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Urban regeneration in Glasgow and Dundee: a comparative evaluation
Pergamon PII: S0264-8377(96)00037-3
Land Use Poficy, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 137-149, 1997 © 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved 0264-8377/97 $17.00 + 0.00
Urban regeneration in Glasgow and Dundee: a comparative evaluation
John McCarthy and S H Alan Pollock
The recent experiences of Glasgow and Dundee in terms of urban regeneration have been very different. One reason for the disparities in the perceived levels of success of regeneration initiatives in these cities has of course been the very different political, social and economic contexts of each. However, it would also seem that the different approaches to urban regeneration in each city have contributed to such disparities, with the closely-targeted approach of Glasgow proving in some ways less effective than Dundee's attempts to enable a wider area of the city to share In the benefits of regeneration. © 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd. Keywords: urban, regeneration, Glasgow, Dundee, evaluation, comparative. John McCarthy is a Lecturer at the School of Town and Regional Planning, University of Dundee, Dundee DD1 4HT, Scotland, UK. S H Alan Pollock is a Senior Lecturer at the School of Town and Regional Planning, University of Dundee, Dundee DD1 4HT, Scotland, UK. A summary version of this paper was presented to the 9th Congress on the Association of European Schools of Planning held in Glasgow in 1995.
This paper will compare the approaches to urban regeneration in Glasgow and Dundee. Firstly, however, it is necessary to set the context by addressing the issue of property-led regeneration, which has dominated and shaped British urban regeneration policy since the early 1980s. Secondly, the significant context for urban policy in Scotland must be considered. Within this context, case studies of Glasgow and Dundee will be compared and, finally, suggestions made for the reasons for and effects of different approaches in each city.
Property-led urban regeneration The process of urban change necessarily incorporates cycles of growth, decline and regeneration (Berry et al. 1993); 'urban regeneration' is, therefore, commonly accepted to refer to the physical, economic and social renewal of areas which have been subject to decline (Parkinson, 1989). In fact, such renewal has come to be symbolized by building. Healey et al. (1992) and Berry et al. (1993) suggest that successful regeneration requires a tangible outcomes in terms of property development in the form of real estate. Nevertheless, considerable controversy has been provoked by so-called property-led regeneration (Turok, 1992) and many observers have questioned the 'trickle-down' of the benefits of property development to the wider community (Lawless, 1988; Imrie and Thomas, 1993). Moreover, the nature of development created as a result of regeneration initiatives has also proved to be controversial, since regeneration policies have typically promoted uses associated with so-called 'post-Fordist' production and consumption, catering for the service sector (Parkinson, 1989). Such controversy leads Imrie and Thomas (1993) to conclude that, whilst property-led regeneration is a necessary element of urban regeneration, it is inadequate in itself. Furthermore, Colquhoun (1995) suggests that regeneration initiatives should focus specifically on those excluded from the benefits of property-led approaches to regeneration.
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A further implication of the prevailing approach to urban regeneration in the 1980s, based on private sector property development, has been the assumption of the need for attention to be focused on concentrated areas (Bianchini et al., 1992). Such 'flagship' projects have become an accepted element of the new, post-modern, fragmented city (Healey et al., 1992). In the context of increasing global competition between cities for investment, the increasing importance of city image has been a major influence on this process. This is because so-called 'place marketing' strategies require a concentration of development in a small area (Loftman and Nevin, 1992) and Wilkinson (1992) suggests that 'islands of renewal', as visible symbols of regeneration, have become a valuable element of such strategies. The term 'flagship' refers in this context to 'significant, high-profile and prestigious land and property developments which play an influential and catalytic role in urban regeneration' (Bianchini et al., 1992) (245). Hence 'flagships' arc seen as symbols of regeneration, which are regarded by some as ends in themselves, since they create increased confidence in an area. Bianchini et al. however, argue that the success of 'flagships' depends specifically on their attraction of other development--the catalytic effect. It has been suggested that such approaches have been based on experience in the United States of 'privatism' in urban regeneration, which has in practice relied largely on property development concentrated in relatively small areas of the central business districts (CBDs) of cities (Barnekov et al., 1989). Whilst this approach has become linked with a reliance on the private sector for investment and development, some local authorities in British cities have become significant proponents of, and participants in, such an approach. This has arisen as a result of the increasingly competitive context of global investment, as well as the action of the British government in forcing local authorities into an acceptance of privatism. (Thornley, 1991). Hence many local authorities have accepted the assumption of the need for quick and visible developmental results (Bianchini et al., 1992; Loftman and Nevin, 1992). Glasgow has been cited as a city which particularly embraced such an approach, though Loftman and Nevin (1992) suggest that Birmingham more accurately reflects the application of US urban policy approaches, since this city more closely mirrors the form of American cities, with an inner city area surrounding the CBD. This is unlike Glasgow, where areas of deprivation are concentrated in peripheral estates. Nevertheless, Glasgow's approach to regeneration has largely involved attempts to target development in the central area of the city, which makes issues of wider access to the resulting benefits and facilities all the more significant. Whilst a consensus on the need for 'flagships' seems evident, the form of specific initiatives and mechanisms adopted to facilitate such developments has varied significantly (Bianchini et al., 1992). In English cities such as London and Liverpool, Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) have led this approach, whilst in Glasgow the Scottish Development Agency (SDA) has fulfilled a similar role. Furthermore, in Glasgow, as in Birmingham, the local authority itself has been a significant participant in regeneration initiatives. In all these cases, however, the justification for the concentration of development efforts in such a small area has been questioned. Hence Bianchini et al. (1992) identify specific problems which have arisen from such 'flagship' initiatives, including, they suggest, the lack of access to the facilities and jobs created, the opportunity costs of using scarce public resources to subsidise 'flagship' developments and the lack of accountability frequently associated with the development of 'flagship' schemes. In addition, an increased reliance on variables over which cities
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have no control would seem to have resulted from associated competition with other cities as tourist, shopping or cultural centres. Loftman and Nevin (1992) also recognise such disadvantages of 'flagships' and, in the context of Birmingham, they suggest that the development of so-called 'prestige' schemes in the CBD will result in negative impacts on adjacent disadvantaged inner-city areas. Whilst such factors can be applied to Scottish cities, the distinctive context for urban regeneration in Scotland should first be considered.
Urban regeneration in Scotland The context for recent urban regeneration initiatives in Scotland has been different from elsewhere in Britain, partly because of the nature and role of the Scottish Office, since in Scotland most government departments responsible for economic regeneration and urban renewal report to a single cabinet minister. This seems to have enabled a greater degree of coordination of urban policy than has occurred in England, where fragmentation of such policy has been the norm. Furthermore, the Scottish Development Agency (SDA) has played a unique and primary role in recent urban regeneration initiatives in Scottish cities. The SDA was created in 1975, with the objectives of attracting industry, facilitating public housing development, developing five New Towns and initiating more specific regeneration initiatives in particular areas. The Agency's powers were absorbed from those of existing agencies and it reported to the Secretary of State for Scotland. In terms of urban regeneration, its most significant achievement, the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal (GEAR) project described below, represented a traditional comprehensive urban renewal approach to urban regeneration (Keating, 1988). Later, however, the SDA's remit shifted towards business development and the attraction of private sector funding, particularly with the introduction by the government in 1983 of Local Enterprise Grants for Urban Projects (LEGUP) grants, which the SDA administered. However, the 1988 Scottish Office report 'New Life for Urban Scotland' marked a shift in policy, since it concluded that the most serious problems of urban deprivation were to be found in peripheral estates. It, therefore, recommended a partnership approach to integrated regeneration in four new initiatives in Castlemilk (Glasgow), Ferguslie Park (Paisley), Wester Hailes (Edinburgh) and Whitfield (Dundee). Again, unlike many initiatives in England, the partnership approach was extended to the involvement of local people in regeneration. In 1991 the SDA was merged with the Training Agency to form Scottish Enterprise, which carries out urban renewal and environmental improvement work via the local enterprise companies. However, the way in which government policy has been interpreted at the local level, in terms of urban regeneration practice, has varied significantly, as indicated by the case studies below.
Glasgow In many ways, the problems of urban decline faced by Glasgow since the Second World War have been similar to those faced by cities throughout the United Kingdom, namely a movement of people out of the city, resulting in the physical, social and economic decay of the inner areas (Pacione, 1985). For instance, in addition to other aspects of industrial decline, the decline of a port function, partly due to technological change, has had similar effects in Glasgow, Liverpool and London (Hayuth and 139
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Hilling, 1992). Nevertheless, several aspects of both the problems of urban decline, as well as the solutions initiated to deal with these problems arises simply from their sheer scale; as Donnison and Middleton (1987) point out, this is partly a consequence of the speed and intensity of 19th Century urban growth, which has brought particular problems in the 20th Century. Consequently, by 1914 the city had the most heavily-populated central area of any city in Europe and by 1945, a full-scale housing crisis had developed as a result of the physical decay of the housing stock, which consisted largely of substandard tenements. The Clyde Valley Regional Planning Advisory Committee therefore recommended a radical programme of large-scale population and industrial dispersal to New Towns in 1946 (Keating, 1988; Pacione, 1985) and the Scottish Office concurred with these proposals. However, the Corporation of Glasgow strongly disagreed, since it felt that the requirements for redevelopment could be wholly accommodated within the boundaries of the city (Keating, 1988) and the City Corporation therefore proposed the development of large housing estates on green field sites on the periphery of the city (Pacione, 1985), in areas designated by the 1946 Clyde Valley Regional Plan as green belt. Partly because of the overwhelming need to provide housing, many of the resulting peripheral housing developments areas lacked necessary amenities or community facilities (Pacione, 1985). By the 1950s, however, the City Corporation accepted the need for overspill outside the city, and in 1954 it repealed its 1946 resolution committing it to rebuilding within the city boundaries (Keating, 1988). The 1954 Development Plan was geared to the renewal of urban slums and it identified three comprehensive development areas (CDAs) within which wholesale demolition would occur (Keating, 1988). This concept was later extended and by 1957 the city had proposed the designation of 29 CDAs (Pacione, 1985). However, despite the CDAs and the overspill policy, over 100000 people were still on the city's housing waiting list in 1960 and available land for housing in the city was becoming scarce (Keating, 1988). This led to a change in policy towards the development of multi-storey housing (Pacione, 1985) and the resulting new 36 storey flats at Red Road were the highest in Europe (Keating, 1988). Such high-rise schemes, initially confined to central areas, were later also developed on the city peripheries. A further shift in policy occurred after 1968, when the CDA approach was replaced by the designation of 'action areas', which were smaller than CDAs and which were expected to be developed within 10 years; significantly, rehabilitation was seen as a more suitable alternative than rebuilding in many such areas (Pacione, 1985). Even by the 1970s, however, the problems of physical decline in the city had still not been solved by the combined policies of renewal and overspill. Both had proved inadequate and it was recognized in the mid-70s that development plans were not an adequate means of solving the city's problems. (Donnison and Middleton, 1987). A new start was brought about by the establishment of the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal scheme, initiated in 1976 and aimed at the environmental, physical and economic renewal of a large area to the east of the city centre. The scheme, which was to be phased over a 10 year period, covered 1600 hectares, 8% of the area of the city and incorporated seven CDA areas (Keating, 1988). In fact, according to Boyle (1988), the approach of GEAR embodied 'the conclusion of a traditional, comprehensive, approach to urban renewal' (78) and Colquhoun (1995) suggests that GEAR was the largest slum clearance programme in the world at this time. The Scottish Development Agency coordinated the scheme, which was implemented in conjunction 140
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with Glasgow District Council, Strathclyde Regional Council, the Scottish Special Housing Association, the Housing Corporation, the Greater Glasgow Health Board, the Manpower Services Corporation and the Property Services Agency (Colquhoun, 1995). The idea for GEAR was part of the wider political and philosophical shift away from New Towns and towards the targeting of policy to inner cities that was later marked in England and Wales by the establishment of Urban Development Corporations. However, GEAR lacked the powers of the UDCs and it therefore had to work much more in partnership with other agencies as well as local people. Public expenditure of some £200 million was involved in the GEAR scheme, including £78 million of the SDA's own money, as well as a broadly equivalent amount of private sector investment. Whilst the physical improvements, particularly in relation to housing areas, have been impressive, if expensive, the extent of employment created has been disappointing, and the peripheral estates, outside the GEAR area, continued to decline throughout the period of GEAR (Colquhoun, 1995; Donnison and Middleton, 1987). Whilst the GEAR programme was a public sector-led initiative, the SDA began in the 1980s to look increasingly towards the private sector as a means of bringing about its objectives (Keating, 1988; Boyle, 1988). Even the life of the GEAR scheme itself, Boyle (1988) asserts, showed a move from welfare-based to economic-based objectives. After 1984, this was extended by the application of Local Enterprise Grants for Urban Projects (LEGUPs), aimed at levering private sector investment; significantly, however, the necessary commercial criteria involved in the selection of appropriate areas for such grants meant that viable schemes were largely restricted to city and town centre locations (Boyle, 1988). The Merchant City section of Glasgow's city centre was an example of an area where such mechanisms were applied, in addition to other subsidies for development. This area, built in the 18th and 19th Centuries, had become run-down by the 1980s, partly because of blight arising from road proposals. Around 35% of the property in the area was vacant or underused in 1980 (Jones and Patrick, 1992), so the area had been scheduled for comprehensive redevelopment (Colquhoun, 1995). Partly because of the interest the GEAR project had generated in private sector housing development in inner city areas, Glasgow District Council, the major landowner in the Merchant City, investigated the feasibility of converting a selected group of buildings to residential use. The results were favourable and the schemes progressed with a public sector subsidy amounting to 39% of total development costs (Cowan and Lindsay, 1993). Changes in government policy enabled direct subsidy of further housing conversions, and the SDA later became involved and applied LEGUP grants. As a result, some £12 million of public subsidy was attracted to the Merchant City, largely for conversion of buildings to private housing for sale (Jones and Patrick, 1992). Whilst the visual improvements to the area are clear, the benefits of development have not only been concentrated in a small area, but have also accrued mainly to a restricted group, namely the younger middle class and higher income buyers able to afford the new housing (Jones and Patrick, 1992). The development of the Merchant City illustrates the emphasis given by public authorities in the 1980s to the improvement of the image of Glasgow, particularly the city centre, with a view to improving the climate for private investment. This went much further, however, with the support of the SDA for 'Glasgow Action', a private sector-led partnership consisting mainly of local business interests, organized on an informal 141
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basis, with the particular objective of attracting private sector corporate headquarters to the city (Keating, 1988). The idea for Glasgow Action arose from a report commissioned by the SDA and carried out by McKinsey and Company in 1984; this report recommended public action to strengthen the city's service sector role, but it specified that a private sector organization was required (Boyle, 1988). Significantly, this concept seemed to have been modelled on American examples of cities such as Boston and Baltimore, which had successfully regenerated their 'downtown' areas by the use of so-called 'growth coalitions'. Whilst relations between Glasgow Action and the local authorities were sensitive at first, the prevailing mood of pragmatism in the late 1980s allowed a degree of consensus (Keating, 1988). In fact, the SDA encouraged Glasgow Action to take a lead role in developing policies for the city centre, including ideas for 'image improvement' (Keating, 1988) and the City Council also launched a marketing campaign based around the 'Glasgow's Miles Better' slogan. This campaign adopted promotional images based on symbols of urban economic regeneration which, again, were largely confined to areas of the city centre such as the Merchant City. Moreover, the Structure Plan policies of the 1980s meant that the city centre was the only location in the conurbation where major (over 2000 m 2) speculative office developments were in accordance with policy (Booth and Boyle, 1992). Furthermore, the SDA directly subsidised a number of 'flagship' schemes such as the Scottish Exhibition and Conference Centre (Boyle, 1988). Indeed, subsidy of the arts formed part of a wider strategy which fused culture with urban regeneration, and the achievements of initiatives such as the Merchant City in encouraging city-centre living encouraged such a strategy (Booth and Boyle, 1993). The new art gallery built to house the Burrell Collectipn seemed to act as a catalyst by drawing other elements of cultural regeneration together, and a successful bid to designate Glasgow as the 1990 European City of Culture was achieved. Together with the Glasgow Garden Festival in 1988, such factors encouraged tourism and associated development, and between 1988 and 1990 five major hotel projects were completed in the city (Cowan and Lindsay, 1993). After the creaction of Scottish Enterprise, the Glasgow Development Agency (GDA, the local enterprise company) continued to fund urban renewal projects within Glasgow, including the city centre, though the GDA expects a ratio of private to public funding of at least 3 : 1. Whilst such improvement in the city's image has had clear effects in terms of urban regeneration, such effects have been extremely selective and have involved costs elsewhere. This is because the property-led approach of privatism, encouraged in Glasgow by the City Council as well as the SDA, has necessarily concentrated on the encouragement of viable development opportunities selected by strictly commercial criteria. Only the city centre was able to fulfill such criteria (Boyle, 1988). As Boyle (1988) explains: The evolution of [urban] policy in the mid-1980s witnessed the selection of urban initiatives in a number of cities and selected communities that did not figure in the calculus of economic dislocation or social deprivation. The choice of Glasgow city centre...had much more to do with commercial objectives than with the original aims of urban policy (p. 80). Clearly, however, the physical effects of such policies have been significant; the £13.1 million spent in the city by the SDA between 1976 and 1984 (Boyle, 1988) has generated substantial private sector investment and 142
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demand and in 1988 Glasgow had one of the largest office development pipelines of any city outside central London (Cowan and Lindsay, 1993). Nevertheless, the problems of the peripheral housing estates such as Easterhouse, Pollok, Drumchapel and Castlemilk have been largely unaddressed by the successes achieved in the city centre. Whilst recent initiatives such as the Castlemilk Partnership have been applied to the peripheral estates, Boyle (1988) suggests that such initiatives may serve simply to obscure reductions in funding targeted to such areas, Keating (1988), therefore, describes the result as a 'dual city' (p. 195), where the residents of the peripheral estates remain both physically and economically remote from the city centre. Moreover, the commercial, service-sector developments in the city centre, Keating (1988) declares, have not improved prospects for manufacturing and high levels of unemployment persist in the city. Cowan and Lindsay (1993), therefore, declare that 'the city centre has shared in the general decline in employment throughout the Glasgow conurbation, albeit less severely' (p. 186). These factors throw into doubt the effects of the turn-around in perceptions of the city and Boyle (1988) indicates that 'there is now an extensive literature that charts the demise of Glasgow as a world city in terms of, first, international trade and secondly as a major centre for engineering' (p. 86). Hence we may question not only the distribution of benefits arising from central area regeneration in Glasgow, both spatially and between groups of the population, but also the promise of economic regeneration which formed the justification for such a strategy. Since the concentration of benefits on the city centre was due largely to public policy and subsidy (Keating, 1988), the opportunity costs of benefits foregone elsewhere are all the more significant.
Dundee Although Dundee is significantly smaller than Glasgow in terms of population it provides an interesting basis for comparison, having suffered from many similar problems of urban decline in the past, which became the focus of a range of regeneration initiatives from since the late 1970s onwards. However, the form of initiatives employed in addressing common issues has produced different outcomes in the respective cities, which are primarily products of the different approaches adopted to regeneration. Moreover, while the high profile transformation of Glasgow from Europe's first 'shock city' to city of culture is well documented, urban regeneration in Dundee has attracted relatively little attention outside the city. In common with Glasgow, the major development of Dundee as a city was centred on its Victorian industrial base and port facilities. In particular, the development of Dundee was heavily dependent on the jute industry, in which it was the dominant world centre (Whatley, 1992), subsuming the traditional employment base of the city in engineering and shipbuilding (Jones, 1968). This led to a variety of trends, classically associated with over-dependency on a traditional narrowly based manufacturing industry. As an industry characterised by the predominance of a poorly paid female workforce, it was significant not only in the social implications of resultant out-migration trends of economically active males, but also that, in contrast to Glasgow, the massive profits (even by modern standards) generated were largely re-invested abroad and not in the city. Jam and journalism, for which the city is also traditionally known, in reality were never significant in employment terms. As the manufacture of jute massively declined, during the inter-war years, unemployment levels within 143
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the industry rose to over 70% in 1931/32 (Carstairs, 1968) and alternative engineering jobs were slow to emerge (Butt, 1985). In the period 1945/70 with the benefit of Development Area status initially under the terms of the Distribution of Industry Act 1945, providing financial incentives and provision of industrial sites, there was significant diversification in the local economy. Spearheaded by an influx of North American companies there was considerable growth in light, electrical (and subsequently electronic) engineering and textiles based on development of jute products and synthetic alternatives, which together by 1970 accounted for around 70% of all manufacturing employment (Doherty, 1992). By the 1980s, the deeprooted nature of the city's economic problems was evident, with decline in both these sectors due to the effects of technological change and overseas competition. This post-war transition with increasing reliance on service sector employment thus changed Dundee from its traditional base in manufacturing industry to a 'post-industrial' city (Doherty, 1992). In parallel to the changing economic circumstances of the city, Dundee has physically expanded and altered in character. While it had followed many conventional patterns of urban expansion its growth has both sporadic, particularly in timescale, yet systematically planned in many respects. Initial expansion in the Victorian era to the east and northwest had brought the settlements of Broughty Ferry and Eochee within the city boundaries. However, this process of organic growth became focused thorough a highly innovative and ambitious plan prepared in 1918 by James Thomson, the City Engineer and Architect. The plan centred on proposals for the dispersal and improvement of working class housing and a range of road engineering schemes which included an outer ring road and a road bridge across the Tay (Subedi, 1993). This provided a framework for the expansion of municipal housing in the inter-war period (Pacione, 1985), developed largely in response to national legislation (Edgar et al., 1992). The second major growth period in the 1950s/60s was again plan-led, which, in common with Glasgow and unusual for the period, included both a strategic/regional context provided by the 1950 Tay Valley Plan as well as a 1952 advisory Development Plan prepared for the city by the consultants Chapman, Dobson & Partners. Both these plans incorporated much of the prevailing planning ethos of the time. (Doherty, 1992). Despite disparities of approach to population out-migration, they provided the basis for extensive peripheral public housing development, and, together with a 1959 Development Plan, they encouraged the adoption of Comprehensive Development Areas to address substandard housing and industrial derelication in the inner city. Whilst beneficial at the time, particularly in terms of significantly reducing the city's stock of substandard housing, this approach to urban regeneration, similar to that in many other UK cities, also laid the foundations for future problems. In particular, as noted by Pacione (1985), the prolific council house building rates of the 1950s and 60s, when over half of the public stock was constructed, were such that future modernization requirements were likely to be of significantly greater magnitude. In common with Glasgow, the development of large peripheral housing estates, coupled with lack of employment opportunities for their inhabitants, led to an unprecedented range of social problems (Keating, 1988). The CDA programme fuelled the problems of inner-city community disruption, and with the 1964/69 programme effectively grinding to a halt, left a legacy of partially cleared plots and vacant premises in several parts of the inner city (McDougall, 1993). In addition, piecemeal development within the city centre was of poor quality both in functional and aesthetic 144
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terms. Thus, by the early 1970s there were growing concerns amongst the planning profession, politicians and the general public over the quality of the new urban fabric, which in many respects was less attractive than what it replaced (McDougall, 1993). These physical features, compounded by structural weaknesses in the local economy presented a serious problem for the external image of Dundee, which was essentially based on an image of overcrowded Victorian tenements, multiple deprivation and widespread physical dereliction. Following local government reorganization in 1975, the new Dundee District Council initially embarked on a programme of housing improvement centred on two of the 'problem' peripheral estates, but more significantly and as a matter of priority sought to focus attention on the inner city area. This was primarily achieved through the early preparation and adoption of a local plan for the inner city (Dundee District Council, 1979) which broadly covered the whole of the pre-20th century part of the city between the outer ring road (Kingsway) and the waterfront excluding the city centre. Although local plan preparation was a statutory requirement of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972, the Inner City Local Plan was seen as a catalyst for urban regeneration and a proactive mechanism intended to focus public and private sector decisions. Integral to the plan's objectives was an extensive programme of environmental improvements, supported by the SDA and designed to enhance the image of the inner city area for both residents and potential developers. These improvements, together with a variety of new build and housing rehabilitation projects and the rationalization of two major arterial road schemes to remove their long-term blighting effect, demonstrated the local authority's commitment to the area (Pacione, 1985). This was highly effective in boosting the confidence of the financial institutions whose support was essential to securing widespread investment within the housing market, as well as in promoting key development opportunities. The latter included a number of outstanding projects such as the multiple award-winning joint venture residential scheme at Upper Dens Works, based on the conversion of a former jute mill, and the private sector-led redevelopment of the massive Camperdown Jute Works complex at Lochee, to create extensive leisure facilities as well as retail and residential uses. Perhaps the most significant regeneration project, in part promoted through the local plan, centred on the Blackness industrial area, to the northwest of the city centre, which was designated as Scotland's first Industrial Improvement Area under the 1978 Inner Urban Areas Act. The significance of the Blackness Project lay no so much in its economic and physical achievements, but in its institutional arrangements bringing together in 1979 representatives of the Scottish Development Agency, Tayside Regional Council and Dundee District Council to form a project team, supported by the Business Community (Bazley, 1993). This approach provided the foundation for the Dundee Project, which was initiated in 1982 with the objectives of diversifying and developing the economy of the city, and arresting its physical decline. As one of the SDA's major urban regeneration initiatives (Boyle, 1988) 'the challenge for the Dundee Project was to translate the lessons and comparative success of Blackness to a city-wide scale' (Bazley, 1993) (41). The Project, based on a partnership of local authorities and the SDA, adopted a multidimensional approach to the regeneration of the city's economic base, with a strong targeted emphasis on high technology industries. The achievement of Enterprise Zone status in 1984 was central to the basic philosophy of diversifying investment opportunities across the city and, uniquely, in 145
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the UK the Enterprise Zone extended to six separate areas covering peripheral greenfield sites and derelict areas of the inner city. In the initial phase of the Project, public expenditure by the partners totalling £38m had directly levered £46m of private sector investment, with some 1780 projectrelated jobs having been created (Scottish Enterprise Tayside, 1992). The relative success of the co-ordinated implementation mechanism provided by the Dundee Project resulted in an initial extension of its original timescale, and it was subsequently continued under the banner of the Dundee Partnership. While the Dundee Project was highly successful in many respects, that success was perhaps more focused on specific areas of the city than originally envisaged. It is particularly ironic that the key 'flagship' project based on the prominent riverside Central Waterfront Enterprise Zone proved to be persistently problematic and remains partially unimplemented as a lost opportunity for the city. As a city which had historically failed to capitalize on its outstanding riverside location, the waterfront development as originally envisaged sought to create a prestigious high quality environment based on a mix of tourist, leisure and residential uses. While the publiclyfunded infrastructural improvements and principal tourist facility centred on the historic ship RRS Discovery were successfully completed despite difficulties over design details, the initial private sector commitment to other aspects of the project were subsequently withdrawn. In the absence of a strategic planning framework, but under intense pressure for development of the site, two retail superstores and a small hotel were constructed in piecemeal fashion, leaving vacant adjacent land as a prominent feature in the area. As previously noted, while the remit of the Dundee Project was citywide in practice its physical projects became largely centred on the inner city and Enterprise Zone areas. The problems elsewhere, while not ignored, were not addressed in a similar fashion and it was evident that the city centre and peripheral local authority housing estates would benefit from the adoption of the co-ordinated approach established by the project (Bazley, 1993). As a consequence, the Dundee Partnership developed a city centre initiative, which was primarily promoted by the District Council through its 'putting the heart back into the city' (Ross, 1994) campaign and its 1993-97 Leadership Plan (Dundee District Council, 1993). The primary focus of the regeneration of the city centre has been in environmental improvements, initially targeting individual locations, but now extended throughout the area, largely by means of extensive pedestrianization opportunities afforded by the completion of an inner ring road. In common with the approach adopted to the inner city, the demonstration of confidence by extensive public expenditure has levered private investment, notably by a major refurbishment of the principal enclosed shopping centre (the Wellgate). Although it is premature to evaluate the success of this initiative, it is a matter of concern at present that substantial loss of retailers and consumer expenditure continues to occur, notably to Tayside's second city at Perth. Although the Dundee Project was involved in the improvement of Dundee's peripheral housing estates, its activity lacked strategic direction, and, as suggested by Bazley (1993), the various public agencies saw 'the problem of the peripheral estates in terms of their individual function' (p. 47). Within this context, Dundee District Council had sought to address a range of problems in these areas, primarily through the enhancement of the fabric of its housing stock, together with associated environmental improvements. While these activities undoubtedly improved the environ146
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ment for residents, they did little to address underlying economic and social problems. As a result of the Scottish Office Report 'New Life for Urban Scotland' (Scottish Office, 1988), based on concerns that the peripheral estates presented the greatest problems of urban deprivation in Scotland, one of the four funded initiatives was centred at Whitfield in Dundee. This resulted in the establishment of the 'Whitfield Partnership', involving 12 public agencies, six financial institutions/development companies and the local community, all committed to a comprehensive strategy for the physical, economic and social regeneration of the area. The success of this arrangement has been reflected with the presentation in 1995 of the British Urban Regeneration Association Best Practice award to the Partnership. With the withdrawal of Scottish Office funding in 1995, it is indicative of the Project's success that the momentum for change and further development continues under the leadership of the local community. While the urban regeneration activities of the past two decades have resulted in significant change to the physical fabric of the city, the extent to which the economic decline of Dundee has been arrested is highly questionable. In this respect a key objective of the Dundee Project, to promote high technology industries, has met with very limited success. This is perhaps best reflected in the development of an excellent Technology Park in the west of the city, where contrary to expectations the majority of new companies comprise conventional office/business uses. In seeking to diversify the economic base of cities such as Glasgow and Dundee, their external image has been demonstrated to be of crucial importance in terms of the attraction of inward investment. In this respect, very different results have been achieved in the two cities. Highly influenced by the example of New York, Glasgow embarked on a similar strategy centred on the 'Glasgow's Miles Better' campaign in the 1980s, selling a new image of the city to the media, the public and more significantly the international business community (Boyle, 1988). While it is easy to dismiss such activities as superficial to the key objectives of urban regeneration, the effect for Glasgow, reinforced by the hosting of a series of international events, paid dividends in terms of the business community's perception of the city. In contrast, the promotion of Dundee through its 'City of Discovery' campaign appeared somewhat introverted by comparison, notably through the absence of national exposure and, as suggested by Doherty (1992) 'was insubstantial and...wishful thinking [more] than a depiction of existing reality' (p. 24). This apparent failure to enhance the city's external image was compounded by extensive national media coverage over the Ford Motor Company's decision to withdraw its initial commitment to the development of a major plant in Dundee, as well as the acrimonious closure of Timex's long-established manufacturing base in the city.
Conclusion Although Glasgow and Dundee have been the focus of initiatives based on extensive public expenditure and have levered private investment to secure their regeneration for the future, against a common background of structural economic decline, their relative success remains debatable. Both cities have been the subject of evident improvement to the quality of the physical environment, but the extent to which either city has developed a long-term sustainable economic future is unclear. While Glasgow, and to a
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lesser extent Dundee, have superficially developed their respective service sector base, the fact remains that, as cities on the periphery of Europe, their former economic dominance and strength is unlikely to be regained. Notwithstanding this perspective, the urban regeneration activities of both cities have been successful in many respects. In the case of Glasgow, the initially-strong focus on the city centre can be contrasted with the approach adopted in Dundee. In seeking to spread initial urban regeneration activity across a city, the experience of Dundee would suggest that physical benefits can become so localized that wider objectives of creating a new economic base are potentially subsumed. Within the potentially wide range of regeneration activities, there appears to be a fundamental requirement for a strategic planning framework to focus individual decisions and activities, as well as a local framework to ensure that such activities are directed to key areas, locations and problems. While the statutory planning system provides such a focus in addressing specific physical problems, it is less appropriate in tackling underlying economic difficulties, typically found in most UK cities. While this might support the adoption of less ambiguous strategies, and the potential use of propertyled flagship projects, the evidence of Dundee already points to the dangers of this approach. It is suggested that such projects, although presenting obvious symbols of 'success', typically require the commitment of resources on a scale which often represents a major opportunity cost for areas elsewhere in the city. Although it has been argued that such projects produce a range of 'trickle-down' benefits, the case of Dundee would suggest otherwise, with the waterfront initiative having been largely unsuccessful and arguably having produced detrimental effects on the city centre. However, it is evident that in Dundee the plan-led approach to urban regeneration has significantly improved the quality of life for many residents. The extent to which this has been achieved in Glasgow is less certain. What is beyond doubt is that both Glasgow and Dundee represent excellent examples of regeneration practice, meriting further long-term evaluation to contribute to the debate on wider aspects of urban policy.
References Barnekov, T., Boyle, R. and Rich, D. (1989) Privatism and Urban Policy in Britain and the United States. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Bazley, K. (1993) Urban regeneration and economic development. In 100 Years: Town Planning in Dundee. Duncan of Jordanstone College of Art, Dundee. Berry, J., McGreal, S. and Deddis, B. (eds) (1993) Urban Regeneration: Property Investment and Development. E. and F. N. Spon, London. Bianchini, F., Dawson, J. and Evans, R. (1992) Flagship projects in urban regeneration. In RebuiMing the City: Property-led Urban Regeneration, eds P. Healey, S. Davoudi, M. O'Toole, S. Tavsanoglu and D. Usher, Ch. 15, pp. 245-255. E. and F. N. Spon, London. Booth, P. and Boyle, R. (1993) See Glasgow, see culture. In Cultural Policy and Urban Regeneration: The West European Experience, eds F. Bianchini and M. Parkinson, Ch. 2, pp. 21-48. Manchester University Press, Manchester. Boyle, R. (1988) Private sector urban regeneration: the Scottish experience. In Regenerating the Cities: the UK Crisis and the US Experience. eds M. Parkinson, B. Foley and D. Judd, Ch. 6, pp. 74-93. Manchester University Press, Manchester. Butt, J. (1985) The changing character or urban employment 1901-81. In Perspectives of the Scottish City, ed. G. Gordon, Ch. 8. Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen. Carstairs, A. M. (1968) The nature and diversification of employment in Dundee in the twentieth century. In Dundee & District, Ch. 22. British Association for the
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Urban regeneration in Glasgow and Dundee. J McCarthy and S H Alan Pollock Advancement of Science, Dundee. Colquhoun, I. (1995) Urban Regeneration. B. T. Batsford Ltd, London. Cowan, M. and Lindsay, C. (1993) City centre regeneration in a regional context: the Glasgow experience in the 1980s. In Urban Regeneration: Property Investment and Development, eds J. Berry, S. McGreal and B. Deddis, Ch. 12, pp. 175-193. E. and F. N. Spon, London. Doherty, J. (1992) Dundee: a post industrial city. In The Remaking of Juteopolis, ed. C. A. Whatley. Abertay Historical Society, 32, Dundee. Donnison, D. and Middleton, A. (eds) (1987) Regenerating the Inner City: Glasgow's Experience. Routledge, London. Dundee District Council (1979)Inner City Local Plan. Dundee District Council (1993) Leadership Plan 1993-1997. Edgar, W., Rowbotham, R. and Stanforth, J. (1992) Dundee's Housing 1915-74. In The Remaking of Juteopolis, ed. C. A. Whatley. Abertay Historical Society, 32, Dundee. Hayuth, Y. and Hilling, D. (1992) Technological change and seaport development. In European Port Cities in Transition, eds B. S. Hoyle and D. A. Pinder, Ch. 3, pp. 40-59. Be[haven Press, London. Healey, P., Davoudi, S. and O'Toole, M. (1992) Property-led urban regeneration: an assessment. In Rebuilding the City." Property-led Urban Regeneration, Ch. 18, pp. 277-289. E. and F. N. Spon, London. Imrie, R. and Thomas, H. (1993) The limits of property-led regeneration. Environment and Planning C 11, 87-102. Jones, C. and Patrick, J. (1992) The Merchant City as an example of housing-led urban regeneration. In Rebuilding the City: Property-led Urban Regeneration, eds P. Healey, S. Davoudi, M. O'Toole, S. Tavsanoglu and D. Usher, Ch. 9, pp. 125-143. Jones, S. J. (1968) Historical geography of Dundee, In Dundee & District. British Association for the Advancement of Science, Dundee. Keating, M. (1988) The City That Refused to Die. Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen. Lawless, P. (1988) Britain's Inner Cities: Problems and Policies, 2nd edn. Chapman, London. Loftman, P. and Nevin, B. (1992) Urban regeneration and social equity: a case study of Birmingham 1980-1992. Research Paper no 8, Faculty of the Built Environment, University of Central England, Birmingham. McDougall, D. (1993) Putting the heart back in the city. In 100 Years: Town Planning in Dundee. Duncan of Jordanstone College of Art, Dundee. Pacione, M. (1985) Renewal, redevelopment and rehabilitation in Scottish cities, 1945-1981. In Perspectives of the Scottish City, ed. G. Gordon, Ch. 10, pp. 280-305. Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen. Parkinson, M. (1989) The Thatcher Government's urban policy, 1979-1989. Town Planning Review 69 (4), 421-446. Ross, I. (1994) Putting the heart back into the city. Proceedings of Town & Country Planning Summer School, St Andrews. Scottish Enterprise Tayside (1992) The Dundee project 1982-91: achievements and objectives. Scottish Office (1988) New Life for Urban Scotland. HMSO, Edinburgh. Subedi, N. K. (1993) James Thomson. In 100 Years: Town Planning in Dundee. Duncan of Jordonstone College of Art, Dundee. Thornley, A. (1991) Urban Planning Under Thatcherism: The Challenge of the Market. Routledge, London. Turok, I. (1992) Property-led urban regeneration: panacea or placebo? Environment and Planning A 24, 361-379. Whatley, C. A. (ed.) (1992) The Remaking ofJuteopolis. Abertay Historical Society, 32, Dundee. Wilkinson, S. (1992) Towards a new city? A case study of image-improvement initiatives in Newcastle upon Tyne. In Rebuilding the City: Property-led Urban Regeneration, eds P. Healey, S. Davoudi, M. O'Toole, S, Tavsanoglu and D. Usher, Ch. 11, pp. 174-210. E. and F. N. Spon, London.
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Land Use Poficy, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 137-149, 1997 © 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved 0264-8377/97 $17.00 + 0.00
Urban regeneration in Glasgow and Dundee: a comparative evaluation
John McCarthy and S H Alan Pollock
The recent experiences of Glasgow and Dundee in terms of urban regeneration have been very different. One reason for the disparities in the perceived levels of success of regeneration initiatives in these cities has of course been the very different political, social and economic contexts of each. However, it would also seem that the different approaches to urban regeneration in each city have contributed to such disparities, with the closely-targeted approach of Glasgow proving in some ways less effective than Dundee's attempts to enable a wider area of the city to share In the benefits of regeneration. © 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd. Keywords: urban, regeneration, Glasgow, Dundee, evaluation, comparative. John McCarthy is a Lecturer at the School of Town and Regional Planning, University of Dundee, Dundee DD1 4HT, Scotland, UK. S H Alan Pollock is a Senior Lecturer at the School of Town and Regional Planning, University of Dundee, Dundee DD1 4HT, Scotland, UK. A summary version of this paper was presented to the 9th Congress on the Association of European Schools of Planning held in Glasgow in 1995.
This paper will compare the approaches to urban regeneration in Glasgow and Dundee. Firstly, however, it is necessary to set the context by addressing the issue of property-led regeneration, which has dominated and shaped British urban regeneration policy since the early 1980s. Secondly, the significant context for urban policy in Scotland must be considered. Within this context, case studies of Glasgow and Dundee will be compared and, finally, suggestions made for the reasons for and effects of different approaches in each city.
Property-led urban regeneration The process of urban change necessarily incorporates cycles of growth, decline and regeneration (Berry et al. 1993); 'urban regeneration' is, therefore, commonly accepted to refer to the physical, economic and social renewal of areas which have been subject to decline (Parkinson, 1989). In fact, such renewal has come to be symbolized by building. Healey et al. (1992) and Berry et al. (1993) suggest that successful regeneration requires a tangible outcomes in terms of property development in the form of real estate. Nevertheless, considerable controversy has been provoked by so-called property-led regeneration (Turok, 1992) and many observers have questioned the 'trickle-down' of the benefits of property development to the wider community (Lawless, 1988; Imrie and Thomas, 1993). Moreover, the nature of development created as a result of regeneration initiatives has also proved to be controversial, since regeneration policies have typically promoted uses associated with so-called 'post-Fordist' production and consumption, catering for the service sector (Parkinson, 1989). Such controversy leads Imrie and Thomas (1993) to conclude that, whilst property-led regeneration is a necessary element of urban regeneration, it is inadequate in itself. Furthermore, Colquhoun (1995) suggests that regeneration initiatives should focus specifically on those excluded from the benefits of property-led approaches to regeneration.
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A further implication of the prevailing approach to urban regeneration in the 1980s, based on private sector property development, has been the assumption of the need for attention to be focused on concentrated areas (Bianchini et al., 1992). Such 'flagship' projects have become an accepted element of the new, post-modern, fragmented city (Healey et al., 1992). In the context of increasing global competition between cities for investment, the increasing importance of city image has been a major influence on this process. This is because so-called 'place marketing' strategies require a concentration of development in a small area (Loftman and Nevin, 1992) and Wilkinson (1992) suggests that 'islands of renewal', as visible symbols of regeneration, have become a valuable element of such strategies. The term 'flagship' refers in this context to 'significant, high-profile and prestigious land and property developments which play an influential and catalytic role in urban regeneration' (Bianchini et al., 1992) (245). Hence 'flagships' arc seen as symbols of regeneration, which are regarded by some as ends in themselves, since they create increased confidence in an area. Bianchini et al. however, argue that the success of 'flagships' depends specifically on their attraction of other development--the catalytic effect. It has been suggested that such approaches have been based on experience in the United States of 'privatism' in urban regeneration, which has in practice relied largely on property development concentrated in relatively small areas of the central business districts (CBDs) of cities (Barnekov et al., 1989). Whilst this approach has become linked with a reliance on the private sector for investment and development, some local authorities in British cities have become significant proponents of, and participants in, such an approach. This has arisen as a result of the increasingly competitive context of global investment, as well as the action of the British government in forcing local authorities into an acceptance of privatism. (Thornley, 1991). Hence many local authorities have accepted the assumption of the need for quick and visible developmental results (Bianchini et al., 1992; Loftman and Nevin, 1992). Glasgow has been cited as a city which particularly embraced such an approach, though Loftman and Nevin (1992) suggest that Birmingham more accurately reflects the application of US urban policy approaches, since this city more closely mirrors the form of American cities, with an inner city area surrounding the CBD. This is unlike Glasgow, where areas of deprivation are concentrated in peripheral estates. Nevertheless, Glasgow's approach to regeneration has largely involved attempts to target development in the central area of the city, which makes issues of wider access to the resulting benefits and facilities all the more significant. Whilst a consensus on the need for 'flagships' seems evident, the form of specific initiatives and mechanisms adopted to facilitate such developments has varied significantly (Bianchini et al., 1992). In English cities such as London and Liverpool, Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) have led this approach, whilst in Glasgow the Scottish Development Agency (SDA) has fulfilled a similar role. Furthermore, in Glasgow, as in Birmingham, the local authority itself has been a significant participant in regeneration initiatives. In all these cases, however, the justification for the concentration of development efforts in such a small area has been questioned. Hence Bianchini et al. (1992) identify specific problems which have arisen from such 'flagship' initiatives, including, they suggest, the lack of access to the facilities and jobs created, the opportunity costs of using scarce public resources to subsidise 'flagship' developments and the lack of accountability frequently associated with the development of 'flagship' schemes. In addition, an increased reliance on variables over which cities
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have no control would seem to have resulted from associated competition with other cities as tourist, shopping or cultural centres. Loftman and Nevin (1992) also recognise such disadvantages of 'flagships' and, in the context of Birmingham, they suggest that the development of so-called 'prestige' schemes in the CBD will result in negative impacts on adjacent disadvantaged inner-city areas. Whilst such factors can be applied to Scottish cities, the distinctive context for urban regeneration in Scotland should first be considered.
Urban regeneration in Scotland The context for recent urban regeneration initiatives in Scotland has been different from elsewhere in Britain, partly because of the nature and role of the Scottish Office, since in Scotland most government departments responsible for economic regeneration and urban renewal report to a single cabinet minister. This seems to have enabled a greater degree of coordination of urban policy than has occurred in England, where fragmentation of such policy has been the norm. Furthermore, the Scottish Development Agency (SDA) has played a unique and primary role in recent urban regeneration initiatives in Scottish cities. The SDA was created in 1975, with the objectives of attracting industry, facilitating public housing development, developing five New Towns and initiating more specific regeneration initiatives in particular areas. The Agency's powers were absorbed from those of existing agencies and it reported to the Secretary of State for Scotland. In terms of urban regeneration, its most significant achievement, the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal (GEAR) project described below, represented a traditional comprehensive urban renewal approach to urban regeneration (Keating, 1988). Later, however, the SDA's remit shifted towards business development and the attraction of private sector funding, particularly with the introduction by the government in 1983 of Local Enterprise Grants for Urban Projects (LEGUP) grants, which the SDA administered. However, the 1988 Scottish Office report 'New Life for Urban Scotland' marked a shift in policy, since it concluded that the most serious problems of urban deprivation were to be found in peripheral estates. It, therefore, recommended a partnership approach to integrated regeneration in four new initiatives in Castlemilk (Glasgow), Ferguslie Park (Paisley), Wester Hailes (Edinburgh) and Whitfield (Dundee). Again, unlike many initiatives in England, the partnership approach was extended to the involvement of local people in regeneration. In 1991 the SDA was merged with the Training Agency to form Scottish Enterprise, which carries out urban renewal and environmental improvement work via the local enterprise companies. However, the way in which government policy has been interpreted at the local level, in terms of urban regeneration practice, has varied significantly, as indicated by the case studies below.
Glasgow In many ways, the problems of urban decline faced by Glasgow since the Second World War have been similar to those faced by cities throughout the United Kingdom, namely a movement of people out of the city, resulting in the physical, social and economic decay of the inner areas (Pacione, 1985). For instance, in addition to other aspects of industrial decline, the decline of a port function, partly due to technological change, has had similar effects in Glasgow, Liverpool and London (Hayuth and 139
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Hilling, 1992). Nevertheless, several aspects of both the problems of urban decline, as well as the solutions initiated to deal with these problems arises simply from their sheer scale; as Donnison and Middleton (1987) point out, this is partly a consequence of the speed and intensity of 19th Century urban growth, which has brought particular problems in the 20th Century. Consequently, by 1914 the city had the most heavily-populated central area of any city in Europe and by 1945, a full-scale housing crisis had developed as a result of the physical decay of the housing stock, which consisted largely of substandard tenements. The Clyde Valley Regional Planning Advisory Committee therefore recommended a radical programme of large-scale population and industrial dispersal to New Towns in 1946 (Keating, 1988; Pacione, 1985) and the Scottish Office concurred with these proposals. However, the Corporation of Glasgow strongly disagreed, since it felt that the requirements for redevelopment could be wholly accommodated within the boundaries of the city (Keating, 1988) and the City Corporation therefore proposed the development of large housing estates on green field sites on the periphery of the city (Pacione, 1985), in areas designated by the 1946 Clyde Valley Regional Plan as green belt. Partly because of the overwhelming need to provide housing, many of the resulting peripheral housing developments areas lacked necessary amenities or community facilities (Pacione, 1985). By the 1950s, however, the City Corporation accepted the need for overspill outside the city, and in 1954 it repealed its 1946 resolution committing it to rebuilding within the city boundaries (Keating, 1988). The 1954 Development Plan was geared to the renewal of urban slums and it identified three comprehensive development areas (CDAs) within which wholesale demolition would occur (Keating, 1988). This concept was later extended and by 1957 the city had proposed the designation of 29 CDAs (Pacione, 1985). However, despite the CDAs and the overspill policy, over 100000 people were still on the city's housing waiting list in 1960 and available land for housing in the city was becoming scarce (Keating, 1988). This led to a change in policy towards the development of multi-storey housing (Pacione, 1985) and the resulting new 36 storey flats at Red Road were the highest in Europe (Keating, 1988). Such high-rise schemes, initially confined to central areas, were later also developed on the city peripheries. A further shift in policy occurred after 1968, when the CDA approach was replaced by the designation of 'action areas', which were smaller than CDAs and which were expected to be developed within 10 years; significantly, rehabilitation was seen as a more suitable alternative than rebuilding in many such areas (Pacione, 1985). Even by the 1970s, however, the problems of physical decline in the city had still not been solved by the combined policies of renewal and overspill. Both had proved inadequate and it was recognized in the mid-70s that development plans were not an adequate means of solving the city's problems. (Donnison and Middleton, 1987). A new start was brought about by the establishment of the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal scheme, initiated in 1976 and aimed at the environmental, physical and economic renewal of a large area to the east of the city centre. The scheme, which was to be phased over a 10 year period, covered 1600 hectares, 8% of the area of the city and incorporated seven CDA areas (Keating, 1988). In fact, according to Boyle (1988), the approach of GEAR embodied 'the conclusion of a traditional, comprehensive, approach to urban renewal' (78) and Colquhoun (1995) suggests that GEAR was the largest slum clearance programme in the world at this time. The Scottish Development Agency coordinated the scheme, which was implemented in conjunction 140
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with Glasgow District Council, Strathclyde Regional Council, the Scottish Special Housing Association, the Housing Corporation, the Greater Glasgow Health Board, the Manpower Services Corporation and the Property Services Agency (Colquhoun, 1995). The idea for GEAR was part of the wider political and philosophical shift away from New Towns and towards the targeting of policy to inner cities that was later marked in England and Wales by the establishment of Urban Development Corporations. However, GEAR lacked the powers of the UDCs and it therefore had to work much more in partnership with other agencies as well as local people. Public expenditure of some £200 million was involved in the GEAR scheme, including £78 million of the SDA's own money, as well as a broadly equivalent amount of private sector investment. Whilst the physical improvements, particularly in relation to housing areas, have been impressive, if expensive, the extent of employment created has been disappointing, and the peripheral estates, outside the GEAR area, continued to decline throughout the period of GEAR (Colquhoun, 1995; Donnison and Middleton, 1987). Whilst the GEAR programme was a public sector-led initiative, the SDA began in the 1980s to look increasingly towards the private sector as a means of bringing about its objectives (Keating, 1988; Boyle, 1988). Even the life of the GEAR scheme itself, Boyle (1988) asserts, showed a move from welfare-based to economic-based objectives. After 1984, this was extended by the application of Local Enterprise Grants for Urban Projects (LEGUPs), aimed at levering private sector investment; significantly, however, the necessary commercial criteria involved in the selection of appropriate areas for such grants meant that viable schemes were largely restricted to city and town centre locations (Boyle, 1988). The Merchant City section of Glasgow's city centre was an example of an area where such mechanisms were applied, in addition to other subsidies for development. This area, built in the 18th and 19th Centuries, had become run-down by the 1980s, partly because of blight arising from road proposals. Around 35% of the property in the area was vacant or underused in 1980 (Jones and Patrick, 1992), so the area had been scheduled for comprehensive redevelopment (Colquhoun, 1995). Partly because of the interest the GEAR project had generated in private sector housing development in inner city areas, Glasgow District Council, the major landowner in the Merchant City, investigated the feasibility of converting a selected group of buildings to residential use. The results were favourable and the schemes progressed with a public sector subsidy amounting to 39% of total development costs (Cowan and Lindsay, 1993). Changes in government policy enabled direct subsidy of further housing conversions, and the SDA later became involved and applied LEGUP grants. As a result, some £12 million of public subsidy was attracted to the Merchant City, largely for conversion of buildings to private housing for sale (Jones and Patrick, 1992). Whilst the visual improvements to the area are clear, the benefits of development have not only been concentrated in a small area, but have also accrued mainly to a restricted group, namely the younger middle class and higher income buyers able to afford the new housing (Jones and Patrick, 1992). The development of the Merchant City illustrates the emphasis given by public authorities in the 1980s to the improvement of the image of Glasgow, particularly the city centre, with a view to improving the climate for private investment. This went much further, however, with the support of the SDA for 'Glasgow Action', a private sector-led partnership consisting mainly of local business interests, organized on an informal 141
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basis, with the particular objective of attracting private sector corporate headquarters to the city (Keating, 1988). The idea for Glasgow Action arose from a report commissioned by the SDA and carried out by McKinsey and Company in 1984; this report recommended public action to strengthen the city's service sector role, but it specified that a private sector organization was required (Boyle, 1988). Significantly, this concept seemed to have been modelled on American examples of cities such as Boston and Baltimore, which had successfully regenerated their 'downtown' areas by the use of so-called 'growth coalitions'. Whilst relations between Glasgow Action and the local authorities were sensitive at first, the prevailing mood of pragmatism in the late 1980s allowed a degree of consensus (Keating, 1988). In fact, the SDA encouraged Glasgow Action to take a lead role in developing policies for the city centre, including ideas for 'image improvement' (Keating, 1988) and the City Council also launched a marketing campaign based around the 'Glasgow's Miles Better' slogan. This campaign adopted promotional images based on symbols of urban economic regeneration which, again, were largely confined to areas of the city centre such as the Merchant City. Moreover, the Structure Plan policies of the 1980s meant that the city centre was the only location in the conurbation where major (over 2000 m 2) speculative office developments were in accordance with policy (Booth and Boyle, 1992). Furthermore, the SDA directly subsidised a number of 'flagship' schemes such as the Scottish Exhibition and Conference Centre (Boyle, 1988). Indeed, subsidy of the arts formed part of a wider strategy which fused culture with urban regeneration, and the achievements of initiatives such as the Merchant City in encouraging city-centre living encouraged such a strategy (Booth and Boyle, 1993). The new art gallery built to house the Burrell Collectipn seemed to act as a catalyst by drawing other elements of cultural regeneration together, and a successful bid to designate Glasgow as the 1990 European City of Culture was achieved. Together with the Glasgow Garden Festival in 1988, such factors encouraged tourism and associated development, and between 1988 and 1990 five major hotel projects were completed in the city (Cowan and Lindsay, 1993). After the creaction of Scottish Enterprise, the Glasgow Development Agency (GDA, the local enterprise company) continued to fund urban renewal projects within Glasgow, including the city centre, though the GDA expects a ratio of private to public funding of at least 3 : 1. Whilst such improvement in the city's image has had clear effects in terms of urban regeneration, such effects have been extremely selective and have involved costs elsewhere. This is because the property-led approach of privatism, encouraged in Glasgow by the City Council as well as the SDA, has necessarily concentrated on the encouragement of viable development opportunities selected by strictly commercial criteria. Only the city centre was able to fulfill such criteria (Boyle, 1988). As Boyle (1988) explains: The evolution of [urban] policy in the mid-1980s witnessed the selection of urban initiatives in a number of cities and selected communities that did not figure in the calculus of economic dislocation or social deprivation. The choice of Glasgow city centre...had much more to do with commercial objectives than with the original aims of urban policy (p. 80). Clearly, however, the physical effects of such policies have been significant; the £13.1 million spent in the city by the SDA between 1976 and 1984 (Boyle, 1988) has generated substantial private sector investment and 142
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demand and in 1988 Glasgow had one of the largest office development pipelines of any city outside central London (Cowan and Lindsay, 1993). Nevertheless, the problems of the peripheral housing estates such as Easterhouse, Pollok, Drumchapel and Castlemilk have been largely unaddressed by the successes achieved in the city centre. Whilst recent initiatives such as the Castlemilk Partnership have been applied to the peripheral estates, Boyle (1988) suggests that such initiatives may serve simply to obscure reductions in funding targeted to such areas, Keating (1988), therefore, describes the result as a 'dual city' (p. 195), where the residents of the peripheral estates remain both physically and economically remote from the city centre. Moreover, the commercial, service-sector developments in the city centre, Keating (1988) declares, have not improved prospects for manufacturing and high levels of unemployment persist in the city. Cowan and Lindsay (1993), therefore, declare that 'the city centre has shared in the general decline in employment throughout the Glasgow conurbation, albeit less severely' (p. 186). These factors throw into doubt the effects of the turn-around in perceptions of the city and Boyle (1988) indicates that 'there is now an extensive literature that charts the demise of Glasgow as a world city in terms of, first, international trade and secondly as a major centre for engineering' (p. 86). Hence we may question not only the distribution of benefits arising from central area regeneration in Glasgow, both spatially and between groups of the population, but also the promise of economic regeneration which formed the justification for such a strategy. Since the concentration of benefits on the city centre was due largely to public policy and subsidy (Keating, 1988), the opportunity costs of benefits foregone elsewhere are all the more significant.
Dundee Although Dundee is significantly smaller than Glasgow in terms of population it provides an interesting basis for comparison, having suffered from many similar problems of urban decline in the past, which became the focus of a range of regeneration initiatives from since the late 1970s onwards. However, the form of initiatives employed in addressing common issues has produced different outcomes in the respective cities, which are primarily products of the different approaches adopted to regeneration. Moreover, while the high profile transformation of Glasgow from Europe's first 'shock city' to city of culture is well documented, urban regeneration in Dundee has attracted relatively little attention outside the city. In common with Glasgow, the major development of Dundee as a city was centred on its Victorian industrial base and port facilities. In particular, the development of Dundee was heavily dependent on the jute industry, in which it was the dominant world centre (Whatley, 1992), subsuming the traditional employment base of the city in engineering and shipbuilding (Jones, 1968). This led to a variety of trends, classically associated with over-dependency on a traditional narrowly based manufacturing industry. As an industry characterised by the predominance of a poorly paid female workforce, it was significant not only in the social implications of resultant out-migration trends of economically active males, but also that, in contrast to Glasgow, the massive profits (even by modern standards) generated were largely re-invested abroad and not in the city. Jam and journalism, for which the city is also traditionally known, in reality were never significant in employment terms. As the manufacture of jute massively declined, during the inter-war years, unemployment levels within 143
Urban regeneration in Glasgow and Dundee: J McCarthy and S H Alan Pollock
the industry rose to over 70% in 1931/32 (Carstairs, 1968) and alternative engineering jobs were slow to emerge (Butt, 1985). In the period 1945/70 with the benefit of Development Area status initially under the terms of the Distribution of Industry Act 1945, providing financial incentives and provision of industrial sites, there was significant diversification in the local economy. Spearheaded by an influx of North American companies there was considerable growth in light, electrical (and subsequently electronic) engineering and textiles based on development of jute products and synthetic alternatives, which together by 1970 accounted for around 70% of all manufacturing employment (Doherty, 1992). By the 1980s, the deeprooted nature of the city's economic problems was evident, with decline in both these sectors due to the effects of technological change and overseas competition. This post-war transition with increasing reliance on service sector employment thus changed Dundee from its traditional base in manufacturing industry to a 'post-industrial' city (Doherty, 1992). In parallel to the changing economic circumstances of the city, Dundee has physically expanded and altered in character. While it had followed many conventional patterns of urban expansion its growth has both sporadic, particularly in timescale, yet systematically planned in many respects. Initial expansion in the Victorian era to the east and northwest had brought the settlements of Broughty Ferry and Eochee within the city boundaries. However, this process of organic growth became focused thorough a highly innovative and ambitious plan prepared in 1918 by James Thomson, the City Engineer and Architect. The plan centred on proposals for the dispersal and improvement of working class housing and a range of road engineering schemes which included an outer ring road and a road bridge across the Tay (Subedi, 1993). This provided a framework for the expansion of municipal housing in the inter-war period (Pacione, 1985), developed largely in response to national legislation (Edgar et al., 1992). The second major growth period in the 1950s/60s was again plan-led, which, in common with Glasgow and unusual for the period, included both a strategic/regional context provided by the 1950 Tay Valley Plan as well as a 1952 advisory Development Plan prepared for the city by the consultants Chapman, Dobson & Partners. Both these plans incorporated much of the prevailing planning ethos of the time. (Doherty, 1992). Despite disparities of approach to population out-migration, they provided the basis for extensive peripheral public housing development, and, together with a 1959 Development Plan, they encouraged the adoption of Comprehensive Development Areas to address substandard housing and industrial derelication in the inner city. Whilst beneficial at the time, particularly in terms of significantly reducing the city's stock of substandard housing, this approach to urban regeneration, similar to that in many other UK cities, also laid the foundations for future problems. In particular, as noted by Pacione (1985), the prolific council house building rates of the 1950s and 60s, when over half of the public stock was constructed, were such that future modernization requirements were likely to be of significantly greater magnitude. In common with Glasgow, the development of large peripheral housing estates, coupled with lack of employment opportunities for their inhabitants, led to an unprecedented range of social problems (Keating, 1988). The CDA programme fuelled the problems of inner-city community disruption, and with the 1964/69 programme effectively grinding to a halt, left a legacy of partially cleared plots and vacant premises in several parts of the inner city (McDougall, 1993). In addition, piecemeal development within the city centre was of poor quality both in functional and aesthetic 144
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terms. Thus, by the early 1970s there were growing concerns amongst the planning profession, politicians and the general public over the quality of the new urban fabric, which in many respects was less attractive than what it replaced (McDougall, 1993). These physical features, compounded by structural weaknesses in the local economy presented a serious problem for the external image of Dundee, which was essentially based on an image of overcrowded Victorian tenements, multiple deprivation and widespread physical dereliction. Following local government reorganization in 1975, the new Dundee District Council initially embarked on a programme of housing improvement centred on two of the 'problem' peripheral estates, but more significantly and as a matter of priority sought to focus attention on the inner city area. This was primarily achieved through the early preparation and adoption of a local plan for the inner city (Dundee District Council, 1979) which broadly covered the whole of the pre-20th century part of the city between the outer ring road (Kingsway) and the waterfront excluding the city centre. Although local plan preparation was a statutory requirement of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972, the Inner City Local Plan was seen as a catalyst for urban regeneration and a proactive mechanism intended to focus public and private sector decisions. Integral to the plan's objectives was an extensive programme of environmental improvements, supported by the SDA and designed to enhance the image of the inner city area for both residents and potential developers. These improvements, together with a variety of new build and housing rehabilitation projects and the rationalization of two major arterial road schemes to remove their long-term blighting effect, demonstrated the local authority's commitment to the area (Pacione, 1985). This was highly effective in boosting the confidence of the financial institutions whose support was essential to securing widespread investment within the housing market, as well as in promoting key development opportunities. The latter included a number of outstanding projects such as the multiple award-winning joint venture residential scheme at Upper Dens Works, based on the conversion of a former jute mill, and the private sector-led redevelopment of the massive Camperdown Jute Works complex at Lochee, to create extensive leisure facilities as well as retail and residential uses. Perhaps the most significant regeneration project, in part promoted through the local plan, centred on the Blackness industrial area, to the northwest of the city centre, which was designated as Scotland's first Industrial Improvement Area under the 1978 Inner Urban Areas Act. The significance of the Blackness Project lay no so much in its economic and physical achievements, but in its institutional arrangements bringing together in 1979 representatives of the Scottish Development Agency, Tayside Regional Council and Dundee District Council to form a project team, supported by the Business Community (Bazley, 1993). This approach provided the foundation for the Dundee Project, which was initiated in 1982 with the objectives of diversifying and developing the economy of the city, and arresting its physical decline. As one of the SDA's major urban regeneration initiatives (Boyle, 1988) 'the challenge for the Dundee Project was to translate the lessons and comparative success of Blackness to a city-wide scale' (Bazley, 1993) (41). The Project, based on a partnership of local authorities and the SDA, adopted a multidimensional approach to the regeneration of the city's economic base, with a strong targeted emphasis on high technology industries. The achievement of Enterprise Zone status in 1984 was central to the basic philosophy of diversifying investment opportunities across the city and, uniquely, in 145
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the UK the Enterprise Zone extended to six separate areas covering peripheral greenfield sites and derelict areas of the inner city. In the initial phase of the Project, public expenditure by the partners totalling £38m had directly levered £46m of private sector investment, with some 1780 projectrelated jobs having been created (Scottish Enterprise Tayside, 1992). The relative success of the co-ordinated implementation mechanism provided by the Dundee Project resulted in an initial extension of its original timescale, and it was subsequently continued under the banner of the Dundee Partnership. While the Dundee Project was highly successful in many respects, that success was perhaps more focused on specific areas of the city than originally envisaged. It is particularly ironic that the key 'flagship' project based on the prominent riverside Central Waterfront Enterprise Zone proved to be persistently problematic and remains partially unimplemented as a lost opportunity for the city. As a city which had historically failed to capitalize on its outstanding riverside location, the waterfront development as originally envisaged sought to create a prestigious high quality environment based on a mix of tourist, leisure and residential uses. While the publiclyfunded infrastructural improvements and principal tourist facility centred on the historic ship RRS Discovery were successfully completed despite difficulties over design details, the initial private sector commitment to other aspects of the project were subsequently withdrawn. In the absence of a strategic planning framework, but under intense pressure for development of the site, two retail superstores and a small hotel were constructed in piecemeal fashion, leaving vacant adjacent land as a prominent feature in the area. As previously noted, while the remit of the Dundee Project was citywide in practice its physical projects became largely centred on the inner city and Enterprise Zone areas. The problems elsewhere, while not ignored, were not addressed in a similar fashion and it was evident that the city centre and peripheral local authority housing estates would benefit from the adoption of the co-ordinated approach established by the project (Bazley, 1993). As a consequence, the Dundee Partnership developed a city centre initiative, which was primarily promoted by the District Council through its 'putting the heart back into the city' (Ross, 1994) campaign and its 1993-97 Leadership Plan (Dundee District Council, 1993). The primary focus of the regeneration of the city centre has been in environmental improvements, initially targeting individual locations, but now extended throughout the area, largely by means of extensive pedestrianization opportunities afforded by the completion of an inner ring road. In common with the approach adopted to the inner city, the demonstration of confidence by extensive public expenditure has levered private investment, notably by a major refurbishment of the principal enclosed shopping centre (the Wellgate). Although it is premature to evaluate the success of this initiative, it is a matter of concern at present that substantial loss of retailers and consumer expenditure continues to occur, notably to Tayside's second city at Perth. Although the Dundee Project was involved in the improvement of Dundee's peripheral housing estates, its activity lacked strategic direction, and, as suggested by Bazley (1993), the various public agencies saw 'the problem of the peripheral estates in terms of their individual function' (p. 47). Within this context, Dundee District Council had sought to address a range of problems in these areas, primarily through the enhancement of the fabric of its housing stock, together with associated environmental improvements. While these activities undoubtedly improved the environ146
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ment for residents, they did little to address underlying economic and social problems. As a result of the Scottish Office Report 'New Life for Urban Scotland' (Scottish Office, 1988), based on concerns that the peripheral estates presented the greatest problems of urban deprivation in Scotland, one of the four funded initiatives was centred at Whitfield in Dundee. This resulted in the establishment of the 'Whitfield Partnership', involving 12 public agencies, six financial institutions/development companies and the local community, all committed to a comprehensive strategy for the physical, economic and social regeneration of the area. The success of this arrangement has been reflected with the presentation in 1995 of the British Urban Regeneration Association Best Practice award to the Partnership. With the withdrawal of Scottish Office funding in 1995, it is indicative of the Project's success that the momentum for change and further development continues under the leadership of the local community. While the urban regeneration activities of the past two decades have resulted in significant change to the physical fabric of the city, the extent to which the economic decline of Dundee has been arrested is highly questionable. In this respect a key objective of the Dundee Project, to promote high technology industries, has met with very limited success. This is perhaps best reflected in the development of an excellent Technology Park in the west of the city, where contrary to expectations the majority of new companies comprise conventional office/business uses. In seeking to diversify the economic base of cities such as Glasgow and Dundee, their external image has been demonstrated to be of crucial importance in terms of the attraction of inward investment. In this respect, very different results have been achieved in the two cities. Highly influenced by the example of New York, Glasgow embarked on a similar strategy centred on the 'Glasgow's Miles Better' campaign in the 1980s, selling a new image of the city to the media, the public and more significantly the international business community (Boyle, 1988). While it is easy to dismiss such activities as superficial to the key objectives of urban regeneration, the effect for Glasgow, reinforced by the hosting of a series of international events, paid dividends in terms of the business community's perception of the city. In contrast, the promotion of Dundee through its 'City of Discovery' campaign appeared somewhat introverted by comparison, notably through the absence of national exposure and, as suggested by Doherty (1992) 'was insubstantial and...wishful thinking [more] than a depiction of existing reality' (p. 24). This apparent failure to enhance the city's external image was compounded by extensive national media coverage over the Ford Motor Company's decision to withdraw its initial commitment to the development of a major plant in Dundee, as well as the acrimonious closure of Timex's long-established manufacturing base in the city.
Conclusion Although Glasgow and Dundee have been the focus of initiatives based on extensive public expenditure and have levered private investment to secure their regeneration for the future, against a common background of structural economic decline, their relative success remains debatable. Both cities have been the subject of evident improvement to the quality of the physical environment, but the extent to which either city has developed a long-term sustainable economic future is unclear. While Glasgow, and to a
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lesser extent Dundee, have superficially developed their respective service sector base, the fact remains that, as cities on the periphery of Europe, their former economic dominance and strength is unlikely to be regained. Notwithstanding this perspective, the urban regeneration activities of both cities have been successful in many respects. In the case of Glasgow, the initially-strong focus on the city centre can be contrasted with the approach adopted in Dundee. In seeking to spread initial urban regeneration activity across a city, the experience of Dundee would suggest that physical benefits can become so localized that wider objectives of creating a new economic base are potentially subsumed. Within the potentially wide range of regeneration activities, there appears to be a fundamental requirement for a strategic planning framework to focus individual decisions and activities, as well as a local framework to ensure that such activities are directed to key areas, locations and problems. While the statutory planning system provides such a focus in addressing specific physical problems, it is less appropriate in tackling underlying economic difficulties, typically found in most UK cities. While this might support the adoption of less ambiguous strategies, and the potential use of propertyled flagship projects, the evidence of Dundee already points to the dangers of this approach. It is suggested that such projects, although presenting obvious symbols of 'success', typically require the commitment of resources on a scale which often represents a major opportunity cost for areas elsewhere in the city. Although it has been argued that such projects produce a range of 'trickle-down' benefits, the case of Dundee would suggest otherwise, with the waterfront initiative having been largely unsuccessful and arguably having produced detrimental effects on the city centre. However, it is evident that in Dundee the plan-led approach to urban regeneration has significantly improved the quality of life for many residents. The extent to which this has been achieved in Glasgow is less certain. What is beyond doubt is that both Glasgow and Dundee represent excellent examples of regeneration practice, meriting further long-term evaluation to contribute to the debate on wider aspects of urban policy.
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