Transition to democracy and the fragmentation of a city: four cases of Central European capitals

Copyright 0 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved C962-6298/96 $lS.W + 0.00

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Transition to democracy and the fragmentation of a city: four cases of Central European capitals

hlstittitt?qf Comparative

Politics, Clniversity of Bergen, Christiesgate Normy

7 5, 5001 Bergeq

Attsnucr. The paper presents the structure of city governments in Warsaw. Budapest. Prague and Bratislava after the municipal reform of 1OYJ. All four capital cities have some features that set them aside from other cities in their respective countries but make them quite similar to each other: a far-reaching territorial fragmentation of the city into districts, overlapping jurisdictions between the city and district governments and a rather limited role fur the executive ob d zji.s the council. Various explanations for those similarities between the four capitals are discussed and some aspects of ciry-district relations are examined. such as the budget-making processes. competitive claims to the city assets (mainly land and buildings) and the lines of divisions within the respective councils. The latest changes in Warsaw city government (March I’)‘)4 arc also outlined. Copyright 0 15% Elsevier Science I.td.

Post-communist

in public administration

reforms

A perennial

problem

central-local

relations.

of administrative

particularly

sensitive.

repudiated,

the new role of the centre

it a renewed

weight

the proper alone,

the proMems

tion has become Tratlitions Austria

the centralist

self-governing

and Prussia.

East and West,

since

transition, become

localities

parts

The states

that emerged

develop

Thus municipal

been

scarce

of the region

provinces supervise

law-making, more

and

closely

so on),

than other

central

were governecl by prefect-like all public services.

administraEurope.

the imperial

of imperial

rule of

Europe

were

to a corporate had a status

rights and duties that came with it. overlapped with those of the state

government

interest

are

initiatives

in East-Central under

after the break-up

similar to other interest organizations, with the However, since the functions of local government government

gave

which

by central

all highly centralized and their practice of local government was limited pattern (Surazska, 1993). This meant that locally elected representatives

(taxation,

have been

of transition

and markets,

of

has been

of transition.

have

in some

cannot paramount.

anti the agent

regime

the process

democracy

is the issue

the problem

of the former

in motion

However,

originated

transition

principles

in setting

of local governance

they

in both

of post-communist

of post-communist

both the target

of

Paradoxically,

Although

and legitimacy.

objectives

reform,

In the process

organizations.

state officials.

had a right to supervise In

prdCtiCe

with witlely

it meant defined

local that the

powers

to

ofa ci[y

Transition to democracy and the fragmentation

366 Although

restricted,

representative the Second reforms

pre-war

local

government

in Central

Europe

was far more

and vigorous than the communist people’s councils, which replaced it after World War. The pre-war

of 1990, which

had preceded

Hungary and Czechoslovakia. legal recognition

corporatist

pattern

also results from municipal

the first democratic

local elections

in Poland,

The institutions and assets of local government

principle of uniform state power and property. The details of this separation been well elaborated, has remained both

republics

frameworks

however, and the role of the state administration

paramount

Nevertheless,

in all countries considered.

of the former

have developed

Polish local government

In the Czech Republic, the elected board is the principal actor

and the council with wide and sometimes gives a clear predominance

Those differences the capital

their own distinctive

gives the mayor a relatively

whereas the Slovak version of local democracy

involved in the day-to-day

Budapest,

Czechoslovakia

of local democracy.’

in local decision-making government

have not

in local matters

during the four years following the 1990 reforms, Poland, Hungary and

wide scope for discretion. executive

received

as distinct from those of the state, putting an end to the communist

competing

to the council,

leaves both the

powers. Hungarian local

whose committees

are directly

business of government.

between

national frameworks

cities in all four countries

appear

of local government quite

Prague and Bratislava received their constitutions

departed from their respective

notwithstanding,

similar to each

other. Warsaw,

by separate statutes which

national patterns of local democracy

in more or less the

same direction. First, in each case the city is divided into districts with substantial powers vested in district governments;2

second, the division of assets and competencies

the city and the districts is not very clear and leads to friction, especially rights: and third, in all cases, the councils overshadow The latter two characteristics

the executive

bodies.

are not difficult to understand. Overlapping

have resulted from legislative inexperience.

Also, councils’ unwillingness

prerogatives to executive bodies is not uncommon,

between

over property powers might to cede their

especially in young democracies.

The

question is, however, why those features have been more pronounced

in the capital cities

than in other municipalities.

for the functioning

Further, the most important characteristic

of each city is its jurisdictional

fragmentation

unique in each national framework

into independent

of urban democracies.

districts, which is also

This last feature is also most

difficult to explain. The consequences

of territorial fragmentation,

of the legislative-executive sections

relationship

of this paper. First, however,

overlapping

jurisdictions and the shape

for each city will be described possible

explanations

in subsequent

are offered as to why the

capital cities in each country differ from the remaining municipalities.

Explaining jurisdictional

fragmentation

The forces behind metropolitan fragmentation in mature urban democracies are complex and involve a variety of social, political and economic interests. The problem occurs in many countries,

regardless

of their particular

pattern of central-local

relations,

federal, like the USA and Canada, or unitary, like the UK or France (Keating,

be it

1991; Cox,

1993). The movement for metropolitan consolidation was gathering momentum in the post-war years, with a wide consensus established by the 1960s among political and professional elites that the cities should be planned. A movement for reform in the cities resulted in government committees being set up in several countries in the second half of the 1960~, such as the Redcliffe Maud Commission in England, the Weatley Commission

j(,-‘

WISLA SlxMxA

in Scotland

or the American

recommended The arguments rationality,

Commission

metropolitan

for metropolitan

such as efficiency

switched

evidence

planning

the political political given the

(Ostrom

to political

Promotion

by progressives underlying

segregation

political

of political

According more

homogeneous

preferences.

theorists,

The

needs public

choice

weaknesses.

units

population

which

mobility, goods.

fragmentation

up, there

in mature have

a ‘consumer’

democracies.

of public

In fact, the most administration

as Cox (1993) pointed advancing

that government

society.

But the government

societv:

rather

goods,

diverse

out, both competing originate

‘is not simply a passive

it has an active interest

its social and material

relations

governments,

in shaping

in place

reluctant

theory

to IivcA. In reduces

as ‘consutners‘

to explain them.

of

metropolitan

and consolidated

behind

urban

Apart frotn the

of local business

leaders

by various

spatial

1980). views,

reform,

the one of the public choice are based

on the ‘bottom-up‘

from the preferences recipient territorial potential

expressed

of impulses outcomes

(Cox, 1993: 14). Similarly,

to establish

of where

to their wealth

may be facilitated

the case for liberal

and

the formation

the metropolitan

their choice

there are also those

(Cox and Nartowicz,

structures

choice

according

of interests

interests

its strengths

towards

Both fragmented

had a mixture

for their

than

is no comprehensive

urban usually

that caters

the level of individual

from exercising

To sum

of

overestimates

the poor

and the other

‘higher-level

of exercising

choice

In a fragmented

homogeneous

thus preventing

of public

assumption

it clearly

a wider

has

tendency

communities

of the consumers

Further,

that are more hand,

is are

it.

fragmentation

of urban

and politicians.

theory

the cities

On the other

the localities

consumption.

that offers

the persistent

choice

fragtnentation.

for them to agree on common

vote for the package

metropolitan

resources.

of local government

give the individual

stratification

self-governments

projects

of

it explains

is a precondition

fact, the territorial

interests

theory

within

at large.

mobility,

can either

social whereas

from the public

First, when

for collective

to a locality

reasons

towards

to those

structure

at large, it is easier

citizens

On the one hand,

of territorial

public

goes,

or they can move

drive

for metropolitan

the fragmented

available

of social and

important

from the poor),

response

case

local structures

of the services

city. so the argument

is a

resources

to gain access

the

government was to restore

1991: 107). In this perspective.

one for at least two reasons.

fragmented

packages

particualr

made

than metropolises

Second.

alternative

such

choice

(Keating, fragmentation

the poor

in the light of

pursuit

of the most

met a neo-conservative who

than the consolidated

a more vigorous

their communal

is enabling

agenda

however,

of metropolitan

Thus consolidation

is one

consolidation

economists,

to the public

indeed,

metropolitan

of the reformers

Such an open

better

for

(the rich trying to fence

the motive school

and enable

of equity,

to support

reason

instead.

of scale. Such arguments

to sustain,

The defenders

reasoning

in the IJSA. They

at first in terms of technocratic

and economies difficult

et al., 1988).

of local government

priorities.

Development

unanimously.

were couched

delivery became

and normative

power

almost

of service

for the ‘best unit’ of local government inconclusive

for Economic

consolidation

by civil

from within

civil

so as to reproduce Keating

observes

that

rivals, are wary of endowing

capital cities with strong local councils’ (Keating, 1991: 120). Indeed, the fortunes of Paris and London metropolitan governments provide good exatnples of central governments having their stakes in the spatial structures of the capitals. The government European capitals.

was also the leading actor in the spatial structuring The division of those cities into independent

decided by national parliaments even before began to function. According to a ‘conspiracy

the democratically theory‘ circulating

of the four Central districts had been

elected city governments in Warsaw and Budapest

368

of a city

Transition to democracy and the fragmentation

city halls, capital city government was perceived by central government as a competitor for the capital’s political and economic resources and the project of jurisdictional fragmentation was designed in order to weaken it. In fact, the capital city is the place where the interests of the local and central governments may easily collide. For example, a competition between central and city governments for property rights to real estate have been a common occurrence and will be discussed later on. Another explanation for the outstanding pattern of a weak and fragmented city government in Central European capitals may be adduced from the abundance of strong interest groups and prominent personalities in the capitals, many of whom have not found enough space for themselves either in the central or in the city government. Thus, the excess of the political elite filled the district councils. This explanation holds in Warsaw, where the creation of independent districts was supported by the citizen’s committees-the organizers of the first democratic elections in 1989 on behalf of Solidarity. Those committees operated in the capital city on a district basis and provided the first post-communist elites for local governments (Surazska, 1993). Central European

capitals in their national

city networks

Central European capitals are the largest cities in their respective countries and the devolution of powers to the city districts might have addressed some specific problems of large agglomerations. This hypothesis can be tested against a simple primacy measurethe population of the capital city as a percentage of the total population of the five largest cities in the country (Rokkan et al., 1987). Primacy measure indicates the types of the country’s city network on the mono-policentric scale. Table 1 also shows the same measure applied to the number of phone connections available in the five largest cities in each country. This last measure indicates possible gaps in the urban infrastructure between the capital and other large cities. The position of capital cities in the urban networks of their respective countries varies, from the distinctly policentric urban structure of Poland to highly monocentric Hungary.

TARLE1. Population

size, percentage of the country’s total population the Central European capitals

Capital

Population (19911

Budapest Warsaw Prague Bratislava

20018035 1653 000 1212 010 441453

Percent of total population

19.5 4.3 11.8 8.4

and primacy measure for

Primacy measure (Pi”

Primacy in 120.of phones”

73

72

37 55 47

38 70 57

ps = ’ P =p, X 100/p, + p1 ps,where P = primacy measure, p, = population of the capital city, & populations of the other four largest cities. These are (in thousands), for Poland: Lodz 845, Krakow 751, Wrockiw 641, Poznan 583; the Czech Republic: Brno 388, Ostrava 328, Plzen 173, Olomouc 106; Slovakia: Kosice, 235, Nitra 90, Presov 88, Bdnska Bistrica 85; HUngdqt Debrecen 214, Miskolc 194, Szeged 176, Pets 170. ” The same as P for phone subscribers. Sources: Rocznik Statystczny 199, Glowny IJrzad Statystyczny, Wdrszawa, pp. 40, 49; Hun@wim StatistiCd Yearbook, Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal, Budapest, 1991, p. 30; Scitani Ludi, Domu A @ytu, 3 March 1991, Federalni Statisticky Wad, Praha, 1991, p. 15; Praha-Brutisluua 19851991, Mestska Spravd Cehskeho a Slovenskeho Statistickeho LJradu v H1.M Prdze a Bratislave, 1992.

SW

WlaLA Sl~I
Warsaw

contains

only 37 percent

Poland,

whereas

the corresponding

Czech Republic

and Slovakia

in the

The

former.

becomes

even

subscribers. largest

figure

remain

if the

population

cities

over

other

primacy

comprises

cities

in the Czech

is applied

connections

of the

monocentricity Republic

to the

of the joint population

of the phone

cities in

The cases

towards

measure

55 percent

but it has 70 percent

of the five largest

is 73 percent.

with a tendency

of Prague

pronounced

population

for Budapest

in between,

predominance

more

Prague‘s

Czech

of the combined

phone

of the five

available

in those

cities. Considering

that metropolitan

of their relative

fragmentation

sizes and the particular

that all other cities have the same municipal unitav),

it can he concluded

unique

structures

The growth

One of the reasons might

have

been

expansion. Central

for metropolitan

European

municipal

capitals,

to local feudal Wdrsaw

lords.

with

the

they enjoyed

when

was under

(~‘ozsony)

as well as the elite to become

the ne\vly

created

cities.

communist between

and the needs

The urban

directed,

expansion

of Warsaw,

expansion

The first thrust of the urban of territory became growth

and

population,

the capitals

occurred

of independent

only in the first post-war

the political adopted

status

of Slovakia

in Czechoslovakia

The period

Polish

cities

break-up

during states.

was

developing.

created

natne

region

in

was subsc-

of the country

in 1993.

boundaries

was not present

Prague

and Bratislava

in the matter.

The major

on the

in the four was centrally

surges

of such

and Figure 2 (population). the

Budapest inter-war

Bratislava

and Prague, period,

underwent

and it expanded

had become

cities.

its Hungarian

over its jurisdictional

of Warsaw,

decade

European

in than

capital.

Budapest,

little voice

expansion

Central

it scrapped

on the other,

in Figure 3 (territory)

are presented

other

four

experience

IOcdl self-administration

the

for

the

to the king rather

Incipient

a city spilling

having

previous

city of the newly

After

the urban

Among

the principal

rule.

democracies

even at the time of the Second

in other

of local democracy

with the localities

some directly

than

rule until 1919, when

the new role of the national

In any case, a conflict one hand

self-government

Hungarian

under

the

the requirements

democracy.

had

subjected

autonomy

state-Czechlslovakia.

assumed

behind

Poland.

of the western

of local

by the government

Republic,

stultified

factor

ancl

(that is,

that had preceded boundaries.

and Prague

more

appointed

Bratislava

Bratislava

needs

As royal boroughs

municipal

in some

of local government

only Budapest

had its authorities

quently

size was not a decisive at least not in policentric

over their jurisdictional

&shed

self-government.

as the other municipalities

fragmentation

the early tradition

planning

cities, regartlless

in each country,

capitals

As the cities spilled

metropolitan

structures

governments,

European

in all four capital

of the city networks

that population

of the capital

of Central

occurs

features

uptraded

even

when

both in terms those

its first surge

cities

of urban

faster in the 197Os, after

by the new

federal

constitution

in 1968.j

of the Second

World War was marked

by stagnation

or even

decline

in all

four cities. Warsaw was most afflicted by the war. Figure 2 does not indicate the real loss of more than 60 percent of the city’s population, including 300000 Warsaw Jews and a further 200000 Warsaw Rising, reconstruction regime

casualties of the Warsaw Rising (August-September 1944). After the more than 70 percent of the city’s buildings were also destroyed. Rapid of the city in the first post-war

and its system

population

exceed

of central

its pre-war

planning. numbers

years WaS the propaganda Nevertheless,

(c.1.3 million)

item for the new

only in the 1970s did Warsaw’s and in that particular

decade

the

370

Transition to democracy and the fragmentation

I/

._ ..

,;’ ,.

‘,. ,,

.._

of a city

,..1

,;,’

‘..

Q:_ .-

., lb

.___

:.

./‘.,

,_.’

,:.

_.

‘..

‘..(

.-.,

.f

‘..,>. ..

‘.,

@ BUDAPEST

-

1930

WARSAW

-

PRAGIIB

-

1922

BRATISLAVA

-

Amo 49brq.wl

~

1974

____

pop. dens. 244WC&tm.

--._._--

Area 368 Wm. pop. dem. lzcwsq.km

folmetdlsmcts

ems-m+ cnyports (distfkt

s+at”S)

-----~

1931

~

fomler Jewish

betore 2nd ww 1946

_._ AlMtro-SlOVOk border.

1971 Dishkts

FGURE 1. Terrtitorial expansion of Central European capitals. Sources: Dostal et al. (1992: chs 3, 10); Praha Bratislaua 1985-1991 (Mestka Sprava Ceskeho a Slovenskeho Statistichecko Uracu, 1992); Weclamowicz et al. (1993); Maris et al. (1992).

city experienced proportion

the

fastest

growth

to the country’s population

In Budapest,

in its history,

both in absolute

terms and as a

(4.5 percent in 1980).

the aftermath of the Trianon Treaty must be taken into account,

which

truncated the country’s territory in 1919. At that time, some 60 percent of former Hungarian citizens found themselves beyond the new borders and many of those ‘expatriated’ in this way moved to Budapest. This particular dislocation, as well as the highly centralist regime of Admiral Horty, made for a considerable growth in Budapest’s population in the two pre-war decades. Whereas in 1920 more than 1.2 million of the

I

Warsaw

w-w

1920-90

FK;I.I
city’s

inhabitants

corresponding in Budapest

comprised numbers

were

more

to overall

197Os, when

decades

population

the 2 million

of the

country’s

1.7 million and 18.4 percent.

limited

In the first two post-war relation

15.4 percent

were

than in Warsaw,

affecting

the city grew rapidly,

growth

inhabitants

in the country. of Budapest

population,

The wartime mostly

the Jewish

both in absolute

Both numbers

comprised

in 1940 the

population

losses

community.

numbers

reached

19.4 percent

and in

a peak in the of the country’s

population. In 1919, Prague

became

700 000 to 1 million agreement

in 1938 until

population.

the capital of the newly

created

on the eve of the war. The period

Its post-war

the growth

end

of the

was much

as a proportion

war)

was

slower

population

of the overall

territory

of the Czech

percent)

and it rose only after the city’s territorial

actually

and grew rapidly

marked

dropped

population by nearly

stagnation

of its

the war. In the 195Os,

(counted 1 percent

enlargement

from

(from the Munich

by the

than that before

Prague’s

Republic)

country

of lost statehood

for the present (from

11.2 to 10.4

in 1974, to reach

a little

over 1.2 million (that is, 11.8 percent of the country’s population) in 1991. It is worth noticing that the story of Prague’s growth is the opposite of that of Bratislava. Bratislava stagnated.

has always been much smaller than Prague but when one grew, the other This can be seen on Figure 3. While the Slovak population was concentrating

fast in Bratislava

in the 1960s and 197Os, Prague

was nearly

stagnant,

and when

Prague’s

growth picked up in the 198Os, Bratislava’s growth was slowing down in both absolute and proportional numbers (to 441000 or 8.4 percent of the country’s population).

of a city

Trunsition to democracy and the fragment&on

372

Warsaw

m-m

- --

Prague

-

:

0

Bratislava

I

I

I

I

I

I

1930

1940

1950

1960

1970

1980

FICXKE 3. Percentage

of country’s population

1 1990

living in the capital city, 1920-90

The data shown in Figures 2 and .? dispel a popular perception that the capital cities of Central Europe had grown out of proportion only under the communist government. In fact, Budapest, Prague and Warsaw underwent their major surges of expansion (both in the territory and population) in the 1920s and 1930s when they became the capitals of the newly independent states. Bratislava’s growth has also been marked by its rise in political status in the 1970s. In the post-war years, the process of concentration of the populations in the capitals has in fact slowed down in all cases (except Bratislava, which became the fully fledged capital only in 1993). Poland, in particular, is considerably more policentric in the 1990s than it was in the 1930s (primacy measure: 46 percent in 1939 and 37 percent in 1990, see Table Z>.4The latter phenomenon has been associated with the overall urbanization that had taken place under the communist regime and made other cities grow. In Figure 4 the post-war growth of the urban population in all four countries can be compared to the growth of both the total population and that of the capitals. In all four countries the growth of urban populations was faster than that of their respective capitals. This trend is much less marked in Hungary than in the other three countries. The most dramatic growth of urban population occurred in Slovakia, where the population in towns above 10000 rose more than four times its 1950 level. Figure 4 shows that Slovakia underwent the major wave of urbanization only in the last two decades of the communist regime. In the 1980s alone, the population of Slovak towns (of 10000 and more) increased by 22 percent, whereas in the Czech Republic only by 2

450

400

#

Total pop. Cl

Urban pop.

E2

Capital pop.

Hungary

Poland

Czech Republic

decade,

however,

350

8 + ; 2 4

300 L

z .-I 2 x -

250

h

200

150

100 0

percent

(Mud.

Poland between

is the second

country

World War, most of which

and capital

populations

the urban

the

population

and capital population

the 6 million

affected

do not include

of ‘insufficient

opportunities

without

of Bratislav:t

sufficient

While interpreting population

the urban

housing,

occurred thereby

The numbers

of commuting (Music,

creating

those

loss in Poland

population.

a large number

urbanization’

rose dramatically

workers.

numbers, during

In fact, the

1993): the state opened a group

the

for Urban job

of ‘peasant-workers‘.

in the cities but living in the country

City structures

under the ‘old regime’

What was the impact present

where

one must take into account

phenomenon working

same

but that of PKIgUe only by 1 percent.

1950 and 1990 (2.5 and 2 times, respectively).

however, Second

1993). In the

by 16 percent

increased

Slovakia

spatial

of the former

organizadtion

structures

of municipal

left behind

governments?

by communist Party committees

regimes

on the

of the capital

cities used to wield considerable influence, far beyond their place in the formal party hierarchy. The powerful first secretaries of Warsaw, Prague and Budapest usually had a seat on the Politburo They were particularly Warsaw party committee was gathering strength,

and some were able to challenge Central Committee leadership. strong at times of crises, as was the case, for example, with the during the post-Stalinist thaw of 1956. As soon as the ruling party however, the centre tried to curb the capital’s party committee

374

Transition to democracy and the fragmentation

of a city

The number of the city districts before and after municipal reform in 1990

TABLE2.

Capital

Before 1990

After 1990

22 7 10 5

22 7 56 17

Budapest Warsaw Prague Bratislava

and to make its leader toe the line. One of the measures enhance

applied to this end was to

the powers of the city districts’ committees.

In Warsaw, the origins of powerful districts can be traced to the reform of 1975, which abolished

the Warsaw Party Committee

committees.

and distributed its powers between

Since at that time no administrative

party structure,

the city as the administrative

Budapest, the city districts exercised

the district

structure could exist without a parallel unit was also abolished.

Similarly in

more extensive powers after the mid-1970s and their

territorial shape remained the same after the municipal reform of 1990 (see TSde 2). Thus the present state of jurisdictional to the old regime. however,

fragmentation

The impact

the fragmentation

in Warsaw and Budapest could be traced

of the former

of Prague

regime’s

and Bratislava.

structures Before

does

not explain,

the Velvet Revolution,

Bratislava had five districts and Prague ten. In both cities, they crumbled into 17 and 56 independent

municipalities,

respectively.

Why such a difference

between

Warsaw and

Budapest on the one hand and Prague and Bratislava on the other? At least two possible explanations

might be offered.

First, the change Poland

of the regime in Czechoslovakia

and even more so in Hungary,

where

cautious and evolutionary.5 The second difference of both

the Czech

exceptionally

Republic

and Slovakia,

was much more decisive than in

the transfer of powers

where

municipalities

have always been

small. This is a particular problem in the Czech Republic, where more than

30 percent

of the population

live in municipalities

of less than 5000 people.

communist regime dealt with this problem through forced amalgamation. fragmentation democratic

was extremely

comes from settlement patterns typical

of the Czech municipalities,

including

The

The subsequent

Prague, has been explained

as a

reaction to those measures (Dostal et al., 1992).

Fragmented

cities

Uneasy relations between the city and its districts is the key to understanding of municipal

authorities

the working

in all four capitals. An ideal of popular participation

in local

decision-making requires rather small communal units that allow easy access to local authorities. Nevertheless, when such an ideal is pushed to its extreme, the number of selfgoverning

communities

may grow whereas their efficacy in solving

lOcd1

problems

may

decrease. Especially in the large cities, there is a range of services which must be provided and coordinated citywide and which may deteriorate if the territorial fragmentation of competencies goes too far. Further, size itself does not necessarily make a ‘perfect community’. Another important factor is a sense of identity held by individual inhabitants, which makes them accept their self-governing community as an ‘appropriate unit’. In the case of Central European capitals, such individual identity is more likely to be associated with the city rather than with its districts.

jx

WISLA Sluwxu

1X1w 3. The

mode

of

election of city and district governments

City mayor City council Ikstrict mayor IXxtrict council

Indirect Indirect Indirect 1Xrect

Nevertheless, independent

in all four status

to widen

their

in possession

way for the districts The degree

sentiments

rather

into coherent

discussion

consists

of

government hand,

on party

received

an with

have tried

of the city halls

were

elected

is a mandatory

each

structure

are directly relations

City and district city

budget

the

and 66 directly

and Bratiskiva

process

city

on the elected

between

the

both city and district makes

their mutual

The peculiarities

of city-

( Thhk 4).

budget-making in Warsaw whereas

own budgets.

Participation

in favour

Council

makes

of Budapest,

from each other, which

in the budgetary

Warsaw

for coordination

than in the first two cases.

are best reflected

representatives.

of the districts.”

governments as welfare,

In Prague

and independent

complicated

which

councils

room

of city and

each with the fill1 status

The city council

more

never

the four cities

in 7iihle 3.

powers.

council,

of the district allows

councils

elected

district

of the districts.

by the communist

of election

districts,

of 22 representatives

more

The mode

of seven

consists

even

city council.

a

strong

and they have

is the only case among

and legally protected

of the city and those of the districts.

relationship

created

association

to the interests

lists. Such a mixed

were

local communities

is presented

subject

provoked

case in point. The city commands

capitals

from

in the first year

has already

European

budget

representatives

interference.

was eroded

and Bratislava

Warsaw

interests

The

powers outside

the districts

units. Nevertheless,

independent

four

Prague

whereas

in the four Central

The city of Warsaw

against

than to integrate

that has no directly

authorities

districts

have

their cooperation

the district councils

meagre

is a particular

its inhabitants,

of local government,

other

capitals

Indirect IXrrct Indirect IXrecl

districts

to secure

of the city government

Budapest,

Warsaw

to fracture

developed

their jurisdictions

in Warsaw,

among

government under

the

made

of their vast prerogatives, The

European

IXrect IXrect IXrect IXrect

consideration,

have been

the position

great deal of controversy.

district

under

still further.

to fence

to which

democracy

local

central

even in the areas left to them by the law. Fait accompli was the most common

challenged

of

cities

competencies

four

Indirect Mixed Indirect l>irwt

and no provisions

the city halls. Once

in

is decided

the districts in the share

by the

themselves of central

This can be explained

city

council

are independent taxes in practice

comprising

the

district

in determining

theil

has tended

by the fact that the districts,

to change as the local

proper, are in charge of most services. Further, many urban services, such roads, fire protection, health and education, have been the responsibility of

the state (although the latter two are in the process of being handed over to the districts). In certain cases the city board may submit requests to the districts for funding of particular projects. Warsaw districts are among the wealthiest municipalities in Poland and they are happy to provide for the needs of the city at large, but they want to do it on their own terms

rather

than on any statutory

k,asis.’

376

of a city

Trunsition to democracy and the fragmentution

TABLE4. The rekdtionship between city and district budgets in four Central European capitals. Arrows indicate the direction of influence in the budget-making process whereas x indicates the budget is made independently.

Warn-au/ Direction of influence City Districts Share of districts in total city expenditure (%)

Budapest

Prague

Bratislam

25

x x ?

T 50

56

Source.s: Municipal statutes of Warsaw, Budapest, Prague and Bratiskwa and interviews with heads of financial of the respective administrative offices.

departments

In Budapest,

the budget is prepared

pattern of distribution

of resources

by the city council,

between

including

the preliminary

the districts. Then negotiations

districts begin. Districts have their political leverage in the negotiations

with the

since most of the

bills of the city council must be approved by the majority of all district councils. Moreover, there is a possibility of districts acquiring direct grants from the government, them even more independent In Prague, resources,

the budget

which makes

from the city ha11.s

is decided

by the district councils

mainly state grants, is determined

and then the division of

by the city council.” Since state grants are the

dominant part of the budget at both city and district levels, the fact that those funds are being processed

by city hall gives the latter some degree

budgets for the city and districts are prepared revenues

separately

of discretion.

In Bratislava,

on the bases of unconnected

and fixed shares in taxes. Although the city runs a deficit while districts have

surpluses, there is no procedure for transfer between the city and district budgets because of the latter’s total independence.‘O Although &YitiSkIW

is an extreme case of the lack of cooperation

districts, other cities have similar problems. many districts have considerable

between the city and its

In each case, the city runs a deficit whereas

surpluses. There is also a significant differentiation

in the

revenues accruing to particular districts but the city can do little in the way of redistribution. Conditions are becoming

more urgent as local governments

taking over more and more responsibilities schools

and hospitals,

(InternationalJournal

which

(that is, the city districts) are

from the state administration for such services as

may result in growing

qf Urban andRegionalResearch,

inequalities

in their provision

1992).

Inequality of resources between the city districts is a particular problem in Prague, whose

46 out of the present 56 districts acquired their independent

status only after the reform of

1990 and are still too weak to rely on their own resources. The districts of Prague accumulated an average surplus of about 3 percent at the end of 1992, an amount almost equal to the deficit run by the city. Surpluses were concentrated

in the old districts, whereas

the new ones ran deficits. The city council in Prague passed a law on the appropriation

of

half of district surpluses but there is no way of making the districts pay. The financial department of the city government considered suspending state subsidies to the recalcitrant districts but this was not quite legal since subsidies belong to a district by law.” The problem of inequalities between districts within the cities under consideration is more likely to be solved by direct state equalization grants rather than by vesting the city governments with more extensive powers over the districts.” In that the Central European

capitals are following solutions adopted in Western Europe (Le Gales, 1992).

Overlapping The

jurisdiction

assumption

precondition

of

some

measure

for local government

fragmented

city government,

city and district

in Bratislava,

as their respective each other.

the distribution between

estate.

directly

Bratislava’s

prirliament

would

which of

undefined.”

their

passed mayors

forms

a law entitling

problem

the proper

of the same dilemma rights belong

the city some sites of a ‘general its property

loans. The city council though

they remain

decided

under

not suffice

for the districts,

regArdtess

of their ‘historic

district

the Kadastral

continued

value’.

land did not exist in the former were

management.

which

Offices

Czechoslovakia

founded

a counter-bill

real estate

to the national

rights to land and buildings property

rights

investors

are often

and Budapest.

although

there

fiercely

put off by

In Warsaw,

it

granting

and several

The Prague

from the banks

largely

location.

is a provision

disputed.

on the

remain

their business

city hall

for security

on

of ‘historic value‘ belong to the city even ‘~’This was enough for the banks but did

selling and leasing

In any case,

in direct

is the city real

the Lord Mayor to control

demands

that the buildings

spontaneously

of contention

of the latter is rather vague

been

facing

have the same rights to

proceeds

in Prague

use’. The meaning

rights while

from

potential

occur

sites, such as a small river port, have already tried to clarify

as well

for establishing

with the districts

area. This is

and given full independence

the

since

authority

of

may result in the councils,

by sending

meantime

is a

In the context

over the same

The main point

responded

In the

This is an important

the lack of clarity about Some milder

them

communities

and the district

in Bratislava

leave them with full property

jurisdiction.

is clear that property

elected

between

authorities.

city council The district

jurisdiction

governments

of assets

elected

in the city centre. territory

exclusive

both the city council

Since both city and district

confrontation

local

institution.

claiming have been

city property,

for

a meaningful

the idea of local independence

where

mayors,

independence

however,

governments

most apparent

of

becoming

the ultimate

buildings property

in any legal sense.

in the Czech

Republic

on their territory right to a piece

Only in January

to issue certificates

of

1993

of land

ownership. There

is a third party in the game for real estate

government, partnership

between

commission Simihrly

or more

the

that decides in Warsaw,

local government,

Government

about

the

in the capital

branches.

districts

notwithstanding, in both

of the ministries

is sacrosanct

the relevant

cities, namely

In Budapest,

the list OF property

the property

the central

elaborate

rules

it is the

government

city and district

possession.

and it is difficult,

of

even for

records.

by assembly participation

to local government.

of far-reaching ‘government

its ministerial

city and

to obtain

The idea of popular powers

exactly

domination by assembly’

is one of the underlying

When of the

pushed

to its extreme,

council

over

can be quite ineffective,

the

motives however,

executive

especially

for delegating

public

it may take the shape body.

This

in the period

kind

of a

of transition

when many decisions must be taken in a short period of time. The city government of U&pest is a good case in point. The Lord Mayor of Budapest is elected by the city council

though

council

nor head

not necessarily

from among

of the administrative

office

its members. and there

He is neither is no executive

chairman board

of the

to support

him. He cannot over permanent

choose his deputies, who are elected directly by the council to preside committees which make most of the decisions.” The council may also

interfere

with the day-to-day

directly

business

of administration,

chief administrator

being

merely

a mediator

main

role

head

between

ministries. involving

His direct

responsibility

council

committee).

capitals

of the mayor board

Although

represents

by the assembly

by the Warsaw

executive

organ

executive

that is typical

has been

definition

the board measure

an exception

(ncnrly

circumstances of a clear-cut

paramount.

However,

Hungary

is an exception

diffused

city

relations

to be sufficient

It is the weakness

between

Bratislava

of a game. The party structures on the circumstances.

wealthier

districts entrenched

cooperation

parties

where

in Poland

and other

and

a mixture

between

party

in the most prestigious

executive,

the

has been organizations

Budapest

can afford

inter-party

its

negotiations,

Although

of self-interest

the city and party

the two levels. authorities

organizations

that

a ‘free-for-all’

kind

rather liquid, although

allegiances

to be gained.

the

to democracy.

civic and interest

have also been

Generally,

is

towards

transition

to run smoothly.

city and district

there is something

themselves

how

coalitions

in the city hall appear

the

civic and interest

and that explains

of political

the relationship

depending already

nor other

tier of state government

function

over

This

A large number

of government

of post-communist

some

the state grants.

such a distributive

functioning

with

to maintain

to local

predominance

to elaborate

to secure

grants

by a

are vested

to the intermediary

are much less party driven than the city council,

links seems makes

parties

local

are also limited powers

in the Czech Republic.

for the

in this regard Due

executive

of state

council’s

system

political

of the ‘managerial’-type

prominence

in the short period

government.

legislative-executive districts

of the party

neither

have had time to mature

system

performs

since

of the Warsaw

the city has managed

the distribution in Prague

The weakness

to its role in channelling

6000) gives

where

importance

due

and the executive

district representatives.

but his powers

where

of mayor,

the

is made

at large.

elected

In Prague.

by assembly’,

this does not add to his strength

in the context

of the territorial

decided. The city government city districts. the

personal

city executive

councillors,

of revenues.

directly

over the districts

(O&SJJ),

The Warsaw

local government

is the mayor

of small municipalities

Under

care (as

he can make

of the selected

board,

sources

in Polish

results from the peculiarity administration

the central

and health

form of ‘government

composed

than with the office

of control

housing

The mayor’s and

US$250 000; the total city budget

of all the district

Council

of his jurisdiction.

rather

(about

this model.

the mayor is head of the executive

Only in Bratislava

councils

In this capacity

the most radical

the city itself has few independent

vague

departments.

district

is for public

Forints

do not fall far behind

elected

is elected

with

Forints).

Budapest

three

of u city

administrative

mediate

only up to 10 million

in 1992 was 60 billion Although

and

the city and

of the appropriate

decisions

and the fragmentation

the council

is to represent

government

other

democracy

Transition to

378

are pretty

this varies

strong

in the

Thus some political

parties

districts

from where

of Warsaw,

have

they exercise some influence on business locations and contracts. The much less influential city council in Warsaw is also less party driven; the division here runs between the ‘city patriots‘ the status

(those

quo on behalf

in favour of Warsaw of the districts

one and indivisible)

and others

who support

they represent.

Conclusions This paper has reviewed the structure of city government in four Central European capitals. The most difficult problem for these young urban democracies appears to be the relationship between the city and its districts. There is some measure of ‘free-for-all’-type relations between the districts and the city in all four cases studied because of lack of

wlSL.4

in the relevant

clarity

legislation.

relations

defined

relatively

resources

and

responsibilities

jurisdictional

In this regard

more

clearly

than

vested

fragmentation

Sl'KAZSKA

j70

Warsaw

seems

the other

in the

can be observed

three

districts.

to have capitals,

The

in Bratislava,

worst

where

its city-district with the bulk of

consequences

of

the mechanisms

for

cooperation between the city and its districts seem to be lacking. The case of Bratislava shows that equal independence of both the city and the districts may in fact cancel each other

out, leaving

Despite and

district

position

councils,

Another

history

between

similarities

them

between

the

That can be credited

factor

of significance

towards

govermnent

central

the most

such as directly

has managed

to maintain

to its role in channelling

royal

relations

borough,

government.

finds it increasingly

to make

proper

the

factors.

and Prague,

in city-district

of the city as a self-governing

standing

to accidental

Bratislava

city hall of Pmgue

over the districts.

districts.

trying

relations

certain

difficult

to cope

of their newly

acquired

is the long

that has secured

even

in

with the aspirations independence

city

state grants to the

in Prague

a tradition

Nevertheless,

elected

its dominant

Prague,

the

of districts

even

though

its city

that are they

lack

resources.

Budapest, its districts alleviates

in turn, provides elaborated

some cities

handling

of a bakuxed

question

influence

are needed

services

available.

those

their respective

the problems

studies

is how

between

types

development. transition?

party system

in Central

of central-local Which

of privatization,

solution

To answer

Europe.

relations

in the

is the best one in

such questions

the use of city assets,

of their distribution

the city and

Here, the effective

local government

various

of post-communist

on the progress the equality

partnership

the party channels.

of the ills of the most diffused

The interesting capital

an example

largely though

and the satisfaction

further

the quality

of citizens

of

with the

MYIYthey are governed.

Acknowledgements Funds

~OI-this research

were

provided

by the Norwegian

Research

Council

(NAVF)

Notes

I. For a comprehensive

description

Polxntl and Sbvakid L. In the case outlined 3

of local government

see Baldersheim

of Warsaw,

in the Czech

Kepublic. Hungary.

the independent

districts

have

recently

been

abolished

hy thy reform

in the Appendix.

I)espite

the well-known

did in fact enjoy ‘1. ‘l’his cannot

limitations

a larger

be credited

measure solely

of communist

to the westward

lost its third largest

cities acquires

time only Wrocbw

at the same

5. In fact. I%udapest election

meetings

had its first municipal

but in practice

Ieve1 was

in the author‘s

authority

from Prague

shift of Poland city, Lwow, counts

elections

amongst

Poland’s

mukiple

Slovakia

1968.

after the Second

whereas

among

with

opinion

after

World

War. As

the former

German

five largest.

candidates

proposed

at open

in 1985.

0. In 1991 the ratio of participation at 52:4ti.

constitutions,

of administrative

a result of this shift Poland

actual

systems

d al. (1993).

15:85.

in the state

PdXeS

by

the

city and the districts

it was 40:hO. For 1992 the ratio was agreed ‘I’he districts

accumulated

about

was established

on the level 20:80

12 percent

surplus

at the

but the vncl of

1901. 7. IMeeting of the Lord Mayor

with the district

8. Intemiew

v,%h chairman

of the budget

9. Interview

with chairman

of the financial

I’9’1.3.

mayors

committee department

of Warsaw of Budapest

on 23 June City Council,

of the Prague

Municipal

1992. 8 Octohcr Office.

1992. 27 March

Transition to democracy and the fragmentation

380

of a city

10. Interview with Lord Mayor of Bratislava, 6 October 1992. 11. Interview with chairman of the financial department, Prague Municipal Office, 27 March 1993. 12. In Warsaw, district mayors are perceived as allies by the state administration, and both parties are opposing the direct election of the city mayor (meeting of district mayors, 23 June 1992). 13. Interview with chief of financial department, Bratislava Municipal Office, 7 October 1992. 14. Interview with chairman of the financial department, Prague Municipal Office, 27 March 1993. 15. One for finances education

and economy,

the second

for city planning

and development,

and the third for

and culture.

References BAI.DERSHFIM, H. et al. (1993) Local democracy and the process of transformation in East-Central Europe. In ‘The Proceedings of the Conference on Regional Orgunizution and Administrative Performunce, Prague, 27-30 September. Cox, K.R. (1993) [Jrban development, collective consumption and the politics of metropolitan fragmentation Political Geography 12, 8-37. Cox, K.R. ~lrin NAHTOWI~, F.Z. (1980) Jurisdictional fragmentation in the American metropolis: alternative perspectives. International Journal of [J&an and Regional Reseurch 4, 196-209. DOSIX, P.. II.I.NEH, M., KARA.J. ANOBARLOW, M. FIX (1992) Cbmnging Territorial Administration in Czechoslovukia. Amsterdam. International Viewpoints. Internatiomal Journal qf Urban and Regional Research (19921 Local go&‘ernme?zt reorganization and housing policy in Budupest o routed table di.wuio>z. Interwtional Journal of urhun arzd Regional Research 16, 477-48X. KI:A-~NI:,M. (1991) Compamtiza IJrhan Politics, Power arzd the City in the linited States, Camzda, Britai~z and Frufze. Aldershot: Edward Elgar. LI: GAI.I:S, I? (1992) New directions in decentraltzation and urban policy in France: the search for 3 postdecentrdlisation state. GoL,er)zme?zt a?zd Poliq 2, 19-36. MAH.I.I\,K.C., KOLA~. 2.. KoI.~A<.Y. I). ~\NI>PI:.ITK,S. (1992) The geography of the 1990 Hungarian parliamentary elections Politicul Geogrupb,z’ 11, 283-305. Musu., J. (1993) Czech and Slovak society. Outline of a comparative study. Czech Sociological Review 1, 5-21. O.I.KOM, V., BI\II, R. ,%uI>Oh-IROM.E. (1988) Local Govwwnent in the United State.x San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studici. ROKK,~N,S.. ~JII~~IN, D., AAHIXIIO.I, F.. MAI.~B~,P. ANI)S.&NIX,T. (1987) Centrt-Periphery Structures in i?urope: At1 ISSC B%rkhook iu Comparative Aw&si.s. Frankfurt Campus Verlag. SI~~~ZSKA, W. (1993) Local government in Poland: poltticdl failure and economic success. In 7i5e New Loc&sm: Comparative lbhan Politics in o Global Era (E. Goetz and SE. Clarke e&j. Beverley Hills: Sage. WF.~.I,<\vouil(L, G. ANI)KSIELAK, J (1993) Aths Warszauy. Warsaw: The Polish Acddemy of Science.

Appendix. Municipal reform in Warsaw, 1994 In March 1994, the Polish parliament passed the new constitution for the Warsaw city government. Independent city districts have been abolished and provisions were made for a consolidated metropolitan government. Since such a radical change in the government of a large city has been quite rare, a brief account of how it occurred may be useful. The government bill on the new constitution for the capital city was sent to parliament in February 1994, marked as urgent; Warsaw was to receive its new consolidated municipal government before the local elections due in June the same year, Predictably, the strongest opposition to reform came from the district authorities. Among them, it was the district mayors who did most to prevent the change, while their respective councils, represented in the Council of Warsaw, could not agree on a common policy on the issue. Nevertheless, the mayors submitted an alternative project to parliament, which would preserve the StatUS quo, and they had even managed to get the support of President Walesa for their case. Yet another project was

WISLA Sl:RAzstiA

381

submitted by the small but influential nationalist party (KPN), which wanted much stronger centralization of the city than envisaged in the government bill. If the government project won in the end it was for three reasons. First, it was the best prepared both legally and technically. Second, it suited the interests of the governing coalition. Finally, it appealed to the sentiments of the ‘city patriots’. The business lobby, on the other hand, was divided in its position towards competing projects. Some smaller companies, which had already entrenched themselves in particular districts, supported the status quo whereas the larger business came out on the side of the government. They might have deemed it to be the most reliable partner. The needs of the city have been secured by carving out of the uptown parts of the districts a single municipality of Central Warsaw, similar in shape to the pre-war territory of the city (see I+gur~ I). The remaining suburban parts of the former districts have been divided into ten municipalities of relatively homogeneous settlement and economic infrastructures. To secure cooperation and redistribution of resources between them, the central and the suburban municipalities form a mandatory Union of Warsaw. Roth the municipal and union councils art! directly elected. The mayor of Central Warsaw is also the Lord Mayor of thr Warsaw [Inion. The Council of the Warsaw Union does not have supervisory powers over the participant municipalities so that the city administration remains a single tier, that IS. based on the municipal authorities. The role of the Union is limited to supervising the metropolitan functions of the city. Nevertheless, its involvement in spatial planning, developmental strategies, infrastructure investments and, last but not least, the instruments of income equalization in its possession. make the Union’s position quite powerful r1i.s d r,is the municipalities. Other than that. both the central and suburban Warsaw municipalities have competencies and duties similar to all other Polish municipalities, Lvith their autonomous structures, property rights and incomes legally protected. I%oth the municipalities and the Warsaw Union have their own budgets. Municipal income consists of Iocal fees and taxes and their share in the personal income tax, as well as direct grants (general and purpose) from the Ministry of Finance. The IJnion‘s income comes from :I share in corporate taxes and fees paid by business companies operating in all Warsaw municipalities. The provision of municipal services (transport, sewage and rubbish disposal, street maintenance, public security, and so on) will be organized by associations of municipalities (voluntary or obligatory) set up for particular purposes as public companies owned collectively by the participant municipalities. There is a trap, however, in this regulation. Previously, those services were provided by the city government to the districts free of charge. Now that the companies are becoming independent, municipalities will have to bu) their her\ ices until they are able to make apropriate arrangements between themselves. I:urther restrictions on local democracy in the capital city come from its role as the site of the central government. First. the statutes of Central Warsaw municipality and of the Warsa\\ IJnion must be approved by the prime minister, who also has a say in recalling the Lord Mayor of the Warsaw Union. More important, however, is the right of central government to divest Warsaw municipalities, without any compensation, of the pieces of property deemed necessary for the functioning of various government agencies. Those functions and agencies have been widely defined, including foreign and international organization but also business organizations with or without links to the government. In practice. the central government acquired an unlimited access to the city buildings and land.