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Transboundary cooperation in shared river basins: experiences from the Rhine, Meuse and North Sea
Water Policy 2 (2000) 83±97
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Transboundary cooperation in shared river basins: experiences from the Rhine, Meuse and North Sea p Pieter Huisman*, 1, Joost de Jong 2, Koos Wieriks 3 Delft University of Technology, PO Box 5048, 2600 GA Delft, The Netherlands
1. Introduction: Rhine and Meuse The Rhine is a relatively small river, with a basin of 170,000 km2. In Europe, the Rhine basin ranks third in size, the basins of Danube and Wolga being ®ve and 10 times larger, respectively. The length of the river is 1300 km, of which 880 km is navigable. The river basin lies in seven countries: Switzerland, Austria, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands (Fig. 1). The population in the basin is some 60 million. The average discharge of the Rhine at the mouth is 2200 m3/s. The favourable hydrologic characteristics of the Rhine explain why it became an important trac chain. At Basle, where the catchment area is only 25% of the total basin area, river discharge is nearly 50% of the total river ¯ow when it reaches the North Sea. The ¯ow distribution over the year is favourable too, as a result of the snow storage in the Alps (Fig. 2). More than 150,000 ships, with some 180 million tonnes of goods, yearly pass Lobith on the German±Dutch border. The Meuse has a catchment area of 33,000 km2 and is 870 km long. The Meuse ¯ows into the former estuary Hollands Diep through which also a large part of the Rhine water makes its way to the North Sea. Since both the Rhine and the Meuse share part of the same delta, from Revised and updated paper originally presented at the SADC±EU Conference on the Management of Shared River Basins, Maseru, Lesotho, 20±21 May 1997. * Corresponding author. 1 Associate professor of integrated water management in the University of Technology of Delft and senior water management engineer in the National Institute on Inland Water Management and Waste Water Treatment. Former Secretary General of the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine against pollution. 2 Director of information and knowledge in the chief directorate of the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management and professor of integrated water management in the University of Technology in Delft. 3 Secretary General of the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine. p
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Fig. 1. The river basins of the Rhine and Meuse.
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Fig. 2. Hydrographs at Basle and Lobith for the Rhine and at Maastrickt for the Meuse.
a scienti®c point of view the Meuse river belongs to the Rhine basin (Fig. 1). The European nations, however, have considered the Meuse to be a separate basin. The Meuse is a typical rain-fed river. High water periods in winter and low ¯ows during summer (Fig. 2). The average ¯ow amounts to 250 m3/s. Parts of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany and the Netherlands belong to the river basin. The basin has a population of nine million people. The river has been canalized over 720 km for navigation and hydro-power. The estuary of the Rhine and Meuse in fact also includes the Scheldt River. This river springs in France, ¯ows through Belgium territory, and debouches into the same estuary system in the Netherlands. One could even argue that the North Sea can be seen as a coastal system, of which also the estuary of the Rhine±Meuse±Scheldt system forms an integral part. This seemingly trivial fact, however, implies that the coastal plain of Germany (the German Bight) suers the consequences of its own pollution of the Rhine, and that Denmark becomes a stakeholder as well.
2. Historical overview of transboundary cooperation Favoured by its physico-geographic situation, the Rhine was and still is one of the most important trac chains in Europe. The Rhine was also the most disputed border between the Roman and Germanic people in Northwest Europe from the ®rst centuries AD. Numerous wars between nations of both origins took place. The last ones, the First and Second World War, had a global impact. Between the wars, dierent Rhine states tried to promote transboundary interests. Speci®c agreements about navigation, ®shery and pollution were
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concluded. The Rhine States tackled these issues as separated tracks. This sectoral approach led to optimal conditions for some interests. Meanwhile, these conditions heavily damaged other interests. In 1985 the Dutch launched the idea to harmonise and integrate all water related interests. This idea was welcomed by the other Rhine basin and North Sea States because it linked similar views in these countries. History has de®ned bilateral cooperation between the Netherlands and Belgium. In the 15th and 16th centuries, the present Dutch and Belgian territories and some parts of France formed one country, the 17 Netherlands provinces. Opinions about religion considerably changed the political landscape in the 16th century. The seven northern states declared their independence in 1581. In 1814, the Netherlands were united again. International cooperation on the Rhine navigation started in 1815. Because of the shifting navigation channels in the delta, the Netherlands government wanted to limit the free Rhine navigation to the branches of the Waal and Lower-Rhine. Since the independence of Belgium in 1839, the Netherlands concluded treaties with the other riparian Rhine states, excluding the Meuse. The Meuse was considered a bilateral matter between the Netherlands and Belgium. From that moment both countries began to formulate their own policies, particularly about transport, industrial and agricultural activities in the Scheldt and Meuse basin. For Belgium, free access to the Rhine and North Sea through Dutch territory is vital. For the Netherlands, water quantity and water quality of the Meuse became important issues. The diverging interests between Belgium and the Netherlands led to a case brought before the Permanent Court of Justice in 1937, but its ambiguous judgement did not force a break-through. After the Second World War, time-consuming negotiations led to an agreement, which was not rati®ed by the Belgians. Internal Belgian controversies played an important role. Since 1993, Belgium has been a federal state with three Regions. Each Region has the right to conclude international treaties. In 1994, France, the Brussels-Capital, the Flemish and Walloon Regions and the Netherlands concluded three treaties to improve the transboundary cooperation 4. The 1992 Helsinki agreement made the conclusion of these treaties easier (the Convention about the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes was signed by 23 European countries in Helsinki in 1992). It explains the observer status position of the Federal Government of Belgium in the Helsinki talks. The cooperation between the North Sea states about water issues began in the 1960s. This cooperation was characterised by dierent opinions between the states of the continent and the United Kingdom about the way to tackle the pollution problem; the emission-approach vs the water quality-approach. In 1972, Belgium, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom signed a treaty in Oslo to protect the marine environment of the North Atlantic sea against pollution caused by incineration and dumping of wastes from ships and aeroplanes. In addition to this treaty, in 1974 the same states signed a convention in Paris to protect the same sea area against the pollution of land-based sources and oshore installations. This convention 4
France, the Walloon Region, the Flemish Region, the Brussels Region and the Netherlands concluded the agreement on the protection of the Meuse. The Flemish Region and the Netherlands concluded the agreement on the equal division of the discharge of the Meuse during low water periods. France, the Flemish Region and the Netherlands concluded the agreement on the protection of the Scheldt.
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obviously had a bearing on the management of West European rivers. In spite of these treaties, however, scientists observed a deterioration of the North Sea. Germany therefore took the initiative for a minister's conference in 1984. The participating countries (Germany, France, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom) committed themselves to better protect the North Sea by adopting the North Sea Action Plan and agreed to harmonise this plan with similar action plans for rivers ¯owing into the North Sea, such as the Rhine Action Programme. Based on experiences about international cooperation in the Rhine and Meuse basin and the North Sea area, a number of lessons have been learned. In the following sections, these lessons will be supported by arguments from history and practice. 2.1. Statement 1: only voluntary decisions of riparian states create the appropriate conditions for sustained international cooperation Until the 19th century some physical obstacles hindered Rhine navigation to a certain degree. The major diculties, however, were caused by the many rulers along the river. Kings, bishops, cities and robber knights tried to pro®t from Rhine navigation. There were numerous tolls along the Rhine and passing ships had to pay duties to the rulers of the dierent Rhine sections. Several rulers and usurpers tried to eliminate the tolls by force; these attempts failed. Elimination of tolls was an important issue in the Peace Conference in Vienna in 1815. In the framework of the Peace Treaty, the riparian Rhine states voluntarily voted for free navigation and elimination of the tolls. They created the Central Commission for the Rhine navigation, the oldest still vital river commission in the world. After 1815, several wars changed the political landscape, but the principle of free navigation on the Rhine remained intact, as it was based on voluntary decisions by sovereign states. Hydraulic power generation and navigation became important issues at the turn of the century. For the Rhine section between Basle and Strasbourg, two solutions were proposed. Germany pleaded for canalization by constructing weirs in the river. France preferred the realization of a lateral canal on its bank. With the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, France forced the right to construct the lateral canal, le Grand Canal d'Alsace. Its implementation was disastrous for the German bank as all discharges smaller than the annual average were diverted into the canal; the old river course only being used for peak discharges. Navigation bound activities on the German bank became impossible. It also harmed agriculture and ®sheries, and aected the landscape too. This situation was one of Hitler's arguments to prepare for war. On the eve of the Second World War, 50% of the Canal was built. Sustainable transboundary cooperation is learning from the past. Soon after World War II, France and Germany voluntarily modi®ed the Versailles regulations. The two concepts, canalization of the river and construction of lateral channels, were combined. Today the combined solution equally serves German and French interests and satis®es both countries, based as it is on a voluntary agreement. 2.2. Statement 2: one-sided promotion of individual or sectoral interests negatively aects other interests The disappearance of ®sheries from the Rhine illustrates that one-sided promotion of
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interests may have dramatic consequences. Until 1900 ®sheries were an important economic activity along the Rhine and its tributaries. Every town had its ®sh market. The supply to the markets was plentiful, particularly of salmon. In 1885, for instance, some 250,000 salmon were caught. Times changed, however. Already in 1850 international eorts were undertaken to protect the salmon stocks against over-®shing and to assure an equal distribution of the catches over the Rhine states. Over-®shing due to mechanical tools was a real threat. As the Dutch ®shermen extended their nets over the total river width, the catches upstream became rather poor. To settle these problems, the Rhine states concluded a salmon treaty in 1869. The Netherlands' parliament, however, rejected this treaty because it would negatively aect Dutch ®shery interests. In 1885, the riparian states concluded another salmon treaty with nearly the same content. This time the other riparian countries managed to convince the Netherlands to sign. As a result, all Rhine states rati®ed this treaty, which is still in force as no state has denounced it. The treaty prescribes that the riparian states shall undertake all eorts to preserve the salmon stock at a high level. The treaty envisaged eorts ensuring the accessibility and protection of the spawning areas in the Rhine and its tributaries. In spite of this legal international instrument, navigation and hydraulic power generation got a far higher priority than ®sheries and other interests. The weirs and reservoir dams made it impossible for migratory ®sh to reach their spawning grounds. Moreover, the weirs and dams produced higher water levels, changing the velocity and sedimentation conditions in the spawning areas. Thus weirs and dams impeded the reproduction of the migratory ®sh. In 1913, the International Salmon Commission made an inventory of the stock. The inventory showed that only few major spawning areas upstream of Basle and in the Moselle were left. Later on these areas were lost due to the construction of the Grand Canal d'Alsace and the canalization of the Moselle. The Netherlands considerably hindered ®sh migration when closing the Zuiderzee, the construction of the Delta-works and the canalization of the Lower-Rhine and the Meuse. In 1940, salmon had nearly disappeared from the whole Rhine basin (Fig. 3). Today, the more than 400 weirs, dams and sluices still form obstacles for transmigratory ®sh. The salmon case
Fig. 3. Number of salmon caught in Germany and The Netherlands.
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clearly shows that the one-sided promotion of navigation and hydro-power interests harmed the ecosystem and ®shery interests. 2.3. Statement 3: bene®cial transboundary cooperation requires mutual trust; concrete measures may con®rm common intentions; this process takes time The Rhine delta is very vulnerable to salinization by the North Sea. In the course of the centuries, measures increasing in scale became necessary to protect the Netherlands against salt water intrusion. In the densely populated western part of the country, the ground water is brackish. In these regions, water from the Rhine and the Meuse is used for the production of drinking water. In the polders lying below sea level, there is a brackish seepage ¯ow to the ditches and canals in the polders. To prevent salinization of the soil, the brackish water has to be removed and replaced by fresh water. Rhine water was very useful for these purposes. Before 1900, the salt concentration in the Rhine did not exceed 10±20 mg/l Clÿ. The rapid industrialization and growth of population since 1850 heavily aected the self puri®cation capacity of the Rhine and its tributaries. The increasing discharges of organic and inorganic substances became more and more problematic. The resulting increase in salt content of the Rhine water was a threat for the Netherlands. Having all but solved the problem of salt water intrusion from the North Sea, the Netherlands saw itself threatened by the same problem, this time from its European hinterland (Fig. 4). In 1932, the Dutch government protested in Berlin and Paris against the increasing pollution of the Rhine, but in vain. After the Second World War, industrial activities in the Rhine basin rapidly increased. In 1946, the Netherlands tried again to draw the attention of the other riparian states to the increasing pollution problem. In 1950, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland created the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution (ICPR). This Commission received its legal
Fig. 4. The increasing chloride load of the Rhine at Lobith.
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foundation with the conclusion of the Convention of Berne in 1963. At the end of the 1950s, the Netherlands formulated quality criteria for the Rhine water. The international discussion of these criteria gave evidence of the contradicting positions of the upstream and downstream riparian states, the ``Oberlieger/Unterlieger'' confrontation. The upstream riparian states recognized the pollution impact in the Netherlands. They also distrusted the Dutch appeal for a cleaner Rhine. The upstream countries thought that they were to pay the bill for the clean-up of the Rhine, while the Netherlands could continue to pollute the Rhine estuaries and the North Sea. Indeed, at that moment waste water from Rotterdam, The Hague and the large potato-¯our industry in the north was discharged untreated. Pollution of Rhine water came to a climax in the autumn of 1971. During the low water period, oxygen-consuming waste water and toxic substances reached such high levels that the Rhine lacked oxygen in its downstream sections. All aquatic life disappeared from these sections (Fig. 5). The Rhine water had become unsuitable for any use. The all time low of the water quality in 1971 shocked the public and governments in the Rhine states. In 1972, the Rhine states decided to take concrete, speci®c steps to reduce the pollution of the Rhine. Among others, the ministers charged the ICPR to elaborate a convention to reduce chemical pollution. This convention was concluded in 1976. Due to mutual mistrust, the convention contained detailed procedures. The convention provided a step by step elimination of the dangerous substances of the so-called ``black-list'' and a reduction of the substances of the ``grey-list''. It prescribed the de®nition of emission standards according to the best technical means for the black-list and the best applicable means for the grey-list substances. The work proved to be more complicated and more time-consuming than expected. The best technical means of today are outdated tomorrow. Another complicating factor was
Fig. 5. The decreasing oxygen content of the Rhine at Lobith.
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the approval of the standards by the European Union, since 1976 a member of the ICPR. Particularly, the juridical approval of the Rhine decisions resulted in time-consuming negotiations in Brussels. As a result of these diculties, by 1986 the ICPR had concluded emission standards for 12 substances only. Collaboration between the basin states of the Meuse is in its infancy compared to that of the Rhine. The historical overview already explained the diculties concerning transboundary cooperation in the Meuse basin. Today, France, the Belgian Regions and the Netherlands are building up their cooperation network based on the 1994 treaty to protect the Meuse. It is a dicult matter. The Walloon Region fears being overpowered by the Dutch and French concerning water quality issues. The French and Dutch members have cooperated for more than 40 years in the Rhine Commission, building up knowledge and negotiation skills. It is these members that have a lead above the Walloons in the Meuse commission. Moreover, the Walloon water authority is under-staed, with about 40 people. To compare: in the Netherlands several hundreds of people are involved in the water problems of the Meuse. This situation requires a prudent approach. Particularly, the Dutch are challenged to gain the con®dence of their Walloon partners. It requires understanding and an unpretending approach by the Dutch. 2.4. Statement 4: disasters with international impacts are excellent occasions to improve transboundary cooperation On 1 November 1986, a disaster hit the Rhine: a warehouse at the Sandoz chemical industries near Basle caught ®re. The ®re in the insecticide stores was particularly disastrous, destroying 1000 tons of agro-chemical substances. The ®re was extinguished using about 10±15 million l of water, a major part of which mixed with the chemicals and ¯owed into the Rhine. The next days showed a poison wave propagating downstream and killing all organisms. Tons of dead ®sh and other animals were taken out of the Rhine. Forty water works along the Rhine had to stop the intake of river water. The Sandoz incident caused a wave of publicity and public concern in all riparian states. On the 12 November the ministers met to discuss the situation. The other states did not blame the Swiss. They recognised the excellent Swiss eorts to clean up the Rhine in the past. A similar accident could have happened in any other country. Now there was political resolve to prevent similar accidents in future. The ICPR was under high pressure to formulate transboundary actions. The result was the Rhine Action Programme (RAP) of 1987. Apart from measures to prevent accidents like the Sandoz incident, the ministers adopted new, clearly de®ned, long term objectives for the Rhine: 1. Higher species such as migratory ®sh should return to the Rhine by the year 2000. The salmon, as the best known species, was chosen as a symbol. 2. Future use of Rhine water for public water supply using simple puri®cation techniques must be guaranteed. 3. The pollution of sediments has to be reduced to such a low level that sediment can be applied on the land or dumped into the sea without negative consequences for the aquatic environment.
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The Rhine Action Programme provided a 50% reduction of the 47 most problematic substances between 1985 and 1995. An important means to achieve this goal is the regular updating of the best available technology. This is not enforced through the detailed procedure of the chemical convention, but simply in terms of political commitment. The modi®ed approach implies that not only point sources but also diuse sources, particularly originating from agriculture and trac, can be tackled. Apart from overall pollution reduction objectives, the Rhine Action Programme contains a unique commitment to rehabilitate the Rhine eco-system. In conclusion, the Sandoz accident was an eminent occasion to strengthen the transboundary cooperation. The resulting pollution-reducing eorts in the Rhine states were substantial (Table 1). Between 1965 and 1989 the authorities in the ®ve riparian states invested about 100 billion DM (US$ 60 billion) in the construction and improvement of treatment plants. Sanitation of waste water from industries and municipalities reduced the concentrations of organic and inorganic substances. The water authorities concluded in 1993 that for 38 substances the Rhine target values had been reached. For nine substances, the observed concentrations were still above the target values. The eorts to reduce these substances have since increased. The 1995 ¯oods along the Rhine and Meuse provided a new opportunity to broaden transboundary cooperation. Large areas along the Rhine and Meuse were inundated. Dikes in the Netherlands were on the point of collapse. The ministers of the riparian states declared in Arles, France, the necessity to reduce the ¯ood risk and harmonize ¯ood-reducing measures. They particularly stressed the harmonization of spatial planning, land use and water management in the river basins. Here again is an example that disasters may trigger political resolve that improves international cooperation. Use these opportunities to reinforce and deepen transboundary cooperation.
Table 1 Pollution reduction on the German±Dutch border in reference years Pollutant
Unit
Natural load
1972
1985
1993
Change 1972±1993 (%)
Mercury Cadmium Chromium Lead Copper Nickel Zinc TOCa Oxygen Phosphate Nitrogen
t/y t/y t/y t/y t/y t/y t/y kg/s mg/l kg/s kg/s
0.7 1 240 75 70 na 250 na 10.0 0.2 0.3
99 167 3627 2000 2018 na 13,800 29 4.4 1.3 1.0
5 9 378 441 473 356 2995 13 8.0 1.0 1.4
2.5 2.8 251 346 314 219 1724 8 10.0 0.5 0.5
ÿ97 ÿ98 ÿ93 ÿ83 ÿ84 na ÿ88 ÿ72 +127 ÿ62 ÿ50
a
Total organic carbon.
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2.5. Statement 5: harmonization of measures must not be limited to river basins but should also include the recipient sea In the North Sea area, pollution by rivers, atmosphere, o-shore industry and navigation concentrate their impacts in the German Bight (Fig. 6). The south±north going currents transport the pollution of the Rhine, Meuse, Scheldt and British rivers to the German Bight. Since the end of the 1970s, oxygen depletion and ®sh diseases were often observed here. The enormous algae blooms and high mortality of seals in the German Bight in 1988 showed the close interrelation between the pollution loads of the rivers and changes in the marine environment. The North Sea minister conference decided to develop a North Sea Action Plan (NAP). The conference fully adopted the RAP-objectives. As the North Sea is extremely
Fig. 6. Water and sedimentation movements in the North Sea.
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vulnerable to nutrients, mercury, cadmium, lead and dioxins, the conference sharpened the reduction goal for these substances from 50 to 70%. On the rebound, the ICPR adopted the sharpened goal and added a fourth objective to the RAP: the improvement of the ecology of the North Sea.
2.6. Statement 6: legal frameworks help to tackle transboundary problems and to structure common activities The Federal Republic of Germany, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland created the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution (ICPR) in 1950. The exchange of diplomatic notes at the end of the 1940s was the base for the transboundary cooperation. This base proved to be insucient for good, professional cooperation. The diplomatic notes did not contain agreements about presidency, the cost of investigations, publication, etc. The ICPR ®nally received its legal foundation with the conclusion of the Convention of Berne in 1963. Article 2 of the convention de®nes the mission of the ICPR. The ICPR has to formulate the investigations about kind, source and extent of the Rhine pollution, recommend appropriate measures to reduce the pollution and to prepare agreements between the participating countries. Moreover, the ICPR is competent in all matters that the Rhine states jointly charge the ICPR with. This last regulation proved to be very useful. The Rhine states could charge the ICPR with the rehabilitation of the Rhine ecosystem in 1987 and the ¯ood problems in 1995. The actual implementation of measurements and measures is the responsibility of the individual basin states. That means that the ICPR is only a negotiation platform and an adviser to the Rhine Governments and, since 1976, the European Union. The work is prepared in working groups of ocials of the participating parties. Decisions are taken in plenary sessions. Every three years, the presidency changes to another party. To assist the president, the plenary and working group meetings the ICPR has a small secretariat (see Fig. 7). The ICPR has to cooperate with the Central Commission for the Rhine navigation and the International Commissions to protect Lake Constance and the transboundary tributaries Moselle and Sarre against pollution. Thanks to the regulations in the Berne convention, the ICPR could tackle transboundary problems and structure common activities such as the rehabilitation of the ecosystem and the ¯ood mitigation measures. Legal frameworks particularly help in dicult situations. They contain regulations for transboundary cooperation. Legal frameworks provide a common grip to ®nd the way out. As the tasks of the ICPR increased in time, the 11th Rhine ministers conference of December 1994 charged the ICPR to up-date the convention of Berne. The new convention has to consider the regulations of the Helsinki agreement of 17 March 1992 and integrate the existing conventions and programmes. To illustrate the broadening of the ICPR's mandate, the words ``against pollution'' were dropped from its name. Its new name will be ``International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine''.
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Fig. 7. Organisation structure of the International Commission of the Protection of the Rhine.
2.7. Statement 7: common monitoring infrastructure contributes to mutual trust, joint assessment and policy-making
After the creation of the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution (ICPR) in 1950, the ICPR started to investigate the kind and the extent of the pollution. An international measurement network was set up. Common analysis methods were developed. This proved a laborious exercise as measurement and analysis methods diered in the participating countries. This important activity provided the common basis for an objective assessment of the water quality. Later, this approach served as an example for many other international fora. Measurement standards and methods to assess the water quality in transboundary waters, prepared and agreed upon in common understanding, create the basis for the formulation of joint measures. Sustainable transboundary cooperation needs a thorough, undisputable, scienti®c assessment of facts. Doubts about facts frustrate international cooperation. Since 1970, scienti®c institutions in six Rhine countries cooperate in the International Commission for the Hydrology in the Rhine basin. This Commission harmonizes hydrological data and sometimes executes speci®c investigations for the ICPR.
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2.8. Statement 8: periodical assessment of plans gives the opportunity to adapt and modify objectives and measures to changing conditions and opinions In 1972, the ministers charged the ICPR to draw up a long term working program (Horizon 1985), with particular emphasis on waste water treatment of households and industries. It was a good instrument to assess progress in pollution reduction. Publication of the list of the main polluters in the Rhine basin helped to stimulate the sanitation eorts. This also demonstrates that public opinion in the Rhine countries is an important factor. Public information about undoubtable facts plays an essential role in decision making. As was already observed, accidents may trigger eorts to intensify and to broaden the transboundary cooperation. The Sandoz-aair of 1986 led to RAP- and NAP-reduction programmes and the rehabilitation plan for the Rhine. Regular evaluation of these plans are essential to assess progress or stagnation. The annual report of the ICPR stimulates the eorts to sharpen the measures in the dierent sectors in order to achieve the over-all pollution reduction goals in time. International evaluation of the national rehabilitation programmes is essential to assess their progress and impact. Transboundary exchange of data and experiences provide the common base for adaptation of the pollution reduction and rehabilitation programmes. The 1995 ¯oods in Rhine and Meuse urged the authorities to develop a coherent set of measures to reduce future ¯ood damage.
3. Conclusion Human intervention degraded the Rhine ecosystem and harmed other water-related interests. It took and will take decades to rehabilitate and mitigate certain impacts. History and experiences of the international cooperation in the Rhine basin and North Sea area can help to recognise and analyse the situation in other transboundary river basins and seas. From the Rhine, Meuse and North Sea case, the following conclusions can be drawn. . Only voluntary decisions by riparian states create the basis for sustainable cooperation on an international level. Wrested concessions do not last very long. . Avoid unilateral promotion of individual and sectoral interests. The Rhine case shows that one-sided promotion of interests negatively aects other interests and may cause considerable harm to the entire ecosystem. . Cooperation in transboundary river basins is a time-consuming process of small steps. Mutual con®dence is the only basis for successful cooperation. . Promotion of all water related interests and information exchange with non-governmental organisations takes time, but supports the transboundary cooperation in river basins and enlarges the acceptation of proposed measures. . Disasters with international impacts can lead to a break-through. They can help to improve transboundary cooperation. . Agreement over, and adoption of, measurement standards and methods is an important basis for achieving the reduction of water pollution of shared water resources. . The transboundary policies for river basins have to be harmonised with the policies for the
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protection of the recipient seas. . Periodical updating of plans gives the opportunity to adapt objectives and measures to the changing conditions and opinions in society.
Further reading Economic Commission for Europe. (1992). Proceedings of the Convention on the Protection and use of Transboundary Water Courses and International Lakes of 17 March 1992. Huisman, P. (1995). From one-sided promotion of individual interests to integrated water management in the Rhine basin. In Proceedings of the Conference on Living with Water, September 1995. Amsterdam. International Commission for the Hydrology of the Rhine Basin. (1993). The Rhine under the in¯uence of man Ð river engineering works, shipping, water management, (in French and German). Lelystad. International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution. (1987). Activity report 1987, (in French and German). Koblenz. International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution. (1991). Ecological Master Plan for the Rhine Ð Salmon 2000, Koblenz. de Jong, J., & de Wit, J. A. W. (1993). Conclusions and Recommendations of the International Conference on Rehabilitation of the River Rhine, March, Arnhem.
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Transboundary cooperation in shared river basins: experiences from the Rhine, Meuse and North Sea p Pieter Huisman*, 1, Joost de Jong 2, Koos Wieriks 3 Delft University of Technology, PO Box 5048, 2600 GA Delft, The Netherlands
1. Introduction: Rhine and Meuse The Rhine is a relatively small river, with a basin of 170,000 km2. In Europe, the Rhine basin ranks third in size, the basins of Danube and Wolga being ®ve and 10 times larger, respectively. The length of the river is 1300 km, of which 880 km is navigable. The river basin lies in seven countries: Switzerland, Austria, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands (Fig. 1). The population in the basin is some 60 million. The average discharge of the Rhine at the mouth is 2200 m3/s. The favourable hydrologic characteristics of the Rhine explain why it became an important trac chain. At Basle, where the catchment area is only 25% of the total basin area, river discharge is nearly 50% of the total river ¯ow when it reaches the North Sea. The ¯ow distribution over the year is favourable too, as a result of the snow storage in the Alps (Fig. 2). More than 150,000 ships, with some 180 million tonnes of goods, yearly pass Lobith on the German±Dutch border. The Meuse has a catchment area of 33,000 km2 and is 870 km long. The Meuse ¯ows into the former estuary Hollands Diep through which also a large part of the Rhine water makes its way to the North Sea. Since both the Rhine and the Meuse share part of the same delta, from Revised and updated paper originally presented at the SADC±EU Conference on the Management of Shared River Basins, Maseru, Lesotho, 20±21 May 1997. * Corresponding author. 1 Associate professor of integrated water management in the University of Technology of Delft and senior water management engineer in the National Institute on Inland Water Management and Waste Water Treatment. Former Secretary General of the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine against pollution. 2 Director of information and knowledge in the chief directorate of the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management and professor of integrated water management in the University of Technology in Delft. 3 Secretary General of the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine. p
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Fig. 1. The river basins of the Rhine and Meuse.
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Fig. 2. Hydrographs at Basle and Lobith for the Rhine and at Maastrickt for the Meuse.
a scienti®c point of view the Meuse river belongs to the Rhine basin (Fig. 1). The European nations, however, have considered the Meuse to be a separate basin. The Meuse is a typical rain-fed river. High water periods in winter and low ¯ows during summer (Fig. 2). The average ¯ow amounts to 250 m3/s. Parts of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany and the Netherlands belong to the river basin. The basin has a population of nine million people. The river has been canalized over 720 km for navigation and hydro-power. The estuary of the Rhine and Meuse in fact also includes the Scheldt River. This river springs in France, ¯ows through Belgium territory, and debouches into the same estuary system in the Netherlands. One could even argue that the North Sea can be seen as a coastal system, of which also the estuary of the Rhine±Meuse±Scheldt system forms an integral part. This seemingly trivial fact, however, implies that the coastal plain of Germany (the German Bight) suers the consequences of its own pollution of the Rhine, and that Denmark becomes a stakeholder as well.
2. Historical overview of transboundary cooperation Favoured by its physico-geographic situation, the Rhine was and still is one of the most important trac chains in Europe. The Rhine was also the most disputed border between the Roman and Germanic people in Northwest Europe from the ®rst centuries AD. Numerous wars between nations of both origins took place. The last ones, the First and Second World War, had a global impact. Between the wars, dierent Rhine states tried to promote transboundary interests. Speci®c agreements about navigation, ®shery and pollution were
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concluded. The Rhine States tackled these issues as separated tracks. This sectoral approach led to optimal conditions for some interests. Meanwhile, these conditions heavily damaged other interests. In 1985 the Dutch launched the idea to harmonise and integrate all water related interests. This idea was welcomed by the other Rhine basin and North Sea States because it linked similar views in these countries. History has de®ned bilateral cooperation between the Netherlands and Belgium. In the 15th and 16th centuries, the present Dutch and Belgian territories and some parts of France formed one country, the 17 Netherlands provinces. Opinions about religion considerably changed the political landscape in the 16th century. The seven northern states declared their independence in 1581. In 1814, the Netherlands were united again. International cooperation on the Rhine navigation started in 1815. Because of the shifting navigation channels in the delta, the Netherlands government wanted to limit the free Rhine navigation to the branches of the Waal and Lower-Rhine. Since the independence of Belgium in 1839, the Netherlands concluded treaties with the other riparian Rhine states, excluding the Meuse. The Meuse was considered a bilateral matter between the Netherlands and Belgium. From that moment both countries began to formulate their own policies, particularly about transport, industrial and agricultural activities in the Scheldt and Meuse basin. For Belgium, free access to the Rhine and North Sea through Dutch territory is vital. For the Netherlands, water quantity and water quality of the Meuse became important issues. The diverging interests between Belgium and the Netherlands led to a case brought before the Permanent Court of Justice in 1937, but its ambiguous judgement did not force a break-through. After the Second World War, time-consuming negotiations led to an agreement, which was not rati®ed by the Belgians. Internal Belgian controversies played an important role. Since 1993, Belgium has been a federal state with three Regions. Each Region has the right to conclude international treaties. In 1994, France, the Brussels-Capital, the Flemish and Walloon Regions and the Netherlands concluded three treaties to improve the transboundary cooperation 4. The 1992 Helsinki agreement made the conclusion of these treaties easier (the Convention about the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes was signed by 23 European countries in Helsinki in 1992). It explains the observer status position of the Federal Government of Belgium in the Helsinki talks. The cooperation between the North Sea states about water issues began in the 1960s. This cooperation was characterised by dierent opinions between the states of the continent and the United Kingdom about the way to tackle the pollution problem; the emission-approach vs the water quality-approach. In 1972, Belgium, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom signed a treaty in Oslo to protect the marine environment of the North Atlantic sea against pollution caused by incineration and dumping of wastes from ships and aeroplanes. In addition to this treaty, in 1974 the same states signed a convention in Paris to protect the same sea area against the pollution of land-based sources and oshore installations. This convention 4
France, the Walloon Region, the Flemish Region, the Brussels Region and the Netherlands concluded the agreement on the protection of the Meuse. The Flemish Region and the Netherlands concluded the agreement on the equal division of the discharge of the Meuse during low water periods. France, the Flemish Region and the Netherlands concluded the agreement on the protection of the Scheldt.
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obviously had a bearing on the management of West European rivers. In spite of these treaties, however, scientists observed a deterioration of the North Sea. Germany therefore took the initiative for a minister's conference in 1984. The participating countries (Germany, France, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom) committed themselves to better protect the North Sea by adopting the North Sea Action Plan and agreed to harmonise this plan with similar action plans for rivers ¯owing into the North Sea, such as the Rhine Action Programme. Based on experiences about international cooperation in the Rhine and Meuse basin and the North Sea area, a number of lessons have been learned. In the following sections, these lessons will be supported by arguments from history and practice. 2.1. Statement 1: only voluntary decisions of riparian states create the appropriate conditions for sustained international cooperation Until the 19th century some physical obstacles hindered Rhine navigation to a certain degree. The major diculties, however, were caused by the many rulers along the river. Kings, bishops, cities and robber knights tried to pro®t from Rhine navigation. There were numerous tolls along the Rhine and passing ships had to pay duties to the rulers of the dierent Rhine sections. Several rulers and usurpers tried to eliminate the tolls by force; these attempts failed. Elimination of tolls was an important issue in the Peace Conference in Vienna in 1815. In the framework of the Peace Treaty, the riparian Rhine states voluntarily voted for free navigation and elimination of the tolls. They created the Central Commission for the Rhine navigation, the oldest still vital river commission in the world. After 1815, several wars changed the political landscape, but the principle of free navigation on the Rhine remained intact, as it was based on voluntary decisions by sovereign states. Hydraulic power generation and navigation became important issues at the turn of the century. For the Rhine section between Basle and Strasbourg, two solutions were proposed. Germany pleaded for canalization by constructing weirs in the river. France preferred the realization of a lateral canal on its bank. With the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, France forced the right to construct the lateral canal, le Grand Canal d'Alsace. Its implementation was disastrous for the German bank as all discharges smaller than the annual average were diverted into the canal; the old river course only being used for peak discharges. Navigation bound activities on the German bank became impossible. It also harmed agriculture and ®sheries, and aected the landscape too. This situation was one of Hitler's arguments to prepare for war. On the eve of the Second World War, 50% of the Canal was built. Sustainable transboundary cooperation is learning from the past. Soon after World War II, France and Germany voluntarily modi®ed the Versailles regulations. The two concepts, canalization of the river and construction of lateral channels, were combined. Today the combined solution equally serves German and French interests and satis®es both countries, based as it is on a voluntary agreement. 2.2. Statement 2: one-sided promotion of individual or sectoral interests negatively aects other interests The disappearance of ®sheries from the Rhine illustrates that one-sided promotion of
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interests may have dramatic consequences. Until 1900 ®sheries were an important economic activity along the Rhine and its tributaries. Every town had its ®sh market. The supply to the markets was plentiful, particularly of salmon. In 1885, for instance, some 250,000 salmon were caught. Times changed, however. Already in 1850 international eorts were undertaken to protect the salmon stocks against over-®shing and to assure an equal distribution of the catches over the Rhine states. Over-®shing due to mechanical tools was a real threat. As the Dutch ®shermen extended their nets over the total river width, the catches upstream became rather poor. To settle these problems, the Rhine states concluded a salmon treaty in 1869. The Netherlands' parliament, however, rejected this treaty because it would negatively aect Dutch ®shery interests. In 1885, the riparian states concluded another salmon treaty with nearly the same content. This time the other riparian countries managed to convince the Netherlands to sign. As a result, all Rhine states rati®ed this treaty, which is still in force as no state has denounced it. The treaty prescribes that the riparian states shall undertake all eorts to preserve the salmon stock at a high level. The treaty envisaged eorts ensuring the accessibility and protection of the spawning areas in the Rhine and its tributaries. In spite of this legal international instrument, navigation and hydraulic power generation got a far higher priority than ®sheries and other interests. The weirs and reservoir dams made it impossible for migratory ®sh to reach their spawning grounds. Moreover, the weirs and dams produced higher water levels, changing the velocity and sedimentation conditions in the spawning areas. Thus weirs and dams impeded the reproduction of the migratory ®sh. In 1913, the International Salmon Commission made an inventory of the stock. The inventory showed that only few major spawning areas upstream of Basle and in the Moselle were left. Later on these areas were lost due to the construction of the Grand Canal d'Alsace and the canalization of the Moselle. The Netherlands considerably hindered ®sh migration when closing the Zuiderzee, the construction of the Delta-works and the canalization of the Lower-Rhine and the Meuse. In 1940, salmon had nearly disappeared from the whole Rhine basin (Fig. 3). Today, the more than 400 weirs, dams and sluices still form obstacles for transmigratory ®sh. The salmon case
Fig. 3. Number of salmon caught in Germany and The Netherlands.
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clearly shows that the one-sided promotion of navigation and hydro-power interests harmed the ecosystem and ®shery interests. 2.3. Statement 3: bene®cial transboundary cooperation requires mutual trust; concrete measures may con®rm common intentions; this process takes time The Rhine delta is very vulnerable to salinization by the North Sea. In the course of the centuries, measures increasing in scale became necessary to protect the Netherlands against salt water intrusion. In the densely populated western part of the country, the ground water is brackish. In these regions, water from the Rhine and the Meuse is used for the production of drinking water. In the polders lying below sea level, there is a brackish seepage ¯ow to the ditches and canals in the polders. To prevent salinization of the soil, the brackish water has to be removed and replaced by fresh water. Rhine water was very useful for these purposes. Before 1900, the salt concentration in the Rhine did not exceed 10±20 mg/l Clÿ. The rapid industrialization and growth of population since 1850 heavily aected the self puri®cation capacity of the Rhine and its tributaries. The increasing discharges of organic and inorganic substances became more and more problematic. The resulting increase in salt content of the Rhine water was a threat for the Netherlands. Having all but solved the problem of salt water intrusion from the North Sea, the Netherlands saw itself threatened by the same problem, this time from its European hinterland (Fig. 4). In 1932, the Dutch government protested in Berlin and Paris against the increasing pollution of the Rhine, but in vain. After the Second World War, industrial activities in the Rhine basin rapidly increased. In 1946, the Netherlands tried again to draw the attention of the other riparian states to the increasing pollution problem. In 1950, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland created the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution (ICPR). This Commission received its legal
Fig. 4. The increasing chloride load of the Rhine at Lobith.
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foundation with the conclusion of the Convention of Berne in 1963. At the end of the 1950s, the Netherlands formulated quality criteria for the Rhine water. The international discussion of these criteria gave evidence of the contradicting positions of the upstream and downstream riparian states, the ``Oberlieger/Unterlieger'' confrontation. The upstream riparian states recognized the pollution impact in the Netherlands. They also distrusted the Dutch appeal for a cleaner Rhine. The upstream countries thought that they were to pay the bill for the clean-up of the Rhine, while the Netherlands could continue to pollute the Rhine estuaries and the North Sea. Indeed, at that moment waste water from Rotterdam, The Hague and the large potato-¯our industry in the north was discharged untreated. Pollution of Rhine water came to a climax in the autumn of 1971. During the low water period, oxygen-consuming waste water and toxic substances reached such high levels that the Rhine lacked oxygen in its downstream sections. All aquatic life disappeared from these sections (Fig. 5). The Rhine water had become unsuitable for any use. The all time low of the water quality in 1971 shocked the public and governments in the Rhine states. In 1972, the Rhine states decided to take concrete, speci®c steps to reduce the pollution of the Rhine. Among others, the ministers charged the ICPR to elaborate a convention to reduce chemical pollution. This convention was concluded in 1976. Due to mutual mistrust, the convention contained detailed procedures. The convention provided a step by step elimination of the dangerous substances of the so-called ``black-list'' and a reduction of the substances of the ``grey-list''. It prescribed the de®nition of emission standards according to the best technical means for the black-list and the best applicable means for the grey-list substances. The work proved to be more complicated and more time-consuming than expected. The best technical means of today are outdated tomorrow. Another complicating factor was
Fig. 5. The decreasing oxygen content of the Rhine at Lobith.
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the approval of the standards by the European Union, since 1976 a member of the ICPR. Particularly, the juridical approval of the Rhine decisions resulted in time-consuming negotiations in Brussels. As a result of these diculties, by 1986 the ICPR had concluded emission standards for 12 substances only. Collaboration between the basin states of the Meuse is in its infancy compared to that of the Rhine. The historical overview already explained the diculties concerning transboundary cooperation in the Meuse basin. Today, France, the Belgian Regions and the Netherlands are building up their cooperation network based on the 1994 treaty to protect the Meuse. It is a dicult matter. The Walloon Region fears being overpowered by the Dutch and French concerning water quality issues. The French and Dutch members have cooperated for more than 40 years in the Rhine Commission, building up knowledge and negotiation skills. It is these members that have a lead above the Walloons in the Meuse commission. Moreover, the Walloon water authority is under-staed, with about 40 people. To compare: in the Netherlands several hundreds of people are involved in the water problems of the Meuse. This situation requires a prudent approach. Particularly, the Dutch are challenged to gain the con®dence of their Walloon partners. It requires understanding and an unpretending approach by the Dutch. 2.4. Statement 4: disasters with international impacts are excellent occasions to improve transboundary cooperation On 1 November 1986, a disaster hit the Rhine: a warehouse at the Sandoz chemical industries near Basle caught ®re. The ®re in the insecticide stores was particularly disastrous, destroying 1000 tons of agro-chemical substances. The ®re was extinguished using about 10±15 million l of water, a major part of which mixed with the chemicals and ¯owed into the Rhine. The next days showed a poison wave propagating downstream and killing all organisms. Tons of dead ®sh and other animals were taken out of the Rhine. Forty water works along the Rhine had to stop the intake of river water. The Sandoz incident caused a wave of publicity and public concern in all riparian states. On the 12 November the ministers met to discuss the situation. The other states did not blame the Swiss. They recognised the excellent Swiss eorts to clean up the Rhine in the past. A similar accident could have happened in any other country. Now there was political resolve to prevent similar accidents in future. The ICPR was under high pressure to formulate transboundary actions. The result was the Rhine Action Programme (RAP) of 1987. Apart from measures to prevent accidents like the Sandoz incident, the ministers adopted new, clearly de®ned, long term objectives for the Rhine: 1. Higher species such as migratory ®sh should return to the Rhine by the year 2000. The salmon, as the best known species, was chosen as a symbol. 2. Future use of Rhine water for public water supply using simple puri®cation techniques must be guaranteed. 3. The pollution of sediments has to be reduced to such a low level that sediment can be applied on the land or dumped into the sea without negative consequences for the aquatic environment.
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The Rhine Action Programme provided a 50% reduction of the 47 most problematic substances between 1985 and 1995. An important means to achieve this goal is the regular updating of the best available technology. This is not enforced through the detailed procedure of the chemical convention, but simply in terms of political commitment. The modi®ed approach implies that not only point sources but also diuse sources, particularly originating from agriculture and trac, can be tackled. Apart from overall pollution reduction objectives, the Rhine Action Programme contains a unique commitment to rehabilitate the Rhine eco-system. In conclusion, the Sandoz accident was an eminent occasion to strengthen the transboundary cooperation. The resulting pollution-reducing eorts in the Rhine states were substantial (Table 1). Between 1965 and 1989 the authorities in the ®ve riparian states invested about 100 billion DM (US$ 60 billion) in the construction and improvement of treatment plants. Sanitation of waste water from industries and municipalities reduced the concentrations of organic and inorganic substances. The water authorities concluded in 1993 that for 38 substances the Rhine target values had been reached. For nine substances, the observed concentrations were still above the target values. The eorts to reduce these substances have since increased. The 1995 ¯oods along the Rhine and Meuse provided a new opportunity to broaden transboundary cooperation. Large areas along the Rhine and Meuse were inundated. Dikes in the Netherlands were on the point of collapse. The ministers of the riparian states declared in Arles, France, the necessity to reduce the ¯ood risk and harmonize ¯ood-reducing measures. They particularly stressed the harmonization of spatial planning, land use and water management in the river basins. Here again is an example that disasters may trigger political resolve that improves international cooperation. Use these opportunities to reinforce and deepen transboundary cooperation.
Table 1 Pollution reduction on the German±Dutch border in reference years Pollutant
Unit
Natural load
1972
1985
1993
Change 1972±1993 (%)
Mercury Cadmium Chromium Lead Copper Nickel Zinc TOCa Oxygen Phosphate Nitrogen
t/y t/y t/y t/y t/y t/y t/y kg/s mg/l kg/s kg/s
0.7 1 240 75 70 na 250 na 10.0 0.2 0.3
99 167 3627 2000 2018 na 13,800 29 4.4 1.3 1.0
5 9 378 441 473 356 2995 13 8.0 1.0 1.4
2.5 2.8 251 346 314 219 1724 8 10.0 0.5 0.5
ÿ97 ÿ98 ÿ93 ÿ83 ÿ84 na ÿ88 ÿ72 +127 ÿ62 ÿ50
a
Total organic carbon.
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2.5. Statement 5: harmonization of measures must not be limited to river basins but should also include the recipient sea In the North Sea area, pollution by rivers, atmosphere, o-shore industry and navigation concentrate their impacts in the German Bight (Fig. 6). The south±north going currents transport the pollution of the Rhine, Meuse, Scheldt and British rivers to the German Bight. Since the end of the 1970s, oxygen depletion and ®sh diseases were often observed here. The enormous algae blooms and high mortality of seals in the German Bight in 1988 showed the close interrelation between the pollution loads of the rivers and changes in the marine environment. The North Sea minister conference decided to develop a North Sea Action Plan (NAP). The conference fully adopted the RAP-objectives. As the North Sea is extremely
Fig. 6. Water and sedimentation movements in the North Sea.
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vulnerable to nutrients, mercury, cadmium, lead and dioxins, the conference sharpened the reduction goal for these substances from 50 to 70%. On the rebound, the ICPR adopted the sharpened goal and added a fourth objective to the RAP: the improvement of the ecology of the North Sea.
2.6. Statement 6: legal frameworks help to tackle transboundary problems and to structure common activities The Federal Republic of Germany, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland created the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution (ICPR) in 1950. The exchange of diplomatic notes at the end of the 1940s was the base for the transboundary cooperation. This base proved to be insucient for good, professional cooperation. The diplomatic notes did not contain agreements about presidency, the cost of investigations, publication, etc. The ICPR ®nally received its legal foundation with the conclusion of the Convention of Berne in 1963. Article 2 of the convention de®nes the mission of the ICPR. The ICPR has to formulate the investigations about kind, source and extent of the Rhine pollution, recommend appropriate measures to reduce the pollution and to prepare agreements between the participating countries. Moreover, the ICPR is competent in all matters that the Rhine states jointly charge the ICPR with. This last regulation proved to be very useful. The Rhine states could charge the ICPR with the rehabilitation of the Rhine ecosystem in 1987 and the ¯ood problems in 1995. The actual implementation of measurements and measures is the responsibility of the individual basin states. That means that the ICPR is only a negotiation platform and an adviser to the Rhine Governments and, since 1976, the European Union. The work is prepared in working groups of ocials of the participating parties. Decisions are taken in plenary sessions. Every three years, the presidency changes to another party. To assist the president, the plenary and working group meetings the ICPR has a small secretariat (see Fig. 7). The ICPR has to cooperate with the Central Commission for the Rhine navigation and the International Commissions to protect Lake Constance and the transboundary tributaries Moselle and Sarre against pollution. Thanks to the regulations in the Berne convention, the ICPR could tackle transboundary problems and structure common activities such as the rehabilitation of the ecosystem and the ¯ood mitigation measures. Legal frameworks particularly help in dicult situations. They contain regulations for transboundary cooperation. Legal frameworks provide a common grip to ®nd the way out. As the tasks of the ICPR increased in time, the 11th Rhine ministers conference of December 1994 charged the ICPR to up-date the convention of Berne. The new convention has to consider the regulations of the Helsinki agreement of 17 March 1992 and integrate the existing conventions and programmes. To illustrate the broadening of the ICPR's mandate, the words ``against pollution'' were dropped from its name. Its new name will be ``International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine''.
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Fig. 7. Organisation structure of the International Commission of the Protection of the Rhine.
2.7. Statement 7: common monitoring infrastructure contributes to mutual trust, joint assessment and policy-making
After the creation of the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution (ICPR) in 1950, the ICPR started to investigate the kind and the extent of the pollution. An international measurement network was set up. Common analysis methods were developed. This proved a laborious exercise as measurement and analysis methods diered in the participating countries. This important activity provided the common basis for an objective assessment of the water quality. Later, this approach served as an example for many other international fora. Measurement standards and methods to assess the water quality in transboundary waters, prepared and agreed upon in common understanding, create the basis for the formulation of joint measures. Sustainable transboundary cooperation needs a thorough, undisputable, scienti®c assessment of facts. Doubts about facts frustrate international cooperation. Since 1970, scienti®c institutions in six Rhine countries cooperate in the International Commission for the Hydrology in the Rhine basin. This Commission harmonizes hydrological data and sometimes executes speci®c investigations for the ICPR.
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2.8. Statement 8: periodical assessment of plans gives the opportunity to adapt and modify objectives and measures to changing conditions and opinions In 1972, the ministers charged the ICPR to draw up a long term working program (Horizon 1985), with particular emphasis on waste water treatment of households and industries. It was a good instrument to assess progress in pollution reduction. Publication of the list of the main polluters in the Rhine basin helped to stimulate the sanitation eorts. This also demonstrates that public opinion in the Rhine countries is an important factor. Public information about undoubtable facts plays an essential role in decision making. As was already observed, accidents may trigger eorts to intensify and to broaden the transboundary cooperation. The Sandoz-aair of 1986 led to RAP- and NAP-reduction programmes and the rehabilitation plan for the Rhine. Regular evaluation of these plans are essential to assess progress or stagnation. The annual report of the ICPR stimulates the eorts to sharpen the measures in the dierent sectors in order to achieve the over-all pollution reduction goals in time. International evaluation of the national rehabilitation programmes is essential to assess their progress and impact. Transboundary exchange of data and experiences provide the common base for adaptation of the pollution reduction and rehabilitation programmes. The 1995 ¯oods in Rhine and Meuse urged the authorities to develop a coherent set of measures to reduce future ¯ood damage.
3. Conclusion Human intervention degraded the Rhine ecosystem and harmed other water-related interests. It took and will take decades to rehabilitate and mitigate certain impacts. History and experiences of the international cooperation in the Rhine basin and North Sea area can help to recognise and analyse the situation in other transboundary river basins and seas. From the Rhine, Meuse and North Sea case, the following conclusions can be drawn. . Only voluntary decisions by riparian states create the basis for sustainable cooperation on an international level. Wrested concessions do not last very long. . Avoid unilateral promotion of individual and sectoral interests. The Rhine case shows that one-sided promotion of interests negatively aects other interests and may cause considerable harm to the entire ecosystem. . Cooperation in transboundary river basins is a time-consuming process of small steps. Mutual con®dence is the only basis for successful cooperation. . Promotion of all water related interests and information exchange with non-governmental organisations takes time, but supports the transboundary cooperation in river basins and enlarges the acceptation of proposed measures. . Disasters with international impacts can lead to a break-through. They can help to improve transboundary cooperation. . Agreement over, and adoption of, measurement standards and methods is an important basis for achieving the reduction of water pollution of shared water resources. . The transboundary policies for river basins have to be harmonised with the policies for the
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protection of the recipient seas. . Periodical updating of plans gives the opportunity to adapt objectives and measures to the changing conditions and opinions in society.
Further reading Economic Commission for Europe. (1992). Proceedings of the Convention on the Protection and use of Transboundary Water Courses and International Lakes of 17 March 1992. Huisman, P. (1995). From one-sided promotion of individual interests to integrated water management in the Rhine basin. In Proceedings of the Conference on Living with Water, September 1995. Amsterdam. International Commission for the Hydrology of the Rhine Basin. (1993). The Rhine under the in¯uence of man Ð river engineering works, shipping, water management, (in French and German). Lelystad. International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution. (1987). Activity report 1987, (in French and German). Koblenz. International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution. (1991). Ecological Master Plan for the Rhine Ð Salmon 2000, Koblenz. de Jong, J., & de Wit, J. A. W. (1993). Conclusions and Recommendations of the International Conference on Rehabilitation of the River Rhine, March, Arnhem.