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Translating social theory—a critical commentary
Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 255–260
Translating social theory—a critical commentary Wai Fong Chua∗ School of Accounting, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia Received 15 December 2001; received in revised form 4 February 2002; accepted 28 February 2002
Abstract This brief commentary argues that Lowe’s (2003) criticisms of Laughlin’s [Acc. Aud. Acc. J. 8 (1995) 63] arguments as being rhetorical and ‘lacking in scientific language’ are inconsistent with his simultaneous advocacy of Latour’s writings. Concerns are also raised with respect to Laughlin’s translation of critical theory in his version of ‘middle-range theorising’. © 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Translating theory; ANT; Critical theory
Lowe (2002) has two stated aims—(1) to provide a brief review of developments in recent European literature dealing with the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK); and (2) to use/demonstrate this approach. These aims are accomplished via a particular strategy. Lowe uses the writing of a key author in SSK—Latour—to critically evaluate the writing of another author—Laughlin, who was himself seeking to advance his translation of the work of a group of German critical theorists (in particular, the writings of Jurgen Harbermas). As a result of this combination of aims and strategy, this paper ends up rather like a watery collage, with multiple objects of interest (Latour, Habermas, Science, science, Rhetoric, rhetoric, etc.) and multiple translations (Lowe’s and Laughlin’s), but each is painted in rather confusing, runny colours. Since we are in Latourian territory, it is probably appropriate to draw a diagram. Numbers in parentheses indicate strategies that could be adapted by commentators. On the bottom left hand side (this choice of left or right is completely arbitrary), we have the host of folk writing in the SSK domain—Barnes, Yearly, Collins, Callon, Latour, etc. We then have Lowe’s interpretation of their work and his particular focus on translating the ideas of Latour. On the right hand side, we have a group of German critical theorists—Horkheimer, ∗ Tel.: +61-2-9385-5828; fax: +61-2-9385-5925. E-mail address: [email protected] (W.F. Chua).
1045-2354/$ – see front matter © 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/S1045-2354(03)00069-8
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Adorno, Marcuse, Benjamin, and in particular, Habermas. We next have Laughlin’s translation of German critical theory—essentially, a fabrication called ‘Middle-Range Theory’. The bridge between the two sides is provided by Lowe’s decision to ‘apply’ (principally) Latour’s ideas on the construction of scientific knowledge by a critical ‘deconstruction’ of Laughlin (1995). And now we have this comment (and other comments in this issue) that provides yet another slant on these translations. There are at least four strategies that could be employed to write this commentary on Lowe: (1) Critically evaluate Lowe’s Latourian-inspired reading of Laughlin’s translation of German critical theory; (2) Advocate the value of Latour’s take on science despite a problematic translation; (3) Critically discuss Laughlin’s translation of German critical theory by putting aside Lowe’s reading; (4) Advocate the value of German critical theory despite multiple, problematic translations. By and large, I am going to adopt the first strategy, although brief comments will be made about (2) and (3) as well. (4), I feel is better accomplished by others far more trained and expert in the field of German social theory.
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My most substantive impression is that Lowe’s paper is schizophrenic in one important dimension—his love–hate relationship with the concept of ‘rhetoric’. In embracing Latour, he appears to accept Latour’s notion of rhetoric, that is, the “discipline that has, for millennia, studied how people are made to believe and behave and taught people how to persuade others” (Latour, 1987, p. 30). Latour is centrally concerned with rhetoric (so defined). Much of his book, ‘Science in Action’ (the main text from which Lowe quotes), seeks to show how scientists use a diverse range of texts, files, documents and artefacts to persuade others to transform what was at first an uncertain opinion into a more ‘concrete’ fact. By conceptualising rhetoric as persuasion via human and non-human allies/resources, Latour argues that the practice of science, whether of the natural or social variety, is intrinsically rhetorical and the scientific article is always a rhetorical vehicle. For Latour then, science is not written as Science, an activity that is set apart from and is more ‘superior’ than mere Rhetoric. Instead, science is a small ‘s’ activity that is rhetorical because it seeks to persuade others. Following Latour’s interest in rhetoric, Lowe, first argues that Laughlin’s paper is rhetorical. I agree with him. Indeed, I am sure Richard Laughlin will himself agree. After all, Laughlin states explicitly in his paper that he is making an argument for “middle-range” thinking (Laughlin, 1995, p. 77). Surely, to make an argument for something is to seek to persuade others of the value of that something. Laughlin further writes that he offers his argument in the hope that it has persuasive power although he claims that his primary purpose is not to persuade others to his view. Instead, he seeks primarily to remind all would-be accounting researchers that they too need to argue the merits of their chosen perspective, to defend their position and to be contradicted. On p. 82, Laughlin stresses yet again that he is making an argument which the reader may not find convincing and he is open that his claims of the strengths of middle-range thinking and the weaknesses of other perspectives are value-laden claims. As a result, I am not sure why Lowe labours this point. Indeed, given that he has chosen to deconstruct a paper that has no empirical ‘evidence’, there is not even a single number that might offer a contradictory argument! Now that Lowe, Laughlin and I all agree that Laughlin’s paper is rhetorical—what next? It is this next step which makes Lowe’s paper schizophrenic, for the critical tonality of his language sets up a Science versus Rhetoric battle. Laughlin’s paper is now not just rhetorical but his assertions are “no more than Rhetorical ploys” (Lowe, p. 18, emphasis added). This prompts the question—what more does Lowe want? The critique continues, Laughlin’s conjectures are “questionable”, his quote on p. 84 (Laughlin, 1995) is “overly dismissive of [other] theorists”, and his comments are a “grave injustice to the so called “Fictean” alternatives” for he misrepresents the work of others. And, to top it all, Laughlin makes statements of value that are not susceptible to “rational” judgement. But I thought Laughlin admitted in his paper that he was making value judgements, so what is the fuss about here? Also, what kind of “rational” judgement does Lowe seek? How does he wish to warrant argumentation? Something called Science? For on p. 20 Lowe criticises Laughlin for not using “scientific language” at a crucial point in his (Laughlin’s) argument. I find it ironical that a writer who embraces Latour can, at the same time, express a desire for Scientific rationality. Or perhaps, that is the perverse manner in which desire works—we secretly covet that which we publicly disdain; we deliberately choose science but implicitly covet a Scientific foundation.
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A second irony is that Lowe constantly uses ‘rhetorical’ questions (that is, questions that are not answered in the text itself) as a writing and persuasive strategy (although his grammar leaves much to be desired because he often leaves out the question mark at the end of these questions). Here are some examples (I have taken the liberty of putting in the question marks)—but what does greater or more balanced mean and what are we to take from a more sophisticated model? (p. 18). By whom and how are such statements to be judged? (p. 18). How are we to measure “tightly clustered”, and even if we could what would it mean? (p. 19). Who is to judge whether one perspective “straddle[s] cells” or is “tightly clustered”? Is it really tenable to make such criticisms? (p. 19). Who is considered qualified to judge the adequacy of Giddens’ theory versus that of Habermas or Weber and how is this to be done? (p. 21). How does this differ from the ideas of Giddens and Weber which (sic) are so cursorily dismissed in the quote above? (p. 21). I raise this point not because I have problems with rhetorical questions per se. They are a common enough mode of persuasion. But surely folk who live in glass houses should not throw stones? If Laughlin is to be criticised for being Rhetorical and not sufficiently Scientific, where is the Scientific basis of Lowe’s own argument? Incidentally, in order for that last question not to be misunderstood, I am no believer in Science. A story-teller like me can hardly be Scientific. Back to Lowe. One of the several unhappy outcomes of his rather muddled translation of Latour is that the value of Latour’s many insights becomes obscured to accounting researchers. Yes, Latour does seek to de-privilege Science with the capital ‘s’. Yes, he does wish to show how science is rhetorical and how scientific knowledge is the fabrication of diverse fact builders. But there is more—for the efforts of Latour and other writers on actor network theory offer us a way of bypassing the agency/structure debate altogether. Their work focuses on the relational materiality of both human and non-human entities (see Law, 1999) in the fabrication of knowledge/science and in the constitution of organisational and social life. That is, actor network theory enables us to research how accounting inscriptions, whether written on paper or embedded in cyberspace, warrant/motivate local actions, and how both these actions and the accountings are themselves connected with and mediated by other circulatory flows of localised actions. For example, we can study why ‘the balanced scorecard movement’ is powerful by following the specific people and events that prompted one company to create a ‘balanced scorecard’ and see how this particular local effort is related to a sum of other very local and very practical ‘implementations of the balanced scorecard’. The rational subjectivity of the local totality is then situated within and related to the imperfect and circulatory sum of institutionalised, total localities. These offerings from actor-network theory, however, are not highlighted via this particular translation. In addition to being schizophrenic, Lowe’s paper is plain wrong in sections. On pp. 15–16, Lowe criticises Laughlin for allegedly reducing a three-dimensional choice process into two. Laughlin argues that researchers make three crucial choices in their research. First, they choose a particular level of prior theorisation. Second, they choose to use particular methodologies that are more or less agreed to by a community of scholars. And finally, they choose to incorporate critique/need for change in various ways. Lowe then argues that without good argument, Laughlin drops the ‘critique/need for change’ dimension and focuses on only two. But this is quite erroneous. Fig. 2 on p. 70 in Laughlin (1995) has three dimensions except it is shown in a two-dimensional diagram with three axes. Perhaps Lowe and I have different perceptual capacities but I again am not clear what the issue is here.
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The final unhappy outcome of this muddy muddle is that Laughlin’s translation of critical theory per se is passed over too quickly and is not evaluated substantively. Like Lowe, I have concerns about Laughlin’s translation but for quite different reasons. My main criticism is that it is not clear what middle range thinking owes to the critical theory of the Frankfurt School in general and to Habermas in particular. I am unsure how Habermas’s theories of ‘universal pragmatics’ and knowledge-constitutive interests lead one down a middle path. For this reader at least, they lead down a critical path, which then begs the question of what constitutes critique in critical theory. As Laughlin points out, critical theory is a diverse body of thought but despite this diversity its intellectual foundations are rooted in the work of Marx, Freud and Weber. Given these foundations, critical theory has certain essential theses. Geuss (1981, p. 2) lists three: 1. Critical theories have special standing as guides for human action in that: (a) they are aimed producing enlightenment in the agents who hold them, i.e. at enabling those agents to determine what their true interests are; (b) they are inherently emancipatory, i.e. they free agents from a kind of coercion which is at least partly self-imposed, from self-frustration of conscious human action. 2. Critical theories have cognitive content, i.e. they are forms of knowledge. 3. Critical theories differ epistemologically in essential ways from theories in the natural sciences. Theories in the natural science are ‘objectifying’; critical theories are ‘reflective’. A critical theory, then, is a reflective theory which gives agents a kind of knowledge inherently productive of enlightenment and emancipation. These elements of critique, however, are refashioned by Laughlin into a ‘skeletal’ theory characterised by an undifferentiated notion of a ‘medium-level’ desire for change. But change towards what and away from what? Middle-range theorising apparently “holds open the possibility that the status quo should continue while also keeping open that change is required . . . [it] neither argues that everything is right nor that it is wrong” (Laughlin, 1995, p. 84). “[T]he medium position on change keeps open the possibility that in certain circumstances critique and ultimate change are important but not in other situations” (Laughlin, p. 82). This makes critical theory sound rather like astrology or one of those paper comments that one finds inside fortune cookies—‘This week you will go on a difficult journey but there will be good fortune at the end’. That is, life is neither all good nor all bad. Whatever happened to ideas like ideologiekritik, emancipation, and genuine consensus as the warrant for social action? They appear to have been erased through translation. Also, the notion of a ‘skeletal’ theory that is then ‘fleshed out’ empirically does not communicate well the commitment of critical theory to reflexive emancipation. Laughlin’s Table 1 is also ambiguous in two other important aspects. Laughlin argues that with middle-range theorising the observer is important and is always part of the process of discovery. It is unclear how the word ‘discovery’ is being used there. Positivists tend to talk about ‘discovering’ empirical generalities. By contrast, ‘critical’ theorists of quite different ilk, from the likes of Marcuse, Adorno and Horkheimer to Knorr-Cetina, Foucault and Latour talk about the fabrication of knowledge. They write that ‘facts’ are the work of
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the historical practice of communities. It would have been helpful had some clarification been provided as to the concept of scientific discovery. In addition, it is not clear why critical theory necessitates case-study data that is heavily descriptive. Again, can data ever not be analytical, if by that we mean ‘theorised’? I find this distinction between ‘description’ and ‘analysis’ rather odd given that critical theorists typically deny that there can be a distinction between observation and interpretation, between fact and value. Perhaps, it would have been more defensible not to imply that middle range thinking had its genesis in critical theory, for that apparent parent appears rather like the proverbial red herring. It seems to me that the meaning of Laughlin’s middle derives solely from its ‘spatial position’ from the constructed alternatives on either side of it (see Laughlin, 1995, Table 1, p. 80). That is, its derivation owes little if anything to critical theory; instead its meaning is attributed solely from it being simultaneously between the ‘high/high/low’ variety on the left and the ‘low/low/low’ variety on the right. Middle-range thinking would then be warranted by its constructed position as the ‘middle’. That’s ok—for it is uncertain that Laughlin’s attempt to manufacture an illustrious lineage accords the argument greater authority or persuasiveness.
Acknowledgements I would like to thank David Cooper for inviting my commentary, giving space to this debate and for his insightful and helpful suggestions.
References Geuss R. The idea of a critical theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School. Cambridge University Press; 1981. Latour B. Science in action. Harvard University Press; 1987. Laughlin R. Methodological themes, empirical research in accounting: alternative approaches and a case for “middle-range” thinking. Acc Aud Acc J 1995;8(1):63–87. Law J. After ANT: complexity, naming and topology. In: Law J, Hassard J, editors. Actor network theory and after. Blackwell Publishers/The Sociological Review; 1999. p. 1–14. Lowe A. Methodology choices and the construction of facts: some implications from the sociology of scientific knowledge. Critic Perspect Acc 2002.
Translating social theory—a critical commentary Wai Fong Chua∗ School of Accounting, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia Received 15 December 2001; received in revised form 4 February 2002; accepted 28 February 2002
Abstract This brief commentary argues that Lowe’s (2003) criticisms of Laughlin’s [Acc. Aud. Acc. J. 8 (1995) 63] arguments as being rhetorical and ‘lacking in scientific language’ are inconsistent with his simultaneous advocacy of Latour’s writings. Concerns are also raised with respect to Laughlin’s translation of critical theory in his version of ‘middle-range theorising’. © 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Translating theory; ANT; Critical theory
Lowe (2002) has two stated aims—(1) to provide a brief review of developments in recent European literature dealing with the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK); and (2) to use/demonstrate this approach. These aims are accomplished via a particular strategy. Lowe uses the writing of a key author in SSK—Latour—to critically evaluate the writing of another author—Laughlin, who was himself seeking to advance his translation of the work of a group of German critical theorists (in particular, the writings of Jurgen Harbermas). As a result of this combination of aims and strategy, this paper ends up rather like a watery collage, with multiple objects of interest (Latour, Habermas, Science, science, Rhetoric, rhetoric, etc.) and multiple translations (Lowe’s and Laughlin’s), but each is painted in rather confusing, runny colours. Since we are in Latourian territory, it is probably appropriate to draw a diagram. Numbers in parentheses indicate strategies that could be adapted by commentators. On the bottom left hand side (this choice of left or right is completely arbitrary), we have the host of folk writing in the SSK domain—Barnes, Yearly, Collins, Callon, Latour, etc. We then have Lowe’s interpretation of their work and his particular focus on translating the ideas of Latour. On the right hand side, we have a group of German critical theorists—Horkheimer, ∗ Tel.: +61-2-9385-5828; fax: +61-2-9385-5925. E-mail address: [email protected] (W.F. Chua).
1045-2354/$ – see front matter © 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/S1045-2354(03)00069-8
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W.F. Chua / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 255–260
Adorno, Marcuse, Benjamin, and in particular, Habermas. We next have Laughlin’s translation of German critical theory—essentially, a fabrication called ‘Middle-Range Theory’. The bridge between the two sides is provided by Lowe’s decision to ‘apply’ (principally) Latour’s ideas on the construction of scientific knowledge by a critical ‘deconstruction’ of Laughlin (1995). And now we have this comment (and other comments in this issue) that provides yet another slant on these translations. There are at least four strategies that could be employed to write this commentary on Lowe: (1) Critically evaluate Lowe’s Latourian-inspired reading of Laughlin’s translation of German critical theory; (2) Advocate the value of Latour’s take on science despite a problematic translation; (3) Critically discuss Laughlin’s translation of German critical theory by putting aside Lowe’s reading; (4) Advocate the value of German critical theory despite multiple, problematic translations. By and large, I am going to adopt the first strategy, although brief comments will be made about (2) and (3) as well. (4), I feel is better accomplished by others far more trained and expert in the field of German social theory.
W.F. Chua / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 255–260
257
My most substantive impression is that Lowe’s paper is schizophrenic in one important dimension—his love–hate relationship with the concept of ‘rhetoric’. In embracing Latour, he appears to accept Latour’s notion of rhetoric, that is, the “discipline that has, for millennia, studied how people are made to believe and behave and taught people how to persuade others” (Latour, 1987, p. 30). Latour is centrally concerned with rhetoric (so defined). Much of his book, ‘Science in Action’ (the main text from which Lowe quotes), seeks to show how scientists use a diverse range of texts, files, documents and artefacts to persuade others to transform what was at first an uncertain opinion into a more ‘concrete’ fact. By conceptualising rhetoric as persuasion via human and non-human allies/resources, Latour argues that the practice of science, whether of the natural or social variety, is intrinsically rhetorical and the scientific article is always a rhetorical vehicle. For Latour then, science is not written as Science, an activity that is set apart from and is more ‘superior’ than mere Rhetoric. Instead, science is a small ‘s’ activity that is rhetorical because it seeks to persuade others. Following Latour’s interest in rhetoric, Lowe, first argues that Laughlin’s paper is rhetorical. I agree with him. Indeed, I am sure Richard Laughlin will himself agree. After all, Laughlin states explicitly in his paper that he is making an argument for “middle-range” thinking (Laughlin, 1995, p. 77). Surely, to make an argument for something is to seek to persuade others of the value of that something. Laughlin further writes that he offers his argument in the hope that it has persuasive power although he claims that his primary purpose is not to persuade others to his view. Instead, he seeks primarily to remind all would-be accounting researchers that they too need to argue the merits of their chosen perspective, to defend their position and to be contradicted. On p. 82, Laughlin stresses yet again that he is making an argument which the reader may not find convincing and he is open that his claims of the strengths of middle-range thinking and the weaknesses of other perspectives are value-laden claims. As a result, I am not sure why Lowe labours this point. Indeed, given that he has chosen to deconstruct a paper that has no empirical ‘evidence’, there is not even a single number that might offer a contradictory argument! Now that Lowe, Laughlin and I all agree that Laughlin’s paper is rhetorical—what next? It is this next step which makes Lowe’s paper schizophrenic, for the critical tonality of his language sets up a Science versus Rhetoric battle. Laughlin’s paper is now not just rhetorical but his assertions are “no more than Rhetorical ploys” (Lowe, p. 18, emphasis added). This prompts the question—what more does Lowe want? The critique continues, Laughlin’s conjectures are “questionable”, his quote on p. 84 (Laughlin, 1995) is “overly dismissive of [other] theorists”, and his comments are a “grave injustice to the so called “Fictean” alternatives” for he misrepresents the work of others. And, to top it all, Laughlin makes statements of value that are not susceptible to “rational” judgement. But I thought Laughlin admitted in his paper that he was making value judgements, so what is the fuss about here? Also, what kind of “rational” judgement does Lowe seek? How does he wish to warrant argumentation? Something called Science? For on p. 20 Lowe criticises Laughlin for not using “scientific language” at a crucial point in his (Laughlin’s) argument. I find it ironical that a writer who embraces Latour can, at the same time, express a desire for Scientific rationality. Or perhaps, that is the perverse manner in which desire works—we secretly covet that which we publicly disdain; we deliberately choose science but implicitly covet a Scientific foundation.
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A second irony is that Lowe constantly uses ‘rhetorical’ questions (that is, questions that are not answered in the text itself) as a writing and persuasive strategy (although his grammar leaves much to be desired because he often leaves out the question mark at the end of these questions). Here are some examples (I have taken the liberty of putting in the question marks)—but what does greater or more balanced mean and what are we to take from a more sophisticated model? (p. 18). By whom and how are such statements to be judged? (p. 18). How are we to measure “tightly clustered”, and even if we could what would it mean? (p. 19). Who is to judge whether one perspective “straddle[s] cells” or is “tightly clustered”? Is it really tenable to make such criticisms? (p. 19). Who is considered qualified to judge the adequacy of Giddens’ theory versus that of Habermas or Weber and how is this to be done? (p. 21). How does this differ from the ideas of Giddens and Weber which (sic) are so cursorily dismissed in the quote above? (p. 21). I raise this point not because I have problems with rhetorical questions per se. They are a common enough mode of persuasion. But surely folk who live in glass houses should not throw stones? If Laughlin is to be criticised for being Rhetorical and not sufficiently Scientific, where is the Scientific basis of Lowe’s own argument? Incidentally, in order for that last question not to be misunderstood, I am no believer in Science. A story-teller like me can hardly be Scientific. Back to Lowe. One of the several unhappy outcomes of his rather muddled translation of Latour is that the value of Latour’s many insights becomes obscured to accounting researchers. Yes, Latour does seek to de-privilege Science with the capital ‘s’. Yes, he does wish to show how science is rhetorical and how scientific knowledge is the fabrication of diverse fact builders. But there is more—for the efforts of Latour and other writers on actor network theory offer us a way of bypassing the agency/structure debate altogether. Their work focuses on the relational materiality of both human and non-human entities (see Law, 1999) in the fabrication of knowledge/science and in the constitution of organisational and social life. That is, actor network theory enables us to research how accounting inscriptions, whether written on paper or embedded in cyberspace, warrant/motivate local actions, and how both these actions and the accountings are themselves connected with and mediated by other circulatory flows of localised actions. For example, we can study why ‘the balanced scorecard movement’ is powerful by following the specific people and events that prompted one company to create a ‘balanced scorecard’ and see how this particular local effort is related to a sum of other very local and very practical ‘implementations of the balanced scorecard’. The rational subjectivity of the local totality is then situated within and related to the imperfect and circulatory sum of institutionalised, total localities. These offerings from actor-network theory, however, are not highlighted via this particular translation. In addition to being schizophrenic, Lowe’s paper is plain wrong in sections. On pp. 15–16, Lowe criticises Laughlin for allegedly reducing a three-dimensional choice process into two. Laughlin argues that researchers make three crucial choices in their research. First, they choose a particular level of prior theorisation. Second, they choose to use particular methodologies that are more or less agreed to by a community of scholars. And finally, they choose to incorporate critique/need for change in various ways. Lowe then argues that without good argument, Laughlin drops the ‘critique/need for change’ dimension and focuses on only two. But this is quite erroneous. Fig. 2 on p. 70 in Laughlin (1995) has three dimensions except it is shown in a two-dimensional diagram with three axes. Perhaps Lowe and I have different perceptual capacities but I again am not clear what the issue is here.
W.F. Chua / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 255–260
259
The final unhappy outcome of this muddy muddle is that Laughlin’s translation of critical theory per se is passed over too quickly and is not evaluated substantively. Like Lowe, I have concerns about Laughlin’s translation but for quite different reasons. My main criticism is that it is not clear what middle range thinking owes to the critical theory of the Frankfurt School in general and to Habermas in particular. I am unsure how Habermas’s theories of ‘universal pragmatics’ and knowledge-constitutive interests lead one down a middle path. For this reader at least, they lead down a critical path, which then begs the question of what constitutes critique in critical theory. As Laughlin points out, critical theory is a diverse body of thought but despite this diversity its intellectual foundations are rooted in the work of Marx, Freud and Weber. Given these foundations, critical theory has certain essential theses. Geuss (1981, p. 2) lists three: 1. Critical theories have special standing as guides for human action in that: (a) they are aimed producing enlightenment in the agents who hold them, i.e. at enabling those agents to determine what their true interests are; (b) they are inherently emancipatory, i.e. they free agents from a kind of coercion which is at least partly self-imposed, from self-frustration of conscious human action. 2. Critical theories have cognitive content, i.e. they are forms of knowledge. 3. Critical theories differ epistemologically in essential ways from theories in the natural sciences. Theories in the natural science are ‘objectifying’; critical theories are ‘reflective’. A critical theory, then, is a reflective theory which gives agents a kind of knowledge inherently productive of enlightenment and emancipation. These elements of critique, however, are refashioned by Laughlin into a ‘skeletal’ theory characterised by an undifferentiated notion of a ‘medium-level’ desire for change. But change towards what and away from what? Middle-range theorising apparently “holds open the possibility that the status quo should continue while also keeping open that change is required . . . [it] neither argues that everything is right nor that it is wrong” (Laughlin, 1995, p. 84). “[T]he medium position on change keeps open the possibility that in certain circumstances critique and ultimate change are important but not in other situations” (Laughlin, p. 82). This makes critical theory sound rather like astrology or one of those paper comments that one finds inside fortune cookies—‘This week you will go on a difficult journey but there will be good fortune at the end’. That is, life is neither all good nor all bad. Whatever happened to ideas like ideologiekritik, emancipation, and genuine consensus as the warrant for social action? They appear to have been erased through translation. Also, the notion of a ‘skeletal’ theory that is then ‘fleshed out’ empirically does not communicate well the commitment of critical theory to reflexive emancipation. Laughlin’s Table 1 is also ambiguous in two other important aspects. Laughlin argues that with middle-range theorising the observer is important and is always part of the process of discovery. It is unclear how the word ‘discovery’ is being used there. Positivists tend to talk about ‘discovering’ empirical generalities. By contrast, ‘critical’ theorists of quite different ilk, from the likes of Marcuse, Adorno and Horkheimer to Knorr-Cetina, Foucault and Latour talk about the fabrication of knowledge. They write that ‘facts’ are the work of
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the historical practice of communities. It would have been helpful had some clarification been provided as to the concept of scientific discovery. In addition, it is not clear why critical theory necessitates case-study data that is heavily descriptive. Again, can data ever not be analytical, if by that we mean ‘theorised’? I find this distinction between ‘description’ and ‘analysis’ rather odd given that critical theorists typically deny that there can be a distinction between observation and interpretation, between fact and value. Perhaps, it would have been more defensible not to imply that middle range thinking had its genesis in critical theory, for that apparent parent appears rather like the proverbial red herring. It seems to me that the meaning of Laughlin’s middle derives solely from its ‘spatial position’ from the constructed alternatives on either side of it (see Laughlin, 1995, Table 1, p. 80). That is, its derivation owes little if anything to critical theory; instead its meaning is attributed solely from it being simultaneously between the ‘high/high/low’ variety on the left and the ‘low/low/low’ variety on the right. Middle-range thinking would then be warranted by its constructed position as the ‘middle’. That’s ok—for it is uncertain that Laughlin’s attempt to manufacture an illustrious lineage accords the argument greater authority or persuasiveness.
Acknowledgements I would like to thank David Cooper for inviting my commentary, giving space to this debate and for his insightful and helpful suggestions.
References Geuss R. The idea of a critical theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School. Cambridge University Press; 1981. Latour B. Science in action. Harvard University Press; 1987. Laughlin R. Methodological themes, empirical research in accounting: alternative approaches and a case for “middle-range” thinking. Acc Aud Acc J 1995;8(1):63–87. Law J. After ANT: complexity, naming and topology. In: Law J, Hassard J, editors. Actor network theory and after. Blackwell Publishers/The Sociological Review; 1999. p. 1–14. Lowe A. Methodology choices and the construction of facts: some implications from the sociology of scientific knowledge. Critic Perspect Acc 2002.