et al. (2003). Type of transaction cost

Transaction cost in forestry activity

Comments

Information costs

• Finding information about specific product availability and reputation of vendor; • Finding information on available enforcement mechanisms in case of breach of contract.

Access to raw material in the necessary amounts, with the correct specifications, at the right time and with a competitive price is crucial for business. Fragmented forest ownership increases uncertainty and risk Forest ownership gives CFEs bargaining power CFEs rely on advance payments for operations

Bargaining/negotiation • Negotiating about prices costs and contract conditions with CFES; • Negotiating about additional community investments and hiring of local labour; sharing of technical knowledge. • Negotiations on advance payments/loans to begin operations • Renegotiations over extracted volumes, forest condition after harvest, prices, changes in quality requirements, social investments. • Monitoring of tree Monitoring and Lack of legal enforcement enforcement costs extraction, hauling, load- mechanisms ing; • Monitoring of milling practices; • Monitoring of reinvestments in forest care and reforestation; • Pressuring CFEs to pay loans; • Applying mechanisms to force CFEs to comply with contracts.

were compared to those listed and then classified as belonging within one of the three types of transaction costs and whether they occurred in a CFE organized as a work group or as a collective organization.

Table 3 Type of organization and characteristics. Ejidal-level

Workgroup

• Decision-making over • Decision-making forest asset is collective over forest asset is • Decisions channelled split into groups; from General Assembly • Groups control to Comisariado Ejidal; harvesting and • Comisariado president commercialization; functions as manager; • No enterprise • Finances controlled by manager but comisariado ejidal; appointed group profits distributed leaders; 3 through repartos, • All costs and public goods and revenues fall services. directly onto groups; • Profits distributed immediately among group members.

Individual • Decision-making over forest asset is split into individual parcel holders; • Individual parcel holders make harvesting and commercialization decisions; • All costs and revenues fall directly onto individuals; • Profits go directly to individuals.

3 Profit distribution occurring at specific times of the year such as before major religious festivities.

Table 4 Number of interviews, organization and position of interviewee in the organization. Organization

Number Position in organization of interviews

CONAFOR

3

SEMARNAT

2

ECOSUR, Universidad de Quintana Roo Producer organizations SPFEQR (Sociedad de Productores Forestales Ejidales de Quintana Roo), OEPFZM (Organización de Ejidos Productores Forestales de la Zona Maya) Consultancies

2 7

Heads of organization, forestry technicians, consultants

3

Buyers and processors

2

Independent consultants hired by ejidos Owner-managers of their own business Various positions (ejido administrators such as Comisariados, ejido sawmill administrators, ejido members who also own micro-enterprises within the ejido including private sawmills, ejido members in general)

Ejidos (Tres Garantías, Noh-Bec, Petcacab, Chacchoben, Felipe Carrillo Puerto, Reforma Agraria, Naranjal Poniente, Tavi)

12

Total number of interviews

31

UNDP certification program, head of forestry development program Head of Natural Resource Use and Restoration, Regional sub-delegate of Environmental and Natural Resource Protection Researchers working with ejidos

5. Results The following section describes the differences found in transaction costs between organizational forms. There were no ejidos that completely organized their timber production activity as individuals; there were some individuals who sold timber in ejidos that had split into workgroups. 5.1. Information costs No major differences in access to information of various types and the ability to process it were found between ejidal-level and workgroup forms of organization. Searching for information about potential buyers was not necessary because the majority of sales go to one major timber buyer with whom ejidos have negotiated for decades. For the buyer, information costs about reliable ejidos are not high because he has worked with ejidos since the times of the MIQRO. Finding out about reputable providers of machinery and operation services was not deemed to be a problem by ejidos that decide to contract. Interviewees clarified that many service providers are local ejidatarios themselves who have started their own small businesses to supply workgroups. They also work with outside service providers who are known in the area. For price information, ejidos have developed a tool called the ‘tabulador’ or cost table that allows them to determine what they consider are fair timber prices and provide them with a price benchmark for negotiation: “So we took on the task to develop the first ‘tabulador’. What was the problem? Most ejidos did not have accounting systems, but due to several circumstances, we did keep track of our accounts, so we knew the real costs of how much it costs to place a cubic meter of timber in the factory, and we negotiated the price. […] This is one of the things we contributed to all [the ejidos] and that we continue to contribute.” The cost table is also used to calculate and establish going rates for machinery rental and wages for service providers. The experience of dealing with MIQRO, the capacities built by the PPF and working in forestry in general have given ejidos the ability to generate and process information necessary to make decisions. Workgroup members believed

D. Carias Vega, R.J. Keenan / Forest Policy and Economics 70 (2016) 1–8

that this form of organization had further allowed the transfer of this know-how, such as documenting timber or measuring volumes, to all ejidatarios. Previously, crucial skills and information were limited to an internal elite. More transparency about what things are done and how they are done was cited as a major advantage of the workgroup forms of organization. Ejidos with smaller forests and less experience with commercialization and processing find transaction cost advantages in membership in secondary-level organizations. These include acquiring information about markets, barriers to entry, opportunities, and technologies appropriate for small forestry enterprises. In summary, information costs were not perceived as a major problem in the engagement with markets, regardless of how ejidos were organized. Elements of learning and skills development have played a key role in lowering these transaction costs for major forestry ejidos. The main buyer has worked in the region for many decades. This has reduced the costs of finding reliable business partners. 5.2. Bargaining and negotiation costs Bargaining and negotiations between the ejidos and the major buyer usually centre not only on obtaining a fair timber price using the cost table to set a minimum, but also additional conditions such as access to finance. The buyer focuses on securing volumes and qualities of raw material necessary for his processing factory near the city of Chetumal. The ejidos negotiate prices and ask for credit to keep their operations going. ‘El patrón’ or ‘the boss’, as the buyer is known, has therefore become embedded in the supply chain as a processor and a financier of forestry. This asset specificity demands that he maintains supply to his plant and therefore is willing to make trade-offs in terms of price and/or provision of loans: “As a matter of fact we have our, I mean our boss who is the person to whom we sell, we could say that he maintains us. So for example, if we ask him for 5–6 million pesos he will give them to us, so we already have a commitment with him to sell him the timber.” “If someone comes and tells me, ‘I will pay you this much’, [el patrón] will say, ‘No, I will give you this much’. He talked to me and told me, ‘I want to be exclusive.’” The comisariado ejidal from a workgroup ejido believed that selling timber to only one buyer was a mistake as it gave the buyer an upper hand on setting prices and choosing only the best product. However, having one buyer with whom forest producers have a long-term relationship, who supplies capital, who is well-known in the region and who approaches ejidos personally is considered worth this potential trade-off price. There was a perception among CFE members interviewed and forest technicians that divisions into workgroups have driven prices down in general. A forester working for a secondary-level organization explained: “Workgroups divide the resource, infighting begins, timber resources are cheapened because there's internal competition between themselves and this leads to chaos.” Independent timber owners who are not part of any of the workgroups further depress prices. They are approached by intermediaries known as ‘coyotes’4 from outside or within the ejidos. The perception is that coyotes take advantage of independent timber owners because they are poor, cash-strapped and are usually approached in bars when they are thought to be in a vulnerable position. There, timber owners agree to sell their future volumes at discounted prices in exchange for quick cash. As a strategy to compensate for the negative effect that these divisions have had on their bargaining power, several ejidos with considerable volumes of high-value timber have agreed to create a new alliance of five ejidos as members.5 Interviewees were 4

A derogatory term that and reflects the negative perceptions that ejidatarios and other participants of the forestry business including the main buyer, have of these intermediaries. 5 These ejidos include: Noh-Bec, Petcacab, Felipe Carrillo Puerto, Bacalar and X-Hazil.

5

confident that even ejidos with workgroups would abide by the rules and not sell at prices other than those established by the alliance. Having to deal independently with each workgroup generates additional transaction costs for buyers. Instead of having to negotiate one contract in an ejido, a buyer is forced to negotiate tens of contracts depending on the number of workgroups within an ejido. This makes the forestry business more complicated and costly than dealing with one unified provider. Additionally, one smaller buyer in the region perceived workgroup organizations as more informal and difficult to negotiate with: “But if you're talking about [a divided ejido], no, I mean, because they are divided you don't even know who you have to deal with. Not here. Here I will go to the ‘comis’ first and if not with my friend [in the sawmill] or with the engineer. Here they are respected, in those others, they ignore them. We are talking about [the divided ejido], since they are groups, everyone does what they want.” Negotiation costs with contractors who supplied rented machinery and services for the sale of roundwood were not stated to be a major problem because local market competition between providers keeps prices down. In the case of sawmills, some bargaining and negotiation costs were found for workgroup ejidos that were not present in ejidal-level organization. One workgroup ejido decided to run its sawmill as a collective enterprise independent from the comisariado ejidal under the Sociedad de Producción Rural (SPR6). The sawmill was required to change its operation from a service provider for each workgroup to a buyer, processor and seller of sawnwood to make it more viable. The sawmill manager had to negotiate with groups to purchase timber and faced uncertainty in timber supply. This has hindered the sawmill's prospects for efficiency and growth. In unified ejidos with a sawmill the Comisariado Ejidal controls the stock of timber, its extraction and sales, and its flow to the sawmill. Unified timber supply assures that the sawmill can operate without disruption and provides economies of scale: “[The divided ejido] has many problems with its sawmill because it does not have certainty in its supply. We do have an assured supply because our timber belongs to everyone, every person here.” In this sense, workgroup organization has given rise to additional transaction costs internal to the ejido.

5.3. Monitoring and enforcement costs Experience and learning have played a valuable role in reducing monitoring costs for both ejidal-level and workgroup organizations. Lack of experience in the days of MIQRO made it difficult to monitor and control logging activity by outsiders. However, they are now able to determine with ease if the volumes being reported are the ones being extracted, where trees should be felled and at what height, how they should be hauled, the quality of the machinery being hired, the prices that should be charged and other technical details. The credibility of government environmental agencies7 was an important motivator for CFEs to monitor what happens in their forests regardless of the organizational type. If there is a breach from one workgroup, this affects all the other workgroups so it is in the interest of all to enforce the sustainable logging practices. The continued reliance on one buyer translates into low enforcement costs for CFEs because trust has become a key aspect of the relationship. However, CFEs are also tied to the buyer through loans so the enforcement problem lies on the side of the buyer. He trusts CFEs enough to loan them money and usually subtracts timber payments from outstanding debts. Keeping track of loans represents an onerous 6 A legal figure in the National Agrarian Registry (Registro Agrario Nacional in Spanish) which can receive credit and loans without working through the ejido executive committee. 7 Such as PROFEPA: Procuraduría Federal de Protección al Ambiente (Federal Attorney for Environmental Protection).

6

D. Carias Vega, R.J. Keenan / Forest Policy and Economics 70 (2016) 1–8

administrative activity but without this informal financial support most timber operations in CFEs would probably come to a halt. There do not appear to be high enforcement costs in loan payments. Reneging on loans would cut necessary finance to the CFE and harm the relationship with a secure, known buyer. The smaller buyer though had problems enforcing contracts for timber deliveries in workgroups. He paid an advance for timber but then the workgroup sold the timber he selected and offered timber of a different quality than had been agreed. This deterred him further from negotiating with workgroups.

6. Discussion There were few differences in transaction costs between the two major organizational forms of CFEs in Quintana Roo. The PPF and contact with MIQRO had considerable effects on ejidatarios' learning, skills acquisition and human capital formation. Their ability to establish their own prices, to calculate extracted timber volumes, to understand forest management practices, to be familiar with equipment and its functioning, and to understand negotiation tactics and functioning of markets in general have been instrumental in their dealings with service providers and major buyer in the region. These reductions in information costs are the ‘oil’ that keeps the gears of the system working. Once information costs were lowered to the point that CFE members were able to stand on a more level playing field with market counterparts, spillover effects on the other transaction costs occurred. This is important because information asymmetries affect all aspects of management and production in community forestry (Harrison, 2005; Pacheco and Paudel, 2010; Pacheco, 2012) and cause inefficient hold-ups and conflicts in other jurisdictions (Benneker, 2008; Ezzine De Blas et al., 2009; Medina et al., 2009). Quintana Roo shows possible avenues for solving these frictions. The potential for the single buyer ‘problem’ (Harrison, 2005; Pacheco, 2012) is very evident in Quintana Roo. However, the predominance of only one buyer has a series of transaction cost advantages because it lowers information, monitoring and enforcement costs. CFEs do not have to look for a buyer, he approaches them to buy timber and they have known him for several decades. This has greatly reduced their search costs, which makes business easier. Having a long term relationship also reduces uncertainty and the risk of being swindled, which translates into reduced monitoring and enforcement costs. Additionally, the buyer is filling a crucial gap in providing credit, a persistent problem in rural Mexico (Ellis et al., 2015). These informal loans involve a certain level of risk for the buyer but which he is willing to take in order to secure timber supply. Although borrowers may lose bargaining power, buyers/lenders like the one in Quintana Roo maintain trade and production going (Lyon and Porter, 2009; Stoian, 2005). The study found that CFEs and their organizational choices have considerable transaction cost effects on their market counterparts; this could explain the limited amount of trading partners willing to participate in these community-oriented markets. Ownership of forests in the hands of communities represents a difficult and fragmented environment for buyers, processors and timber companies, (Vidal, 2004; Murphy and Schindler, 2011; Bigsby et al., 2010). However, Quintana Roo indicates that the right forms of relationships can reduce transaction costs and provide an operating environment in which there is market stability for community owners and resource security for timber processors. For example, division of the management of forest resources into workgroups, coupled with the need of CFEs for informal loans and advance payments from buyers to operate, has meant greater expenditures in looking for business partners, negotiating with them and monitoring their compliance, at least when compared to dealing with unified communities. However, one buyer with long-term knowledge and relationships in the region has better information on who is a reliable supplier and how to carry out successful negotiations. This explains his continuing dominance in the region: he faces lower information, negotiation, and enforcement costs relative to his potential competitors.

Lowering of transaction costs experienced by CFEs vis-à-vis trading partners also enabled ejidos to implement an alternative organizational choice. Either knowingly or unknowingly, ejidos have made an assessment of the costs of interacting and negotiating with other market participants versus the costs of collective decision-making. For several ejidos in Quintana Roo, the costs of dealing with other market actors became lower than coordinating production internally. This is important because several authors have stressed that power asymmetries and heterogeneity of interests among members in collective organizations impose governance costs on their owners (Pérez-Cirera and Lovett, 2006; Hansmann, 1988). Sub-community level arrangements have the potential of increasing transparency, accountability, and greater appropriation of benefits by CFE owners (Krepps and Caves, 1994). Hence it should not be assumed that collective organizations are unproblematic or that communities have an innate ability for collective action and face lower costs of governance than other groups. This does not deny that sub-communal organizations also have their inherent problems. Asymmetries in human capital held by members has given rise to ‘elite’ workgroups (Wilshusen, 2005), while fewer forest revenues have been channelled to collective investments (Antinori and Rausser, 2010; Ellis et al., 2015). Additionally, community-level organization makes decisions about operation and production that are geared towards economies of scale much less conflictive because it eliminates transaction costs between individual/group providers and the processing entity. Opportunistic members that act as profit centres, with interests that run against those of the integrated entity are a problem for organizations that maintain a semblance of market exchange such as workgroups (Sexton, 1986). However, the subdivided organizational option reflects a community choice made viable by low transaction costs and highlights that poorly managed collective enterprises can also lead to uneven distribution of benefits, damage the social fabric of communities and eventually cause poor conservation outcomes (see Carias Vega and Keenan (2016)). 7. Policy implications Organizations promoting community forestry have favoured the application of vertically-integrated, collective organization models for CFEs with the aim of removing intermediaries and other markets participants so that more benefits are appropriated by communities. However, coordinating production also imposes governance costs, a type of transaction cost, on communities. Some communities may find it easier, and much more aligned with their goals, to split and simplify decisionmaking and profit distribution, even if it means losing some coordination abilities and public goods investments. In Quintana Roo low transaction costs with contractors and buyers has made alternative forms of organization viable. Hence, creating enabling environments for local entrepreneurship and allowing organizational innovation is preferable to pushing specific forms of organization (De Jong et al., 2010). Ostrom (1990), Burkey (1993), and Morrow and Hull (1996) also highlight the need for enabling environments in which government and donor organizations support the provision and training of internal change agents. In our particular case this involves lowering transaction costs for both CFEs and market participants that interact with them. Reducing information costs and hence information asymmetries is a crucial first step for policy action (see also Ferris et al., 2008; Kleih et al., 1999a and Kleih et al., 1999b who stress the importance of information for improving the functioning of rural agricultural markets in Africa and Adhikari, 2009 on Payments for Environmental Services schemes). For CFEs, information costs and asymmetries can be lowered through local capacity-building and/or information systems. Capacity building would focus on providing communities with tools for establishing price benchmarks, for determining timber volumes, for establishing adequate sustainable forestry standards and mechanisms for enforcing them, providing negotiation techniques, how to write contracts, and employing suitable technologies. These types of skills allow CFEs to

D. Carias Vega, R.J. Keenan / Forest Policy and Economics 70 (2016) 1–8

take ownership of the business relationship (Hewitt and Delgadillo, 2009). Easily accessible and updated details on markets and potential buyers greatly reduce search costs for CFEs and give them a good idea of what is expected of them and what they can expect from unknown business partners. These strategies could increase the number of competing buyers. However, some markets are characterized by strong personal relationships and personal contact hence placing a limit on the amount of possible trading partners. Information is a valuable asset for buyers as well. It all begins with knowing who is a reputable and reliable trading partner to make business less risky and costly. This is especially true for international buyers who do not have contact or experience with community organizations and are unfamiliar with the way they operate. Information on CFE products, reliability, production capacities, and negotiation practices are basic necessities for effective business relationships. Ratings systems or identification of consolidated business partners backed by the federal or state government can reduce these information costs for buyers and help make accurate assessment of risks and generate mechanisms to hedge that risk. Government backing and officialising of information and written contracts reduce informality and inspire trust. Obtaining ‘better’ prices for timber is one of the ways in which communities appropriate greater benefits from their forest resources. The prevalence of a single buyer can push down prices; in Quintana Roo this was linked to a large extent to community reliance on buyers for finance and credit. The information strategies proposed above can increase market participation and competition from additional trading partners. This needs to consider the potential impacts on long-term relationships that can provide benefits in reducing transaction costs. A complementary aspect that maintains the value of strong relationships with buyers while ensuring competitive prices for communities is to have the timber price linked to a market index. Policy aimed at improving prices for communities must also address the problem of formal credit for community operations. Some experiences demonstrate that banks will approach community operations with the right accompaniment by NGOs and government agencies. Commercial banks have approached CFEs in the Mayan Biosphere Reserve in Petén, Guatemala (see Junkin, 2007 and Hodgdon and Loewenthal, 2015). They modified requirements and used equipment and evidence of sales contracts as collateral, while the secondary association, Association of Forest Communities of Petén (ACOFOP in Spanish) also backed loans for its member CFEs and agreed to pay any non-payment and lien on harvested wood. Another option is a formalized lending component in deals between buyers and CFEs (Mayers, 2000). At a broader level, government policy on forest tenure and initiatives that seek to value forest goods and services beyond timber will most likely impact community entrepreneurship albeit indirectly. In Quintana Roo and Mexico in general, the formation of workgroups was facilitated in part by market-based reforms to the Agrarian Law, which sought to improve production in rural areas. Although forestlands remained under collective ownership, division of timber volumes and revenues was tolerated thus enabling workgroups. As community forestry becomes more inclusive of forms of forest tenure that are not collective (see http://www. growingforestpartnerships.org/locally-controlled-forestry and Macqueen et al. (2012) on the concept of ‘locally-controlled’ forestry’), sub-communal and private forms of organization for commercial forestry will become more prevalent. Government initiatives requiring greater coordination between forest owners and larger scales to generate impact such as payments for environmental services (PES), carbon credits, and REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) will confront sub-communal organizations with the choice of what to produce privately or semi-privately, when to create partnerships and long term contracts, and when to engage fully in collective action. 8. Conclusions There are four key conclusions from this study. First, collective, hierarchical organization is not the only way to reduce transaction costs for

7

CFEs. Even if some forms of organization rely more on market transactions than the others to engage in production, they are viable if transaction costs with business partners (in particular information costs and asymmetries) are low enough. Lower transaction costs are the result of capacity-building and skilling initiatives. Second, CFEs and their business partners value relationships that reduce the range of transaction costs and of uncertainty in general. This is the case even if there are trade-offs in prices and concessions of other types such as loans. Third, policy must focus on creating enabling environments that are less adversarial and uncertain. Lowering transaction costs between parties is essential to achieve this. An enabling environment can set the stage for good commercial relations, social innovation, and entrepreneurship, but other policies related to land tenure and incentives to value forest services beyond timber can also impact entrepreneurial decisions. Finally, TCE theory must further explore how the experience of transaction costs and organizational choice are affected by learning and skills development. Furthermore, skills differentials between individual actors could mean that transaction costs are a relative and not absolute concept. Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank the Latin American and Caribbean Environmental Economics Program (LACEEP), Australian Aid, the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity, government and non-government agencies in Quintana Roo, and ejido members for their support and collaboration in this study. References Adhikari, B., 2009. Market-based Approaches to Environmental Management: A Review of Lessons From Payment for Environmental Services in Asia. ADBI Working Paper Series. Antinori, C., 2005. Vertical integration in the community forestry enterprises of Oaxaca. In: Bray, D.B., Merino-Pérez, L., Barry, D. (Eds.), The Community Forestry of Mexico: Managing for Sustainable Landscapes. University of Texas Press, Austin, TX, EEUU. Austin: University of Texas. Antinori, C., Bray, D.B., 2005. Community forest enterprises as entrepreneurial firms: economic and institutional perspectives from Mexico. World Dev. 33, 1529–1543. Antinori, C., Rausser, G.C., 2008. Ownership and control in Mexico's community forestry sector. Econ. Dev. Cult. Chang. 57, 101–136. Antinori, C.M., Rausser, G.C., 2010. The Mexican Common Property Forestry Sector. Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UCB. Barry, D., Campbell, J.Y., Fahn, J., Mallee, H., Pradhan, U., 2003. Achieving significant impact at scale: reflections on the challenge for global community forestry. CIFOR Conference on Rural Livelihoods, Forests, and Biodiversity, Bonn, Germany. Benneker, C., 2008. Dealing With the State, the Market and NGOs: The Impact of Institutions on the Constitution and Performance of Community Forest Enterprises (CFE) in the Lowlands of Bolivia. University of Wageningen. Bigsby, H., Macdonald, I., Rai, C., 2010. Small Forests, Big Ambitions and a Hard Realitycommunity Forestry in Nepal. Bray, D.B., 2004. Manejo adaptativo, organizaciones y manejo de la propiedad comun: perspectivas de los bosques comunales de Quintana Roo, Mexico. In: Armijo, N., Llorens, C. (Eds.), Uso, Conservacion y Cambio en los Bosques de Quintana Roo. Universidad de Quintana Roo, Chetumal, Mexico. Bray, D., 2005. Can common property regimes alleviate poverty? Markets and their absence in the commons property literature. In: Perez, L.M., Robson, J. (Eds.), Managing the Commons: Markets, Commodity Chains and Certification. SEMARNAT, INE, Mexico. Bray, D.B., Merino-Pérez, L., 2002. The Rise of Community Forestry in Mexico: History, Concepts, and Lessons Learned From Twenty-five Years of Community Timber Production (Report prepared for the Ford Foundation). Bray, D.B., Merino-Pérez, L., Negreros-Castillo, P., Segura-Warnholtz, G., Torres-Rojo, J.M., Vester, H.F., 2003. Mexico's community-managed forests as a global model for sustainable landscapes. Conserv. Biol. 17, 672–677. Bray, D.B., Antinori, C., Torres-Rojo, J.M., 2006. The Mexican model of community forest management: the role of agrarian policy, forest policy and entrepreneurial organization. Forest Policy Econ. 8, 470–484. Burkey, S., 1993. People First: A Guide to Self-reliant Participatory Rural Development. Zed Books Ltd. Carias Vega, D., Keenan, R.J., 2014. Transaction cost theory of the firm and community forestry enterprises. Forest Policy and Economics Forest Policy Econ. 8, 1–7. Carias Vega, D., Keenan, R.J., 2016. Agents or stewards in community forestry enterprises? Lessons from the Mayan Biosphere Reserve, Guatemala. Land Use Policy 52, 255–265. Cox, M., Arnold, G., Tomás, S.V., 2010. A review of design principles for community-based natural resource management. Ecol. Soc. 15, 38.

8

D. Carias Vega, R.J. Keenan / Forest Policy and Economics 70 (2016) 1–8

De Janvry, A., Gordillo, G., Sadoulet, E., 1997. Mexico's Second Agrarian Reform: Household and Community Responses, 1990–1994. Center for US-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego La Jolla, CA. De Jong, W., Cornejo, C., Pacheco, P., Pokorny, B., Stoian, D., Sabogal, C., Loumann, B., 2010. Opportunities and challenges for community forestry: lessons from tropical America. In: Mery, G., Katila, P., Galloway, G., Kanninen, M., Lobovikov, M., Varjo, J. (Eds.), Forests and Society-responding to Global Drivers of Change. IUFRO, Vienna, Austria. Dressler, W.H., Mcdermott, M.H., Schusser, C., 2015. The politics of community forestry in a global age—a critical analysis. Forest Policy Econ. 58, 1–4. Ellis, E.A., Kainer, K.A., Sierra Huelsz, J.A., Negreros-Castillo, P., Rodríguez Ward, D., Di Giano, M.L., 2015. Endurance and adaptation of community forest management in Quintana Roo, Mexico. Forest 6, 4295–4327. Ezzine De Blas, D., Ruiz Pérez, M., Sayer, J.A., Lescuyer, G., Nasi, R., Karsenty, A., 2009. External influences on and conditions for community logging management in Cameroon. World Dev. 37, 445–456. Ezzine De Blas, D., Ruiz Pérez, M., Vermeulen, C., 2011. Management conflicts in Cameroonian community forests. Ecol. Soc. 16, 8. Fafchamps, M., 1996. The enforcement of commercial contracts in Ghana. World Dev. 24, 427–448. Ferris, S., Engoru, P., Kaganzi, E., 2008. Making Market Information Services Work Better for the Poor in Uganda, CGIAR Systemwide Program on Collective Action and Property Rights. International Food Policy Research Institute. Forster, R., Albrecht, H., Belisle, M., Caballero, A., Galletti, H., Lacayo, O., Ortiz, S., Robinson, D., 2003. Forest Communities and the Marketing of Lesser-used Tropical Hardwoods in Mesoamerica. Universidad de Quintana Roo. Forster, R., Arguelles, L.A., Aguilar, N., Kaatz, S., 2005. In: Forest Trends, Tropical Rural Latinoamérica, Procymaf, Roo, U, Conafor (Eds.), Market options and barriers for timber and sawnwood from Michoacán, Oaxaca, Guerrero, Campeche and Quintana Roo, Mexico. Galletti, H., 1998. The Maya forest of Quintana Roo: thirteen years of conservation and community development. In: B., R., Primack, D.B., Galletti, H.A., Ponciano, I. (Eds.), Timber, Tourists, and Temples: Conservation and Development in the Maya Forest of Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico. Island Press, Washington, D.C. Gow, H.R., Streeter, D.H., Swinnen, J.F., 2000. How private contract enforcement mechanisms can succeed where public institutions fail: the case of Juhocukor. Agric. Econ. 23, 253–265. Hansmann, H., 1988. Ownership of the firm. J. Law Econ. Org. 267–304. Harrison, S., 2005. Institutional and political factors affecting the development of smallholder forestry in Leyte Province. ACIAR Smallholder Forestry Project-redevelopment of a Timber Industry Following Extensive Land Clearing: Proceedings From the Endof-project Workshop. The University of Queensland, pp. 149–158. Harrison, S., Herbohn, J., Niskanen, A., 2002. Non-industrial, smallholder, small-scale and family forestry: what's in a name? Small Scale For. Econ. Manag. Policy 1, 1–11. Hewitt, D., Delgadillo, M.C., 2009. Key Factors for Successful Community-corporate Partnerships. Rainforest Alliance, Richmond, Vermont, USA. Hodgdon, B., Loewenthal, A., 2015. Expanding access to finance for community forestry enterprises: a case study of work with forestry concessions in the Mayan Biosphere Reserve (Peten, Guatemala). In: Alliance, R., Fund, M.I. (Eds.), Community Forestry Case Studies. Holmes, T.P., Blate, G.M., Zweede, J.C., Pereira, R., Barreto, P., Boltz, F., Bauch, R., 2002. Financial and ecological indicators of reduced impact logging performance in the eastern Amazon. For. Ecol. Manag. 163, 93–110. Humphries, S., 2010. Community-based Forest Enterprises in Brazil and Mexico: Timber Production and Commercialization Models, Market Engagement, and Financial Viability. University of Florida. Junkin, R., 2007. Overcoming the barriers to financial services for small-scale forestry: the case of the community forest enterprises of Petén, Guatemala. Unasylva-FAO 58, 38. Kellert, S.R., Mehta, J.N., Ebbin, S.A., Lichtenfeld, L.L., 2000. Community natural resource management: promise, rhetoric, and reality. Soc. Nat. Resour. 13, 705–715. Kleih, U., Kergna, A., Sanogo, O., 1999a. Community access to marketing opportunities-options for remote areas. Mali Case Study. Natural Resources Institute (NRI), Chatham, UK and Institut d'Economie Rurale, Bamako, Mali (51 pp). Kleih, U., Odwongo, W., Ndyashangaki, C., 1999b. Community Access to Marketing Opportunities: Options for Remote Areas. Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich, Chatham Maritime, UK. Krepps, M.B., Caves, R.E., 1994. Bureaucrats and Indians: principal-agent relations and efficient management of tribal forest resources. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 24, 133–151. Larson, D.M., Hardie, I.W., 1989. Seller behavior in stumpage markets with imperfect information. Land Econ. 239–253. Leffler, K.B., Rucker, R.R., 1991. Transactions costs and the efficient organization of production: a study of timber-harvesting contracts. J. Polit. Econ. 1060–1087. Lyon, F., Porter, G., 2009. Market institutions, trust and norms: exploring moral economies in Nigerian food systems. Camb. J. Econ. 33, 903–920. Macleod, W.B., 2007. Reputations, relationships, and contract enforcement. J. Econ. Lit. 595–628. Macqueen, D., Demarsh, P., Pandey, G.S., Castro Díaz, E., Robinson, L., Lewis, S., 2012. Big ideas in development: investing in locally controlled forestry. In: I. F. E. A. (Ed.), Development. Mayers, J., 2000. Company-community forestry partnerships: a growing phenomenon. Unasylva-FAO 33–41.

Medina, G., Pokorny, B., Campbell, B., 2009. Community forest management for timber extraction in the Amazon frontier. Int. For. Rev. 11, 408–420. Molnar, A., Liddle, M., Bracer, C., Khare, A., White, A., Bull, J., 2007. Community-based forest enterprises in tropical forest countries: status and potential. Rights and Resources Initiative. Molnar, A., Gomes, D., Sousa, R., Vidal, N., Hojer, R.F., Arguelles, L.A., Kaatz, S., Martin, A., Donini, G., Scherr, S., 2008. Community forest enterprise markets in Mexico and Brazil: new opportunities and challenges for legal access to the forest. J. Sustain. For. 27, 87–121. Morrow, C.E., Hull, R.W., 1996. Donor-initiated common pool resource institutions: the case of the Yanesha forestry cooperative. World Dev. 24, 1641–1657. Murphy, J.T., Schindler, S., 2011. Globalizing development in Bolivia? Alternative networks and value-capture challenges in the wood products industry. J. Econ. Geogr. 11, 61–85. Nascimento, J.R., Mota Villanueva, J.L.B., 2004. Instrumentos para el desarrollo de dueños de pequeñas tierras forestales. Inter-American Development Bank. Ostrom, E., 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Pacheco, P., 2012. Smallholders and communities in timber markets: conditions shaping diverse forms of engagement in tropical Latin America. Conserv. Soc. 10, 114. Pacheco, P., Paudel, N.S., 2010. Communities and forest markets: assessing the benefits from diverse forms of engagement. In: Larson, A.M. (Ed.), Forests for People: Community Rights and Forest Tenure Reform. Earthscan. Pacheco, P., Ibarra, E., Cronkleton, P., Amaral, P., 2008. Políticas públicas que afectan el manejo forestal comunitario. In: Sabogal, C., De Jong, W., Pokorny, B., Louman, B. (Eds.), Manejo forestal comunitario en América Tropical: Experiencias, lecciones aprendidas y retos para el futuro. CIFOR-CATIE, Belem, Brazil. Pejovich, S., 1995. Privatizing the Process of Institutional Change in Eastern Europe. International center for economic research. Pérez-Cirera, V., Lovett, J.C., 2006. Power distribution, the external environment and common property forest governance: a local user groups model. Ecol. Econ. 59, 341–352. Richards, E., 1992. The Forest Ejidos of South-east Mexico: A Case Study of Participatory Natural Forest Management. Network Paper-Rural Development Forestry Network, United Kingdom. Santos Jimenez, V., 2009. Low-tech Log Conversion: A New Path for Small Forest Communities ComForNet [Online]. 2015. Sexton, R.J., 1986. Cooperatives and the forces shaping agricultural marketing. Am. J. Agric. Econ. 68, 1167–1172. Sierra Huelsz, J.A., Negreros-Castillo, P., Di Giano, M.L., Ellis, E.A., Kainer, K.A., 2014. Community-based forest management in Quintana Roo, Mexico. In: Katila, P., Galloway, G., De Jong, W., Pacheco, P., Mery, G. (Eds.), Forests Under Pressure: Local Responses to Global Issues. International Union of Forest Research Organizations (IUFRO). Snook, L.K., Santos Jimenez, M., Carreón Mundo, M., Chan Rivas, C., May Ek, F.J., Mas Kantún, P., Nolasco Morales, A., Hernandez Hernandez, C., Escobar Ruíz, C., 2003. Managing natural forests for sustainable harvests of mahogany (Swietenia macrophylla): experiences in Mexico's community forests. Unasylva 54. Stiglitz, J.E., 2000. The contributions of the economics of information to twentieth century economics. Q. J. Econ. 1441–1478. Stoian, D., 2005. La economía extractivista de la Amazonía norte boliviana. In: (CIFOR), C. F. I. F. R. (ed.). Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Jakarta, Indonesia, Bolivia. Taylor, P.L., 2001. Community forestry as embedded process: two cases from Durango and Quintana Roo, Mexico. Int. J. Sociol. Agric. Food 9, 59–81. Taylor, P.L., 2003. Reorganization or division? New strategies of community forestry in Durango, Mexico. Soc. Nat. Resour. 16, 643–661. Taylor, P.L., 2010. Conservation, community, and culture? New organizational challenges of community forest concessions in the Maya Biosphere Reserve of Guatemala. J. Rural. Stud. 26, 173–184. Taylor, P.L., Zabin, C., 2000. Neoliberal reform and sustainable forest management in Quintana Roo, Mexico: rethinking the institutional framework of the forestry pilot plan. Agric. Hum. Values 17, 141–156. Vidal, N.G., 2004. Forest Company-community Agreements in Mexico: Identifying Successful Models. Forest Trends. Wiersum, K.F., 2009. Community forestry between local autonomy and global encapsulation: quo vadis with environmental and climate change payments? Paper first community forestry international workshop ‘thinking globally—acting locally: community forestry in the international arena’ Pokhara, Nepal, September 15–18, 2009. On line http://edepot.wur.nl/157269. Accessed 17 May 2016. Williamson, O.E., 1996. Transaction cost economics and organization theory. In: Smelser, N.J., Swedberg, R. (Eds.), The Handbook of Economic Sociology. Princeton University Press. Williamson, O.E., 1998. The institutions of governance. Am. Econ. Rev. 75–79. Wilshusen, P. (Ed.), 2005. Community Adaptation or Collective Breakdown? The Emergence of ‘Work Groups’ in Two Forestry Ejidos in Quintana Roo, Mexico. Wilshusen, P.R., 2006. Sociedad de Productores Forestales Ejidales de Quintana Roo. Community-based Forest Enterprises in Tropical Forest Countries: Scoping Study. Wilshusen, P.R., Raleigh, L., Russell, V.A., 2002. By, for and of the people: the development of two community-managed protected areas in Oaxaca, Mexico. J. Sustain. For. 15, 113–126.