Unum and pluribus: ideological underpinnings of interethnic communication in the United States

www.elsevier.com/locate/ijintrel

Int. J. Intercultural Rel. Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 591±611, 1999 # 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved Printed in Great Britain 0147-1767/99 $20.00+0.00

PII: S0147-1767(99)00011-5

UNUM AND PLURIBUS: IDEOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF INTERETHNIC COMMUNICATION IN THE UNITED STATES YOUNG YUN KIM* University of Oklahoma, USA ABSTRACT. The present analysis examines everyday public discourse on issues of interethnic relations to demonstrate how the ideals of the founding ideology, ``classical liberalism'', play out in contemporary American society. Guiding this analysis is a systemic conception in which an individual's interethnic communication behavior is reciprocally linked to the ideological milieu. The analysis utilizes Billig's (Billig, M. (1991) Ideology and opinions: studies in rhetorical psychology. London: Sage; Billig, M., Condor, S., Edwards, D., Gane, M., Middleton, D., & Radley, A. (1988) Ideological dilemmas: a social psychology of everyday thinking. London: Sage.) articulation of the inherently dilemmatic nature of the Western ideology to describe the underlying ideological themes captured in various publicly communicated messages addressing issues of interethnic relations. A qualitativeinterpretive method is employed to examine a wide range of messages voiced in recent years by politicians, community and civic leaders, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens. Results reveal four types of messages: (1) messages of assimilationism re¯ecting the traditional liberal themes of ``individual identity'' and ``procedural equality''; (2) messages of pluralism emphasizing the counter-themes of ``group identity'' and ``status equality''; (3) messages of reconciliation that seek to accommodate and balance both liberal themes and counter-themes; and (4) messages of extremism that take ``group identity'' beyond realms that most Americans deem ``unreasonable''. # 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved

INTRODUCTION The United States is widely regarded as a construction organized by ``classical liberalism'', a political ideology of the Enlightenment tradition rooted in the European and Anglo-American philosophers such as John Locke, Adam Smith, and John Dewey (cf. Rorty, 1998). Central to this ideology is the theme of individualism, ``the social priority of the individ-

*Department of Communication, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK 73019, USA. Tel.: +1-405-325-3111; fax: +1-405-325-7625.; E-mail: [email protected]

591

592

Y. Y. Kim

ual vis-a-vis the State, the established Church, social classes . . . or other social groups'' (Abercrombie, 1980, p. 56). While recognizing the existence of in®nite individual di€erences, individualism stresses a universalistic view of human nature presupposing social categories such as ethnicity. The theme of individualism is inseparably linked to the companion theme of procedural equality, that is, ``equal rights'' and ``equal opportunities'' a€orded to all individuals in the form of ``human rights''Ðthe basic requisite of a free and democratic society. Enshrined in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and democratic and capitalistic institutions, these and related liberal principles constitute the core of the American cultural ethos, projecting a vision of American society that seeks to transcend a monolithic tribal ancestral and territorial condition. Essayist Henry Grunwald captured this liberal tradition in a bicentennial essay (Time, 5 July 1976, p. 35): The US was not born in a tribal con¯ict, like so many other nations, but in a con¯ict over principles. Those principles were thought to be universal, which was part of the reason for the unprecedented policy of throwing the new country open to all comers.

Given these ideals, however, Americans are far from being of a same mind about various social issues. In fact, the opposite is true when it comes to ``interethnic'' (or ``inter-racial'') relations. Ever since the Reconstruction era of the late 19th century when ``civil rights'' debates began (cf. Wilson, 1998), American society has experienced an extraordinary degree of unease, con¯ict, self-criticism, and mutual-criticism as it struggled to reconcile the ideals of individualism and procedural equality with the reality of inequality, real or perceived, along ethnic/ racial group lines. Increasingly in recent decades, the traditional primacy of the individual has been challenged by the claims of ethnic identity and equal group status. This American dilemma continues to stir heated public debates including the on-going ``dialogue on race'' launched by President Clinton in June 1997. Indeed, interethnic relations has become a perpetual sore spot in the American consciousness. It galvanizes Americans into ``us-against-them'' posturing in the form of ``identity politics''Ðalso described as ``politics of di€erence'' (Woodward, 1997) and ``politics of recognition'' (Taylor, 1992). Essayist Russell Baker laments this situation in an essay entitled Gone with the Unum: I have always been an E Pluribus Unum person myself, but the future does not look bright for an E Pluribus Unum America. The melting pot in which the Pluribus were to be combined into the Unum was not the success its advertisers had promised . . . What is new these days is the passion with which we now pursue our tribal identities . . . O, Unum, what misery we

Unum and Pluribus

593

courted when we forsook thee for Pluribus. (The New York Times, 5 May 1994, p. A15).

This paper takes a close look at this contentious political landscape and analyzes the wide-ranging voices of American people. An attempt is made to describe how the interrelated liberal themes of individualism and procedural equality are reproduced, challenged, and reconciled. An increased understanding of such ideological underpinnings allows an insight that goes beyond commonly presumed generalities along the lines of race, ethnicity, and political party aliation. In reality, ideological convergence and divergence cut across all conventional social categories.

THEORY Guiding this analysis are two basic premises: (1) societal ideology and individual communication behavior are reciprocally linked; and (2) social ideology as it is practised in everyday life is inherently dilemmatic. Each of these premises is explained below based on an integrative perspective on the nature of interethnic communication, in general, and on

FIGURE 1. Context ^behavior Interface in Interethnic Communication: an Organizing Scheme (Source: Kim, 1997, P. 266).

594

Y. Y. Kim

the relationship between the societal ideology and individual communication behavior, in particular.

Ideology±behavior Interface Interethnic communication is conceived as an open system in which multiple layers of contextual factors in¯uence, and are in¯uenced by, an individual communicator's behavior (Kim, 1994, 1997). This systemic conception is depicted in Figure 1 in the form of a matrix, in which each layer of the communication context acts as a meta-level context to the sub-level(s) embedded within it. At the core of this matrix are communication behaviors, the ``stu€'' of the communication process or the ``what'' and ``how'' of the messages sent and received. Communication behaviors in¯uence, and are in¯uenced by, the factors of the context ``surrounding'' the communication process. The ®rst layer of the context is the communicatorÐthe dense locus of structure that guides, and is guided by, the communicator's encoding and decoding activities. At this level, we are interested in the characteristics (e.g., ``cognitive structure'', ``identity'', and ``group bias'') of what is commonly known as the ``mind'' that organizes and processes incoming verbal and nonverbal information into meaningful messages. Next comes the layer of situation, the immediate social milieu created when the communicator interfaces with one or more persons, either face-to-face or through various mediated channels. Here, we are interested in such factors as ``ethnic heterogeneity'', ``interethnic salience'', and ``interaction structure''. Beyond the situational level is the environment, the larger societal-historical milieu including the prevailing ideology of the society (Kim, 1997). In this perspective, ideology is de®ned in terms of ``lived ideology''Ð ``a latent consciousness or philosophy'', ``a society's way of life'', or ``what passes for common sense within a society'' (Billig, 1991, pp. 27± 29). Ideology thus refers to social phenomenon that stimulates, substantiates, and constrains the intellectual beliefs and expressions of thinking individuals. Individuals are viewed as not blindly following the dictates of the mental schema within the ideology, but formulating and expressing their opinions by invoking socially shared beliefs as their own. Even in making remarks that are self-serving or internally contradictory, communicators are assumed to consider their argument ``reasonable'' or even ``persuasive'' in the eyes of a ``rational'' audience. In Billig's (1991, p. 21) words: To maximize their chances of being persuasive, speakers should make appeal to the sensus communis, which they share with their audience. Particularly useful were common-places, or the sort of moral maxims, which are laden with cliched appeals to values. Thus, orators' discourse, which seeks to create

Unum and Pluribus

595

new movements of opinion towards a position not commonly shared, will rehearse old commonly shared stereotypes.

The reciprocal nature of the ideology-behavior interface is depicted in Figure 1 in a ``stimulus-and-response'' rather than a one-directional causal relationship. This interactive conception is consistent with the formulations o€ered by such discourse analysts as Billig and his associates (Billig, 1991; Billig et al., 1988) and van Dijk (1997, 1998).

Ideological Dilemma Inherent in the present conception of ideology is a dilemma, a contradiction arising from the inevitable gap between the ideals of a society and the reality of everyday life that does not measure up to such ideals. Such dilemma exists as long as a signi®cant number of individual Americans perceive that the ideals of individualism and procedural equality are not applied to those of minority ethnic backgrounds. A natural response to such discrepancies has been a social movement that challenges the status quo and advocates the primacy of ethnic group identity and equality of group status (versus procedural equality) as a more viable blueprint for interethnic relations. As Billig et al. (1988, p. 27) state: The liberal traditions of modern capitalist society contain their own contrary themes or unresolved theoretical tensions. Within the ideology of liberalism is a dialectic, which contains negative counter-themes and which gives rise to debates. These debates are not con®ned to the level of intellectual analysis; both themes and counter-themes have arisen from, and passed into, everyday consciousness. And, of course, this everyday consciousness provides the material for further intellectual debate.

The present notions of ideology and ideological dilemma di€er from those of critical theorists (in the tradition of Marx, Engel, and Weber) such as Geuss, who de®nes ideology as ``delusion or false consciousness'' of intellectual elites that justi®es and legitimizes their domination in the society (Tsuda, 1986, p. 59). The primary aim in the critique of ideology is to reveal the ``falsity'' of institutionalized consciousness that misguides people to perpetuate the hegemony of the status quo. Billig (1991, p. 5) ®nds this view paradoxical in that it invites two contrasting social psychological views of the ordinary person. On the one hand, the critiques of ideology . . . seek to give dignity to the oppressed . . . [respecting] the ordinary person as an agent of thinking and as a deserving inheritor of future freedom. On the other hand, there is a dismissal of the thinking of the ordinary person. The masses are seen to be duped victims of ideology.

596

Y. Y. Kim

ANALYSIS Based on the above theoretical consideration, the present analysis seeks to understand and describe the dilemmatic nature of the ideological milieu manifested in everyday public communication practices of American people in the area of interethnic relations. Speci®cally, the analysis investigates how the traditional liberal themes of individualism and procedural equality play out in everyday public discourse, and how they are challenged by voices that advocate the contrary themes of group identity and status equality. Di€erent sorts of data have been examined including the communication messages of political and civic leaders, activists, academicians, and ordinary citizens who have directly or indirectly participated in public debates on issues of ethnicity, race, and interethnic relations. Some of them have been captured in naturally occurring interethnic communication messages, and others in the form of personal re¯ections and testimonials. These messages have been made public in published books, book chapters, and articles in newspapers and news magazines. The data have been analyzed through an interpretive exercise to uncover contrary ideological themes with respect to interethnic relations. As such, the present analysis shares features with other qualitative investigations such as discourse (or rhetorical) analysis designed to elucidate social psychological processes through understanding spoken and unspoken messages (e.g., Billig et al., 1988; Billig, 1991; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; van Dijk, 1998). In addition, the present analysis utilizes more systematic data (based on representative samples) from recent public opinion polls and survey interviews to complement its focus on speci®c communication messages. Guided by the theoretical premises linking societal ideology and individual communication behavior in a mutually-de®ning relationship, the present analysis reveals that the dialectics of classical liberal ideology play out in the contemporary American public discourse on interethnic relations in terms of four main message types: (a) messages of assimilationism; (b) messages of pluralism; (c) messages of reconciliation; and (d) messages of extremism.

Messages of Assimilationism Individualism, the core principle of enlightenment philosophy and classical liberalism, directly and powerfully illuminates the thinking of the American public and their tendency to celebrate individual achievement, self-reliance, and individuality (Sampson, 1977, p. 769). Individualism recognizes and values the fact that we are ``all di€erent'', and questions the validity and morality of categorical thought. Individual identity presupposes group identity. Even though each person

Unum and Pluribus

597

is unique, all humans are endowed with the same set of fundamental rights and responsibilities. Prejudice directed against a particular social group, ethnic or otherwise, is wrong not only because it is irrational but also because its focus on social categories contravenes the intellectual or moral prescription to value the unique qualities of the individual. The primacy of the individual over the group hinges on the value of equality as it pertains to the premise that a fair society and the basic liberty of the individual can only be attained by an appreciation of equal rights and equal opportunity for all individuals. All laws and rules are to be universally applied to everyone. Equality in this sense means procedural equalityÐin the sense of ``being treated fairly'' for ``fair play''Ð rooted in a ``biopsychological'' (or ``naturalistic'') worldview and the Aristotelian notion of ``equity'' (or ``distributive justice'') (cf. Rossides, 1976, pp. 13±14); Tsuda, 1986, pp. 62±63). This view accepts and appreciates di€erential individual merits in the allocation of resources and status based on the presumption that ``there is a natural distribution of human talent, ranging from the few individuals of genius and talent to the defective and delinquent'' (Rossides, 1976, p. 9). The above traditional liberal values are strongly emphasized in opinions that advocate assimilationism as the guiding principle for interethnic relations. Employing such metaphors as ``melting pot'' and ``color-blind society'' to depict the United States, assimilationist messages project a societal vision in which immigrants and indigenous ethnic minorities ``mainstreamed'' into the normative culture and institutions. In this societal vision, the government is responsible for universally applying societal rules to all its citizens irrespective of skin color and religious creed. Immigrants and ethnic minorities, in turn, are expected to assimilate themselves socially and culturally, so as to become fully functional in the American society. Each person, and each person alone, is seen as ultimately responsible for his or her own achievement of status. Everyone is expected to ``play by the rules'', while excessive insistence on group-based policies such as prolonged bilingual education is viewed as fundamentally an ``un-American'' idea that endangers the larger fraternity of all Americans. Emphasis on group identity over individual identity, as such, is deemed unacceptable because it renders itself to what essayist Iyer (1990) calls ``state-sponsored favoritism'' that mandates racial/ethnic ``preferences'' or ``quotas'' and ``reverse discrimination''. Making employment or admission decisions based on ethnic identity is considered counterproductive as it obscures di€erential individual merits that must be earned individually. Iyer (1990, p. 86), an immigrant himself from India, expresses his objection to such practices as follows: As an alien from India, I choose to live in America precisely because it is a place where aliens from India are, in principle, treated no better (and no

598

Y. Y. Kim

worse) than anyone else . . . The problem with people who keep raising the cry of ``racism'' is that they would have us see everything in terms of race. They treat minorities as emblems, and everyone as typecast . . . As an Asian minority myself, I know of nothing more demeaning than being chosen for a job, or even a role, on the basis of my race. Nor is the accompanying assumptionÐthat I need a helping hand because my ancestors were born outside EuropeÐvery comforting . . . Are we, in fact, to cling to a state of childlike dependency?

The themes of individual identity and procedural equality have been repeatedly promoted by Presidents. As Beasley (1997) reports in an analysis of past Presidential inauguration addresses, Presidents, regardless of their party aliations, spoke consistently of an ``American identity''Ða common identity that emphasizes individual identities in opposition to distinctions based on ethnic and other social categories. As Beasley (1997, p. 39) observes: ``Presidents have o€ered sermonic instructions in how citizens might overcome these di€erences by subscribing to a particular set of American values . . . To create an inclusive rhetoric of American identity, presidents have bypassed discussions of background or biology to focus instead upon [universal] belief''. The same liberal values were expressed by President Clinton when he spoke of American citizens' ``primary allegiance to the values America stands for and values we really live by'' and states ``Long before we were so diverse, our nation's motto was E Pluribus UnumÐout of many, we are one. We must be oneÐas neighbors; as fellow citizens; not separate camps, but family'' (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 31, 23 October 1996, p. 1851). The universal principles of individual identity and procedural equality are abundantly echoed in remarks of various Americans. A newspaper reader, for example, writes to the editor of The New York Times Magazine (29 April 1992, p. 10), objecting to an earlier article ``Cultural Baggage'' on the signi®cance of ethnic group identity: ``I've been ®ghting ethnic labels since I was 12 or 13, and decided that only I had a right to de®ne myself . . . I am not almost WASP. I am AfricanAmerican. I'm also part Cherokee from both sides of my family. But so what? . . . I've taken risks with my life that only I am responsible for, and I have reaped substantial rewards for daring to be myself and not just di€erent''. Similarly, Crouch (1995, 1998), an African-American essayist, speaks to the common humanity of all races in arguing against racial politics in his books. Crouch (1998, p. 268) emphasizes the essential Americanness of African-Americans: ``We . . . observe ourselves functioning in almost every capacity and exhibiting every inclination from the grand to the gaudy, from the idealistic to the shallow ethnic con''.

Unum and Pluribus

599

Perhaps one of the most compelling articulations of the liberal ideals and of disapproval of identity politics is o€ered by Glenn C. Loury (1993, pp. 7±10), a professor of economics at Boston University, as he re¯ects on his own social identity as an African-American and his individual identity as a human being. The most important challenges and opportunities that confront me derive not from my racial condition, but rather from my human condition. I am a husband, a father, a son, a teacher, an intellectual, a Christian, a citizen. In none of these roles is my race irrelevant, but neither can racial identity alone provide much guidance for my quest to adequately discharge these responsibilities . . . The expression of my individual personality is to be found in the blueprint that I employ to guide this project of construction. The problem of devising such a plan for one's life is a universal problem, which confronts all people, whatever their race, class, or ethnicity.

Messages of Pluralism Assimilationism and its traditional liberal values described above are challenged by contrary messages of pluralism (or ``multiculturalism''). To varying degrees, pluralist messages replace the old ``melting pot'' metaphor with newer ones such as ``mosaic'', ``quilt'', and ``salad bowl'' that emphasize the distinctiveness of ethnic groups. Pluralist messages uphold group identity as a primary construct of a personhood, highlighting a fact of life that we are di€erent ``types'' of persons de®ned by social categories such as race, ethnicity, language, and national origin. Rooted in the world view of ``relativism'' that classi®es humanity into categories of distinct qualities, pluralist messages emphasize ingroup sameness and point to the existence of a ``natural attitude'' for their moral and intellectual claims for group distinctiveness (cf. Gar®nkel, 1967). The emphasis on the sanctity of the group stems from the experiences of unequal treatment, perceived and real, of certain individuals along ethnic lines. The persistent reality in which the old liberal ideal of procedural equality fails to work for minority group members has given way to a new demand for a new politics of resentment and victimization. Instead of de®ning equality procedurally in terms of fairness of rules, pluralism advocates the contrary belief in status equality (as opposed to procedural equality)Ða demand for equal results in the interest of ``emancipation'' or ``oppressed'' groups. In this view, ethnicity is not only a fact that must be recognized and respected, but also a means to combat unjust practices such as ``institutional racism''. This contrary ideological position rejects the biopsychological explanation of inequality and replaces it with a ``sociocultural'' (or ``structural'') explanation. That is, human beings are inherently equal in their original

600

Y. Y. Kim

states, but their original natures become distorted and corrupted in the process of interaction with others in society and through the development of sociocultural institutions such as language, culture, property, law, and ``social strati®cation'' among people (Tsuda, 1986, pp. 62±63). The traditional liberal notions of individual identity and procedural equality, therefore, are deemed a false ideology in that it serves only the end of legitimizing the capitalist system of ``winners'' and ``losers'' in society. Logically, then, pluralist arguments for group identity and status equality call for ``progressive'' change toward greater political, economic, and social justice and greater ``empowerment'', ``pride'', and ``dignity'' of ethnic minorities. Along this line, arguments have been made for a redistribution of power and resources to overcome racial inequalities (e.g., Hacker, 1992), and for a greater diversity of the university curriculum by replacing it with one ``that would focus on the achievements of marginalized peoples and on the sins of the nation's founders'' (Traub, 1998, p. 25). In San Francisco, for instance, the school board is reported to be developing a plan to require every high school student in the district to read works by authors of color (The New York Times, 11 March 1998, p. A21). Debunking the important liberal value of ``free speech'', pluralist messages demand suppression of ``hate speech'', loosely de®ned as words that a minority group ®nds o€ensive. An eloquent argument against the ``old'' liberal ideals and a succinct advocacy for the counter-ideals of group identity and status equality are o€ered by Mole® Keith Asante, the chairman of the Department of AfricanAmerican studies at Temple University. In an essay entitled ``Racism, Consciousness, and Afrocentricity'', Asante (1993, pp. 142±143) re¯ects on his experience of growing up in a racist society and explains how he came to reject Du Bois' notion of ``double consciousness'' as a tragic outcome inescapable in the ``Eurocentric'' society. Asante, thus, advocates ``Afrocentricity'' as an intellectual model based on which African Americans can claim an equal identity and status as a distinct people. The feeling that you are in quicksand is inescapable in the quagmire of a racist society. You think that you can make progress in the interpretation of what's happening now only to discover that every step you take sinks the possibility of escaping. You are a victim despite your best e€orts to educate those around you to the obvious intellectual mud stuck in their minds . . . Even from my young adult years I thought a precondition of my fullness, a necessary and natural part of my maturity, was the commitment to be who I am, to be Afrocentric . . . Afrocentricity is the active centering of the African in subject place in our historical landscape. This has always been my search; it has been a quest for sanity.

Unum and Pluribus

601

Messages of Reconciliation Straddled between the above-described ideological poles of assimilationism and pluralism are the voices of ideological reconciliation. These voices are what sociologist Alan Wolfe (1998) in One nation, after all asserts as occupying ``the vital center''Ðthe ``middle'' America. They re¯ect the struggle of mainstream Americans to seek moderation, tolerance, accommodation, integration, and balance, as well as ambivalence and even contradiction. They may, for example, support bilingual programs, but only if they are short-lived and not used as a political goal or instrument of power demanded by every group for its own separate slice of the political pie. Or, they may support multiculturalism but only to the extent that ethnic identity is subsumed under the common ``American identity'' that emphasizes individualism. They may support armative action programs based on group identity, but consider ``quota'' systems as unfair, devisive, and ultimately counter-productive. Such an attempt at ideological reconciliation is exempli®ed in a remark President Clinton made during a round table discussion on race televised on PBS on 9 July 1998: ``I believe there is an independent value to having young people learn in an environment where they're with people of many di€erent racial and ethnic backgrounds. And the question is, How can you balance that with our devotion to merit?'' (The New York Times, 9 July 1998, p. A21). Messages of reconciliation such as these can be traced to the mainstream, integrationist civil rights movement led by Martin Luther King, Jr. In this movement, the traditional liberal ideals of individualism and procedural equality have been largely upheld in the struggle to eliminate systematic discrimination against African Americans as a group. Such a position of integration and reconciliation is eloquently expressed in the widely quoted ``I Have a Dream'' speech King delivered before the Lincoln Memorial on 28 August 1963: So I say to you, my friends, that even though we must face the diculties of today and tomorrow, I still have a dream. It is a dream deeply rooted in the American dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creedÐwe hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal . . . I have a dream my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character. I have a dream today (King, 1992, pp. 104± 105).

The same stance of ideological reconciliation has been recently voiced by Hugh Price, President of the National Urban League. In his keynote address at the League's 1998 annual conference, Hugh shared his belief that the current conditions in the United States o€er blacks the ``best shot we have ever had to shove ourselves the rest of the way into the

602

Y. Y. Kim

American mainstream'' (The New York Times, 13 August 1998, p. A23). Racial discrimination still exists, Hugh pointed out, but AfricanAmerican parents must take greater responsibility for the education of their children: ``With unemployment so low, employers are gobbling up almost every willing and able worker with a pulse. Shame on us if we don't seize this historic opening in the economy . . . I think we are moving rapidly toward the day when if you've got something to put on the table, employers aren't going to care what color you are'' (The New York Times, 13 August 1998, p. A23). A similar message of ideological reconciliation was communicated on Columbus Day in 1992 by Niles Bird Runningwater, then president of the Indian student association at the University of Oklahoma. We don't choose to protest this fallacy of American history, but rather to celebrate the survival and continuance of Indian peoples . . . By doing this we can fully acknowledge 500 years of coexistence of Indian and non-Indian peoples in America . . . We're trying to do our part in togetherness and participation by eliciting communication and excitement concerning the respect of others' cultures (The Oklahoma Daily, 24 March 1992, p. 3).

Moderate voices such as these often escape media attention or get lost in the midst of loud and conspicuous voices of committed ideologues from the left and the right. Yet messages of reconciliation are all around us when we look for them. In his autobiography Walking in the wind, Lewis (1998), a leader of the civil rights movement since the 1960 s and currently a Democratic Congressman from Georgia, articulates his abiding faith in the ``Beloved Community'', a vision of what society could become were people of all class and ethnic backgrounds to reach across the barriers that divide them. Rorty (1998), in his book Achieving our country, argues for ideological moderation and objects to intransigent ``leftists'' and ``conservatives''. In Someone else's house, Tamar Jacoby (1998) professes her faith in interethnic integration and calls for realism that appreciates the real progress between blacks and whites that has taken place in American society and of insisting on the need for both blacks and whites to stay on the long and slow course of integration. An ideological reconciliation is also sought by Gerald Gra€ in Beyond the culture wars (1992) and by Alan Ryan (1998) in Liberal anxieties and liberal education. Both authors support the principles of multiculturalism and other pluralistic theories, while insisting that category-based ideas of cultural diversity in the academe must be moderated and put in dialogue with traditional courses to avoid continuation of a disconnected curriculum and mutual resentment.

Unum and Pluribus

603

Messages of Extremism The full spectrum of American public discourse on interethnic relations further includes the marginal voices of separatism, often characterized as ``extremist'' views. Whereas the aforementioned messages of assimilationism, pluralism, and reconciliation commonly adhere to the societal goal of interethnic integration (while disagreeing on speci®c visions as to how to achieve this goal), extremist messages frequently express a preference for a maximum ingroup±outgroup separation. Some of the most unambiguous separatist messages come from those identi®ed with ``extreme right'' groups including the Ku Klux Klan, Neo-Nazi, Skinheads, and those of the so-called ``Patriot'' movements. Members of such groups are known for their commitment to racial purism, the supremacy of the white race, and, in some cases, even arms training and preparation for a race war (Southern Poverty Law Center, 1998). George Burdi, who is reported to be working to revitalize the Neo-Nazi movement through a newly powerful network, the Internet, states his separatist view toward blacks: ``To put black men and women in American society, which is traditionally and essentially established on European traditions, and to say, `Here you go, you're an equal, now compete', is just as ridiculous as assuming that you could move white people to the Congo and have them e€ectively compete . . . the progeny of slaves cannot live in harmony with the progeny of slavemasters'' (The New York Times Magazine, 25 February 1996, pp. 40±41). Of course, separatist messages come from the ``extreme left'' as well, including such contemporary ethnic nationalist groups as the New Black Panthers and the Nation of Islam. In particular, Farrakhan's call for black nationalism and economic ``reparations'', his assertion of black racial superiority, and his condemnation of Jews as ``bloodsuckers'' have been widely reported (e.g., Time, 28 February 1994, pp. 21± 25). He is reported to have called the United States ``the Great Satan'' during a visit to Iran and proclaimed: ``You can quote me: God will destroy America at the hands of the Muslims'' (Time, 26 February 1996, p. 12; The Washington Post, 26 February 1996, pp. A1, A6). Farrakhan explains his separatist view in an interview featured in Time (28 February 1994, pp. 21±25) as follows: ``My ultimate aim is the liberation of our people. So if we are to be liberated, it's good to see that hands that are holding us. And we need to sever those hands from holding us that we may be a free people, that we may enter into a better relationship with them than what we presently have'' (p. 25). Extreme separatist messages are heard even from those who are unaf®liated with a recognized extremist group. Although not always explicit, separatist views can be easily inferred from the in¯ammatory rhetorical devices employed to condemn or scapegoat an outgroup or position the

604

Y. Y. Kim

ingroup as ``victims''. An example is the phrase ``culture war'' Patrick Buchanan used in a speech he delivered during the 1992 presidential election. This phrase connotes an unmistakable line drawn to ``defend'' what Buchanan appears to believe to be the authentic American culture. Indeed, separatist messages appear to be becoming increasingly louder: Robert Kimball (1990, p. xi) characterized black studies in universities as ``this war against Western culture''; Alan Bloom (1987, p. xii) accuses ``liberal teachers'' as ``intellectual barbarians'' and ``culture peddlers''; minority student protesters at Stanford University chant ``Down with racism, Western culture's got to go'' (The New York Times, 25 October 1995, pp. A1, B8); a black student leader at Northwestern University insists that no black people can be racists ``because racism is a function of power'' (The New York Times, 25 October 1995, p. B8); a group of Hispanic students at Cornell University occupy a building to demand separate Hispanic housing (The New York Times, 20 April 1994, p. B8). Thus, the extremes meet. As much as the separatist messages of the extreme right and the extreme left di€er dramatically in respective claims, they converge in rigid ingroup±outgroup distinction, characterization of the ingroup as ``victims'', full-blown confrontational rhetorical posturing, and forti®cation of mutually intransigent moral claims. Separatist messages of both kinds violate the rationality and civility normally expected by most Americans in public discourse. As such, extremist messages are deemed to be beyond the realms most Americans consider ``reasonable''. As Billig et al. (1998, p. 118) observe, ``the extreme bigot is free to play consistently and unambiguously in an area which is beyond reality but which taunts reality. There is no need to hedge and qualify statements in order not to pass a seemingly unreasonable judgment''. It is not surprising, then, that separatist arguments do not resonate with the American public at large and, instead, are usually met with messages of rejection of one kind or another. Even though mainstream Americans diverge in their views on the locus of American life (individual vs group identity) and the meaning of equality (procedural vs status equality), they are largely united in their objection to the separatist vision of the United States and in their shared condemnation of ``hate'' messages as fundamentally ``un-American''. Exemplifying such common reactions to separatist messages are the responses of several readers to a Time magazine cover story featuring Farrakhan, entitled ``Price and Prejudice'' (28 February 1994, pp. 21±34). Their letters to the editor characterize Farrakhan in such un¯attering terms as a ``wild, hate-mongering preacher'', ``the Minister of Rage'', ``streetwise hipster who shrewdly plays to the emotions of the most miserable and hopeless of his own people''. One reader admonishes the editor for even featuring the story in the magazine: ``As an African-American, I ®nd it very

Unum and Pluribus

605

upsetting that every time Farrakhan speaks the media give him a microphone and an ampli®er . . . We should stop pointing ®ngers and making excuses that seem to confuse and anger more than unite our community. We can't continue at this level. We just can't''. Others have responded to Farrakhan's separatist messages by warning against putting group identity over individual identity. Shelby Steel, an African American professor at San Jose State University, points to the danger of excessive claims of group identity in an opinion column in The New York Times (13 March 1994, p. E17). Louis Farrakhan personi®es a speci®c territory in the collective imagination of black America. (Only this place in the imagination explains the vast disparity between his prominence and his rather small following.) It is the territory where the group ceases to be a mere identity or culture and becomes a value in itself. Here the group becomes synonymous with truth, and no longer needs approval from others . . . It is precisely their break from universal truthsÐtolerance, brotherhood, fair-mindednessÐthat enables them to assert the supremacy of their group.

A more reconcilatory response to Farrakhan is seen in the American Jewish Committee's one-page political advertisement placed in The New York Times (24 February 1994, p. B12) in response to ``verbal attacks by leaders of the Nation of Islam on whites, women, Jews, Catholics, Arabs, gays, and African-Americans who criticize their persistently divisive message''. We, the undersigned, believe the best response we can give to those who teach hate is to join our voices, as we have so often joined forces, in a better messageÐof faith in each other, of shared devotion to America's highest ideals of freedom and equality. `We must all learn to live together as brothers', the Reverend Dr Martin Luther King, Jr, said, `or we will all perish together as fools. That is the challenge of the hour'. Together, we strive to meet that challenge. For with all our di€erences, we are indeed united, as Americans.

SYNTHESIS Guided by the theoretical premises linking societal ideology and individual communication behavior in a mutually-de®ning relationship, the present analysis has highlighted the dilemmatic nature of ideology as it is played out in everyday public discourse on interethnic relations in the United States. It has been demonstrated that communication messages addressing interethnic issues do not automatically mirror the traditional liberal themes of individualism and procedural equality. Rather, they are dynamically challenged by the contrary themes of group identity and equal group status. The ideological dialectics undergirds messages

606

Y. Y. Kim

of assimilationism and pluralism, along with messages of reconciliation and separatism. Together, these liberal themes and counter-themes undergird varied communication messages. The individualistic ideal and the principle of procedural equality are most closely aligned with messages of assimilationism, generally identi®ed as the position of the mainstream political right. On the other hand, messages of pluralism, often associated with the mainstream political left, advocate the primacy of group identity and the equality of status between ethnic groups. Moderating and balancing these two ideological views are the messages of reconciliation representing middle America. In contrast, messages of extremism that are commonly identi®ed with the views of the extreme right and the extreme left that emphasize ingroup victimhood and moral superiority and maximum ingroup±outgroup separation. As a way of synthesizing these four positions, an ideological circle is proposed (see Figure 2). In this circle, the four positions are di€erentiated based on two bipolar dimensions: (a) the horizontal dimension of classical liberal and contrary themes; and (b) the vertical dimension of integrationist and separatist visions for the American society. The oppositional relationship between the assimilationist messages of liberal themes and pluralist messages of counter-themes is indicated by their respective positions of 3 o'clock and 9 o'clock. Linking these two message types are the integrationist messages of reconciliation placed at the 12 o'clock position. The separatist messages of extremism (from both the extreme political right and the extreme political left) are merged into the 6 o'clock position, opposite from the position of the integrationist messages of reconciliation.

FIGURE 2.Types of Interethnic Communication Messages in an Ideological Circle.

Unum and Pluribus

607

This circular model is presented with a caution against regarding the four ideological positions in it as ®xed, deterministic, or monolithic categories. It is not uncommon for individuals and groups to hold contradictory opinions at a given time. Nor can we expect the American ideological milieu to stay the way it is today. Except for the case of extreme separatists and committed ideologues, Americans are more or less willing to accept inconsistencies, contradictions, and changes. Such is the case, for example, when Eric Liu (1998) (son of successful immigrants from Taiwan), in his book The accidental asian: notes from a native speaker refuse to buy into the separatist line of ``Professional Asian-Americans'' in the absence of a unifying cultural idiom justifying it. At the same time, Liu acknowledges the African-American model of identity politics set in heavy protests and oppositions in light of the common racial heritage and the legacy of slavery and subjugation. Given the pliable and dynamic nature of ideology and interethnic communication, the proposed model serves mainly as a broad conceptual ``map'' of the ideological underpinnings of interethnic communication in the United States today. As such, the model further provides an initial scheme for tracking ideological changes over time, or to compare cross-societal ideological similarities and di€erences. The qualitative-interpretive method employed in this work does not allow an accurate assessment of the extent to which each of the four positions on interethnic relations represents the opinions of the American public at large. Even though such generalizations require a more systematic investigations that employs a representative sample, the present analysis allows a tentative conclusion: The classical liberal ideals continue to accompany the mainstay of American consciousness on interethnic relations in the form of assimilationism and reconciliation, even as they are vigorously challenged by voices of pluralism and of extremism. This conclusion is largely supported by ®ndings from public opinion polls. In a 1997 Time/CNN poll of over 1100 Americans, for instance, 96% of the respondents agreed with the assimilationist statement, ``It should be the duty of all immigrants to learn English if they plan to stay in this country''. In response to the question, ``Which comes closest to your view on bilingual education in public schools?'', only 11% agreed with the pluralist view that ``children of immigrants should be taught in their native language inde®nitely''. This is in sharp contrast with the 48% of the respondents who indicated ``children of immigrants should be taught in their native language only until they know enough English to join regular classes'', and with the remaining 40% who said ``all children should be taught in English'' (Gray, 1998, p. 70). Similar sentiments underlie the decisive passage of ``Proposition 227'' in 1998 by California voters, thereby eliminating all bilingual education programs and replacing them with intensive English language instruc-

608

Y. Y. Kim

tions. Likewise, when ``Ebonics'' (``Black English'') was endorsed by the Oakland Uni®ed School District Board of Education at the end of 1996 as a legitimate language program, many public leaders who often diverge ideologically with respect to interethnic relations (from Jesse Jackson to Jesse Helm) came together to denounce and reject it as an ``extremist'', ``dangerous'', and ``divisive'' idea (Palmeri, 1997). The continuing ecacy of liberal ideology is also suggested by the fact that, over a period of roughly two past decades, the number of interracial marriages in the US has escalated from 310,000 to more than 1.1 million, and that the incidence of births of mixed-race babies has multiplied 26 times as fast as that of any other group (Smolowe, 1993, p. 64± 65). Relatedly, the results of Gallop polls taken over the past 25 years (1972±1997) show a dramatic increase in percentage of white Americans who are willing to vote for a black candidate for president rose (from 35 to 93%) and who approve of marriage between blacks and whites (25±61%) (USA Today, 8 August 1995, p. A11). The present characterization of the American ideological landscape is further supported by Wolfe's (1998, p. 309) assessment of ``the new middle-class morality''. Based on 200 in-depth interviews conducted in Boston, Atlanta, Tulsa, and San Diego metropolitan areas, Wolfe (1998) has found ``little support for the notion that middle-class Americans are engaged in bitter cultural con¯ict with one another'' (p. 278). Instead, according to Wolfe, they are ``struggling to ®nd ways in which their core beliefs can be reconciled with experiences that seem to contradict them'' (p. 281), while insisting on a set of values ``capacious enough to be inclusive but demanding enough to uphold standards of personal responsibility'' (p. 322). Given this landscape of contemporary American interethnic communication, the proposed circular model of ideology may serve as a groundwork for a more narrowly focused investigation of the increasing politicization of ``intellectual ideology'' (cf. Billig et al., 1998; Diesing, 1991; Gra€, 1992; Hammersley, 1995; Thornton, 1996)Ða subset of the American ideological milieu in the form of social research practices. The ideological variations identi®ed in the present analysis o€er a broad, societal perspective, based on which the academic polemics on issues of ethnicity, race, and interethnic relations. Particularly in light of the voices of critical and postmodernist analysts calling for openly political and agenda-driven research (e.g., Orbe, 1997; Tsuda, 1986; Young, 1996), we need to examine how di€erent methodological schools de®ne the nature of the relationship between research and ideology. Speci®cally, we need to understand how ideological positions of di€erent investigators correspond to those observed in the everday discourse of the American public at large, and how a particular ideological position directly or indirectly in¯uences an academic investigation of inter-

Unum and Pluribus

609

ethnic communicationÐhow a problem is de®ned and theorized, how research questions are posed, how data are collected, and how results are interpreted. Exactly how the nature of American interethnic relations and the underlying ideological forces will unfold in the future remains to be seen. Meanwhile, debates will doubtlessly continue as Americans struggle with competing visions of Unum and PluribusÐvisions of what it means to be Americans. Free and public debates, indeed, are essential for American society to guard itself against stagnation and entropy. The very fact that interethnic issues continue to engage American consciousness is itself an armation, and a hallmark, of the American liberal traditionÐa tradition Grunwald (1976, p. 36) celebrated in his Bicentennial essay: So one must love America, most of all and most deeply for its constant, dicult, confused, gallant and never ®nished struggle to make freedom possible. One loves America for its accomplishments as well as for its un®nished businessÐand especially for its knowledge that its business is indeed un®nished . . . One ultimately loves America for not what it is, or what it does, but for what it promises . . . we must deeply believe, and we must prove, that after 200 years the American promise is still only in its beginning.

REFERENCES Abercrombie, N. (1980). Class, structure and knowledge. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Asante, M. (1993). Racism, consciousness, and Afrocentricity. In G. Early (Ed.), Lure and loathing: essays on race, identity, and the ambivalence of assimilation (pp. 127±148). New York: Penguin. Beasley, V. (1997). You, the people: ®nding insights into diversity and citizenship in presidential rhetoric. In S. Morreal & A. Jones (Eds.), Proceedings of the 1997 Summer Conference of the National Communication Association: Racial and Ethnic Diversity in the 21st Century (pp. 35±41). Washington, DC: National Communication Association. Billig, M. (1991). Ideology and opinions: studies in rhetorical psychology. London: Sage. Billig, M., Condor, S., Edwards, D., Gane, M., Middleton, D., & Radley, A. (1988). Ideological dilemmas: a social psychology of everyday thinking. London: Sage. Crouch, S. (1995). The all-American skin game, or, The decoy of race: the long and the short of it, 1990±1994. New York: Pantheon Books. Crouch, S. (1998). Always in pursuit: fresh American perspective, 1995±1997. New York: Pantheon Books. Diesing, P. (1991). How does social science work? Re¯ections on practice. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

610

Y. Y. Kim

Gar®nkel, H. (1967). Studies in ethnomethodology. Englewood Cli€s, NJ: Prentice±Hall. Gra€, G. (1992). Beyond the culture wars: how teaching the con¯icts can revitalize American education. New York: Norton. Gray, P. (1998). Teach your children well. Time, 69±71. Grunwald, H. (1976). Loving America. Time, 35±36. Hacker, A. (1992). Two nations: Black and White, separate, hostile, unequal. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Hammersley, M. (1995). The politics of social research. London: Sage. Iyer, P. (1990). The masks of minority terrorism. Time, 86. Jacoby, T. (1998). Someone else's house: America's un®nished struggle for integration. New York: The Free Press. Kim, Y. Y. (1994). Interethnic communication: the context and the behavior. In S. Deetz (Ed.), Communication yearbook 17 (pp. 511±538). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Kim, Y. Y. (1997). The behavior-context interface in interethnic communication. In J. Owen (Ed.), Context and communication behavior (pp. 261±291). Reno, NV: Context Press. Kimball, R. (1990). Tenured radicals: how politics has corrupted higher education. New York: Harper & Row. King Jr, M. L. (1992). In J. Washington (Ed.), I have a dream: writings and speeches that changed the world. San Francisco: Harper Collins. Lewis, J. (1998). Walking with the wind: a memoir of the movement. New York: Simon & Shuster. Liu, E. (1998). The accidental Asian: notes of a native speaker. New York: Random House. Loury, G. (1993). Free at last? A personal perspective on race and identity in America. In G. Early (Ed.), Lure and loathing: essays on race, identity, and the ambivalence of assimilation (pp. 1±12). New York: Allen Lane/Penguin. Orbe, M. (1997). Constructing co-cultural theory: an explanation of culture, power, and communication. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Palmeri, A. (1997). Ebonics and politics: a Burkian analysis. In Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the National Communication Association, October, Chicago. Potter, J., & Wetherell, M. (1987). Discourse and social psychology. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Rorty, R. (1998). Achieving our country: leftist thought in twentieth-century America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rossides, D. (1976). The American class system: an introduction to social strati®cation. Washington, DC: University Press of America. Ryan, A. (1998). Liberal anxieties and liberal education. New York: Hill & Wang. Sampson, E. (1977). Psychology and the American ideal. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 767±782. Smolowe, J. (1993). Intermarried . . . with children. Time [Special issue: The new face of America], 64±65. Southern Poverty Law Center (1998). Intelligence Report, 90.

Unum and Pluribus

611

Taylor, C. (1992). Multiculturalism and the politics of recognition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Thornton, M. (1996). Hidden agendas, identity theories, and multiracial people. In M. Root (Ed.), The multiracial experience: racial borders as the new frontiers (pp. 101±120). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Traub, J. (1998). Nathan Glazer changes his mind, again. The New York Times Magazine, 22±25. Tsuda, Y. (1986). Language inequality and distortion. Philadelphia: John Benjamin. Van Dijk, T. (Ed.) (1997). Discourse as social interaction. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Van Dijk, T. (1998). Ideology: a multidisciplinary approach. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Wilson, K. (1998). The contested space of prudence in the 1874±1875 civil rights debate. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 84(2), 131±149. Wolfe, A. (1998). One nation, after all. New York: Viking. Woodward, K. (Ed.) (1997). Identity and di€erence. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Young, R. (1996). Intercultural communication: pragmatics, genealogy, deconstruction. Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters.