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US technological leadership: Where did it come from and where did it go?
ABSTRACTS J PROD INNOV M A N A G
ciated with failure at a later point during tactical operationalization." The article shows the results of the factor analysis done on the data, and lists the specific failure causes in the different situations. Such data cannot be summarized here. However, it does behoove future researchers to deal with the method used to make a failure determination, the planned output of the project, and the life-cycle point when failure is determined, if anticipated failure causes are to be established. If this is done, perhaps we can learn a lot more about how project failure should be defined and measured in an empirical setting.
US Technological Leadership: Where Did It Come From and Where Did It Go?, R. Nelson, Research Policy (1990), pp. 117-132 (AKG) The United States was the dominant technology leader and the most productive economy during the 25 years that followed the Second World War. In conjunction with becoming the leader in technology development, the US gained the majority of world markets. That dominance has all but changed. The US technological leadership has dwindled and in many industries has become a laggard. This article examines the causes of the rise and fall in US technological leadership. America had developed its strength through the abridging of labor to machines during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Also during this period, American invention and innovation in consumer and producer goods became prevalent. Systems consisting of a series of interchangeable parts rapidly gained usage in numerous manufacturing facilities. Other phenomena included a mass market of relatively well-to-do households, an expanding rail and communication network, and an increase in the number of industries engaged in mass production and marketing. Although key discoveries in steel production were made in Europe, Americans were far more efficient in implementing these discoveries than were their European counterparts. By the beginning of World War I, the US had attained leadership in mass production industries with a high degree of capital intensiveness and economies of scale. Additionally, the US had put in place an infrastructure for supporting the new science-based industries that were rapidly be-
J PROD INNOV M A N A G 1991 ;8:212-227
215
coming a focus. Also during this period, the US had put into practice various systems to train scientists in the areas of chemistry, chemical engineering, and electrical engineering. During the inter-war period, US firms further enhanced their production capabilities and developed innovative mass production procedures. A large and affluent American nation willingly absorbed new consumer goods such as automobiles and electrical appliances. Restricted international trade policies prevented small manufacturing powers from exploiting large-scale production systems, "dampened inter-company rivalry and fostered cartelization in Europe." America, on the other hand, was able to exploit and implement advanced technologies due to its sheer market size and by favoring competition among closely competing firms. Most industries during this period were dependent on technologies and products where the US had a competitive edge. Moreover, an increasing number of American youths were graduating from college and, according to the author, "provided American firms with a supply of people who were schooled in liberal arts and technical subjects. This greatly facilitated growing professionalism of management in US industry." Despite its dominance in mass production industries, Americans were considered as followers by Europeans when it came to "technologies where scientific and engineering sophistication was important." America was competent, but not dominant, in high-tech fields like chemical processing equipment. Upon exiting from the Second World War, America stretched and broadened its technological capabilities built by wartime production. These strides, coupled with the fact that several of the other leading nations around the world were either stagnant or declining, served to further increase American dominance. Its citizens felt proud from victory and realized the role technology had played in it. Too, college enrollment boomed, which triggered a flurry of research foundation openings in American Universities. Many companies operated sizable R&D programs, and dominated technologies such as computers and semiconductors. But, by the mid-1960s America's dominance in mass production industries and high-tech industries was eroding quickly. GNP per person and
216
J PROD INNOV M A N A G 1991 ;8:212-227
productivity growth rates slowed the movement. An increase in imports, rather than a decline in exports, was the major contributor behind the post-1983 deteriorating high technology trade balance. Patent data showed a US decline in high technology patents at the same time the Japanese share was growing dramatically. A more careful analysis revealed that aircraft, aircraft engine and aircraft turbine technology strength remained with America whereas professional and scientific instruments, telecommunication, and consumer electronic technologies were washed away. The factors behind these trends included (1) free flow of world trade, (2) eroding market size advantages, (3) less use of technology as a competitive weapon, (4) large expenditures on R&D in other countries, and (5) less spillover from military R&D into civilian technology. Determinants of National Innovativeness and International Market Segmentation, Chol Lee, /nternational Marketing Review (1990), pp. 39-49 Diffusion of innovation is a field of study that seeks (among other things) to identify those persons or firms who are the most likely to adopt an innovation. Knowing that, developers can target their efforts at such persons, as a means of getting a quick foothold in a new product's market. This article shows the results of carrying this identification search to countries rather than just people and firms. If product developers know which countries are the most likely to be innovators and early adopters of a new item, their economies too could be so targeted. The author used traditional and accepted tools and theory of measurements to construct the study reported here. Adoption by a country was measured by the extent of ownership of that item in its society. That is, he did not measure the time or sequence of country adoptions, but rather a cross-sectional look at the extent of adoption of a given innovation in all countries at the same time. It is presumed that the country with the most adopters was the earliest to adopt. The item measured (to determine the innovativeness of each country) was black and white and color television sets per 1,000 people, in 1981. This a category measure, not the more erratic adoption of any one brand of product. Next came the issue of how to identify the in-
J PROD INNOV M A N A G ABSTRACTS
novator nations, so that one could predict the order of adoption of future innovations. Earlier diffusion research had come up with a set of l0 measures or country attributes that had often predicted well. They were: Size of country Proportion of manufacturing and service sector GNP Degree to which government was democratic Scientists and engineers per capita Literacy rate
Per capita GNP Electric power consumption per capita Likelihood of having Protestantism as dominant faith College students per head of population Number of outgoing tourists per head of population
In terms of results, here are the nations in the first three waves of innovativeness: Innovators. Japan, United States Early adopters. Canada, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, West Germany Early majority. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Hong Kong, Israel, Italy, Korea, Kuwait, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, United Kingdom. This shows the 24 countries most likely to adopt an innovation (based on their adoption of television). The l0 descriptive factors correlate very well with innovation speed, only total population and religion failing to be closely related to chance of adoption. Further analysis showed that a very high percentage of the total variance in the data could be explained by just four factors: (1) GNP, (2) literacy rate, (3) proportion of GNP in manufacturing and services, and (4) the number of scientists and engineers per capita. This means that a developer putting together a global rollout plan would list all countries being considered. From that set, the four most significant factors would be measured for each country, and weighted by the coefficients in the article. This would yield a ranking of the nations being considered, and the segmentation (rollout) could proceed. A simpler method would be to rely on the national list above (Japan, etc.) but using more cur-
ciated with failure at a later point during tactical operationalization." The article shows the results of the factor analysis done on the data, and lists the specific failure causes in the different situations. Such data cannot be summarized here. However, it does behoove future researchers to deal with the method used to make a failure determination, the planned output of the project, and the life-cycle point when failure is determined, if anticipated failure causes are to be established. If this is done, perhaps we can learn a lot more about how project failure should be defined and measured in an empirical setting.
US Technological Leadership: Where Did It Come From and Where Did It Go?, R. Nelson, Research Policy (1990), pp. 117-132 (AKG) The United States was the dominant technology leader and the most productive economy during the 25 years that followed the Second World War. In conjunction with becoming the leader in technology development, the US gained the majority of world markets. That dominance has all but changed. The US technological leadership has dwindled and in many industries has become a laggard. This article examines the causes of the rise and fall in US technological leadership. America had developed its strength through the abridging of labor to machines during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Also during this period, American invention and innovation in consumer and producer goods became prevalent. Systems consisting of a series of interchangeable parts rapidly gained usage in numerous manufacturing facilities. Other phenomena included a mass market of relatively well-to-do households, an expanding rail and communication network, and an increase in the number of industries engaged in mass production and marketing. Although key discoveries in steel production were made in Europe, Americans were far more efficient in implementing these discoveries than were their European counterparts. By the beginning of World War I, the US had attained leadership in mass production industries with a high degree of capital intensiveness and economies of scale. Additionally, the US had put in place an infrastructure for supporting the new science-based industries that were rapidly be-
J PROD INNOV M A N A G 1991 ;8:212-227
215
coming a focus. Also during this period, the US had put into practice various systems to train scientists in the areas of chemistry, chemical engineering, and electrical engineering. During the inter-war period, US firms further enhanced their production capabilities and developed innovative mass production procedures. A large and affluent American nation willingly absorbed new consumer goods such as automobiles and electrical appliances. Restricted international trade policies prevented small manufacturing powers from exploiting large-scale production systems, "dampened inter-company rivalry and fostered cartelization in Europe." America, on the other hand, was able to exploit and implement advanced technologies due to its sheer market size and by favoring competition among closely competing firms. Most industries during this period were dependent on technologies and products where the US had a competitive edge. Moreover, an increasing number of American youths were graduating from college and, according to the author, "provided American firms with a supply of people who were schooled in liberal arts and technical subjects. This greatly facilitated growing professionalism of management in US industry." Despite its dominance in mass production industries, Americans were considered as followers by Europeans when it came to "technologies where scientific and engineering sophistication was important." America was competent, but not dominant, in high-tech fields like chemical processing equipment. Upon exiting from the Second World War, America stretched and broadened its technological capabilities built by wartime production. These strides, coupled with the fact that several of the other leading nations around the world were either stagnant or declining, served to further increase American dominance. Its citizens felt proud from victory and realized the role technology had played in it. Too, college enrollment boomed, which triggered a flurry of research foundation openings in American Universities. Many companies operated sizable R&D programs, and dominated technologies such as computers and semiconductors. But, by the mid-1960s America's dominance in mass production industries and high-tech industries was eroding quickly. GNP per person and
216
J PROD INNOV M A N A G 1991 ;8:212-227
productivity growth rates slowed the movement. An increase in imports, rather than a decline in exports, was the major contributor behind the post-1983 deteriorating high technology trade balance. Patent data showed a US decline in high technology patents at the same time the Japanese share was growing dramatically. A more careful analysis revealed that aircraft, aircraft engine and aircraft turbine technology strength remained with America whereas professional and scientific instruments, telecommunication, and consumer electronic technologies were washed away. The factors behind these trends included (1) free flow of world trade, (2) eroding market size advantages, (3) less use of technology as a competitive weapon, (4) large expenditures on R&D in other countries, and (5) less spillover from military R&D into civilian technology. Determinants of National Innovativeness and International Market Segmentation, Chol Lee, /nternational Marketing Review (1990), pp. 39-49 Diffusion of innovation is a field of study that seeks (among other things) to identify those persons or firms who are the most likely to adopt an innovation. Knowing that, developers can target their efforts at such persons, as a means of getting a quick foothold in a new product's market. This article shows the results of carrying this identification search to countries rather than just people and firms. If product developers know which countries are the most likely to be innovators and early adopters of a new item, their economies too could be so targeted. The author used traditional and accepted tools and theory of measurements to construct the study reported here. Adoption by a country was measured by the extent of ownership of that item in its society. That is, he did not measure the time or sequence of country adoptions, but rather a cross-sectional look at the extent of adoption of a given innovation in all countries at the same time. It is presumed that the country with the most adopters was the earliest to adopt. The item measured (to determine the innovativeness of each country) was black and white and color television sets per 1,000 people, in 1981. This a category measure, not the more erratic adoption of any one brand of product. Next came the issue of how to identify the in-
J PROD INNOV M A N A G ABSTRACTS
novator nations, so that one could predict the order of adoption of future innovations. Earlier diffusion research had come up with a set of l0 measures or country attributes that had often predicted well. They were: Size of country Proportion of manufacturing and service sector GNP Degree to which government was democratic Scientists and engineers per capita Literacy rate
Per capita GNP Electric power consumption per capita Likelihood of having Protestantism as dominant faith College students per head of population Number of outgoing tourists per head of population
In terms of results, here are the nations in the first three waves of innovativeness: Innovators. Japan, United States Early adopters. Canada, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, West Germany Early majority. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Hong Kong, Israel, Italy, Korea, Kuwait, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, United Kingdom. This shows the 24 countries most likely to adopt an innovation (based on their adoption of television). The l0 descriptive factors correlate very well with innovation speed, only total population and religion failing to be closely related to chance of adoption. Further analysis showed that a very high percentage of the total variance in the data could be explained by just four factors: (1) GNP, (2) literacy rate, (3) proportion of GNP in manufacturing and services, and (4) the number of scientists and engineers per capita. This means that a developer putting together a global rollout plan would list all countries being considered. From that set, the four most significant factors would be measured for each country, and weighted by the coefficients in the article. This would yield a ranking of the nations being considered, and the segmentation (rollout) could proceed. A simpler method would be to rely on the national list above (Japan, etc.) but using more cur-