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Unique crisis response strategies in sports public relations: Rugby league and the case for diversion
Public Relations Review 34 (2008) 108–115
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Public Relations Review
Unique crisis response strategies in sports public relations: Rugby league and the case for diversion Toni Bruce a,∗ , Tahlia Tini b,1 a b
Department of Sport and Leisure Studies, The University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand P.O. Box 66-160, Beachhaven, Auckland, New Zealand
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Keywords: Crisis communication Rugby league Sport Diversion Australia
a b s t r a c t Sport is a unique ‘product’ in that most of its messages and images are conveyed through media coverage rather than through advertising or sales campaigns. While the coverage is usually positive, media interest becomes more problematic in high profile scandals which can be very damaging. In this paper, we propose that the culture of elite men’s sport and its interdependence with mass media creates a situation in which sports public relations personnel have access to crisis communication strategies not previously specified in the existing literature. Based on textual analysis of media coverage of an Australasian men’s rugby league salary cap scandal, we argue that, in certain situations, a sports organisation may draw upon a crisis response strategy that we term diversion in order to successfully limit the damage to the organisation’s reputation. In particular, we suggest that the often intense ‘relationship’ that fans have with players may allow team sports to focus attention on players (and fans) as innocent victims with the result that negative publicity for the sport overall is reduced. © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. The unique arena of sports public relations Despite a lack of research there is little doubt that professional sport is a unique realm of public relations (L’Etang, 2006). First, much of its publicity occurs through media coverage and is, therefore, much less controllable than paid advertising or sales campaigns. On the positive side, the high levels and credibility of media coverage help create and strengthen strong bonds with fans and feed an “insatiable appetite for sport material” (McGregor & Harvey, 1999, p. 251). On the down side, however, ‘negative’ stories can seriously damage the reputation and popularity of an organisation and affect the bottom line in areas such as attendance, merchandising, sponsorship and endorsement deals (see Shilbury, Quick & Westerbeek, 1998). It is generally accepted that professional sport and the media are involved in a symbiotic, interdependent relationship where “each depends on the other for its commercial success and its prominent place in the popular culture” (Coakley, 1998, p. 380). Although this relationship is primarily available to male, professional and globally mediated sports, the value of sport to the broadcast media in particular should not be underestimated as it has led to exponentially increasing amounts paid for broadcast rights to major events. Live broadcast sport thus becomes a key arena for positive public relations for sports organisations, in large part because broadcasting rights holders “are not in the business of casting aspersions on the event for which they have forked out large sums of money” (Barnett, 1990, p. 164).
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +64 7 838 4500; fax: +64 7 838 4555. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (T. Bruce), [email protected] (T. Tini). 1 Author is an aspiring fiction writer who has just completed her first novel. 0363-8111/$ – see front matter © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2008.03.015
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In contrast, newspapers and broadcast news media are much more likely to focus on scandals and crises (Barnett, 1990; Rowe, 1999). The combination of public interest and extensive media coverage means that sports public relations practitioners cannot ignore the news media and, as a result, a second unique aspect of sports public relations is the focus on reactive rather than proactive public relations (Henley, 1994; McGregor & Harvey, 1999; Shilbury et al., 1998). Thus, sports organisations spend much of their time reacting to unplanned events that may negatively influence public attitudes (Shilbury et al., 1998) rather than proactively attempting to influence public attitudes. The intense media scrutiny of professional sports does not mean, however, that public relations practitioners have no control over how their organisation, athletes or sport are represented. Although sports organisations are primarily dependent on the news media for disseminating their messages, particularly in crisis situations, several studies of professional sports organisations in North America suggest that the interdependence between sports journalists and sports public relations personnel actually offers “a measure of control over what becomes sports news and how it is reported” (Lowes, 1999, p. 49; Fortunato, 2000). Further, the growing use of team and league websites introduces a controllable and more direct form of communication with fans and the media (see Sallot, Porter & Acosta-Alzuru, 2004). However, although professional sports operate in a context where it would seem logical to have well-developed crisis communication plans, it appears that many sports organisations, including those with professional full-time staff, continue to operate in a reactive or ineffective fashion rather than planning and preparing for the kinds of crises that can be predicted (Helitzer, 1999; Marra, 1998). The apparent lack of planning is exacerbated in Australasia – the site of this case study – in large part because the trajectory of professionalism lags behind that of Europe and North America (Smith & Stewart, 1999). Indeed, in both Australia and New Zealand, public relations remains an under-skilled and relatively low status arena which is often subsumed under marketing. Fears remain that much public relations work is based on gut feelings rather than research or theory (Singh & Smyth, 2000)2 . In sport, McGregor and Harvey (1999) suggest that public relations has “often been hostage to volunteer enthusiasms and amateur activity reliant on good will rather than high standards” (p. 251). They point out that much public relations work is performed by competent players, coaches, managers or agents rather than by specialist public relations personnel; in part because “the need for sports PR is little appreciated among some old-fashioned administrators” (McGregor & Harvey, 1999, p. 254). Further, the devaluation of public relations means that “many sports officials simply ‘stick their finger in the air’ to see which way the wind is blowing” rather than using systematic communications plans (Henley, 1994, p. 212). 2. Rugby league in Australasia In similar fashion to the public relations industry, rugby league is still much closer to amateur, volunteer, grass-roots beliefs and administration than North American or European sport3 despite the National Rugby League (NRL) competition being run as a fully professional activity with paid managers, players, coaches and staff. For almost 80 years, the sport has been membership-based, local community-centred and run by volunteer administrators (Phillips & Hutchins, 2003). Indeed, it was only in the 1980s that the sport moved from a traditional 52-person board-of-delegates system to a more streamlined nine-person corporate management board (Shilbury & Deane, 2000). Thus, in similar fashion to sports such as English country cricket (see Hopwood, 2005), rugby league’s organisational structures, processes and belief systems remain more strongly influenced by historical, amateur traditions rather than business practices. Ideologically, rugby league is known as a sport for ‘hard men’ and its value structure tends to reinforce traditional notions of masculinity such as the ability to inflict and play through pain without complaint, the valorisation of physical force and strength, and the strategic use of violence (see Hutchins and Phillips, 1997; Phillips & Hutchins, 2003). Although the realities of needing to attract a wide range of fans has led rugby league to market itself beyond its traditional base of working-class males (Rowe, 1997), the sport is overwhelmingly masculine in its ethos; an orientation that is reflected in its media coverage. The sport is strongest in the eastern Australian states, with the majority of NRL teams and the governing body headquarters based in and around Sydney.4 Since the mid 1990s, elite men’s rugby league has been embroiled in numerous scandals along with the “unprecedented turmoil” resulting from a media battle for control of pay-TV broadcasting rights which briefly led to competing national leagues in 1997 (Phillips & Hutchins, 2003; Rowe, 1997, p. 221). Public faith and historically fierce fan loyalties that had been severely tested in 1997 were further challenged in 2000 when reductions in the competition from 20 to 14 teams led to unpopular team amalgamations and a protracted, highly publicised and ultimately successful legal case by one team for reinstatement. In terms of our case study, in August 2002 rumours surfaced of serious cheating by the Canterbury Bulldogs.
2 The differences between Australasia and North America are clear. For example, a recent Australian sports management text does not include a section on public relations, nor is it mentioned in the index (Smith & Stewart, 1999). In contrast, not only does a major North American sport management text (Mullin, Hardy, & Sutton, 1993) contain a chapter on public relations, but the major text designed for sport public relations professionals (Helitzer, 1999) is now in its third edition. Mullin et al. (1993) point to the centrality of public relations in North American sports when they state that it “must play an integral role in both the strategic planning process. . .and the implementation and management of the strategic plan” (p. 262). 3 Indeed, two-thirds of the Australian sports work-force in 1997 was estimated to be volunteers, and just over 10% of sports administrators were paid (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1999). 4 In contrast, women’s rugby league is virtually invisible in Australia. Indeed it was only in 1998 that the national governing body agreed to affiliate women’s teams. For a brief history, see the Australian women’s national team web page: http://www.sportingpulse.com/assoc page.cgi?c=7-2131-0-0-0&sID=29161.
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The allegations of an almost $1million5 salary cap breach were potentially another blow to rugby league’s struggle to reclaim fans and public support lost during the previous 6 years of organisational upheaval and litigation. In 2002, the Canterbury Bulldogs were competing in a 15-team NRL competition which included 14 Australian and one New Zealand team. Thus, the competition and primary media coverage included both Australia and New Zealand. Like many other football clubs, the Bulldogs were associated with a licensed social club – the Canterbury-Bankstown Leagues Club – which generated additional club income from profits on food, alcohol and gambling, and provides a ‘home’ base for fans located in the working-class, south-west area of Sydney (see Phillips & Hutchins, 2003). In this paper, we analyse the crisis communication strategies used by the Bulldogs and suggest that, although the organisation generally failed in its attempts to control media coverage, its approach (perhaps accidentally) introduced a strategy, diversion, that has not previously been discussed in the literature but which may be unique to the sports context. However, before presenting our analysis, it is important to briefly summarise the existing crisis communication literature. 3. Crisis communication: best practice Historically, crisis communication has been the responsibility of public relations personnel who are able to draw upon research that provides strategies and solutions for effectively communicating with stakeholders before, during and following an organisational crisis. Much of the public relations literature focuses on practical recommendations for predicting and preparing for crises, developing crisis management plans (e.g., Helitzer, 1999), and for effective communication during a crisis. However, this approach is increasingly being challenged by those arguing that a narrow vision of public relations as a communications activity should give way to a focus on building and managing relationships with key stakeholders (Ledingham & Bruning, 1998). This argument is supported by research that suggests the importance of establishing strong relationships with stakeholders that will “build reservoirs of good will, alliances, and shared understanding” (Ulmer, 2001, p. 594; see also Ledingham & Bruning, 1998). Such relationships may not only prevent crises in the first place but also lessen the effects or limit the duration of crises when they do occur (Fearn-Banks, 1996). Further, although Ledingham (2006, p. 472) argues that such relationships “may take decades . . . to solidify”, there is significant evidence of strong relationships between sports teams and their key stakeholders such as fans, volunteers, media and sponsors. Teams such as the Bulldogs, which formed in 1935, have had many decades to solidify connections based on sporting passion and tradition, and many key stakeholders have well-established, even daily, exposure to the organisation whether directly or via the mass media. Overall, however, crisis public relations is dominated by practical, experience-based, post-crisis communication strategies that constitute “everyday knowledge” or “accepted wisdom” (Coombs, 2006, p. 174). Summarizing the literature, Coombs (2006) suggests that the main lessons are “be quick, be consistent and be open” (p. 172). Speed is vital to avoid information vacuums that can be easily filled with misinformation, while a consistent message, whether delivered by one or more spokespeople, supports believability (Coombs, 2006, 2001; Small, 1991; Ulmer, 2001). Advance planning is also identified as important. Davis and Gilman (2002) state that, “Without the benefit of advance planning, an organisation will scramble to come up with a response. This suggests a lack of command and can result in inaccurate or incomplete messages, which add to the damage of a crisis” (p. 38). Openness or truthfulness is emphasized by Fearn-Banks (1996) who argues that, “if your organization has erred, it is usually better to reveal the mistake at once, apologize, and make amends. . ..Cover-ups make a crisis persist” (p. 65). It should be noted, however, that merely having a good crisis communication strategy on the books is no guarantee of successful implementation (Marra, 1998). Instead, it appears that the way in which an organisation engages in crisis communications will reflect its culture which is the result of formal and informal codes of conduct, values, beliefs, practices, norms, jokes, taboos and language (Fearn-Banks, 1996; Kauffman, 2005). As Fearn-Banks (1996) argues, “the culture determines to some degree how people within the organisation behave” (p. 13). Much of the post-crisis literature focuses on post-crisis apologia or a discourse of defense in which the organisation attempts to absolve itself from guilt and repair its image (Benoit, 1997; Blaney, Benoit & Brazeal, 2002; Coombs, 2006; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2002). Benoit’s image restoration theory includes five categories of strategies: denial, evading responsibility, reducing the offensiveness of the event, corrective action and mortification (Blaney et al., 2002; Coombs, 2000).6 The categories include a variety of options such as categorically denying involvement, finding a scapegoat, blaming the victim or stating that the organisation was provoked into taking the action it did. Other options include bolstering, in which an organisation focuses on its positive qualities, minimizing the seriousness of the offense, differentiating itself from other organisations that have committed similar but more serious offences, attacking the accuser, linking the action to a larger context where more important values are at work, and apologizing (Cowden & Sellnow, 2002). Fearn-Banks (1996) emphasizes the importance of learning from a crisis and putting in place changes that help prevent similar crises in the future. However, none of the research has, to our knowledge, identified the most successful approach used by the Bulldogs – that of presenting the players (who were implicated in the scandal) and fans as innocent victims; a strategy which successfully minimised the overall damage to the organisation.
5
All dollar amounts are in Australian dollars. Coombs (2004) defines these slightly differently – as deny strategies (denial, scapegoating), diminish strategies (excuses or justification), rebuilding strategies (compensation offers or apologies) and reinforcing strategies (bolstering, ingratiation via praising stakeholders) – but the overall trend is the same. 6
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4. Analysing the crisis This study utilises textual analysis as a method for critically analysing media constructions of reality (McKee, 2001; Turner, 1997). Without direct access to the organisation’s internal documents and meetings, analysing the Bulldogs’ planning or intentions for crisis communication is impossible. However, given the dependence of sports organisations on the news media for disseminating information during a crisis, analyzing publicly available sources such as media coverage and organisation websites offered a fruitful method for analysing the Bulldogs’ public relations strategies during the 18-day salary cap scandal. Therefore, based on almost 150 news stories, letters to the editor and television news broadcasts in major Australian and New Zealand news outlets,7 we use media texts as sources for assessing what image restoration and crisis management tactics the Bulldogs used, and consider their ‘success’ in terms of the image of the organisation. Our analysis is based on the assumption that the media do not merely reflect reality but construct particular kinds of realities which represent dominant cultural beliefs (Hall, 1984). Because the news media has high credibility, the ‘facts’ as reported by the media are likely to have strongly limited the ways in which this crisis was understood by those interested in or affected by it (e.g., Hall, 1980, 1984; McKee, 2001). Therefore, this analysis also focuses on how the media reported the events, considering both the tone of representations and whether the organisation experienced success in controlling the framing of the stories (see also Fortunato, 2000; Lowes, 1999). Although we examined the texts in chronological order to investigate how the strategies and representations evolved, and considered them in light of Benoit’s image restoration strategies, our focus in this paper is on a new strategy – diversion – which we suggest offers a powerful way for sports organisations to retain support for their ‘product’ – the sport and players – even if administrators come under significant pressure. However, by contrasting this crisis with a later sex scandal involving the same team, we point out that this strategy is more effective in certain situations; primarily those during which the players are, or can be represented as being, innocent victims of activities outside their control. 5. Failed strategies In order to contextualise our presentation of diversion as a new sports public relations strategy, we briefly assess the ‘standard’ crisis communication strategies employed by the Bulldogs, which included denial, attacking the accuser, provocation, scapegoating, corrective action and, belatedly, mortification. Overall, our analysis revealed that the Bulldogs’ crisis communication strategies demonstrated little, if any, understanding of public relations best practice. Indeed, the Bulldogs’ approach to the crisis resulted in an almost complete loss of control over the organisation’s image, with the limited exception of diversion. In stark contrast to crisis communications best practice which emphasizes the importance of a consistent message, the two organisations involved in the scandal employed up to five different official spokesmen who did not always present the same message. For example, while the Bulldogs were solely focusing on denial, the Leagues Club spokesman (unsuccessfully) attempted to also attack the accuser by linking the leak of incriminating documents to a disgruntled developer ousted from a combined Bulldogs-Leagues Club building project. The crisis was exacerbated by the fact that the denial strategy was quickly shown to be a lie. Once it became apparent that a paragraph showing significant existing and planned salary cap breaches of more than $1million had been deliberately removed from documents previously presented to the NRL, the Bulldogs image restoration strategies changed to provocation and mortification. For example, the Leagues Club spokesman read a statement from the Bulldogs – “We . . . have made submissions of mitigating circumstances that the club would like the league to take into consideration” (Davies, Walter, McClymont & Masters, 2002, para 11) – which also included mortification: “We apologize unreservedly to fans” (para 12). Both of these strategies also ultimately failed. First, the ‘mitigating circumstances’ were not identified and nor did they ever emerge into the public domain. Second, as the increasingly negative and unsympathetic coverage over the next 2 weeks revealed, the apology was not accepted as legitimate by fans, the media or the NRL. Throughout the crisis, the failure of the Bulldogs to effectively use the one media format over which they did have control – their website and its general news section, Dogbites – further demonstrated their lack of understanding of public relations practice and reduced their opportunities to challenge the media framing of the issue. Unfortunately for the Bulldogs, their turnaround – from denial to admission of fault (albeit with provocation) – clearly violated crisis communications best practice which suggests that they should have admitted to the overspending as soon as the breach was discovered, therefore maintaining a clear and consistent message. When neither mortification nor provocation worked as strategies, the Bulldogs attempted to use their CEO as a scapegoat. However, despite his resignation, the media began to focus extensively on the role of the entire nine-man Bulldogs management team. Almost 40 articles between August 19 and 24 explicitly blamed Bulldogs management for the breach. Numerous headlines between August 20 and August 25 demonstrated a strongly critical slant: August 20 – Boot the Dogs out; August 21 – Kick them out; August 24 – League just could not tolerate blatant cheats; August 25 – Cheats must not prosper. These headlines appeared to reflect popular sentiment, as evidenced in comments by the NRL chairman who stated
7 These include seven Australian media outlets (the Australian Associated Press, Sydney Morning Herald, Daily Telegraph, Sunday Telegraph, Australian, Courier-Mail, Sun-Herald) and four New Zealand newspapers (the New Zealand Herald, Waikato Times, Sunday Star Times and Sunday News) as well as all three New Zealand national television news broadcasts and some Australian web-available television coverage.
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that “the public reaction to this has been very strong and we must listen to them. At the end of the day, the game must come first . . . The tea ladies, the people in tipping competitions, the kids, people who I see on building sites are saying, ‘Kick the bastards out’ . . .” (Masters, Mascord, Magnay & Halloran, 2002, p. 42). Similarly, the general consensus in the Sydney Morning Herald open forum website letters on August 20 was that Bulldogs and Leagues Club management should be punished: “. . . the people responsible (the suits) should pay the consequences”. The media also used the NRL CEO to give credibility to the framing of the Bulldogs as intentionally cheating. His description of the breach as “deliberate” and “elaborate” (Walter & Masters, 2002, p. 34) was used in 27 articles and on all three New Zealand television news broadcasts. The use of these and other terms such as blatant, calculated, unlawful, systematic, cynical, devious, unconscionable, duplicitous and deceitful reinforced the negative representation of the Bulldogs management and compounded the loss of control over their image and representation. The negative publicity continued even after the Leagues Club spokesman and entire Bulldogs Board resigned as a form of corrective action after the Bulldogs received the harshest penalty in the 94-year history of the competition – being fined heavily, stripped of 37 competition points and denied the chance to play in the competition finals. This form of corrective action clearly failed as a public relations strategy because the media continued to frame those responsible in a negative manner, most obviously in the following description in the Sun-Herald: “They acted with a sickening and shameful degree of self-interest and now the club, the team, the players and the fans are paying the penalty on their behalf” (Winning back, 2002, p. 20). Similarly, despite the Bulldogs’ website claiming the Leagues Club spokesman had resigned in the interests of the club he loved, Sydney media framed him as defiant, brazen and duplicitous and as the “architect of the disaster” (Honeysett & Payten, 2002, p. 17). The climax to the crisis, which was dubbed Bulldog-gate, appeared to be the Bulldogs’ decision not to appeal the NRL punishment; a decision for which the NRL congratulated the organisation while also employing a discourse of corrective action which emphasized the need for the Bulldogs to establish new systems for the future. However, although the Bulldogs almost completely lost control over how the crisis was represented, their ongoing focus on the innocence of the players, combined with the empathy for players and fans evident in the media coverage and NRL statements, worked to ensure that the global community of rugby league fans was not alienated from the sport and paved the way for the Bulldogs to begin to restore their image and relationship with fans. Thus, in our analysis, a new crisis communication strategy – diversion – comes to the fore, as players and fans are represented as innocent victims of an intentionally dishonest management board. 6. Diversion: players and fans as innocent victims From early in the crisis, the Bulldogs attempted to create a discourse that diverted attention away from management by focusing on the players, and later the fans, as innocent victims. Although Bulldogs management were not successful in shifting media attention away from their cheating, the strategy of highlighting the negative impacts of harsh penalties on players and fans added another dimension to the public understanding and media framing of the crisis. Diversion provided an opportunity for the Bulldogs organisation to connect with their fans and to limit the overall damage to the sport and team, because the aspects of the organisation with which fans most relate – the players and on-field performance – could be divorced from the scandal. Throughout the crisis, Bulldogs spokespeople presented the players as having done nothing wrong. The popular Bulldogs coach further reinforced the theme of innocence by stressing that the players had the right to feel proud of their on-field achievements. The organisation’s use of diversion was successful in that media coverage supported this framing by quoting fans, players and rugby league administrators as being concerned for players: “This breach was engineered in a boardroom and the NRL’s grenade should explode there and not out on the field where innocent players would be cut down by the shrapnel” (Fenech, 2002, p. 61). Quotes such as this generated some sympathy for the Bulldogs’ organisation as a whole; with the players represented as ‘suffering’ far more from the outcome of the crisis than those who were responsible for it. In addition, rugby league fans were also regularly represented as victims in the scandal. Once it became clear that the punishment was likely to be severe, including eliminating the team from the competition finals, the media focus shifted to include the impact on fans. Representative comments on the Sydney Morning Herald website open forum included the following: “The players and fans have done nothing wrong, but they are the ones that will be hurt the most” and “It’s not fair to the players. . .and the fans, as they are not the ones who put themselves in this situation.” One columnist focused primarily on the fans, writing, “We feel utterly sad for the members and supporters. Sport is not a religion but it is a chapel for unqualified loyalty and trust. Supporters have invested money and emotion into the Canterbury Bulldogs and have been betrayed absolutely” (Smith, 2002, p. 52). We suggest that diversion may be particularly appropriate and effective in sports crisis communications, in part because few other organisations have a product, the players, with whom supporters have such an emotional attachment. Although closest to Benoit’s bolstering strategy – which emphasizes good traits or past acts that might offset the current damage – focusing on the innocence of players and fans is a way of distracting or diverting publics from other negative aspects of the breach and redirecting the focus of media images of the organisation. For example, one Bulldogs player was described as emotionally breaking down during an interview, a framing that reinforced the image of the players as distressed victims. Twelve articles between August 20 and 24 also represented the players in this way, supported by quotes from players from other teams arguing the Bulldogs did not deserve to be kicked out of the competition. It should be noted that diversion was
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not always successful, as some letter writers and journalists challenged the notion of the players as victims. For example, one newspaper suggested that: . . .comments that the players were innocent parties and were not playing for money cannot be taken seriously. . .Collectively the players were receiving salaries way above the going rate and no fan of the game can seriously believe that the players, and their managers, did not know what was going on. (Breen, 2002, p. 42) Despite these rare challenges, however, the diversion strategy was effective, and further enhanced by its consistency with the NRL’s position that rugby league and Bulldogs fans were innocent victims. For example, as the penalty was handed down, the main media focus was on the emotionally charged official statement given by the NRL CEO which was quoted in the majority of stories in broadcast and print media. Numerous newspapers carried extensive quotes from the statement and New Zealand’s TV3 broadcast the comments live: This is unquestionably a bitter day for Rugby League. Indeed the game has had its heart broken in a tragic and unexpected way. There is no question that persons within the Bulldogs have let down their players, their fans and their club desperately. The NRL feels deeply for the players and fans of the Bulldogs who are victims in this but it feels just as strongly that the players and fans of other clubs in the finals should not risk their dreams being shattered because a club was allowed to get away with breaking the rules. (TV3, 2002) The CEO’s comments cemented the discourse that Bulldogs management had truly been intentionally dishonest, as well as reinforcing a contrasting representation of the NRL as authoritative, credible and acting in the best interests of the sport. The punishment was represented by the media as fair and appropriate, and supported by expert opinion in the form of quotes from respected members of the rugby league community. Although there is little evidence that this consistency of message was a combined communications effort, it does illustrate a shared desire by both organisations to maintain the positive images associated with players by fans and, therefore, to provide some protection for the sports product and the long-term sustainability of the team and NRL competition.
7. Conclusions Of interest in this case study is that the Bulldogs’ lack of truthfulness and the breakdown in trust between those running the organisation and the fans and media did not, as might be predicted (see Shilbury et al., 1998), significantly affect the bottom line in areas such as attendance. Indeed, average home attendance more than doubled in the year following the scandal. While the attempt to cover up the salary cap cheating did, as Fearn-Banks (1996) argues, extend the crisis and rebound negatively on management, it did not appear to seriously disrupt the fans’ existing relationship with the club as a whole. Indeed, the success of diversion as a crisis strategy bolsters the argument that public relations should focus on building quality relationships rather than on technical communication practices (Hopwood, 2005; Ledingham, 2006). By protecting the players and coach, with whom fans have the strongest emotional connection, and sacrificing the management team, the organisation ensured that the relationship with at least one key stakeholder group would continue. Indeed, the increased spectator numbers the following year may reflect the strength of this relationship as fans turned out to demonstrate their support for the players and, incidentally, contributed to the rebuilding of the organisation. At the same time, the analysis demonstrates the importance of good crisis communication with all stakeholders in the sports realm. In this case, although the organisation’s blatant premeditated dishonesty did not result in wholesale rejection of the team, its poor crisis management alienated other key stakeholders such as the media and turned fans against the management team. The result was that the print and broadcast news media in both Australia and New Zealand clearly constructed a limited and negative representation of the Bulldogs organisation as ‘cheaters’. Neither possible provocations for committing the breach, such as the unfairness of a salary cap, nor the initial claim of mitigating circumstances received much media coverage. However, the effect of the penalty on both fans and players was widely publicised. The crisis communication strategies employed by the Bulldogs did not reflect best practice and may have exacerbated the negative outcomes of the crisis. The Bulldogs, in initially agreeing to open their books for auditing but denying the allegations, seemed more dishonest when it was discovered that they had violated the salary cap; an approach likely to have alienated stakeholders more than necessary (see Fearn-Banks, 1996). The Bulldog’s initial strategies suggest that they had gone to great lengths to conceal their cheating and did not believe they would be caught. Although the punishment might not have been different had the Bulldogs been honest from the outset, it seems likely that a truthful and consistent message from the beginning would have greatly minimized any damage done to stakeholder relationships, particularly with the media, and to future profitability and viability. However, the use of a strategy not previously identified in the research literature – diversion – in relation to the players and fans did allow the Bulldogs to regain some control over the tone and framing of some reports. We suggest, however, that this strategy would not have been as effective had it not intersected with the views of the NRL and the wider rugby league community. Certainly, the failure of the Bulldogs communication strategies in the heat of the crisis suggests that the importance of public relations was not fully understood – if it was even included in strategic plans for the organisation. This finding reinforces Hopwood’s (2005) research on English country cricket which discovered that public relations is not “formally implemented to the extent that it should be” (p. 202). Further, the Bulldogs, as Hopwood argues about some cricket clubs, not only internalised
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problems and issues but appeared “content to rely on history, tradition and, perhaps mythology, to assuage potentially damaging image and reputation issues” (2005, p. 206). As suggested earlier, this lack of appreciation for the importance of public relations can be traced back to the historically volunteer organisation of rugby league. Indeed, media coverage during the crisis made a strong case that NRL clubs and their associated Leagues Clubs have long operated more as ‘personal fiefdoms’ run by individuals than as ‘corporations’, and that management demonstrated little understanding of expectations for personal and economic accountability within a professional sport environment. Thus, the Bulldogs communications approach clearly reflected the values, beliefs and assumptions of the organisation (Fearn-Banks, 1996; Kauffman, 2005) which one media article described as “infamous for its internecine political rivalries and bitter personal squabbles” (Walter & Masters, 2002, p. 34). The use of diversion, however, may have helped alleviate the ‘bottom line’ effects of the crisis (in terms of attendance in ensuing years), by drawing upon the positive relationships built up over many years between the fans and the most visible representatives of the organisation, the players. The failure of the Bulldogs to learn from the past (see Fearn-Banks, 1996) was evident less than 2 years later when allegations of gang rape by players exploded onto the front pages of newspapers in February 2004. The refusal of the Bulldogs management and players to take the allegations seriously – most evident in their attempts to blame the victim and in the players wearing casual attire such as t-shirts to formal police interviews (e.g., Magnay, Kennedy & Tomas, 2004) – resulted in overwhelmingly negative media coverage (see Prent, 2004). The situation was exacerbated when the Australian national team captain made a joke based on word-play related to ‘rape’ (Bulldogs assault, 2004). According to Prent (2004), although no charges were laid, the media highlighted police statements “that ‘insufficient evidence’ does not equate to a confirmation of the innocence of the accused”; and the team’s claim that “the players had been vindicated, and their innocence proven” was “not well received on the whole” (p. 25). Overall, it was clear that diversion was much less effective in this case. Yet, at the same time, it should be noted that within a culture of elite male sport where women are often seen as sex objects or ‘groupies’ (see Messner, Dunbar & Hunt, 2000), at least a segment of the public and media supported the diversion strategy – representing the players as innocent victims of a ‘slut’ who agreed to consensual group sex but later changed her mind (see Prent, 2004). Indeed, even in the face of a crisis involving the players, average home attendance figures in 2004 only dropped by about 1400 spectators (to an average of 19,693) as the team on the field competed well enough to reach the NRL finals. Overall, we conclude that this case study allows us to identify a new crisis communications strategy in sports public relations; one which has the potential to limit damage to the organisation overall, even if management come under fire. Diversion appears to work because it draws on the passion resulting from the “intense personal relationship” that fans have with players and teams (MacLean, 1996, p. 139). Such relationships appear to be experienced by fans as existing independently of the individuals who might be running the organisation. This unique relationship means, however, that diversion may be a strategy with limited applicability beyond sport, except perhaps in industries such as music and entertainment where fandom is a key component of the ‘product’. In the sporting context, diversion appears to work best when management are presumed to be at fault and is less effective when players or fans are believed to the cause of the crisis. However, given that rugby league, like many elite male team sports, is firmly embedded in a male sporting culture where fan idolisation of players means that much of their behaviour is excused or forgiven, it is not surprising that diversion is a successful strategy and one that sports organisations should seriously consider integrating into their public relations planning.
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Public Relations Review
Unique crisis response strategies in sports public relations: Rugby league and the case for diversion Toni Bruce a,∗ , Tahlia Tini b,1 a b
Department of Sport and Leisure Studies, The University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand P.O. Box 66-160, Beachhaven, Auckland, New Zealand
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Keywords: Crisis communication Rugby league Sport Diversion Australia
a b s t r a c t Sport is a unique ‘product’ in that most of its messages and images are conveyed through media coverage rather than through advertising or sales campaigns. While the coverage is usually positive, media interest becomes more problematic in high profile scandals which can be very damaging. In this paper, we propose that the culture of elite men’s sport and its interdependence with mass media creates a situation in which sports public relations personnel have access to crisis communication strategies not previously specified in the existing literature. Based on textual analysis of media coverage of an Australasian men’s rugby league salary cap scandal, we argue that, in certain situations, a sports organisation may draw upon a crisis response strategy that we term diversion in order to successfully limit the damage to the organisation’s reputation. In particular, we suggest that the often intense ‘relationship’ that fans have with players may allow team sports to focus attention on players (and fans) as innocent victims with the result that negative publicity for the sport overall is reduced. © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. The unique arena of sports public relations Despite a lack of research there is little doubt that professional sport is a unique realm of public relations (L’Etang, 2006). First, much of its publicity occurs through media coverage and is, therefore, much less controllable than paid advertising or sales campaigns. On the positive side, the high levels and credibility of media coverage help create and strengthen strong bonds with fans and feed an “insatiable appetite for sport material” (McGregor & Harvey, 1999, p. 251). On the down side, however, ‘negative’ stories can seriously damage the reputation and popularity of an organisation and affect the bottom line in areas such as attendance, merchandising, sponsorship and endorsement deals (see Shilbury, Quick & Westerbeek, 1998). It is generally accepted that professional sport and the media are involved in a symbiotic, interdependent relationship where “each depends on the other for its commercial success and its prominent place in the popular culture” (Coakley, 1998, p. 380). Although this relationship is primarily available to male, professional and globally mediated sports, the value of sport to the broadcast media in particular should not be underestimated as it has led to exponentially increasing amounts paid for broadcast rights to major events. Live broadcast sport thus becomes a key arena for positive public relations for sports organisations, in large part because broadcasting rights holders “are not in the business of casting aspersions on the event for which they have forked out large sums of money” (Barnett, 1990, p. 164).
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +64 7 838 4500; fax: +64 7 838 4555. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (T. Bruce), [email protected] (T. Tini). 1 Author is an aspiring fiction writer who has just completed her first novel. 0363-8111/$ – see front matter © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2008.03.015
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In contrast, newspapers and broadcast news media are much more likely to focus on scandals and crises (Barnett, 1990; Rowe, 1999). The combination of public interest and extensive media coverage means that sports public relations practitioners cannot ignore the news media and, as a result, a second unique aspect of sports public relations is the focus on reactive rather than proactive public relations (Henley, 1994; McGregor & Harvey, 1999; Shilbury et al., 1998). Thus, sports organisations spend much of their time reacting to unplanned events that may negatively influence public attitudes (Shilbury et al., 1998) rather than proactively attempting to influence public attitudes. The intense media scrutiny of professional sports does not mean, however, that public relations practitioners have no control over how their organisation, athletes or sport are represented. Although sports organisations are primarily dependent on the news media for disseminating their messages, particularly in crisis situations, several studies of professional sports organisations in North America suggest that the interdependence between sports journalists and sports public relations personnel actually offers “a measure of control over what becomes sports news and how it is reported” (Lowes, 1999, p. 49; Fortunato, 2000). Further, the growing use of team and league websites introduces a controllable and more direct form of communication with fans and the media (see Sallot, Porter & Acosta-Alzuru, 2004). However, although professional sports operate in a context where it would seem logical to have well-developed crisis communication plans, it appears that many sports organisations, including those with professional full-time staff, continue to operate in a reactive or ineffective fashion rather than planning and preparing for the kinds of crises that can be predicted (Helitzer, 1999; Marra, 1998). The apparent lack of planning is exacerbated in Australasia – the site of this case study – in large part because the trajectory of professionalism lags behind that of Europe and North America (Smith & Stewart, 1999). Indeed, in both Australia and New Zealand, public relations remains an under-skilled and relatively low status arena which is often subsumed under marketing. Fears remain that much public relations work is based on gut feelings rather than research or theory (Singh & Smyth, 2000)2 . In sport, McGregor and Harvey (1999) suggest that public relations has “often been hostage to volunteer enthusiasms and amateur activity reliant on good will rather than high standards” (p. 251). They point out that much public relations work is performed by competent players, coaches, managers or agents rather than by specialist public relations personnel; in part because “the need for sports PR is little appreciated among some old-fashioned administrators” (McGregor & Harvey, 1999, p. 254). Further, the devaluation of public relations means that “many sports officials simply ‘stick their finger in the air’ to see which way the wind is blowing” rather than using systematic communications plans (Henley, 1994, p. 212). 2. Rugby league in Australasia In similar fashion to the public relations industry, rugby league is still much closer to amateur, volunteer, grass-roots beliefs and administration than North American or European sport3 despite the National Rugby League (NRL) competition being run as a fully professional activity with paid managers, players, coaches and staff. For almost 80 years, the sport has been membership-based, local community-centred and run by volunteer administrators (Phillips & Hutchins, 2003). Indeed, it was only in the 1980s that the sport moved from a traditional 52-person board-of-delegates system to a more streamlined nine-person corporate management board (Shilbury & Deane, 2000). Thus, in similar fashion to sports such as English country cricket (see Hopwood, 2005), rugby league’s organisational structures, processes and belief systems remain more strongly influenced by historical, amateur traditions rather than business practices. Ideologically, rugby league is known as a sport for ‘hard men’ and its value structure tends to reinforce traditional notions of masculinity such as the ability to inflict and play through pain without complaint, the valorisation of physical force and strength, and the strategic use of violence (see Hutchins and Phillips, 1997; Phillips & Hutchins, 2003). Although the realities of needing to attract a wide range of fans has led rugby league to market itself beyond its traditional base of working-class males (Rowe, 1997), the sport is overwhelmingly masculine in its ethos; an orientation that is reflected in its media coverage. The sport is strongest in the eastern Australian states, with the majority of NRL teams and the governing body headquarters based in and around Sydney.4 Since the mid 1990s, elite men’s rugby league has been embroiled in numerous scandals along with the “unprecedented turmoil” resulting from a media battle for control of pay-TV broadcasting rights which briefly led to competing national leagues in 1997 (Phillips & Hutchins, 2003; Rowe, 1997, p. 221). Public faith and historically fierce fan loyalties that had been severely tested in 1997 were further challenged in 2000 when reductions in the competition from 20 to 14 teams led to unpopular team amalgamations and a protracted, highly publicised and ultimately successful legal case by one team for reinstatement. In terms of our case study, in August 2002 rumours surfaced of serious cheating by the Canterbury Bulldogs.
2 The differences between Australasia and North America are clear. For example, a recent Australian sports management text does not include a section on public relations, nor is it mentioned in the index (Smith & Stewart, 1999). In contrast, not only does a major North American sport management text (Mullin, Hardy, & Sutton, 1993) contain a chapter on public relations, but the major text designed for sport public relations professionals (Helitzer, 1999) is now in its third edition. Mullin et al. (1993) point to the centrality of public relations in North American sports when they state that it “must play an integral role in both the strategic planning process. . .and the implementation and management of the strategic plan” (p. 262). 3 Indeed, two-thirds of the Australian sports work-force in 1997 was estimated to be volunteers, and just over 10% of sports administrators were paid (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1999). 4 In contrast, women’s rugby league is virtually invisible in Australia. Indeed it was only in 1998 that the national governing body agreed to affiliate women’s teams. For a brief history, see the Australian women’s national team web page: http://www.sportingpulse.com/assoc page.cgi?c=7-2131-0-0-0&sID=29161.
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The allegations of an almost $1million5 salary cap breach were potentially another blow to rugby league’s struggle to reclaim fans and public support lost during the previous 6 years of organisational upheaval and litigation. In 2002, the Canterbury Bulldogs were competing in a 15-team NRL competition which included 14 Australian and one New Zealand team. Thus, the competition and primary media coverage included both Australia and New Zealand. Like many other football clubs, the Bulldogs were associated with a licensed social club – the Canterbury-Bankstown Leagues Club – which generated additional club income from profits on food, alcohol and gambling, and provides a ‘home’ base for fans located in the working-class, south-west area of Sydney (see Phillips & Hutchins, 2003). In this paper, we analyse the crisis communication strategies used by the Bulldogs and suggest that, although the organisation generally failed in its attempts to control media coverage, its approach (perhaps accidentally) introduced a strategy, diversion, that has not previously been discussed in the literature but which may be unique to the sports context. However, before presenting our analysis, it is important to briefly summarise the existing crisis communication literature. 3. Crisis communication: best practice Historically, crisis communication has been the responsibility of public relations personnel who are able to draw upon research that provides strategies and solutions for effectively communicating with stakeholders before, during and following an organisational crisis. Much of the public relations literature focuses on practical recommendations for predicting and preparing for crises, developing crisis management plans (e.g., Helitzer, 1999), and for effective communication during a crisis. However, this approach is increasingly being challenged by those arguing that a narrow vision of public relations as a communications activity should give way to a focus on building and managing relationships with key stakeholders (Ledingham & Bruning, 1998). This argument is supported by research that suggests the importance of establishing strong relationships with stakeholders that will “build reservoirs of good will, alliances, and shared understanding” (Ulmer, 2001, p. 594; see also Ledingham & Bruning, 1998). Such relationships may not only prevent crises in the first place but also lessen the effects or limit the duration of crises when they do occur (Fearn-Banks, 1996). Further, although Ledingham (2006, p. 472) argues that such relationships “may take decades . . . to solidify”, there is significant evidence of strong relationships between sports teams and their key stakeholders such as fans, volunteers, media and sponsors. Teams such as the Bulldogs, which formed in 1935, have had many decades to solidify connections based on sporting passion and tradition, and many key stakeholders have well-established, even daily, exposure to the organisation whether directly or via the mass media. Overall, however, crisis public relations is dominated by practical, experience-based, post-crisis communication strategies that constitute “everyday knowledge” or “accepted wisdom” (Coombs, 2006, p. 174). Summarizing the literature, Coombs (2006) suggests that the main lessons are “be quick, be consistent and be open” (p. 172). Speed is vital to avoid information vacuums that can be easily filled with misinformation, while a consistent message, whether delivered by one or more spokespeople, supports believability (Coombs, 2006, 2001; Small, 1991; Ulmer, 2001). Advance planning is also identified as important. Davis and Gilman (2002) state that, “Without the benefit of advance planning, an organisation will scramble to come up with a response. This suggests a lack of command and can result in inaccurate or incomplete messages, which add to the damage of a crisis” (p. 38). Openness or truthfulness is emphasized by Fearn-Banks (1996) who argues that, “if your organization has erred, it is usually better to reveal the mistake at once, apologize, and make amends. . ..Cover-ups make a crisis persist” (p. 65). It should be noted, however, that merely having a good crisis communication strategy on the books is no guarantee of successful implementation (Marra, 1998). Instead, it appears that the way in which an organisation engages in crisis communications will reflect its culture which is the result of formal and informal codes of conduct, values, beliefs, practices, norms, jokes, taboos and language (Fearn-Banks, 1996; Kauffman, 2005). As Fearn-Banks (1996) argues, “the culture determines to some degree how people within the organisation behave” (p. 13). Much of the post-crisis literature focuses on post-crisis apologia or a discourse of defense in which the organisation attempts to absolve itself from guilt and repair its image (Benoit, 1997; Blaney, Benoit & Brazeal, 2002; Coombs, 2006; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2002). Benoit’s image restoration theory includes five categories of strategies: denial, evading responsibility, reducing the offensiveness of the event, corrective action and mortification (Blaney et al., 2002; Coombs, 2000).6 The categories include a variety of options such as categorically denying involvement, finding a scapegoat, blaming the victim or stating that the organisation was provoked into taking the action it did. Other options include bolstering, in which an organisation focuses on its positive qualities, minimizing the seriousness of the offense, differentiating itself from other organisations that have committed similar but more serious offences, attacking the accuser, linking the action to a larger context where more important values are at work, and apologizing (Cowden & Sellnow, 2002). Fearn-Banks (1996) emphasizes the importance of learning from a crisis and putting in place changes that help prevent similar crises in the future. However, none of the research has, to our knowledge, identified the most successful approach used by the Bulldogs – that of presenting the players (who were implicated in the scandal) and fans as innocent victims; a strategy which successfully minimised the overall damage to the organisation.
5
All dollar amounts are in Australian dollars. Coombs (2004) defines these slightly differently – as deny strategies (denial, scapegoating), diminish strategies (excuses or justification), rebuilding strategies (compensation offers or apologies) and reinforcing strategies (bolstering, ingratiation via praising stakeholders) – but the overall trend is the same. 6
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4. Analysing the crisis This study utilises textual analysis as a method for critically analysing media constructions of reality (McKee, 2001; Turner, 1997). Without direct access to the organisation’s internal documents and meetings, analysing the Bulldogs’ planning or intentions for crisis communication is impossible. However, given the dependence of sports organisations on the news media for disseminating information during a crisis, analyzing publicly available sources such as media coverage and organisation websites offered a fruitful method for analysing the Bulldogs’ public relations strategies during the 18-day salary cap scandal. Therefore, based on almost 150 news stories, letters to the editor and television news broadcasts in major Australian and New Zealand news outlets,7 we use media texts as sources for assessing what image restoration and crisis management tactics the Bulldogs used, and consider their ‘success’ in terms of the image of the organisation. Our analysis is based on the assumption that the media do not merely reflect reality but construct particular kinds of realities which represent dominant cultural beliefs (Hall, 1984). Because the news media has high credibility, the ‘facts’ as reported by the media are likely to have strongly limited the ways in which this crisis was understood by those interested in or affected by it (e.g., Hall, 1980, 1984; McKee, 2001). Therefore, this analysis also focuses on how the media reported the events, considering both the tone of representations and whether the organisation experienced success in controlling the framing of the stories (see also Fortunato, 2000; Lowes, 1999). Although we examined the texts in chronological order to investigate how the strategies and representations evolved, and considered them in light of Benoit’s image restoration strategies, our focus in this paper is on a new strategy – diversion – which we suggest offers a powerful way for sports organisations to retain support for their ‘product’ – the sport and players – even if administrators come under significant pressure. However, by contrasting this crisis with a later sex scandal involving the same team, we point out that this strategy is more effective in certain situations; primarily those during which the players are, or can be represented as being, innocent victims of activities outside their control. 5. Failed strategies In order to contextualise our presentation of diversion as a new sports public relations strategy, we briefly assess the ‘standard’ crisis communication strategies employed by the Bulldogs, which included denial, attacking the accuser, provocation, scapegoating, corrective action and, belatedly, mortification. Overall, our analysis revealed that the Bulldogs’ crisis communication strategies demonstrated little, if any, understanding of public relations best practice. Indeed, the Bulldogs’ approach to the crisis resulted in an almost complete loss of control over the organisation’s image, with the limited exception of diversion. In stark contrast to crisis communications best practice which emphasizes the importance of a consistent message, the two organisations involved in the scandal employed up to five different official spokesmen who did not always present the same message. For example, while the Bulldogs were solely focusing on denial, the Leagues Club spokesman (unsuccessfully) attempted to also attack the accuser by linking the leak of incriminating documents to a disgruntled developer ousted from a combined Bulldogs-Leagues Club building project. The crisis was exacerbated by the fact that the denial strategy was quickly shown to be a lie. Once it became apparent that a paragraph showing significant existing and planned salary cap breaches of more than $1million had been deliberately removed from documents previously presented to the NRL, the Bulldogs image restoration strategies changed to provocation and mortification. For example, the Leagues Club spokesman read a statement from the Bulldogs – “We . . . have made submissions of mitigating circumstances that the club would like the league to take into consideration” (Davies, Walter, McClymont & Masters, 2002, para 11) – which also included mortification: “We apologize unreservedly to fans” (para 12). Both of these strategies also ultimately failed. First, the ‘mitigating circumstances’ were not identified and nor did they ever emerge into the public domain. Second, as the increasingly negative and unsympathetic coverage over the next 2 weeks revealed, the apology was not accepted as legitimate by fans, the media or the NRL. Throughout the crisis, the failure of the Bulldogs to effectively use the one media format over which they did have control – their website and its general news section, Dogbites – further demonstrated their lack of understanding of public relations practice and reduced their opportunities to challenge the media framing of the issue. Unfortunately for the Bulldogs, their turnaround – from denial to admission of fault (albeit with provocation) – clearly violated crisis communications best practice which suggests that they should have admitted to the overspending as soon as the breach was discovered, therefore maintaining a clear and consistent message. When neither mortification nor provocation worked as strategies, the Bulldogs attempted to use their CEO as a scapegoat. However, despite his resignation, the media began to focus extensively on the role of the entire nine-man Bulldogs management team. Almost 40 articles between August 19 and 24 explicitly blamed Bulldogs management for the breach. Numerous headlines between August 20 and August 25 demonstrated a strongly critical slant: August 20 – Boot the Dogs out; August 21 – Kick them out; August 24 – League just could not tolerate blatant cheats; August 25 – Cheats must not prosper. These headlines appeared to reflect popular sentiment, as evidenced in comments by the NRL chairman who stated
7 These include seven Australian media outlets (the Australian Associated Press, Sydney Morning Herald, Daily Telegraph, Sunday Telegraph, Australian, Courier-Mail, Sun-Herald) and four New Zealand newspapers (the New Zealand Herald, Waikato Times, Sunday Star Times and Sunday News) as well as all three New Zealand national television news broadcasts and some Australian web-available television coverage.
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that “the public reaction to this has been very strong and we must listen to them. At the end of the day, the game must come first . . . The tea ladies, the people in tipping competitions, the kids, people who I see on building sites are saying, ‘Kick the bastards out’ . . .” (Masters, Mascord, Magnay & Halloran, 2002, p. 42). Similarly, the general consensus in the Sydney Morning Herald open forum website letters on August 20 was that Bulldogs and Leagues Club management should be punished: “. . . the people responsible (the suits) should pay the consequences”. The media also used the NRL CEO to give credibility to the framing of the Bulldogs as intentionally cheating. His description of the breach as “deliberate” and “elaborate” (Walter & Masters, 2002, p. 34) was used in 27 articles and on all three New Zealand television news broadcasts. The use of these and other terms such as blatant, calculated, unlawful, systematic, cynical, devious, unconscionable, duplicitous and deceitful reinforced the negative representation of the Bulldogs management and compounded the loss of control over their image and representation. The negative publicity continued even after the Leagues Club spokesman and entire Bulldogs Board resigned as a form of corrective action after the Bulldogs received the harshest penalty in the 94-year history of the competition – being fined heavily, stripped of 37 competition points and denied the chance to play in the competition finals. This form of corrective action clearly failed as a public relations strategy because the media continued to frame those responsible in a negative manner, most obviously in the following description in the Sun-Herald: “They acted with a sickening and shameful degree of self-interest and now the club, the team, the players and the fans are paying the penalty on their behalf” (Winning back, 2002, p. 20). Similarly, despite the Bulldogs’ website claiming the Leagues Club spokesman had resigned in the interests of the club he loved, Sydney media framed him as defiant, brazen and duplicitous and as the “architect of the disaster” (Honeysett & Payten, 2002, p. 17). The climax to the crisis, which was dubbed Bulldog-gate, appeared to be the Bulldogs’ decision not to appeal the NRL punishment; a decision for which the NRL congratulated the organisation while also employing a discourse of corrective action which emphasized the need for the Bulldogs to establish new systems for the future. However, although the Bulldogs almost completely lost control over how the crisis was represented, their ongoing focus on the innocence of the players, combined with the empathy for players and fans evident in the media coverage and NRL statements, worked to ensure that the global community of rugby league fans was not alienated from the sport and paved the way for the Bulldogs to begin to restore their image and relationship with fans. Thus, in our analysis, a new crisis communication strategy – diversion – comes to the fore, as players and fans are represented as innocent victims of an intentionally dishonest management board. 6. Diversion: players and fans as innocent victims From early in the crisis, the Bulldogs attempted to create a discourse that diverted attention away from management by focusing on the players, and later the fans, as innocent victims. Although Bulldogs management were not successful in shifting media attention away from their cheating, the strategy of highlighting the negative impacts of harsh penalties on players and fans added another dimension to the public understanding and media framing of the crisis. Diversion provided an opportunity for the Bulldogs organisation to connect with their fans and to limit the overall damage to the sport and team, because the aspects of the organisation with which fans most relate – the players and on-field performance – could be divorced from the scandal. Throughout the crisis, Bulldogs spokespeople presented the players as having done nothing wrong. The popular Bulldogs coach further reinforced the theme of innocence by stressing that the players had the right to feel proud of their on-field achievements. The organisation’s use of diversion was successful in that media coverage supported this framing by quoting fans, players and rugby league administrators as being concerned for players: “This breach was engineered in a boardroom and the NRL’s grenade should explode there and not out on the field where innocent players would be cut down by the shrapnel” (Fenech, 2002, p. 61). Quotes such as this generated some sympathy for the Bulldogs’ organisation as a whole; with the players represented as ‘suffering’ far more from the outcome of the crisis than those who were responsible for it. In addition, rugby league fans were also regularly represented as victims in the scandal. Once it became clear that the punishment was likely to be severe, including eliminating the team from the competition finals, the media focus shifted to include the impact on fans. Representative comments on the Sydney Morning Herald website open forum included the following: “The players and fans have done nothing wrong, but they are the ones that will be hurt the most” and “It’s not fair to the players. . .and the fans, as they are not the ones who put themselves in this situation.” One columnist focused primarily on the fans, writing, “We feel utterly sad for the members and supporters. Sport is not a religion but it is a chapel for unqualified loyalty and trust. Supporters have invested money and emotion into the Canterbury Bulldogs and have been betrayed absolutely” (Smith, 2002, p. 52). We suggest that diversion may be particularly appropriate and effective in sports crisis communications, in part because few other organisations have a product, the players, with whom supporters have such an emotional attachment. Although closest to Benoit’s bolstering strategy – which emphasizes good traits or past acts that might offset the current damage – focusing on the innocence of players and fans is a way of distracting or diverting publics from other negative aspects of the breach and redirecting the focus of media images of the organisation. For example, one Bulldogs player was described as emotionally breaking down during an interview, a framing that reinforced the image of the players as distressed victims. Twelve articles between August 20 and 24 also represented the players in this way, supported by quotes from players from other teams arguing the Bulldogs did not deserve to be kicked out of the competition. It should be noted that diversion was
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not always successful, as some letter writers and journalists challenged the notion of the players as victims. For example, one newspaper suggested that: . . .comments that the players were innocent parties and were not playing for money cannot be taken seriously. . .Collectively the players were receiving salaries way above the going rate and no fan of the game can seriously believe that the players, and their managers, did not know what was going on. (Breen, 2002, p. 42) Despite these rare challenges, however, the diversion strategy was effective, and further enhanced by its consistency with the NRL’s position that rugby league and Bulldogs fans were innocent victims. For example, as the penalty was handed down, the main media focus was on the emotionally charged official statement given by the NRL CEO which was quoted in the majority of stories in broadcast and print media. Numerous newspapers carried extensive quotes from the statement and New Zealand’s TV3 broadcast the comments live: This is unquestionably a bitter day for Rugby League. Indeed the game has had its heart broken in a tragic and unexpected way. There is no question that persons within the Bulldogs have let down their players, their fans and their club desperately. The NRL feels deeply for the players and fans of the Bulldogs who are victims in this but it feels just as strongly that the players and fans of other clubs in the finals should not risk their dreams being shattered because a club was allowed to get away with breaking the rules. (TV3, 2002) The CEO’s comments cemented the discourse that Bulldogs management had truly been intentionally dishonest, as well as reinforcing a contrasting representation of the NRL as authoritative, credible and acting in the best interests of the sport. The punishment was represented by the media as fair and appropriate, and supported by expert opinion in the form of quotes from respected members of the rugby league community. Although there is little evidence that this consistency of message was a combined communications effort, it does illustrate a shared desire by both organisations to maintain the positive images associated with players by fans and, therefore, to provide some protection for the sports product and the long-term sustainability of the team and NRL competition.
7. Conclusions Of interest in this case study is that the Bulldogs’ lack of truthfulness and the breakdown in trust between those running the organisation and the fans and media did not, as might be predicted (see Shilbury et al., 1998), significantly affect the bottom line in areas such as attendance. Indeed, average home attendance more than doubled in the year following the scandal. While the attempt to cover up the salary cap cheating did, as Fearn-Banks (1996) argues, extend the crisis and rebound negatively on management, it did not appear to seriously disrupt the fans’ existing relationship with the club as a whole. Indeed, the success of diversion as a crisis strategy bolsters the argument that public relations should focus on building quality relationships rather than on technical communication practices (Hopwood, 2005; Ledingham, 2006). By protecting the players and coach, with whom fans have the strongest emotional connection, and sacrificing the management team, the organisation ensured that the relationship with at least one key stakeholder group would continue. Indeed, the increased spectator numbers the following year may reflect the strength of this relationship as fans turned out to demonstrate their support for the players and, incidentally, contributed to the rebuilding of the organisation. At the same time, the analysis demonstrates the importance of good crisis communication with all stakeholders in the sports realm. In this case, although the organisation’s blatant premeditated dishonesty did not result in wholesale rejection of the team, its poor crisis management alienated other key stakeholders such as the media and turned fans against the management team. The result was that the print and broadcast news media in both Australia and New Zealand clearly constructed a limited and negative representation of the Bulldogs organisation as ‘cheaters’. Neither possible provocations for committing the breach, such as the unfairness of a salary cap, nor the initial claim of mitigating circumstances received much media coverage. However, the effect of the penalty on both fans and players was widely publicised. The crisis communication strategies employed by the Bulldogs did not reflect best practice and may have exacerbated the negative outcomes of the crisis. The Bulldogs, in initially agreeing to open their books for auditing but denying the allegations, seemed more dishonest when it was discovered that they had violated the salary cap; an approach likely to have alienated stakeholders more than necessary (see Fearn-Banks, 1996). The Bulldog’s initial strategies suggest that they had gone to great lengths to conceal their cheating and did not believe they would be caught. Although the punishment might not have been different had the Bulldogs been honest from the outset, it seems likely that a truthful and consistent message from the beginning would have greatly minimized any damage done to stakeholder relationships, particularly with the media, and to future profitability and viability. However, the use of a strategy not previously identified in the research literature – diversion – in relation to the players and fans did allow the Bulldogs to regain some control over the tone and framing of some reports. We suggest, however, that this strategy would not have been as effective had it not intersected with the views of the NRL and the wider rugby league community. Certainly, the failure of the Bulldogs communication strategies in the heat of the crisis suggests that the importance of public relations was not fully understood – if it was even included in strategic plans for the organisation. This finding reinforces Hopwood’s (2005) research on English country cricket which discovered that public relations is not “formally implemented to the extent that it should be” (p. 202). Further, the Bulldogs, as Hopwood argues about some cricket clubs, not only internalised
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problems and issues but appeared “content to rely on history, tradition and, perhaps mythology, to assuage potentially damaging image and reputation issues” (2005, p. 206). As suggested earlier, this lack of appreciation for the importance of public relations can be traced back to the historically volunteer organisation of rugby league. Indeed, media coverage during the crisis made a strong case that NRL clubs and their associated Leagues Clubs have long operated more as ‘personal fiefdoms’ run by individuals than as ‘corporations’, and that management demonstrated little understanding of expectations for personal and economic accountability within a professional sport environment. Thus, the Bulldogs communications approach clearly reflected the values, beliefs and assumptions of the organisation (Fearn-Banks, 1996; Kauffman, 2005) which one media article described as “infamous for its internecine political rivalries and bitter personal squabbles” (Walter & Masters, 2002, p. 34). The use of diversion, however, may have helped alleviate the ‘bottom line’ effects of the crisis (in terms of attendance in ensuing years), by drawing upon the positive relationships built up over many years between the fans and the most visible representatives of the organisation, the players. The failure of the Bulldogs to learn from the past (see Fearn-Banks, 1996) was evident less than 2 years later when allegations of gang rape by players exploded onto the front pages of newspapers in February 2004. The refusal of the Bulldogs management and players to take the allegations seriously – most evident in their attempts to blame the victim and in the players wearing casual attire such as t-shirts to formal police interviews (e.g., Magnay, Kennedy & Tomas, 2004) – resulted in overwhelmingly negative media coverage (see Prent, 2004). The situation was exacerbated when the Australian national team captain made a joke based on word-play related to ‘rape’ (Bulldogs assault, 2004). According to Prent (2004), although no charges were laid, the media highlighted police statements “that ‘insufficient evidence’ does not equate to a confirmation of the innocence of the accused”; and the team’s claim that “the players had been vindicated, and their innocence proven” was “not well received on the whole” (p. 25). Overall, it was clear that diversion was much less effective in this case. Yet, at the same time, it should be noted that within a culture of elite male sport where women are often seen as sex objects or ‘groupies’ (see Messner, Dunbar & Hunt, 2000), at least a segment of the public and media supported the diversion strategy – representing the players as innocent victims of a ‘slut’ who agreed to consensual group sex but later changed her mind (see Prent, 2004). Indeed, even in the face of a crisis involving the players, average home attendance figures in 2004 only dropped by about 1400 spectators (to an average of 19,693) as the team on the field competed well enough to reach the NRL finals. Overall, we conclude that this case study allows us to identify a new crisis communications strategy in sports public relations; one which has the potential to limit damage to the organisation overall, even if management come under fire. Diversion appears to work because it draws on the passion resulting from the “intense personal relationship” that fans have with players and teams (MacLean, 1996, p. 139). Such relationships appear to be experienced by fans as existing independently of the individuals who might be running the organisation. This unique relationship means, however, that diversion may be a strategy with limited applicability beyond sport, except perhaps in industries such as music and entertainment where fandom is a key component of the ‘product’. In the sporting context, diversion appears to work best when management are presumed to be at fault and is less effective when players or fans are believed to the cause of the crisis. However, given that rugby league, like many elite male team sports, is firmly embedded in a male sporting culture where fan idolisation of players means that much of their behaviour is excused or forgiven, it is not surprising that diversion is a successful strategy and one that sports organisations should seriously consider integrating into their public relations planning.
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