Urban heritage governance within the context of emerging decentralization discourses in Jordan

Habitat International 42 (2014) 253e263

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Urban heritage governance within the context of emerging decentralization discourses in Jordan Rama Al Rabady*, Shaher Rababeh, Shatha Abu-Khafajah Department of Architectural Engineering, Hashemite University, Zarqa, Jordan

a b s t r a c t Keywords: Archeological governance Urban heritage governance Decentralization Political culture Internal colonialism Jordan

Decentralization is becoming a fashionable trend in many parts of the world as states are increasingly challenged by their ability to achieve an ideal state of development and of democracy. Debate on decentralization and good governance is twofold: administrative and political. Conditioned by international aid, decentralization discourses in Jordan emphasize an administrative reform to achieve economic development and social justice. In urban heritage governance, confining decentralization discourses to economic dimensions undermines the impact of the ‘political culture’ of governance. The study analyzes the political culture of decentralization as it evolved in Jordan in two phases: archeological governance and urban heritage governance. Based on both primary and secondary data, the study traces the totalitarian lineage that has marked the former centralized political culture of archeological governance during colonialism. Political cultural lineage is challenging the flux of democratic and decentralization discourses in contemporary urban heritage governance; leading alternatively to democracy crisis that features the re-introduction of colonialism in the form of ‘internal colonialism’. The study recommends a political cultural reform that liberates decentralized urban governance among its multi-layered governmental system from the traditional ethos of external and internal colonialism. Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction Decentralization is becoming a fashionable trend in many parts of the world because states are increasingly challenged by their ability to strike a wise balance between the ‘democratic state’ and the ‘developmental state’ (Saito, 2008). From an administrative perspective, decentralization is defined as “the transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and the raising and allocation of resources from the central government and its agencies to field units of government agencies, subordinate units or levels of government, semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, area-wide, regional or functional authorities, or non-governmental private or voluntary organizations” (Rondinelli & Nellis, 1986: 5). Transferring the responsibilities is employed to achieve democratization, widen public participation, allow equitable distribution of growth benefits and reduce poverty (Saito, 2008). In most cases, and since decentralization traits are meant for communities and their well being, decentralization is interconnected with urban (local) governance.

* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ962 797544487. E-mail addresses: [email protected], [email protected] Rabady). 0197-3975/$ e see front matter Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2014.01.002

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Governance could be defined to highlight the economic or the political dimensions of the concept. Economically, the World Bank defines governance as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development” (World Bank, 1992: 1). Politically however, governance is defined as “processes and outcomes of consultative interactions between different constituent members including public, private, and civil organizations in order to resolve common political, economic, and social issues” (Evans, Joas, Sundback, & Theobald, 2005; Kooiman, 2003: 4; Paproski, 1993; Saito, 2003). This kind of co-governing process implies changing notions from ‘government’ to ‘governance’. While ‘government’ introduces a topdown process that reduces the role of the public to a matter of ‘recipients of solution’; governance, on the other hand, indicates a bottom-up and interactive processes that allow diverse entities from subnational and local governments, private or civil spheres to participate as active stakeholders in the decision making and taking processes (Saito, 2008). Urban governance has become important in developing countries because of the increasing urbanization and developments that took place due to the shift in population from rural to urban areas. Within these contexts, urban governance entailed many of the debates about decentralization and the relationship between urban and national governance (Harpham & Boateng, 1997). The debate is

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twofold: administrative and political. The administrative (institutional) dimension is usually connected with the market economy to achieve economic development and social justice. It advocates a pluralistic economic system through which the government collaborates with private sectors and the civil society to deliver better and competitive urban services to the wider communities. It is an approach that characterizes the World Bank in its attempt to differentiate between political and technical dimensions of governance through reducing its role to promoting economic development (Harpham & Boateng, 1997). This is clearly stated in the Bank’s articles of Agreement which “prohibit the institution from interfering in a country’s internal political affairs and requires it to take only economic considerations into account in its decisions” (World Bank, 1994: vii). However, confining itself to the economic dimensions of governance to reduce poverty has been criticized because the World Bank does not provide for reforming the system of governance, i.e., it does not address issues of power, politics and democracy. It is a factor that makes aid conditionality an unsuitable approach to strengthen good governance in developing countries (Santiso, 2001). Werlin (1990) suggests that effective measures for decentralization should also consider its political dimensions and requirements because good governance in developing countries is evolving as a tripartite concept that incorporates political development, economic development and mature democracy. These three aspects are inseparable from their ‘cultural dimension’ because, as suggested by Harpham and Boateng (1997: 73), “Good governance cannot be based on precisely the same foundations in all societies. It must be based on the distinct local culture and the unique history of the modern state and its institutions”. The cultural dimension is not meant here in its traditional civic means only. Borrowing from Matlosa (2003: 86) the term ‘political culture’ is used “as a concept that denotes a broad array of norms, values, beliefs, attitudes and traditions that shape systems, institutions and processes of governance”. In such contexts, political culture affects and is affected by the political and economic governance structures in a region. Furthermore, political culture has both direct and indirect impact for democratic governance because it builds societal beliefs and orientation regarding their political systems (Chilton, 1988). So far, programs and studies on urban heritage governance in developing counties are not considerable to the instrumental impact of the ‘political culture’ on materializing decentralization in contemporary times (Matlosa, 2003). Governments, in collaboration with international aid agencies (especially the World Bank and the IMF) are practicing more emphasis on the economic reform in its decentralization discourses. The main thrust of this paper is that dominant political cultures play a critical role in contemporary urban heritage governance. The study hypothesizes that there existed and still exists a totalitarian lineage that has marked the former centralized political culture of archeological governance during colonialism. Such political cultural lineage is challenging emerging political reform or the rhetoric of liberalism, democracy and neo-liberalism; if not leading to new forms of colonialism that affect every efforts for achieving integrative urban heritage governance. Adopting the notion of ‘political culture’ for understanding urban governance and decentralization is particularly important in developing countries. Decentralization is meant to enable innovative management and creative programs as it reflects the different perspectives of the local communities and their representative authorities (Rondinelli, 1983). On the one hand, decentralized governance emerges as a trend, even in postcolonial states that have been classified by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) as the most centralized countries, such as Jordan

(Neumann, 2006; UNDP, 2010). On the other hand, urban governance is orchestrated in some policies to classify cultural heritage on the basis of specific measures to serve specific goals. In Jordan, for example, archeology and heritage are two terms used to distinguish between two different types of the tangible cultural histories. The former incorporates historical remains from antiquity dated before 1750 and protected by the Antiquities law of 1923 and its amendments. The latter incorporates remains of the past which the Antiquities Law excluded, represented mainly by the materials from the Ottoman and early 20th century structures dated after 1750; including heritage sites (location or buildings), heritage building (constructions and architectural structures) and urban locations (architectural areas, public spaces and neighborhoods, and the landscape that represent the values on which the culture of the residents was built) (LOB, 2005). They are termed as heritage (turath) and protected by the 2005 Law for the Protection of Urban and Architectural Heritage (PUAH), also known as the Heritage Law. Enactment of the Heritage Law was synchronized with the inception of several World Bank funded, tourism-led regeneration projects in five of the secondary cities in Jordan e as will be discussed later. Although meant to act on an urban (local) level, however, urban heritage governance is faced with a high level of centralization that tends to foster stronger standardization of management models and governance landscapes (Al Rabady, 2010, 2013). Central governments are neither able to meet the least conditions of decentralization in urban heritage governance nor acquainted to adopt its new forms and challenges. This is happening despite that Jordan witnessed a flux of democratic and decentralization discourses that took place one approximately every decade since its establishment in 1921 because of changing conditions on the national and international scenes. By calling attention to ‘political culture’, this study is in tune with a literature that is gaining importance for the analysis of political phenomena from a cultural perspective (see for example Dirks, 2001, 2004; Heur, 2007; Jessop & Oodterlynck, 2008). It is an approach that enables us to conceptualize governance cultures and modes of regulation on an urban scale. It also allows theorizing the historical changes in urban heritage governance and tracing the continuities and transformations of cultural forms of governance in the broader context of contemporary international political economic determination in Jordan but also in the internal and local context of decentralization. In order to achieve these goals, the study starts by analyzing governance as it evolved in Jordan in two phases: archeological governance and urban heritage governance. Phase one discusses the unstable interface of archeological governance with the political cultures of colonialism, political economy, democracy, neo-liberalism, and political peace economy as conditioned by the international and national changes. It singles out prospects and constrains for achieving democratic governance and decentralization in Jordan during the past decades. Decentralization assessment for this phase is made with reference to secondary resources and existing literature that tackles the political culture of governance in Jordan with its different dynamics and changes. As governance in Jordan has moved in the current century toward urban heritage governance, the second phase explores the contemporary centralelocal efforts toward institutionalization of the democratic urban governance as introduced by the National Agenda 2006e2015. Decentralization assessment is made with reference to the accounts of key official informants who participated in the recent Third Tourism Project e Cultural, Heritage, Tourism, Urban Development Project e CHTUD that was conducted in collaboration between the Jordanian Government, represented by the Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities (MoTA), and other international aid agencies (mainly the World Bank, United States

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Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)). Madaba appears as a constructive case for assessing contemporary discourses of decentralization since the city synchronizes between piloting decentralized governance (as designated by the National Agenda) and an undergoing urban regeneration project in its historic zone. The study concludes by discussing ‘internal colonialism’ as an inevitable outcome of the country’s attempt to balance between the ‘democratic state’ and the ‘developmental state’ while maintaining its legitimacy and authority in the nation building. Phase one: archeological governance and the dance between ‘state of authoritarianism’, ‘state of democracy’ and ‘state of development’ Every country has a political culture that governs its different mainstreams. In order to understand the contemporary political culture of urban heritage governance in Jordan, it would be useful to touch on the historical infrastructures that underpinned archeological governance since the establishment of Jordan. Four general phases could be considered: colonialism, postcolonialism, liberalism and the political ‘peace’ economy. Colonialism (1920se1930s): archeological governance as a centralized state-of-power Archeology has been an integral part of the different colonial policies in Jordan. During the Ottoman period, and in order to preserve their territorial integrity, the Ottoman Empire established an alliance with the Germans around the military/cultural exchange. Cultural exchange was invoked by what Shaw (2003: 163) describes it as the tradition of the white European and North American society “to demonstrate the superiority of the supposed mainstream of human cultural development”. The Ottoman territory was a critical point in this colonial project. Accordingly, Europeans hunted for archeology whilst exerting economic and political power on the Ottomans (Bektas, 2004; Shaw, 2003). The strategy succeeded in the acquisition of some local archeology despite that the Regulation of 1884 had forbidden the exportation of any artifacts excavated from the Ottoman territory. One clear example in Jordan is the removal of parts of the façade of the Mshatta Palace (an early 8th Century Umayyad palace) and sending it to the Bode Museum in Berlin in 1903 as a gift from the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II to Emperor Wilhelm II of Germany (Shaw, 2003: 121e122, 129). The British mandate adopted a different colonial approach in Jordan. It introduced the notion of the ‘state’ because, and according to earlier records, Jordan’s pre-state population is described as being “ungovernable” and was “unaccustomed to obedience to central authority” (Massad, 2001). It was through direct contact with the British mandate that Jordan (known as Transjordan) started to articulate the institutional structure of the newly emerging state. One of the main structures that have been introduced into Jordan was the archeological policy. Shortly after World War I; the British colonial administration was directly involved in orchestrating the norms, ideologies, laws and landscape of power for urban heritage governance in Jordan. The first attempt of the colonial administration to articulate archeological governance of Transjordan was through introducing the notion of cultural heritage; specifically through the Basilica Affair (see Maffi, 2009; Malkawi, 1996 for a complete account on this incident). Although the Basilica affair resulted in building the central Mosque in Downtown Amman, Maffi (2009) suggests that it led to critical initiatives that shaped the ideologies and norms of urban heritage governance in Jordan. Firstly, the British employed

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the spectrum of cultural heritage, i.e., identifying what is considered heritage in Jordan and transforming the local ancient vestiges into cultural heritage. Secondly, participation in archeological practices was limited to western archeologists. The native people were excluded because they did not prove their competency in the field of archeology and its related activities e except few personals who studied and trained in Europe. Thirdly, the legislative and administrative architecture of urban heritage governance was shaped with the enactment of the first law of Antiquities and the establishment of the Department of Antiquities (DoA) (also known as Public Antiquities Department) directly after the Basilica affair in 1923 with the objective to preserve, restore and excavate archaeological sites. The British archaeologist George Horsfield, Director of Antiquities in Palestine, became its General Inspector. Although the foundation of the DoA and the promulgation of the first law of Antiquities in the Emirate marked the beginning of the local history of archeology in Transjordan, these colonial-driven initiatives embodied a new political culture of domination given that they institutionalized the British sovereignty over a social and cultural domain, which, before 1923, had not been disciplined yet (Maffi, 2009: 14). This colonial legacy of domination proved to be incoherent with the local cultures. Nonetheless, the administrative style of the Euro-colonizers grew as a leading ideology which impacted later policies and practices of archeological governance when Transjordan was transformed from a mere mandated emirate into an independent nation state in 1946. Postcolonialism (1940se1970s): consolidating the centralized archeological governance and introducing tourism-led approach Bianca (2000) suggests that the independence of Arab states witnessed a transformative (as opposed to transitional) change. Although the struggle against colonial rule resulted in a national independence, the new independent nation states adopted the administrative colonial framework; a state-focused framework. Massad (2001) describes this ‘anticolonial moment’ in Jordan by stating that: “The nationalist representatives of the colonized will oversee the colonial state’s institutions, which are now in the service of the postcolonial independent state. This moment is discontinuous from the previous one in that it overthrows the existing discursive and material structure of colonial governance. The nation-state and its apparatuses are now staffed and run by anticolonial nationalists for the benefit of the nation and not colonialism. However, as far as the techniques of governance are concerned, there is almost complete institutional continuity. The colonial structure of governance survives the “rupture” unscathed” (Massad, 2001: 9). Institutional continuity appeared in archeological governance also. The state authority was initially represented by the Department of Antiquities (DoA) which was eventually incorporated into the institutional structure of another state agency; that is the Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities (MoTA). MoTA was launched as a tourism authority in 1953 and was upgraded through the 1987 royal decree into a ministry level, to also include, under its umbrella, the Department of Antiquities, known since then as the Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities (MoTA, 2005b). The declaration followed MoTA’s involvement in the First Tourism Project (1976e 1983) that was funded by the World Bank. Beside infrastructural works in Petra and Jerash, the project provided for building the capacity and overseas training of the staff of Antiquities Department and the Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities (World Bank,

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1976). Municipalities were not involved in issues related to archeological governance, even if these archeologies were located within the municipal domain. Until contemporary times, DoA and MoTA act as the governmental body responsible for conserving and developing archeological sites and their development for tourism purposes e see Fig. 1 that shows the organizational structure of MoTA and the DoA division, which is directly connected with the Minister. Daher (2005) suggests that MoTA in postcolonialism introduced an identical “patriarchal structure of central governmental agencies” that is still related to the codes of the stateframework. Centralized archeological governance was enhanced in the 1960s and 1970s on an urban level when the capital city of Amman prepared its master plan to incorporate within its responsibilities the regeneration of archeological sites located within the historic downtown area. In that period, Jordan witnessed development boom, influenced by the huge influx of money from emigrant’s transmittal poured into the country (Ababseh, 2013b: 289). This was also the era when development, especially in Amman, was most suitably brought about by rational planning conducted by international experts, which consolidated the position of the central government. It was particularly marked through the idea of creating the “Greater Amman Region” which was first introduced in the early sixties through the British planners, represented mainly by Vernon Z. Newcombe’s plan. Similar to the London experience

Fig. 1. Organization structure of MOTA and the DOA division. Modified from MoTA, 2013.

and other former British colonies, the ‘Greater’ was used as a ‘control device’ that “make[s] planning independent of accidental local authority boundaries” (Malkawi, 1996: 74). Accordingly, the concept of ‘metropolitan authority’ suggested a local governance reform envisioned through concentrated decentralization for the rest of the regions in Jordan (for more information see Malkawi (1996)). Although the idea was not implemented at that time because it was ill-defined and challenged by defining the geographic boundaries of the Greater Region and norms of authority, control and power, it, nevertheless, remained influential in orchestrating the centralelocal relation in restructuring the governance of Jordan in the 1980s. Liberalism (1980s): the ‘state of democracy’ and preventive reconcentration In the late 1980s, Jordan was faced with a severe and destabilizing debt crisis and economic hardship caused by the drastic drop in oil revenues following the fall in the price of the oil and the increasing debt (Ababseh, 2013b: 289). In response to this ongoing fiscal crisis, Jordan drew support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1989. In return, Jordan had to undertake serious economic adjustment measures, including privatizing some of the state’s companies (such as the Jordan Telecommunications Company, Water Authority and the Royal Jordanian Airlines) and

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decreasing the subsidies on some basic commodities. Sudden adjustment measures triggered a 3-days hunger riots in the southern governorates e a factor that pushed king Hussein to start a democratic process in the country in 1989, represented by preparing the National Charter that outlined the foundations and parameters for political liberalization in Jordan (al-Mithaq al-Watani al-Urdunni) and the recommencement of the first elections since 1957 (Ababseh, 2013b: 290; Robinson, 1998). Although the Charter codified the Political Parties Law and the Press and Publications Law; democratic initiatives were not necessarily genuine. Wiktorowicz (2002: 112) comments on Jordan’s democratic strategies and suggests that democracy was introduced into the country as a tool to reassert control in the heart of the economic crisis that Jordan was witnessing at that time. Rightly, the IMF economic ‘reform programme’ triggered riots that persuaded the government to liberate the existing authoritarian political system, but riots were about hunger and poverty; it was not primary about democracy and the right for local governance. Consequently, and in a very short period of time, the political transition unleashed new form of ‘embedded authoritarianism’ through which the central government and the governing elites maintain different codes and administrative procedures to limit democracy and popular participation (Dieterich, 2002: 131; Wiktorowicz, 2002: 111). This was particularly evident when Jordan started to collaborate with international bodies to frame its cultural and planning governance discourses. This sets the socio-cultural and political context in which archeology continued to be centrally-governed by tourismled projects. Jordan was involved in international traits and programs that helped to shape archeological governance. One of the first initiatives was the launching of a National Environment Strategy Project (NES) in 1989 in agreement with the International Union for the Conservation of Natural Resources (IUCN). An entire chapter of the agreement was devoted to “antiquates and Cultural Resources” to safeguard and preserve them for future generations (Costello & Palumbo, 1995: 542; McEachern, 1991: 205e213). Most importantly, decentralization of archeological management in Jordan became an ‘official project’ and a constant feature of the policies of the Jordanian State (Maffi, 2011). Initiation of the NES strategy was intended to be under the direction of the Ministry of Municipal, Rural Affairs and the Environment (Costello & Palumbo, 1995: 542e 543). Unfortunately, however, the strategy was not implemented and remained a document on the shelves. Accordingly, the late 1980s initiative of the NES project, along with other projects,1 was not able to reduce the state-centered governance and subsequent authoritarian practices. In fact, marginalizing the role of local governance in cultural manners was further noticed on an urban planning level, particularly through re-activating the vision of “metropolitan” and “Greater” municipalities in Jordan, starting with the capital city of Amman.

1 Another initiative that appeared with the cultural context was the Cultural Resources Management Program (CRM) (1987e1992). The program was promoted by the DoA in assistance with the American Center of Oriental Research (ACOR). The program sought to develop an organized database that incorporates preliminary information about Jordan’s archaeological sites in an electronic format (known as the Jordan Antiquities Database and Information System e JADIS) (Palumbo, 1994). Besides using this database to develop a National Register for historic assets dated before 1750, the database was intended to act as a coordination tool between the diverse governmental agencies and the DoA to counter destructions of cultural heritage caused by the economic-driven development projects (Costello & Palumbo, 1995: 544). However, this program was not concerned with issues of local governance and the empowerment of municipalities because it was endowed by the Antiquities Act, which, as mentioned earlier, put the power of heritage management in the hand of the central government only e i.e., MoTA and the DoA.

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Amman prepared the Greater Amman Comprehensive Development Plan (GACDP). It incorporated a project-based approach for managing and conserving historic sites (especially the downtown area) as part of the entire Comprehensive plan. The plan was completed in 1988 after a tight collaboration between local planners from Amman Municipality and the private international firm Dar al-Handasah Consultants; headed by the British Planner John Calder. According to this plan, Amman and the areas around it composed of 14 municipalities and 11 village councils became the Greater Amman Municipality (GAM). The idea of Greater Amman was justified as a means to overcome the problem of the multiplicity of authorities of municipalities and village councils (MGA & DH, 1988). Malkawi (1996) commented on amalgamating these separated units with the central Amman Municipality through the concept of ‘central-metropolitan-authority’. He suggests that the idea of city-region provided the central government with a tool to practice ‘power over’ the local municipal entities and transform them into path dependent entities. In his words: “Another issue that confirms the doubts about the reasoning of Greater Amman is that the idea of city-region.implies decentralization. Indeed, the whole scheme of reorganization, as the plan suggests it, is based on creating different local centers. Yet, we find that the planners call for “centralizing” the power and control in the Municipality of Amman” (Malkawi, 1996: 70). Accordingly, the concept of “metropolitan authority” suggested a local governance reform envisioned through concentrated decentralization (re-concentration) for the rest of the regions in Jordan. In 2001, the Ministry of Municipalities led the municipal restructuring to merge several municipalities and reduce their number from 328 to 99. Such centralized reform challenges local governance at the municipal level because it decreases the power and responsibilities of local governments in favor of vesting control in some centralized authorities. Furthermore, it counters the new liberalization and decentralization discourses that started in the 1990s by international agencies to achieve political and economic reforms in the country. The political ‘peace’ economy (1990s): the ‘state of development’ to forge authoritarianism with new faces Whilst the 1980s was orchestrated to advance Jordan as a “state of democracy”, the 1990s envisioned Jordan as “the state of development”. In 1994, a structural reform was made to the governorate system. New economic-driven divisions were made to create four governorates: three of which have strong tourism potential (Ajlun, Madaba and Jerash) and one as an emerging economic hub (Aqaba). Role of the governorates was thus strengthened in 1994 to achieve decentralization and the number of municipalities rose from 90 in 1979 to 214 in 1994. This transitional phase in the political history of Jordan was accompanied with a peace treaty with Israel, through which the ‘Peace economy’ (Ababseh, 2013b) was envisioned by developing the tourism sector in the country. A study on Tourism Development Master Plan in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was thus carried out between 1994 and 1996 under JICA (JICA, 1996). The study resulted in developing ‘The Tourism Development Master Plan of Jordan’ and the identification of several urban regeneration projects to enhance the urban tourism in the country. It oriented urban heritage governance in Jordan toward project-based urban heritage governance of historic downtown areas in both primary and secondary cities (Al Rabady, 2013). In light of these tourism-led regeneration plans, international donor agencies, with their conditional aid, became essential actors

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in achieving an economic reform in the country and opened its market to the neo-liberal global economic programs. Several projects were initiated and funded by international donor agencies such as the World Bank, USAID, JICA, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) and many other donor agencies. Jordan’s Second Tourism Development Project was funded by the World Bank with the objectives to increase sustainable and environmentally sound tourism in Petra, Wadi Rum, Jerash and Karak. Besides other conservation and developmental works, the project provided for sector development support, including technical assistance to the Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities and project management services (World Bank, 1997). Although these projects were conducted within the municipal province, in most cases, archeological governance remained within the domain of the central government (MoTA). Role of local municipalities and communities was not advanced to any state of significance. Doan (2006), for example, examines the rapid growth of tourism in Jordan in the wake of the peace treaty with Israel and the optimism of the JICA Tourism Master Plan. He suggests that although these incidents encouraged local communities to invest in the tourism industry (as the case of the hotel building boom that took place by entrepreneurial families from Wadi Musa), they, nevertheless, increased the internationalization of the tourism industry in Jordan because local investors were challenged by unrealistic tourism projection figures and the negative consequences of instability in the tourist sector. Daher (2000) also suggests that the foreign aid is politically driven to foster the privatization of the tourism sector in the country. It introduces ‘deterministic modes of development’ that increases dependency and meanwhile kills local creativity and innovation. In view of that, foreign aid rhetoric is emerging as a neo-colonial form of domination that is replacing the previous century of the colonized imperialism. It is used to introduce a new force of global and economic domination which, through adopting the ‘Western late-capitalist mechanisms and ideology’, could be leading to diminishing the authority of the central state itself (Daher, 2000). Phase two: urban heritage governance and the ‘ideal state of development and democracy’ The 2000s is a period that focused on the urban aspects of political economy. Jordan witnessed crucial politico-economic changes that brought decentralization again to the front stage. Politically, and in light of the developing international trend for democratization, Jordan underwent a new wave of ‘democracy’ through preparing the 2006e2015 National agenda: The Jordan We Strive For. The agenda adopted a holistic approach to achieve socio-economic and political reform over the next decade and embarked upon a trend of increasing democracy, empowerment and involvement of citizens in the civic life, and decentralization of governance responsibilities to subnational levels (RNAC, 2006). Economically, Jordan was subject to a program of economic reform in which decentralization came to be seen as an ideal mean for advancing local-driven economic development. Accordingly, and for the first time, the country undertook regeneration initiatives for entire zones and urban settings. Existing administrative structures (governorates, districts and sub-district) were gradually replaced by Special Economic Zones such as the Mafraq Developmental Zone and Aqaba Private Zone (Ababseh, 2013a: 227, 2013b: 287). Other urban regions exhibiting rich historical assets were regenerated as growing and competing tourism destinations. Urban heritage regeneration programs were developed in accordance with the second National Tourism Strategy 2004e2010 that was developed through a fund from the USAID. The strategy

envisioned tourism as an essential and vibrant growth sector that will contribute to improving the long-term economic and social well being of the Jordanians (MoTA, 2004). It fostered the launching of a large scale project ‘Cultural, Heritage, Tourism, Urban Development Project e CHTUD’ in collaboration between the Jordanian Government, represented by MoTA, and other international aid agencies (mainly the World Bank, USAID and JICA). The project sought to concurrently regenerate five highly branded historical cities, including Jerash (the city of archeological (Roman) tourism), Karak (the city of historic (medieval) tourism), Salt (City of cultural tourism), Ajloun (city of natural tourism) and Madaba (city of religious tourism).2 Besides, and in light of the democratization discourses that were highlighted through the 2006e2015 National agenda, the CHTUD reports suggest that one of the major responsibilities of this project is empowerment by bottom-up activities, i.e., active participation and involvement of local municipalities in urban heritage governance. Through this project, MoTA, as a state agency, adopted decentralization in urban governance as a justified policy with excessive expectations for transforming Jordan into a ‘state of development and democracy’. Nonetheless, Saito (2008) suggests that decentralization should be assessed based on empirical models because although decentralization has a good intention in theory, its implementation is challenged by today’s ever-changing political, social and economic circumstances, especially in developing countries. This argument appears to be valid within the context of Jordan because despite Jordan’s attempt to achieve democratization in the 1980s, Wiktorowicz (2002) and Dieterich (2002) found that democratic-oriented political restructuring fostered a new form of ‘embedded authoritarianism’ through maintaining power in the hand of the central authority. In order to examine the 2005 wave of decentralization that came to Jordan under the umbrella of neo-liberalized political economy, current study is investigating decentralization discourses as introduced through the recent CHTUD project; with a focus on the case of Madaba that has been designated to pilot decentralization practices in Jordan (MoTA, 2005a, 2005b). Several models for assessing decentralization in the developing countries have been developed (see for example Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2005; Rondinelli, McCullough, & Johnson, 1989; Saito, 2008). It mostly adopted a political-economy approach to study decentralization by emphasizing administrative, institutional, behavioral, and psychological aspects. Additionally, Saito (2008) suggests an ‘actor perspective’ framework that focuses on the stakeholders (or actors) through their dynamic interactions within the political, legal, administrative and behavioral structures. His approach emerges from his believe that formal decentralization discourses and practices are usually not stakeholder-neutral, particularly in developing countries where the state is never perceived as an “organic, fixed, and unchallengeable entity” (Saito, 2003). Following Saito’s approach, our attempt in this study is to interpret relevant social, cultural, political, economic and managerial dynamics that have been discussed in literature and compare them with real decentralization discourses and practices to attain a more accurate understanding of what is taking place in the transition provoked by the 2005’s decentralization discourses, specifically in relevance to heritage governance in Jordan. Three dynamics have been investigated through in-depth interviews with key informants who were involved in the CHTUD at the both the national (state) and the local levels.

2 The classification is based on an interview with a study participant from MoTA who was in charge of the CHTUD project.

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to initiate successive studies and internationally funded projects,4 one of which is the CHTUD project. Secondly: it is commonly acknowledged that the CHTUD, with its emphasis on the public domain, is a municipal undertaking. Despite that MoTA realizes this fact; it took a leading role in administering and supervising the project and its implementation. Besides its legal power, MoTA is justifying its involvement in this project based on earlier successful stories in other places in Jordan. A study participant from MoTA described the involvement of MoTA in this project by stating:

Fig. 2. Main governmental agencies involved in developing tourism in Jordan. Modified from JICA, 1996.

Political motivation Decentralization is essentially a political process. It is widely acknowledged in literature that one of the most distinguished factors that determine the success of decentralization is the ‘nature of the state itself’ and the political commitment of the state to create appropriate political, administrative, organizational and behavioral conditions (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007; Rondinelli et al., 1989; Saito, 2008). Political devolution mandates that political leaders, central agencies and government officials should be willing to transfer power and authority from the central government to subnational administrative and local government units. It should also open the political process to public participation and allow citizens to influence local policymaking. Political devolution is not necessarily considered in the decentralization discourses as implemented in Madaba. In fact, decentralization of heritage governance in Jordan is challenged by the existence of highly centralized legal framework that hinders devolution of political power to provincial and municipal governments. Following the Antiquities law of 1923 and its amendments, the 2005 Heritage Law assigns MoTA as the government agency responsible for the administration, development and promotion of Jordan heritage. MoTA in its turn sets a scheme of the stakeholders involved in heritage-related matters including other ministries and the Greater Amman Municipality located in the state capital. Other local municipalities are not included in this scheme e as shown in Fig. 2. In fact, exclusion of the local municipalities from these urban-based activities is not new. It was previously heightened through the Law of Municipalities of 1995, through which many responsibilities of the municipalities that have direct relation to local governance have been taken away from these municipalities to other central government agencies in Amman. The role of the municipalities has been service-related (Gold, 2007). They are not granted sufficient political, financial or professional resources to participate in real political action or policymaking. A centralized constitutional environment of heritage management in Jordan reflects a lack of commitment from the central government side to cede power to local authorities. Their role is ignored despite of two things. Firstly, the Greater Madaba Municipality (GMM) showed its competency in planning for regenerating the historic downtown area. In 1995, GMM prepared a comprehensive regeneration plan for the historic downtown area to promote it as a tourism destination (Fig. 3). The plan, with its suggested projects, was not implemented.3 Rather, MoTA used it as a reference

3 In his speech, the then Mayor declared that he visited MoTA several times seeking financial support to implement these project but finding no positive response from MoTA (GMM, 1997).

“Although the agency responsible for the implementation of CHTUD project is MoTA, the project is not a tourism project. It is a municipal project. The project is for the local community, the owner is the municipality. It is for the benefit of the city. But because of the weak capacity of the municipalities, it was decided that MoTA should undertake this project. MoTA has a successful experience in doing smaller projects in Wadi Rum and Jerash. We thought we can expand our experience to wider urban settings. Therefore, we worked in the downtown areas of five historic cities to enhance its urban tourism, achieve economic development, and attract investments so that, step by step, we add these cities on the tourism map” (MoTA study participant, 2009). It is a stance that has been supported by the international aiding agency e the World Bank whose emphasis was to help in boosting the tourism industry in the country through these regeneration projects. According to a study participant from MoTA: “This project is originally a municipal project, but the municipality cannot handle such a huge project because of its weak capacity. In order not to be rhetoric, we and the World Bank don’t care who is conducting the project. Our concern is to develop a tourism product.this is really what matters the most.. because, eventually, I will be asked about the number of tourists that visited these sites, number of jobs that have been created, contribution of the project to the economic revenues in the country, etc .This is what really matters for us” (MoTA study participant, 2009). Cheema and Rondinelli (2007: 16) suggest that “international development organizations and bilateral donors have significantly increased their funding for decentralization in developing countries, both in response to requests from governments and to support programs for generating sustainable livelihoods”. It is a situation that can be equally noticed in Jordan. The potential of promoting decentralization and achieving democratic heritage governance through the CHTUD tends to be overlooked by international donors in favor of economic enhancement. Despite the rhetorical claims of donors to be interested primarily in decentralizing the governance in Jordan, the democratic governance discourse has felled victim to what in practice turns out to be a blueprint for poverty alleviation and economic enhancement in this region. As a result, it could be implied that neither the new legislative structure under Heritage Law nor the new CHTUD project were able to provide for transferring the authority from the

4 The first was the 2003e2004: Urban Regeneration and Tourism Development Plans, prepared by Lufthansa Consulting and Others. In general, the study expanded the 1995 municipality plan for regenerating the downtown area through a projectbased proposal. On an architectural level, the study included suggestions for restoring, rehabilitating and reusing some of the archeological and heritage sites. On an urban level it suggested revitalization of the main tourism street e the King Talal street.

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Fig. 3. Madaba’s urban contexts, as many other cities in Jordan, exhibits both archeological and heritage sites that are currently distributed throughout the downtown area. Madaba started to advance conservation of its archeological (mainly classical) legacy since the 1930s when it was a target of Orientals searching the religious value of its archeology, especially those related to the Byzantine period. Excavation works were conducted in collaboration between the central government represented by the Department of Antiquities (DOA) and international agencies represented by the German Protestant Institute of Archaeology in Jerusalem, the Franciscan Archaeological Institute, University of Toronto, USAID, etc. Archeological findings were then restored and are currently developed for tourism purposes. In 1995, GMM suggested a regeneration plan with a proposal for of a tourist trail that connects main archeological sites along with number of different-sized development projects scattered along the same trail. Source: modified from Al Rabady, 2001.

center to lower levels of government. It rather closed any chances for intergovernmental coordination and shared governance in heritage-related matters in Jordan. This was enhanced when the central government (represented by MoTA) was not able to assign functions and revenues to local municipalities and the resources by which to participate in the urban regeneration projects and plans e as will be illustrated in the organizational orders. Organizational dynamics Decentralization requires determining the relationships among the different levels of government and administration. It also requires allocating the functions, roles and duties among the organizational levels (Rondinelli et al., 1989). In the case of the CHTUD, The World Bank report highlighted the ‘weak’ performance of the Greater Madaba Municipality (GMM) and declared that the municipality suffers from general weaknesses in urban and planning problems, managing public spaces and urban services, coordinating with the public utility companies, along with other organizational weaknesses in human resources and qualifications, financial management, and absence of public participation (MoTA, 2005a, 2005b). Based on that, the CHTUD project team included ‘capacity building’ to develop local urban heritage governance of involved municipalities. Capacity building was intended through the creation of City Management Units (CMUs) that could act as an administrative channel for restructuring the centralelocal relations and activate the role of the municipality in this project. However, it was found that the ideologies and mechanisms for creating this unit did not serve this same purpose. MoTA took no serious measures for creating the CMU. A study participant from the Heritage Management Department at the GMM described MoTA’s attitude in this matter by stating:

“One year passed on the CHTUD project. The CMU was not officially launched in any of the municipalities. One day we received a letter from MoTA questioning the delay in hiring qualified staff for the CMU. Along with the letter, MoTA attached number of strict conditions and high standards of qualifications for the unit staff; which certainly will not be found in Madaba or any other municipality in Jordan. It was clear that there is something wrong and that MoTA is putting limitation on creating the CMUs in the municipalities. The Mayor of Madaba discussed the issue with other involved municipalities and when they contacted MoTA they found that MoTA is withdrawing from this responsibility because it decided to use its own staff to work on this project as they are already paid through the budget of the project. The municipalities were not mentioned or involved by any means” (GMM study participant, 2009). Saito (2008) warns that a natural outcome of decentralization is increasing the autonomy of subnational governments. The autonomy itself becomes contested between the central and local governments because stakeholders influence and are also influenced by others. It is clear from the case of the CMU that MoTA was cautious about giving the municipality an autonomous status. It rather re-emphasized a hierarchical structure, whereby the central government practices ‘command and control’ and does not allow the local governments to make their own decisions without significant control by the central government. Behavioral and psychological dynamics An instrumental socio-political factor that can affect the implementation of decentralization programs in developing

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countries is the behavioral conditions (Rondinelli et al., 1989). According to Rondinelli et al. (1989), decentralization is conditioned with a ‘minimum level of trust and respect’ that characterizes the centralelocal relationships. The two levels should recognize the capability of each other in performing certain functions and participating effectively in various aspects of management. Regrettably, however, ‘trust’ and ‘recognition’ were not necessarily obvious through the centralelocal relationships as approached in the CHTUD project in Jordan. Rather, analysis of the in-depth interviews suggests that the centralelocal interaction revealed two main behavioral outcomes: lack of mutual trust and lack of recognition. Whilst MoTA contained the project in its provinces, it maintained a symbiotic relation with GMM. Analysis indicates that MoTA sought to coordinate with GMM because of different reasons. The first is to ensure the success of the project as municipalities play important role in enabling the project, allowing accessibility and solving problems emerging throughout the implementation of the project. The second is to enforce the legislative outcomes of the project, specifically the rules and regulations that control new constructions within the downtown area. The third is to ensure the sustainability of the project and its maintenance in the long term. After all, local members in the GMM express their concern about these limited roles because they believe that MoTA perceived them simply as an adjunct to the central government and something to be controlled and managed. Study participants from the GMM described the ‘intimidating’ form of MoTA’s authority and lack of collaboration between the different sectors by stating: “The municipality does not have the right to interfere in anything. Once we complain that there is a delay in the project, the representative engineer from MoTA warns us [that] if you interfere more we will stop this project. We have engineers who have qualifications and capacity to undertake such type of projects. Your role as municipalities is limited to providing support and promoting the project to be endorsed by the public community” (GMM study participant, 2009). Another study participant stated that “Collaboration! What collaboration? Collaboration is not just funding! They [MoTA] fund the project but there was not any type of collaboration.the municipality did not interfere in anything.I participated in several meetings with them and they told us if you (as municipality) interfere more we will withdraw from the project and leave” (GMM study participant, 2009). Interplay of multi-level power and partnership between local, regional and state levels can evolve from a stage where the partnership is totally controlled by the agency to stages of active consultation, seeking consensus, negotiating agreements, sharing authority, transferring authority and responsibilities, or stakeholder control (Selin, 1999). In MoTA, and referring to professionalism and ‘expert knowledge’ (Masser, 1986), least form of partnership (i.e., stakeholder control), has been noticed because urban heritage governance remained a centralized practice; challenging by that any emerging discourses for decentralizing urban heritage governance in Jordan.

Conclusion: political cultural reform as a thrust for colonial turn The history of the political culture of Jordan reflects the fact that the country is in a constant state of transformation. Political

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centralization that pervaded Jordan since colonialism has been gradually replaced by political liberalization. The political liberalization discourses essentially emerge as new forms of political culture which emphasizes participatory and democratic urban governance as against centralization of power. Whereas the independence as well as the national and global political economy has given greater momentum to this political transformation, other important external factors imposed the adoption of economic adjustment programs. Guided by the international style of democratization, democracy promotion has been connected with neo-liberalism in Jordan. However, connecting democracy promotion with neo-liberalism is challenging democracy discourses because the connection is primarily concerned with removing a country’s economic decision making from the state control and put it in the hand of small departments that are tied with international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF (Hanieh, 2006). Obviously, economic-driven democracy promotes ‘controlled’ decentralization and limits the role of the state to a status of ‘passing a central directive’ for fiscal distribution according to the priorities of ‘locally-determined’ needs. Decentralization is thus meant to deepen neo-liberal reforms without necessarily changing the official political structure that governs the centralelocal relations, i.e., decentralization without democracy. Creating a neo-liberal state according to these conditions generates negative consequences. On the one hand, it implies ‘atomization and massive disempowerment’ because the country’s resources are controlled by international bodies, fragmentation between the regions, and commodification of the public services (Hanieh, 2006). Relevantly, and on the other hand, it leads to democracy crisis on the national and local levels because Jordan adopted a ‘defensive democracy’ in which “a state seeks to pre-empt anticipated pressure for political reform in the face of a [fiscal] crisis in the state, not society” (Robinson, 1998: 389) (stress added). Defensive democratization is thus used by the rentier state as a tool to maintain its authority, i.e., it did not emerge as a reaction to social pressures for a bottom-up democracy and local-driven governance. Accordingly, when Jordan was faced with the 2005’s demands for significant democratic expansion to decentralize heritage governance, the study finds that, decentralization discourses featured new forms of control to maintain the same power relations and dominant authoritarian orders. The new form of control legitimates ‘integrated domination’ that govern the contemporary discourse and practices of heritage management, i.e., it reintroduces colonialism with a new version, that is, ‘internal colonialism’. In the course of assessing decentralization discourses in Jordan since the inception of the state in the early twentieth century, the study explores “the rich potential of the internal colonial concept in its entirety” (Hind, 1984: 553, 555). It examines the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ policies as two interrelating factors affecting intragovernmental anomalies and hence the norms and characteristics of internal colonialism. From an urban governance perspective, this study finds that internal colonialism has been employed by the political actors and decision makers at the central government because MoTA prefers to act within a ‘closed system’ of governance. The relationship between the central and the local is patterned as ‘dominant-submissive relationship’ that prevents the latter groups from any form of public participation in policymaking affecting their urban lives and well being. In this manner, local governments are put under new forms of political subjection and domination by which, on the pretext of liberalism and democracy discourses, they are being ‘colonized’ by their own central governments and ruling elites, i.e., to use Blauner (1969) term, ‘colonialism within the country’. Despite seeking to assert their economic liberalism and political democracy, the central government demanding authority

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found they had little choice but to operate within the culture of colonial and postcolonial systems of governance. Evidently, existence of internal colonialism is pushing the state government to adopt democracy only hypothetically and superficially, i.e., defensive democracy. Furthermore, centralized heritage governance guarantee that heritage and archeology is always approached as a commodity. It restricts thinking of it, and approaching it, critically and unconventionally. It guarantees that archeology and heritage are objects of the elite; they control physical and mental approach to it. Unless real measures are considered for solving the inherent tension between the economic and political dimensions of democracy in Jordan; urban governance will not be able to achieve a genuine political cultural reform that liberates itself from the traditional ethos of external and internal colonialism.

Acknowledgement The authors are very grateful to Madaba’s citizens, officials and study participants representing the Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities/Jordan, Greater Madaba Municipality and the Municipal Council, Ministry of Municipalities and Rural Affairs. Their contributions, along with that of the former Prime Minister, Abdel Salam Majali, were invaluable in articulating the research and its findings. I would like also to acknowledge the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments that significantly improved the final structure of the paper.

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