Understanding governance structures in community management of ecosystems and natural resources: The Marujá case study in Brazil

Ecosystem Services ∎ (∎∎∎∎) ∎∎∎–∎∎∎

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Understanding governance structures in community management of ecosystems and natural resources: The Marujá case study in Brazil Claudia Sattler a,n, Barbara Schröter a, Camila Jericó-Daminello b, Karla Sessin-Dilascio b, Claas Meyer a, Bettina Matzdorf a, Lukas Wortmann a, Paulo Antonio de Almeida Sinisgalli b, Angela Meyer c, Gregor Giersch c a

Leibniz-Center for Agricultural Landscape Research (ZALF), Institute of Socio-Economics, Eberswalder Strasse 84, 15374 Müncheberg, Germany University of São Paulo (USP), Prof. Luciano Gualberto Ave. 1289, Cidade Universitária, 05508-010 São Paulo, Brazil c Organisation for International Dialogue and Conflict Management (IDC), Mumbgasse 6/27, 1020 Vienna, Austria b

art ic l e i nf o

a b s t r a c t

Article history: Received 17 November 2014 Received in revised form 3 October 2015 Accepted 23 October 2015

Community management is seen as one important approach in environmental governance to manage ecosystems and natural resources. Understanding the underlying principles of how and under which premises the different local actors successfully collaborate in environmental governance can offer valuable insights into how ecosystems and their natural resources as well as related ecosystem service delivery can be sustained for the livelihoods of local communities. In this study, Ostrom’s set of design principles and Cox and others’ enlarged set of principles were used to investigate one co-management example of community management: the Marujá community in the Cardoso Island State Park in southeastern Brazil, which was evaluated as successful by the community itself. The aim of the study was to analyse the presence or absence of each principle and how the principles were met in specific. Furthermore it was discussed in how for the specific compliance with the principles shapes certain features of the governance approach and helped in explaining its overall success. The analysis was mainly based on data collected through qualitative interviews with the different governance actors. All of Ostrom’s principles and most of Cox and others’ enlarged set of principles could be verified for the community. The principles helped in explaining how the community was able to organize collective action and initiate a governance change from top-down management of the state park to a co-management agreement which was considered a win–win by both parties: the community and the state park authorities. However, several additional factors were identified which contributed to the overall success. This included that the governance change was initiated bottom-up with the support of the whole community, could draw support from very committed governance actors both from the community and the state park authorities, who pushed the process forward over a long time period, and that the community received initial external funding which gave enough momentum to the process at the beginning. & 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Environmental governance Co-management Community-based management Common pool resources Ecosystem services Latin America

1. Introduction Community management is seen as one important approach in environmental governance to manage ecosystems and natural resources (e.g. Agrarwal and Narain, 2000, Beitl, 2014, Berkes et al., 1991, Berkes, 2006, Carlsson and Berkes, 2005, Fabricius et al., 2007, Liu et al., 2014, Olson, 1965, Ostrom, 2000, Poteete et al., 2010). Community management thereby represents one of the three main governance concepts that are typically differentiated, the other two being hierarchies and markets (Vatn, 2010). While n

Corresponding author: Fax: þ 49 0 33432 82308. E-mail address: [email protected] (C. Sattler).

hierarchies are based on a system of command and resource allocation happens according to existing authority and power structures, markets are driven by self-interest and voluntary exchange of goods and services between individual actors and resource allocation takes place on account of their willingness to pay. By contrast, community management is based on collective action and cooperation among actors. For resource allocation, both individual and common goals are taken into account. As pure forms of each governance concept are rare, often hybrid solutions develop which combine elements of one or two or all concepts. One prominent example for a governance hybrid in community management is co-management, an arrangement where local resource users and government actors share power and

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2015.10.015 2212-0416/& 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article as: Sattler, C., et al., Understanding governance structures in community management of ecosystems and natural resources: The Marujá case study in Brazil. Ecosystem Services (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2015.10.015i

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Fig. 1. : Geographical location of the Marujá community in the Cardoso Island State Park in south-eastern Brazil. Source: Own illustration based on data from D-maps (http:// d-maps.com) and Diva-GIS (http://www.divagis.org/gdata).

responsibility in resource management (cf. Berkes et al., 1991). Comanagement thus combines elements of community management with hierarchies. Collective action as the underlying principle in community management then can be defined as the cooperation among individuals (cf. Beitl, 2014, p. 93) and relates to any action taken together by a group of people to pursue common goals and their joint welfare (Ostrom, 1990, p. 5 et seq.). Successful governance solutions based on community management, including co-management, are particularly well described in the context of common pool resource (CPR) management (e.g. Ostrom, 1990, Ostrom and Walker, 1991, Ostrom et al., 1992) In her work, Elinor Ostrom investigated how local communities co-operate to share resources, effectively avoid the overuse of CPR, and also assure their survival for future generations. Based on her studies, she derived a list of eight design principles1 associated with successful collective action in CPR governance (Ostrom, 1990). However, also critique has been voiced that Ostrom’s principles are not exhaustive enough and that additional factors need to be taken into consideration, both in respect to the social system as well as the natural system (e.g. Agrawal and Chhatre, 2006, Cinner and McClanahan, 2006; Harkes, 2006, Tucker et al., 2007). In this context, Cox et al. (2010) re-viewed the principles and developed an extended and modified list of design principles. Against this backdrop, Ostrom’s set of design principles (Ostrom, 1990) as well as Cox and others’ enlarged set of principles (Cox et al., 2010) were used to investigate one co-management example of community management in the Marujá community in south-eastern Brazil, which was evaluated as a success by the community itself. The objectives of this study are to analyse and discuss in how far these principles help to explain why the governance change was evaluated as successful. In particular we investigated the following research questions:

 Can all of Ostrom’s and Cox and others’ defined principles be 1 Ostrom’s set of design principles has been applied for many CPR cases across the world. An extensive online repository of CPR studies is available through the Digital Library of the Commons available at: http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc.

 

verified for the governance approach developed in the Marujá community and how are the principles met in particular? How defines the specific compliance with the principles certain features of the governance approach and helps explain its success? Are there additional factors that were crucial for the success?

2. Methods 2.1. Case study The Marujá community is located in the Ilha do Cardoso State Park (Parque Estadual da Ilha do Cardoso, PEIC) in São Paulo state in south-eastern Brazil (Fig. 1). The area comprises about 22,500 ha and holds large remainders of continuous Atlantic Forests extremely rich in biodiversity which includes large stretches of mangrove ecosystems on one side, and sensitive dune ecosystems and beaches on the other side of the island. Altogether six communities live inside the park, Marujá being the largest one. At present, Marujá is home to about 60 families with approximately 180 inhabitants. The residents are traditional „Caiçara“, an ethno-cultural mixture of indigenous people, descendants of Portuguese colonizers, and former African slaves. In terms of ecosystem services, their livelihood depend on provisioning services such as food and fiber, but also extraction of wood and other materials for handcrafting, and regulating services such as water filtration for waste water treatment through a system of installed tubes filled with soil. Very important are also cultural services, as the Caiçara culture is based on the belief that they are caretakers of the ecosystems they depend upon for their living. Historically, the Caiçaras used to live on sustainable small-scale agricultural, fishing and hunting activities. Today, their livelihood is based mostly on eco-tourism and fishing for self-consumption, as agricultural activities and hunting are no longer allowed inside the park. The PEIC was already created in 1962 and although this category of protection areas per se does not allow inhabitants inside the park and requires relocation of existing communities within a

Please cite this article as: Sattler, C., et al., Understanding governance structures in community management of ecosystems and natural resources: The Marujá case study in Brazil. Ecosystem Services (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2015.10.015i

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certain time frame, communities were reluctant to leave as enforcement of environmental laws was low at that time. During the late 1980s and 1990s, the area got more and more under pressure due to developing mass tourism with many tourists moving to the region to stay for good. Land speculation for real estate development and illegal construction within the park boundaries followed. The process was reinforced by the construction of highway BR-116, which suddenly linked major urban centers to the region. At this point, the state park administration could not effectively prevent these developments due to lacking human and financial resources. Increasing tourist numbers also came to the Marujá community causing uncontrolled development directly at the beach impairing the valuable dune ecosystems. Soon problems with sewage and waste water treatments as well as garbage collection became unmanageable due to the high number of visitors. In response to the increasing environmental degradation, the community organized itself and founded a community association entitled AMOMAR (Associação dos Moradores do Marujá) to make their concerns heard by the park authorities. The community finally succeeded in negotiating a co-management agreement with park authorities. Together both parties worked out an Environmental Management Plan (Plano de Gestão Ambietal, MP). For the MP development external funding could be made available through the Atlantic Forest Protection Program (PPMA). The MP finally laid out the rules for natural resource usage and access for all legit Caiçara community members, including limitations of overall tourist numbers which were allowed to come to the community. The MP also ensured the Caiçaras’ the right to stay inside the park. To allow for participation in decision making between the local communities and the park authorities a regional council was created with representatives from the park, each community, and other local actors. The co-management agreement put an end to the invasion of the region by outsiders, and helped to preserve the unique terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems on which the community members depend for their livelihoods. Overall, the process took several years, with the first MP officially being approved in 1998. In consequence, the community follows now a steady-state and no-grow strategy, limiting the annual number of tourists allowed to come to the region so they can manage with the waste and sewage issues and also limiting the use and access to natural resources from the forest and marine ecosystems. For a more detailed description of the case study the reader can refer to Sattler and Schröter (2015) and Schröter et al. (2014). 2.2. Data collection Data collection in the case study primarily was based on qualitative interviews, complemented by participant observation and document study, investigating the time period from the 1990s and early 2000s during which the MP was developed2. Qualitative interviews were done face-to-face based on semistructured interview guidelines. The addressed topics included the following: (a) relevant actors in ecosystem and natural resource management (individuals, groups, organizations) and their attributes, (b) differentiation between the actors who belong/who do not belong to the community, (c) actors’ relationships (supportive vs. conflicting), (d) current rules for ecosystem and natural resource management, (e) possible sanctions in case of rule violation, (f) how rules are made and how rules can be changed, and (g) current problems in the community. All interviews were 2

The first MP was approved in 1998 and was valid for two years. After adaptation, the new, amended version entered into force in 2000 and was open for adaptation every 5 years, but in 2005 and also 2010 no amendments where done.

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conducted in the familiar environment of the interviewees. Interview length varied between 20 and 120 min, with most interviews lasting between 60 and 90 min. Participant observation and document study was used to triangulate and verify the information gained through the interviews. For participant observation, community members were accompanied during their everyday activities, such as informal talks, small meetings and workshops, where they interacted with each other and other stakeholders such as the state park representatives. Document study concentrated mainly on the analysis of documents received from the state park authorities, such as the minutes from AMOMAR and the regional council meetings, as well as different versions of the MP. An overview of all interviews conducted with the different groups of actors in the period of September 2012 to February 2013 is provided in Table 1. Selection of interviewees was done via snow-ball sampling, where already interviewed stakeholders named other individuals for sub-sequent interviews. Interviews were stopped once saturation was achieved, i.e. no new aspects to the questions were brought up during the conversations. All interviews were conducted in Portuguese and were digitally recorded after confirming the consent of the interviewees. 2.3. Data analysis For data analysis the recorded interviews were transcribed into the original language Portuguese, but also translated into English. Then content analysis (e.g. Krippendorff, 2004) was used for interpretive analysis of the interview transcripts, looking for statements confirming the presence (or absence) of Ostrom’s and Cox and others’ defined principles. For the analysis first a system of categories was developed based on the principles (coding) and then interview statements were grouped according to the categories (cf. Mayring, 2008). In some cases, for verification, we also used triangulation and went back to the original audio-recordings, or compared with notes gained from participant observations or studied available documents for confirmation (cf. Flick, 2004). A principle was assessed to be present when at least three interviews contained confirming statements. A principle was assessed to be absent when no confirming statements could be retrieved from the interviews. A principle was also assessed to be absent when contradictory statements occurred. All interviews were given the same weight, with the exception of the interviews with external experts which were used as an additional reference only, as the experts were not directly involved into the co-management arrangement. A verbatim record of both set of principles, cited after Ostrom (1990) and Cox et al. (2010), respectively, is provided in Table 2. Throughout the further manuscript, reference to the principles is made by using the abbreviations O* for principles defined by Ostrom and C* for principles defined by Cox and others’ as introduced in Table 2.

3. Results In this section we investigate the presence or absence of each principle one by one based on the retrieved statements from the interviews addressing the first research questions:

 Can all of Ostrom’s and Cox and others’ defined principles be verified for the governance approach developed in the Marujá community and how are the principles met in particular? Direct citations, translated from Portuguese to English by the

Please cite this article as: Sattler, C., et al., Understanding governance structures in community management of ecosystems and natural resources: The Marujá case study in Brazil. Ecosystem Services (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2015.10.015i

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authors, are highlighted in italics. Table 3 gives an overview of which principles can be fully or partly (ticks in brackets) confirmed for the case study. To allow for the linkage of statements to a specific group of actors, all statements are marked with their respective ID codes as introduced in Table 1.

Total:

27

E1, E2 External experts E*

2

P1 Environmental police P*

1

G1 M1 – M3 Park guards Environmental monitors G* M*

1 3

D1, D2 Park director D*

2

A1 – A7 AMOMAR officials (president, secretary, treasurer, their deputies, and six community members as supervisors serve on the board) A*

7

R1 – R11

All residents of the Marujá community who commit themselves to respecting the traditional Caiçara culture Members of Marujá’s community foundation AMOMAR who serve voluntarily on the association’s board (elected for 2 years). In principle all residents are considered a member of AMOMAR, however, to participate in the votes, one has to be older than 16. Employed by the state park authorities (fixed salary) and in charge of the overall management of the state park Employed by the state park authorities (fixed salary) and in charge of the environmental monitoring Associated to the state park authorities (no fixed salary) and in charge of the environmental monitoring, but also for giving tours to tourists and organizing environmental education measures (for tourists, schools, etc.) Special section of the police force concerned with environmental issues, in contrast to park guards they carry guns and are allowed to do actual arrests in the state park Experts neither associated to the Marujá community nor the state park authorities providing an outside perspective on the community Community residents R*

11

Stakeholder group short description ID group Stakeholder group

Table 1 Overview of conducted interviews.

Interviews [n] ID codes

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3.1. Clear boundaries (O1 vs. C1A/C1B) O1/C1A: The boundaries of the user group can be clearly described based on two socio-cultural characteristics: firstly family ties to the region, either by birth or marriage, and secondly commitment to the “traditional” Caiçara culture [R9]. Everyone who fulfills both criteria can claim the right to be considered as a rightful Marujá resident, who is allowed to permanently live in the community and access and withdraw certain resources. The Caiçara culture thereby is referred to by residents as a culture that is in harmony with nature [R11, M1]. “The traditional resident, the Caiçara … he always cared and appreciated nature” [M1]. If a traditional resident is absent from the community for more than one year, she or he forgoes the right of residency. “Who can live here and who cannot? When I am gone and stay away for 1 year and 1 day, then I don’t have the right to return” [R10]. The only way a new member is admitted into the community is by marrying a Caiçara. “That traditionalism is the criterion of residency in the territory, but it is not the only one. …you have a way to enter into that community which is socially accepted for centuries: marriage” [E1]. By contrast, „non-traditional“ [e.g. A1, A3] people, such as tourists can only stay for a maximum of three months and are not allowed access to resources. All non-traditional residents who lived in the community before the MP was negotiated, had to leave eventually [e.g. A7, A1]. “We had some non-traditional residents that had business here. They … were sent away … now there are no outsiders inside the park” [A1]. The reference to “outsiders” [e.g. R10, A1, M2, G1, D1] is made to distinguish between the rightful traditional residents and other people who enter into the park temporarily. Outsiders are also often mentioned when referring to environmental damage, e.g.: “When people come from outside … when they want to take the orchids, we do not allow” [R3]. C1B: Most reference in the interviews is made to the “larger biophysical environment” which relates either to the general boundaries of the state park [e.g. R4, R9] or Cardoso Island as a whole [e.g. R2, R5, R8, A2, A6]. Several statements point toward single resources, specifying also their rough locations by referring to the “beach”, “waterfall”, “channel”, “mangroves”, or the inland “forest”, etc. Examples concern abiotic resources (e.g. water) and biotic resources likewise (e.g. fish, plants): “Here everybody has the same opportunity … you can catch fish in the channel, collect seafood at the beach … no one will go hungry here” [R5]. “We take things from the forest to make handcrafts … woods, roots” [A4]. Altogether, the sense of belonging to people and place of the community is very strong and relates to both, the social (O1/C1A) and the natural system boundaries (C1B). In regard to O1/C1A interviewees mostly refer to their social ties to other community members. Asked about why they like to live in the community, interviewees answered for instance that their family and friends are here [e.g. R2, R4, A4], that they enjoy their work [e.g. R10, A3], that they have their freedom [e.g. R6, R8] and that there is no crime [A2, A6]. Nonetheless, the attachment to the physical place with all its natural characteristics, more in support of principle C1B, goes also very deep. Here interviewees mention for instance their appreciation of existing natural beauties such as the beach or the waterfall [e.g. R1, R3, R4, A2], but also that their environment is calm and peaceful [e.g. R2, R3, R10, A2, A3, A5] and without any pollution [e.g. A5].

Please cite this article as: Sattler, C., et al., Understanding governance structures in community management of ecosystems and natural resources: The Marujá case study in Brazil. Ecosystem Services (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2015.10.015i

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Table 2 Design principles for CPR governance according to Ostrom 1990 (O*) and Cox et al. 2010 (C*). Design principles according to … Ostrom. (1990) (O*):

Cox et al. (2010) (C*):

C1A: User boundaries: Clear boundaries between legitimate users and nonusers must be clearly defined. C1B. Resource boundaries: Clear boundaries are present that define a resource system and separate it from the larger biophysical environment. C2A: Congruence with local conditions: Appropriation and provision rules are O2: Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions: Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resource congruent with local social and environmental conditions. units are related to local conditions and to provision requiring labor material and/ C2B: Appropriation and provision: The benefits obtained by users from a common-pool resource (CPR), as determined by appropriation rules, are proportional or money. to the amount of inputs required in the form of labor, material, or money, as determined by provision rules. O3 ¼C3: Collective-choice arrangements: Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules. O4: Monitoring: Monitors who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriators’ C4A: Monitoring users: Monitors who are accountable to the users monitor the behavior, are accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators appropriation and provision levels of the users. C4B: Monitoring the resource: Monitors who are accountable to the users monitor the condition of the resource. O5 ¼C5: Graduated sanctions: Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) by other appropriators, by officials accountable to the appropriators, or by both. O6 ¼C6: Conflict-resolution mechanisms: Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-costs arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials. O7 ¼C7: Minimal recognition of rights to organize: The rights of appropriators to device their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities. For CPR that are parts of larger systems: O8 ¼C8: Nested enterprises: Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises. O1: Clearly defined boundaries: Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from the CPR must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself.

Table 3 Verification of design principles for CPR governance for the Marujá case study. Ostrom. (1990)

Verified?

Cox et al. (2010)

Verified?

O1

✓

O2

✓

O3 O4

✓ ✓

O5 O6 O7 O8

✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

C1A C1B C2A C2B C3 C4A C4B C5 C6 C7 C8

✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ (✓) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

3.2. Rules for CPR management (O2 vs. C2A/C2B) O2/C2A: The CPR management considers both, “local” (O2) and more specific also “local social and environmental” (C2A) conditions in Marujá. For example, several rules are related to the overall perceived carrying capacity of the community’s natural environment. “We all reached an agreement … there should be a limit and we work under this limit and we manage to keep everything organized, everyone takes care of his/her area” [R5]. Limitations concern, for instance, the overall number of tourists that are allowed to visit the community, which is restricted to a maximum of 1,000 per night3. “If we wouldn’t have these limits it would be full of tourists and become a mess” [R7]. Also the number of tents per household is restricted to a maximum of five and made conditional on the availability of a bathroom. This is to ensure that waste water, sewage, and garbage4 (e.g. R9], can be handled adequately (cf. C2A). Furthermore, camping is only allowed on official camping sites to protect environmental sensitive sites such as the dunes [e.g. R10]. Another example for O2/C2A relates to fishing 3 Interviewees reported more than 4,000 overnight visitors before the number was restricted. 4 Unfortunately, there are no actual figures on the amount of waste water, sewage and garbage, etc. before the introduction of the MP, as no official records were kept.

(e.g. R4, E1): “We are good people … we fish in the right age of the fish … and we only extract from nature what is allowed” [R4]. Other rules prohibit agricultural production, hunting, sealing area for construction, and keeping pets, all activities that can affect the environment and/or counteract conservation aims. In regards to the social component of C2A, assignment of tents to households (and therefore also paying tourists) follows the criterion of fairness and equality, distributing tents about evenly among the families to prevent social tensions [e.g. R9, R2]. O2/C2B: To ensure that benefits obtained by CPR users are balanced by respective inputs for sustaining the CPR, a system of “Mutirão” (joint efforts) exists, which requires input from all community members. Mutirão are “for the common good of the community” [R9] and encompass a variety of activities, which includes maintaining the community’s water tank and waste water treatment system, cleaning the beach from waste mostly washed ashore from the ocean, maintaining tourist trails, collecting garbage, organizing the garbage transfer to the mainland, monitoring activities, or doing improvements in the community, etc. [e.g. R5, R9, R10, A1, A2, A3, A5, A6]. Although participation is voluntary, community members scrupulously monitor whether other members contribute their share: “every resident should participate, for those who don’t participate, they should compensate in another way” [A2]. Also taxes were introduced as tiered payments proportional to the number of tourists hosted by each household. The money goes into a fund monitored by AMOMAR and is spent on improvement in the community. “All that money is to solve problems of the community” [R8]. 3.3. Collective choice arrangements (O3 ¼C3) Marujá community members can participate though AMOMAR in rule making and modification, as most rules are formalized in the MP which can be amended every 5 years. This can only be done with the participation of the community [e.g. A1, R1, R4]. The procedures for mutual decision making within AMOMAR are straightforward. Each traditional resident is considered a member and decisions are done by majority vote where everyone above the age of 16 is allowed to vote. Meetings are usually once a month with varying participation in dependence on discussed topics. “If

Please cite this article as: Sattler, C., et al., Understanding governance structures in community management of ecosystems and natural resources: The Marujá case study in Brazil. Ecosystem Services (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2015.10.015i

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something important is at stake, like the election of the board, everyone goes” [R9]. For transparency, all meetings are followed up by minutes in writing. Minutes are also distributed to the state park authorities for documentation [e.g. A2]. AMOMAR is also responsible for the tax collection and is trusted with the decision how the money is to be spent. “What is AMOMAR’s is ours, since AMOMAR is ruled by people who care for our gains” [R1]. AMOMAR is seen as the most important forum for addressing existing problems and deliberation within the community [e.g. A3, A5]. Furthermore AMOMAR is perceived to improve cooperation, awareness rising, and communication among residents: “With AMOMAR we got organized, people got more aware of things, because we ask people for their collaboration, we talk more and longer. Before AMOMAR we communicated less” [A5]. Finally, doing “fun stuff” such as organizing “barbeques”, playing the “fandango” (traditional music and dance) is also part of the agenda [A2]. 3.4. Monitoring of resource users and resources (O4 vs. C4A/C4B) Here interview statements support primarily the first notion of principle 4 (O4/C4A, monitoring of resource users), while support of the second (C4B, monitoring of the resource itself), is touched upon, but much less pronounced. Also, monitoring activities are not entirely carried out by appropriators, i.e. the community members, themselves, but are done as a shared task between them and others, such as environmental monitors, park guards, and also the environmental police, but with clear responsibilities [e.g. R10, A3, A7, M1]. O4/C4A: Monitoring of resource users is the responsibility of AMOMAR [e.g. R3, R10, A1]. “When we see that people are doing wrong things, we go to them and take action” [R10]. Reporting rule violators to AMOMAR has become an accepted norm that is seen as necessary to protect the resources [e.g. R1, R4, R5, A2]. “People know that, if they do [violate rules], they will be in trouble, because there is the surveillance of the other residents” [A7]. The only exception can be within families, but the community members condemn such exceptions: “If it’s allowed for one, it should be allowed for everybody” [A4]. O4/C4B: Monitoring of ecosystems and natural resources themselves is mostly referred to indirectly by addressing either improvements or mentioning resources that are under particular distress, but without giving quantifiable information [e.g. R10, R11]. Thus, principle C4B is assessed as only partly present. Resources under distress include wildlife because of hunting, orchids because of collectors, or Euterpe species because of palm heart harvesting [e.g. R3, R5, R8, R9, R11, A1, G1, M1, P1, D1, E1]. Very often also impairment of local fish populations by outside fishermen is mentioned [e.g. R4, R5, R10, A1, A3, A5, G1, P1, E1]. “Fishermen from outside, they take all the fish, and what they don’t want, they throw on the beach” [R10]. In general, it was also recognized that monitoring of CPR is very difficult [e.g. A1]. “The palmiteiros, we try to stop them, but the park is huge. They come with a vessel during the night and never to the same place” [R9]. Monitored violations are almost entirely attributed to outsiders, with only few examples for community members. “Regarding nature, virtually no [rule violations], some removal of sand for construction, one or two times disallowed trail opening … small things” [A1]. 3.5. Graduated sanctions (O5 ¼ C5) In Marujá, a system of graduated sanctions has been worked out for three different groups of actors: i) outsiders and intruders to the state park, ii) tourists and other visitors, and iii) the residents themselves. Offenses by outsiders (i) concern illegal fishing, hunting, palm heart harvesting, and deforestation [e.g. P1, D1]. Sanctions include

immediate reporting by the residents to the state park. Park guards and environmental police are then responsible for the actual pursuit and arrest. Punishment can include destructions of illegal fishing gear (e.g. nets in the wrong mesh size), fishing license withdrawal, or fines [e.g. G1, P1, P2]. Getting hold of outside intruders only works through the cooperation with the community: “They [the residents] help us a lot; passing on information, and showing the locations, it’s important … it’s a huge area” [P1]. “As the area is extensive, we can’t be everywhere” [P2]. Rule violations by tourists (ii) and residents (iii) are handled with more circumspect, as residents depend on eco-tourism for their living and all residents have to continue to live with each other. Violations by tourists (ii) relate to illegal camping in environmentally sensitive areas, doing bonfires on the beach, bringing dogs, leaving garbage, causing noise, using drugs or drinking alcohol [e.g. M1]. Sanctions include immediate reporting by residents or environmental monitors to AMOMAR officials. In a next step tourists are confronted with their misbehavior which usually settles the issue [e.g. A3]. If they cannot be reasoned with, they are asked to leave the community. In more severe cases, such as drug usage, they are handed over to the police [e.g. A3, M1]. Violations by residents in the first place relate to illegal construction activities (e.g. additions to existing houses) or putting more tents for tourists than were assigned [e.g. R2, D1]. Sanctions include fines, demolition of built structures, additional input asked for the joint efforts, and in rare cases, also cut off from resources [e.g. A7]. Notably, the community itself decides on the punishment of community members: “It’s the assembly [AMOMAR] who decides the punishment. This is very effective, because it is one thing if the park orders you to do something, but it’s another thing if it’s selfcontrol. The park is not present, who is present are the residents” [D1]. Sanctions are applied strictly, with no exceptions. “You cannot go in favor of a resident who is wrong. When you need to punish a resident who is doing something wrong you will have to do it” [A2]. 3.6. Conflict resolution mechanisms (O6 ¼ C6) At the community level, AMOMAR is the relevant arena to mediate conflicts between residents or between residents and tourists [e.g. R3, R4, R10, A2, A5]. This is done mainly through communication at the regular meetings where conflicting issues are one point on the agenda. Disagreements among residents result e.g. from rule violation, especially if someone does not contribute to the joint efforts [e.g. A2]. Disagreements between residents and tourists develop around a range of smaller issues, such as leaving trash, making noise, etc. [e.g. A2]. Communication is also used to address conflicts between the community and the state park [e.g. R5, R10]. Thereby it is considered crucial that communication takes place at eye level. “We even criticize them [the state park employees]. The director [of the state park] also criticizes. But we continue talking until we reach an agreement” [R5]. Conflicts develop mostly around negotiation of rule exceptions, e.g. for construction. Here the regional council functions as another arena for conflict resolution [e.g. R10, R11, A1, A2, D2]. “If you want to improve, want to expand, renew the bathroom, this needs an authorization. You need to fill in a request and take it to the meeting of the council” [A5]. All requests are made through AMOMAR as individual residents are not supposed to make direct contact to the council [e.g. A2]. Altogether, the agreed system for conflict resolution is perceived as flexible enough to allow for individual solutions [e.g. R7, D2]. Moreover, conflict is seen as something normal: “When you go to a place where everybody says ‘amen’, something is wrong. …. Disagreement is constructive … to have a position … and then it takes a joint decision. … I strongly believe in a participatory process”

Please cite this article as: Sattler, C., et al., Understanding governance structures in community management of ecosystems and natural resources: The Marujá case study in Brazil. Ecosystem Services (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2015.10.015i

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[D1]. Under the existing legal framework however, the leeway for granting exceptions is limited [e.g. D2]. Sometimes, residents also get frustrated with the time it takes until a solution is found [e.g. R4]. 3.7. Minimal recognition by external authorities (O7 ¼C7) The community’s right to organize itself through its community foundation AMOMAR is recognized through the MP which is a legally binding document for both parties: the community and the state park [R10, A1, A2, D1, D2]. For the community, the recognition of its right to self-organize is combined with the right to stay in the PEIC [e.g. R9, A4]. The MP … “was the way to ensure that the residents could stay” [A4]. The MP also lays out the rules under which this right can be executed. One important condition is that the community follows a no-grow rationale as required by the general regulatory framework [e.g. D2]. For the state park, the recognition of the community’s right to self-organize offers one important benefit: they gain a strong partner for their conservation mission [e.g. A2, M2, D1, D2]. Without the support of the communities in the park, achieving conservation aims is considered unattainable: “Supervision is the responsibility of the park, but they have too little people to control. I think they have three. Image, if they had 100, they still wouldn’t manage” [A2]. However, to get this support, the park administration forgoes its right to relocate the community as originally requested by law [D1]. 3.8. Nested governance (O8 ¼C8) Nested governance in CPR management can concern appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and other governance activities. Thereby, ‘nested’ means that governance is organized in multiple layers involving actors from multiple levels. This nested structure can be verified for Marujá and shows, for instance for principles two, four, five, and six [e.g. R10, M1, R1, D2]. In regard to O2 and C2A/C2B, appropriation and provisioning rules for CPR management were negotiated at the community level (through AMOMAR) and also at the regional level together with the state park. It resulted in the collaborative formulation of the MP. “Many management plans were done in the office … They [the authorities] did it the way they wanted it … Here, it was actually made together … It was made with the community” [D2]. With respect to O4 and C4A/C4B, monitoring is also done as a shared task involving the community and the environmental monitors at the local community level, and the park guards and the environmental police at the regional state park level [e.g. R10]. Through the cooperation between community and the state park administration, enforcement is strengthened [e.g. A2]. Concerning O6 and C6, conflict resolution follows a subsidiary principle, which starts at the lowest level based on communication among contesting parties. If no reconciliation amongst parties can be achieved, the case is transferred to the next instance equipped with higher authority [M1], e.g. to fine someone, to make arrests, etc. It starts with AMOMAR and then is passed on to the environmental monitors, park guards, and finally the environmental police: “The monitors depend on the park guards and the park guards also depend on the environmental police. …. The team works well together” [M1]. Altogether, the nested approach involving the local community level and the regional level associated with the state park is acknowledged as a win–win situation on both sides: “We work together, it strengthens the ties, we share opinions and together everyone wins, the park, the community … a management of the community where all parts work together” [M1].

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4. Discussion Based on the analysis presented in Section 3, all of Ostrom’s (Ostrom, 1990) and most of Cox and others’ (Cox et al., 2010) defined principles can be confirmed for the case study (see Table 3). Only principle C4B could not fully be backed up by interview statements (see Section 3.4). While in Section 3, we looked at each principle separately to scrutinize single aspects of the developed governance approach, in this section, we look at the approach as a whole. Therefore we first highlight specific features of the governance approach and discuss how these features relate to the different principles and the overall success of the approach. In a second step, we explore and discuss some additional factors that go beyond the defined principles, but which we think were also crucial and contributed to the success of the approach. This section addresses the last two research questions:

 How defines the specific compliance with the principles certain 

features of the governance approach and helps explain its success? Are there additional factors that were crucial for the success?

4.1. Specific features of the governance approach and how they depend on the compliance of different principles contributing to the overall success of the approach 4.1.1. Collective action The governance change in Marujá was based on collective action among community members (e.g. Adger, 2003, Beitl, 2014), which was enabled by the adherence of different principles. First of all, the community members had a clear definition of who belonged to the community and who did not (O1 and C1A). The community members also shared the same cultural background with a strong sense of place (C1B). So regular communication, trust among individuals, and reciprocity of actions, which are all seen as the necessary ingredients for collective action (e.g. Smith, 2010, Mosimane et al., 2012), were already common practice and did not have to be developed first. Through the foundation of AMOMAR, collective choice arrangement (O3 and C3) to settle problematic issues became possible. Thereby, decided actions were guided by focusing on common rather than individual and selfish interests, another pre-condition that makes successful ecosystem and natural resource management more likely (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999). AMOMAR was also crucial later on in the process when rules for CPR management (O2/C2*) were negotiated with the state park. According to Ruttan (2008) one way to measure the success of collective action is the degree to which individuals finally comply with defined rules. So it is noteworthy, that in Marujá, rule violation (O4/C4) is mostly attributed to “outsiders” but not to residents. Also, reporting rule violators became accepted behavior and was not hampered by close social ties, which is often reported as an obstacle for effective monitoring, as friends or kin get warned about ongoing monitoring efforts (Beitl, 2014). 4.1.2. Co-management The governance change in Marujá finally resulted in a comanagement arrangement, where power and responsibility is shared between government actors and the local resource users in the community (e.g. Armitage et al., 2007, Berkes et al., 1991, Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2007, Schultz et al., 2011). For effective co-management clear responsibilities need to be assigned to the different partners in co-management. In Marujá this is reflected, for instance, in the sharing of tasks for collective-choice arrangements (O3/C3), monitoring (O4/C4*), or conflict resolution mechanisms (O6/C6). For example in monitoring, the better

Please cite this article as: Sattler, C., et al., Understanding governance structures in community management of ecosystems and natural resources: The Marujá case study in Brazil. Ecosystem Services (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2015.10.015i

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knowledge of the local geographic conditions helps to track where in the area outsiders cause environmental damage, but actual arrests can only be made through the environmental police. It is only through coordination and cooperation that successful monitoring can be achieved. Allocation of tasks to different partners is done according to their specific skills and capabilities (cf. Cash and Moser, 2000, Singelton, 1998). Due to knowledge pluralism actors can also generate a more holistic problem understanding (e.g. Stern, 2005), or can improve their understanding through mutual learning effects over time (Ernstson et al., 2010). To this effect, Carlsson and Berkes (2005, p. 71) also refer to co-management as “a logical approach to solving resource management problems by partnership”. However, achieving real power-sharing takes time and is rather the outcome than the starting point when changing to co-management (e.g. Carlsson and Berkes, 2005). In Marujá, although nowadays both parties, the community and the state park, view their agreement as an equal partnership, at the beginning the community clearly was the weaker party. 4.1.3. Multi-level governance and cross-level interaction As the co-management agreement involves community actors form the local level and several governmental actors from the regional and national level, the governance approach in Marujá finally led to a multi-level governance arrangement (cf. Berkes, 2006, Young, 2002a). Actors cooperate horizontally at the same level (e.g. AMOMAR and the environmental monitors at the local level) but also vertically across different levels (e.g. AMOMAR and the state park administration). This relates closely to principle eight, Ostrom’s concept of nested governance (O8/C8) (cf. Markelova and Mwangi, 2015). But to allow for cross-level interaction in a multi-layered context, first respective governance structures need to be put in place to build several decision points across levels. This also requires a transfer of decision making power from the central to more local levels (Blaikie, 2006, Low et al., 2000). In Marujá this was done by establishing two new governance structures: AMOMAR as an arena for joint decision making at the local level, and the regional council as a structure for translating and negotiating decisions across levels with the participation of different stakeholder groups (government and state park representatives, community members, local non-governmental organizations, and different lobby groups). Particularly the regional council was crucial for connecting levels and served as a bridge between local and non-local actors. According to Cash and Moser (2000) such bridging structures bring a number of merits to governance (cf. Bebbington et al., 2006): they serve, for instance, to broker information between levels, to provide a neutral arena for discussions, to resolve tensions, and to build trust among parties. All these functions can be verified for the Marujá case and are for instance relevant with respect to principles O3/C3 or O6/C6. A precondition for their realization is that the community is allowed to devise its own institutions (O7/C79) (cf. Beitl, 2014, Ruiz-Ballestros and Gual, 2012). Switching from mono-centric decision making (like in the top-down management of the state park before the governance change took place) to poly-centric decision making (like in the final co-management agreement) is linked positively to improved decision making and better governance outcomes (Armitage, 2008, Newig and Fritsch, 2009).

governance change in Marujá, as top-down initiation often is reported to fail, because a blueprint approach is applied under the assumption that communities are alike and that what works for one also works for another (Blaikie, 2006). By contrast, bottom-up initiation stands a higher chance that the governance change is a good fit for the specific local conditions and ensures continued onthe-ground support by the community (Markelova and Mwangi, 2015). In Marujá the motivation for bottom-up initiation was particularly strong, as their livelihoods were threatened by the pending relocation plans. Furthermore, in case of top-down initiation by external donor agencies or government agencies, the process is often organized within a too narrow timeframe predefined by the project duration or by the electoral cycles (Markelova and Mwangi, 2015). But because institutional change and building up new institutional usually works slow, long-term engagement is absolutely necessary (Young, 2002b). 4.2.2. Commitment and leadership Achieving governance change often depends on leadership to organize the necessary collaboration (e.g. Folke et al., 2005, Ostrom, 1990). In Marujá the process of governance change was supported by two very committed individuals. Both functioned as intermediaries between other parties and carried the process forward over a long time period. At the local level this was the community leader who had the trust of the community members and who gave also the impulse to found the community association to initiate self-organization. At the regional level this was the state park director who served in this position for altogether ten years. The director was very much in favor of a park model that allowed the traditional Caiçara residents to stay although this was in conflict with the existing legal framework (Sessin-Dilascio et al., 2015). Thus, a paradigm shift was required allowing to switch from a segregative concept for conservation to an integrative concept that include park inhabitants into the conservation efforts. It was only through both individuals’ persistence and long-term engagement that the co-management agreement and the MP were finally worked out. The roles that intermediaries, as single individuals or organizations, can play in governance are also in the focus of recent research (e.g. Matzdorf et al., 2014, Sattler et al., 2013, Schomers et al., 2015). 4.2.3. External funding Another factor that worked in favor of the governance change was that initial external funding was available through the Atlantic Forest Protection Program (PPMA). The funds were granted early on and gave a lot of momentum to the process (Sessin-Dilascio et al., 2015). Lovell et al. (2002) show that bottom-up initiatives require support from external agencies to take off. As local actors often lack financial resources these need to be provided by larger and more influential national or international actors (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999). This again stresses the importance of intermediaries who can make the connection to these actors. External funding also expresses an outside interest in the process and works as an additional motivation for involved actors as the importance of the process is also acknowledge by external actors.

5. Conclusions 4.2. Additional factors contributing to the success of the approach 4.2.1. Bottom-up initiation Governance change can either emerge from bottom-up initiation by community members or as a result of top-down initiation by government mandate or through external donor agencies strategically aiming for more participation (Paavola, 2008). We think bottom-up initiation was crucial for the success of the

This study presents an in-depth analysis of one successful example for community-based CPR management. Ostrom’s and Cox and others’ defined set of principles for CPR management were used to understand and discuss the underlying factors of its success. All of Ostrom’s and most of Cox and others’ defined principles could be confirmed for the case study. The list of principles provided a helpful tool to investigate single aspects of the governance

Please cite this article as: Sattler, C., et al., Understanding governance structures in community management of ecosystems and natural resources: The Marujá case study in Brazil. Ecosystem Services (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2015.10.015i

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approach and gain a deep understanding of how the principles were realized exactly. Consideration of single principles in the governance approach helped to understand how the principles enabled collective action and the development of a co-management agreement between different parties as a multi-level governance arrangement where several new governance structures first had to be established to allow for cross-level decision making. Through the in-depth study of the example, additional factors, such as bottom-up initiation of the process, very committed governance actors who function as intermediaries between other actors, and initial external funding could be identified as equally important factors for the success. Overall, the co-management agreement led to a win–win situation. The benefit for the traditional community members is their negotiated right to stay in the park. The main benefit for the state park lies in the fact that they gain a strong partner in supporting their conservation mission. Through their agreement both actors can prevent ongoing degradation of ecosystems and natural resources through effects of mass tourism. Studying such examples by breaking down the whole system in single analytical aspects can greatly improve the understanding of how governance change happens in a specific context. Overall, governance change for improved CPR management is acknowledged as a complex process with various actors associated with multiple governance levels. Understanding theses complexities for a concrete case helps us in identifying possible solutions for other cases that face similar challenges. Moreover, it also leads to new research questions with regard to what factors influence its success. Of specific interest for further research seems the role that intermediaries play in connecting actors, the importance of bridging structures which allow for cross-level interaction of different actors, and the enabling factors for the paradigm shift which allowed the actors to switch from the segregative to the integrative concept for conservation. Thereby, long-term studies seem important. As governance change is a longer process which continues further into the future, changing frame condition will most likely require further adaptations over time.

Supplementary material Supplementary material to the Marujá case study is available through the CiVi.net project website. Materials include a participatory movie available at http://www.civinet.eu/english/81732/5/ 0/100, or alternatively at YouTube: http://youtu.be/Y-40eydIbKE. Participatory movies involve the community into the process of movie making. The project team just functions as a facilitator of the process, by teaching participants how to use the movie equipment to direct and film videos and do interviews. The footage then is selected at daily screenings for a period of about 10–14 days. While classic movie production focuses on the final product, participatory movie production focuses on the process of making the movie and its meaning for the participants and the process of learning and exchange that brings for the whole team.

Acknowledgments The research underlying this study was conducted in the CiVi. net project (www.civinet.eu), funded by the European Commission within its 7th Framework Programme under Contract number 282750. We would like to express great gratitude to the community members of Marujá for participating in the interviews and for their great hospitality and support during the case study visits of

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the project team. Furthermore we wish to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback on an earlier draft of this paper.

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Please cite this article as: Sattler, C., et al., Understanding governance structures in community management of ecosystems and natural resources: The Marujá case study in Brazil. Ecosystem Services (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2015.10.015i