Variable adaptations: Micro-politics of environmental displacement in the Okavango Delta, Botswana

Geoforum 57 (2014) 21–29

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Variable adaptations: Micro-politics of environmental displacement in the Okavango Delta, Botswana Jamie E. Shinn a,⇑, Brian King a, Kenneth R. Young b, Kelley A. Crews b a b

The Pennsylvania State University, Department of Geography, 302 Walker Building, University Park, PA 16802, USA The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Geography and the Environment, 305 E. 23rd Street-A3100-CLA 3.306, Austin, TX 78712-1697, USA

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history: Received 6 March 2014 Received in revised form 31 July 2014

Keywords: Adaptation Transformative adaptation Okavango Delta Botswana Environmental displacement Variability

a b s t r a c t Increasing environmental variability associated with global climate change is expected to produce social instability and human displacement in future decades. As such, there remains a pressing need to understand the implications of environmental changes for human populations and their adaptive capacities. This paper analyzes governmental and intra-community responses to environmental variability through a case study from the Okavango Delta, Botswana. We report findings from fieldwork conducted during May–June 2011 and October 2012–May 2013 in the village of Etsha 13. Following an increase in annual flooding in 2009, 2010, and 2011, the Government of Botswana permanently relocated hundreds of residents to a nearby dryland area, asserting that this new settlement was necessary to reduce future risks from flooding variability. While some residents accepted this position, others elected to return to the floodplain or to illegally divert the flow of the water to protect their homes. This paper explores the micro-politics of these relocation efforts and competing responses in order to examine differential adaptive responses to increased flooding levels. We situate these findings within the burgeoning literature on transformative adaptation and suggest that micro-political dynamics are critical in shaping the limitations to, and possibilities for, effective adaptive responses to global environmental change. Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction It is widely accepted that global climate change will have significant and unpredictable social and ecological impacts. The results of environmental change are already manifesting in local contexts through extreme weather events and increased environmental variability (Pelling, 2010). Marginalized groups are often the least prepared to respond to such impacts, as a result of ‘‘everyday vulnerabilities’’ stemming from existing social, political, and economic dynamics (Adger, 2006; Ribot, 2009). These impacts are expected to disrupt agrarian and other livelihood practices and have the potential to increase existing vulnerabilities. There is also a growing concern about human displacement as a result of climate change. During the 2012 meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), it was announced that the United Nations predicts there will be 50 million environmental refugees by 2020. While the concept of a ‘‘climate refugee’’ has yet to be accepted by the United Nations, this announcement highlighted the increasing attention to the ways in which global ⇑ Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (J.E. Shinn), [email protected] (B. King), [email protected] (K.R. Young), [email protected] (K.A. Crews). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2014.08.006 0016-7185/Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

environmental change will transform human settlements and migration patterns (Hollifield et al., 2011; Biermann and Boas, 2010.) How people are able to respond to such environmental changes will be simultaneously produced by ecological conditions, existing vulnerabilities, and local-level socio-political dynamics. As such, investigations of micro-level adaptive responses can reveal not only the impacts of climate change in specific settings but also important non-climatic sources of vulnerability. This article analyzes the adaptive responses within the community of Etsha 13 to variable flooding events in the Okavango Delta of Botswana. The Okavango Delta is a dynamic wetland landscape characterized by spatiotemporal variability in flooding patterns. Annual floods in 2009, 2010, and 2011 were higher than they had been in many decades and in some areas, including Etsha 13, they were spatially distinct from previous flooding regimes. The spatial variability of these floods was differentially experienced within Etsha 13, resulting in intra-village variations in impacts and resulting responses. In drier years during the past three decades, some residents of Etsha 13 built homes in the occasionally inundated floodplain; higher water in recent years returned to this area and flooded many people’s households (known locally as compounds). Beginning with annual floods in 2009, the Government of Botswana began relocating hundreds of these residents to a nearby

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dryland area now known as the ‘‘New Stands,’’ arguing that residents must permanently settle in the dryland to avoid risks of future flooding. While some residents favored relocating to the New Stands permanently, others acted against the wishes of the government by returning to their former compounds in the occasionally inundated floodplain in order to more easily access nearby resources necessary for livelihoods oriented around the wetland. In another notable response, some village residents altered the flow of the water in direct violation of governmental edicts in order to protect their homes from rising waters. These responses, which are detailed in this article, show that adaptive capacities within Etsha 13 are therefore variable and can either be actualized through collusion with the government or by contesting its particular vision for adaptation (Fig. 1). This article explores the micro-politics of these responses, focusing on competing visions between the government and residents to document variations of adaptation to environmental variability. We report findings from research conducted between May–June 2011 and October 2012–May 2013, relying primarily upon qualitative interviewing and participant observation in Etsha 13. The case study demonstrates that adaptation takes different forms for different actors within a socio-ecological system, and that different adaptive responses can reflect prevailing dynamics related to vulnerability, access, and governance. Additionally, through investigation of the spatially varied impacts of flooding, we demonstrate how micro-level adaptation is both socially and spatially constructed and differentially experienced. We build on recent scholarship to suggest that a re-conceptualization of adaptation as a potentially transformative political process must attend to micro-politics, or risks intensifying existing systemic issues of inequality and vulnerability that have the potential to undermine the success of adaptation measures for already marginalized actors.

Adapting to environmental change Scholarship within the social sciences has a long and complicated relationship with adaptation. Within geography, the concept first gained purchase within cultural ecology and natural hazards scholarship in the 1970s and 1980s (Bassett and Fogelman, 2013; Osbahr et al., 2008; Head, 2010; Zimmerer, 2010). Work during this time tended to emphasize adaptation as human adjustment to ecological surroundings and considered biophysical risks as manageable through the application of technical and top-down solutions (Bassett and Fogelman, 2013). This was in part a result of adaptation’s ecological legacy, which led to a view of society as a type of self-regulating system that worked to maintain homeostasis (Watts, 1983; Head, 2010). This view of adaptation came under critique in the late 1970s and early 1980s for a lack of attention to political-economic root causes of societal vulnerability. Of note, Watts (1983) illustrated how households in Nigeria who were ‘‘conceptually prepared’’ to respond to drought instead suffered from famine as a result of social, economic, and political legacies of colonialism and capitalism. The geographic subfield of political ecology emerged at least in part out of concerns about these previous understandings of socio-environmental dynamics and quickly shifted from a focus on adaptation to one on vulnerability (Robbins, 2012; Bassett and Fogelman, 2013). Vulnerability was seen as a way to address underlying structural conditions more explicitly while providing opportunities to attend to questions of political and power dynamics within specific socio-environmental settings. As scholarship on the impacts of climate change has increased in recent years, attention has returned to adaptation to consider the ways in which social systems can respond to environmental change, including within IPCC reports (IPCC, 2014; Moss et al., 2013; Birkenholtz, 2012; Ribot, 2011; Tschakert and Dietrich, 2010; Adger et al., 2009; Smith et al.,

Fig. 1. Map of Etsha 13, indicating location of New Stands and seasonally and occasionally inundated floodplain (map made by Aaron Dennis).

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2000). The Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines adaptation as ‘‘The process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects. In human systems, adaptation seeks to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In natural systems, human intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate and its effects (Noble et al., 2014, p. 4).’’ This resurgence of engagement with adaptation is not without some articulated reservations. Adaptation has long been critiqued as a ‘‘slippery’’ concept (Head, 2010, p. 235), and some scholars feel current uses of adaptation are too similar to earlier applications critiqued by political economists. As a result, some scholars are now working toward an understanding of adaptation that attends to issues of power and structural vulnerability. Ribot (2011) argues that a focus on adaptation implies the question of ‘‘how’’ people respond to environmental change, but not ‘‘why’’ they must adapt in the first place. Because adaptation has no ‘‘implicit link’’ to marginalization, it erases any causality in the process of adaptation (Ribot, 2011, p. 2). Since the concept of adaptation is ‘‘not going away,’’ Ribot (2011) argues that studies of adaptation must include an explicit focus on vulnerability in order to ensure not just a focus on adaptation itself, but also on the root cause of who needs to adapt and why. Pelling (2010) further emphasizes the importance of understanding the limits to adaptation, and suggests that most of the related literature has been framed around technical solutions, rather than in cultural, social, and political terms. Likewise, Moser (2009, p. 328) argues, ‘‘. . .there is a growing need to understand and empirically test our understanding of the social dynamics that underpin. . . on-the-ground adaptation strategies and actions through existing governance structures and mechanisms.’’ Adger et al. (2009) similarly suggest that scholars must consider social limits to adaptation, rather than just ecological, economic, and technological ones. While current work tends to focus primarily on exogenous limits to adaptation, Adger et al. (2009, p. 338) argue that many limits are actually endogenous to society, noting the need to think ‘‘about the ways in which societies are organized, the values that they hold, the knowledge that they construct and the relationships that exist between individuals, institutions and the state.’’ They argue that through the investigation of these endogenous factors, social scientists can begin to understand limits to adaptation that originate from structural vulnerabilities within a society. In a recent and notable paper, Bassett and Fogelman (2013, p. 50) find that even with this growing body of critical work on adaptation, there is still ‘‘. . .considerable continuity between the natural hazards debate of the 1970s/1980s and the different interpretations of vulnerability and adaptation in the current climate change literature.’’ Bassett and Fogelman (2013) reviewed articles on adaptation from four major climate change journals and placed each article into a related category: (i) Adjustment adaptation, (ii) Reformist adaptation, and (iii) Transformative adaptation. Whereas adjustment adaptation is politically conservative and seeks to maintain the status quo, transformative adaptation seeks to understand structural causes of vulnerability in different political-economic and environmental contexts with the explicit intention of challenging existing power dynamics. Reformist adaptation is located at the middle of the continuum. While our intention is to engage directly with Bassett and Fogelman’s definition of transformative adaptation, it should be noted that they are not the only scholars engaging with this concept (for a similar definition, see Pelling, 2010; for a more conservative definition, see Kates et al., 2012). Indeed, even the most recent IPCC report briefly discusses the concept, though it notes ‘‘The clear operational definitions of what constitutes transformational adaptation remain elusive. . .’’ and that, ‘‘The current complexity and ambiguity in the definition of transformational adaptation may constrain its

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effective operationalization in policy environments (Klein et al., 2014, p. 25).’’ Thus, while attention to transformative adaptation is expanding, it still lacks clear definition and normative intention. There is a growing body of case study based research working to link causal roots of vulnerability to potentially transformative adaptive strategies. Osbahr et al. (2008) offer one impressive example. Using a case study from Mozambique, these authors find ‘‘complex cross-scale engagements and diverse institutions to be essential. . .’’ in tackling climate change (Osbahr et al., 2008, p. 1952). Recognizing that adaptation is a process shaped by broader political economic and social dynamics, they suggest that development agendas concerned with climate change and its impacts will be more successful if they support social institutions. This work highlights the importance of uncovering limits to adaptation that originate not only from the broader socio-political context but also from within societies themselves. Of particular relevance to the case study of Etsha 13 detailed below, these authors detail policy from within Mozambique designed to promote transitional access to lowland and upland fields to facilitate agricultural responses to flooding variability. With these questions and insights in mind, we now turn to our case study from the Okavango Delta, Botswana to highlight the role of micro-politics in shaping the possibilities for adaptive responses to environmental changes. We argue that micro-politics highlight not only differential intra-community experiences with flooding and relocation, but also the multi-scalar institutional relationships that have the potential to impede or promote transformative adaptation.

Case study and methods Case study The research that informs this article was completed in the Okavango Delta of northwest Botswana, which serves as an excellent setting for examining human responses to environmental variability and change. The Okavango Delta is a system characterized by dynamic biophysical processes, such as precipitation and flooding that vary spatially and temporally. While water is always present within portions of the Delta, floodwaters typically arrive in the region of Etsha 13 around April and May, fed by both local and upstream precipitation from the highlands of Angola. The Delta contains three major hydro-ecological zones: permanent swamp, seasonal (regularly flooded) floodplains, and occasional floodplains (Wolski and Savenije, 2006; McCarthy et al., 2000). Rechannelization of the Delta is common due to the movement of sediment through the system (Wolski et al., 2012) so that different locations in the system experience water in distinct ways. There is also interannual and quasi-decadal variability (Neuenschwander and Crews, 2008). Floodwaters arrive slowly and are somewhat predictable due to water gauges along the Botswana–Namibia border that help track inflow into the Delta. Given the gradual increase in floodwaters, one of our governmental respondents noted with confidence that they knew approximately when the water would arrive. Knowing when the water will arrive, however, is quite different from knowing its eventual location because the spatial extent, amount, and timing of the floodwaters can vary significantly. The Etsha region is emblematic of this dynamism, as it has recently experienced significant levels of spatiotemporal variability. The Okavango Delta is located in the Kalahari (Kgaligadi) desert, making the wetland an important source of water for humans and wildlife. Livelihood systems within the Okavango Delta are diversified and often dependent upon precipitation and flooding regimes (Meyer et al., 2011; Mbaiwa and Darkoh, 2005; Kgathi et al., 2007; Mbaiwa et al., 2008). Residents engage in both molapo (floodplain) and dryland agricultural practices. Molapo farming is an histori-

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cally adapted practice that depends upon the recession of floodwaters to provide nutrients and moisture to the soil (Magole and Thapelo, 2005). Because of the reliance upon the flood to provide irrigation, the spatial and temporal dynamism can present a challenge to this practice. Even as early as 2005, research found that governmental rules limiting farming in the floodplain were combining with flooding variability to produce less available territory for this form of agricultural production (Kgathi et al., 2005). Dryland farming, on the other hand, occurs outside of the floodplain and is largely reliant upon variable precipitation for crop production. Crops grown in either the dryland or molapo fields can include maize, millet, beans, melons, and sorghum. Livestock husbandry, primarily of cattle, is also practiced in the region with one recent study suggesting it was the most common livelihood strategy within a number of villages in the Delta (Motsholapheko et al., 2011). Natural resource collection also occurs for subsistence and commercial purposes. Wood and shrub products are collected for cooking fuel and fencing materials. Reeds (Common Reed or Phragmites australis), palm, and thatch grass are gathered for building materials and the weaving of baskets for commercial sale. Wild fruits and water lilies are reported to be gathered by some residents and are used to augment household diet. These collection patterns are sometimes supplemented with fishing as a source of food or income. In addition to biophysical processes, livelihoods in the region are also interlinked with cultural dynamics. A number of different ethnic groups reside within the research setting, including the Bayei and Hambukushu. This research was completed within the Etsha region, located along the western edge of the Delta in thirteen villages (Etsha 1–13) that were originally designed for Hambukushu who migrated from Angola in the late 1960s during that country’s civil war. A smaller population of Bayei from nearby areas moved to the Etsha villages after the Hambukushu began to settle and develop them. While the ethnicities have overlapping livelihood strategies, the Bayei tend to rely more heavily on wetland based resources, while the Hambukushu tend to engage more in dryland farming practices. Both ethnicities maintain strong cultural identities related to their respective agricultural practices. Further, the Bayei tend to live in closer proximity to the floodplain and engage in multiple wetland-based livelihoods. Even after settling in Etsha 13, many Bayei households maintained close links to smaller Bayei settlements on the edges of or in the interior of the Delta, often shifting between them throughout the year based on agricultural and fishing seasons.

Findings Life in the New Stands In drier years during the past three decades, residents of Etsha 13 built homes in the occasionally inundated floodplain. Floods during the months of annual peak flooding of April and May of 2009, 2010, and 2011 caused displacement of hundreds of these residents from their homes. In response, the Government of Botswana relocated many of these residents to a dryland area on the outskirts of Etsha 13, now known as the ‘‘New Stands.’’ The displacement of Etsha 13 residents had implications for the entire village, not just for those who were relocated. Eighty-one percent of those interviewed in Etsha 13 in 2011 discussed issues with the relocation, whether they themselves were relocated or not. While each of the relocated households has a unique story of displacement, there are common threads that run throughout. For example, displaced residents reported that while they expected flooding to occur near the village in 2009, they did not expect it to reach their particular compounds. Moreover, the floodwaters came quickly that year and arrived in the village during the night. Respondents shared stories of waking up in the middle of the night only to notice that their blankets were wet and their compound was flooding. The Government of Botswana responded rapidly to the 2009 floods. Governmental officials arrived the day after floods reached the village with trucks and boats to move people to the designated dryland area. People were then given tents as temporary shelter for themselves and any belongings salvaged from their compounds. The New Stands are located on land that was once agricultural fields owned by villagers. The government reportedly compensated the previous owners of the land and provided them with new dryland fields further from the village. During the floods of 2009, displaced people were also given food baskets, temporary toilets, and firewood, in addition to relocation assistance and tents. The government also provided large water tanks and eventually installed a few permanent public water taps at the New Stands. It should be noted that during the 2010 and 2011 floods, no aid was given beyond relocation assistance and tents. According to an Assistant Development Officer at the regional District Commissioner office, the Red Cross and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) had donated the additional resources given in 2009. In 2010 and 2011, the government was the only entity offering assistance (Fig. 2).

Methods This paper reports on findings from research that is designed to understand livelihood production and social dynamics within a region that has recently experienced environmental variability in flooding regimes. The findings reported here derive from qualitative semi-structured interviewing and participant observation that took place within the village of Etsha 13 from June–July 2011, with additional fieldwork completed by the first author in 2012–2013. Twenty-seven household interviews in total were completed in Etsha 13 in 2011, of which twenty were randomly sampled, with an additional seven intentionally sampled to collect information from the New Stands. An additional twenty-five qualitative household interviews were conducted in Etsha 13 by the first author from October 2012–May 2013. This was designed to provide a multi-year assessment of the multiple adaptive responses to flooding variability within the case study region. All interviews were completed with representatives of the households with assistance from local interpreters in English, Setswana, and Hambukushu. Additional interviews were conducted with governmental officials and members of the local tribal authority during 2013.

Fig. 2. A household gathers under a government-issued tent in the New Stands.

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While people living in the New Stands recognized the governmental assistance they received, it was common for people to be dissatisfied with the government response to flooding. This dissatisfaction was particularly notable for those displaced in 2010 and 2011, when no additional assistance was given from external organizations. In some cases, people complained that the tents they were given were in need of repair and did not provide adequate shelter. Others suggested that the government should build new homes for all displaced people. In a very few cases, the government did build people new small concrete houses. A young woman living in one of these homes explained that she qualified because she had no family to help her and that she had many children of her own, though most of the other people who were built houses were elderly. She said that she was happy with the house and planned to stay there. An elderly woman living in another cement home built by the government expressed her gratitude for the house, even though parts of it were of poor quality. When asked if she would remain there, she said she would stay ‘‘for the whole of her life.’’ In contrast, the vast majority of displaced people were not provided with new homes. Typically, they remained in a temporary tent camp for a few months before being allocated a new plot from the regional Land Board in a part of the New Stands that quickly became a permanent part of Etsha 13. The Land Board is the governmental authority responsible for allocating plots of land and the regional Tawana Land Board is the agency responsible for issuing plots in the New Stands. Of important note, residents can only legally have one plot of land, so when they accepted the allocation of a plot in the New Stands, they forfeited their right to their former plot in the floodplain. After the certificate for the land was given, people moved their tents and any belongings that survived the floods to the new plot and began the process of building a new permanent compound. Residents had little say in where their new plot was located and some respondents reported that while they would have preferred to resettle elsewhere, they were unable to ‘‘since this is the plot the Land Board gave them.’’ While not everyone chose to stay in the New Stands, those who did gave a number of reasons for permanently relocating rather than returning to their previous compounds. Some people felt that their old compounds were ‘‘too dangerous’’ due to higher water. When one woman was asked about the possibility of returning to her old plot, she explained that she would not return because the water was so high people were fishing where her home used to be. Others felt that life would be easier at the New Stands. One respondent said that people ‘‘are not free to live’’ at the old compounds, because they are always worried about getting flooded. Another respondent reported that life in the New Stands is better, because there is no risk of drowning. Another household explained that they were ‘‘relieved’’ to be living in the New Stands, because at their previous compound the children had to cross the river to go to school. When asked whether she wanted to return to her old plot, one woman replied ‘‘this is our home now, because the old house has been destroyed.’’ The relocation demonstrates several points about the responses to the flooding levels in Etsha 13. First, the government responded quickly in 2009 and in subsequent years to relocate residents away from the occasional floodplain. While additional resource support declined after 2009, the government continued to work with residents to provide new plots through the Land Board, as long as those residents were willing to forfeit their plot in the occasional floodplain. Many did because of the perception that it was preferable, or at least safer, to be in the New Stands. However, not all residents shared these sentiments. Rather, some people chose to return home and continue living in the occasionally inundated floodplain, even with the risk of flooding in future years. As the next section details, for these residents adaptation to environmental

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variability involved other types of responses, some of which were in direct conflict with the wishes and rules of the national government of Botswana. Returning home While many residents responded to the flooding by resettling in new areas demarcated by the state, others decided to return to their homes in the flooded area. Those who chose to return to their original compounds after the annual floods receded gave a number of reasons for doing so. Some said they would have preferred to live in the New Stands but could not afford to build new homes there. One household explained how they moved to the New Stands in 2010 but moved back to their old plot in 2011 because they did not have enough money or the skills to build new houses, and the government was going to take away their tents. Another family described how they had already been allotted tents and a plot in the New Stands, but had not yet decided whether to move. They were considering building a house there in the future because they believed the higher annual floods would continue, but did not have the income necessary to do so. They said, ‘‘We cannot prepare because of lack of resources. We would like to move to the new plot away from the flood, but we are unable to construct new houses.’’ Other households returned to their old compounds temporarily, and while they preferred to remain there, they felt pressured by the government to move permanently to the New Stands. One family interviewed in 2013 was still living in their original compound, but was in the process of building in the New Stands where they had been given a plot by the Land Board. Like many of their neighbors, their compound was flooded in 2010 and one of their homes collapsed. They moved to the New Stands during the floods but returned to their plot after two months when the floods dried. Even though they planned to move to the New Stands when their new compound was completed, the family had significant concerns about the relocation, including the inability to move their electricity and water connections with them. They said they would prefer to stay at their original compound and move back and forth to the New Stands as needed. They explained that the President of Botswana, Ian Khama, visited Etsha 13 and the residents told him about their concerns about moving to the New Stands. The President reportedly responded that they could choose to return to their old compounds, but that they would not be given additional help if they were to get flooded again. The man explained that even though they do not want to move, they did not want to argue with the government and preferred to ‘‘follow the rules.’’ Other households explained that while they have not yet been flooded, the government was still encouraging them to move to the New Stands to avoid future flooding. One household explained that the government was encouraging them to move to the New Stands because their house will likely be in the path of future floods. However, moving would be difficult, because no one in the household is working and they do not have enough money to build a new compound. An adult member of the household felt that the government should assist those who need to move because of the floods. However, he explained that they are given no assistance with relocation because they are encouraged to move, but not forced to do so. In addition to speaking with residents of Etsha 13, interviews were completed with governmental officials with jurisdiction over the Etsha region. When asked her opinion on people returning to homes that had been previously flooded, the Assistant Development Officer at the District Commissioner’s Office explained that it is a bad thing, and that people should rather stay in the dryland permanently. She explained that the Government watches the inflow of water into the Delta and informs communities before

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the annual floods whether they should move out of the floodplain. But she said that some people tell them they are ‘‘people of the river’’ and want to stay where they are, even though ‘‘We. . . know they will be the same ones we will be helping.’’ She continued, ‘‘It is a lot of trouble, but what can we do?’’ While there is no penalty for moving back to your old plot, she made it clear that it is against the wishes of the government. She indicated that the same people are moved every year. In another interview, a District Commissioner for the region confirmed that it is not illegal to return to the flooded compound. He said that all they can say to people is ‘‘please move to the other area,’’ but that they cannot provide anything other than a new plot. He said, ‘‘If you go back and water comes, do not come for assistance.’’ But, he said they provide assistance anyway because, ‘‘we cannot ignore them.’’ While it is clear from these comments that the government prefers people to move permanently out of the floodplain, interviews indicate this poses significant challenges for many households. As the next section details, the implications for livelihood systems can be significant and thus challenge the possibilities for successful adaptive responses, particularly ones that are consistent with the vision of the state. Increased need and decreased access to natural resources One of the major challenges of moving to the New Stands is that of decreased access to natural resources and other capital assets for rebuilding, an issue which intensifies already existing issues for many vulnerable households in the region. People detailed having ‘‘to get used to a new lifestyle’’ in the New Stands. This included problems that had not been experienced in their old plots in the village, including ants and termites that destroy house building material and baskets used for storage. In addition, people complained that they were unable to lock the tents and unfinished houses. People also mentioned that the distance and effort to gather firewood were greater. During interviews conducted in the New Stands during May–June 2011, many respondents were concerned they would not be able to rebuild homes before the government came to take the tents back. Often mentioned as a reason for accepting the temporary tent housing was the fact that getting together the needed reeds and thatch for building a new house depended not just on having a site, but also on having the mobility and time to harvest the plant materials from the Delta. Further, increased flooding levels decreased access to grasses and reeds needed for building. One household explained that if they leave in the morning it ‘‘takes until 2 PM to reach the reed and grass collection area. . .making it necessary to spend the night there. It takes 10 days to collect enough for our building needs because you have to rest from the aches and pains in your arms from collecting.’’ Sixty-seven percent of people interviewed in Etsha 13 in 2011, whether displaced or not, mentioned increased difficulty from the floods in collecting grass and reeds, which are important building materials for homes and fences for compounds. Some people in the New Stands were able to salvage some resources such as bricks and reeds from their previous plots and use them to begin new structures, however virtually all people in the New Stands were forced to collect at least some new natural resources to build compounds. As one person explained, things became more difficult because ‘‘now everyone is starting from the beginning.’’ As recently as May 2013, it was common to see partially assembled houses, as people waited for the money or ability to collect enough resources (Fig. 3). One family explained how the season for collecting reeds and grass is usually from July to August, but they are now collecting earlier because of the urgency to rebuild. This means that the reeds and grass are of a sub par quality because they have not had enough time to grow and are not yet ‘‘ready.’’ Further, they

Fig. 3. A partially finished house in the New Stands awaits completion with reeds and grass thatch.

described that there are rules for time of collection set by the government, and that they now need to break those rules out of desperation to complete their house before the tents are taken away. So while the national government has been assertive in advocating the relocation of residents from the occasional floodplain, the institutional environment shaping natural resource collection has remained rigid to the detriment of establishing new homes. The same family detailed how they now collect some grass at the dryland, but the type of grass that grows there has ‘‘thorns’’ and is of lower quality than the wetland grass. There is no alternative to reeds. While people also have the option to buy reeds and grasses, there were reports of increased prices of resources for sale due to the added difficulty of collection. Not only did the floods of 2009–2011 decrease access to resources needed for building homes in the New Stands, there was also a lack of access to resources necessary for important natural resource-based livelihoods in the region. While this was felt most acutely by those trying to rebuild in the New Stands, it impacted residents throughout the village. Thirty-seven percent of respondents in 2011 mentioned an increased need for a traditional canoe (mokoro) to access wetland resources due to the higher floodwaters. However, mekoro (plural) are expensive to buy and difficult to build, so people often discussed trying to borrow one from friends or family. Without a mokoro, people were forced to not collect at all, or to risk wading in deep water to collect resources. This was associated with fears of drowning, as well as fears of the increased presence of dangerous animals, including crocodiles and hippopotamuses. Flooding also had significant impacts on molapo farming. Agricultural livelihoods related to both dryland and molapo farming are critical to household food security in the region. While many people participate in molapo farming, it is a particularly important livelihood for people in the Bayei tribe in Etsha 13. As one Bayei man said, ‘‘The whole family [molapo] farms, that is who we are.’’ Fifty-nine percent of people interviewed in Etsha 13 in 2011 described complete or partial loss of their molapo fields. Some people described molapo fields too inundated with water to grow any crops at all, while others described partially inundated fields in which they were able to continue to plow a smaller part of the field. One woman explained, ‘‘[the field] is getting smaller now because the flowing is changing.’’ People often view molapo farming as an easier way to grow crops than at the dryland, making the loss of these fields particularly serious. As one respondent described, when you plow by the river, you always know there will

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be water. However, in the dryland fields they are not sure when the rain will come, making it more difficult to farm. People also described a lack of equipment needed to transition to dryland farming. One family described how they are unable to farm a dry field because they do not have the necessary equipment, such as a donkey cart. Transitions to the New Stands and to dryland farming pose specific challenges to the many female-headed households in Etsha 13. One respondent explained how building new homes before the tents are taken away would be difficult, as she had ‘‘no husband to build strong houses.’’ When one woman who farms at the molapo was asked if she intended to transition to dryland farming, she said she is unable to do so because she does not have a husband to do the difficult work of clearing the land. Likewise, another woman explained that even if the Land Board gives her a dryland plot, it would be difficult for her because her husband passed away and it was he who did the demanding work of clearing fields for farming. Another commented that since her husband had passed away, she struggled to maintain fences to keep cattle and wild animals from destroying crops. However, very few people said they would stop farming completely, whether they planned to continue to eke out crops at the molapo or to attempt the difficult work of clearing a dryland field. As one woman said when asked if she would stop farming, ‘‘I will not give up, because if I give up I will starve.’’ Adaptation as resistance: changing the flow As the above section indicates, the story of flooding and relocation in Etsha 13 highlights differences in power and desires of governmental and local actors. While many residents chose to relocate permanently to the New Stands, most are not completely satisfied with the relocation assistance they received. Moreover, many of those who preferred to return to their original plots against the government wishes are slowly in the process of moving permanently to the New Stands, with varying levels of success. However, the rising waters of the Delta provoked other interesting responses from local people who chose to not relocate at all. Of note, we observed an illegal response that involved efforts to control and change the flow of the floodwaters. Such interventions are prohibited by national level legislation meant to allow the ‘‘natural’’ flow of the Okavango Delta’s waters to occur. Members of the research team were shown a makeshift dam about 40 meters long made of sand bags and poles that was designed to protect about 20 compounds from the flood. Local people constructed this dam with bags they purchased from the health clinic. It provided about one meter of height of protection, which was enough to at least postpone the moment when their compounds became flooded (Fig. 4). A key informant involved with the construction of the dam noted that ‘‘the assistance of the government was not enough: the rains get tents wet, crops are destroyed by the flood. It is better to build a wall and stop the flood.’’ He also hoped to get local permission to build another wall that would provide additional protection for his house, which is ‘‘not a safe place to live.’’ It was his opinion that without the wall, the entire town would have flooded. He confirmed plans to rebuild and strengthen the wall to make it permanent for protection against future floods. The Assistant Development Officer at the District Commissioner’s Office explained that without permission from the Department of Water Affairs the building of such a dam is illegal. She explained that the problem with the dam is that it blocks the water from flowing in its natural direction, which can force it to flow to someone else’s compound. An interview with the District Commissioner for the region echoed these concerns. He explained how when people build small boundaries or embankments where the channel would normally flow, the water can accumulate behind

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Fig. 4. The dam built by residents to block water, shown here during the 2011 flooding season.

the boundary and eventually breaks the wall, doing even more damage. He explained that rather than diverting the flow of water, it is better just to move out of the path of flooding. However, even though the government is aware of the dam and disapproves, as of May 2013, the dam still existed and there have been no repercussions for those who built it.

Discussion In Etsha 13, a range of social actors enacted a variety of responses to the floods of 2009–2011. Many of the state-level governmental responses involved new strategies to permanently mitigate the negative impacts of flooding, including the relocation of residents living in the occasional floodplain. At the same time, other responses from residents built on long histories of more fluid types of adaptation, by shifting between the dryland and wetland areas as necessitated by floods. And in one major instance, residents took matters into their own hands by blocking the flow of water altogether. Residents who chose to adapt by moving permanently to the New Stands acted within the desires of the government, while those residents who chose only temporary relocation to the New Stands, as well as those who blocked the flow of water, acted against government wishes. While no punitive action has yet been taken against those operating outside of government strategies, there is a strong perception from residents that they will be increasingly pressured to move to the dryland area permanently in the future. When studied together, these competing types of responses reveal the diverse ways residents of Etsha 13 are both enabled and constrained in their ability to successfully respond to recent increases in flooding variability. If residents are willing to enact the response desired by the state, they are offered some amount of governmental support, which can go a long way in helping already socio-economically vulnerable residents securely respond to a changing environment. However, if a resident prefers to respond in other ways, even if those responses are based on cultural practices, they are offered very little or no governmental support. In this way, residents are pressured toward a particular type of state-sponsored adaptation to flooding variability. So while no one claimed to have been outright forced to relocate, it is evident that many residents living in the floodplain feel a sense of powerlessness in the face of governmental requests that they do so. Even as people described a desire to remain living in the floodplain, or to

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transition back and forth to the dryland, many of the same households detailed current or future plans to move permanently to the New Stands, because as the one household said, it is better ‘‘to follow the rules.’’ This micro-political context of Etsha 13 highlights important power relationships between actors at a variety of scales. It also highlights differential desires for adaptation, between state and non-state actors, and also between groups within the village itself. Complex institutional relationships related to government, ethnicity, and gender determine if a household has the power to adapt to environmental variability using desired and culturally influenced strategies. Bayei people tend to have stronger ties to molapo farming and other wetland-based livelihoods, resulting in differential impacts for this group than for members of other ethnicities. Additionally, women tend to face more difficulty making the transition to the dryland than men, resulting in a differential impact of flooding variability for female-headed households. Thus, while the transition to living and farming in the dryland is technically an option available to all residents, its desirability and feasibility are partly tied to local-level institutional relationships that are culturally rooted and understood. These local-level institutional dynamics are also informed by power relationships at different scales. National- and regional-level governmental decisions overrule the desires of residents to remain in the occasional floodplain, where they can more easily gain access to the natural resources that have long formed the basis of wetlandbased livelihoods. While small acts of resistance occur, as with the boundary dam described above, many residents transition to the dryland against their wishes, highlighting the influence of state practices in Botswana. While the state might view the relocation of residents from the floodplain as a matter of safety, the view ignores important local-level socio-ecological relationships, particularly for the Bayei. Asking (or subtly forcing, as the case might be) Bayei residents to move to the dryland is asking them to move to a location with which they have little cultural identity, and where they will experience increased difficulty maintaining culturally important wetland-based livelihoods, such as molapo farming. Further, these relocation efforts do not recognize the gendered impacts such residential and agricultural transitions will have for femaleheaded households. As such, this case study highlights ways in which adaptive capacity (and its limits) are informed by factors both endogenous and exogenous to the community in question. Finally, one of our objectives with this study is to detail the case-specific challenges to transformative forms of adaptation. As of now, the Botswana state is promoting adaptation of a sort, but is effectively impeding a culturally sensitive or empowering form of adaptation. We argue based on Bassett and Fogelman’s continuum, these current responses clearly fall into the adjustment category (and perhaps the reformist category, in the case of the dam). For truly transformative adaptation to take place in Etsha 13, measures would have to, as Adger (2006, 276) suggests, ‘‘redress marginalization as a cause of social vulnerability.’’ As such, it would mean addressing issues of marginalization for people of this rural region generally, and of women and Bayei people specifically. The state would need to create space for a continuation of the long history of fluidity of life in the Delta. This would give residents access to the dryland in times of high water and allowing them to return to their homes after the recession of floods. This may not sound transformative per se, and yet the study of micro-politics of Etsha 13 shows that allowing residents the power to maintain cultural practices also allows them to enact their own desired responses to variability. This would require at least two key elements: a reduction in the rigidity of certain existing rules through changes to policy that would surrender some state power to residents of Etsha 13, and the creation of policy that facilitates fluid adaptive responses. This relocation of power and creation of

empowering policy would allow true transformation to flourish in Etsha 13. However, based on extensive research in the region, it is unlikely that such transformations will occur in the near future. Rather, it is likely that the residents of Etsha 13 who remain in the occasional floodplain will experience increasing pressure from the government to move permanently to the dryland. In coming years, this pressure to relocate poses a potential risk of loss of cultural identity for the Bayei and will increase the already heavy burden for many of the female-headed households in the region. As such, this top-down and static approach to adaptation will intensify existing vulnerabilities and constrain the possibilities for transformative adaptation for residents of Etsha 13. Conclusions The impacts of climate change will continue to intensify around the globe (IPCC, 2014). As evidenced by the case of Etsha 13, in some areas these impacts will include displacement (permanent and temporary) of people from homes and sites of livelihood production. It is less certain the extent to which people will be able to respond to these impacts in effective and culturally desired ways. The case of Etsha 13 shows that adaptive responses can be the result of complex societal dynamics, both endogenous and exogenous to impacted communities. The state may not desire the same responses as residents, and not all residents will want the same responses as each other. Nor will all actors have equal capacity to adapt in desired and effective ways. Additionally, as shown by flooding variability in Etsha 13, adaptation is not just socially and ecologically constructed but also spatially variable, even at the local scale. We use this case study to show that the investigation of micropolitical dynamics can reveal existing issues of power and sources of existing vulnerabilities. Once identified, effective adaptation measures must address these root issues, thereby addressing not only the ‘‘how’’ of adaptation, but also the less explicit question of ‘‘why’’ certain actors must adapt at all. In some cases, this deeper questioning will necessitate a transformation of the social system itself, in order to foster a form of adaptation that is desired, just, and effective. As social scientists continue to engage with the concept of transformative adaptation, we must recognize that the possibilities and desires for adaptation are differential within a socio-ecological system, and that a particular adaptive response, or failure to engage in that response, can reflect critical issues of power, access, and governance. If transformative adaptation is to become a possibility, scholars and practitioners must attend to the micro-politics that have the potential to empower or undermine adaptive potential for certain actors. Acknowledgments The research that informs this article was supported by the United States National Science Foundation (BCS/GSS-0964596 and BCS/GSS Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Award1234018), the Fulbright Foundation, the Penn State Geography Department, the Penn State Africana Research Center, and the Explorer’s Club. We are grateful to Fuata John, Japhet John, and Kentse Madise for their invaluable work as research assistants, as well as to Allison White and Evan Griffin for their help with interviews. We would like to thank Aaron Dennis for making the map for this article. Finally, we offer thanks to two anonymous reviewers whose feedback helped to strengthen this manuscript. References Adger, W.N., 2006. Vulnerability. Global Environ. Change 16 (3), 268–281. Adger, W.N., Dessai, S., Goulden, M., Hulme, M., Lorenzoni, I., Nelson, D.R., Wreford, A., 2009. Are there social limits to adaptation to climate change? Climatic Change 93 (3–4), 335–354.

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