Urban regeneration for the London 2012 Olympics: Issues of land acquisition and legacy

City, Culture and Society 1 (2010) 89–98

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Urban regeneration for the London 2012 Olympics: Issues of land acquisition and legacy Juliet Davis ⇑, Andy Thornley Cities Programme, London School of Economics, United Kingdom Department of Geography, London School of Economics, United Kingdom

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Keywords: Legacy Urban regeneration Compulsory purchase Compensation Participation

a b s t r a c t This article sets out to explore issues associated with the immediate legacy of the assembly of land to form the site for the 2012 Olympics. In selecting this focus, we recognise the difficulties of defining Olympic legacy - given that the concept has come to embrace a multitude of meanings - and also the challenge of speculating on how current plans for it will unfold beyond 2012. We begin this paper by setting out what we mean by Olympic legacy. In the first part of the paper, we explore the process of planning for legacy along with some of the debates and issues this has raised. We focus particularly on the question of how much difference winning the bid in 2005 has actually made, given that plans for the regeneration of east London’s Lea Valley were already in progress then. The preparations for hosting an event can have a significant impact on the decision-making process as the tight timetable, and specific Olympic objectives, shape behaviour. One dimension in this process is the impact the preparations and the process have had on the people living and working on the Olympic site. In the second part of this article, we look at the way the process has been affecting the people that were relocated from the site in 2007. How have they been affected and what kind of legacy has the Olympic project produced for them, at least in the shortterm? Specifically, we examine the impact of the Olympic timescale on community participation opportunities and the way in which land acquisition has been undertaken. We conclude that experiences and results of the process have been varied, suggesting broader challenges of delivering local or evenly distributed benefits through mega-event driven development. Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Defining ‘legacy’ There is a long history of cities using the Games to obtain some lasting physical benefit for their cities beyond just the sporting facilities. It could be said that this began in the 1960s in Rome (1960) and Tokyo (1964) – one of the main legacies at this time being transport infrastructure. From around 2000, the International Olympic Committee began to get more interested in the impact of the Games on cities and introduced a detailed programme of indicators and monitoring. However, as Gold and Gold (2008) point out, the concept of legacy is extremely vague. At a broad level, we could ask whether one legacy of the Beijing Games has been to change the world’s perception of China. One of London’s pitches in bidding for the Games was that it would change the views of young people ⇑ Corresponding author. Address: Cities Programme, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom. Tel.: +44 7725555086. E-mail address: [email protected] (J. Davis). 1877-9166/$ - see front matter Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.ccs.2010.08.002

across the world regarding health and sport. It is necessary to break the concept down into specific categories. There are legacy aspects concerning the image of the host country or city. The economic impact of major events has attracted a lot of attention, especially regarding the contribution of the Games to the economic growth of a city. Attempts are made to measure whether new economic sectors can be developed, and whether the new jobs and skills provided by the construction work and the hosting of the event, have a lasting benefit. A major question is whether these employment opportunities are taken up by people in the local communities. Then there is the physical legacy including the ongoing use of land and the built structures that remain after the Games such as transport infrastructure and housing. Again, a major issue here is the degree to which this physical legacy benefits existing communities. Environmental sustainability has also become a major issue in recent years. So legacy can cover many different aspects including image, economics, built environment and sustainability.

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However, the picture is complicated further because the nature of the legacy can take different forms. It can be short term or long term, tangible or intangible, direct or indirect, foreseen or unforeseen, positive or negative. Such characteristics make it very difficult to evaluate legacy in any overall terms. Many aspects will be difficult to quantify, for example changes in image or the lost alternatives that have been usurped by using the land or resources for the Olympics (the IOC assessments focus on the tangible indicators and therefore do not give the whole picture). Other aspects may be difficult to pin directly on the Games themselves because they are part of a broader ongoing process, for example changes in land values. It is also important to recognise that the actual legacy may be very different from the one that is presented in the plans before the event. One major issue that the history of previous Games demonstrates is that legacy is tightly linked to the financing of the games. After so many Games, the legacy plans have been diverted by having to sell off assets to the highest bidder in order to balance the Olympic budget. There can also be negative legacies, for example the evictions that frequently take place to clear the site. In Seoul in 1988 it has been estimated that 720,000 people were evicted and around one and quarter Million in Beijing (COHRE., 2007). Finally, and probably most importantly, the legacy will affect different people in different ways. For example, the impact will be different depending on whether one is a sports activist or not, lives locally or elsewhere in the city, rents or is a home owner, is well off or poor. This can be illustrated by the issue of gentrification. The Games are likely to upgrade an area and increase land and property values. This can be seen as resulting in successful urban regeneration and leading to the disappearance of physically and socially depressed neighbourhoods. However, many people will not benefit from this process and some may be left in a worse position. So, in analysing legacy, it is not only necessary to disaggregate the concept and examine the different aspects, but it is also necessary to examine the impact on different groups. In the rest of this contribution we will look at two dimensions. First we focus on ‘urban regeneration’ and explore the relative contribution that the Olympics offers to the improvement of the Lower Lea Valley area in which it is located. This involves outlining the other projects and plans for this area. Secondly we focus on the people already living and working on the Olympic site and explore their involvement in the planning process, in particular how they have been affected by the acquisition of land for the Olympics. Their experience is important as an ingredient in a ‘legacy of sustainable, mixed-use regeneration’ (LDA, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c) in the East End. Plans for the regeneration of the Lower Lea Valley Throughout London’s history, the ‘East End’ has contained the poorest neighbourhoods and has a long association with the low paid and casual dockland employment. Over the years there have therefore been many plans and policies to redress this imbalance. When the docks closed and moved downstream, this opened up development opportunities over a vast area. However, the area required considerable land preparation and access improvement and

these were carried out under the London Docklands Development Corporation from 1980 to 1998. The most significant project was Canary Wharf which has become a major office quarter to rival the City of London and contains many global companies. It has become part of London’s response to maintaining its World City role. The site for the Olympics in the Lower Lea Valley lies only three miles to the north but there is little connection between the areas. Canary Wharf is oriented to the city centre, and its retail and employment activity offers little to the residents around the Olympic site. So it could be said that the impact of this period in the regeneration of East London was confined to the former Docklands. The East has always suffered from poor public transport facilities and when Canary Wharf was built this was a major problem. The first response was to build a light railway out from the centre of the city but this proved insufficient. It was only later when the Jubilee line was extended there that Canary Wharf was able to fulfil its development potential. Similarly new transport infrastructure has been the key to upgrading the other parts of east London including the Lower Lea Valley. At the southern end of the Olympic site is the transport interchange and town centre of Stratford. A number of important new transport facilities, built or planned, include Stratford. A link to Canary Wharf was established via the Docklands Light Railway in 1987 and this was further improved with the extension of the Jubilee line in 1999. In 1994, the Channel Tunnel was opened and this led to a discussion over the route of a new high speed line from the centre of London. The eventual route was chosen so that it passed through east London and offered potential for regeneration. The terminus was to be at St. Pancras with stops at Stratford and Ebbsfleet. As well as carrying the Eurostar trains, this track is to be used for new high speed trains between Stratford and St. Pancras cutting journey length substantially. The first trains on this service started at the end of 2009. The last, and perhaps most dramatic, transport project is Cross Rail. This is a line in a new tunnel under the centre of London that connects existing railways in the east and west. This will have a major impact in connecting the important city centre functions, Canary Wharf and Heathrow Airport. There will be a stop on this line at Stratford. After considerable debate, the legislation and finance for this line was agreed in 2008 and building work has started. The project is due for completion in 2017 and will give a further boost to the accessibility of the Lower Lea Valley. Stratford and the Lower Lea Valley, although only four miles from central London, have always been cut off by poor access, the river, and derelict land. However, all these transport projects have dramatically changed this picture. Not surprisingly, the potential of the area has attracted the attention of speculators and developers. Many new schemes have been proposed and land values have risen. The most significant project is probably Stratford City. The job of building the high speed rail link to the Channel Tunnel was given in 1996 to a Consortium, including engineers, banks, and transport operators, called London Continental Railways. To help finance the rail link, the Consortium was given ownership of the land around the stations at St. Pancras, Stratford and Ebbsfleet, in order to attract developers to build major projects. At Stratford the

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Australian developers, Westfield, are undertaking what they claim to be ‘one of the largest development projects in Europe’. This includes 460,000 m2 of offices, housing and community facilities, and is dominated by a new retail centre with three major department stores. They claim it will be the third biggest retail centre in London after the West End and Knightsbridge. Planning permission for the scheme was granted in 2004 and building started in 2007. So the transport projects and Stratford City were planned before the Olympic bid and, it could be argued, would ensure the regeneration of the Lower Lea Valley regardless of the addition of the Olympic development. The cities of Birmingham and Manchester had made unsuccessful bids for the 1992, 1996 and 2000 Games. When investigating these failures, the British Olympic Association learnt from the International Olympic Committee that the only British city that was likely to be successful was London. However, bids have to be made by cities and as Mrs. Thatcher had abolished the Greater London Council in 1986, there was no city-wide authority to enter the competition. This situation changed in 1997 when the new national Labour government promised to restore a government for Greater London and also introduce the post of an elected mayor – who could potentially give strong leadership for a bid. At this point the British Olympic Association began a campaign for a London bid. Right from the outset, they realised that sporting quality alone would not be sufficient and so they also placed a strong emphasis on legacy and regeneration. They published a feasibility study in 2001 using sites across London. However, Ken Livingstone, who had been elected Mayor in 2000, insisted that the Games should be located in east London because of the regeneration potential there. Any bid must include a legal undertaking from national government that they will be the limitless financial guarantor and it was slow struggle to get this. Eventually in May 2003, very shortly before the deadline for submission, national government agreed to give its support. Meanwhile the Mayor was having to prepare his Spatial Development Strategy for the city – called the London Plan (Mayor of London, 2004). This was eventually published in 2004 and included a range of policies to redress the spatial imbalances across the capital with ‘an overall priority to the east of London’ (p. 37) and an identification of Stratford as one of the Opportunity Areas capable of accommodating substantial new jobs and homes in the regeneration effort. It is important to note however that when London won the Olympic competition the following year, this came as a surprise. At the strategic level, the regeneration plans for East London were already in place and did not rely on the Olympics. After winning the bid, the London Plan had to be revised to incorporate the Games-though this only required small modifications. The legacy that the Games would provide for this deprived part of London was central to the bid document and a major factor in its success. As the head of the bid, Lord Coe said ‘legacy is absolutely epicentral to the plans for 2012. Legacy is probably nine-tenths of what this process is about, not just 16 days of Olympic sport’ (May 2006, quoted in NEF, 2008). However, the treatment of legacy has changed as the process has moved from the rhetoric of the bid, through the plans for the Games to the

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decision about how to use the site afterwards. There have been many ‘legacy statements’ along the way from the different bodies involved. The Olympic Delivery Authority has been responsible for ensuring that the site is ready for the Games and, in 2007, it published masterplans for the Games and also for the legacy ‘transformation’ afterwards (ODA, 2007). These were needed as a policy framework for obtaining the necessary planning permissions for individual schemes. The plans for the site after the Games were then developed in more detail in the Legacy Master Plan Framework (LMF) published as a draft for consultation by the London Development Agency in 2009. Although this document contains a considerable amount of detail, its stated objective is to be illustrative of potential and to establish some key principles. It does, however, present a ‘preferred Legacy Framework’ for consultation with ‘legacy partners, stakeholders and the wider public’ (LDA, 2009a; LDA, 2009b, p. 4). It stresses that this framework needs to be flexible so that it can adapt to future uncertainties such as changes in the real estate market. The key elements in the plans are the parkland, the Stadium, the Olympic Village and the media centre. After the Games the intention is that the central part of the site, along the river, will be turned into a public park. This will form the southern end to the La Valley Regional Park that has been slowly evolving under the auspices of the La Valley Regional Park Authority set up in 1967 and the fulfilment of an idea that was first set out by Patrick Abercrombie in his 1944 Plan for London. It has proved difficult to find a commercial organisation to take on the Stadium after the Games and the idea has been to build this in a flexible way so that the number of seats can be reduced after the Games and it can become an Athletics centre. The LMF suggests that it could also house a specialist secondary school. The Olympic Village is designed to become a residential area with various community facilities, such as primary schools, and further housing is suggested on other parts of the site. Overall around 10,000 new homes are predicted. The media centre is seen as having potential to provide local job opportunities, including in small business and the creative sector. Although many of the smaller stadiums will be dismantled, the Aquatics Centre and Velodrome will be retained for community and elite sporting use. Although many of these olympic structures have the potential to contribute to the needs of the surrounding community, whether and how they will actually be implemented is uncertain. Future development is primarily driven by market forces and the global crisis of 2008 has created problems for government budgets and developers’ finance-raising abilities. Many of the legacy suggestions outlined in the LDA depend upon public resources. Public finance difficulties will particularly affect the amount of social and low cost housing provided. We have also already noted how the lessons of past Games show that the land and property assets are often used to recover overspend on the Games. The latest chapter in the legacy planning came in May 2009 when the new Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, established a new public sector, not-for-profit, agency called the Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC) to take over responsibility for the legacy. A leading urban regeneration expert

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from the United States has been appointed as chief executive. In its mission statement this agency has reiterated the need to integrate the Olympic site into the surrounding community however it has also placed an emphasis on attracting private investment. It has re-opened the debate on the Stadium and is exploring again the commercial possibilities for it as a large venue. It has also talked about making the Olympic site and Park a ‘must see’ destination for tourists to London and a location for major cultural and leisure events. Although the former Mayor, Ken Livingstone, also talked about the global aspects of legacy, the earlier approach was more balanced towards community needs. As we move from the bid, through early legacy statements to the current situation, there seems to be a greater emphasis on the London-wide and global orientation. This could be a reaction to the realities of the market, the economic crisis of 2008/9 and the pressures to balance the Olympic finances. We have tried to show how the regeneration of East London and the Lower Lea Valley has been determined by plans, and transport and property decisions, that have taken place outside the Olympic project. The contribution of the Olympics has been its influence on the process of how this is achieved. It has created enormous publicity for the area because of its popular and media attraction. It has had a major function in bringing additional resources, such as the Lottery funding, to the regeneration of the area. The tight timetable, and the absolute need to complete by a specified date, has focussed the minds of the various agencies involved. In past Games, this has sometimes led to a distortion in the normal decision-making process and a limitation on public involvement. In the second section of this article we will pick out one strand of this process in the London case, focussing on how local pre-Olympic users and residents on the site have been both involved and impacted by the procedures for land acquisition and compensation for their relocation. Land acquisition and compensation From 2000, the London Development Agency (LDA) identified the Lower Lea Valley as one of the six ‘strategic priority locations’ for regeneration in London. Under the terms of the Regional Development Agencies Act 1998, the LDA have the statutory powers to compulsorily assemble land for purposes linked to economic development, urban regeneration and ‘sustainable development’, with an emphasis on the local scale. Employing these powers to assemble land for an international event required the establishment of a close link between Olympic ambitions and those informing the LDA’s approach from 2002 to physical regeneration in the Lea Valley. The LDA thus confirm in 2004 the twofold aim of ‘deliver[ing] a successful Olympic Games and a legacy of sustainable mixed-use regeneration in the Lower Lea Valley (London Development Agency (LDA), 2004c, p. 1). In addition, determining the validity of the CPO relied on the substantiation of a view that regeneration of the site chosen for the Games could not be achieved without its comprehensive redevelopment. The LDA’s Statement of Case provides justification for this on the basis of certain characteristics of the site: a) that ‘the majority of the Order Lands are characterised by

remnants of past uses’, b) that redevelopment to date had been conducted in a piecemeal fashion which has failed to solve intrinsic spatial and social problems, c) that existing development was wasteful in terms of land, including tracts of ‘unused and under-used’ land and, d) that significant levels of industrial contamination were present in the ground (Eversheds LLP, 2005, p. 15). The ‘past uses’ that Eversheds refer to are the manufacturing uses which had informed development in the Lea Valley from the mid-nineteenth century, leaving a legacy of industrial buildings and infrastructure. However, the ‘remnants’ refers to the businesses and services that occupied the site at the time the case was made. In reality there were 254 highly diverse industries and businesses on the site at the turn of the millennium. The LDA claim that that the valley was characterised by negative patterns of shortterm investment, with roughly 30% of all occupiers only having been there from as far back as 1995 (London Development Agency (LDA), 2004b, p. 2) and by the hallmarks of social deprivation, measured according to the English Indices of Multiple Deprivation. In the report produced by Arup (2002) on the feasibility of making a bid for the 2012 Games, the potential for the Olympics to draw larger, longer-term private investors to Stratford, the Lower Lea Valley and the Thames Gateway is emphasised. This document makes the case for site assembly and redevelopment on the basis that only through such a dramatic move and scale of public investment would it become possible for ‘entirely different activities in the future’ to emerge (p. 9) and, in this way, for the economy of the wider region to be actively influenced. The LDA’s Statement of Case seconds this, putting across the view ‘that the impediments to regeneration in the Lea Valley were such that progress would only be achieved [...] firstly, by the intervention of an agency with the skills, capability and resources to identify and overcome the obstacles, and, secondly, with the injection of large amounts of public funds’ (Eversheds LLP, 2005, p. 1). The Olympic venues, park and village remaining after the Games are viewed by Arup as pieces contributing to a jigsaw of large scale spatial and economic initiatives in East London including the Millennium Dome and Millennium Village, the ExCel Centre and Royal Victoria Village. These are viewed as having a collective potential to transform post-industrial East London, making it competitive with other parts of London. An Olympic development process, according to Arup, formed an way of linking a number of previously incomplete strategies ranging from government targets for sustainable development to the Unitary Development Plans of the local boroughs. At the local level, from early 2004, the prospect of the Games in the Lower Lea Valley created the motive for planning authorities whose areas of jurisdiction met in the site to come together as a ‘Joint Planning Authorities Team’ (JPAT). This group approved the outline planning application for the Games and Legacy in October 2004. Each of the above points suggests that in spite of the relatively short timeframe of an Olympic Games, the event has the capacity to act as a ‘catalyst’ to longer term regeneration through creating conditions for the attraction of large-scale investment on the one hand and interconnected processes of decision-making on the other.

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The compulsory purchase order The site assembly process involved two separate Compulsory Purchase Orders. The first was a Power Lines CPO, confirmed by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry on 4th April 2005. The second, relating to all property interests, was called the Lower Lea Valley, Olympic Legacy Compulsory Purchase Order 2005. Linked to this was a Relocation Strategy (LDA, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c) for the dispersal of all businesses, residents and other user groups from the site to new locations. The LDA argued that regeneration fundamentally relied on the relocation of these groups. This links to a general view that the business uses were either of low economic value for London and or not suited to integration within mixed-use development. The visually disordered landscape associated with these groups and their uses was viewed as incompatible with the image of the renewal landscape being evolved by the Government, the LDA and their operatives. It is argued that it would have been practically impossible to redevelop the site without the relocation of all its former users. This larger CPO was confirmed on 18th December 2006. Under the terms of the Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, the LDA were obliged to compensate for losses associated with the CPO and relocation. This involved the formation of a legacy commitment to more than compensate for the loss of local jobs and homes. Thus, in place of the 5000 jobs associated with former businesses and 1500 fairly poorquality homes, the LDA became committed to a regeneration ‘legacy’ of 6000 jobs and 9000–12,000 new homes on site. At a more immediate scale, it involved identifying potential alternative locations for each of the businesses, residents and other occupants with formal land-interests. A report by legal advisor Eversheds confirms the viability of relocating all former users within the Thames Gateway at least ‘in the short to medium term’ (Eversheds LLP, 2005, p. 1). They claim that across the London Thames Gateway ‘Zones of Change’ 385 hectares of vacant or significantly under-occupied land were immediately available for relocating businesses (Eversheds LLP, 2005, pp. 38–39). So what did those people affected by these proposals and strategies think of them, and what scope did they have to influence the manner in which they became subject to the process? In several documents relating to the CPO, the London Development Agency and its representatives emphasise the importance of public involvement in decision making about the specific targets of the regeneration. In interview, a representative from the Consultation and Engagement division confirmed that it had been the agency’s broad intention to avoid falling under the kinds of criticism which the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC) has attracted since the 1980s. This hinged on a lack of opportunity offered to local land-owners and residents to benefit in the short or longer term from profits accruing through the redevelopment of the Isle of Dogs (Interview, LDA, 2007). However, the LDA also highlight the challenge of achieving effective public engagement ‘on London’s bid to host the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, and the wider regeneration of the Lea Valley in the face of a relatively short timescale’ (London Development Agency (LDA), 2004c, p. 3). They emphasise that this chal-

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lenge is increased in ‘the context of a widely publicised, high profile process with high levels of media attention’ (p. 3). These statements suggest procedural and ideological differences between deliberative, democratic process and top-down, specific ends driven urban development. They also highlight the difficulties of reconciling the two approaches under the gaze of the media – which has frequently drawn attention to the potentially negative impacts of the Olympics on the local micro-economy. The LDA explain how it endeavoured to do so (2004c). A public engagement programme was run in tandem with the progression of the Olympic and Legacy masterplans – submitted for outline planning in October 2004. Consultation on the Olympic masterplan was pulled forward from consultation on the wider regeneration in order to allow local ambitions for change in the medium to long term to unfold more slowly. However, for the members of the public with land interests in the Olympic site and who had been delivered with a CPO notice, a relatively tight window of opportunity for participation in developing the specifics of its outcomes applied. The Statement of Case highlights that ‘[g]iven the tight timescale for completing the Olympic development, the LDA requires possession of the land at the latest by July 2007’. However, it makes clear that the LDA was committed to providing ‘such reasonable assistance as it can to relocate those displaced’. In spite of the pressure of time, the LDA set out to tailor support and assistance to the specific needs of a wide range of users. Some informal businesses were assisted in formalising their activities in order to qualify for compensation in addition to being advised on relocation. The LDA were keen to be flexible in terms of supporting relocation to sites in the context of ‘the property portfolio that the LDA already has or in the general market’ (Eversheds LLP, 2005, pp. 38–39). In interview, an LDA representative argued that the LDA sought to avoid generalising the ‘needs’ of different groups in order ‘to come to a better solution [and] to make sure that they’re sited in the best place’ (Interview, LDA, 2008). The Relocation Strategy similarly emphasises the LDA’s aim to provide ‘proactive one-to-one support to businesses’ and other users. The LDA ultimately sought to avoid having to draw down its CPO powers by negotiating towards ‘private agreements’ with all legal occupants. Given the number of occupants, this was clearly a complex process. Keys to achieving it lay in, a) the LDA’s capacity to provide land directly in the Thames Gateway, b) the delegation of the role of finding alternative sites to groups themselves, c) the use of its political power to help them secure these, and, d) its commitment to compensation. The LDA’s website reports that a major advantage of negotiation is that solutions can be ‘found to the satisfaction of all parties’ (London Development Agency (LDA), 2004b). The process of negotiation implies the distribution of decision-making powers amongst all those involved. Whilst occupants had had the opportunity to negotiate with the LDA over compensation and relocation sites, relocation itself was presented as a non-negotiable ‘fact’ in the terms of the CPO notice. Negotiation, in these terms, was limited to a specific aspects of the land acquisition process. The Relocation Strategy (2004b) explains the structure of financial support in the form of compensation

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available to these occupants including ‘offer[ing] landowners a market value for their sites’ (p. 10). In accordance with the Compulsory Purchase Act (2004), displaced occupants were also offered compensation for costs associated with moving and for possessions linked to their former property which they could not take with them or adapt to new spaces. The LDA anticipated ‘that similar premises at similar rents/values could be found elsewhere’ in London, not just in the Lea Valley (p. 3). Whilst it acknowledged that if the bid was successful, property prices would be likely to rise, it expressed confidence ‘that supply will remain at reasonably similar levels throughout the period within which relocation with be necessary’ (p. 6). This assumption significantly underpinned the LDA’s calculation of compensation payments due to relocated occupants. The Government’s Planning Portal reported in 2008 that compensation, translated as a cost for acquiring the Olympic site, amounted to around £750 million. In recent months, this cost has become a subject of political controversy, based on claims articulated in the national press that it has significantly exceeded its budget (Matthiason, 2009). The Relocation Strategy articulates the primary principles upon which this expenditure was justified. It states that ‘[a]s the Mayor’s agency for business support and development, the LDA is committed to ensuring that the [Olympic Area] proposals do not adversely impact on the economic performance of the local area or of London as a whole’. Thus, although the LDA’s perceptions of the site’s appearance and of its relative insignificance for the London economy led to their advocacy of the use of the CPO, it remained crucial to them not to be and certainly not to be seen as agents in the demise of any existing enterprise. Between May and August 2006, in accordance with the Compulsory Purchase Act (2004), a Public Inquiry was held in order to determine the CPO. This was a full year after the bid had been won. This provided the opportunity for objections to a CPO – which affected groups had a legal right to make – to be formally ‘heard’. The ultimate decision rested with the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government. In a bid to minimise the number of representations at the hearing, the LDA accelerated its negotiation processes with land-owners, producing ‘a flurry of eleventh hour relocation deals.’1 By the time the hearing commenced, 90% of the land was in the LDA’s possession and 70% of the jobs on the site safeguarded (LDA, 2006) leaving a relatively small number of individuals objecting to the terms of relocation or to the CPO itself (see Fig. 3). This inevitably strongly weighted the outcome in the LDA’s favour. Also influencing the outcome was, again, the unmovable timescale for the development of the site for the Games. The LDA were virtually obliged to deliver a vacant site in July 2007. This timescale was met, despite negotiations with several occupants remaining incomplete. Although these formed a small proportion of the total number of former owners and users, they are notable for the reason that they tended to represent the most deprived groups and smallest, most marginal businesses.

1 Taken from: http://www.planningportal.gov.uk/england/professionals/en/ 1115314064356.html.

Relocation: trajectories and experiences Figs. 1 and 2 show the trajectories of each of the relocated users from the Olympic site. Whilst a pattern is evident – most of the users were relocated within East London, the largest proportion to the outer boroughs – it is also clear that a variety of solutions to the need for relocation sites was found. Approximately 80 businesses were relocated to the five ‘Zones of Change’ outlined by the LDA. The 30 or so others were relocated to a variety of other destinations – within and beyond London. The trajectories of the relocations of key industries such as waste recycling accords with larger scale land use strategy (see, for example Greater London Authority (GLA, 2007, 2008). Whilst in these terms, the map evidences a broad logic underpinning the relocations, it also indicates a range of more particular solutions. It was mostly, though not exclusively, the non-business or ‘other occupiers’ who became vociferously opposed to the process of the Compulsory Purchase (Fig. 3). There were numerous reasons for this. The following analysis is based on interviews conducted as part of research towards a PhD with a range of these former occupants in 2008 and 2009. In depth interviews were held with five firms of different sizes, representatives from two residential groups – a group of English Gypsy Travellers and a housing cooperative – a cycle centre and an allotment gardening society. Whilst this approach does not make it possible to generalise the experiences of 250 odd occupant groups, it has made it possible to understand particular experiences in detail and to consider relationships between these. For each of the firms interviewed, the timescale of the process appeared was an issue, particularly in terms of the relationship between the short time period given to negotiation and relocation and the longer period in which compensation figures were settled. Whilst they claimed to not be opposed to the aim to regenerate the site, they each became opposed to the way in which they were handled through the CPO process. All of the interviewees acknowledged the fragmentation and dilapidation of the site. A firm distributing metal components conveyed support for the principle of regenerating a site they described as: pretty. . . [raises eyebrows]. It was an industrial wasteland that did need sorting out’ [. . .] I mean you got your car broken into – it must be four or five times. You had a knife pulled on you. You had money [. . .] grabbed out your hand, the wages grabbed out your hands [So] yeah, we were sitting there going brilliant, bring the regeneration on (Interview, FHB, 2009). A firm of glass assemblers and distributors said, along similar lines: ‘To work out of Stratford was hard, I mean it was a mess, I mean it was a little enclave of deprivation really around East London’ (NC interview). Allotment holders, though quite a different group also conveyed support for the idea of regeneration, so long as this showed respect for the maturity of the existing landscape of its gardens and riverbanks. Groups reacted differently when the scale of redevelopment proposed with the Olympic bid became clear. The allotment holders claimed that plans flew in the face of ‘sustainability agendas’ linked to regeneration and objected

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Fig. 1. Diagram showing relocations of user groups from the Olympic site to neighbouring ‘fringes’ by 2008. Ordnance Survey data reproduced with permission of: Ordnance Survey ÓCrown Copyright. ÓJuliet Davis.

strongly to the alternative sites they were offered. Fig. 3 also indicates their rejection of the notion that a short-term spectacle could justify the displacement of a long-established gardening group they viewed as an active community. The metal firm described their surprise on discovering that regeneration would affect their position on the site: They were never going to do anything with our site – we were on a modern industrial estate. So we were always going to be [able to stay] and that’s why we were sort of doubly shocked weren’t we? (Interview, FHB, 2009). The glass firm explained how they were looking to move out of Stratford to larger premises in the Royal Docks anyway, so the question of how regeneration would be conducted did not preoccupy them. In fact, the compensation offered for relocation provided an opportunity they had

not previously envisaged. The workshops of the Royal Opera House described a similar situation, with the relocation providing the opportunity to establish a whole new ‘Production Park’ in the outer Thames Gateway. Representatives from both residential groups argued that for up to three years before the bid was secured, they had been consulted on their needs and circumstances more than once and were expecting details they had provided to be taken into account in regeneration plans. The Olympics timeframe appeared to make it more difficult for them to achieve what they desired – which was to either move or stay, but remain together as distinctive ‘community’ groups. A representative from the housing cooperative argued that, because they’d told us in 2003 your estate’s going to be demolished whatever happens – even though that

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0

10000

meters

Fig. 2. Diagram showing relocations of user groups from the Olympic site by 2008. Ordnance Survey data reproduced with permission of: Ordnance Survey ÓCrown Copyright. ÓJuliet Davis.

Fig. 3. Protest walk organised by supporters of the Eton Manor Gardening Society. Photo taken by Martin Strickland, Flickr.

wasn’t true – I would have expected them – if they were serious about all of this – to have started working on it immediately [. . .] You’ve already proposed the idea to the community in 2003; you start in 2004. You get the information in 2004 about the numbers – which are fairly substantial – so you know that you’re now looking at least for one good piece of land (Interview, Cooperative Housing, 2009). Several groups noted that they did not know about the plans until quite late on in the bid process. A smoked salmon manufacturer operating on the site suggested that

the first his business heard of the Olympics coming to Stratford was on the news in 2005. This left his business, as others, with a tight timetable for finding a suitable alternative site, initially complicated by the uncertainty that London would actually win the bid. The ‘double shock’ that the metal firm refers to in the quote above relates to this. All the businesses spoke of having difficulties with the way in which compensation was handled – focussing particularly on negotiations over what could count as genuine compensation and what would constitute ‘betterment’, which is not permitted under CPO law. The glass firm said that although ‘[w]e had to finance it, the money did come through from the LDA. . . but it was slow’ (NC, interview, 2009). Larger businesses appear to have felt the effects of ‘slowness’ less than smaller businesses. One small firm, a team of three, which distributes wigs and hair extensions, articulated that: My understanding was. . . you have to go on and incur the costs – this is what, you know, their surveyors kept on saying to us – [because] if you don’t go and spend it, you can’t have the evidence of incurred cost, and so there isn’t a claim. But from my point of view. . . is. . . how can I incur the costs if I don’t have the money to physically incur the cost?! [And] not only did I not have the money, but I also wasn’t sure whether it was a compensatable item, and so I wouldn’t incur the cost in case it [wasn’t]. . . So I was really, we were really, erm, getting deeper and deeper into. . . into debt actually’ (Interview, BM, 2009).

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Perception of the speed at which payment was forthcoming affected the way in which people felt about the compensation they received in the end. The glass firm portrayed its outcomes positively: the LDA didn’t the LDA didn’t overpay for our move. I mean I’m not... you know... we obviously we moved out of a twenty three year old factory into a brand new freehold factory which they basically kitted out for us according to our [needs]. We didn’t get any extras though. For example, I wanted two cranes but they would only give me one crane, because I only had one in the previous factory’ (NC, interview). The small wig firm, said, on the other hand that ‘[the LDA] did not quite understand that not all companies are in a position to find their own place’ or indeed have the time for lengthy negotiating. So, ‘in fact when you asked are things getting better now, yes they are, but we’ve had to kind of pick ourselves up from ground zero, all over again and rediscover ourselves. . . Staff have gone, which is unfortunate [. . .] but I [still] can’t afford to employ them’ (Interview, BM, 2009). Although, as indicated above, the LDA anticipated that little effect on property values would result from the relocations, the businesses interviewed experienced this otherwise. The wig firm said it was impossible ‘to find anything local. We’d find that the rent had suddenly gone up from £5 a square foot, which is what we were paying – very reasonable – to, you know, in the order of £10 to £15 a square foot’. The smoked salmon firm attributed the price rises to both the Olympics and to the issues of land supply created, ‘when you’ve got 250 businesses [. . .] all looking to move [. . .] So you’ve also got this bubble which creates inflated prices, but any landowner that is thinking of selling, thinking ‘‘oh God, they’ve got to make their minds up pretty soon. I can charge whatever I want to charge for the land.” So land prices were just going sky high’ (Interview, HF, 2008). Former occupants who became involved in the Public Enquiry felt that timescale not only influenced outcomes but in some cases prevented views from being aired. The smoked salmon firm said that ‘it’s not, you know, unlike most compulsory purchases where these things go to Public Inquiry, you know . . . Terminal 5: 400 objections; it took five years. Here: you had 400 objections; it took six weeks – because you cannot have the 2012 Games in 2016’. He was due to put forward an objection at the Inquiry but indicated that the LDA’s concern over what he might raise influenced their style of negotiation the compensation settlement he was offered. He relayed that, what really clinched it at the end was that I was due to [. . .] cross examine Sebastian Coe. And literally the day before that was about to happen, err, [the LDA] phoned me and said, if I withdraw my cross examination, they’ll do a deal. So I thought ‘‘Oh. Okay” (HF, interview, 2008). A representative from the local cycle centre interpreted his experience of the Public Inquiry in a similar way. He made a representation at the hearing on the basis of having

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failed to reach a satisfactory solution with the LDA on either a temporary or more permanent relocation of the centre. He relayed that: ‘I went to the planning enquiry and cross examined Lord Coe, erm. . . He said that he gave his solemn undertaking that we would receive all that we wished for and more in legacy AND in the interim, and basically understood totally that [our facility] was a path for competition for young athletes and that that should mean that they shouldn’t have their facilities taken away from them. So I was then down to cross examine, the head of town planning, erm. . . Yeah and they (the LDA) called me on the day before I was due to cross examine him and said literally, ‘‘You have won; we will give you Hog Hill”. I signed papers which basically was a covenant, a deed of covenant that the LDA would provide a (new cycling) facility on Hog Hill [in the London Borough of Redbridge] (Interview, EUG, 2008). Although the above interview excerpts reveal that former occupants experienced the land acquisition process in different ways, it is clear that the timescale imposed in the bidding phase for the Games and through the CPO produced impacts. Some groups appeared to benefit more than others, at least in the short term. The groups that benefited tended to conform better with the wider regional objectives of central government and the GLA. Conclusions In the first part of this paper, we suggested that the contribution of the Olympics to the regeneration of the Lea valley to date has been its influence on the process of how this is achieved. In the second part of this paper we explored one particular strand of this – the effect of the Olympics timetable on procedures of land acquisition. These are viewed as the first stage of the regeneration envisaged and planned for the site, and thus as a first phase of the Olympic legacy. The analysis suggests that tension is created between the requirement for speed and efficiency – given the immovability of the date for the Games and the challenge of redeveloping a former industrial site – and the aim to achieve outcomes which can be shown to be in the public interest. Although the LDA place considerable emphasis in their literature on the aim and ethos of ‘negotiation’, it is clear that major aspects of the process were presented as non-negotiable. Issues appear to have arisen in relation to the availability and price of land, which became scarce and expensive as the deadline for relocation created the need for firms to move at the same time. The process appears to have favoured larger firms but, at least in the short term, was not particularly beneficial to residents or those classified as ‘other users’ by the LDA. Clearly these relocations form only one small part of the wider process of creating a Legacy to the 2012 Olympics. However, they suggest a broader challenge of achieving urban local regeneration in the context of mega-event planning. Whilst the time pressures of this help fuel and legitimise topdown decision-making, negative impacts on those least financially, organisationally or socially equipped to withstand change are simultaneously produced. Whilst land remediation and physical infrastructure, a park, new sport-

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ing venues, housing and social infrastructure may indeed serve to raise the value and quality of the environment of the Lower Lea Valley, these are long-term, projected benefits. The short-term has produced a complex and somewhat unevenly distributed array of outcomes. Acknowledgements The above article is based on Juliet Davis’s research into the Compulsory Purchase of the Olympic site forming part of her thesis on the 2012 Olympic Legacy. With thanks particularly to each of the business and resident group representatives interviewed as part of this research. References Arup. (2002). Olympic Bid Feasibility Study. London: Arup. COHRE. (2007). Fair Play for Housing Rights: Mega-events, Olympic Games and Housing Rights. Geneva: Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions. Eversheds LLP. (2005). The London Development Agency (Lower Lea Valley, Olympic and Legacy) Compulsory Purchase order 2005: Statement of Case of the London Development Agency. London: Eversheds LLP. Gold, J., & Gold, M. (2008). ‘Riding the Mexican Wave? Deciphering the meaning of Olympic Legacy’. In Proceedings of the Conference on The Olympic Legacy: People, Place and Enterprise, University of Greenwich, May 8/9.

Greater London Authority (GLA). (2007). Lower Lea Valley: Opportunity Area Planning Framework. London: Greater London Authority. Greater London Authority (GLA). (2008). ‘Industrial Capacity’. The London Plan (Consolidated with Alterations since 2004) Supplementary Planning Guidance. London: Greater London Authority. London Development Agency (LDA). (2004a). Olympic Park Relocations Position Statement. London: London Development Agency. London Development Agency (LDA). (2004b). Relocation Strategy: Lower Lea Valley Olympic & Legacy Planning Applications. Appendix 6 to the Environmental Statement. London: London Development Agency. London Development Agency (LDA). (2004c). Statement of Participation: Context Document for the Lower Lea Valley Olympic & Legacy Planning Applications. London: London Development Agency. London Development Agency (2005a). Olympic Business Relocation Charter. London: London Development Agency. London Development Agency (2005b). The London Development Agency (Lower Lea Valley, Olympic & Legacy) Compulsory Purchase. London, London Development Agency. London Development Agency (2005c). Guide to the Lower Lea Valley, Olympic and Legacy Compulsory Purchase Order 2005. London: London Development Agency. London Development Agency (2006). London Development Agency (Lower Lea Valley, Olympic and Legacy) CPO 2005: Inspector’s Report. London: London Development Agency. London Development Agency (2009). ‘‘Olympic site land assembly.” London Development Agency: Places and Infrastructure. Available from http:// www.lda.gov.uk/server.php?show=nav.00100h003001. Retrieved 01.02.09 LDA (2009). Legacy Masterplan Framework. London: London Development Agency. Matthiason, N. (2009). ‘LDA faces £60m Olympic budget shortfall’ The Observer, Sunday 14 June. Mayor of London (2004). The London Plan. London: Greater London Authority. NEF (2008). Fool’s Gold. London: New Economics Foundation. ODA (2007). Lower Lea Valley Olympic & Paralympic Masterplan & Lower Lea Valley Legacy Masterplan. London: Olympic Development Authority.