Unconventional risks: The experience of acute energy development in the Eagle Ford Shale

Energy Research & Social Science 20 (2016) 91–98

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Energy Research & Social Science journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/erss

Original research article

Unconventional risks: The experience of acute energy development in the Eagle Ford Shale Colter Ellis a,∗ , Gene L. Theodori b , Peggy Petrzelka c , Douglas Jackson-Smith c , A.E. Luloff d a

Department of Sociology, Montana State University, United States Department of Sociology, Sam Houston State University, United States Department of Sociology, Utah State University, United States d Department of Agricultural Economics, Sociology, and Education, Pennsylvania State University, United States b c

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history: Received 30 December 2015 Received in revised form 26 March 2016 Accepted 6 May 2016 Available online 11 June 2016 Keywords: Energy development Perceptions Risk Rural areas

a b s t r a c t Many rural communities are facing complicated risks resulting from unconventional oil and gas development and hydraulic fracturing. This study focuses on residents’ experiences of risk and the factors limiting local leader’s efforts to protect residents. Data for this research were obtained through interviews with community leaders, industry officials, and focus groups with private citizens. Data collection occurred in four counties in the Eagle Ford Shale region of South Texas. Study participants shared examples of how their lives were impacted by increased truck traffic, food and housing insecurity, flaring of hydrogen sulfide (H2 S) gas, and concerns about water contamination. Community leaders confront a tension between supporting economic growth and development associated with energy development, and managing these negative social and environmental outcomes. We identify three significant factors that weaken the power and limit the ability of local governments to effectively advocate for their communities. First, rural communities lack the staffing, expertise, and financial resources to properly cope with development. Second, the rural geography makes it difficult for local governments to work collaboratively across political borders. Third, the dominant conservative political values make it difficult for local leaders to advocate for increases in regional, state, or federal regulation. © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction Innovations in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing have made hydrocarbons locked in South Texas’s Eagle Ford Shale accessible for the first time. Since drilling began in 2008, counties in this rural South Texas region have experienced significant employment and economic growth [41]. This is a welcome change for some residents whose counties have long been among the poorest in the state. These changes, however, co-exist with growing concerns about potential risks to public health, the environment, and overall quality of life [1,25,31]. These concerns are not unfounded. A wide body of research on boom-bust cycles indicates that rapid growth in natural resource extraction is commonly followed by periods of decline, leaving communities to face difficult social, economic, and environmental circumstances [13,32,49]. Given this previous

∗ Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (C. Ellis), [email protected] (G.L. Theodori), [email protected] (P. Petrzelka), [email protected] (D. Jackson-Smith), [email protected] (A.E. Luloff). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.05.006 2214-6296/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

research, there is reason to be concerned about long-term outcomes for Eagle Ford residents. Due to the burgeoning shale oil and gas industry, community leaders in and around shale plays are increasingly confronted with a rather broad range of benefits and costs associated with the energy development [33]. Potentially positive economic effects – such as increases in tax revenue, local employment, and business activity – are attractive but must be weighed against negative local economic issues – such as costs associated with road maintenance and increased public services, losses of revenue from competing energy sources, and declines in land value adjacent to drilling sites [8,21,25,37]. Furthermore, unconventional drilling introduces risks different from other forms of energy development [18,31]. While horizontal drilling and multi-stage hydraulic fracturing technologies allow industry operators unprecedented precision, non-point source hazards such as flowback wastewater transport and disposal, aquifer contamination, increased seismic activity, and risks to human health are persistent concerns associated with shale oil and gas development [7,10,14,15,44]. A growing body of social research examines perceptions of hydraulic fracturing among local residents [16,17,30,34,38–40,48]

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and community leaders [1,3,22]. These studies document local’s concerns about a wide range of social, environmental, and economic issues. Notable among these issues are truck, declining quality of life, and perceived threats to air and water quality. These recent studies of shale oil and gas booms tell a familiar story. Sociologists have long discussed the challenges of rapid energy development [9,13,27]. Despite the concerning findings of many short-term boomtown studies, however, research spanning multiple decades indicates that communities eventually recover [5,4,32]. Still, relatively little is known about the short-term structural and cultural obstacles communities face as they attempt to adapt to their new circumstances. This may be an especially important gap in our theoretical knowledge of boom-bust cycles if, as Jacquet and Kay [19] suggest, these areas are hit by “repeated mini-booms and mini-busts,” as opposed to the one-time boom-bust cycle typical of other energy developments (p. 12). Building on previous research, our study uses semi-structured interviews with community leaders (n = 34) and focus groups with local residents (n = 46) in the Eagle Ford. These data give insight into the ways locals experience risk. Like previous research, respondents identify truck traffic, cost of living increases, flares, and water contamination as central areas of concern. Participants’ descriptions of these concerns are accompanied by vivid personal accounts of being run off the road by truck traffic, having neighbors priced out of their homes, dealing with poisonous gas, and encountering illegal dumping of potential water contaminants. These stories represent more than perception, but actual lived experiences critical to understanding the impact of energy development. Our data also show that local leaders are struggling to find solutions. Interviews with county and city officials identify three factors hindering local governments’ ability to effectively adapt to change. First, rural city and county governments lack the resources—i.e. staff, expertise, experience, and financial, to adequately anticipate, understand, and organize responses to many of the unintended social, health and environmental impacts associated with rapid energy booms. Second, this lack of capacity is aggregated by geographical, organizational, and logistical barriers to collaboration among rural governments in this vast (over 50,000 km2 ) and relatively thinly populated region (11.5 persons/km2 ). This is especially problematic when responding to risks such as traffic and leakages of hydrogen sulfide gas (H2 S) that regularly cross county lines. Third, conservative political values mitigate against collective efforts to pursue strong regulatory authority to oversee and manage industry activities. As a result of these factors, local governments are in a relatively weak position to negotiate with industry actors to mitigate or prevent undesired social, health and environmental impacts.

2. Methods Significant drilling in the Eagle Ford Shale basin begins on Fayette County’s eastern border (see Fig. 1). From there, the play stretches southwest across a relatively narrow strip of land to Maverick, Dimmit, and Webb Counties, at which point the formation passes into Mexico. During data collection, this was one of the most active shale plays in North America. Since 2008, the Railroad Commission of Texas has issued over 20,000 drilling permits across 17 counties. In 2014, the Eagle Ford produced 280,360 barrels of condensate, 5080 million cubic feet of natural gas, and 1,060,191 barrels of oil per day [35]. The rapid pace of this development has had significant consequences for the local population. Our research took place in Gonzales, Karnes, McMullen, and La Salle counties. While not representative of the whole region, we chose these counties for their geographic dispersion east to west along the shale play. To make contacts, we attended regional conferences and local workshops on oil and gas development where we

Table 1 Interviewees’ Community Position and Location.

County/City Officialsa Social Servicesa School Professionalsa Business Leadersa Church Leadersa Seniorsb Low-Income Residentsb Property Ownersb Total

La Salle

McMullen

Karnes

Gonzales

2 2 2 4 1 3 5 5 24

6 4 3 – – – – – 13

1 2 1 – 2 8 13 12 39

2 2 – – – – – – 4

Nine additional interviews were conducted with industry officials for a total n = 89. a Key informant interviews. b Focus group participants.

introduced ourselves to local officials. We then identified relevant city and county leadership from all four counties. We interviewed county commissioners, city mayors and managers, county sheriffs, housing authority directors, chamber of commerce representatives, attorneys, school superintendents, teachers and school staff, social services personnel, and religious leaders (see Table 1). This technique, known as “purposive sampling,” generates a theoretically guided non-probability sample that focuses on cases of specific interest [26]. All interviews were semi-structured, conducted in-person, and ranged in length from 45 min to over two hours (n = 34). Interviews took a responsive approach focusing on perceptions of development, experiences working with industry, community wellbeing, and hopes for the future [29]. Interviews began with general questions about risks and benefits. Probing questions were used once interviewees identified specific issues as relevant to them and their area. Based on interview findings, we identified three populations differentially experiencing development: seniors, low-income people, and landowners. We conducted focus groups with homogenous samples of each of these subpopulations. Focus groups were conducted in La Salle and Karnes counties. Karnes County is considered “ground zero” for the hydraulic fracturing activity in the Eagle Ford, thus, a primary county for gathering data on residents’ perceptions of this activity. La Salle County is approximately 50 miles west of Karnes and has comparable oil and gas development. Gonzales and McMullen counties were dropped due to financial constraints. A total of eight focus groups, four in each county, were conducted. One focus group of senior citizens was conducted in each county as was one focus group of landowners. Given the work and family schedules of lower-income individuals who are most often employed in service sector type jobs, we arranged two focus group times to accommodate their calendars. Among other sources, we worked with religious leaders to recruit senior citizens, housing authority directors to recruit low-income individuals, and chamber of commerce representatives to recruit landowners. We also had success inviting individuals we met casually during previous visits. The number of participants in the focus groups ranged from four to twelve individuals (n = 46). The focus groups lasted between one and two and one half hours. A meal was provided to increase participation. Additionally, nine interviews were conducted with community engagement and economic development representatives from the oil and gas industry. Eligible companies were limited to primary operators. Companies from support industries and subcontractors were excluded. Interviews and focus groups were recorded and transcribed verbatim. Once transcribed, other members of the research team who were not involved in the interviewing listened to the interviews in full and verified transcription accuracy. These data were imported into NVivo 10.2, a software program used to analyze qual-

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Fig. 1. Wells Permitted and Completed in the Eagle Ford Shale Play. Source: Ref. [35].

itative data. Initial coding identified general themes within the data. Focused coding refined these themes into specific categories as they emerged from the data [6,28]. Coding and analysis were conducted and verified by four members of the research team. Preliminary results of this research were then presented locally to Eagle Ford community members who were invited to provide feedback. This process is known as “member checking” and is a way to validate qualitative data [26]. To protect the confidentiality of individuals and organizations, we use pseudonyms and have de-identified all data.

3. Findings 3.1. Community impacts Interviews with local leaders and focus groups with residents revealed that the negative outcomes experienced by Eagle Ford communities co-exist with hopes for long-term economic benefit. The boomtown research of the 1970s and 1980s tends to emphasize the social disruption and negative outcomes of extractive industry and energy development in the rural intermountain west [2]. Authors have critiqued this approach by stressing that individuals experience changes differently depending on social and geographic position [11,47]. In Eagle Ford communities, landowners with mineral rights who have access to income from leases with energy companies, younger adults who may be able to secure jobs working in industry, and local business owners who provide services to oil and gas companies appear to be the biggest winners. On the other hand, low-income residents and seniors reported the most significant negative personal experiences with development. Taken as a whole, local residents recognize these tradeoffs and remained generally positive about the value of continued oil and gas development. This is due, in part, to the long period of economic stagnation

or decline that preceded Eagle Ford development. As one school teacher said: I think most people are for the most part happy about it because of the economic prosperity that it has brought to our community. And you have to understand that [our area has] had no, it was farming and ranching for years and then it became hunting because, the farming took so much water and drought issues. I think most people are excited about it. While generally enthusiastic about new economic opportunities, community leaders and local residents felt overwhelmed and unprepared to manage the surge in development. As this school teacher continued, “We weren’t prepared for it yet, you know? And the majority of people didn’t really know it was coming, and it took everybody, I mean, it’s like we woke up one morning and we had this traffic problem and we didn’t really know what to do about it.” In addition to truck traffic, informants commonly identified cost of living increases, gas flaring, and water pollution as significant problems. The following sections detail how residents experience these risks in their everyday lives. 3.1.1. Truck traffic Interviewees described increased traffic as one of the most salient negative outcomes of development. This corroborates findings from quantitative studies of local residents’ concerns in other shale plays [37,20]. Our qualitative data allow a more nuanced description of how truck traffic impacts the lives of everyday people. Many study participants identified specific events that made them fearful of driving. Take the case of an administrative assistant and school bus driver from a rural school district. During our interview, she told us about her experiences driving a school bus among the truck traffic: Well, you know, [the truck] just start drifting over. And I’m thinking okay, are they gonna get back in their lane? But I of

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course honk the horn at ‘em or wave at ‘em, you know? And then, on several occasions they did not pull over early enough. So on two different occasions I have had to go completely into the ditch and stop because I was that scared that we were gonna hit head on. And I don’t even know if the person ever woke up or, got back in their lane, or whatever cause I’m too concerned about the bus and my kids that are on there. This respondent went on to tell us about the emotional impact of these events. The last time she was forced off the road, she was late to work. Although the kids on the bus made it to class on time, she needed to compose herself: It’s very emotional because you’ve got these 22 kids that you’re responsible for. Not just your own self – but because I know all of these kids. Known ‘em since they were born. So I can’t imagine; they’re like my own kids. So, that was probably the most, one of the very scariest things. She went on describe coming upon a fatal crash while driving the bus. One of the deceased was laying in the road in full view of the children. The driver and children sat for 30 minutes waiting for emergency staff to let them pass. Other respondents emphasized that truck traffic had a disproportionate effect on seniors. On average, rural populations tend to be older than their urban counterparts, and Eagle Ford communities are no exception. In the 2010 census, each of our four study counties had significant populations of people over 65: La Salle = 13.2%, McMullen = 25.6%, Karnes = 14.2%, Gonzales = 43.4% [42].1 Senior residents in focus groups emphasized their fear of driving and linked truck traffic to increased isolation and a loss of independence. One of the most prominent themes was that fear of traffic limited older residents ability to get to the drugstore. As one senior stated in a focus group: We have only one drugstore here in town, and then I found out because I didn’t want to drive because it was too much traffic and a lot of those big rigs, not only one, but three or four in a row, and we have only one traffic light here. And then there’s a lot of trucks, como se dicen los [they say as] pickup trucks, like working trucks that the workers are driving and some of them are driving fast, they don’t even stop at the stop signs, so it’s hard for us seniors. . . So it kind of makes it hard, people say, “I don’t want to go in that direction because, I don’t want to go and get my medicine because it’s right in the center of town,” and, so it’s kind of hard. As this comment was made, other members of the focus group nodded in agreement and each expressed significant fear about driving. Interviewees reported that the change in traffic was abrupt, unanticipated, and has had serious implications. In a survey-based study, Theodori [37] found that local residents reported increased truck traffic as the most problematic byproduct of energy development. While Jacquet and Stedman [20] found that this variable had little impact on people’s overall attitudes towards energy development, traffic does represent one of the most important risks for local residents. This is especially true for senior citizens who may become increasingly isolated and dependent on others for transportation. 3.1.2. Cost of living Like traffic, cost of living increases are common characteristics of acute oil and gas development. This is especially problematic for renters who can see their rents increase as drilling intensifies. Food and fuel prices also increase [3]. In the Eagle Ford, these increases have serious implications for local housing authorities. These orga-

1

Nationally, 14.5% of US residents are over the age of 65 [42].

nizations commonly work with private property owners to secure housing for low-income families. As one housing authority representative reported, “a two bedroom would rent for $250–$300, and we thought $300 was a lot of money. Right now, a two bedroom goes for $2500–$3100.” A neighboring housing authority representative reported a similar situation, “In 2008, you could rent a two bedroom in [this] county for $450, all day long. We rented two bedrooms for $425 and when we went up to $450 people just thought we were robbing them blind.” Rents in this county doubled to over $800 for families on public assistance, but many landlords could rent their properties outside the program for $1800–$2000. According to housing authority staff, owners were selling their properties or otherwise choosing not to continue renting to low-income tenants. This change forced many long-time residents to move. For example, as a third housing authority staff member told us, “I had one resident, she had been in this particular house for 42 years. It changed landlords and the current landlord evicted her because she was only paying $300 a month and he could get $1600 if he put her out of her little house.” Development brought price increases for many basic life necessities. Seniors and low-income focus group participants found increases in the price of food especially problematic because they were unable to travel out of town to less expensive grocery stores. As one senior focus group participant said, “It makes it hard for people on a fixed income, who don’t have a way out of town, or who don’t have a way to communicate with someone who can.” Respondents told us that price increases at local stores could be dramatic. The importance of these price jumps were especially pronounced for low-income focus group participants: All the prices are going up. I mean, you go into the grocery store one week and it’s like a $1.50 for a box of something and the next week you go in and it’s a $1.75, I mean it doesn’t go up in small increments, it goes up like a quarter every time. You go in to buy milk, one week it’s $3, and the next week you go in and it’s $3.50! The costs of housing and food were serious problems noted by seniors and low-income residents. Those with more resources reported driving further to larger towns or areas with less development activity. While traveling out of town was feasible for some, the fuel costs and fear of traffic meant that many older and low-income residents were left to shop at local stores. 3.1.3. Flaring In addition to increased traffic and costs of living, study participants also noted environmental and health concerns, primarily in relationship to flaring and water contamination. Local residents were less likely to relate specific personal experiences dealing with these issues. People in leadership and emergency management positions, however, were keenly aware of examples of environmental and health problems associated with development. One of most widely discussed issues was the flaring of gas at well sites across the play. Oil wells in the Eagle Ford shale commonly produce natural gases. Ideally, natural gases with commercial value are collected. This requires a specific infrastructure, typically a pipeline. In areas with many wells being drilled simultaneously, oil wells may begin producing natural gases before such infrastructure is ready. Thus, in some cases, natural gases are burned at the wellhead. This process is commonly known as “flaring.” These flares can be very dramatic, especially at night, when flames cast light into the sky and across the landscape. Another reason for flaring is that not all the natural gas produced has commercial value. This is the case with H2 S, a poisonous gas that smells like rotten eggs and is a common byproduct of Eagle Ford production. During our data collection, flaring of H2 S was widespread across the Eagle Ford.

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Several informants reported situations where H2 S flares had accidentally gone out, spewing the heavy and toxic gas into the air. One such event was especially concerning to a local school superintendent. As he explained, “apparently the H2 S gas. . . it’s heavier [than air] and sets in low, and [the school building is] in a low spot.” He continued to recount an incident involving a malfunctioning flare: Basically, they’re flarin’ these wells off, running off poisonous gas, and a flare will go out for some reason. Either they ran out of propane, someone not doin’ their job, I don’t know, and then the whole town will smell like rotten eggs. I’m not talkin’, just like when you’re drivin’ through an oil patch or something, I’m talkin’ eyes water, taste it in your mouth. It can be that bad. And we’ve had, that I know of, three of those incidents. For this superintendent, the risk was significant enough that he worked with several oil and gas companies to buy H2 S gas sensors for school employees. The sensors were yellow beeper-sized electronics that could be clipped on a belt and would alert the employee of high H2 S levels. The risks associated with flaring were also a key concern of local law enforcement personnel. One county sheriff discussed the difficulties communicating with industry officials about flaring. While he had several experiences dealing with industry, he specifically recounted a flare malfunction. As he said: The whole town was smelling real strong [of] rotten eggs. And that evening, I was heading home, heading south of town. Well, H2 S is heavier than air, it goes into the low-lying areas. Well, I went into one of those dips, and I came up. . . well I used to work at the [company] plant. I know sour gas when I smell it. And when I came up out of that dip the entire inside of my truck started smelling real strong. . . I looked down and my H2 S monitor was going off. . . And I looked at that, and then I could taste it. And I’d never been in it that thick to where you could actually taste it in your mouth. The sheriff made a phone call to the company that was most likely involved. “They said, naw, we’re not even burning anything off.” It is not uncommon to smell rotten eggs when driving in the Eagle Ford, even when there is no immediate threat. The sheriff assumed that this must have been the case, but he continued to receive calls from concerned residents. He decided to inquire at a drilling site near town that was run by the company he had just called. Again, he was told that nothing was amiss. As he said: Well, you know, guess what? People lie to law enforcement. And I got lied to. About a week later I found out that if I walked out in the brush out there I’d have found 3 dead cows, that the flare had gone out. . . and there’s 3 cows probably 400 yards away when it went off and they dropped in their tracks. Environmental risks such as H2 S are a serious byproduct of drilling in the Eagle Ford. In addition to air quality issues, water contamination was also noted as an environmental risk by those we interviewed.

3.1.4. Water contamination The water needed to complete a hydraulically fractured well can range between 1 and 3 million gallons but may exceed 5 million gallons in some cases [1]. With tens of thousands of wells being drilled, a relatively high volume of fresh water (from a relatively arid region) has been required to support hydraulic fracturing operations. “Frac fluid,” as it is known, is a mixture of freshwater, proppants, and chemicals needed for drilling and well completion [40]. Pressure forces the frac fluid back out of the completed well. This fluid is generally known as “frac flowback” and

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must be captured, stored, disposed of, or treated [40]. Flowback wastewater can be processed and re-used, but the more common management strategy is to dispose of frac flowback in underground injection wells [43]. Flowback wastewater is typically laden with high concentrations of dissolved solids and hydrocarbon residues and requires an extensive infrastructure of trucks, storage ponds, and injection wells for disposal. Frac flowback has the potential to contaminate waterways and aquifers if it is not managed correctly [14]. The transportation of frac flowback liquid from the well to the disposal site is an especially risky time and an area of concern for county leadership. Company subcontractors often provide the labor and equipment to transport this fluid. County leadership regularly called these companies “fly-by-night” operations and felt that they had little interest in building long-term community or industry relationships. Law enforcement personnel, county commissioners, and other leaders regularly suspected these companies of illegally dumping frac flowback and other toxic wastes. According to local leaders, these companies get paid by the load, which encourages them to cut corners. As one county official said: Especially around holidays, because they try to make a couple extra loads to get a little bit more cash. And so they’ll go out to get a load of salt water and they’ll go down one of our county roads and just open up their valve and just [sound effect] right down the county road and they’ll turn around and come back, get another load. This county official went on to state that county police officers had found a trail of black fluid that had been dumped along a road. The officers had followed the trail and found the responsible truck driver. They had a pickle jar filled with flowback fluid collected as evidence. The interview data show local residents face risks to their health and wellbeing from increased truck traffic, housing and food insecurity, and air and water pollution. Residents’ perceptions of these risks are based on very real experiences. These risks also appear to disproportionally impact seniors and low-income people. For some long-time residents, these changes have made their communities unlivable. Local leadership are aware of these inequalities. As one county judge said, “It’s hard to be poor and live in the Eagle Ford, and you can quote me saying that. Your car can’t handle it and you can’t handle it psychologically. Your whole life has been turned upside down. . . it’s changed for ever, and for them, not for the better.” Despite this realization, community leaders struggle to find solutions. In the next section, we discuss the structural and cultural dynamics that hinder community adaption in the Eagle Ford. 3.2. Community leadership The community leaders interviewed for this study, especially those in elected positions, struggle to adapt to rapid growth in their communities. They feared disrupting economic growth, but also expressed real concern for their community members. As one county judge said, “I mean, these are people we grew up with, people we love, they are our citizens, they are our friends.” Three key issues hinder their efforts to protect these residents. First, rural government officials lack the capacity to effectively monitor and respond to emerging risks. Second, the rural geography presents logistical and social obstacles to collaboration among local governments. Finally, the predominant conservative political culture of the region limits the willingness of local leaders to explore regulatory options. 3.2.1. Limited local government capacity The core Eagle Ford production area includes 17 counties, 10 of which have populations under 20,000. Of the 49 independent cities

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and towns, nearly all had fewer than 10,000 residents during the 2010 census. Local governments consist of county commissions, led by an elected “county judge,” and city councils or commissions, usually led by a mayor. Typical of rural governments elsewhere in the U.S., the cities and counties in this region operate on small budgets. Local leadership rely heavily on a small staff, many of whom work part-time, and struggle to find sufficient resources to maintain up-to-date information technology and management systems [46]. These governments’ inability to raise sufficient funds from the local tax base lead many local leaders to lobby the state legislature for more state resources to pay for mitigating the impacts of development [45]. The years proceeding Eagle Ford development were defined by relatively stagnant growth. As a result, many local governments were institutionally unprepared for the boom. They lacked experienced staff and did not have formalized zoning or city plans. As one government leader noted: When I came to work here, this community was so backwards. . .didn’t even have a master plan. Didn’t have a land use plan, didn’t, I mean, didn’t have anything. . . A&M did our comprehensive plan for us, and we’re reviewing their final draft, we are going to mark it up and, if I ever get time to read it and mark it up, then we will proceed with the approval process. But at least we have it. We’ve got goals and objectives set by the council. Local governments like this one were largely understaffed and had limited expertise working with energy development. In some cases, cities hired part-time work from government retirees who commuted twice a week from larger counties. These people brought expertise, but counties could not afford to hire them as full-time employees. Like many boomtowns, Eagle Ford communities were institutionally unprepared for the dramatic increase in energy development. This made it difficult for local governments to implement basic safeguards against the social, health and environmental impacts associated with rapid energy booms. As development has continued, local governments have begun to adapt by formalizing basic processes. As local governments work to become more sophisticated, however, they have begun to confront geographic and cultural confounds. 3.2.2. Rural geographies The Eagle Ford’s rural geography is an obstacle to effectively managing the risks and potential benefits of oil and gas development. Many negative outcomes, such as strained infrastructure, population increases, traffic, water contamination, and air quality issues cross county lines and necessitate an organized regional response. In the absence of state government interventions, responding to these regional concerns requires local governments to collaborate. Our data indicate that while some city and county leaders see a need for pooling their efforts, they do not have an effective system for regional coordination. As a result, county officials are left to negotiate independently with oil and gas companies as they attempt to adapt to the rapid changes in their communities. This puts local governments at a disadvantage. As one city official said, “As long as all the cities are fractured and are handled as independent entities, we’re gonna get screwed.” County judges reported that the state government was not providing significant support to local communities. Judges from two of the first and hardest hit Eagle Ford counties lobbied to increase support for infrastructure, road, law enforcement, and other resources. Ultimately, these efforts ended in frustration. As this county judge stated, “we found out that when it comes down to the wire, we are on our own. We don’t have help, we have each other.” The community leaders interviewed, however, did not have a history of

working together. Sparse population and limited economic activity meant that, until recently, they had little if any reason to interact. According to one industry official: Some of the county officials don’t necessarily understand [how to think regionally], they’ve graduated to that, I say graduated but they know, like, if you have an issue in [the next] county, or a success, other people want to replicate the success or they want to address the issue, you know? It’s to prevent it happening across the play. The inability to “think regionally,” as this industry official put it, was an obstacle for both county officials and industry. Each county had multiple industry actors working within their borders. Similarly, each company was working across multiple counties and neither local governments nor individual companies were communicating effectively. Industry took steps to resolve this issue by organizing the South Texas Energy and Economic Roundtable (STEER). This organization has garnered considerable support and participation from industry by providing companies with a platform to organize their efforts. Local leaders can use STEER as a centralized industry contact for addressing emergent problems. While this organization is well regarded by both industry and local governments, the absence of a similar community-based organization means that while industry has become increasingly organized, local governments continue to work independently.2 A culture of hyper-independence and a general skepticism about government regulation further complicate the process of organizing an area wide response. 3.2.3. Conservative values Conservative values exacerbate the structural restraints of governmental capacity and rural geography. Government regulation of any kind is largely unpopular in Texas where limiting government and protecting private property rights are particularly powerful cultural values. Elected officials are often hesitant to pursue political or legal options to regulate industry. The way elected officials dealt with traffic in school zones was exemplary of this point. Three county officials cited traffic near schools as a serious issue. As one county judge said: And what is happening is right along there [points out main road] is a school. And you got 7,000 vehicles that go through there every day on the average, commercial related. So we are putting our youngest kids face-to-face those vehicles. And then our elderly are kept hostage by these trucks coming in and out. When this topic came up for a third time, we asked why the county had not made an effort to redirect traffic around the school zone. The answer was telling about area conservative values. “People have a right, we don’t own the highways, we don’t own the county roads. You own them. Anybody that pays taxes owns them. So how do we stop somebody from using their own property? That would be socialism and communism. Can’t do that.” Community leaders’ hesitation to intervene with energy exploration and development was also a theme in focus groups with property owners who expressed frustration about the lack of regulatory oversight and enforcement. This frustration was paired with some uncertainty about the roles of local and state officials. The Texas Railroad Commission (TRC) is an important regulatory body overseeing many parts of oil and gas development. County commissioners are responsible for local elements of regulation such

2 A group of community leaders has also developed The Eagle Ford Consortium. This group has been successful at bringing diverse groups of people together for annual meetings, but has not yet developed platform for community leaders to negotiate with industry.

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as traffic and well setback distances. The absence of these ordinances was an especially important theme in one county. As one landowner said: I’ve talked with the Railroad Commission a few times and didn’t get anywhere, but the last time I spoke to them, they actually told me their job is to permit for these activities, but if you want safeguards put in place, the Railroad Commission says that is the job of your County Commissioners and County Judge. That goes nowhere in [this county], but they said that actually most counties and cities will have ordinances and stuff to protect the environment in their county whereas [our county] it just doesn’t have any. Another landowner from the same county put it this way: The Railroad Commission should be there to make sure that you don’t interfere with your neighbor, and that’s not what’s happening, because the Railroad Commission says it’s up to the county Commissioners and the County Judge to pass any ordinances to protect you from your neighbor. And we don’t have that. We don’t have any ordinances. We don’t have a county government that can do it. We have no ordinances at all. Never needed them, you know, just never did need them for anything. While local governments have the capacity to implement some regulations, conservative values limiting the role of government, combined with the need for economic development, complicate the passage of such ordinances. These same conservative values hinder county officials’ ability to work together when advocating for the interests of their area. The idea of counties collaboratively negotiating with oil and gas companies was brought up by one city manager. As he said: This opinion is very out of character for me because I am very anti-union. I mean, I am a fifth generation Texan. I mean, screw anybody who wants to come messing with us. [But], the cities in the Eagle Ford Shale should form an organization very similar to OPEC and we should band together, and if we did, we would be able to stand toe to toe with the oil company. As he continued, this city manager told us that other officials did not take this idea seriously: I started this push once before and got laughed at, but why not take the OPEC model? I mean, what are they going to do? Leave arguably the richest oil deposits in North America because a bunch of towns went, “Give us more money?” Given his own politically conservative outlook, even this respondent was surprised at himself for entertaining the idea of this kind of organization. Still, he recognized the vulnerability of local governments working independently. Nevertheless, the conservative values of the region make taking the “OPEC model” laughable. A new state statute limiting the regulatory power of city and county governments in Texas illuminates these themes. The law, passed in May of 2015, was largely seen as a response to Denton, Texas’s vote to ban hydraulic fracturing in the city limits. While the law does prohibit counties and municipalities from banning drilling, the law allows local governments to regulate fire and emergency response, traffic, light and noise pollution, but only if the rules are deemed “commercially reasonable” [36]. This law, another example of conservative values, means that local community leaders anywhere in Texas are left to negotiate with industry actors without the ability to impose their own meaningful regulations. 4. Conclusion Oil and gas development is an important economic opportunity for Eagle Ford communities, but it comes with potential – and

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sometimes very real – social, health and environmental risks. Truck traffic, cost of living increases, and perceived air and water pollution are now parts of residents’ everyday life. Our research gives depth to the largely quantitative literature on community perceptions of hydraulic fracturing. For the local residents in this study, development means not taking grandchildren to lunch, having trouble affording rent, and school employees wearing H2 S detectors. Thus, the risks these Eagle Ford residents face are more than perceptions, but lived realities of the Eagle Ford Shale Boom. Our analysis identifies three important hindrances community leaders face as they adapt to their new context. First, similar to the boomtowns described by Gilmore [12] and others, city and county governments in the Eagle Ford lack the staff, expertise, and experience to manage development activities [9,27]. Second, rural geographies complicate collaborations across political boundaries. The region’s vast and sparsely populated geography, combined with a recent history of economic stagnation, means that local governments struggle to build relationships. This is especially concerning because communities have remained fractured while industry has become increasingly organized. Finally, conservative values further complicate this process by limiting the realistic political and legal options for local officials. These values embrace many of the same neoliberal ethics that normalize the risks associated with hydraulic fracturing [23,24]. This article extends the growing body of research on residents’ perceptions of oil and gas development and provides a more nuanced understanding of how development impacts the lives of local residents. Based on our findings, we propose the following recommendations. First, we encourage local and state governments, along with industry actors, to identify and engage leaders of community groups who work with vulnerable populations (e.g., seniors, low-income people, and underrepresented racial and ethnic groups). These subpopulations experience a disproportionate share of the social and economic dislocations associated with rapid energy development. Second, we suggest local community leaders and industry actors work together to implement and/or improve public transportation for seniors. A small bus or van could be used to take seniors and other citizens in need of transportation to grocery stores, pharmacies, and other destinations. Third, local governments need a platform to collectively engage industry actors. While informal meetings are being held, county judges and other community leaders need a stronger formal association to advocate for their community interests if they are to realize the potential for positive long-term economic and social outcomes. Finally, we encourage researchers investigating the economic and social outcomes of energy development to push past basic measures of perception. Developing practical policies supportive of communities undergoing energy development necessitates a thorough and systematic analysis of residents’ experiences and responses to risk.

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