Union organizing effort and success in the U.S., 1948–2004

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Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 27 (2009) 13–34

Union organizing effort and success in the U.S., 1948–2004夽 Michael Wallace a,∗ , Andrew S. Fullerton b , Mustafa E. Gurbuz a a

Department of Sociology, University of Connecticut, 344 Mansfield Road, Storrs, CT 06269, United States b Oklahoma State University, United States Received 18 July 2008; accepted 14 October 2008

Abstract While union density in the public sector has increased in recent decades, private sector union density in the U.S. has declined steadily since the mid-1950s. Scholars have evoked a variety of explanations to account for the decline in union membership, but substantially less attention has been devoted to understanding the contribution of the union organizing process as governed by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). In this paper, we focus on two aspects of this process: union organizing effort (the effort to establish union representation elections to organize non-unionized workers) and union organizing success (success in winning union representation elections). Using annual time series data for the U.S. from 1948 to 2004, we show that there has been a long-term decline in both union organizing effort and union organizing success, which likely contributes to declining union density. We focus on three explanations for these changes: the political–legal environment for unions, deindustrialization and globalization, and employer opposition to unionization efforts. We find that each of these factors contributes to organizing effort and success and conclude with a discussion of the implications of this research for future mobilization efforts. © 2008 Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International Sociological Association Research Committee 28 on Social Stratification and Mobility. Keywords: Union decline; Union organizing effort; Union organizing success; NLRB certification

1. Introduction In 1950, historian Arthur Schlesinger, assessing the ten events “that profoundly shaped and shook history” in the first half of the twentieth century, ranked the “upsurge of labor” as third in importance behind the two world wars (Brody, 1980, p. 173). By contrast, in the last half-century, perhaps no social trend impacting the U.S. labor force has had more far-reaching effects on workers

夽 The authors would like to thank Steven Lopez, Andrew Martin, Michael Mulcahy, and Chris Tilly for helpful comments on previous drafts of the paper. A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2006 annual meeting of the American Sociological Association in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. ∗ Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (M. Wallace).

than the decline of union membership. Union density, or the percentage of workers belonging to labor unions, reached a peak of about 33% in the mid-1950s and has declined steadily ever since to about 12.5% in 2004. This trend is remarkable considering the marked divergence between unionization trends in the public and private sectors (Cornfield & Fletcher, 2001; Farber, 2005; Freeman, 1988). Public sector membership hovered between 10% and 12% until 1962 when President Kennedy signed Executive Order 10988 which legitimized unionization among federal employees (Barbash, 2006). Subsequent legislation at the state levels spurred unionization among state employees to the point that about 37% of all public sector employees were unionized by 2004. By contrast, private sector unionization has declined steadily since the 1950s. After peaking in 1953 at 35.7%, union density in the private sector has reached its lowest level in

0276-5624/$ – see front matter © 2008 Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International Sociological Association Research Committee 28 on Social Stratification and Mobility.

doi:10.1016/j.rssm.2008.10.002

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Fig. 1. Public- and private-sector union density.

nearly a century at about 7.9% in 2004. The divergent trends in public and private sector unionization and the impact on overall unionization are shown graphically in Fig. 1. As Fig. 1 makes clear, the overall pattern in union density is weighted heavily by trends in the private sector since the private sector comprises the largest portion of the labor market. Hence, much recent research has focused appropriately on causes for union decline in the private sector (Farber & Western, 2001; Nissen, 2003). Several researchers (e.g., Goldfield, 1987) have suggested that an important aspect of union decline lies in the institutional processes of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) which, among other things, oversees union representation elections in the private sector (see Stern & Cornfield, 1996 for a review of the literature on the NLRB union certification process). In this paper, we focus on the role of NLRB union representation elections in shaping the decline of union organization in the private sector. For most of the post-World War II period, the NLRB road to union representation can be described as a two-stage process, each of them fraught with difficulty for those seeking to unionize: first, the effort to achieve NLRB authorization to hold a union representation election and, second, the campaign to persuade a majority of workers in the representation unit to vote in favor of union representation. We focus on both stages of the NLRB union certification process and how they are related to broader changes in the U.S. political economy. We refer to the effort to establish union representation elections to organize non-unionized workers as union organizing effort and refer to success in achieving unionization through winning NLRB elections as union organizing success. While several studies have focused on the second stage of this pro-

cess (e.g., Bronfenbrenner & Juravich, 1998; Freeman, 1985; Goldfield, 1987; Lopez, 2004), the build-up to these elections is equally important, but has been largely ignored (Goldfield, 1987). A fuller explanation of union decline requires a better understanding of why mobilization efforts have faltered in recent decades and might lead to new strategies for union revitalization in the future. As Goldfield (1987, p. 208) states, “. . .unions can put out the necessary effort to win when they have to . . . (but) most of the time unions do not put out this sufficient effort.” We contend that union decline may be due to diminished union organizing effort, declining organizing success, or some combination of the two.1 We identify three potential sources of change in union organizing effort and success. First, we focus on the political–legal environment in which labor vies for union members. The political–legal environment has been dominated by the Wagner Act of 1935 which created the National Labor Relations Board and established the right of workers to form unions and bargain collectively. The subsequent passage of the Taft–Hartley Act in 1947 and the Landrum–Griffin Act of 1959 swung the balance of power back toward employers and reshaped the institutional context of union organizing (Lichtenstein, 2002). In particular, hundreds of NLRB regulatory decisions and interpretations of labor law by the courts have chipped away at the original scope of union organizing envisioned by the NLRA (Gross, 1985, 1995). Second, we investigate the role of deindustrialization and globalization as factors undermining the position of organized labor to attract new members. Particularly, since the 1970s, the loss of well-paying manufacturing jobs and the threat of foreign competition and immigrant labor have weakened labor’s capacity to make gains in union membership. Third, we analyze expressions of employer opposition to union organization which have become more conspicuous factors in throttling union organizing effort and success. We now turn to a fuller discussion of these topics. 2. Explaining union decline in the United States Explanations for the decline in unionization are wellestablished in the literature (for reviews, see Clawson & Clawson, 1999; Cornfield, 1991; Fiorito, 2007) and there is some overlap between these explanations and potential 1 A more nuanced view is that declining union win rates in certification elections have led to reduced effort to initiate future NLRB elections. Therefore, the increasing obstacles to union organizing may be more to blame than the sheer effort of unions to organize new members.

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sources of change in union organizing effort and success. Several studies point to compositional changes in the U.S. labor force in terms of demographic, industrial, or occupational factors (Bronfenbrenner, 2005; Cornfield, Cavalcanti, Filho & Chun, 1990; Dickens & Leonard, 1985; Goldfield, 1987; Nissen, 2003; Western, 1997). Similarly, some studies point to fluctuations in the business cycle (e.g., unemployment, wage changes, etc.) as critical for spurring workers to join unions (Ashenfelter & Pencavel, 1969; Elsheikh & Bain, 1978; Pencavel, 1971), although these studies have limited capacity to explain long-term trends. Others (Lipset & Meltz, 2004; Lipset & Schneider, 1987) offer cultural explanations that center on Americans’ unique sense of individualism and reticence to participate in collective efforts for selfadvancement in the labor market. Some scholars point to the quiescence and passivity of organized labor (Griffin, McCammon, & Botsko, 1990) or to unions’ failure to commit sufficient resources to unionization drives (e.g., Bronfenbrenner, 2005; Bronfenbrenner & Hickey, 2004; Bronfenbrenner & Juravich, 1998). Explanations for this weak commitment to union growth often include the conservative nature of business unionism, the economistic orientation of union leaders, and the tendency to service existing members’ needs rather than recruiting new members (Bronfenbrenner & Hickey, 2004; Voss & Sherman, 2000). While these accounts have much credibility, a common denominator among them is that they place primary responsibility for union decline on characteristics of potential union members themselves or on union leadership, rather than on historical or contextual factors that hinder union growth. If workers wanted to be in unions, they would be. However, this view neglects considerable structural obstacles that have impeded workers’ ability to join unions. Drawing from the worker responses to the Worker Representation and Participation Survey, Freeman (2007) points out, “The rise in the desire for union representation . . . suggests . . . that if workers were provided the union representation they desired in 2005, then the overall unionization rate would have been about 58%.” Freeman shows that this gap between the percentage of workers who belong to unions and those who desire unionization is the largest in recent U.S. history and the largest among six advanced Englishspeaking nations with comparable industrial relations systems. Among the historical factors impacting the contemporary U.S. labor movement, three stand out as potentially important factors in understanding trends in organizing effort and success: the political–legal environment, deindustrialization and globalization, and employer opposition to unions.

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2.1. The political–legal environment The political and legal environment surrounding union organizing is one major explanation for the decline in union density in recent decades (Cornfield, 1986, 1989a,b; Kochan, Katz, & McKersie, 1994; Robinson & McIlwee, 1989). Since the New Deal, the overarching legal framework for union organization has been set by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, commonly known as the Wagner Act for the New York senator who sponsored the bill in Congress. The NLRA definitively established workers’ right to unionize and engage in collective bargaining and gave legal standing to the practice of the strike for defending workers’ collective interests. Further, it established the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and charged it with overseeing procedures for union representation elections and sanctioning their results. In addition, the NLRB adjudicated cases of unfair labor practices against employers and unions and had authority to impose sanctions, including worker reinstatement and back pay for employer retaliation against union activists (McCammon, 2001). In conjunction with a series of favorable court rulings, the Wagner Act galvanized workers’ protests against employers and spurred a surge in union organization, particularly among unskilled and semi-skilled workers who comprised the ranks of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) (Piven & Cloward, 1979; Wallace, Rubin and Smith, 1988). Subsequent labor legislation sought to rein in the sweeping changes created by the Wagner Act and swing the balance of power back in favor of employers. In the wake of the most extensive strike wave in the country’s history in 1946,2 Congress passed the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, also known as the Taft–Hartley Act. Taft–Hartley restricted the use of such effective labor strategies as sit-down strikes, sympathy strikes, and secondary boycotts; put limits on union political contributions; created provisions for employers to file unfair labor practices against unions; created a “free speech” provision for employers that effectively gave management the right to actively campaign against union organizing drives; and gave the president the right to order striking workers back to work in cases of national emergency (Gross, 1985; Lichtenstein, 2002; Wallace, 2007; Wallace et al., 1988). Taft–Hartley also provided support for workers’ rights

2 During 1946, striking workers cost employers 116 million persondays lost in employment, about 68% higher than the next highest year in U.S. history, 1969 (Wallace et al., 1988).

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to engage in collective bargaining as well as to refrain from participating in collective bargaining, which has allowed subsequent NLRB boards to apply the policy in favor of either unions or employers, depending upon the political climate and the composition of the board at the time (Gross, 1985). Taft–Hartley was followed twelve years later by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, or the Landrum–Griffin Act, which further severely limited the economic and political power of unions. Landrum–Griffin strengthened many of the restrictions imposed by Taft–Hartley, called for more government regulation of the internal affairs of unions, and limited the autonomy of unions to control their own funds and internal procedures (Lichtenstein, 2002; Wallace et al., 1988). Thus, while the institutional structure and procedures of the NLRB as established by the Wagner Act remained largely intact, Taft–Hartley and Landrum–Griffin tilted the balance of power back in favor of employers and encouraged a variety of employer strategies to curb union growth. Among the many employer advantages of the Taft–Hartley Act, one provision reversed the Wagner Act’s protection for the closed shop in which workers in unionized companies were required to belong to the union. In addition, Taft–Hartley gave states the right to outlaw the union shop (in which workers must become members within a specified period) by enacting right to work laws. Right to work laws (or, in some cases, state constitutional amendments) effectively permit employers to create “open shop” environments in which workers in unionized companies do not have to join unions or pay union dues (Ellwood & Fine, 1987). These laws damaged the ability of unions to raise financial resources, undermined their effectiveness in fighting employer abuses, and thus weakened their appeal to workers. Right to work laws provided employers, particularly those in manufacturing settings, with incentives to avoid unions by shifting production from the highly unionized Northeast and Midwest to the right to work states, which are concentrated in the South, the Plains states, and the Rocky Mountain states (Bronfenbrenner, 2000). According to Ellwood and Fine (1987), right to work laws dramatically decreased the de facto number of workers eligible for unionization as well as the size of the bargaining units petitioning for union recognition. Due to a combination of additional states passing right to work laws3

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There are currently 22 states with right-to-work laws, constitutional amendments or both that cover all workers. A 23rd state, Indiana, limits right-to-work provisions to school employees (U.S. Department of Labor, 2006).

and the shift of employment from unionized regions to right to work states, the percentage of national employment under the jurisdiction of right to work laws has increased from about 3% in 1946 to over 40% in 2004. Further, the other 60% of the labor force are dissuaded from union organizing by the threat that their employers might relocate to the right to work states or overseas. We expect that right to work laws have negatively affected the organizing effort and organizing success of unions. A watershed moment in the post-World War II political–legal environment was Reagan’s crushing of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) strike in 1981. This event consummated the demise of the capital–labor accord (Bowles, 1982; Weisskopf, 1981) that had created a rough parity in the power between employers and unions for three decades after World War II. By showing that the government would fire striking federal workers and permanently replace them with new employees, Reagan opened the door to more aggressive anti-union strategies by private sector employers and fundamentally altered the rules of the game for employers and unions thereafter. The PATCO strike signaled an institutional rearrangement of labor-management relations in the U.S. This sea change in national labor policy occurred almost overnight: Chaison and Dhavale (1990) document a nearly 50% plunge in the number of union representation elections from 1980 to 1982, the years before and after the PATCO strike. The 1980s were marked by an aggressive period of concessionary bargaining, anti-union campaigns orchestrated by outside consultants, strike-breaking with replacement workers, and other union-busting activities that had a “chilling effect” on union organizing activities from which the union movement has yet to recover (Harrison & Bluestone, 1988, p.102; Logan, 2006). We hypothesize that the post-PATCO years will be negatively associated with organizing effort and organizing success. In a context where major labor legislation was turning the tide against the union movement, several countervailing forces supported union growth. First, since the New Deal, Democratic influence in the national government has traditionally improved enforcement of labor laws and favored pro-labor policies including supporting workers’ right to unionize. Western (1997) has shown in cross-national analyses that leftist parties consistently improve the prospects for unionization. In the U.S., Democratic control of the Congress is advantageous for maintaining or building union strength by passing pro-labor laws which improve the condition of workers and protect workers’ right to unionize. Democratic presidents can positively influence success in NLRB

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union certification elections by their appointments to the NLRB board. On the other hand, McCammon (2001) found that Democratically appointed NLRB members had no impact on labor’s “legal mobilization,” that is, the frequency of unfair labor practice charges filed by unions against employers. Nevertheless, we expect that Democratic representation in the national government should be positively related to organizing effort and organizing success. Also, recent reforms and changes in leadership of the nation’s largest labor federation, the AFL-CIO, have signaled a renewed emphasis on union organizing. In 1995, John Sweeney’s “New Voice” campaign emerged as a dissident faction within the AFL-CIO executive council that was dissatisfied with President Lane Kirkland’s ineffectual leadership, particularly in allowing union membership to decline to such low levels. Sweeney, who had served for 15 years as president of the fastest-growing union in the U.S., the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), pressed for a new emphasis on organizing new members, political education and support of pro-labor candidates, and greater diversity among the membership and executive council of the AFL-CIO. After his election as AFL-CIO president in 1995, Sweeney implemented numerous reforms to improve organizing effort and organizing success. New programs were created such as Union Summer (which enlists college activists in a summer of union organizing), Senior Summer (which retrains retired union workers in political and organizing activities), Union Cities (to support efforts by central labor councils in many cities to become more effective) and efforts to provide training and organizational support for state and local unions who attempted to create union organizing programs. Despite these efforts, Sweeney’s leadership has recently been challenged by another dissident faction that charges that his reforms have not gone far enough or have been unsuccessful. In 2005, seven dissident unions, which account for about 5.4 million of the AFL-CIO’s 13 million members, disaffiliated from the AFL-CIO to form a breakaway labor federation called Change to Win. Despite this latest challenge, we expect that Sweeney’s leadership of the AFL-CIO, spanning the years 1995 to the present, has increased union organization effort and union organizing success. 2.2. Deindustrialization and globalization Several researchers (e.g., Goldfield, 1987; Juris & Roomkin, 1980) argue that unionization has declined due to changes in the industrial and occupational structure. The “deindustrialization of America” (Bluestone &

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Harrison, 1982) has led to a massive shift from manufacturing to service jobs and to geographic mobility of manufacturing jobs within the United States from highunion to low-union-regions. Cross-national research from several affluent countries (Lee, 2005) suggests that deindustrialization has deeply influenced union decline. Wallace and Brady (2001) argue that deindustrialization triggered a spatialization of the labor process has led to dramatic declines in union membership in a variety of manufacturing industries which previously were highly unionized (cf., Brueggemann & Brown, 2003; Cornfield, 1986). In recent years, the hypermobility of capital has presented challenges to union organizers (Bronfenbrenner, 2000), and union strategies seem illequipped for organizing non-union workers in service jobs and, in particular, for appealing to women workers and workers of color who tend to populate these jobs (Bronfenbrenner, 2005). Although the SEIU and other service unions like the American Federation of Teachers have demonstrated some success in organizing service workers, we expect that, on the whole, deindustrialization has undermined organizing effort and organizing success. Globalization presents a similar threat to organized labor (Boswell & Stevis, 1999). The last half century was marked by increasing interdependence between the U.S. domestic economy and the global economy. Products made by foreign producers consume an increasingly larger share of the U.S. consumer market and many American companies have had to find new ways to remain competitive in the global market. The free-trade movement, symbolized by treaties like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 and the bilateral trade agreement with China negotiated by President Clinton in 1999, and the influence of organizations like the World Trade Organization, has accelerated the process of globalization in recent years. In order to remain competitive, many U.S. businesses have had to reduce labor costs either by moving their operations overseas or cutting the wages of their U.S. workers. As a result, more manufactured goods are being produced abroad for sale in the U.S. domestic market, resulting in a negative balance of trade in the U.S. A negative trade balance is an indicator of capital mobility and the spatialization of labor (Wallace & Brady, 2001) and should decrease union organizing effort and success as union jobs in the U.S. manufacturing sector move overseas and are replaced with low-wage service jobs. On the other hand, a positive balance of trade, characteristic of the earlier years in our analysis, indicates a trade surplus that should be favorable to union organizing. Thus, we expect that our first measure of globalization, the balance of

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trade, will be positively related to union organizing effort and organizing success; in other words, an unfavorable balance of trade will reduce effort and success. Similarly, the recent influx of immigrant labor, both legal and illegal, has complex implications for wage levels and union organizing in the U.S. Recent research shows that while immigrant workers have flowed into all levels of the U.S. occupational structure, including some workers in high-skilled occupations (HernándezLeón, 2004) and some who have experienced substantial job mobility after arriving in the U.S. (Bean, Leach & Lowell, 2004), they are nevertheless concentrated in lowwage occupations, particularly services (Hagan, 2004). The widespread economic restructuring in the U.S. labor market of the 1990s has accelerated the inflow of immigrant workers with low skill levels who are compelled to work harder and accept lower wages than many native workers while employers reap the benefits (Waldinger & Lichter, 2003). While the poor wages and working conditions of many immigrant workers would seem to make them ripe candidates for union organization (Bronfenbrenner et al., 1998; Milkman, 2000), many union activists still view immigrant workers as threats to established standards for wages and working conditions (Briggs, 2001). Further, many employers have historically hired immigrants because they are presumed to be less amenable to union organizing and will undermine the ability of native workers to build a strong union movement (Haar, 2006). While recent research shows that immigrant workers in New York City (Ness, 2005) and Los Angeles (Milkman, 2006) are capable of forging successful union organization drives, it is too early to tell if these relatively recent successes will spearhead a broad-based unionization effort among U.S. workers. Recent comparative research (e.g., Lee, 2005) strongly suggests that immigration negatively impacts unionization. Therefore, on balance, we expect this second measure of globalization – immigration – to be negatively related to union organizing effort and organizing success. 2.3. Employer opposition to unions Employer opposition and resistance have played a major role historically in the ability of U.S. workers to organize themselves into unions (Rubin, Griffin, & Wallace, 1983), and this is no less so in recent decades. According to the “class conflict thesis” (Cornfield, 1989b), capital flight, deindustrialization, and the passage of right to work laws in many Southern states have created an environment that has enabled employers to engage in several anti-union efforts and unfair

labor practices (see also Kochan, Katz, & McKersie, 1994). Essentially, there are several mechanisms by which employers oppose unions. First, increasing economic power of corporations as reflected in levels of aggregate concentration allows employers to mobilize resources which give them a structural advantage in resisting unionization. Greater corporate resources not only assure that employers can survive protracted union organization campaigns and outlast striking workers, they also effectively pre-empt many efforts to organize new workers by suggesting that these efforts are doomed to failure. Second, increased resources allow capitalists to create a hegemonic corporate culture that glorifies the goals of capitalism, fosters worker loyalty, and marginalizes anti-corporate sentiments. The corporate ethos is so strong that it permeates the culture at large through mechanisms such as advertising, philanthropic activities, and civic participation, and creates a latent pro-business climate that mitigates union activism. Third, concentrated corporate power also allows firms to develop a “business scan” that facilitates a class-wide rationality among the business class (Useem, 1982). This class cohesion permits capitalists to share information that helps them achieve greater unity with regard to goals and strategies to resist labor. We suspect that the demise of the capital–labor accord, signaled by the post-PATCO years, has only enhanced the effectiveness of these aspects of corporate power to stave off workers’ unionization attempts. Hence, we expect that levels of aggregate corporate concentration will be negatively related to union organizing effort and organizing success. Second, some scholars have recently noted important shifts in the nature of corporate management and control that have had important implications for the restructuring of the workplace (Applebaum & Berg, 1996; Gordon, 2000; Osterman, 1999). These changes led to the rise of the “shareholder value society” in the 1980s in which corporate control began prioritizing shareholder rights over stakeholder rights (Fligstein, 2001; Fligstein & Shin, 2004). The beneficiaries of this new environment were corporate shareholders as well as managers and professionals who supervised the corporate restructuring and those who lost out are stakeholders such as workers and communities who depended on jobs and tax revenues. The shareholder value society nurtured a new managerial culture which placed less emphasis on firm size and growth and greater priority on profit maximization. In this culture, workers were no longer valued partners in the firm, but were viewed as costs to be minimized (Fligstein & Shin, 2004). Although proponents of this perspective do not explicitly discuss how this new culture has affected

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unions, it has nonetheless created a spate of workplace changes that adversely affected workers (declining job security, increased hours of work and growing wage inequality, and reduced benefits at work). Clearly, unions are viewed as obstacles to the achievement of these corporate goals, so corporations will be motivated to undermine unions’ efforts to organize additional workers. Therefore, we expect that the rise of the shareholder value society, as evidenced by a rising ratio of corporate dividends to corporate profits, has negatively affected union organizing effort and organizing success. Third, employer opposition takes a more direct form in the openly anti-union activities that many employers utilize to prevent unionization campaigns from getting off the ground and defeating those campaigns which do get started (Bronfenbrenner et al., 1998). The NLRB’s two-stage process actually provides three opportunities for employers to defeat unionization drives: first, by obstructing and delaying union efforts to gain NLRB authorization to hold a union representation election; second, by marshalling resources to defeat the union in the election by de-legitimizing the union message, threatening the loss of jobs if the union wins, and intimidating workers who might support the union; and third, by refusing to bargain in good faith in negotiating a first contract once a union is recognized.4 This has led to the widespread perception among labor scholars and union activists that the NLRB union election process is broken. As early as 1988, Freeman (1988, p. 74) observed, “It is apparent that the legally established mode of organizing labor in the private sector of the United States has run dry for unions.” More recently, AFL-CIO Organizing Director Acuff (2005) has claimed, “The National Labor Relations Board process forces workers through a meat grinder. It is a process riddled with excessive delays, insignificant penalties to deter unscrupulous employers from violating the law, and an unfair election process that put workers through hell and back simply for trying exercise a basic human right.” Recent “card check” campaigns, by which employers agree to grant union recognition once a majority of workers sign cards saying they favor a union, seek to circumvent the obstacles of the conventional NLRB election process. The proposed Employee Free Choice Act would require all private sector employers to recog-

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While there has been no recent systematic study based on representative samples of union-won elections, an older study by Weiler (1984) found that the percent of union wins yielding first contracts fell from 86% in 1955 to 63% in 1980.

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nize unions on the basis of card checks, impose stricter penalties for employers who fired workers who support unions, and impose mandatory arbitration on employers who stall in negotiating a first contract. This Act was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in early 2007 and achieved support from a slim majority of 51 members of the U.S. Senate, but not enough to invoke cloture and end a filibuster by its opponents. The prospects for passage of this legislation seem more promising in the new Obama administration. Nevertheless, under the current regime of labor law, corporations have engaged in numerous anti-union strategies with few repercussions (Logan, 2006). They routinely hire anti-union consultants to devise strategies for maintaining a union-free environment, to assist management in filing unfair labor practice charges and launching union de-certification campaigns against unions, and to vilify union activists during representation elections (Clawson & Clawson, 1999; Goldfield, 1987; Kochan, Katz, & McKersie, 1994; Nissen, 2003). This anti-union climate has also been reflected in a surge of union deauthorization campaigns initiated by employers. Union deauthorization campaigns have divided the attention and resources of unions, putting them on the defensive, and slowing down union organization effort. We expect the effects of corporations’ anti-union activities to have negative effects on both union organizing effort and organizing success. 2.4. Hypotheses Summarizing the above discussion, we contend that union decline and anti-unionism stem from three general sources: the political–legal environment, deindustrialization and globalization, and employer opposition to unions. Specifically, we expect union organizing effort and success to be negatively associated with right to work laws, the post-PATCO period, deindustrialization, immigration, aggregate corporate concentration, the shareholder value society, and employer anti-union efforts and positively associated with Democratic control of the national government, the Sweeney era of the AFL-CIO, and a positive balance of trade. 3. Data and methods In this research, we investigate the causes of union organizing effort and success in the United States between 1948 and 2004. Our analysis begins in 1948 because, as we have shown, the passage of the Taft–Hartley Act in 1947 marks a significant turning point in the U.S. labor movement and was the major

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Fig. 2. (a) Workers eligible for certification, (b) number of certification elections, (c) union votes in certification elections, and (d) union wins in certification elections.

precursor to the decline in union strength beginning in the mid-1950s (Wallace, 2007). We utilize annual time series data that come from a variety of U.S. government publications and other public sources. Our analysis thus spans 57 years. 3.1. Dependent variables We have argued that since the Wagner Act the process of union organization has involved a two-stage process governed by the NLRB which we labeled union organizing effort and union organizing success. In this analysis, we derive two indicators of each of these concepts, thus meaning we have four dependent variables in the analysis. 3.2. Union organizing effort While much of the literature on union decline has focused on changes in union density, relatively little research has looked at the preparatory work done by unions to initiate organizational drives. Union organizing effort is the effort to establish union representation elections to organize non-unionized workers. Union

organizing effort has been broached in previous studies as an important labor outcome (e.g., Brady & Wallace, 2000; Wallace, Griffin, & Rubin, 1989), but, except for Chaison and Dhavale’s (1990) descriptive research note, labor scholars have not systematically investigated its role in union decline. Goldfield’s (1987) landmark study of union decline focused mainly on organizing success; while he acknowledged the potential importance of union organizing effort, his study failed to investigate this dimension of union decline. We derive two measures of this union organizing effort. The first, Workers Eligible, represents the number of non-union workers eligible to vote in NLRB union representation elections as a percentage of all private sector, non-union workers in the labor force. The second measure, Elections, is the number of NLRB union representation elections divided by the private sector, non-union labor force, multiplied by 100.5 Although these two measures are

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Our decision to use private sector, non-union workers as the denominator in both measures of union organizing effort is based on the fact that this is the pool of workers that is subject to union recruitment at any point in time.

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highly correlated (r = .87), they tap slightly different dimensions of union organizing effort. Workers Eligible indicates the relative potential to add to the ranks of union members, while Elections represents the relative effort to initiate new unionization campaigns. 3.3. Union organizing success Union organizing success, which is the focus of Goldfield’s (1987) research, represents the second stage of the union organization process—success in achieving unionization through winning NLRB elections. Again, we derive two measures. The third dependent variable, Union Voting, represents the percentage of valid votes in NLRB representation elections in favor of union representation. The fourth dependent variable, Union Wins, represents the percentage of NLRB representation elections won by unions. These two measures are highly correlated (r = .94), but the difference between them is important. Union Voting directly taps the degree of pro-union sentiment among those voting in all union representation elections and is therefore reflective of the underlying support for unions. Union Wins, on the other hand, indicates actual victories in union representation elections and is the most accepted indicator of union organizing success. In Figs. 2a–d, we show trends in these four dependent variables. All four show decline over the 57-year period of the analysis consistent with the overall pattern of decline in union density. Of the two union organizing effort variables, Workers Eligible shows a gradual decline until 1980 and then levels off at its lowest levels since the passage of the Wagner Act. Elections show a steep decline around 1980 and continue to taper off after that, until reaching its lowest level in the final year of the analysis. Both the union organizing success variables show cyclical, but downward-trending patterns until about 1980. After that, Union Voting maintains its cyclical pattern, but ceases to trend downward; in fact, there is evidence of a slight upward movement in the last several years. Union Wins, however, shows an upturn throughout the post-PATCO period, particularly since 1995 when Sweeney became president of the AFL-CIO. We note that union organizing success must be interpreted in light of union organizing effort. Unions might have higher win rates despite (or because of) lower rates of union organizing effort, particularly if unions choose their battles more strategically and allocate resources towards union campaigns that they have higher chances of winning. There is some evidence that this is precisely what happened during the Sweeney era of the AFL-CIO.

21

3.4. Independent variables 3.4.1. Political–legal environment We include four measures of the political–legal environment surrounding union decline in the U.S. Right to work represents the percentage of private sector, non-agricultural workers living in states that have adopted right to work laws. This variable increases steadily throughout the years of the analysis due to more states passing right to work laws and a geographic shift of employment into right to work states. Our next measure, post-PATCO era, is a period dummy variable representing the years since the PATCO strike. This variable is scored 0 for years 1948–1980, and 1 for years 1981–2004. This measure coincides with Chaison and Dhavale’s (1990) observation of the precipitous decline in union representation elections after the PATCO strike. We experimented with several measures of Democratic control of the national government, including the Presidency and both houses of Congress. Ultimately, we found the most robust effects for a measure of percent non-Southern Democrats in the House which reflects the core Democratic support for organized labor. Finally, we create a period dummy to mark the Sweeney era of the AFL-CIO, scored 1 for years 1995–2004 and 0 for other years.6 This measure also serves as a proxy for the rise of the card check era, the major alternative means of union organizing which was initiated by Sweeney’s SEIU.7 3.4.2. Deindustrialization and globalization Deindustrialization represents the long-term dismantling of the manufacturing sector and the shift towards services (Bluestone & Harrison, 1982). This systemic process is poorly captured simply by a measure of workers employed in manufacturing. Instead, we follow Wallace and Fullerton (2003) by operationalizing deindustrialization as the percent of workers employed in manufacturing, lagged 10 years, divided by the same measure in the current year. This measure tends to dip below 1.00 when manufacturing share of employment is increasing and tends to rise above 1.00 during periods of deindustrialization. We derive two measures of globalization. The first of these, balance of trade, is the net flow

6

Even though Sweeney took over as President of the AFL-CIO late in 1995, we include 1995 in the Sweeney period because of the build-up to his ascendance to the presidency. 7 We emphasize that the card check process used by SEIU starting in the 1990s circumvents the traditional NLRB process which is the focus of our measures in this paper. Consequently, although we expect that the SEIU campaign indirectly spurred higher levels of NLRB organizing, this is not a mathematical function of SEIU activity.

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M. Wallace et al. / Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 27 (2009) 13–34

of manufacturing goods into and out of the U.S.; when exports exceed imports, this represents a positive balance of trade that should benefit union organizing effort and success.8 The second measure, immigration, is measured as the total number of legal immigrants over the past 10 years as a percent of current year’s population. We sum immigrants over the previous 10 years to approximate the cumulative effects of recent immigration in the labor market and to smooth out short-term fluctuations. Unfortunately, our measure does not include a component to tap illegal immigration since no reliable measure exists over the entire period. This measure thus represents a conservative estimate of globalization’s impact on the labor supply. 3.4.3. Employer opposition We include three measures of employer opposition to unions. First, aggregate concentration is the percent of assets in the manufacturing sector controlled by the largest 100 manufacturing firms. This measure, previously used by Jacobs (1988), reflects the generalized economic power of corporations to shape corporate culture and create an anti-union climate in the workplace. While aggregate concentration in the economy as a whole would be preferred, such a measure is not available over the time period of this analysis. This manufacturingbased measure, which rises steadily over the period of the analysis, serves as a suitable proxy. Second, we include the dividends to profits ratio to capture the shift in managerial culture associated with the rise of the shareholder value society (Fligstein, 2001; Fligstein & Shin, 2004). Third, we include a measure of employer anti-unionism which is operationalized as value in logged real dollars of back pay workers receive from employers as compensation for losing their jobs in retaliation for union activities, as ordered by the NLRB. This measure, derived from data published in the NLRB Annual Report, reflects one of the key forms of retribution used by employers to deter union activity (Haar, 2006).9 As Acuff (2005) notes, “Here in the United States, over 20,000 workers were 8

Here we focus on the manufacturing balance of trade because manufacturing has historically been the engine of the U.S. economy and a stronghold of labor unions. 9 We acknowledge that this measure does not capture the full extent of employer opposition to union organizing and that, to some degree, it is dependent on NLRB enforcement. Nevertheless, it does capture the most severe instances of opposition that have been sanctioned by the NLRB and as such serves as a suitable proxy for the underlying level of employer opposition. We use the dollar amount of back pay rather than the number of workers reinstated because back pay is a better measure of the severity of employer retaliation as it accounts for the length of time workers have been without work.

fired or discriminated against for union activities in 2004 alone.” 3.5. Control variables We also include three variables which control for dimensions of the business cycle (Goldfield, 1987). Unemployment represents the percentage of the civilian labor force that is currently unemployed. Previous studies have shown that it is harder for unions to organize new workers during times of high unemployment and economic recession (Goldfield, 1987). Percent change real wages is the change in average manufacturing wages from year t-1 to year t divided by the same value in year t-1. As wages improve, the union/non-union wage differential tends to narrow, creating less incentive for non-unionized workers to join unions; thus, we expect our measure of change in real wages to be negatively related to union organizing and success. We also include a measure of capacity utilization which taps the degree to which the industrial sector is running at or near full capacity. We expect capacity utilization to have a positive impact on effort and success since employers are less inclined to accept an interruption in production and profitability when capacity utilization is high. Finally, for each model we enter the lagged endogenous variable to de-trend the series and to control for other possible determinants of the dependent variable. We also lag the six deindustrialization/globalization and employer opposition variables by one year (aggregate concentration is lagged by two years) to avoid simultaneity bias and to allow these variables appropriate time to affect the dependent variables. Because of the small number of cases in the analysis (N = 57), we report statistical significance levels up to p < .10. 4. Analysis In Table 1, we provide descriptive statistics for the variables used over the 1948–2004 period of the analysis. We have already discussed trends in the four dependent variables as shown in Fig. 2a–d. The means, standard deviations, and range of the independent variables are within the expected levels. We also provide a correlation matrix of all variables used in the analysis in Appendix A. Our key analyses are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 presents OLS regression models of our two union organizing effort variables, Workers Eligible and Elections. Table 3 presents OLS models for two union organizing success variables, Union Voting and Union Wins. We provide five models for each of the four depen-

M. Wallace et al. / Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 27 (2009) 13–34

23

Table 1 Descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis. Mean

S.D.

Range

Dependent variables Workers eligible Elections Union voting Union wins

1.07 13.37 55.84 53.81

0.77 7.43 9.83 9.34

.20–3.48 2.86–24.77 45.83–83.10 40.34–74.50

Independent variables Business cycle Unemployment Percent change real wages Capacity utilization

5.63 0.98 82.94

1.50 1.55 4.87

2.90–9.70 −2.31–4.01 73.8–95.5

Political–legal environment Right to work Post-PATCO era Percent non-southern democrats Sweeney era

29.25 0.42 38.50 0.18

7.06 0.50 6.05 0.38

16.24–40.47 0–1 19.59–48.51 0–1

Deindustrialization and globalization Deindustrialization Balance of trade Immigration

1.14 −0.82 0.96

0.12 1.86 0.28

.80–1.36 −5.08–3.09 .37–1.50

Employer opposition Aggregate concentration Dividends to profits ratio Employer anti-unionism

0.61 48.67 9.02

1.94 12.04 1.03

−6.09–5.41 31.93–72.44 6.14–10.45

Notes: N = 57. Data come from various government publications including the NLRB annual report, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the Bureau of Economic Analysis.

dent variables. Our approach is to enter each set of predictor variables one at a time along with the three control variables, then estimate a “full” model that combines all three sets, then estimate the “best” model for each dependent variable. Our definition of the “best” model was guided by the AIC statistic, but the inability to include one key variable in some of our models prevented strict adherence to this criterion (see note 11 below). Because our models include the lagged endogenous variable, we use the Durbin’s h statistic to test for serial correlation. Four out of 20 models presented below show unacceptable levels of serial correlation (h < −1.96 or h > 1.96); however, none of the “best” models are afflicted with this problem. Hence, we conclude that the significance of the coefficients in each of our final models is not contaminated by serial correlation. In Table 2, we estimate models for Workers Eligible in models 1–5 and elections in models 6–10. Before proceeding to the variables of interest, we first note the effects of the control variables. First, as expected, the lagged endogenous variable has consistently positive and statistically significant effects across all ten models. The three business cycle variables show mixed results. Although generally in the predicted directions,

their statistical significance is sporadic. In the final model for Workers Eligible (model 5), none of the three are statistically significant. For Elections (model 10), unemployment is negative and significant as expected, but capacity utilization is also negative and significant, which was not expected. Turning to the first dependent variable, we see in model 1 that the political–legal environment has a large impact on Workers Eligible. As expected, right to work is negatively associated and percent non-Southern Democrats and the Sweeney era are positively related to Workers Eligible. The latter finding indicates that even though the Sweeney era is associated with increasing card check unionization, this period also saw an increase in worker organization through the NLRB process. In model 2, all three deindustrialization and globalization variables are in the expected direction and statistically significant (balance of trade at p < .10). In model 3, all three employer opposition variables are negatively signed and statistically significant as predicted (aggregate concentration at p < .10). In model 4, we combine the three explanations and in model 5, we show the “best” model. Here we must note an analytical problem that complicated estimation

24

Workers eligible (models 1–5)

Workers eligiblet-1 Electionst-1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

.042 (.122)

.267* (.101)

.231* (.090)

.315** (.112)

.295** (.090)

Business cycle Unemployment Percent change real wages Capacity utilization

.053 (.045) .049 (.036) .027# (.014)

Political–legal environment Right to work Post-PATCO era Percent non-southern democrats Sweeney era

−.121*** (.017) .020 (.149) .029** (.010) .782*** (.187)

Deindustrialization and globalization Deindustrializationt-1 Balance of tradet-1 Immigrationt-1 Employer opposition Aggregate concentrationt-2 Dividends to profits ratiot-1 Employer anti-unionismt-1 Constant Adjusted R2 Durbin’s h AIC

Elections (models 6–10)

Model 1

.003 (.047) .029 (.033) .025# (.013)

−.024 (.049) .097* (.040) .016 (.014)

−1.353* (.592) .082# (.044) −.714*** (.190)

.704 (1.228) .918 −.33 .056

.923 (1.062) .901 .10 .067

Model 7

Model 8

Model 9

Model 10

.526*** (.102)

.666*** (.061)

.678*** (.095)

.531*** (.074)

.576*** (.053)

−.753* (.339) −.451* (.221) −.149 (.091)

−207 (.461) .756# (.382) −.131 (.132)

−.399 (.361) −.307 (.251) −.049 (.094)

−1.238*** (.214) .036 (.212) −.255*** (.062)

#### −2.553* (1.205) .117* (.046) 1.133 (.818)

###

.010 (.058) −.029 (.040) .029# (.016)

−.045 (.035) −.026 (.035) .016 (.011)

−.565 (.368) .609* (.297) −.168 (.108)

#### .126 (.156) .001 (.009) .306* (.131)

#### .202# (.110)

−.478*** (.125) −1.456 (1.632) .410*** (.074) 2.474 (1.530)

−.604 (.591) .131* (.056) −1.005*** (.211) −.040# (.020) −.013* (.005) −.260*** (.067) 2.516 (1.590) .878 .68 .082

Model 6

−.026 (.016) .005 (.005) −.146* (.058) .989 (1.409) .945 −1.87 .040

.279* (.121)

−3.300 (4.202) 1.191** (.355) −3.372* (1.307)

.149*** (.038) −1.021*** (.190) −.034* (.015) −.166** (.055) 2.123# (1.082) .946 −1.11 .035

20.988* (10.236) .938 −1.96 3.951

29.242*** (7.566) .963 .65 2.297

−4.553 (3.650) 1.353*** (.354) −5.483*** (1.294) −.363# (.195) −.069 (.058) −.878 (.600) 26.672# (15.246) .883 −3.34** 7.338

−.142 (.102) .081* (.033) .239 (.394) 14.586 (8.834) .977 −1.12 1.565

.166*** (.041)

1.352*** (.199) −4.791*** (1.077) −.269** (.095)

32.965*** (6.184) .974 −.24 1.642

Notes: Numbers presented are unstandardized coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). # p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. ### indicates that the right to work variable is “backgrounded” in these models. This variable continues to be a significant predictor but is excluded from the model due to a high level of collinearity with other variables in the model. Due to a missing value, models with the variable Balance of Trade have a sample size of 56 rather than 57 (1949–2004).

M. Wallace et al. / Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 27 (2009) 13–34

Table 2 Results of OLS regression models of union organizing effort, 1948–2004 (N = 57).

Union voting (models 1–5)

Union votingt-1 Union winst-1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

.227 (.148)

.668*** (.114)

.699*** (.092)

.374* (.152)

.414** (.120)

Business cycle Unemployment Percent change real wages Capacity utilization

−.118 (.524) .684 (.435) .071 (.146)

Political–legal environment Right to work Post-PATCO era Percent non-southern democrats Sweeney era

−1.525*** (.275) 6.196** (1.676) .129 (.111) 9.347*** (2.296)

Deindustrialization and globalization Deindustrializationt-1 Balance of tradet-1 Immigrationt-1 Employer opposition Aggregate concentrationt-2 Dividends to profits ratiot-1 Employer anti-unionismt-1 Constant Adjusted R2 Durbin’s h AIC

Union wins (models 6–10)

Model 1

−.047 (.782) .753 (.585) .096 (.211)

−.066 (.589) .152 (.499) .143 (.167)

−4.477 (9.612) .072 (.709) −2.752 (2.849)

72.542** (22.364) .927 −1.64 8.112

17.489 (19.777) .881 −2.50* 12.142

Model 7

Model 8

Model 9

Model 10

.772*** (.099)

.875*** (.078)

.828*** (.062)

.770*** (.100)

.774*** (.069)

−.019 (.507) .347 (.357) .095 (.131)

−.017 (.379) .137 (.290) .128 (.099)

−.187 (.607) .107 (.409) .138 (.151)

.204 (.397) .073 (.282) .210 (.105)

#### 2.099 (1.496) .076 (.087) 2.806* (1.333)

###

−1.031 (.957) .560 (.672) .023 (.242)

−1.076# (.571) .913# (.544) −.001 (.150)

−.273 (.374) .236 (.276) .049 (.101)

#### 6.626* (2.480) −.061 (.145) 2.566 (2.138)

#### 6.776** (1.976)

−.507** (.183) 2.833* (1.062) .183* (.072) 4.952** (1.686)

7.170 (9.514) 1.868# (.969) −10.677** (3.738) .077 (.238) .025 (.057) −1.931* (.854) 21.027 (20.865) .894 −2.22* 11.678

Model 6

−.118 (.264) .038 (.086) −2.654* (.992) 62.615 (28.314) .904 −1.95 10.606

-2.421 (5.887) −.259 (.434) .124 (1.727)

1.084# (.609) −7.393* (2.865)

−2.517** (.911) 65.268** (20.686) .909 −1.73 9.447

15.000 (16.051) .964 −1.93 3.658

.714 (13.792) .951 −.93 4.529

.073 (.139) .072* (.033) −1.050# (.529) 4.212 (13.802) .960 −1.00 4.000

2.239* (1.082)

1.412 (5.907) .657 (.602) −4.102# (2.365)

−2.838 (1.845)

.037 (.165) .082 (.055) −1.261# (.632) 7.385 (18.443) .959 −2.15* 4.113

.082* (.036) −1.368* (.534) 3.841 (13.707) .962 −1.02 3.801

Notes: Numbers presented are unstandardized coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). # p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. ### indicates that the right to work variable is “backgrounded” in these models. This variable continues to be a significant predictor but is excluded from the model due to a high level of collinearity with other variables in the model. Due to a missing value, models with the variable Balance of Trade have a sample size of 56 rather than 57 (1949–2004)

M. Wallace et al. / Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 27 (2009) 13–34

Table 3 Results of OLS regression models of union organizing success, 1948–2004 (N = 57).

25

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M. Wallace et al. / Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 27 (2009) 13–34

of the models in this paper. All our combined models initially displayed high levels of multicollinearity among three variables: right to work, balance of trade, and immigration. Numerous analyses convinced us that right to work is a consistently strong negative predictor – in fact, the dominant predictor – of all four dependent variables in this analysis, but its inclusion in models with these other two variables is impossible due to multicollinearity. We thus chose to exclude the right to work variable from the combined models, mindful of its profound effects, so that we might concentrate on the effects of the other variables. We represent the presence of right to work in the combined model with a special symbol, “####”, to acknowledge its background influence in the models, but do not formally estimate its effects. This approach, while unconventional, is nonetheless necessary to develop a richer understanding of the other causal processes involved.10 Once right to work was removed from the combined models, levels of multicollinearity as indicated by the variable inflation factor (VIF) were no longer problematic.11 With this in mind, we find that six additional variables – post-PATCO (p < .10), Sweeney era, balance of trade, immigration, aggregate concentration, and employer anti-unionism – remain statistically significant as predicted in the “best” model (model 5). Clearly, all three of the factors we consider – political–legal environment, globalization, and employer opposition – make a contribution to understanding the decline in Workers Eligible. In models 6–10, we show results predicting the frequency of union representation elections. Among the political–legal variables (model 6), right to work is the lone negative and significant predictor, while percent non-Southern Democrats shows a positive, significant effect. In model 7, both balance of trade and immigra10 There is good reason to believe these three variables might be empirically correlated. Immigrant workers are likely to be attracted to right to work states in greater numbers because they provide greater employment opportunities. Similarly, much of the demographic shift of employment to right to work states is the by-product of the declining manufacturing base in the Rust Belt states and is therefore associated with the negative balance of trade in manufacturing. Unfortunately, the effects of these variables cannot be disentangled statistically with the available data. Including the right to work variable in the final models results in VIF scores ranging from 25 to 96 for this variable, which is well above the traditional threshold of 10 (Gujarati, 2003). The inclusion of this variable also resulted in VIF scores well above 10 for other key independent variables. 11 The inability to include the right to work variable in all our models limited our ability to strictly adhere to the AIC as the criterion for choosing the best model. Thus for three of our four dependent variables, the “best” model has the second lowest (not the lowest) AIC among the models shown.

tion show statistically significant effects in the predicted directions for the deindustrialization and globalization factor. Finally, for employer opposition, only aggregate concentration shows a negative and significant effect on Elections (p < .10). In model 10, we produce the “best” model predicting Elections. After backgrounding the highly significant right to work variable, we find that percent non-Southern Democrats and balance of trade positively affect, and immigration and aggregate concentration negatively affect, union representation elections. The dividends to profits ratio is positive and significant as predicted in the combined model (model 5), but does not survive in the “best” model (model 10).12 Thus, a somewhat different picture, particularly among the political–legal variables, emerges regarding the determinants of Elections as compared to Workers Eligible. Nevertheless, a core of four variables – right to work, balance of trade, immigration, and aggregate concentration – consistently predicts both measures of union organizing effort. One question raised by these results is why employer opposition variables, in particular, would reduce union organization effort rather than causing higher efforts of mobilization among unions. As alluded to earlier, we believe four mechanisms are at work: (1) increased resources evidenced in corporate concentration have persuaded unions that organizational campaigns will be hard-fought and likely to fail; (2) the business scan function of capitalist organization in permitting capitalist class to provide a cohesive, unified strategy against labor; (3) the cultural hegemony of the capitalist class in fostering worker loyalty and undermining public sentiment for unions; and (4) other initiatives by capitalists such as union deauthorization campaigns have forced unions to divide their resources and have weakened the foundation for new organizing efforts. The net result of these factors 12 Another potential measure of employer opposition is the involvement of employers in Political Action Committees (PACs). However, the designation of PACs was first established by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. Amendments to this law in 1974 created the Federal Election Commission and established regulations for PACs. Thus, official data on PACs only begin in 1974. Using these partial data, we conducted a truncated analysis from 1975 to 2004. We created a ratio of pro-business PACs to pro-labor PACs to indicate the relative power of business to organized labor. This ratio ranged from .44 in 1974 to 5.13 in 1993, fairly accurately reflecting the shifting balance of power between business and labor. When this PAC variable was included in our truncated analyses, it showed a negative and significant effect on both measures of union organizing effort, but was not significant for either measure of organizing success. We conclude that such a measure of business strength, had it been available throughout the entire period of our analysis, might have been another factor in reducing union organizing effort.

M. Wallace et al. / Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 27 (2009) 13–34

as reflected in our employee opposition measures is to de-mobilize union efforts to organize workers. We now turn to models predicting union organizing success in Table 3. Models 1–5 predict Union Voting and models 6–10 predict Union Wins. We first discuss the control variables. Again, the lagged endogenous variable is a consistently strong determinant of both measures of organizing success. In the “best” model for Union Voting, unemployment (negative) and percent change in real wages (positive) are statistically significant (both at p < .10), although the latter is not in the predicted direction. In the “best” model for Union Wins, capacity utilization (positive) is significant and in the predicted direction (p < .10). Turning now to the variables of interest, we see in model 1 that three of the four political–legal variables have significant effects on the percentage of workers voting in favor of unions. Right to work is negatively associated and post-PATCO and the Sweeney era are positively associated with Union Voting. The positive post-PATCO effect was not expected, but it appears consistent with the trend for Union Voting displayed in Fig. 2c. That graph showed that the downward trend in Union Voting began to level off and even turn slightly upward after 1981. This suggests that unions may have become more selective in choosing their battles after PATCO with the result of increasing the percent of eligible workers voting for unions, albeit in a smaller number of elections (Farber & Western, 2002). In other words, union organizers today seek to generate a higher level of support among workers than in previous years before taking the final step of requesting a union representation election. All three of the deindustrialization and globalization variables (model 2) are in the expected negative direction, but none of them shows a statistically significant effect. Of the two employer opposition variables in model 3, only employer anti-unionism is negatively related to Union Voting. In the “best” model for Union Voting (model 5), we again background the strong, negative effect of right to work. Beyond this, except for the Sweeney era, all variables previously significant in the preliminary models retain their significance here. All told, then, all three factors play a part in the determination of Union Voting. Union Voting is negatively impacted by right to work laws, immigration, and employer anti-unionism, and positively related to post-PATCO and the balance of trade (p < .10). In models 6–10, we show the results for Union Wins. This time all four political–legal variables are statistically significant in the predicted direction (model 6). Again, none of the deindustrialization and globalization

27

measures are significant determinants of Union Wins as was the case for Union Voting (model 7). Among the employer opposition variables (model 8), employer anti-unionism is a negative, significant determinant of Union Wins (p < .10) as expected, but the dividends to profits ratio is unexpectedly positive and significant. When we estimate the “best” model in model 10, two of the previously significant political–legal variables drop out. After backgrounding right to work, only the Sweeney era variable remains significant among the political–legal variables. This finding suggests that the rise of the card check campaign during the Sweeney era actually improved the chances of winning NLRB elections, perhaps by siphoning off more difficult organizing campaigns to the card check process. In addition, employer anti-unionism remains negative and significant and the unanticipated positive and significant effect of the dividends to profits ratio persists.13 Another variable which we retain in the model, immigration, comes close to statistical significance. All told, the “best” models for Union Voting and Union Wins show some similarities, but the only two variables that consistently affect both are the backgrounded right to work variable and employer anti-unionism. We next considered whether there might be periodized effects of some of the key variables. The post-PATCO era dummy variable (1981–present) represents a period in which the rules of the game between labor and management were substantially changed. During this time, labor has been in decline and the deindustrialization and globalization variables, in particular, have taken on increased significance for the labor movement. In Table 4, we show results from models in which we created an interaction effect for each of the three deindustrialization and globalization variables and entered them, first singly and then as a group, into models predicting the four union organizing effort and success variables. In order to preserve degrees of freedom, we include only the lagged endogenous variables, the business cycle control variables, the PATCO era dummy variable, the three main effects

13

An anonymous reviewer offered a potential alternative explanation for the unanticipated positive effect of dividends to profits ratio which we find plausible. This is that a higher dividends to profits ratio indicates that shareholders exert greater control than corporate managers in corporate affairs. When shareholders are in control, they often advocate other values beyond bottom-line profitability including “green” environmental policies, consumer accountability, and labor responsibility. Thus, the positive effects of this variable might indicate that greater shareholder control creates a more favorable opportunity for union organizing success.

28

Table 4 Period-specific effects of OLS regression models of union organizing effort and organizing success, 1948–2004 (N = 57). Workers eligible (models 1–4)

Elections (models 5–8)

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

−.981 (1.392)

−.424* (.181)

−1.973*** (.466)

−1.480 (1.266)

−14.870 (8.987)

−5.024*** (1.340)

−2.477 (3.646)

−7.583 (9.906)

Deindustrialization and globalization Deindustrializationt-1 Balance of tradet-1 Immigrationt-1

−1.431* (.676) .096# (.055) −.682** (.221)

−1.098# (.558) 0.253*** (0.064) −.355# (.211)

−.318 (.560) .091* (.045) −2.284*** (.378)

−.390 (.605) .180* (.068) −1.739*** (.488)

−8.235# (4.317) .756* (.351) −2.267 (1.355)

−5.601 (3.852) 1.451** (.451) −1.439 (1.415)

−6.437# (4.457) .845* (.356) −2.466 (2.852)

−8.758# (4.620) 1.527** (.514) 1.846 (3.305)

9.544 (7.363)

1.909*** (.422) .951

−.254 (.980) −.175# (.099) 1.481** (.481) .952

−.858 (3.604) .968

4.977 (7.560) −1.435 (.718) −3.775 (3.749) .971

Interactions with post-PATCO era Post-PATCO × deindustrializationt-1 Post-PATCO × balance of tradet-1 Post-PATCO × immigrationt-1 Adjusted R2

.862 (1.123) −.313*** (.088) .930

.945

Union voting (models 1–4)

−1.305* (.633) .969

.971

Union wins (models 5–8)

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

Panel B: Union organizing success Post-PATCO era

−10.538 (21.465)

.272 (3.066)

−14.349# (8.172)

−17.785 (23.436)

−1.587 (13.941)

−3.462# (1.730)

−10.292# (5.767)

.474 (13.868)

Deindustrialization and globalization Deindustrializationt-1 Balance of tradet-1 Immigrationt-1

−1.337 (10.293) 1.620# (.903) −6.915* (3.390)

2.596 (8.976) 3.326** (1.122) −4.221 (3.432)

12.317 (9.825) 1.890* (.857) −24.629** (7.438)

8.992 (10.646) 2.822* (1.188) −17.947# (9.085)

−1.067 (6.683) .215 (.560) −1.072 (2.075)

.091 (5.261) 2.148** (.689) 1.438 (1.848)

5.346 (6.390) .366 (.538) −11.438* (5.146)

4.565 (6.285) 2.162** (.723) −3.745 (5.205)

2.720 (11.308)

19.710* (7.820) .905

4.468 (17.652) −1.973 (1.695) 14.560 (8.919) .904

11.772* (5.508) .955

−7.546 (10.297) −3.322*** (.980) 5.396 (5.354) .963

Interactions with post-PATCO era Post-PATCO × deindustrializationt-1 Post-PATCO × balance of Tradet-1 Post-PATCO × immigrationt-1 Adjusted R2

13.192 (17.455) −3.305* (1.415) .893

.903

−3.450*** (.878) .951

.963

Notes: Additional variables which are included in the model but not shown are: the lagged dependent variable, unemployment, percent change in real wages, and capacity utilization. Numbers presented are unstandardized coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). # p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Due to a missing value, models with the variable Balance of Trade have a sample size of 56 rather than 57 (1949–2004).

M. Wallace et al. / Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 27 (2009) 13–34

Model 1 Panel A: Union organizing effort Post-PATCO era

M. Wallace et al. / Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 27 (2009) 13–34

for deindustrialization and globalization, and the relevant interaction effects (the lagged endogenous variables and the business cycle variables are not shown to save space). In Panel A of Table 4, we show the determinants of the two organizing effort variables. Deindustrialization shows no indication of period-specific effects for either Workers Eligible (model 1) or Elections (model 5). The main effect of deindustrialization is negative and significant for both models, but the interaction with PATCO fails to reach significance. This suggests a slight but important difference from the results in Table 2. Deindustrialization was in fact a deterrent to union organizing effort in the period prior to the 1980s, but not a factor after PATCO. This coincides with observations by Bluestone and Harrison (1982) that the 1970s was the peak period of deindustrialization in the U.S. On the other hand, balance of trade shows a significant period interaction with both variables. An unfavorable balance of trade works to labor’s advantage in the pre-PATCO period as U.S. employers acquiesce to labor’s demands in order to protect their domestic operations; after PATCO, an unfavorable balance of trade works to the disadvantage of unions because employers have more options to shift production out of the country. Immigration also shows evidence of an interaction with the PATCO period. For Workers Eligible, immigration is negative and significant in the pre-PATCO period indicating that immigrant workers are a liability to organizing efforts, but after PATCO they show a positive and significant effect. This finding is consistent with recent claims that immigrant workers offer great potential for union organizing in the new, globalized economy (Clawson, 2003). This pattern is similar for Elections but neither the pre-PATCO nor post-PATCO immigration effect achieves statistical significance. When all three interactions are included in the same model, the period-specific balance of trade and immigration effects remain significant for Workers Eligible and only the period-specific balance of trade effect exists for Elections. Another noteworthy observation is that the dummy variable for the post-PATCO period now turns negative and is sometimes significant in models 1-8 (although it is not significant in either of the final models, 4 and 8), which suggests that when taking into the account the period-specific effect of the globalization variables, the post-PATCO period as a whole was harmful for union organizing effort. In Panel B of Table 4, the results for union organizing success are similar. This time, there is no evidence at all of a period-specific effect for the deindustrialization variable either before or after PATCO. However, both

29

balance of trade and immigration show period-specific effects for both dependent variables, Union Voting and Union Wins, in models where they are added individually to the main effects. An unfavorable balance of trade improves chances of union organizing success in the pre-PATCO period and hinders success post-PATCO. Conversely, high rates of immigration harm union organizing success in the pre-PATCO period and bolster success after PATCO. However, in model 4 for Union Voting when all three period-specific interaction effects are included simultaneously, the post-PATCO interaction effects of both variables are non-significant (although the post-PATCO effect of immigration approaches significance at p < .10). In model 8 for Union Wins, only the post-PATCO effect of balance of trade remains significant (post-PATCO immigration has a t-ratio above 1.00 but is non-significant). In sum, these analyses suggest that there is fairly strong evidence that the two globalization measures, balance of trade and immigration, have reversed their effects in the post-PATCO period. Higher unfavorable balance of trade has weakened organized labor’s position and higher rates of immigration have aided unions’ prospects for success. Again, the effect of the dummy variable for the post-PATCO period tends to be negative (in 6 of 8 models), but is only marginally significant in three. Even so, this represents a change from the findings presented in Table 3 where the PATCO dummy variable was positive and significant for Union Voting. Summarizing the findings from Table 4, a consideration of periodized effects provides substantial nuance to our story. The post-PATCO period when labor was substantially weakened, altered the way in which the deindustrialization and globalization variables affected union organizing effort and success. Deindustrialization’s effects are negative for both organizing effort prior to 1980, but not after. Balance of trade has positive effects on both organizing effort and success prior to 1980 and negative effects afterward. Immigration is a deterrent to both effort and success prior to 1980, but a catalyst after PATCO. Finally, the effect of the post-PATCO period dummy shifts in a more negative direction when these interactions are considered, which is consistent with conventional wisdom. 5. Discussion and conclusions After controlling for the effects of the business cycle, we found support for each of our three explanations (political–legal environment, deindustrialization and globalization, and employer opposition) for union organizing effort and success in the U.S. since the

30

M. Wallace et al. / Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 27 (2009) 13–34

late 1940s. However, these explanations vary in their importance depending upon the stage of the union organizing process and the specific dependent measure used. The political–legal environment is an important determinant of both union organizing effort and success in the U.S. While some aspects of the political–legal environment benefited union organizing efforts and success rates (e.g., Democratic presence in Congress and the Sweeney era of the AFL-CIO), others have served to limit the ability of unions to organize new workers. The rise of right to work laws (particularly in Southern states) after the passage of the Taft–Hartley Act in 1947 has had a negative influence on every aspect of the union organizing process studied in this paper. As an increasing proportion of workers have come to work in right to work states, unions have recruited fewer workers for certification elections, held fewer elections overall, and been less successful in winning elections. Finally, PATCO had a positive effect on union organizing effort and organizing success consistent with the observation that there has been an uptick in these variables since the 1980s. The positive effect of PATCO on union organizing success may reflect initial efforts of unions such as the SEIU in the mid- to late1980s to put more effort into organizing new workers and move away from the business unionism model of organizing. Deindustrialization and globalization have also played an important role in the decline in union organizing effort and success in the U.S. since the mid 1900s. Deindustrialization is one of the least consistent predictors of effort and success, failing to register a significant effect in any of the four “best” models (but note again the negative effect of pre-PATCO deindustrialization on organizing effort in Table 4). However, the two measures of globalization consistently impact both aspects of union growth. Balance of trade is a strong deterrent for both measures of union organizing effort and a modest predictor of one of the organizing success variables (Union Voting). Considering periodized interactions, however, shows that an unfavorable balance of trade actually benefitted organized labor before PATCO, while its negative effects on labor are mostly after PATCO. Immigration is strongly and negatively related to three of the four dependent variables and comes close in the fourth, which provides support for the notion that unions have had a difficult time organizing immigrant workers because of language barriers, threats of deportation and other obstacles. However, the interaction models in Table 4 suggest a more nuanced picture where immigrants have actually improved effort and success since PATCO. Recent successes in the “Justice for Jan-

itors” campaigns suggest that the barriers to organizing immigrants may be overcome (Rudy, 2004). Finally, our study provides support for the notion that employer opposition is largely to blame for declining union organizing effort and success in recent decades in the U.S. Employer anti-union efforts have made it more difficult for unions to recruit workers for certification, achieve high pro-union votes, and win certification elections in order to set up collective bargaining with employers. Employers’ anti-union efforts heated up after the PATCO strike in 1981, which suggests that employer opposition and the political–legal environment surrounding union organizing are inextricably linked. Also, aggregate concentration reduces both measures of union organizing effort, but does not affect organizing success. This suggests that the market power of corporations deters workers from seeking to organize, but has less impact on the outcome of certification elections. We find little sustained impact of the shareholder value society once other aspects of the political economy are controlled. However, the positive effect of dividends to profits ratio on Union Wins is perplexing (but see footnote 13). Our findings may seem out of sync with the thrust of the growing literature on new “social movement unionism” (Brecher & Costello, 1999; Clawson, 2003; Cornfield & Fletcher, 2001; Cornfield & McCammon, 2003; Hurd, Milkman, & Turner, 2003; Mantsios, 1998; Voss & Sherman, 2000). Much of this literature points to the promise of a revitalized labor movement that utilizes new tactics to organize segments of the labor force (e.g., African Americans, Hispanics, and women) that have been marginalized by the traditional union movement. This literature points specifically to the success of organizing strategies by the SEIU and other unions that circumvent the usual NLRB election process and encourage employers to sign “neutrality agreements” and accept “card check” procedures in lieu of representation elections. While there is evidence that such non-NLRB procedures do yield higher success rates and more union members than traditional NLRB methods per attempt, this trend has limited applicability to our analysis for three reasons. First, these non-NLRB methods of union organizing only began to be used with some regularity in the mid-1990s, a fairly short portion of the time frame represented in our analysis. Second, while these strategies have accounted for a rising percentage of new union members in recent years (Eaton & Kriesky, 2001), more workers are still subject to unionization under conventional NLRB procedures than card check procedures. Moreover, card check procedures have been limited to certain sectors of the economy organized by

M. Wallace et al. / Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 27 (2009) 13–34

unions like the SEIU. Third, the very success of these strategies has spurred increased employer awareness and renewed efforts to resist their spread to other sectors of the economy or in the future. In short, while the new social movement unionism may hold potential for union organizing in the future, its overall impact on the historical process of unionization in the 57 years of our analysis has been limited. In summary, the findings from this study highlight the need to understand aspects of the political–legal environment, globalization, and employer opposition in order to explain the long-term decline of unions in the U.S. Nevertheless, studies like ours could be improved by better data on some of the processes we identify. For instance, instead of legal immigrants, we would have preferred to include measures of illegal immigration, but there are no reliable indicators of this variable that extend through the entire period of the analysis.14 Thus, our use of legal immigration likely produces a conservative estimate of the overall effect of immigration on union organizing. The immigration factor is likely to be a two-edged sword in the future so it is important to devise better measures. On the one hand, it provides employers with a plentiful supply of cheap labor to undercut the wages of U.S. workers; on the other hand, immigrant workers would seem to be likely candidates for unionization efforts in the future. In addition, we would urge future researchers to develop better measures of employer opposition. Data on employer spending on outside consultants would be particularly useful in this regard, although such data are unlikely to be found over a long-term period. Finally, it is surprising that deindustrialization had so little impact in our models when many accounts of union decline give it such a prominent role. Our measure of this concept is relatively new but we feel it is substantially better than a simple measure of percent of workers in manufacturing. Nevertheless, perhaps there is room for improvement in how deindustrialization is measured in future studies. Similarly, whereas our study focused on the union organization process in the aggregate over an important 57-year period in U.S. labor history, future studies might disaggregate these processes in various ways. For instance, one fruitful line of investigation would be to explore these processes in a time series analysis of the U.S. states. Since states comprise political–legal environments where the key processes we identify are

14 Studies using a more limited time frame than ours or using crosssectional design might have better prospects as better estimates of illegal immigration have become available for the period since 1990.

31

present in varying combinations – in particular, they represent spatial contexts where organized labor has varying degrees of strength – such an analysis might shed further light on processes of union decline. In particular, a state-specific analysis would be helpful in disentangling the role of right to work laws from other factors in the analysis, something we could not fully address in our aggregate analysis. Another useful line of inquiry would be to investigate these processes across different industries. Since industries operate under varying technical, social, and market-related constraints and carry different legacies of union organization and worker militancy, they provide useful contexts for exploring the range of possible scenarios for union organizing processes. A third line of investigation is to explore in more detail than was possible in this paper the period-specific variations in these processes. While we have shown that the postPATCO era, in particular, had some impact on both union organizing effort and success, future research should explore alternative periodizations and the interaction of these periods with some of the key variables in our models. Finally, our study necessarily concentrates on processes of union organization in the private sector as this is the sector that is governed by the National Labor Relations Board. As shown in Fig. 1, overall union levels of membership are strongly tied to trends in the private sector so studies like ours are important for understanding the crisis of union membership in the country as a whole. Much of the extant literature suggests that the unionization of public sector workers follows a very different dynamic than that of private sector workers, so the examination of public sector unionism, while important, is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, future studies should further explore the puzzle of union organization in the public sector in an attempt to explain why unions in this sector have flourished (relatively) compared to the private sector, despite facing many similar obstacles. The strength of our study is that it puts recent claims about an “upsurge” in the union movement in some perspective. It demonstrates that there are considerable structural obstacles to a genuine revitalization of the labor movement that have deep historical roots and are not likely to be easily overcome. While we find studies of union revitalization encouraging (e.g., Clawson, 2003; Fantasia & Voss, 2004; Voss & Sherman, 2000), we suggest that such success stories should be tempered with a longer sociohistorical view that takes into accounts the numerous obstacles to union organization that remain relevant for most American workers.

32

M. Wallace et al. / Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 27 (2009) 13–34

Appendix A. Correlation matrix

Workers eligible Elections Union voting Union wins Unemployment Percent change real wages Capacity utilization Right to work Post-Patco era Percent non-southern democrats Sweeney era Deindustrializationt-1 Balance of tradet-1 Immigrationt-1 Aggregate concentrationt-2 Dividends to profits ratiot-1 Employer antiunionismt-1

1 2 3 4 5 1 .89 1 .91 .69 1 .87 .67 .96 1 −.43 −.31 −.52 −.63 1 .77 .64 .84 .86 −.57

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

1

.62 .51 .58 .59 −.76 .57 1 −.94 −.89 −.87 −.81 .33 −.74 −.55 −.82 −.94 −.64 −.64 .32 −.68 −.47 −.33 −.06 −.54 −.59 .53 −.55 −.28 −.49 −.83 .88 −.85 .01

8

1 .83 .28

1 .06

1

−.61 −.31 −.18 −.19 −.15 −.25 .67 .54 −.31 1 −.79 −.76 −.77 .43 −.67 −.39 .82 .72 .34 .33 1 .90 .75 .69 −.21 .66 .47 −.93 −.85 −.12 −.63 −.82 1 −.82 −.73 −.67 .17 −.61 −.38 .87 .76 .14 .63 .67 −.74 1 −.09 .18 .17 −.11 .24 −.03 −.05 .03 −.20 .02 .01 −.03 −.15

1

−.71 −.77 −.51 −.40 −.04 −.43 −.32

.75

.75 −.02

.63

.58 −.81

.74

−.86 −.78 −.83 −.81

.88

.80

.46

.77 −.84

.74 −.16

.29 −.76 −.41

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