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US-VISIT accuracy could be better
NEWS
Copyright Notice This newsletter and the individual contributions contained in it are protected under copyright by Elsevier Ltd, and the following terms and conditions apply to their use: Permissions may be sought directly from Elsevier Rights & Permissions Department, PO Box 800, Oxford OX5 1DX, UK; tel: +44 (0)1865 843830, fax: +44 (0)1865 853333, e-mail: [email protected]. You may also contact Rights & Permissions directly through Elsevier’s home page (http://www.elsevier.com), selecting first ‘Support and contact’, then ‘Copyright and permission’. In the USA, users may clear permissions and make payments through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA; tel: 978 7508400, fax: +1 978 7504744, and in the UK through the Copyright Licensing Agency Rapid Clearance Service (CLARCS), 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 0LP, UK; tel: +44 (0) 207 436 5931; fax: +44 (0) 207 436 3986. Other countries may have a local reprographic rights agency for payments. Derivative Works Subscribers may reproduce tables of contents or prepare lists of articles including abstracts for internal circulation within their institutions. Permission of the publisher is required for resale or distribution outside the institution. Permission of the publisher is required for all other derivative works, including compilations and translations. Electronic Storage or Usage Permission of the publisher is required to store or use electronically any material contained in this journal, including any article or part of an article. Contact the publisher at the address indicated. Except as outlined above, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission of the publisher. Address permissions requests to: Elsevier Rights & Permissions Department, at the mail, fax and e-mail addresses noted above. Notice No responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods, products, instructions or ideas contained in the material herein. Because of rapid advances in the medical sciences, in particular, independent verification of diagnoses and drug dosages should be made. Although all advertising material is expected to conform to ethical (medical) standards, inclusion in this publication does not constitute a guarantee or endorsement of the quality or value of such product or of the claims made of it by its manufacturer.
02265 Printed by Mayfield Press (Oxford) Ltd.
2
fingerprint
US-VISIT accuracy could be better The USA’s Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) programme has been told by a leading academic that it could do better, especially in circumstances when fingerprint images submitted to the system are of questionable quality. A theoretical analysis published by Stanford University researchers in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) contends that the performance of the system when fingerprint image quality is low leaves it vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists, who could attempt to scam the system by sending terrorists to the USA with either inherently poor fingerprints or deliberately altered prints through the use of surgery, chemicals or sandpaper. The current US-VISIT system does not adapt threshold levels depending upon the quality of the image under consideration. In the worst case scenario, the chances of detecting a terrorist with prints on file at a US port of entry are only about fifty-fifty, the researchers claim. Overall, the research paper said, the probability of correctly matching a fingerprint if it is on file is 0.959 (at false positive probability of 3.1 x 10–3 when the watchlist had six million people). However, if terrorists are able to ‘game’ the system by submitting poor quality prints, then this detection rate could fall to 0.526. The researchers contend that much better performance could be reached if different thresholds were adopted depending upon the quality of the fingerprint. In this case the worst case scenario would see the detection probability increase from 0.526 to 0.733. US-VISIT statistics The US-VISIT programme rolled into operation in January 2004 and is administered by t USA’s Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It will ultimately involve the collection of fingerprints and biographic information from visitors at US visa-issuing posts worldwide and upon their arrival at and departure from US air, sea and land ports. US-VISIT entry procedures are currently in place at 115 airports, 15 seaports, and in the secondary inspection areas of the 50 busiest land ports of entry. By 31 December 2005, US-VISIT entry procedures will be implemented in the secondary inspection areas of all remaining land ports of entry. To date, more than 25 million visitors have been
Naturally, these statistics hinge on the assumption that terrorist organisations will attempt to defeat the biometric system by employing terrorists with poor-quality fingerprints. However, the researchers claim: “In light of the meticulous planning that has gone into terrorist attacks over the last decade, we believe this assumption is not only prudent, but realistic.” The use of more than two fingers for lowquality images was also considered by the researchers. They found that the detection probability could be raised to approximately 0.95 if ten fingers are used on the poorest quality fingerprints. (In other words, the worst-case performance under the researchers’ proposed multi-finger strategy is approximately the same as the existing strategy’s performance under the assumption that terrorists do not behave strategically at all.) The research – led by professor Lawrence Wein – concluded that “there is no excuse for a multibillion dollar programme to settle for performance below the level of the proposed multi-finger strategy, particularly given the potentially grave consequences of a false negative”. The introduction of quality-dependent thresholds requires only minor software modifications, the researchers claim, and should be implemented as soon as possible. Homeland security officials have defended the US-VISIT system, pointing out that the paper is purely theoretical and examines the performance of the system under the worst case scenario. The DHS has published its latest statistics which highlight the success of the system to date. These demonstrate that while the system has found no terrorists, approximately 7,000 people have been denied US visas and more than 600 have been arrested or turned away at ports of entry (see box). Contact: Lawrence Weins’ paper appears in the May 9-13 issue of PNAS, Web: www.pnas.org/papbyrecent.shtml processed through US-VISIT. It has registered many successes since it began. These include: •State Department consular officers around the word have denied US visas to approximately 7,000 visa applicants. More than a third of these visas were denied because the applicants' fingerprints matched those on various US government law enforcement and security lists; •Fingerprint and other data have enabled inspectors from US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to deny entry to approximately 594 people who arrived at US borders seeking to enter the country. •US-VISIT has helped special agents from US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrest approximately 39 people through fingerprint matches, investigative leads and other information.
Biometric Technology Today • June 2005
Copyright Notice This newsletter and the individual contributions contained in it are protected under copyright by Elsevier Ltd, and the following terms and conditions apply to their use: Permissions may be sought directly from Elsevier Rights & Permissions Department, PO Box 800, Oxford OX5 1DX, UK; tel: +44 (0)1865 843830, fax: +44 (0)1865 853333, e-mail: [email protected]. You may also contact Rights & Permissions directly through Elsevier’s home page (http://www.elsevier.com), selecting first ‘Support and contact’, then ‘Copyright and permission’. In the USA, users may clear permissions and make payments through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA; tel: 978 7508400, fax: +1 978 7504744, and in the UK through the Copyright Licensing Agency Rapid Clearance Service (CLARCS), 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 0LP, UK; tel: +44 (0) 207 436 5931; fax: +44 (0) 207 436 3986. Other countries may have a local reprographic rights agency for payments. Derivative Works Subscribers may reproduce tables of contents or prepare lists of articles including abstracts for internal circulation within their institutions. Permission of the publisher is required for resale or distribution outside the institution. Permission of the publisher is required for all other derivative works, including compilations and translations. Electronic Storage or Usage Permission of the publisher is required to store or use electronically any material contained in this journal, including any article or part of an article. Contact the publisher at the address indicated. Except as outlined above, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission of the publisher. Address permissions requests to: Elsevier Rights & Permissions Department, at the mail, fax and e-mail addresses noted above. Notice No responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods, products, instructions or ideas contained in the material herein. Because of rapid advances in the medical sciences, in particular, independent verification of diagnoses and drug dosages should be made. Although all advertising material is expected to conform to ethical (medical) standards, inclusion in this publication does not constitute a guarantee or endorsement of the quality or value of such product or of the claims made of it by its manufacturer.
02265 Printed by Mayfield Press (Oxford) Ltd.
2
fingerprint
US-VISIT accuracy could be better The USA’s Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) programme has been told by a leading academic that it could do better, especially in circumstances when fingerprint images submitted to the system are of questionable quality. A theoretical analysis published by Stanford University researchers in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) contends that the performance of the system when fingerprint image quality is low leaves it vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists, who could attempt to scam the system by sending terrorists to the USA with either inherently poor fingerprints or deliberately altered prints through the use of surgery, chemicals or sandpaper. The current US-VISIT system does not adapt threshold levels depending upon the quality of the image under consideration. In the worst case scenario, the chances of detecting a terrorist with prints on file at a US port of entry are only about fifty-fifty, the researchers claim. Overall, the research paper said, the probability of correctly matching a fingerprint if it is on file is 0.959 (at false positive probability of 3.1 x 10–3 when the watchlist had six million people). However, if terrorists are able to ‘game’ the system by submitting poor quality prints, then this detection rate could fall to 0.526. The researchers contend that much better performance could be reached if different thresholds were adopted depending upon the quality of the fingerprint. In this case the worst case scenario would see the detection probability increase from 0.526 to 0.733. US-VISIT statistics The US-VISIT programme rolled into operation in January 2004 and is administered by t USA’s Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It will ultimately involve the collection of fingerprints and biographic information from visitors at US visa-issuing posts worldwide and upon their arrival at and departure from US air, sea and land ports. US-VISIT entry procedures are currently in place at 115 airports, 15 seaports, and in the secondary inspection areas of the 50 busiest land ports of entry. By 31 December 2005, US-VISIT entry procedures will be implemented in the secondary inspection areas of all remaining land ports of entry. To date, more than 25 million visitors have been
Naturally, these statistics hinge on the assumption that terrorist organisations will attempt to defeat the biometric system by employing terrorists with poor-quality fingerprints. However, the researchers claim: “In light of the meticulous planning that has gone into terrorist attacks over the last decade, we believe this assumption is not only prudent, but realistic.” The use of more than two fingers for lowquality images was also considered by the researchers. They found that the detection probability could be raised to approximately 0.95 if ten fingers are used on the poorest quality fingerprints. (In other words, the worst-case performance under the researchers’ proposed multi-finger strategy is approximately the same as the existing strategy’s performance under the assumption that terrorists do not behave strategically at all.) The research – led by professor Lawrence Wein – concluded that “there is no excuse for a multibillion dollar programme to settle for performance below the level of the proposed multi-finger strategy, particularly given the potentially grave consequences of a false negative”. The introduction of quality-dependent thresholds requires only minor software modifications, the researchers claim, and should be implemented as soon as possible. Homeland security officials have defended the US-VISIT system, pointing out that the paper is purely theoretical and examines the performance of the system under the worst case scenario. The DHS has published its latest statistics which highlight the success of the system to date. These demonstrate that while the system has found no terrorists, approximately 7,000 people have been denied US visas and more than 600 have been arrested or turned away at ports of entry (see box). Contact: Lawrence Weins’ paper appears in the May 9-13 issue of PNAS, Web: www.pnas.org/papbyrecent.shtml processed through US-VISIT. It has registered many successes since it began. These include: •State Department consular officers around the word have denied US visas to approximately 7,000 visa applicants. More than a third of these visas were denied because the applicants' fingerprints matched those on various US government law enforcement and security lists; •Fingerprint and other data have enabled inspectors from US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to deny entry to approximately 594 people who arrived at US borders seeking to enter the country. •US-VISIT has helped special agents from US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrest approximately 39 people through fingerprint matches, investigative leads and other information.
Biometric Technology Today • June 2005