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Union steward locus of control, job, union involvement, and grievance behavior
Union Steward Locus of Control, Job, Union Involvement, and Grievance Behavior Dan R. Dalton, Indiana University William D. Todor, The Ohio State University
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Recently, the lack of interest in the study of labor unions has been described as astounding [ 151. Nowhere is this lack more evident than in the meager empirical research that has examined the grievance process. The term “grievance” does not even appear in the index of the ambitious Hundbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology [ Ill. Ronan and Prien [3 I] referred to the grievance process as “ubiquitous” and noted the attention it receives in most organizations. Others [3, 261 have suggested that grievances are characterized by “heavy cost and disruptiveness.” Empirical research on the grievance process has generally focused on the antecedents or determinants of the formal grievance. Differences in employee attitudes, demographic characteristics, organizational structure, and leadership patterns, for example, have all been hypothesized to account for an observed disparity in the number of grievances filed in organizations. The results of these research efforts have not been encouraging; such factors have not contributed substantially to the understanding of the differences that characterize rank and file union member grievance filing behavior. Recent work [7, 81 suggests that much of the previous research may have virtually ignored a major actor in the process: the union steward. The filing of a grievance is not ordinarily the independent act of a rank and file employee; the union steward is a moderator in the process. Address
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86
Dan R. Dalton and William D. Todor
Dalton and Todor [7, 81 suggest that demographic and attitudinal differences in rank and file employees may account for substantial variance in the decision that employees may make to initiate the grievance process. This “initiation” decision, however, does not guarantee that a formal grievance will be filed. The union steward has a variety of discretionary behaviors that can directly influence the number of grievances formally filed in a given organization. Five such behaviors, in order of an increasing propensity of the union steward to grieve [9], are listed here: 1. The union steward, when confronted with a rank and file union member who wishes to file a grievance, may counsel the employee to abandon the grievance process (i.e., the steward may talk the employee out of filing). 2. The union steward may agree that the suggested grievance is viable, but rather than formally filing, will settle the potential grievance through discussion with the employee’s supervisor. 3. The union steward may file grievances that are requested by rank and file members. Issues of merit, if any, of a potential grievance are essentially moot. If a grievance is requested, the steward will tile. 4. A steward may witness or otherwise become aware of an incident over which a grievance could be filed. The rank and file member directly involved has shown no overt interest in filing over the incident. In such circumstances, the union steward may encourage (even insist) that the affected member file. 5. In the incident described above (4), the rank and tile member may remain unwilling to file over the incident. Union stewards may, in this case, file an action in the name of the union. The approval of the affected employee is unnecessary. Dalton and Todor’s [7] primary point is that engagement in these behaviors (or subsets of them) probably accounts for more variance in the number of grievances filed in an organization than the propensities of rank and tile employees. Differences in rank and file members (whether demographic, attitudinal, or otherwise) may account for variance in the decisions to initiate the grievance process. Union steward intervention behaviors, however, may operate to truncate grievance filing propensities in rank and file members. Figure 1 illustrates the prepotent truncations of union stewards and the exhaustiveness of steward intervention categories [9]. Virtually all links connecting a grievable incident or condition to the formal grievance proceed through the union steward. Individual union
Condition
or
Incident
Grievable
Potentially
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88
Dan R. Dalton and William D. Todor
members are legally entitled to tile grievances in their own behalf, without the intervention of the union steward. This, however, rarely occurs. For example, in the local union sample reported in this research, covering over 1,000 grievances, no grievances at all were filed directly. Union stewards are not the only actors in the grievance process. They are, however, central actors; the union steward is the only participant in the process who has a “veto” power over both management and the rank and file employee. Management does have influence in the process. Managerial personnel may intervene proactively to prevent the occurrence of incidents or conditions that might lead to a grievance (link A in Figure 1). Management may also attempt to influence an employee with respect to filing a grievance immediately after the incident (link B) or somewhat later (link G) when he or she decides to file. The supervisor may, for example, assure the employee that the incident or condition was relatively isolated and unlikely to recur. Perhaps there was a legitimate oversight (e.g., improper overtime hours) that management might immediately agree to rectify. These interventions are important; they may actually reduce the incidence of grievances in the work place. If, however, the union steward is not satisfied with the management intervention or its effects (even if the potentially aggrieved is content), he or she may file a grievance with or without the endorsement of the potentially aggrieved employee. In essence, the steward may veto any intervention by management. The potentially aggrieved employee is an important actor in the grievance process. Whether or not an individual is inclined to file a grievance over an incident, the union steward retains truncation powers. Although an employee wants to tile (link H), the union steward may counsel not to do so. The steward may argue that the action is not viable; perhaps a similar action recently adjudicated was lost by the union. Whatever the reason given, this “counseling” behavior reduces the number of formally filed grievances. Conversely, an employee may not wish to file a grievance over a given incident. The steward may encourage (link I) the employee to file an action or, should the employee refuse to file, the union steward may simply bypass the individual and tile in the name of the union (link E). Whereas management and employees certainly have an impact on the process, the union steward has a veto power. No matter what relevant managerial personnel or rank and file employees wish to do about a condition or an incident that is potentially grievable, union stewards have discretionary behaviors that can truncate the propensities of the other actors in the process.
Union Steward
89
In any scenario, illustrated in figure 1, the union steward is the critical actor; actions by management and individual union members are subject to the steward’s approval. Link E, the bypass link, is the proverbial “ace in the hole” whereby the union steward may bypass both management and individual workers and file in the name of the union. Such bypassing is frequent. In the data reported in this research, for example, over 23 percent of the grievances filed were in the name of the union. This does not imply that all such grievances are filed over the objections of employees. Filing “in the name of the union” is also a means of providing anonymity, when requested, for employees principally involved in a grievance. This is not common but does occur. Interventions by stewards may have an important impact on the number of grievances filed in an organization. These behaviors are largely discretionary [7, 81. Differential engagement in these intervention behaviors may be a critical indicator of labor-management relations within an organization. The analytical question of this research concerns the factors that may contribute to variation in union steward propensities to engage in these behaviors. Dalton and Todor [7] demonstrated that manifest needs of union stewards may be an important predictor of the three interventions suggested by them at that time. Whereas a host of individual differences in union stewards may account for variance in these behaviors, locus of control, job involvement, and union involvement may be especially appropriate.
Independent Variables Locus of Control
Rotter [32] postulated that consistent, systematic differences exist with respect to an individual’s belief in internal versus external control. Organ [23] noted that internals are said to believe that they can significantly influence outcomes by their own behavior, while externals believe that their behavior is much less decisive in this respect. Szilagyi and Sims [35] have suggested that individuals who view events around them as the results of their own actions (or under their control) can be referred to as “internals.” Conversely, individuals who perceive events around them as independent of their own actions and more a function of fate, luck, or powerful others are said to be “externals.” This notion of internal/external (ity) may be a valid predictor of a union steward’s propensity to engage in discretionary behaviors. None of the five interventions is “default” behavior; they must be engaged in proactively; the steward must “do” something. Presumably, stewards would be less likely to engage in these behaviors if they perceived their consequences as the “result of luck, chance, fate, as under the control of
90
Dan R. Dalton and William D. ‘I’odor
powerful others, or as unpredictable because of the great complexity of forces surrounding item” [32]. Although the literature addressing internal-external control is voluminous [ 13, 18, 19, 20, 25, 361, the references to its use in organizational contexts is less frequent. It has been associated with both attitudinal constructs [24, 30, 351 and behaviors [ 1, 2,4, 23, 331. With respect to work-related variables, Szilagyi and Sims [35] concluded that the extant research has generally supported Rotter’s contention that individuals with a strong belief that they can control their destiny are more likely to be alert to, and take advantage of, certain aspects of the work situation. The internal-external control criterion has not been applied in a union context. To the extent that union stewards can be categorized as “internal,” they may be more likely to engage in the enumerated interventions. “Internal” orientation is hypothesized to be positively related to all five steward interventions. Job and Union Involvement Reitz and Jewel1 [30] noted that job involvement-the degree to which one’s work is an important part of one’s life-has become an increasingly valuable construct in both empirical investigations and theoretical speculations about job performance and other worker behaviors. A recent review of the empirical literature on job involvement that summarizes some 80 correlates of job involvement (personal and situational characteristics and outcome variable such as performance, turnover, and absenteeism) attests to this observation [28]. The job involvement construct has not been extended to a union context. The extent of job and/or union involvement might serve as a predictor of the nature of union steward intervention behaviors. A union steward with relatively high levels of job involvement, for example, might file fewer grievances against the company. Such a steward might also be correspondingly less likely to encourage union members to file grievances or to file grievances over their objections. Also, perhaps as a function of the traditionally perceived adversarial relationship between union and firm, union stewards with relatively high levels of union involvement might engage in more grievance tiling behaviors but be less likely to discuss potential grievances informally with supervision. Job and union involvement are hypothesized to be associated with the steward intervention behaviors. Job involvement will be positively associated with intervention behaviors that reduce the number of grievances tiled and inversely related to those behaviors that increase the number of filed grievances. Union involvement is hypothesized to have opposite effects. Relatively high levels of union involvement will be
91
Union Steward
positively associated with intervention behaviors that increase the number of formally filed grievances. An inverse relationship is expected between union involvement and steward intervention behaviors that would reduce the number of grievances. Method Sample In this study, 106 union stewards representing some 4,600 rank and file members employed by a West Coast communications company comprise the sample. A questionnaire was administered to these stewards on site by the researchers. All questionnaires, a 100 percent participation rate, were collected and subjected to analysis. Company and union tenure of stewards ranged from 1 to over 21 years. Females comprised 46.2 percent of the sample, males, 48.1 percent; the remainder preferred not to state their gender. Modal age of the subject stewards was 26 to 35 years. These stewards represent a broad cross section of nonmanagerial/nonprofessional employees. Male and female, blue and white collar employees of various ages and seniority, involved in a range of technical and nontechnical occupations, are their constituency. Measures Job Involvement. The original job involvement instrument was developed by Lodahl and Kejner [2 I]. Subsequently, a factor analysis of this scale conducted by Lawler and Hall [ 171 indicated that six items of the original instrument best constituted a “job involvement” scale. These six items, in a Likert-type 7-point format, were used in this study to determine the level of job involvement for the subjects. For this sample, the internal reliability coefficient for this scale was .86. Union Involvement. Union stewards in this sample actually have two positions: employment by the organization and a position with the union as a union steward. Therefore all items in the 5item job involvement scale were asked in two contexts: company and union. For company job involvement, the instrument items were asked traditionally. With respect to union involvement, the items were modified slightly. For example: “the most important things that happen to me involve my job as a union steward” (item 2); ‘ ‘I am really a perfectionist
about my work as a union steward” (item 5).
The internal reliability coefficient context was .90 for this sample.
for the modified scale for the union
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Dan R. Dalton and William D. Todor
Locus of Control. Locus of control was measured by Rotter’s [32] Internal/External scale, 23 times in a forced choice format. This scale actually contains 29 items, with 6 “tillers” not scored to assess internal/ external (ity). Each item has two choices for response: one indicates an “internal” orientation; the other, an “external. ” Responses to the 23 scored items form a metric of internality or externality that ranges from 0 to 23. A respondent score of 23 indicates an external response to every item (Rotter scores for externality). While noting some evidence for subfactor structure in the Rotter scale (5, 6, 10, 12, 16, 22,29), we rely on a unidimensional interpretation of internality/externality for locus of control. The internal consistency reliability of the Rotter scale for this sample is 0.78. Despite recent controversy over the factor structure of the I-E scale, it represents the best available measure of the global construct of locus of control [30]. Steward Interventions. Table 1 presents the items used to determine the extent of the various intervention behaviors of the subject union stewards. The subjects were asked to respond in “ranges.” Stewards were not expected to recall exactly how many grievances they filed over the previous year, but it was anticipated that they could recall the range (from 4 to 7 grievances filed, for example). The same general approach was taken with respect to the percentage ranges of the other steward intervention items as well. The internal reliability coefficient for those steward intervention behaviors was .83 for these subjects. Inasmuch as the responses in the steward intervention items are in a range, these items were classified as ordinal level for purposes of analysis. Measures of association and significance with respect to these behaviors were computed as Kendall rank order correlation coefficients.
Results The frequencies of the steward intervention behavior responses are noted in Table 1. Just over one-third of the stewards reported that they did not file a grievance on behalf of an employee over the past year. Over 40 percent of the stewards either never or very seldom (less than 5 percent of the time) counseled a potential grievant not to file a grievance. Over 46 percent stated that they encouraged rank and tile members to file grievances even on occasions when the member had shown no inclination to do so. Nearly 33 percent of the stewards will file a grievance in the name of the union without the support of the involved rank and tile members. Job involvement, union involvement, and locus of control are hypothesized to be associated with all of the union steward intervention
93
Union Steward
Table 1: Frequencies: How often never very from from from more
Steward Grievance
do you talk an employee
out of filing a grievance? 21.7% 21.7 12.3 14.2 15.1 10.4
seldom, less than 5% of the time 5 to 10% of the time 11 to 25% of the time 26 to 50% of the time than 50% of the time
How often do you settle a potential lem with the employee’s supervisor?
grievance
never very seldom, less than 5% of the time from 5 to 10% of the time from 11 to 25% of the time from 26 to 50% of the time more than 50% of the time Within the past year, for employees?
how many
Behavior
grievances
none l-3 4-7 8-10 11-15 more than 15
before
it is filed by discussing
the prob-
14.2% 11.3 16.0 12.3 20.8 20.8 were you involved
in as a steward
by filing
33.4% 21.7 16.0 8.5 7.5 16.0
If you see or hear of an incident that could result in a grievance, but the person who has been involved expresses no interest in filing, how often would you suggest to that person that a grievance be filed? never very from from from more
seldom, less than 5% of the time 5 to 10% of the time 11 to 25% of the time 26 to 50% of the time than 50% of the time
10.4% 9.4 10.4 6.6 11.3 46.2
Suppose that you did suggest to an individual that he or she file a greivance over some matter and that individual preferred not to do so. How often, under these circumstances, would you file the grievance anyway? never very from from from more
seldom, less than 5% of the time 5 to 10% of the time 11 to 25% of the time 26 to 50% of the time than 50% of the time
19.8% 17.0 11.3 9.4 8.5 31.1
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Dan R. Dalton and William D. Todor
behaviors. These hypotheses were based on two fundamental notions: the ordinarily adversarial relationship between union and organization and the observation that none of the described steward interventions is default behavior. In every case, the union steward must “do” something. Table 2 illustrates the results of the examination of these research questions. As evident in Table 2, job involvement is not significantly associated with any of the enumerated steward grievance behaviors. Union involvement, however, is significantly related to the two more “radical” behaviors of 1) encouraging rank and file members to tile when no overt interest has been shown by the involved individual and 2) the steward filing grievances over the objections (lack of support) of the involved rank and file member. Note the relatively high association between job involvement and union involvement (0.65; p < 0.001). Given the assumption of the ordinary adversarial relationship between union and organization, this relationship would seem counterintuitive. Purcell [27] and Stagner [34], among others, have discussed the notion of “dual loyalty. ” They suggested that union members with favorable feelings toward the union are often favorably inclined toward the company as well. Perhaps for this sample this is the case for “involvement” also. Both “loyalty” and “involvement” may be traits (i.e., some individuals would be loyal and/or involved with any organization with which they interact). Notice also the interassociations between the steward grievance behaviors. With a single exception (frequency of advising a potential grievant not to file and frequency of steward filing in the name of the union), all are statistically significant. Two particularly large associations are not surprising. The frequency of advising a potential grievant not to file and the frequency of discussion with supervision to settle grievances informally are evidently closely related (0.48; p < 0.001). Both behaviors would have the effect of decreasing the number of grievances formally filed in the organization. Similarly, encouraging members to file when they otherwise would not and filing grievances in the name of the union without the aggrieved party’s consent are highly related (0.54; p < 0.001). Again, this is consistent as both behaviors have a tendency to increase the number of grievances formally filed in the organization. No inverse associations occur between the steward intervention behaviors. Stewards who are relatively active in behaviors that lead to increased numbers of grievances do not necessarily eschew behaviors with a tendency to reduce the incidence of grievances. This may suggest a “grievance activism”: an active steward may engage in all these behaviors.
dp < 0.001.
0.65d _
-
and locus of control
2
1 0.03 -0.12 -0.29c -
4
r. All other
reported
relationships
os7d _
are Pearson’s
0.64d
o.37d o.54d
o.3ld _
in this table
o/W
o.39d 0.26c
o.35d
-0.11 0.34d -o.3W o.23b
9
o.34d
-0.09 0.28C -0.29c 0.11
8
_
0.10 o.22b -o.4od 0.27c
7
-0.11 0.07 -o.33d o.19d
6
and Steward
0.05 0.06 -0.3ld 0.48d
5
Locus of Control,
intercorrelations
0.05 0.16 _
3
Job, Union Involvement,
Job involvement Union involvement Locus of control (externality) Frequency of advising potential greivant not to file Frequency of discussion with potential grievant’s supervisor to resolve the problem prior to formal filing of grievance Number of greivances filed Frequency of encouraging rank and file member to file a greivance even if member has shown no interest in doing so Frequency of steward filing a grievance in the name of the union over the objections (lack of support) of the involved rank and file member Grievance activism
a Job involvement, union involvement, are calculated by Kendall’s tau. bp < 0.05. cp < 0.01.
9.
8.
6. 7.
5.
1. 2. 3. 4.
Table 2: Associations between Greivance Behavior”
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Dan R. Dalton and WilliamD. Todor
Such a metric (grievance activism) is easily formed. The five dependent variables may be summed in an unweighted combination. Captured in this metric is the full extent of those behaviors in union stewards that may affect the number of grievances filed. The associations that include the grievance activism variable are also illustrated in Table 2. “Grievance activism” is significantly associated with both union job involvement (0.34; p -C 0.001) and locus of control (-0.30; p < 0.001). Also evident in Table 2 are statistically significant inverse relationships across the board between locus of control (scored by externality) and all enumerated steward grievance behaviors. A major dependent variable of this research is reported grievances filed, not grievances filed. This fundamental difference could lead to apparent relations among the variables based on common method error rather than true covariation. This concern may be minimized in this data as union archival records were available as a cross-check to the numbers of grievances reported by the union stewards. Whereas a guarantee of anonymity to the respondents precluded an actual comparison of the reported grievances filed with the actual number filed by individual stewards, a level of verification was nonetheless possible. It could be determined if the proportion of stewards who indicated that they filed grievances in a given range (from for example) was consistent with the four to seven grievances, proportion of stewards who actually did so without identifying individual stewards. Given that the percentage of stewards who actually filed between four and seven grievances, for example, is known (from the union archival records), a confidence level can be ascertained to indicate whether the reported percentage of stewards is a reasonable representation of the actual percentage of stewards filing grievances in a given of the binomial distribution, range. By a normal approximation confidence levels can be determined based on the standard error. All reported grievance ranges were within a 0.95 confidence interval with the exception of the “ 1-3” grievances filed range. A smaller percentage of stewards reported that they had filed between one and three grievances than was indicated in the archival records. For five of the six grievance ranges, however, the sample (the percentage of stewards who reported filing grievances in a given range) could reasonably have been drawn from the population (actual percentage of stewards who actually filed grievances in the given range) within a 0.95 confidence level.
Union Steward
97
Discussion The results of this investigation support the hypothesis that differences in locus of control orientations are related to steward grievance behaviors. Union, but not company, involvement is related to several of these behaviors. These results may have interesting implications for practitioners and organizational theorists alike. It may be disturbing that over 42 percent of the respondents seldom or never counsel potential grievants not to file, particularly considering the demonstrated impact that the grievance process has on the organization [3, 261. This may suggest that in some cases grievances may enter the process without regard to their merit. Whether or not all incidents brought to the attention of union stewards are viable is uncertain. It may also be disturbing to both management and organized labor that evidently many grievances are filed by stewards without review. Perhaps worse, nearly 15 percent of the respondents indicate that they never settle potential grievances prior to formal filing by discussion with the potentially aggrieved person’s supervisor. Many stewards (46 percent) indicate that they encourage the filing of a grievance more than half of the time even when the involved rank and file member displays no interest in pursuing the matter. More radically, perhaps, 30 percent of the stewards state that even when rank and file member does not file over a given incident, they will file in the name of the union. The across-the-board relationships between steward grievance filing behavior and locus of control orientation leads to an interesting paradox. Arguably, two of the steward interventions are essentially positive behaviors. Counseling a prospective grievant not to file a formal grievance, under some circumstances, is probably responsible conduct. Similarly, resolving potential grievances informally by discussion with the aggrieved employee’s supervisor seems positive as well. Virtually any intervention that leads to an informal resolution of a grievance prior to formal filing is in the best interests of both management and organized labor. Internal locus of control in union stewards may be somewhat predictive of a greater utilization of the steward grievance intervention behaviors that presumably lead to fewer formally filed grievances. Union steward locus of control orientation, however, is related not just to the two positive steward interventions but to all five steward intervention behaviors.The ramifications of union stewards engaging in the remaining three interventions may be serious. While there is probably a baseline for the number of grievances tiled by a steward, we doubt that the “more the better” is a viable strategy. Grievances may
98
Dan R. Dalton
and
William D. Todor
have a certain nuisance value and be used in retaliation. Unpopular supervisors may at times be inundated by grievances the merits of which are largely irrelevant. This may be a very viable short-term strategy. However, certain steward behavior: (blind filing of grievances without review, encouraging members to file over incidents in which they evidently have no interest, and filing over the objections of the rank and file member) are neither in the best interests of management nor the union in a longer time frame. From the managerial perspective, this observation requires no further comment. From the standpoint of the steward and the union, “number of grievances filed” may be an important index of performance. Through a policy of filing large numbers of grievances, largely without review, however, the credibility of the steward and the union may become suspect. In instances in which many grievance actions are not viable, perhaps even frivolous, getting a fair hearing on a meritorious grievance may be difficult. Management may also become less likely to become involved in informal resolution processes. Eventually, the rank and file membership may become aware that they enjoy a very modest winning percentage. Three of the union steward intervention behaviors that lead to greater numbers of formal grievances may be dysfunctional to both management and labor. This raises a paradox. Locus of control in stewards is associated with all five interventions as described in this research. Two of the intervention behaviors are potentially positive for management and labor. The remaining three interventions, correlates of the same index, may be dysfunctional. The same correlate predicts both functional and dysfunctional grievance behaviors in union stewards. In terms of selecting stewards, for example, would a union prefer stewards with internal locus of control orientations? These results, along with their implications, should be interpreted with caution. One difficulty is that we do not know the base rate for any of the enumerated steward intervention behaviors. For instance, exactly what is reasonable grievance filing behavior for union stewards? At what point do stewards file “too many” or “not enough” grievances? The union steward, whose role with respect to the suggested intervention behaviors is not well understood, remains a critical actor in the grievance process. Traditional inquiry into the nature of grievance filing behavior in rank and file members has ignored the fundamental impact of the union steward on the process. The filing of a grievance is not ordinarily the independent act of the employee. The union steward is ordinarily a mediator in the process. The Taft-Hardy Act does enable
Union
99
Steward
union members to file grievances directly to employers, though this is rarely done. The role of the steward in the grievance process may partially explain the lack of substantive associations between a variety of demographic and personality differences in rank and file members and their propensities to file grievances. Again, differences in rank and file members may very well explain the decision to initiate the process. As has been noted, however, this decision is not final. The steward has discretionary behaviors that may result in grievances not being filed when requested and, importantly, in being filed when they are not requested. Union steward behavior and propensities will account for more of the variance in the number of greivances filed than differences in rank and file members. Considering the costs borne by both management and organized labor in the grievance process, the role of the union steward, long ignored, is worthy of future research.
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Dalton, D. R., and Todor, W. D., Antecedents of Grievance Filing Behavior: Attitude/Behavioral Consistency and the Union Steward, Academy Mgt. J., in press.
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and William D. Todor
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23.
Organ, D. W., Extraversion, ditionability in Organizations,
Locus of Control, and Individual Differences J. Applied Psy. 60 (1975): 401-404.
24.
Organ, D. W., and Greene, Satisfaction, J. AppliedPsy.
C. N., Role Ambiguity, 59 (1974): 101-102.
25.
Phares, E. J., Locus of Control: A Personality Determinant Learning Press, Morristown, N.J., 1973.
of Behavior. General
26.
Price, .I., DeWire, J., Nowack, J., Schenkel, Grievances, Personnel J. 55 (1976): 33-37.
W., Three
27.
Purcell, T. V., Blue Collar Man: Patterns of Dual Allegiance in Industry. University Press, Cambridge, 1960.
28.
Rabinowitz, S., and Hall, D. T., Organizational Psychol. Bull. 84 (1977): 265-288.
29.
Reid, D. W., and Ware, E. E., Multidimensionality of Internal-External Control: Implications for Past and Fugure Research, Canadian J. Behau. Sci. 5 (1973): 264-271.
30.
Reitz, H. J., and Jewell, L. N., Sex, Locus of Control, and Job A Six-Country Investigation, Acad. Mgt. J. 22 (1979): 72-80.
31.
Ronan, W. R., and Prien, ganizational Performance, 78-99.
to Factor Analysis. Sage Publications, Attitudes and Motiand L. W. Porter,
of Job Characteristics to Job InvolveJ. Applied Psy. 54 (1970): 305-312. Control
H. M., Locus of Control. Lawrence
of Reinforcements:
Erlbaum
T. M., and Kejner, M., The Definition Applied Psy. 49 (1965): 24-33. of Internal
Construct
in the
versus
External
of Control, in ed., Academic
Associates,
and Measurement
Control,
Locus
K., and Ronan,
Research
A Review,
Hillsdale,
N.J.,
of Job InvolveJ. Consult. Clin. in Con-
of Control,
on Job
and Work
Studies
of
Harvard
Involvement,
Involvement:
E. P., An Analysis of Organizational Behavior and OrOrganizational Behav, Human Performance 9 (1973):
Union
101
Steward
32.
Rotter, J. B., Generalized Expectancies for Internal versus Reinforcement, Psychol. Monographs 80 (1966): l-28.
33.
Ruble, T. L., Effects of One’s Locus of Control and the Opportunity pate in Planning, Organizational Behav. Human Performance 16 (1976):
34.
Stagner,
35.
Sailagyi, A. D., and Sims, H. P., Locus of Control Multiple Occupational Levels, J. Applied Psy. 60 (1975):
36.
Throop, W. F., and MacDonald, A. P., Internal-External Bibliography, Psychol. Reports 28 (1971): 175-190.
External
R., The Psychology of Industrial Conflict. Wiley, New York,
Control
to Partici63-73.
1956.
and Expectancies 638-640. Locus
of
across
of Control:
A
L)iscrerionury hehuviors Utilizution srewurd
hehuviors
oj’union stewards ure described.
muy be u criticul oj proactive job
hypothesis theorists
grievunce
involvement. received
union
empiricul
und pructirioners
The use (or othenvise)
index oj’rhe number of grievuncesjiled filing
support
dike
behaviors
itndvemenr.
is systemuricully
und locus of‘ control
in this reseurch.
oj’these
in un organizurion.
Implicorions
ussociured orienrurions.
with This
for orgoni:utiotrul
ure discussed.
Recently, the lack of interest in the study of labor unions has been described as astounding [ 151. Nowhere is this lack more evident than in the meager empirical research that has examined the grievance process. The term “grievance” does not even appear in the index of the ambitious Hundbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology [ Ill. Ronan and Prien [3 I] referred to the grievance process as “ubiquitous” and noted the attention it receives in most organizations. Others [3, 261 have suggested that grievances are characterized by “heavy cost and disruptiveness.” Empirical research on the grievance process has generally focused on the antecedents or determinants of the formal grievance. Differences in employee attitudes, demographic characteristics, organizational structure, and leadership patterns, for example, have all been hypothesized to account for an observed disparity in the number of grievances filed in organizations. The results of these research efforts have not been encouraging; such factors have not contributed substantially to the understanding of the differences that characterize rank and file union member grievance filing behavior. Recent work [7, 81 suggests that much of the previous research may have virtually ignored a major actor in the process: the union steward. The filing of a grievance is not ordinarily the independent act of a rank and file employee; the union steward is a moderator in the process. Address
correspotdotcc~
Gradrtatc School ofdkness.
JOURNAL Q Elsevier
OFBUSINESS
Science
52 Vanderbilt
Publishing
to Dalr R. Dalton, Ittdiana
Administrative
(Jttil1ersit.v. Bloomir:~ton.
10,85-101 Co., Inc., 1982
RESEARCH
Ave., New York, NY 10017
and Behavioral
Studies,
I.V 4 7401.
(1982)
85 0148-2963/82/01085-17$2.7~
86
Dan R. Dalton and William D. Todor
Dalton and Todor [7, 81 suggest that demographic and attitudinal differences in rank and file employees may account for substantial variance in the decision that employees may make to initiate the grievance process. This “initiation” decision, however, does not guarantee that a formal grievance will be filed. The union steward has a variety of discretionary behaviors that can directly influence the number of grievances formally filed in a given organization. Five such behaviors, in order of an increasing propensity of the union steward to grieve [9], are listed here: 1. The union steward, when confronted with a rank and file union member who wishes to file a grievance, may counsel the employee to abandon the grievance process (i.e., the steward may talk the employee out of filing). 2. The union steward may agree that the suggested grievance is viable, but rather than formally filing, will settle the potential grievance through discussion with the employee’s supervisor. 3. The union steward may file grievances that are requested by rank and file members. Issues of merit, if any, of a potential grievance are essentially moot. If a grievance is requested, the steward will tile. 4. A steward may witness or otherwise become aware of an incident over which a grievance could be filed. The rank and file member directly involved has shown no overt interest in filing over the incident. In such circumstances, the union steward may encourage (even insist) that the affected member file. 5. In the incident described above (4), the rank and tile member may remain unwilling to file over the incident. Union stewards may, in this case, file an action in the name of the union. The approval of the affected employee is unnecessary. Dalton and Todor’s [7] primary point is that engagement in these behaviors (or subsets of them) probably accounts for more variance in the number of grievances filed in an organization than the propensities of rank and tile employees. Differences in rank and file members (whether demographic, attitudinal, or otherwise) may account for variance in the decisions to initiate the grievance process. Union steward intervention behaviors, however, may operate to truncate grievance filing propensities in rank and file members. Figure 1 illustrates the prepotent truncations of union stewards and the exhaustiveness of steward intervention categories [9]. Virtually all links connecting a grievable incident or condition to the formal grievance proceed through the union steward. Individual union
Condition
or
Incident
Grievable
Potentially
FIGURE
VD
!)C
I
.
E
I
v
>
)
I
to Informal Resolutlon
in the Grievance Process.
)I (with negative propensity to grieve)<
INDIVIDUAL
.
H
< F G
v
t
(with positive propensity to grieve)<
INDIVIDUAL
(usually 1st line supervision)
1: Model of Steward Prepotency
A
MANAGEMENT
STEWARO
UNION
Formal Gr1t:anc>
88
Dan R. Dalton and William D. Todor
members are legally entitled to tile grievances in their own behalf, without the intervention of the union steward. This, however, rarely occurs. For example, in the local union sample reported in this research, covering over 1,000 grievances, no grievances at all were filed directly. Union stewards are not the only actors in the grievance process. They are, however, central actors; the union steward is the only participant in the process who has a “veto” power over both management and the rank and file employee. Management does have influence in the process. Managerial personnel may intervene proactively to prevent the occurrence of incidents or conditions that might lead to a grievance (link A in Figure 1). Management may also attempt to influence an employee with respect to filing a grievance immediately after the incident (link B) or somewhat later (link G) when he or she decides to file. The supervisor may, for example, assure the employee that the incident or condition was relatively isolated and unlikely to recur. Perhaps there was a legitimate oversight (e.g., improper overtime hours) that management might immediately agree to rectify. These interventions are important; they may actually reduce the incidence of grievances in the work place. If, however, the union steward is not satisfied with the management intervention or its effects (even if the potentially aggrieved is content), he or she may file a grievance with or without the endorsement of the potentially aggrieved employee. In essence, the steward may veto any intervention by management. The potentially aggrieved employee is an important actor in the grievance process. Whether or not an individual is inclined to file a grievance over an incident, the union steward retains truncation powers. Although an employee wants to tile (link H), the union steward may counsel not to do so. The steward may argue that the action is not viable; perhaps a similar action recently adjudicated was lost by the union. Whatever the reason given, this “counseling” behavior reduces the number of formally filed grievances. Conversely, an employee may not wish to file a grievance over a given incident. The steward may encourage (link I) the employee to file an action or, should the employee refuse to file, the union steward may simply bypass the individual and tile in the name of the union (link E). Whereas management and employees certainly have an impact on the process, the union steward has a veto power. No matter what relevant managerial personnel or rank and file employees wish to do about a condition or an incident that is potentially grievable, union stewards have discretionary behaviors that can truncate the propensities of the other actors in the process.
Union Steward
89
In any scenario, illustrated in figure 1, the union steward is the critical actor; actions by management and individual union members are subject to the steward’s approval. Link E, the bypass link, is the proverbial “ace in the hole” whereby the union steward may bypass both management and individual workers and file in the name of the union. Such bypassing is frequent. In the data reported in this research, for example, over 23 percent of the grievances filed were in the name of the union. This does not imply that all such grievances are filed over the objections of employees. Filing “in the name of the union” is also a means of providing anonymity, when requested, for employees principally involved in a grievance. This is not common but does occur. Interventions by stewards may have an important impact on the number of grievances filed in an organization. These behaviors are largely discretionary [7, 81. Differential engagement in these intervention behaviors may be a critical indicator of labor-management relations within an organization. The analytical question of this research concerns the factors that may contribute to variation in union steward propensities to engage in these behaviors. Dalton and Todor [7] demonstrated that manifest needs of union stewards may be an important predictor of the three interventions suggested by them at that time. Whereas a host of individual differences in union stewards may account for variance in these behaviors, locus of control, job involvement, and union involvement may be especially appropriate.
Independent Variables Locus of Control
Rotter [32] postulated that consistent, systematic differences exist with respect to an individual’s belief in internal versus external control. Organ [23] noted that internals are said to believe that they can significantly influence outcomes by their own behavior, while externals believe that their behavior is much less decisive in this respect. Szilagyi and Sims [35] have suggested that individuals who view events around them as the results of their own actions (or under their control) can be referred to as “internals.” Conversely, individuals who perceive events around them as independent of their own actions and more a function of fate, luck, or powerful others are said to be “externals.” This notion of internal/external (ity) may be a valid predictor of a union steward’s propensity to engage in discretionary behaviors. None of the five interventions is “default” behavior; they must be engaged in proactively; the steward must “do” something. Presumably, stewards would be less likely to engage in these behaviors if they perceived their consequences as the “result of luck, chance, fate, as under the control of
90
Dan R. Dalton and William D. ‘I’odor
powerful others, or as unpredictable because of the great complexity of forces surrounding item” [32]. Although the literature addressing internal-external control is voluminous [ 13, 18, 19, 20, 25, 361, the references to its use in organizational contexts is less frequent. It has been associated with both attitudinal constructs [24, 30, 351 and behaviors [ 1, 2,4, 23, 331. With respect to work-related variables, Szilagyi and Sims [35] concluded that the extant research has generally supported Rotter’s contention that individuals with a strong belief that they can control their destiny are more likely to be alert to, and take advantage of, certain aspects of the work situation. The internal-external control criterion has not been applied in a union context. To the extent that union stewards can be categorized as “internal,” they may be more likely to engage in the enumerated interventions. “Internal” orientation is hypothesized to be positively related to all five steward interventions. Job and Union Involvement Reitz and Jewel1 [30] noted that job involvement-the degree to which one’s work is an important part of one’s life-has become an increasingly valuable construct in both empirical investigations and theoretical speculations about job performance and other worker behaviors. A recent review of the empirical literature on job involvement that summarizes some 80 correlates of job involvement (personal and situational characteristics and outcome variable such as performance, turnover, and absenteeism) attests to this observation [28]. The job involvement construct has not been extended to a union context. The extent of job and/or union involvement might serve as a predictor of the nature of union steward intervention behaviors. A union steward with relatively high levels of job involvement, for example, might file fewer grievances against the company. Such a steward might also be correspondingly less likely to encourage union members to file grievances or to file grievances over their objections. Also, perhaps as a function of the traditionally perceived adversarial relationship between union and firm, union stewards with relatively high levels of union involvement might engage in more grievance tiling behaviors but be less likely to discuss potential grievances informally with supervision. Job and union involvement are hypothesized to be associated with the steward intervention behaviors. Job involvement will be positively associated with intervention behaviors that reduce the number of grievances tiled and inversely related to those behaviors that increase the number of filed grievances. Union involvement is hypothesized to have opposite effects. Relatively high levels of union involvement will be
91
Union Steward
positively associated with intervention behaviors that increase the number of formally filed grievances. An inverse relationship is expected between union involvement and steward intervention behaviors that would reduce the number of grievances. Method Sample In this study, 106 union stewards representing some 4,600 rank and file members employed by a West Coast communications company comprise the sample. A questionnaire was administered to these stewards on site by the researchers. All questionnaires, a 100 percent participation rate, were collected and subjected to analysis. Company and union tenure of stewards ranged from 1 to over 21 years. Females comprised 46.2 percent of the sample, males, 48.1 percent; the remainder preferred not to state their gender. Modal age of the subject stewards was 26 to 35 years. These stewards represent a broad cross section of nonmanagerial/nonprofessional employees. Male and female, blue and white collar employees of various ages and seniority, involved in a range of technical and nontechnical occupations, are their constituency. Measures Job Involvement. The original job involvement instrument was developed by Lodahl and Kejner [2 I]. Subsequently, a factor analysis of this scale conducted by Lawler and Hall [ 171 indicated that six items of the original instrument best constituted a “job involvement” scale. These six items, in a Likert-type 7-point format, were used in this study to determine the level of job involvement for the subjects. For this sample, the internal reliability coefficient for this scale was .86. Union Involvement. Union stewards in this sample actually have two positions: employment by the organization and a position with the union as a union steward. Therefore all items in the 5item job involvement scale were asked in two contexts: company and union. For company job involvement, the instrument items were asked traditionally. With respect to union involvement, the items were modified slightly. For example: “the most important things that happen to me involve my job as a union steward” (item 2); ‘ ‘I am really a perfectionist
about my work as a union steward” (item 5).
The internal reliability coefficient context was .90 for this sample.
for the modified scale for the union
92
Dan R. Dalton and William D. Todor
Locus of Control. Locus of control was measured by Rotter’s [32] Internal/External scale, 23 times in a forced choice format. This scale actually contains 29 items, with 6 “tillers” not scored to assess internal/ external (ity). Each item has two choices for response: one indicates an “internal” orientation; the other, an “external. ” Responses to the 23 scored items form a metric of internality or externality that ranges from 0 to 23. A respondent score of 23 indicates an external response to every item (Rotter scores for externality). While noting some evidence for subfactor structure in the Rotter scale (5, 6, 10, 12, 16, 22,29), we rely on a unidimensional interpretation of internality/externality for locus of control. The internal consistency reliability of the Rotter scale for this sample is 0.78. Despite recent controversy over the factor structure of the I-E scale, it represents the best available measure of the global construct of locus of control [30]. Steward Interventions. Table 1 presents the items used to determine the extent of the various intervention behaviors of the subject union stewards. The subjects were asked to respond in “ranges.” Stewards were not expected to recall exactly how many grievances they filed over the previous year, but it was anticipated that they could recall the range (from 4 to 7 grievances filed, for example). The same general approach was taken with respect to the percentage ranges of the other steward intervention items as well. The internal reliability coefficient for those steward intervention behaviors was .83 for these subjects. Inasmuch as the responses in the steward intervention items are in a range, these items were classified as ordinal level for purposes of analysis. Measures of association and significance with respect to these behaviors were computed as Kendall rank order correlation coefficients.
Results The frequencies of the steward intervention behavior responses are noted in Table 1. Just over one-third of the stewards reported that they did not file a grievance on behalf of an employee over the past year. Over 40 percent of the stewards either never or very seldom (less than 5 percent of the time) counseled a potential grievant not to file a grievance. Over 46 percent stated that they encouraged rank and tile members to file grievances even on occasions when the member had shown no inclination to do so. Nearly 33 percent of the stewards will file a grievance in the name of the union without the support of the involved rank and tile members. Job involvement, union involvement, and locus of control are hypothesized to be associated with all of the union steward intervention
93
Union Steward
Table 1: Frequencies: How often never very from from from more
Steward Grievance
do you talk an employee
out of filing a grievance? 21.7% 21.7 12.3 14.2 15.1 10.4
seldom, less than 5% of the time 5 to 10% of the time 11 to 25% of the time 26 to 50% of the time than 50% of the time
How often do you settle a potential lem with the employee’s supervisor?
grievance
never very seldom, less than 5% of the time from 5 to 10% of the time from 11 to 25% of the time from 26 to 50% of the time more than 50% of the time Within the past year, for employees?
how many
Behavior
grievances
none l-3 4-7 8-10 11-15 more than 15
before
it is filed by discussing
the prob-
14.2% 11.3 16.0 12.3 20.8 20.8 were you involved
in as a steward
by filing
33.4% 21.7 16.0 8.5 7.5 16.0
If you see or hear of an incident that could result in a grievance, but the person who has been involved expresses no interest in filing, how often would you suggest to that person that a grievance be filed? never very from from from more
seldom, less than 5% of the time 5 to 10% of the time 11 to 25% of the time 26 to 50% of the time than 50% of the time
10.4% 9.4 10.4 6.6 11.3 46.2
Suppose that you did suggest to an individual that he or she file a greivance over some matter and that individual preferred not to do so. How often, under these circumstances, would you file the grievance anyway? never very from from from more
seldom, less than 5% of the time 5 to 10% of the time 11 to 25% of the time 26 to 50% of the time than 50% of the time
19.8% 17.0 11.3 9.4 8.5 31.1
94
Dan R. Dalton and William D. Todor
behaviors. These hypotheses were based on two fundamental notions: the ordinarily adversarial relationship between union and organization and the observation that none of the described steward interventions is default behavior. In every case, the union steward must “do” something. Table 2 illustrates the results of the examination of these research questions. As evident in Table 2, job involvement is not significantly associated with any of the enumerated steward grievance behaviors. Union involvement, however, is significantly related to the two more “radical” behaviors of 1) encouraging rank and file members to tile when no overt interest has been shown by the involved individual and 2) the steward filing grievances over the objections (lack of support) of the involved rank and file member. Note the relatively high association between job involvement and union involvement (0.65; p < 0.001). Given the assumption of the ordinary adversarial relationship between union and organization, this relationship would seem counterintuitive. Purcell [27] and Stagner [34], among others, have discussed the notion of “dual loyalty. ” They suggested that union members with favorable feelings toward the union are often favorably inclined toward the company as well. Perhaps for this sample this is the case for “involvement” also. Both “loyalty” and “involvement” may be traits (i.e., some individuals would be loyal and/or involved with any organization with which they interact). Notice also the interassociations between the steward grievance behaviors. With a single exception (frequency of advising a potential grievant not to file and frequency of steward filing in the name of the union), all are statistically significant. Two particularly large associations are not surprising. The frequency of advising a potential grievant not to file and the frequency of discussion with supervision to settle grievances informally are evidently closely related (0.48; p < 0.001). Both behaviors would have the effect of decreasing the number of grievances formally filed in the organization. Similarly, encouraging members to file when they otherwise would not and filing grievances in the name of the union without the aggrieved party’s consent are highly related (0.54; p < 0.001). Again, this is consistent as both behaviors have a tendency to increase the number of grievances formally filed in the organization. No inverse associations occur between the steward intervention behaviors. Stewards who are relatively active in behaviors that lead to increased numbers of grievances do not necessarily eschew behaviors with a tendency to reduce the incidence of grievances. This may suggest a “grievance activism”: an active steward may engage in all these behaviors.
dp < 0.001.
0.65d _
-
and locus of control
2
1 0.03 -0.12 -0.29c -
4
r. All other
reported
relationships
os7d _
are Pearson’s
0.64d
o.37d o.54d
o.3ld _
in this table
o/W
o.39d 0.26c
o.35d
-0.11 0.34d -o.3W o.23b
9
o.34d
-0.09 0.28C -0.29c 0.11
8
_
0.10 o.22b -o.4od 0.27c
7
-0.11 0.07 -o.33d o.19d
6
and Steward
0.05 0.06 -0.3ld 0.48d
5
Locus of Control,
intercorrelations
0.05 0.16 _
3
Job, Union Involvement,
Job involvement Union involvement Locus of control (externality) Frequency of advising potential greivant not to file Frequency of discussion with potential grievant’s supervisor to resolve the problem prior to formal filing of grievance Number of greivances filed Frequency of encouraging rank and file member to file a greivance even if member has shown no interest in doing so Frequency of steward filing a grievance in the name of the union over the objections (lack of support) of the involved rank and file member Grievance activism
a Job involvement, union involvement, are calculated by Kendall’s tau. bp < 0.05. cp < 0.01.
9.
8.
6. 7.
5.
1. 2. 3. 4.
Table 2: Associations between Greivance Behavior”
96
Dan R. Dalton and WilliamD. Todor
Such a metric (grievance activism) is easily formed. The five dependent variables may be summed in an unweighted combination. Captured in this metric is the full extent of those behaviors in union stewards that may affect the number of grievances filed. The associations that include the grievance activism variable are also illustrated in Table 2. “Grievance activism” is significantly associated with both union job involvement (0.34; p -C 0.001) and locus of control (-0.30; p < 0.001). Also evident in Table 2 are statistically significant inverse relationships across the board between locus of control (scored by externality) and all enumerated steward grievance behaviors. A major dependent variable of this research is reported grievances filed, not grievances filed. This fundamental difference could lead to apparent relations among the variables based on common method error rather than true covariation. This concern may be minimized in this data as union archival records were available as a cross-check to the numbers of grievances reported by the union stewards. Whereas a guarantee of anonymity to the respondents precluded an actual comparison of the reported grievances filed with the actual number filed by individual stewards, a level of verification was nonetheless possible. It could be determined if the proportion of stewards who indicated that they filed grievances in a given range (from for example) was consistent with the four to seven grievances, proportion of stewards who actually did so without identifying individual stewards. Given that the percentage of stewards who actually filed between four and seven grievances, for example, is known (from the union archival records), a confidence level can be ascertained to indicate whether the reported percentage of stewards is a reasonable representation of the actual percentage of stewards filing grievances in a given of the binomial distribution, range. By a normal approximation confidence levels can be determined based on the standard error. All reported grievance ranges were within a 0.95 confidence interval with the exception of the “ 1-3” grievances filed range. A smaller percentage of stewards reported that they had filed between one and three grievances than was indicated in the archival records. For five of the six grievance ranges, however, the sample (the percentage of stewards who reported filing grievances in a given range) could reasonably have been drawn from the population (actual percentage of stewards who actually filed grievances in the given range) within a 0.95 confidence level.
Union Steward
97
Discussion The results of this investigation support the hypothesis that differences in locus of control orientations are related to steward grievance behaviors. Union, but not company, involvement is related to several of these behaviors. These results may have interesting implications for practitioners and organizational theorists alike. It may be disturbing that over 42 percent of the respondents seldom or never counsel potential grievants not to file, particularly considering the demonstrated impact that the grievance process has on the organization [3, 261. This may suggest that in some cases grievances may enter the process without regard to their merit. Whether or not all incidents brought to the attention of union stewards are viable is uncertain. It may also be disturbing to both management and organized labor that evidently many grievances are filed by stewards without review. Perhaps worse, nearly 15 percent of the respondents indicate that they never settle potential grievances prior to formal filing by discussion with the potentially aggrieved person’s supervisor. Many stewards (46 percent) indicate that they encourage the filing of a grievance more than half of the time even when the involved rank and file member displays no interest in pursuing the matter. More radically, perhaps, 30 percent of the stewards state that even when rank and file member does not file over a given incident, they will file in the name of the union. The across-the-board relationships between steward grievance filing behavior and locus of control orientation leads to an interesting paradox. Arguably, two of the steward interventions are essentially positive behaviors. Counseling a prospective grievant not to file a formal grievance, under some circumstances, is probably responsible conduct. Similarly, resolving potential grievances informally by discussion with the aggrieved employee’s supervisor seems positive as well. Virtually any intervention that leads to an informal resolution of a grievance prior to formal filing is in the best interests of both management and organized labor. Internal locus of control in union stewards may be somewhat predictive of a greater utilization of the steward grievance intervention behaviors that presumably lead to fewer formally filed grievances. Union steward locus of control orientation, however, is related not just to the two positive steward interventions but to all five steward intervention behaviors.The ramifications of union stewards engaging in the remaining three interventions may be serious. While there is probably a baseline for the number of grievances tiled by a steward, we doubt that the “more the better” is a viable strategy. Grievances may
98
Dan R. Dalton
and
William D. Todor
have a certain nuisance value and be used in retaliation. Unpopular supervisors may at times be inundated by grievances the merits of which are largely irrelevant. This may be a very viable short-term strategy. However, certain steward behavior: (blind filing of grievances without review, encouraging members to file over incidents in which they evidently have no interest, and filing over the objections of the rank and file member) are neither in the best interests of management nor the union in a longer time frame. From the managerial perspective, this observation requires no further comment. From the standpoint of the steward and the union, “number of grievances filed” may be an important index of performance. Through a policy of filing large numbers of grievances, largely without review, however, the credibility of the steward and the union may become suspect. In instances in which many grievance actions are not viable, perhaps even frivolous, getting a fair hearing on a meritorious grievance may be difficult. Management may also become less likely to become involved in informal resolution processes. Eventually, the rank and file membership may become aware that they enjoy a very modest winning percentage. Three of the union steward intervention behaviors that lead to greater numbers of formal grievances may be dysfunctional to both management and labor. This raises a paradox. Locus of control in stewards is associated with all five interventions as described in this research. Two of the intervention behaviors are potentially positive for management and labor. The remaining three interventions, correlates of the same index, may be dysfunctional. The same correlate predicts both functional and dysfunctional grievance behaviors in union stewards. In terms of selecting stewards, for example, would a union prefer stewards with internal locus of control orientations? These results, along with their implications, should be interpreted with caution. One difficulty is that we do not know the base rate for any of the enumerated steward intervention behaviors. For instance, exactly what is reasonable grievance filing behavior for union stewards? At what point do stewards file “too many” or “not enough” grievances? The union steward, whose role with respect to the suggested intervention behaviors is not well understood, remains a critical actor in the grievance process. Traditional inquiry into the nature of grievance filing behavior in rank and file members has ignored the fundamental impact of the union steward on the process. The filing of a grievance is not ordinarily the independent act of the employee. The union steward is ordinarily a mediator in the process. The Taft-Hardy Act does enable
Union
99
Steward
union members to file grievances directly to employers, though this is rarely done. The role of the steward in the grievance process may partially explain the lack of substantive associations between a variety of demographic and personality differences in rank and file members and their propensities to file grievances. Again, differences in rank and file members may very well explain the decision to initiate the process. As has been noted, however, this decision is not final. The steward has discretionary behaviors that may result in grievances not being filed when requested and, importantly, in being filed when they are not requested. Union steward behavior and propensities will account for more of the variance in the number of greivances filed than differences in rank and file members. Considering the costs borne by both management and organized labor in the grievance process, the role of the union steward, long ignored, is worthy of future research.
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Anderson, C. R., Locus of Control, Coping Behaviors, and Performance Setting: A Longitudinal Study,J. Applied Psy. 62 (1977): 446-451.
2.
Andrisani, P. .I., and Nestel, G., Internal-External Control Outcome of Work Experience,J. Applied Psy. 61 (1976):
as a Contributor 156-165.
Personnel Psy. 23 (1970):
in a Stress to and
13-37.
3.
Ash, P. A., The Parties to a Grievance,
4.
Broedling, L. E., Relationship of Internal-External Control to Work Motivation and Performance in an Expectancy Model, J. Applied Psy. 60 (1975): 60-65.
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