Understanding the consequences of pride and shame: How self-evaluations guide moral decision making in business

Journal of Business Research 84 (2018) 271–284

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Understanding the consequences of pride and shame: How self-evaluations guide moral decision making in business☆ Richard P. Bagozzia,

T

⁎,1

, Leslie E. Sekerkab, Francesco Sguerac

a

Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, 701 Tappan Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234, USA Department of Management, Menlo College, 1000 El Camino Real Blvd., Atherton, CA 94027, USA c Católica-Lisbon School of Business and Economics, Catholic University of Portugal, Palma de Cima, 1649-023 Lisboa, Portugal b

A R T I C L E I N F O

A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Self-conscious emotions Pride Shame Moral decision making

Understanding how morally responsible and irresponsible business actions lead to feelings of pride and shame can help us learn more about what motivates moral decision making. This study examines how these particular self-conscious emotions interact with two variables depicting a person's other-orientation, which is made up of other-directed values and perspective-taking. Through an experimental design, we unpack their conjoint influence on moral decisions that either promote the organization or repair the damage done to it. By doing so, we contribute to the existing literature by clarifying nuances between self-conscious and moral emotions, and by testing the specific influence of pride and shame on moral decision-making.

1. Introduction In the wake of the VW, Wells Fargo Bank, and Equifax scandals, the latest in corporate crises dujour, business researchers continue to work toward understanding what contributes to such blatant corporate malfeasance (Jia & Zhang, 2016). The social and political narrative, which provides a context for business, tends to focus on negativity, and large scale unethical behavior. With such a pronounced emphasis on unethical or amoral behaviors, business researchers rightly pursue why ethical deviance occurs, striving to predict why and how people justify their unlawful or egregious behaviors. Yet, many businesses and organizational members are actively engaged in socially responsible actions on a daily basis, finding ways to proactively advance their firm's operations in a morally conscientious manner. This presents an interesting opportunity to advance business research; that is, to study peoples' decision-making efforts at the point of choosing a morally honorable or reprehensible path. While organization-level explanations, such as examination of their climate and culture, have helped to explicate business ethics (Deconinck, 2011; Fraedrich & Iyer, 2008; Hsieh & Wang, 2016), researchers continue to grapple with the individual-level factors of moral action. For example, striving to unpack unethical behavior, Cicala, Bush, Sherrell, and Deitz (2014), looked to the construct of transparency. Others have considered the influence of moral intensity on

decisions (Ferguson, 2014). Nevertheless, business researchers have not yet fully considered the affective impact of a moral decision. Said differently, once a choice has been made and action occurs, what are the potential ramifications of the emotional leftovers (how people feel about their actions, once taken)? In striving to better understand these relevant concerns, this work examines how moral malfeasance or accomplishments are managed and addressed by organizational members. Pursuing this goal, we asked: When a business person faces an organizational moral challenge, what internal processes compel them to respond with moral strength? In contrast to earlier models on moral decision-making, which largely focus on cognition (Ferrell & Gresham, 1985; Rest, 1986; Treviño, 1986; see Dedeke, 2015 for a review), current research investigating moral decisions reveals the functioning of automatic emotions as instigators of moral judgments and action choices. Haidt's (2010, 2012) social intuitionist model proposes that people who perceive reprehensible or exemplary moral behavior performed by others are thought to react automatically, responding with certain negative or positive moral emotions. Haidt and his colleagues have shown that perceptions of moral transgressions lead to negative moral emotions like contempt, anger, or disgust (e.g., Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Aidt, 1999; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008), and moral rectitude leads to positive moral emotions like admiration, awe, gratitude, or elevation (e.g., Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Haidt & Seder, 2009; Keltner & Haidt,

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The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest. Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (R.P. Bagozzi), [email protected] (F. Sguera). 1 Note: Author names are alphabetical. Each author contributed equally to this research. ⁎

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2017.11.036 Received 20 May 2017; Received in revised form 23 November 2017; Accepted 27 November 2017 0148-2963/ © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

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Table 1 Constructs definition. Construct

Definition

Source

Pride Shame

A private sense of achievement that is publicly recognized by significant others An unpleasant, painful emotion that involves a negative evaluation of the core or global self Intended pro-social actions that sustain the firm's doing good Intended reparative behaviors that repair damages done to the firm's stakeholders

Tracy & Robins, 2007 Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O'Connor, 1987 Xie et al., 2015 Xie et al., 2015

Life guiding principles of correcting social injustices and being considerate of others The ability to consciously put oneself into the mind of another individual and imagine what that person is thinking or feeling

Schwartz, 1996, 2006 Davis, 1980; Decety & Cowell, 2014a, 2014b

Pride proactive behaviors Shame proactive behaviors Individuals' other-orientation Other-directed values Perspective-taking

causing harm as a member of the organization makes one the focus of attention by organizational stakeholders, it also interesting to investigate how individuals' orientation toward others (operationalized by two constructs: other-directed values and perspective-taking) regulates the effects of pride and shame on moral decision-making (i.e., functioning as a potential amplifier for pride and a buffer for shame). Testing our hypotheses, we conducted an experiment with three conditions (two experimental manipulations and a control condition). Feelings of pride were induced as a result of engaging in perceived actions that enhanced a firm's adoption of environmental responsibility with specific acts of moral strength taken to prevent an oil spill. Greater pride was shown to increase intended proactive behaviors (i.e., actions taken to sustain the firm's doing good) to the degree that individuals held strong other-directed values (i.e., values oriented to benefit others) and at the same time exhibited a disposition to adopt the perspective of others, a cognitive dimension of empathy (e.g., Walter, 2012). The alternative manipulation induced shame, experienced by a perceived consequence of engaging in acts that resulted in an oil spill. Feelings of shame influenced positive proactive behaviors (i.e., actions taken to benefit other people or the firm after the oil spill) to the extent that the individual had low other-directed values and simultaneously showed a weak disposition to take the perspective of others. Table 1 and Fig. 1 presents a definition of the constructs and a schematic of the relationships tested. Overall, our work makes three substantial contributions to business research. First, we add to the theory of moral decision-making by contextualizing the role of emotions in business situations. By doing so, we extend previous research on customer moral decision-making following responsible and irresponsible firm actions (e.g., Xie et al., 2015) with an investigation on how members of an organization react to parallel moral situations. Second, we shed light on the role of selfconscious emotions in moral decision-making by: a) clarifying nuances between self-conscious emotions and moral emotions and b) showing how they act as drivers of pro-social action tendencies. Finally, we go beyond Haidt's focus on affect-only as a driver of moral decisionmaking by integrating emotional processes with cognitive mechanisms functioning as self-regulation (i.e., individuals' orientations toward others), thus testing explicit conditions whereby emotions lead to moral decision-making in business. The findings have important implications in the business context. In fact, understanding how morally responsible and irresponsible management actions lead to feelings of pride and shame can help us learn more about what motivates future action toward the organization, such as repairing the damage one has done to organizational stakeholders (e.g., in corporate scandals), or sustaining the company's responsible actions already in place. Thus, our results offer important managerial implications, with key takeaways that provide useful distinctions through insights that can be applied to management education, as well as to organizational workshops that target ongoing adult moral development.

2003). More recently, Xie, Bagozzi, and Grønhaug (2015) applied the social intuitionist model in business situations to show that consumers respond to positive green actions by an organization with gratitude and negative green actions with contempt, anger, and disgust, and these emotions then subsequently influence actions toward the associated organization. Our study approaches moral decision-making in ways that are both similar to and different from Haidt's social intuitionist approach. Similar to Haidt, our assumption is that moral transgressions and moral praiseworthy actions automatically lead to felt negative and positive emotions. Complementing Haidt's framework, we posit an important ethical role for self-conscious emotions (versus moral emotions) in business scenarios. According to Haidt (2003), moral emotions are “emotions that are linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent” (p. 853, emphasis in original). Moral emotions include multiple collections of other-directed emotions, such as the “other-condemning” family (i.e., contempt, anger, and disgust), the “other-suffering” family (i.e., compassion), and the “otherpraising” family (i.e., gratitude, awe, and elevation). In contrast to moral emotions, which generally focus on the interest or welfare of others (Haidt, 2003), self-conscious emotions focus on the agent as the center of attention and subsume personal judgments of both the self and one's own actions.2 These self-judgments involve “self-awareness and self-representations” (Tracy & Robins, 2004, p. 105) related to the expectations of others, and to what they mean for the self. Accordingly, our study examines two self-conscious emotions, namely pride and shame; often considered as opposite poles on an emotional continuum. These self-conscious emotions are crucial drivers and regulators of human interaction as they entail basic “mammalian displays of submission [shame] and dominance [pride],” such as “eye contact avoided [shame] versus sought [pride]; apparent body size decreased [shame] versus increased [pride]; social interaction avoided [shame] versus sought [pride]” (Haidt, 2003, p. 859). Despite their importance in regulating social relationships inside and outside the firm, these emotions have been understudied by previous research in business (Haidt, 2003; Gruenewald, Dickerson, & Kemeny, 2007, Erikson, 1950; Parker & Thomas, 2009; see the Theory and hypotheses section below for a discussion). Aiming to fill this gap, we investigate how pride and shame can serve as triggers of employees' future actions (Murphy & Kiffin-Petersen, 2016; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tracy & Robins, 2007), either by repairing damages done to other stakeholders, or by sustaining positive behavior on behalf of the firm. Finally, our study goes beyond the social intuitionist model to specify the conditions under which emotions experienced by organizational members lead to intended proactive behaviors in relation to the broader organization. In fact, to the extent that doing good or

2 Haidt (2003, p. 861) defines the self-conscious emotions as a particular type of moral emotions that involve disinterest. However, he also de-emphasizes their moral importance: “If the criterion of ‘disinterestedness’ is the capacity to feel the emotion in situations that do not involve the self, then the self-conscious emotions fare poorly”.

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Fig. 1. Mediation and moderation of the effect of manipulated pride and shame on proactive behaviors.

similarly “self-reflection and self-evaluation” (Tangney et al., 2007, p. 347) as personal defining characteristics. As such, self-conscious emotions are a unique class of emotions that involve self-relevant thoughts, feelings, intentions, and behaviors (Campos, 1995; Fischer & Tangney, 1995). They motivate people to work hard toward achievement (Stipek, 1995; Weiner, 1985), and to behave in moral, socially appropriate ways (Hart & Matsuba, 2007). Moreover, they function to provide immediate and salient feedback on a person's social and moral acceptability – helping to ascertain one's self-worth as an individual. A distinctive characteristic is that their elicitation requires an ability to form stable self-representations, to focus attention on those representations (i.e., to self-reflect), and generate a self-evaluation (Tracy & Robins, 2004). Complex self-evaluative appraisals are both an important part of the direct causal processes that elicit self-conscious emotions and of the evolutionary processes through which these emotions became part of the human affective repertoire. These self-processes may mediate the relation between an emotioneliciting event or environmental stimulus, and its emotional output (pride, shame, etc.) (Leary & Tangney, 2011). Self-conscious emotions can also reflect moral content and serve as personal motives for action. Importantly, “(a)s the self-reflects upon the self, moral self-conscious emotions provide immediate punishment (or reinforcement) of behavior [and] function as an emotional barometer, providing immediate and salient feedback on our social and moral acceptability” (Tangney et al., 2007, p. 347). Self-conscious emotions then provide a basis for future action toward the organization, either rectifying the damage one has done to others, or by sustaining the responsible actions of the organization as a consequence of prior praiseworthy actions. The conditions under which self-conscious emotions lead to appropriate responses are worth further consideration (see below). In contrast to moral emotions, where another person or organization commits an act that one finds reprehensible or admirable, selfconscious emotions arise when the self is the actor, engaging in ethical or unethical actions. While both moral and self-conscious emotions can lead to subsequent behaviors, the processes under which they operate are quite different, as are their origins.

2. Theory and hypotheses Sunar (2009) identified three morality clusters of emotions via use of relational models (Fiske, 1991), moral domains (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997) and reciprocal sets of other-blaming and selfconscious affective experiences. This typology was derived from the evolutionary bases for morality, associated with kin selection, social hierarchy, and reciprocal altruism, respectively. In teasing out the selfconscious emotions as a distinctive branch of the moral domain, they serve as affective cues to support social functioning. Lewis (1992) outlined the development of self-conscious emotions, showing how individuals learn to incorporate social standards, rules, and goals, as part of early socialization. Learned through direct or indirect means, a sense of right and wrong is developed via culturalization to a particular society, including the family and the groups one associates with (e.g., clubs, teams, religious and/or political affiliations, and other organizations) and exposure to the media. How the individual evaluates his or her own actions will vary, based upon what is highly valued among one's social milieus, or by what is deemed valued among the groups the person becomes a part of, as life progresses. Affective experiences are triggered by a process of evaluation, determining the relative success or failure of one's actions, based on cultural requisites associated with personal values and those perceived as representative of those present in the current context or situation. Moral emotions have been studied extensively in psychology and recently scrutinized in business ethics contexts as well (e.g., Antonetti & Maklan, 2014; Grappi, Romani, & Bagozzi, 2013). Extant literature has a tendency to view self-conscious emotions as examples of moral emotions or to simply consider emotions in a binary (positive/negative) fashion. We know that moral emotions are “linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent” (Haidt, 2003, p. 22, emphasis added). They also reflect a person's affective reactions toward others, including one's organization or toward one's own personal actions as the object of attention. These emotions do not emphasize self-evaluative processes, but rather focus on the appraisal of another person or organization, like one's company or firm, as the object of scrutiny. By contrast, self-conscious emotions take the self as the center of attention and concern personal judgments of the self and one's own actions. This self-evaluative effort relates particularly to the expectations of others and what this means for the concept of self. Specifically, self-conscious emotions involve “selfawareness and self-representations” (Tracy & Robins, 2004, p. 105) and

2.1. The nature and consequences of pride and shame Pride occurs when a person focuses his/her attention on the self, experiencing public and/or private self-representations, appraising an event that happens to oneself as relevant and congruent with self273

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That is, when someone feels guilty, his or her first concern is to repair or undo the action that has provoked the guilt sensation by approaching directly the source of distress. Accordingly, the origins of shame and guilt are different in that “guilt concerns one particular action, in contrast to shame, which pertains to the entire self” (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; p.245, emphasis added). In contrast to guilt, shame entails an “avoidance mechanism.” For example, when an organizational member undergoes moral failure, feelings of shame arise and entail “the experience of negative selfevaluations based on anticipated or actual depreciation by others due to a failure to meet standards of behavior” (Creed, Hudson, Okhuysen, & Smith-Crowe, 2014, p. 276). These self-evaluations should in theory induce the wrong-doer to avoid the source of distress; and rather than fixing the problem (as in the case of guilt), fleeing from it. But in an organizational context, such responses are difficult to enact, and more personally and institutionally functional responses are needed. Whereas the extant literature often casts shame in a negative light leading to withdrawal, we expect that the self-consciousness captured by shame can also promote moral decision-making and behavior (Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011). Gruenewald et al. (2007) explain how circumstances that threaten the social self can prompt a coordinated internal response, characterized by the elicitation of shame and physiological processes, providing cues to mobilize resource functions to address such threats. Thus, the implementation of instrumental coping responses in relation to one's role and the effective performance of the organization can help to overcome the intense unpleasant feeling of shame. In fact, the defensive coping mechanism of psychological compensation fits organizational contexts well (e.g., Bäckman & Dixon, 1992; Vaillant, 2000). Psychological compensation is defined as “the use of alternative means to maintain a given level of functioning when specific goal-relevant means are no longer available” (Freund & Baltes, 2002, p. 644). In cases where an organizational member experiences feelings of shame for the actions they have taken, causing harm, it is plausible that they will have a desire to make restitution for the damage they have caused, promote transparency, seek out collaborative solutions, and advocate for changes in standards and/or policies. Thus, we hypothesize:

identity goals, and attributes the cause of the event to an internal factor where responsibility is accepted (Tracy & Robins, 2004, p. 116). Ethical behavior is known to produce a sense of pride in the workplace and raises the organization's level of perceived fairness (Scott, 2005). Hu and Kaplan (2015) point out that pride is often triggered by events associated with being responsible for a socially valued outcome, which can boost self-determination, motivation, and performance-oriented goals. Additionally, pride contributes to psychological empowerment, contextual performance success (especially in competitive cultures/ settings), and effective long-term relationships in organizations. Generally, pride is an emotion that has been often associated with behaviors that benefit the self, as these actions sustain an increased sense of self-worth. Yet, by the same mechanism underpinning personal benefits, pride can also provoke actions that benefit the organization. In fact, pride “serves to enhance people's self-worth and, perhaps more importantly, to encourage future behavior that conforms to social standards of worth” (Tangney et al., 2007, p.395). The type of pride we examine, termed normal or authentic pride, is based upon the demonstration of morally commendable behavior. Authentic pride involves a private sense of achievement that is publicly recognized by significant others such as colleagues, family, friends, coworkers, and/or management. Although Haidt (2003) mentions pride as a base for moral decision-making in passing, few if any studies have hypothesized positive effects that go beyond the personal gains and enact the support of one's own firm. Yet, this type of pride is useful as it promotes subsequent positive actions (Weiner, 1985). Because it results from self-appraisals that one is responsible for contributing to socially valued outcomes (Mascolo & Fischer, 1995, p. 66), the person experiencing pride can enhance selfworth by sustaining actions that originally led to felt pride and in other ways continuing to work for and on behalf of the organization in a positive way. Doing so can also maintain or increase self-esteem (e.g., Herrald & Tomaka, 2002; Stein, Folkman, Trabasso, & ChristopherRichards, 1997). Accordingly, we hypothesize that pride will lead to pro-social actions that favor one's company: H1a. Felt pride mediates the effect of responsible actions taken by an organization member on his/her decision to engage in proactive behaviors designed to promote and sustain the company.

H2a. Felt shame mediates the effect of irresponsible actions taken by an organization member on his/her decision to engage in proactive behaviors designed to make restitution, promote transparency, and change company practices.

Shame is engendered by a common set of cognitive processes that are both similar to those found with pride and differ in important ways: “an individual must focus attention on some aspect of the self, activating public and/or private self-representation; appraise the event as relevant to and incongruent with identity goals; and attribute the cause of the event to some internal factor, blaming the self for the situation” (Tracy & Robins, 2004, p. 115). Through the years, shame has been overlooked by research on moral decision-making, most often in favor of guilt. Erikson (1950) was one of the first scholars to distinguish psychologically between shame and guilt, noting that “shame is an emotion insufficiently studied, because in our civilization it is so easily absorbed by guilt” (Lansky, 1995; p. 252). Parker and Thomas (2009) suggest that a failure to adequately understand the unique elements of shame ignore a growing body of research on important psychological differences between the self-conscious emotions (see also Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Tangney et al. (2007) discuss the defining characteristics of felt shame and review research in psychology supporting an interpretation consistent with the conditions proposed by Tracy and Robins (2004). Shame is an unpleasant, painful emotion and involves a negative evaluation of the core or global self (Tangney et al., 2007). The initial action tendencies in response to felt shame entail such urges as to avoid eye contact with significant others, run away, hide, or “metaphorically” crawl into a hole. It is therefore not surprising that researchers in moral decisionmaking have focused on guilt rather than shame, as the former induces an automatic “approach mechanism” to perform reparative behaviors.

2.2. Pride and shame in other-oriented individuals 2.2.1. The role of other-directed values Hume's (1739) A Treatise of Human Nature provided a substantive definition of humanity and its relationship to benevolence. Hanley (2011) explains how humanism refers to other-directed values, a recognition of our shared humanity. While other-directed values are allocentric, curiously they give an untapped resource for potential insight toward understanding what moves people toward morally responsible decision-making. In organizational studies, values like benevolence have been considered relevant in research studying cross-cultural values (Schwartz et al., 2001) and multiculturalism (Imamoĝklu & Karakitapoĝklu-Aygüun, 2004), and scholarly endeavors unpacking the collectivist orientation (Triandis, 1995). But for the most part, otherdirected values have been used mostly in theological treatises. Interestingly, there is a relationship between ethical behavior and trust, where other-directed values like benevolence have been identified as facilitating and even predicting trustworthiness (Bews & Rossouw, 2002). Benevolence is also known to be associated with moral decisions in patient care (Lutzén & Nordin, 1993), and predicts sensitivity toward multicultural issues (Fry, 2005). Yet, other-directed values remain largely an understudied potential resource for support in moral decision274

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making in business. Therefore, the first individual difference we consider as a moderator of the effect of felt pride and shame herein are other-directed (sometimes called other-related) values. These types of values can be represented by the virtues of social justice and kindness to others. Virtues are traits of character that function to regulate how one responds to constraints or facilitators in social contexts (e.g., Hursthouse, 1999; Swanton, 2003). Social justice and kindness toward others reflect the propensity of a person to act rightly in social contexts that demand certain moral responses. Individuals who place a strong weight on others' interests will tend to focus on maximizing the benefits for others in society (Santos, 2012). Schwartz (1992) proposed that values of social justice and kindness/ helpfulness symbolize altruistic concerns that provide guideposts for how to act in morally difficult or challenging situations. Such values have proven useful in explaining engagement with a variety of prosocial behaviors (e.g., Fukukawa, Shafer, & Lee, 2007; Schultz, 2001; Stern, Kalof, Dietz, & Guagnano, 1995). Prior research has shown that people who more strongly endorse other-directed values show stronger personal moral norms and behavioral intentions to protect others (e.g., Feather, Woodyatt, & McKee, 2012) and the natural environment (e.g., Cheung, Luke, & Maio, 2014). Accordingly, having this type of other-directed values should enhance the effects of pride on proactive behavior through needs for selfconsistency (Korman, 1970; Sguera, Bagozzi, Huy, Boss, & Boss, 2017). That is, people experiencing feelings of pride, stemming from behaviors that enhanced a positive view of themselves, will strive to maintain those feelings by sustaining those positive behaviors that reinforce a positive self-image (e.g., cognitive consistency; Festinger, 1957). Thus, we hypothesize:

repair to right the wrong, and indirectly rebuild or bolster the damaged self. H2b. The greater the felt shame, the greater the likelihood of favorable decisions to undertake proactive behaviors, to the extent that respondents place low importance on other-directed values. 2.2.2. The role of perspective-taking Perspective-taking (i.e., putting oneself in the shoes of another) is another condition examined as a moderator of the effects of felt pride and shame. As a cognitive component of empathy (Walter, 2012), perspective-taking is defined as “the ability to consciously put oneself into the mind of another individual and imagine what that person is thinking or feeling [and] has been linked to social competence and social reasoning” (Decety & Cowell, 2014a, 2014b, p. 530; see also Underwood & Moore, 1982). Perspective-taking is distinct from classic empathy-related reactions (e.g., empathetic concern) because it lacks emotionality (e.g. Eisenberg & Morris, 2001); thereby enabling individuals to bypass empathic arousal and bias (Hoffman, 2000; Pizarro, 2000). Perspective-taking is somewhat similar to role-taking which forms the basis of moral judgment development (Kohlberg, 1984). Timmerman (2015) explains that contractualism interprets our moral judgments as making claims about the reasons of individuals for acting in various situations, reasons that can only be recognized by considering others' perspectives. Contractualism, which justifies acting on moral principles and making moral choices, requires the capacity of perspective-taking, which neither utilitarianism nor Kantianism assign much significance. Perspective-taking demonstratively contributes to the post-conventional stage of moral development (Myyrya, Juujärvi, & Pesso, 2010), regarded as the most advanced (Rest, 1979). At the post-conventional reasoning level, laws are not blindly accepted, but rather scrutinized to ensure society-wide benefit (i.e., focusing on what is the best for the public as a whole). Perspective-taking is particularly relevant to moral judgment in organizational settings. Each organizational member must orient themselves in relation to the perspective of others as part of the larger, shared system to which they belong, such as a professional community or work group. As a psychological process, reflective perspective-taking is particularly useful in management decision-making efforts (Cojuharenco & Sguera, 2015; Sekerka, 2016). It is an active cognitive process of imagining the world from another's vantage point or imagining oneself in another's circumstance to understand their visual viewpoint, thoughts, motivations, intentions, and/or emotions, with benefits for organizational members as they work to effectively navigate a world filled with mixed-motive social interactions (Ku, Wang, & Galinsky, 2015). Perspective-taking is often the glue that binds people together, but it can also serve as a relational amplifier (Pierce, Kilduff, Galinsky, & Sivanathan, 2013). We argue that the impact of felt pride will be accentuated to the extent that one has the capacity to take the perspective of others. This should be manifest most directly at the interpersonal level when the actions leading to feelings of pride are tied to significant others (e.g., friends, family, and co-workers). Although research to date has focused primarily on taking the perspective of others who experience pain or suffering, our research proposes that perspective-taking will also amplify the effects of felt pride, as reinforced by significant others. This proposition is based on research in the neuroscience literature on empathy, where a network of common emotional systems for positive and negative emotions have been implicated, including the amygdala, insula, posterior superior temporal sulcus, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, medial prefrontal cortex, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (see Bagozzi et al., 2013, and research cited in Decety & Cowell, 2014a, p. 527). Further, beyond interpersonal bases for self-conscious emotions, it can be argued that there is a link between perspective-taking and larger moral concerns at the societal level, which should reinforce

H1b. The greater the felt pride, the greater the likelihood of favorable decisions to undertake proactive behaviors, to the extent that respondents place high importance on other-directed values. Conversely, since these values portray an ideal self (e.g., being a person who is just and/or kind/helpful), it is expected that opposite outcomes will emerge for people experiencing shame. Shame involves injury to the core self in the sense that commission of irresponsible actions leads one to devalue the self for not meeting expected personal standards of behavior and internalized moral norms (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). The normal coping responses and action tendencies following the experience of shame are to try to hide, escape, avoid, or even deny the shame-inducing event (e.g.,Lewis, 1992). These reactions to felt shame are expected to be greatest for those persons holding stronger other-directed values, because the expectations of others undergird one's standards of conduct and the need to meet moral requisites in society and groups to which one belongs. Therefore, to the extent that one places less importance on other-directed values, a person feeling shame for having performed harmful acts should be more inclined to decide to conduct reparative proactive behaviors than one who places great importance on other-directed values. The person that places lower importance (versus higher importance) on other-directed values is not as overwhelmed by shame and does not need to protect the core self by fleeing the situation, but rather can bolster the core self by doing good acts. The person high in other-directed values should feel a greater need to protect their image by withdrawing relatively more into the self to the exclusion of helping others. In other words, the experience of a damaged self-image -further scrutinized by others- should motivate individuals with strong other-directed values to hide from the situation and avoid further harm to their image (e.g., cognitive dissonance; Festinger, 1957). By the same token, although people with lower other-directed values will also experience shame, they are likely to be less encumbered because of lower expectations toward establishing their ideal self (e.g., believing there is nothing to lose). These lower expectations should therefore unleash instinctive action tendencies to engage in moral 275

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(Tangney et al., 2007), eventually sustaining moral actions on the behalf of the firm. Such moral actions may be represented by desiring to remain with the company, speaking favorable of the company, and encouraging others to work for the company. Accordingly, our conditional indirect hypothesis summarizing the cumulative effect of the previous hypotheses is:

taking prosocial actions to perpetuate good works in the case of felt pride. Decety and Cowell (2014b, p. 338) point to such a link when they note, “Humans are arguably unique… in that they can adopt the perspective of another, which can lead to expanding the circle of care from the tribe to all humanity.” Finally, individuals might decide to sustain moral actions if the pride that they experience (as a result of their previous actions) is consistent with the maintenance of their positive ideal self (Korman, 1970). One way in which individuals “become aware that they have lived up to […] some actual or ideal self-representation” (Tracy & Robins, 2004, p. 105) is by gauging what others think of them. Thus, a higher sensitivity in perceiving others' approval should augment the experience of pride and fulfill the actor's self-consistency needs required to sustain positive behaviors on the behalf of the company (i.e., a proud self). Accordingly, we suggest that doing good as an agent of an organization makes one the focus of attention by significant others, and at the same time has larger social and moral implications, which are modulated further to the extent that one is able to take the perspective of others into consideration. Therefore, we hypothesize:

H1d. Felt pride mediates the effect of responsible actions taken by an organization member on his/her decision to engage in proactive behaviors designed to promote and sustain the company, to the extent that respondents place high importance on other-directed values and have a higher ability to take the perspective of others. In contrast to pride, we expect that experienced shame will lead to intended proactive behaviors only for those individuals who show low perspective-taking and hold weak other-directed values. In spite of the avoidance nature of shame, this low orientation toward others should unleash action tendencies and increase the likelihood of engaging in reparative behaviors such as making restitution for the harm, promoting transparency, and changing the status quo. Thus, our conditional indirect hypothesis is the following:

H1c. The greater the felt pride, the greater the likelihood of favorable decisions to undertake proactive behaviors, to the extent that respondents have a higher ability to take the perspective of others.

H2d. Felt shame mediates the effect of irresponsible actions taken by an organization member on his/her decision to engage in proactive behaviors designed to make restitution, promote transparency, and change company practices, to the extent that respondents place low importance on other-directed values and have a lower ability to take the perspective of others.

Although important in amplifying the effects of pride, being able to take the perspective of others should lead to opposite results for people experiencing shame. In fact, while shame can be interpersonal in its source, its experience is mainly intrapersonal (Tangney et al., 2007). Reactions to shame stem from others' disapproval of the self, a personal characteristic, rather than disapproval for the action that led to the shameful situation. Individuals experiencing shame focus inward, to address the task of protecting and repairing their self-image. This goal has priority over other-oriented concerns (Yang, Yang, & Chiou, 2010). Accordingly, the ability to understand others is crucial in regulating proactive and defensive coping reactions to feelings of shame. That is, as individuals imagine “others” evaluating their own persona, they might experience enhanced or reduced urges to act based on their ability to thoughtfully assume others' perspectives. Such differences in sensitivity for perceived disapproval should induce individuals high in perspective-taking to attempt to exit (flee) the situation, because acting upon shame entails additional exposure to others' judgments which threaten one's self-concept (Tangney et al., 2007). By contrast, low perspective-taking individuals should try to repair the situation and, indirectly, their self-image. This is because engaging in reparative behaviors and facing others' judgments will not pose additional threats to their egos. Hence, feelings of shame in high perspective-taking individuals are likely to lead to distress and inaction, while for low perspective-taking individuals, feelings of shame should unleash natural coping tendencies, to fix the situation without fear of being overly judged (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Lazarus, 1991). Thus, we hypothesize:

3. Method 3.1. Research design We manipulated pride and shame by use of specific experimental and control conditions. The categorical independent variable (X1) consisted of exposure to a pride-inducing versus a control condition, and the categorical independent variable (X2) consisted of exposure to a shame-inducting versus a control condition (see Fig. 1). The two continuous mediating variables in separate analyses were felt pride (M1) and shame (M2), respectively. The same two continuous moderating variables were employed for both the pride and shame conditions: other-directed values (Q) and perspective-taking (V). The two continuous dependent variables were pride proactive behaviors (Y1) and shame proactive behaviors (Y2). We used Hayes' (2013) Process Model 18 in SPSS to analyze the proposed moderated mediation mechanisms.

3.2. Stimulus materials Similar to many studies in psychology (e.g., Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Roseman, 1991), scenarios were used to manipulate emotions indirectly. Given the difficulty in inducing emotions, together with practical and ethical concerns, the use of scenarios represents a viable procedure that has been found to be a valid experimental tool (e.g., Quigley, Lindquist, & Barrett, 2014). Each narrative scenario used the J.J. Oil Company, a fictitious organization, as the focal firm and told a story about the protagonist senior manager (“you”). Although the company name was fictitious, the scenario followed details present in a number of actual cases in industry. Both the pride and shame experimental conditions portrayed the protagonist in vivid terms, making decisions and engaging in actions that harmed or protected the natural environment. The control condition simply described company facilities and operating procedures. Each participant was randomly assigned to and read only one scenario. The actual scenarios are provided in the Appendix.

H2c. The greater the felt shame, the greater the likelihood of favorable decisions to undertake proactive behaviors, to the extent that respondents have a lower ability to take the perspective of others. 2.2.3. The moderated-mediation model In conclusion, self-conscious emotions of pride and shame are personal feelings related to how well the self meets normative expectations. Perspective-taking accentuates the relevance of pride and buffers the effect of shame. In a similar way, other-directed values provide evaluative importance or weight to felt pride, yet they tend to block reparative behaviors associated with shame. Thus, it is expected that greater felt pride will lead, under conditions of high perspective-taking and strong other-directed values, to proactive behaviors. In simple words, this high orientation toward others should amplify the positive effects of pride through an enhanced sensitivity to public recognition 276

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same category in their classic study of emotions. Shame proactive behaviors were indicated with 6 items on 5-point scales. The items measured respondents' intentions to engage in those proactive behaviors. The items were “no advocacy for change in standards” to “advocate for changes in standards,” “make no restitution for harm” to “make restitution for harm,” “do not consult with coworkers” to “consult with coworkers,” “do not try and resolve issues” to “try to work out equitable solutions,” “avoid speaking with management” to “seek our dialogue with management,” and “keep to yourself” to “discuss matters with family and friends.” These items are similar to those used by researchers to measure negative reactions and behaviors toward good-and bad-behaving companies in the green business and corporate social responsibility literature (e.g., Xie et al., 2015). Other-directed values were measured with 4 items on 7-point “not at all important to me” to “very important to me” scales, with “moderately important to me” in the middle, based on Schwartz's research on human values (1996, 2006). Respondents were asked to consider each value “as a guiding principle” in their lives. The items were “social justice: caring for the poor,” “social justice: correcting social injustices,” “helpful: being kind and considerate,” and “helpful: lending a helping hand.” Perspective-taking was measured with 7 items on 7-point, “Does not describe me at all” to “Describes me very, very well” scales, with “Describes me moderately well” as the middle category. The items were drawn from Davis (1980). Example items include, “I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision,” “I can sometimes see things from the other guy's point of view,” and “Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.”

Table 2 Means, standard deviations, Cronbach's alphas, and correlations among the variables in the study. Variable

Mean

s.d.

1

2

3

4

5

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Manipulated pride Felt pride Perspective-taking Other-directed values Pride proactive behaviors

0.04 3.62 4.98 5.31 3.58

1.00 0.94 1.23 1.33 0.97

– 0.35⁎⁎ − 0.01 0.01 0.21⁎⁎

0.82⁎⁎⁎ 0.16⁎ 0.18⁎ 0.59⁎⁎

0.92 0.52⁎⁎ 0.29⁎⁎

0.90 0.33⁎⁎

0.89

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Manipulated shame Felt shame Perspective-taking Other-directed values Shame proactive behaviors

0.05 3.09 4.92 5.33 3.71

1.00 1.14 1.17 1.33 0.73

– 0.56⁎⁎ − 0.04 0.02 0.16⁎

0.95 0.07 0.17⁎ 0.27⁎⁎

0.90 0.50⁎⁎ 0.26⁎⁎

0.92 0.35⁎⁎

0.83

Cronbach's alphas are reported along the diagonal. ⁎ p < 0.05. ⁎⁎ p < 0.01. ⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.001.

3.3. Respondents and procedures Respondents were students enrolled in the business management program, along with members of the program's faculty and staff, at a small liberal arts business college in the Western United States. A modest portion of the sample included individuals in these latter roles, all of whom assume a variety of management duties to ensure the program is accredited and delivered effectively and efficiently. The bulk of the participants, however, were upper level senior management students. All of these individuals were preparing for their future role as full time managers, currently engaging in business management coursework and their internship program. Participants were approached by interviewers who briefly described the study as being about management decision-making. The questionnaires were distributed randomly across the three conditions. A convenience quota sample was obtained by selecting respondents roughly in proportion to the percentages found in the larger population of individuals at the college in the three categories mentioned above. Respondents were distributed across conditions as follows: N = 86 in the pride, N = 90 in the shame, and N = 82 in the control conditions.3 A total of 43% of respondents were women, 57% men; 135 people were less than or equal to 20 years old, 91 between 21 and 30 years inclusive, and 28 were 31 years or older.

4. Results Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, correlations, and reliabilities of measures of the scales. It can be seen that satisfactory reliabilities resulted and scales are correlated low to moderately high.

4.1. Pride Table 3 displays the results for the conditional effects of manipulated pride on the decision to engage in pro-active responses, according to the processes summarized in Fig. 1. Notice first under the mediator variable model, manipulated pride affects felt pride positively and strongly, as predicted: b = 0.33, p < 0.001, Cohen's d = 0.74. Next under the outcome variable model, as hypothesized, the three-way interaction for felt pride × perspective-taking × other directed values is significant: b = 0.05, p < 0.05. Figs. 2 and 3 show the simple slope effects of the interaction of felt pride and perspective-taking, for low (b = 0.03, ns) and high other-directed values (b = 0.16, p < 0.05), respectively, where it can be seen that the effect of felt pride on intended pride proactive behaviors is significantly stronger for high compared to low perspective-taking when other-directed values are high (Fig. 3), and felt pride and perspective-taking do not interact to influence pride proactive behaviors under low other-directed values (Fig. 2). The bottom panel of Table 3 gives the conditional indirect effects. Consistent with Table 3 and Figs. 2 and 3, the indirect effect of felt pride, which mediates the effects of manipulated pride on intended pride proactive behaviors, is stronger when perspective-taking is high and other-directed values are high. In simple words, pride triggered stronger responses in those individuals who were able to both take the perspective of others and hold strong other-directed values. This otherorientation amplified the effects of pride en route to sustained moral actions. Accordingly, our hypotheses on the effects of pride were confirmed (H1a to H1d).

3.4. Measures Felt pride was measured with two items recommended by Tracy and Robins (2007). Five-point scales were used to indicate from “none” to “strong” both felt pride and felt self-worth. Pride proactive behaviors were recorded on three bi-polar items with 5-point categories. The items measured respondents' intentions to engage in those proactive behaviors. The items were “speak ill-will of the company” to “speak favorably of the company,” “deter others from working for the company” to “encourage others to work for the company,” and “leave the company” to “stay with the company.” These items are similar to those used by researchers in the green business and corporate responsibility literature (e.g., Xie et al., 2015). Felt shame was measured with two 5-point items. The items were “no shame at all” to “extreme shame,” and “no self-blame at all” to “extreme self-blame.” Shaver et al. (1987, p. 1067) found that shame and the two self-blame cognates of regret and remorse clustered on the 3 Two respondents in the control condition were excluded in the pride analyses because of missing values.

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(b = − 0.12, p < 0.01) and high other-directed values (b = 00, ns). It can be seen that the effect of felt shame on the decision to engage in shame proactive behavior is significant for low but not high perspective taking, when other-directed values are low (Fig. 4), and felt shame and perspective taking do not interact to influence intended shame proactive behaviors under high other-directed values (Fig. 5). Thus, felt shame triggered intended reparative behaviors only for those individuals who show low perspective-taking and hold weak other-directed values. This low orientation toward others unleashed the willingness to engage in reparative behaviors in spite of the avoidance effects of shame. The bottom panel of Table 4 details the conditional indirect effect. Consistent with Figs. 4 and 5, we find that felt shame mediates the effects of manipulated shame on the decision to engage in shame proactive behaviors, when perspective taking is low and other-directed values are low, based on the estimated effect and the positive bootstrapping lower and upper confidence intervals which do not include zero. However, for the other three combinations of perspective taking and other-directed values, we see that all three effects are non-significant, and the bootstrap confident intervals include zero in their estimates (see hypotheses H2a to H2d). Confirming all of our hypotheses, the effects of pride and shame on both sustained and reparative intended behaviors depended on the level of other-orientation of the actor.

Table 3 Results for conditional effects of manipulated pride on pro-active responses. Felt pride

Constant Manipulated pride Felt pride Perspective-taking Other-directed values Interaction 1 Interaction 2 Interaction 3 Interaction 4 R2

Pride proactive behaviors

B

se

B

se

3.61*** 0.33***

0.07 0.07

− 1.97 0.03 0.86 0.92** 0.99** − 0.22** − 0.15 − 0.17 0.05* 0.46***

1.46 0.06 0.51 0.35 0.37 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.02

0.12***

Conditional indirect effects Mediator

Otherdirected values

Perspectivetaking

Effect

BootSE

BootLLCI

BootULCI

Felt Felt Felt Felt

Low High Low High

Low Low High High

0.11 0.11 0.14 0.24

0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06

0.01 0.00 0.03 0.13

0.22 0.31 0.31 0.36

pride pride pride pride

Interaction Interaction Interaction Interaction

1: 2: 3: 4:

perspective-taking × other-directed values. felt pride × perspective-taking. felt pride × other-directed values. felt pride × perspective-taking × other-directed values.

5. Discussion Basic research shows that emotions have evolved to serve specific Fig. 2. Plot of the interaction between felt pride and perspective-taking at low level of other-directed values. ⁎ No significant statistical difference between the slopes.

4.2. Shame

adaptive functions, (Lazarus, 1991). This perspective is gradually influencing business ethics research. Theories regarding the elicitors and functions of self-conscious emotions explain how these feelings are experienced when the fundamental goal of maintaining a positive social self is threatened or endorsed in a social setting like an organization (Gruenewald et al., 2007).

Table 4 presents the findings for the conditional effects of manipulated shame on pro-active responses, according to the processes summarized in Fig. 1. Notice first under the mediator variable model (i.e., the first combined column in Table 4, labeled, “felt shame”), we see that manipulated shame influences felt shame positively and strongly, as hypothesized: b = 0.72, p < 0.001, Cohen's d = 1.37. Next under the outcome variable model (i.e., the second combined column, labeled, “shame proactive behaviors”), it can be observed, as forecasted, that the three-way interaction for felt shame × perspective taking × other-directed values is significant: b = 0.05, p < 0.05. Figs. 4 and 5 show the two simple slope tests depicting the interactions between felt shame and perspective taking, for low

5.1. Theoretical contributions Given the limited empirical research on self-conscious emotions in organizational research (e.g., Bodolica & Spraggon, 2011), we chose to investigate the feelings of pride and shame in business situations. By adding granularity to how pride and shame function to guide moral decision-making in business, we have extend previous studies on 278

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Fig. 3. Plot of the interaction between felt pride and perspective-taking at high level of other-directed values.

results of our study extend the dearth of empirical research targeting shame as a potential self-regulatory prompt for moral decisions and action in organizational settings (e.g., Murphy & Kiffin-Petersen, 2016), and show that, rather than being framed as a prompt for avoidance behaviors (Verbeke & Bagozzi, 2002), shame can function as a useful internalized evaluative tool to help shape and guide effective responseactions. In organizational settings, moral norms or standards have previously been linked to behavior through moral emotions, where the perception of praiseworthy or reprehensible conformance to, or violation of, standards by others have been shown to lead to such positive moral emotions as awe, elevation, and gratitude and such negative moral emotions as contempt, anger, or disgust (Haidt, 2012). Our research provides an alternative perspective, one where the self is managed through personal evaluations, which prompt the desire to act in admirable or irresponsible ways. In so doing, we complement previous research on self-conscious emotions by clarifying nuances between selfconscious emotions and moral emotions and by showing how their inward focus can prompt positive actions in the business context. Because doing bad or good as an agent of an organization makes one the focus of attention by significant others, we investigated how individual differences in other-orientation regulate the effects of pride and shame on moral decision-making. Specifically, we proposed and tested a moderated mediation model wherein reactions to felt pride and shame, arising from one's own actions, were shown to depend on the extent to which one dispositionally takes the perspective of another person and at the same time is inclined toward others. In this regard, our results for pride—with respect to social behavior—extend previous research findings on the positive effects of understanding others' experience of physical pain or suffering (Decety & Cowell, 2014a, 2014b), as the type of other-orientation studied in our research reinforces taking prosocial actions to perpetuate good for everybody. Although important in amplifying the effects of pride, we found that other-orientation, counter-intuitively perhaps, has an opposite and detrimental effect for people experiencing shame. “Other-oriented” individuals are more sensitive to being disapproved by people, thus acting upon shame opens them up to additional exposure to others' judgments of them (Tangney et al., 2007). In our experiment, this sensitivity likely induced a felt urge to flee the situation rather than trying to repair the harm done. We found that low otheroriented individuals actively seek to repair the harm they caused, because others' judgments posed less of a threat to their damaged selfimage compared to individuals higher in other-related values.

Table 4 Results for conditional effects of manipulated shame on pro-active responses. Felt shame

Constant Manipulated shame Felt shame Perspective-taking Other-directed values Interaction 1 Interaction 2 Interaction 3 Interaction 4 R2

Shame proactive behaviors

B

se

B

se

3.08*** 0.72***

0.08 0.08

− 1.35 0.04 1.86*** 0.65** 0.67* − 0.08 − 0.31** − 0.27** 0.05* 0.25***

1.29 0.06 0.52 0.28 0.25 0.05 0.11 0.10 0.02

0.32***

Conditional indirect effects Mediator

Otherdirected values

Perspectivetaking

Effect

BootSE

BootLLCI

BootULCI

Felt Felt Felt Felt

Low High Low High

Low Low High High

0.22 0.03 0.01 0.03

0.07 0.09 0.13 0.06

0.10 − 0.16 − 0.24 − 0.08

0.37 0.20 0.28 0.16

shame shame shame shame

Interaction Interaction Interaction Interaction

1: 2: 3: 4:

perspective-taking × other-directed values. felt shame × perspective-taking. felt shame × other-directed values. felt shame × perspective-taking × other-directed values.

customers moral decision-making (e.g., Xie et al., 2015) with an investigation on how organizational members react to responsible and irresponsible firm actions. Our findings show that authentic pride, typically framed as an individualistic motive (e.g., Hu & Kaplan, 2015), can be applied in service of broader interests. When regulated by otherrelated values and perspective taking, pride helps usher self-directed choices to achieve goals that contribute to morally responsible actions, behaviors that are good for the organization and the extended community. Moreover, given the world's population is predominantly culturallyrooted in collectivism (roughly 70%), typically associated with shamebased self-conscious affective reactions (rather than guilt-based), the findings presented are of interest for business ethics in the context of the global enterprise (see Bagozzi, Verbeke, & Gavino, 2003). The 279

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Fig. 4. Plot of the interaction between felt shame and perspective-taking at low level of other-directed values.

encouraging others to work for the company. On the other hand, feelings of shame led to proactive behaviors designed to fulfill one's role in the organization and enhance functioning therein. Here the defensive mechanism of psychological compensation was suggested as a means for coping with felt shame (e.g., Freund & Baltes, 2002). The specific shame proactive behaviors were desires to make restitution for the damages caused, promote transparency, seek out collaborative solutions, and advocate for changes in pro-environmental policies. Overall, our study and its findings advance our understanding, application, and further development of the social intuition approach to self-conscious emotions. In particular, the work was posited in a business ethics context, which exemplifies the adaptability of the social intuitionist model for use in business situations.

Accordingly, our results shed new light on the negative effects of perspective-taking and other-oriented values when coupled with positive and negative emotions. In addition, Haidt's (2012) social intuitionist approach, consistent with David Hume's theory of moral behavior, relies on emotional arguments and does not formally incorporate cognitive content. The model of moral decision-making and behavior in our research proceeds from affective assumptions, but deviates from Haidt's approach by introducing cognitive content in the form of self-regulation through personal values and perspective-taking. This modified perspective is therefore an integrative one where emotions are still seen as the primary drivers of moral actions, but reasoning regulates their effect. Our research also addressed specific behavioral consequences of pride and shame, as they relate to a particular organizational context. On the one hand, feelings of pride led to proactive behaviors intended to sustain performance of the original actions that prompted pride. In other ways, pride continues to work for and on behalf of the organization in a favorable manner. Such outcomes can further enhance selfworth and personal satisfaction. The particular proactive behaviors prompted by pride were represented by decisions to remain with the company, speaking favorably about the company to others, and

5.2. Managerial implications Today, business ethics scholars consistently embrace the notion that affective experiences can serve to motivate or deter organizational members from pursuing moral action. Accordingly, if management is genuinely committed to corporate social responsibility, they need to better understand how and why self-conscious emotions like shame and Fig. 5. Plot of the interaction between felt shame and perspective-taking at low level of other-directed values.

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which involves a threat to the presented self, would benefit from additional inquiry. This common emotion may serve as a self-regulatory mechanism in everyday organization behavior, while also providing a signal to others that the member values the norms or expectations that led to their embarrassment (e.g., Verbeke & Bagozzi, 2003). Likewise, the self-conscious emotion of envy could function in organizations as a motivator for prosocial action. Here low or moderate levels of envy may spur certain types of useful reactions (e.g., self-improvement). Of course, similar to the case of pride, where excess arrogance or hubris is to be avoided, malicious envy should be controlled. Likewise, the role of being envied is worthy of study. Guilt is another emotion that is worth investigating within organizational contexts. Although in our study we experimentally manipulated shame, we also measured guilt as an alternative mediator, eventually replicating a similar set of findings for shame. In addition, we conducted a robustness check to evaluate whether our results for shame hold after controlling for the effect of guilt. The results of our model remain statistically significant and unchanged even after accounting for experienced guilt. Yet, future studies should investigate and manipulate the specific effects of induced guilt for reparative behaviors through different mediators (e.g., experienced guilt) and moderators (e.g., guilt proneness). The data for our study were based upon the use of a convenience or availability sampling method, a type of non-probability sampling that relies upon data collection from population members who are available to participate in the process. In business research this method can be applied to gain primary data regarding specific issues such as perceptions, reactions, and opinions. In our specific case, the majority of the participants in the study were upper-level senior management students. Although these students were not practicing managers, all had extensive business course work and experienced realistic business cases in classes. The purpose of the program they were enrolled in was to develop young men and women for entry level positions in management, with the expectation that they would move into management positions over time. While debate continues regarding the use of students as surrogates for business managers in experimental studies (Hughes & Gibson, 1991), prior research has endorsed the practice (e.g., Remus, 1986). Rather than arguing whether convenience sampling is good or bad, Landers and Behrend (2015) explain how sampling is better understood in methodological terms of range restriction and omitted variables bias. Our data did not exhibit significant range restrictions, and the experimental nature of the study reduces problems of omitted biases because random assignment of participants to conditions provides a certain degree of assurance of equal likelihood of omitted variables across conditions. With a goal to better understand people's perceptions, most studies in industrial–organizational (IeO) psychology use convenience samples. Indeed, well known scholarship in the area of ethical decisionmaking and corporate social responsibility draws insight from convenience samples and student participants (Alonso-Almeida, Fernández de Navarrete, & Rodriguez-Pomeda, 2015; Treviño, 1986; Treviño & Youngblood, 1990). Thus, our convenience sample leveraging management student engagement was justified in that it met conventional and reasonable required criteria for justified methodologically-based inclusion. We acknowledge that future research is needed with samples of actual managers and employees. Because of both the practical drawbacks and ethical risks of inducing organizational pride and shame, we used scenarios to manipulate emotions in relation to the organization, within which the participant presumably had engaged in morally admirable or reprehensible actions. Nevertheless, the use of other approaches would expand the scope and establish the validity of the role of self-conscious emotions in organizations (Teper, Zhong, & Inzlicht, 2015). Quigley et al. (2014) suggest numerous laboratory induction techniques for manipulating emotions. For example, videos, images from the International Affective Pictures System (Lang, Bradey, & Cuthbert, 2008), posed facial emotions,

pride may help support moral decisions that underwrite this type of performance. If we hope to secure a future that addresses social welfare and environmental sustainability in business enterprise, we need practical insights that show how managers can move in this direction. Recognizing, leveraging, and even cultivating useful emotions known to be associated with the pursuit of moral action can then be viewed as a management tool, rather than cast as a subjective idea. Insights from this work underscore the value of unpacking the relationship between affect (e.g., pride and shame) and cognition (e.g., empathy). The findings affirm the value of pride and shame toward deployment of a stakeholder view, suggesting that cultivating selfconscious emotions can be used to help management shift from shareholder self-interest to broader perspective-taking efforts. Given that stakeholder-driven firms typically adopt the idea of embracing others' perspectives in decision-making, the implications are profound. In short, if a firm's leadership genuinely cares about stakeholders in route to accomplishing their performance goals, a greater understanding of self-conscious emotions will be necessary to effectively leverage human decision-making processes that support a sincere regard for others. The findings of our research also offer business implications that can be applied to management education, as well as to corporate training and ongoing adult moral development in the workplace. For example, managers can become visible role models, purposively working to fortify moral strength in their everyday task actions. By explicitly discussing and valuing self-awareness and, more specifically, the ability to recognize one's own self-conscious emotions, employees will come to appreciate what enables (or disables) their ability to address an ethical issue, challenge, or dilemma with moral strength. In workshops or training sessions, employees can learn to openly discuss how affective influences play a role in fostering or thwarting an employee's desire to address an ethical issue. When the organization or its processes are viewed as barriers to moral action, it may be the result of competing values. Bringing these tensions forward can be a useful focal point for ethical discourse, learning, and development. Moreover, management can reflect the value of achieving moral performance goals (both corporate and individual), by honoring and rewarding perspective-taking. This suggests the need to track and assess moral competencies that support ethical behavior in employee performance (e.g., emotional signaling, reflective pause, self-regulation, and moral preparation) (Sekerka, 2016; Sekerka & Bagozzi, 2007). To sustain and build moral strength in business, managers will need to incorporate a more mindful consideration of other-oriented concerns, and support the ability to recognize and draw insight from self-conscious emotions. 5.3. Limitations and future research A number of limitations of our research should be pointed out, for they offer promising opportunities for future scholarship. The role of other self-conscious emotions deserves further study. For example, the type of pride that we investigated is “authentic” pride. This kind of pride is realistic and fits the situation created in the organization in question. Our creation of authentic pride differs, however, from exaggerated or excessive pride, often termed hubris. This other kind of pride is typically associated by others as reflecting an arrogant, egotistical, or haughty persona (i.e., the person sees themselves as being better than others), and frequently leads to break-downs in communication and negative attributions (Tangney, 1990; Tangney & Fischer, 1995). By contrast, authentic pride, as a result more of what one does (pride in accomplishments) rather than who one is, reflects such feelings as achievement, success, fulfillment, and self-worth (Tracy & Robins, 2007). Accordingly, future research can investigate and compare the behavioral effects of these two types of pride in ethical situations. Further, although the core self as reflected in shame has consequences for reparative and other positive responses, embarrassment, 281

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A.1.1. Scenario 1 (control) You are senior management working for an international oil firm named J.J. Oil. The company operates within the field of energy, engaged in the production and transport of natural oil and gas. You ensure that the firm's tankers are properly equipped so that the transport of the oil is done without causing environmental harm. In particular, the company you work for concentrates much of its activities in the petro-chemistry industry, where it boasts a strong international market position. The firm operates within 70 countries with around 76,000 employees. In fact, the company is a leading operator within the European refining sector, as well as in the distribution of oil products in international markets. In 2008, the sale of products was equal to 50.15 million tons. The capacity of the firm's refineries is currently equal to 544 thousand barrels a day. This company owns extraction plants in a number of countries, where besides forming agreements for drilling, it has also set up refineries and distribution networks. In fact, the design and realization of pipelines and refineries is often inserted in the agreements as compensation for the detection and development of oil-fields. In 2008, the investments sustained by the firm were in three main areas: a) refining and logistics; b) distribution network of oil products; and c) purchase of service stations.

sounds/voices, music, imagery and recall, evocative words, performing bodily movements and posture, physiological manipulations, use of confederates to model stimuli, motivated performance tasks, virtual reality stimuli, and real-world stimuli (e.g., graphic images of physical or personal damage or gains) all represent alternative ways to induce emotions. Additionally, our research studied the moderating role of two individual differences, perspective-taking and other-directed values, regarded as two important dispositions in moral behavior (Decety & Cowell, 2014a; Hursthouse, 1999; Schwartz, 1996). But the effects of other differences in terms of values could be investigated as well. For instance, such values and virtues as self-direction, creativity, freedom, flourishing, humility, harmony, embeddedness, mastery, and intellectual autonomy might contribute to the self-regulation of selfconscious emotions. Likewise, affective empathy and theory of mind (Bagozzi et al., 2013) seem particularly relevant to goal-directed behavior and can be studied objectively as physical brain processes. Finally, moral identity and different self-concept foci (i.e., relational self, collective self, individual self), which have been shown to moderate the experience of moral emotions (e.g., Xie et al., 2015), might be studied as potential moderators of self-conscious emotions. Attitudinal or evaluative processes also might complement the functioning of self-conscious emotions and even compete as rival hypotheses to account for moral decisions (e.g., Judge & Kammeyer-Mueller, 2012). In general, there is a need to better integrate emotional and cognitive processes in moral decision-making (Dedeke, 2015).

A.1.2. Scenario 2: (pride) You are senior management working for an international oil firm named J.J. Oil for the past three years. The company operates within the field of energy, engaged in the production and transport of natural oil and gas. You ensure that the firm's tankers are properly equipped so that the transport of the oil is done without causing environmental harm. In recent years the strategy within the company has been to implement cost-cutting measures, which threatens the safety standards designed to protect the environment. You play a role in this emergent trend: cutting back on resources devoted to safety inspections and procedures to save money. After careful reflection, you decide to take on senior management to address this issue. Given that the environment is deeply intertwined with your firm's core purpose, you work tirelessly building a strategic case for making environmental protection a key distinguishing feature of the organization's core mission. This means a self-imposed shift in J.J. Oil's refinement process, moving to create as little environmental impact as possible and distinguishing conservation of bio-diversity a central corporate objective. This is an operational change, not a marketing ploy. Your plan is a well-thought out process to show how refinement operations can actually be changed. You include how to build integrated support, drawing on the strength from environment initiatives, partnering with regulatory agencies, and networking with other sustainability cooperatives. Finally, you have outlined the creating of a nature reserve funded by the company that will protect an area that would otherwise succumb to development. You show how this long-term eco-friendly perspective will create profits that are truly environmentally sustainable. This change imposes a demonstrative shift to traditional operations, a proactive stance toward genuine environment corporate responsibility. Senior management at J.J. Oil decide to go ahead with a pilot project, which proves to be an overwhelming success, resourcing greater cost savings than expected and attracting government attention as a model for new industry standards. As a result of your plan you have just been selected as “Change Agent of the Year” by the company's CEO. The distinction has made the local news and journalists have been calling you to get your thought on how to make environmental sustainability even more deeply integrated across industry standards. As a result, family and friends from around the country are contacting you to say how thrilled they are to learn of this achievement with such far reaching implications. Regardless of the award, it is clear that as a result of your efforts, you have helped to make a positive change in the world, one that will have lasting impacts for future generations to

5.4. Conclusion In conclusion, whereas previous studies have mainly focused on moral emotions (e.g., contempt, anger, disgust, gratitude, awe, elevation), more research is needed to investigate the unique role played by discrete self-conscious emotions, such as pride and shame, in moral decision-making. The present study offers an initial step in expanding and deepening the existing literature by clarifying nuances between social self-conscious and moral emotions, and the processes regulating their effects on moral decisions. Compliance with ethical standards Ethical approval All procedures performed in studies involving human participants were in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional and/ or national research committee and with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards. Informed consent Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants included in the study. Appendix A. Study protocol A.1. Instructions Please be as honest and frank as you possibly can be in your responses. We really need to learn what are peoples' true reactions, and to what extent people differ from others. Thus we need you to express your genuine, personal reactions, not necessarily how you believe you or others should think or feel about things. We want your true thoughts and feelings in this anonymous questionnaire. Put YOURSELF in place of the person described in this scenario. As vividly as possible, truly imagine that you ARE this person. Read each scenario carefully and respond to the items that follow. It should take you about 30 min to complete the questions. 282

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A.1.3. Scenario 3: (shame) You are senior management working for an international oil firm named J.J. Oil for the past five years. The company operates within the field of energy, engaged in the production and transport of natural oil and gas. You ensure that the firm's tankers are properly equipped so that the transport of the oil is done without causing environmental harm. In recent years the strategy within the company has been to implement cost-cutting measures, which threatens the safety standards designed to protect the environment. You plan a role in this emergent trend: cutting back on resources devoted to safety inspections and procedures to save money. But today's news is a spill disaster. One of your firm's tankers experienced a massive leak from its main holding tank (likely as a result of aging parts and lack of service), spilling > 40 million liters of crude oil into the ocean. The oil slick extends for miles, which will cause the suffering and death of thousands of fish, birds, and other animals, whose carcasses can already be seen floating on the surface. The animals are covered by a greasy layer of oil, are unable to move or fee, and destined to die a slow, agonizing death. As the oil stretches out over the area, marine flora and fauna will perish in much the same way, gradually suffocated by the oil that leaves sea beds lifeless. There will be horrific damage to the shoreline and beaches, as the slick moves with the wind and currents toward land. The population of mussels, clams, oysters, and other seafood farming is now completely contaminated. Fishing operations have to cease impacting those who depend upon these resources to make a living, not to mention the larger fishing industries that depend upon healthy natural resources. Many people, some of whom are your friends and relatives, are now out of business for the unforeseeable future. It has already been estimated that it will require no < 20 years for the marine eco-system to recover from this disaster. Due to your initiation of cut-backs in resources, the tanker did not have proper inspections which could have identified and corrected the equipment malfunction that caused the disaster. This situation did not have to occur and there's really no denying that, in large part, it is your fault. You did little or nothing to reverse the reduced safety trend that led to the oil spill disaster. Acknowledgements We would like to thank the reviews and editor for constructive comments and suggestions for improving our paper. References Algoe, S., & Haidt, J. (2009). Witnessing excellence in action: The other-praising emotions of elevation, admiration, and gratitude. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 4, 105–127. Alonso-Almeida, M. D. M., Fernández de Navarrete, F. C., & Rodriguez-Pomeda, J. (2015). Corporate social responsibility perception in business students as future managers: A multifactorial analysis. Business Ethics: A European Review, 24(1), 1–17. Antonetti, P., & Maklan, S. (2014). Feelings that make a difference: How guilt and pride convince consumers of the effectiveness of suitable consumption choices. Journal of Business Ethics, 124, 117–134. Bäckman, L., & Dixon, R. A. (1992). Psychological compensation: A theoretical framework. Psychological Bulletin, 112, 1–25. Bagozzi, R. P., Verbeke, W., & Gavino, J. C., Jr. (2003). Culture moderates the self-regulation of shame and its effects on performance: The case of salespersons in the Netherlands and the Philippines. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88, 219–233. Bagozzi, R. P., Verbeke, W. J., Dietvorst, R. C., Belschak, F. D., van den Berg, W. E., & Rietdijk, W. J. (2013). Theory of mind and empathic explanations of Machiavellianism a neuroscience perspective. Journal of Management, 39(7), 1760–1798. Baumeister, R. F., Stillwell, A. M., & Heatherton, T. F. (1994). Guilt: An interpersonal approach. Psychological Bulletin, 115(2), 243–267. Bews, N. F., & Rossouw, G. J. (2002). A role for business ethics in facilitating trustworthiness. Journal of Business Ethics, 39(4), 377–390. Bodolica, V., & Spraggon, M. (2011). Behavioral governance and self-conscious emotions: Unveiling governance implications of authentic and hubristic pride. Journal of Business Ethics, 100(3), 535–550.

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He also works in the areas of emotions and the theory of mind and empathy, as well as philosophy of science aspects of the use of structural equation models in social science and management research. Leslie Sekerka is a Professor of Organizational Behavior at Menlo College in Atherton, California. She is Director of the Ethics in Action Research and Education Center and serves as an academic partner at Santa Clara University's Markkula Center for Applied Ethics. She delivers customized workshops and personal coaching to foster ethical action in professional practice with a complementary research agenda that focuses on adult moral development, ethical decision making, and moral courage in the workplace. Francesco Sguera is an Assistant Professor of Organizational Behavior at Católica Lisbon School of Business and Economics. He received his PhD in Business Administration from the University of Bologna. 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