Variable rules, o.k.? Or can there be sociolinguistic grammars?

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Language& CommunicOrion, Vol. 5, No. I, pp. 5367.1985.

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VARIABLE RULES, O.K.? OR CAN THERE BE SOCIOLINGUISTIC G~MMARS? SUZANNE ROMAINE 1. Introduction’ in this paper I want to deal with two major issues which arise in trying to create a reasonable interface between so-called ‘variation theory’ and linguistic theory. As suggested by my title, I question whether there can be sociolinguistic grammars, and if so, what role variable rules might play in them. These are not entirely new issues. I have dealt with some of them before (cf. especially Romaine, 1981). Sterelny (1983) has recently covered some of the same ground. There are some points on which Sterelny and I agree. At the risk of being tedious, I will summarize them here at the outset, because elsewhere (e.g. 1983, p. 63) he has accused me of being unclear about my claims. We both seem to accept that variable rules ‘pose notational and analytical problems about the appropriate form tif rules and rule systems dealing with variation, . . . and even deeper problems about the interpretation of such rule systems’ (Sterelny, 1983, p. 47). There are some details of content in which we differ, particularly with the regard to the question of interpretation, which I will deal with here. More importantly, however, Sterelny appears to have misunderstood some of my arguments and is therefore concerned to refute them. This is particularly the case with respect to the question of whether variable rules provide coherent representations of grammars for individuals or groups. This raises the question of the kind(s) of grammars which variable rules are compatible with. One of his charges against me is, however, justified; and for honesty’s sake, I’ll just plead guilty to it now, and hope to rectify the error later (section 4). Sterelny (1983, p, 66) accuses me of failing to distinguish between epistemology and ontology. I agree that the distinction is an important one. Perhaps some of the confusion arises due to my failure to separate the two, Maybe Sterelny misunderstood the strategy of argumentation I adopted in which I criticised the variable rule model from the perspective of the epistemology Labov endorsed in proposing the notion, namely positivism. I tried to show that the concept of variable rule was not only inconsistent with claims made within ‘variation theory’ in particular, about the nature and mechanism of linguistic change, but was also incompatible with work on generative grammar. In this paper I will approach the question of whether there can be s~io~n~istic grammars in a limited sense by reference primarily to Chomsky’s views on what constitutes a grammar. I will look first at the role which grammar construction plays in relation to the goals which Chomsky sets for linguistic theory, in particular, as he has expressed them in 1980. 2. Va~abiIity and the problem of grammar construction Chomsky’s general assumptions are in many respects not very different from those of many of his predecessors such as Bloomfield, who believed that the problem of grammar construction could be solved by the postulation of rules which describe recurrent Correspondence relating to this paper should be addressed to Professor Suzanne Romaine. Merton College, University of Oxford, Oxford, U.K. 53

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arrangements of form and meaning. A grammar is from a purely descriptive point of view just a convenient way of spelling out how units of form and meaning recur. The use of rules as devices for expressing these regularities (either observed or unobserved) has occupied a prominent place in western philosophical thought, not only in disciplines like linguistics, but also in the social sciences. Likewise, the notion that language, behavior, societies, history etc. can be thought of as ‘rule-governed’ systems has a long history (cf. the discussion in Romaine, 1984). In keeping with this line of thought, some sociolinguists have implicitly defined what I will call for the moment ‘logistic grammars’ in terms of models which incorporate certain kinds of variability between units of form and meaning, and thus extend existing ‘grammar’, especially early models of transformational generative grammar, by formalizing variation. Concern with the construction of sociolinguistic grammars defined in this way has focused on two main issues: (1) Construction of devices for handling variation, e.g. Labov’s work on variable rules; De Camp’s on implicational scaling; and Klein’s on variety grammars. (2) Defining the boundaries of grammar, e.g. Labov’s, Trudgill’s, Bickerton’s and Rickford’s concern with the question of whether polylectal competence should be part of grammar (either in the individu~ or community). These issues and related concerns in variation theory have provoked a variety of arguments, which are we&known, so I will not review them here. Now, strictly speaking, Chomskyan grammars have never ruled out variation. Sterelny (1983, p. 47) cites variability in dative movement as an example of a case which can be handled by an optional transformational rule. Any theory of universal grammar carries with it implicit claims about the possible loci of variation and the kinds of factors which constrain linguistic processes. So Chomsky could quite legitimately claim (and has implicitly done so) that his grammar provides scope for variability. Furthermore, Chomsky has discussed technical solutions to the problem of representing variability not only among dialects of English, but also among languages. Thus, Sterelny’s statement (1983, p. 50) to the effect that if we accept the standard theory of grammar, the problem of inherent variation ‘disappears’, is somewhat misleading. The question of which parameters of grammar are open and can be fixed in slightly different ways through interaction with language-specific input is a major problem in the most recent versions of generative grammar, e.g. government and binding theory (cf. Chomsky, 1981). But more on variability within the context of this model later. In so far as generative grammars can ‘handle’ variation, Chomsky would see no need for sociolinguistic grammars which did nothing more than extend the form~ism of the grammar in different ways in order to incorporate variability. There is no need for alternative technical solutions since work which concentrates on this pursuit undermines the general goals of universal grammar, i.e. to provide explanations for some of the formal properties of natural language. Chomsky and Lasnik (1977, p_ 426) maintain that ‘to attain explanatory adequacy it is in general necessary to restrict the class of possible grammars, whereas the pursuit of descriptive adequacy often seems to require elaborating the mechanisms available and thus extending the class of possible grammars’. Since claims such as these about the interpretation of formalisms, rules and representations etc., have always been central to Chomsky’s formulation of the theory of universal grammar, one cannot afford to neglect these in a discussion of the problem of constructing sociolinguistic grammars. At the same time, I think one can make

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a strong intellectual case for saying that it is the interprefation of any theory which makes the formalism interesting, and therefore, one should not ignore the relationship between the task of sociolinguistic grammar construction and the implicit goals one might envisage for a sociolinguistic theory. One way to interpret the efforts of those who have tried to extend generative grammars by formalising variation is in terms of au implicit goal of observational or descriptive adequacy: i.e. a grammar is not adequate either observationally or descriptively unless it makes some provision for variation. Another interpretation is implied however by the work on panlectal competence: namely, the repr~n~tions of the grammar in some sense reflect what people know. This suggests a further goal of explanatory adequacy seen in terms of a type of psychological or mentdi realism which expresses a relationship between properties of grammar and properties of speaker/hearer knowledge. The similarity between my formulation of these implicit goals and Chomsky’s (1%5) criteria of observational, descriptive and explanatory adequacy is deliberate. His formulation of these principles is given below. Chomsky ‘s criteria of adequacy for grammars and lingidstic theory

Observational adequacy. A grammar of a language is observationally adequate if it correctly predicts which sentences are (and are not) syntactically, semantically and phonologically well-formed in the language. Descriptive adequacy. A grammar of a language is descriptively adequate if it correctly predicts which sentences are (and are not) syntactically, semantically and phonologically well-formed in the language, and also correctly describes the syntactic, semantic and phonological structure of the sentences in the languages in such a way as to provide a principled account of the native speaker’s intuitions about this structure. Explanatory adequacy. A grammar attains explanatory adequacy just in case it correctly predicts which sentences are and are not well-formed in the language, correctly describes their structure, and also does to in terms of a highly restricted set of optimally simple, universal, maximally general principles which represent psychologically plausible, natural principles of mental representation and are ‘learnable’ by the child in a limited period of time, and given access to limited data. The principles in question which define mental representation are understood to be ‘properly characterized as a system of rules that specify the properties of an unbounded set of linguistic expressions’ (Chomsky, 1981, p. 33). I will examine now the way in which these goals are tied to Chomsky’s conception of grammar as a system of rules, and are incompatible with ‘variation theory’ and attempts to construct variation grammars. I should point out that Chomsky sees his criteria as hier~~hi~~iy-ordered levels of adequacy. Explanatory adequacy is the highest goal. While many grammars might be descriptively or observationally adequate, only one will meet the highest criterion. I think it is simplistic to order these goals in a linear continuum, since the issues at stake at each level are very different, as we will see. The degree of success in the construction of sociolinguistic grammars depends on what status they are to have and what it is they are intended to represent.

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2. I. Observational,

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descriptive and explanatory adequacy in variation grammars

Let’s take first the problem of descriptive adequacy in variation grammars. It might seem fairly easy to reach the goal of descriptive adequacy without departing radically from the formal mode of grammatical description and the formalisms associated with generative grammar. Most of the preliminary attempts to construct what I will refer to loosely as ‘grammars of variation’, ‘variation grammars’ or ‘variety grammars’ have been tied quite closely, though are not necessarily logically dependent on, the prevailing orthodoxy of grammar. Proposals which fall under this heading include De Camp’s implicational scaling, Labov et af.‘s variable rule methodology and Klein’s variety grammar. De Camp and Labov have expressed a desire to keep within the confines of generative formalism, and have tried to construct their models of variation in terms of the parameters and representations already provided by generative grammar. Both claim that the analysis of variation ‘extends’ but at the same time is compatible with generative grammar. Klein and Dittmar (1979) however, make no such claims.

A brief sketch of what each of these proposals entails is given in Figs l-3. Fig. 1. Implicational scaling. Varieties

F,

v1 “z v3 “4 vs

+ + + + -

Features F2 Fs + + + + + -

-

F4 +

:

Prediction: If the product of any F x V = + , then the value above or to the left is also + .

Fig. 2. Variable rules. A+[B]/XY where [fl =f(C, D, E..) B = one or more variants of A (Ct D, E) are linguistic or social variables g [B] is the linguistic variable defined by the rule whose frequency is a function of the constraints (Cl D, E) etc. The more precise mathematical details of this model are given in Cedergren and Sankoff (1974), and subsequent modifications in the papers in Sankoff (1978).

Fig. 3. Variety grammar. Rule blocks 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

NP-N NP -c Det. N NP+Det.Adj.N NP - Det N Adj. NP+DetNAdj.

“1 n n n

n n

Where n = a probability value.

“z n n n n n

Varieties “3 “4 n n n n n n n n n n

v5 n n n n n

V6 n n n n n

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We can see at a giance the nature of the modifications required to generative grammar. De Camp (197 1 a, b) suggests that lexical items and rules can be marked with binary features. The implicational scale allows us to establish a hierarchy of varieties based on the cooccurrence of features, where the features include, e.g. { f formal], [ f standard ] etc. Variable rules and variety grammars, on the other hand, involve ‘extending’ the notion of rule of grammar to include probabilistic rules. Labov assumes that some transformational rules would be reformulated as variable rules, while others would remain categorical or obligatory. Klein and Dittmar (1979) assume that rules apply in rule blocks and can be seen as alternative expansions of category symbols in PS (phrase structure) rules, which can be probabilistically weighted. Different varieties may have different values. 2.2. Variation in universal grammar Let’s now compare Chomsky’s recent thinking on the issue of variation in universal grammar with these proposals to see what modifications to the generative machinery he believes are entailed by the existence of certain facts about variability. It may be useful to provide a diagram of what a generative grammar looks like (Fig. 4), which incorporates some of Chomsky’s more recent work on filters and control, and government and binding. Among the facts of variability which Chomsky now wishes to account for arise from certain surface distributional properties of elements that may appear in COMP. These may

Fig.

4.

Model of generative grammar (adapted from Radford, D. 430)‘.

1981, p. 390 and Chomsky and Lasnik,

1977,

Base component (a) Phrase structure rules Core grammar (b) Lexicon (1) Lexical entries (2) Redundancy rules (3) Restructuring rules (4) Inherent case marking Output of base (c) Lexical insertion D-structure Transformational component (a) Transformations (1) NP movement (or a movement) (2) WH movement (b) Conditions on transformations

Output of T-rule component

S-structure Case component (a) Case marking rules Output of case component (b) Case fibers Deletion component (a) Deletion rules (b) Conditions on deletion Output Surface Surface Output Filtered

of deletion component structure structure filters of filters surface structure

case-marked S-structure Semantic component (a) Semantic rules (b) Binding conditions (c) etc. (?) Output of semantic component

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differ according to dialect and language. Take, for instance, the following examples discussed by Chomsky and Lasnik (1977). (1) The man [COMP own the land] come over (1977, p, 438). (2) The man f COMP you met] (1977, p.435). (3) We want [COMP to win] (1977, p. 442). Where COMP + WI-I -WI-I + for,that, + WH + who, etc. The problem with (1) and (2) is that if we allow free deletion of COMP in order to allow (2) to be realized as the man you met, which is grammatical for all speakers of English, we also then generate sentences of type (1) without complementizers, which are grammatical only in certain dialects of English like BEV (Black English Vernacular). The problem with (3) is similar; namely, some dialects of English allow for-to complementizers, e.g. Ozark English, Belfast English, while standard English doesn’t. The particular facts are not of great significance; further details are given of these and other cases in Chomsky and Lasnik. Only the nature of the problems and the solutions advocated by Chomsky and Lasnik will concern me here. Basically, the problem has to do with variabihty in ~~ati~ty arising from differences in surface structure ~stribution produced by overgeneration. Given the fact that the theoretical framework determines the possibilities for constraining the grammar, we have the following options: introduce constraints at the base level, in the transformational rule component, surface filters, interpretive rules or general conditions on rule applications (Chomsky and Lasnik, 1977, p. 429). Both the base rules and transformations rules are unordered and optional. The solution adopted by Chomsky and Lasnik is to allow the grammar to overgenerate, and then impose surface filters and constraints to derive certain variants as either optional or obligatory depending on the dialect. Thus, with regard to the problem posed by sentences (I) and (2), Chomsky and Lasnik rule out an alternative solution whereby there is a special condition on the deletion of COMP elements in subject NP relative clauses. Instead, they postulate a filter for standard English, which rules out the ungrammatical cases: i.e. * [NP NP tense VP]. In the case of the third sentence type they propose another filter, which rules out for-to complementizers in standard English: i.e. * [for-to]. This has the interesting theoretical consequence that the differences in dialects reside in a difference of filters. Now it might seem at first glance that in wishing to make the grammar accountable to the distribution of surface variants that Chomsky’s goals are compatible with the aims of variationists like Labov, Sankoff, De Camp et al. After all, devices like variable rules and implicational scales account for the surface distribution of variants too. And, if that’s the case, then don’t these devices have the status of notational variants technically equivalent to surface filters, all of which have the purpose of extending generative grammar? Assuming that a grammar which was equipped with variable rules, implicational scales, surface filters etc. described a particular corpus of data, and that such descriptions are at least a part of the enterprise of constructing sociolinguistic grammars, could they all meet the criteria of descriptive and observational adequacy in the sense that Chomsky defines them? And can these variety grammars make reference to the kinds of rules belonging to generative grammars?

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Both descriptive and observational adequacy in Chomsky’s terms imply well-formedness. This is a theoretical construct which has been fairly clearly defined for generative grammars. According to Chomsky, grammars generate sentences which are to be understood as predictions about the grammaticality of classes of sentences (i.e. sentence types). Wellformedness is defined strictly within a closed system without reference to an actual corpus. In fact, Chomsky (1980, p. 199) maintains that ‘restriction of grammatical analysis to a real corpus would be about as sensible as restriction of physics or biology to motion pictures of events happening about us in normal lives’. Generative grammars do not generate true sentences or actual utterances, which are then checked for adequacy against some corpus; they generate correct sentences. The conditions on correct sentences are bound purely by devices like PS rules, movement rules, conditions, filters etc. In the most general terms then, this type of grammar is a set of devices which check derivations for well-formedness. Grammaticality is strictly a property of system sentences defined by the grammar, and the grammar is merely a formal arrangement of the devices for explicating these predictions. We can predict the sentences because they are formed by fixed assembly procedures within a closed system. In this respect the grammar is not different from other systems of formal logic. It is not easy to see how one could define the notion of sociolinguistic well-formedness within this type of system without making goals of sociolinguistic theory incompatible with those of generative grammar. What would a sociolinguistic grammar generate? Could we interpret the output of such a grammar as a set of predictions about the set of sentences which are sociolinguistically well-formed? It depends on whether one could define wellformedness within the system; but I think most would agree that sociolinguistic wellformedness has to do with appropriateness, and must therefore derive at least partly from actual or potential use. Well-formedness for sociolinguistic grammars would involve a relation defined in terms of a sentence and its use in context. The type of prediction we might expect our grammar to make would be that certain sentence types would be correct, i.e. well-formed, relative to, say, certain speech act circumstances, e.g. indirect questions are well-formed for performing the speech act of commanding, etc. This would involve matching a sentence generated by purely linguistic rules with another ‘rule’ elsewhere, which for Chomsky would lie outside the linguistic system. That is, the rule would be a condition on how the sentence could be potentially used. Is this a reasonable interpretation? I think that it already stretches the notion of generative grammar since it suggests that wellformedness has to do with the likelihood of a sentence being realized as an utterance. This means that the theory no longer has to do with types, but tokens. ‘Generate’ in the Chomskyan sense has nothing to do with real time production of potential or actual tokens. This is where the apparent similarity ends between the implicit aims of variationists and Chomsky in so far as accountability to distribution goes. Chomsky is concerned with distribution only in so far as it affects well-formedness and grammaticality, not real time distribution of utterances in relation to speakers, contexts, environments etc. The latter is part of performance. The structure of the grammar now reflects, if anything, even more strongly Chomsky’s idea that there is a common universal core of grammatical rules which are exceptional, and that languages vary within fixed limits, even though certain details of rules can obviously vary from language to language (cf. Chomsky, 1977, p. 75). If we were to build into this formalism idiosyncratic or language-specific conditions on application of rules, then it would

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be impossible to attain any universal formulation of rules like WH movement which would be valid across languages, dialects or even speakers. We couldn’t say the rule was ‘the same’. In relegating the differences between dialects and languages to a difference in filters, Chomsky is able to maintain that variation does not affect core grammar. The exclusion of variation from the common core syntactic rules shared by all humans strengthens Chomsky and Halle’s (1968) earlier claim about the basic underlying uniformity of dialects of English. Labov (1969) has expressed agreement with their conclusion, and even claimed that variable rule analysis supported it. Given the connection between formalism and the locus of variation, it is hard to see how it could do otherwise. If we examine the typical range of sociolinguistic variables dealt with by variable rule analysis, we can see that they affect relatively superficial levels of the grammar (in particular, phonology), or apply as late rules. Thus, they could be handled by surface filters or in the semantic component by interpretive rules. If it is true that there is no connection between the correctness of a sentence, i.e. its grammaticality, and the possibility of its occurrence (or what we would like to define as its sociolinguistic well-formedness) then it is a mistake to try to alter generative grammar either by reformulating some of the rules as variable rules or by linking generative rules and lexical items with features. The fact that variable rules conflate well-formedness with occurrence is a problem which has been dealt with extensively elsewhere (cf. e.g. Gazder, 1976; Kay and McDaniel 1979; Sankoff and Labov, 1979; Romaine, 1981; Kay and McDaniel, 1981; Sterelny, 1983). Kay and McDaniel (1979, p. 185) support my conclusion that it is a mistake to try to extend generative grammar as a formal theory to accommodate data on frequency since the formalism is specifically designed to account for the nature of types and not tokens. In their reply to Kay and McDaniel, Sankoff and Labov (1979) argue that variable rules make no psychological claims and that the association between generative grammar and variable rules is purely notational and has nothing to do with the substance of generative grammars. Of course, it was precisely the theoretical interpretation of variable rules which provoked such a great dispute; few doubted that as data-sorting and displaying devices they can be very useful tools in the analysis of sociolinguistic patterns. But if there is no theoretical interpretation, then variable rules and variety grammars do not consitute a theory about any empirical phenomenon (although one frequently comes across references to what goes by the name of of ‘variation theory’). In other words, the grammar describes a finished product (i.e. correlations between linguistic tokens and certain other variables) and it makes no interesting claims about sociolinguistic behavior other than to demonstrate that certain aspects of sociolinguistic behavior can be handled within the formalism developed for generative grammar, even though these rules cannot count as appropriate representations which are part of generative grammar. This is essentially the conclusion reached by Itkonen (1983, p. 17) when in questioning the value of quantitative methods he observes of ‘Labov and his school’ that: they analyse in the mintttest detail the operation of statistical causation, i.e. the variable in fluence of the linguistic and/or social context on such unrelated small-scale ‘linguistic variables as word-fmal t/d vs zero, no vs any, b/we vs zero, etc.’ But they have no original conception (or perhaps no conception) about such large-scale questions as what an overall grammar of a language will look like. Questions like this continue to be answered on the basis of qualitative data . . It is simply a fact that there are no large-scale quantitative studies that make interesting and novel claims about language, and about syntax in particular (Itkonen, 1983, p. 17).

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and speech communties

Sterelny (1983, p. 54) gives a list of what he considers to be the minimum conditions on a theory of language. I do not propose to tackle here the issue of what linguistics as a discipline is about. This is not an empirical matter. I do not think Sterelny would disagree that what is scientifically interesting is to some extent arbitrary. Nevertheless, I do not see why it should be a requirement of a theory of language that it must ‘provide an account of the relationship between an individual’s grammar and that of the speech community’. Sterelny’s (1983, p. 59) view is that there is no viable interpretation of variable rules with respect to the individual’s grammar. I agree that it does not make sense to try to interpret variable rules as rules internalized by individuals (cf. Romaine, 1981, pp. 102-103 for discussion). Sterelny (1983, p. 62) is, however, wrong when he says that I think it is a reasonable enterprise to construct a grammar of the speech community. On the contrary, my point was that the only ontological status variable rules could have within the Labovian epistemology (which is by no means clear) is that of rules which have their locus in some entity of a more abstract level than the individual, such as the sociolect or speech community. Labov (1969, p. 759) is quite explicit that the minimal unit of linguistic description is the speech community. Thus, Labov: . . . the construction of complete grammars for idiolects, even one’s own, is a fruitless and unrewardii task; we now know enough about language in its social context to realize that the grammar of the speech community is more regular and systematic than the behavior of any one individual. Unless the speech pattern is studied within the overall system of the community, it will appear as a mosaic of unaccountable and sporadic variation (Labov, 1969, p. 759).

I have argued in detail elsewhere (cf. Romaine, 1982) the issues involved in defending notions like ‘speech community’ and ‘rules of community grammar’. In particular, I have said that it is impossible to see how a community whose grammar is undergoing change can be described in terms of a variable rule which all speakers use in the same way (cf. also Kay, 1978). In Romaine (1981, p. 103) I remarked that the locus of language and the place of the individual were basic but unresolved issues (cf. also the recent treatment of these questions by Pateman, 1983). Labov’s claim is that the locus of language is in the community or group, and that the speech of any social group will be less variable than the speech of any individual. Thus, variable rules are written for groups rather than individuals, and it is maintained that there is isomorphism between individual and group grammars. At this point, it is helpful to contrast the kinds of claims which Labov makes with those of Chomsky, particularly in relation to the methodological problem of abstraction and idealization in the construction of linguistic theories. A language system or a theory about a language system may be regarded as autonomous/non-autonomous with respect to at least two dimensions: namely, whether it is dependent on or assumes the existence of individual speakers, and whether it is concerned with accounting for how the system is used (cf. Romaine, 1984, for further discussion). Chomsky and Labov base their methodologies for investigating language systems on a partial autonomy thesis. For Chomsky, the system is explicitly autonomous primarily with respect to the use of language, while for Labov it is implicitly autonomous with respect to speakers. However, each then abstracts the system away from individuals in different directions. For Chomsky, the individual is the locus of the language system. While its existence is purely internal, the individual (or rather his mind/brain) is merely the passive repository of a system. Chomsky

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does not recognize a supra-individual or external existence of language as being of relevance to linguistic theory. He says (1980, p. 116) from the fact that ‘an individual has an internalized grammar, it does not follow that there exists a “shared language”‘. Labov’s methodology, on the other hand, relies on individual speakers only to the extent that they produce the utterances or tokens of variables, i.e. the physical realizations of language, which are then analysed as if they had a transcendental existence and locus in the society or in group grammars apart from the individuals. Labov’s methodology yields in effect an ‘autonomous sociolinguistics’, which is a seeming contradiction to those who think of autonomous theories as being essentially asocial. This is, however, a result of oversimplifying the ontology problem. Different theories engage the object of enquiry (in this case, language and/or grammar) not only from the perspective of different ontologies of the world (and of language), but at different levels of abstraction within each ontology. Both Chomsky and Labov claim an empirical basis for their grammars, though each works from quite a different ontology of language and on a different level of abstraction. Attempts to build bridges between radically different ontologies by interpreting descriptive machinery or formalisms designed to analyse language at one level of abstraction within the framework of another theory only add to the confusion. This has been largely responsible for the debate about variable rules. I said earlier (2.1) that notions like variable rules, variety grammars etc. have been tied closely to, though are not logically dependent on the generative ontology. It is at this stage that I would like to redeem myself of the category error of failing to distinguish between ontology and epistemology. 4. Variation ‘theory’ and variable rules: ontology and epistemology I have shown that there is a serious disjunction between rules of grammar in Chomsky’s sense and variable rules, which prevents sociolinguistic grammars from attaining even observational adequacy. The problem becomes no less intractable if we define a sociolinguistic grammar in terms of a model which is to be interpreted as a representation of speaker capabilities. If we try to project this type of interpretation onto sociolinguistic grammars, we would need to answer the question: what is the nature and structure of the knowledge that enters into our capacity to use language. This is an implicitly stated goal of those who have developed the concept of communicative competence from a variety of perspectives (e.g. ethnomethodological, anthropological and philosophical; e.g. Hymes, 1972; Cicourel, 1973; Habermas, 1971). In its broadest formulation communicative competence involves not only a knowledge of language(s), but also ‘common-sense knowledge’. As one person has put it, it includes ‘everthing one needs in order to behave as if one were a member of a particular culture who has a particular linguistic repertoire’. If our grammar must provide formal representations for ‘rules’ of this type, we can no longer regard it as a device which generates predictions. Rules of communicative competence like the Cooperative Principle, Grice’s Maxims or Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson’s rules for turn-taking in conversations do not rely on correctness defined in terms of the limits of a logical system. Rather, they rely on conventional knowledge and have normative implications. They are both ‘regulative’ and ‘constitutive’ (to use Searle’s distinction). They tell us not only that certain things ought to be done, but also how to do certain things, e.g. how to behave in conversational interaction if one wants to be a member of group

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X (cf. von Wright [ 19711 and also Collett [ 19771 for a discussion of the nature of rules for social behavior). These are rules which govern behavior and which can ‘occur’ with observable regularity, but are not in any strict sense determined by the system of which they are a part. Sociolinguistic grammars cannot be assembly instructions which link up rules of social behavior with generative linguistic rules, and claim to describe or account for sociolinguistic behavior. Social systems, unlike generative grammars, are open, not closed systems. Knowledge of how we use grammar cannot be given in advance since social life and interaction shape communicative competence from infancy onwards (cf. Hymes, 1980, p. vi et passim). Our understanding of the constitutive rules of language use are constantly negotiated and recreated dynamically in speech situations. Communicative competence is therefore open-ended. Given (1979) has argued that formal-logical systems are inconsistent with representation of pragmatic systems. Formal-logical systems are fundamentally closed, context-free, discrete and based on deductive inference. Pragmatic systems, however, are open-ended, context-dependent, continuous and based on inductive inference. This is not the place to examine in detail Chomsky’s views on the structure of what he calls ‘pragmatic competence’ (which includes much of what was formerly referred to as ‘performance’) and its relation to grammatical competence. He speculates (Chomsky, 1980, p. 54), however, that pragmatic competence may be characterized by a system of constitutive rules represented in the mind. Nevertheless, his desire to keep syntax autonomous rests not on empirical evidence, but on a philosophical belief that the properties of universal grammar as embodied in grammatical competence are purely biological, and therefore common to all uses and users of a language. Social rules, by comparison, are man-made. Sterelny (1983, p. 60) suggests, following Pylyshyn, that social factors are much more cognitively penetrable than linguistic ones. Therefore, it doesn’t make sense to treat both as factors of equal status in writing rules, at least if the rules are to have some theoretical rather than some more purely descriptive basis. This raises the question of representation. And so far, for the sake of the argument, I have assumed implicitly that grammars in some sense provide representations for language(s). Although others have certainly thought that Chomsky believed this, this interpretation is not consistent with Chomsky’s more recent (1980) discussion of the status of rules and representations. Sankoff and Labov (1977, p. 215), for example, say that generative grammars are finite devices for generating infinite sets called languages. As far as Chomsky’s latest thinking on the relationship between grammar(s) and language(s) is concerned, it appears that there is only a tenuous link between the two. He says (1980, p. 126) that the fundamental concepts are grammar and knowing a grammar, while language and knowing a language are derivative. A grammar does not in itself define a language. I think it is fair to say that the present status of rules (and grammars) and the role they play in human behavior (linguistic and otherwise) is unclear from a philosophical perspective. The available empirical evidence does not suffice to clarify these issues. The crucial questions would appear to be determining firstly, when the behavior of a system conforms to a rule, and secondly, when we are justified in saying that the behavior is ‘caused’ by a representation of that rule. I have separated these two issues because it seems to me to make sense to recognize that there is a set of questions one can ask about the behavior of a system, which is independent of both details of the physical structure of the device (i.e. its material realization) and of its manner of functioning (i.e. its execution). At least

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in some domains of cognitive science it is accepted that one can study computational processes without regard to how they are materially realized or physically instantiated in an actual device (cf. e.g. Pylyshyn, 1980). I think that the most that can be claimed of variable rules is that they have a status similar to the algorithms of a computational theory. That is, they provide a specification of a program that is computed by a system and an account of how the system carries out the computation. The system which underlies variable rules can thus be regarded as both rule-governed and computational. 5. Compu~tion without ~p~sent~~on: variable rules, O.K.? The question which must concern us now is the problem of how one decides what properties an object such as grammar seen as a computational system must have in order to be capable of functioning as a representation. If one cannot defend an ontology in which variable rules have a representations status akin to that postulated for Chomskyan rules of grammar then we must decide whether the model alone generates enough of intellectual interest without having a higher level theoretical interpretation. If such a model which made no claims about mental reality were worth pursuing, then in effect, we’d be endorsing computational rules without representation. To extend the analogy, we might say that this puts us in the philosophic~ly awkward position of defending an epistemology without an ontology. Deciding such matters is not easy for a number of reasons. For one thing, I find it hard to believe that the formal abstract objects which linguists call grammars can refer to anything of higher ontological significance (cf. the discussion in Katz, 1981). Arguments about the psychological reality of linguistic entities have to a large extent been ‘invented’ to warrant knowledge claims which already receive all the warrant they can receive within the context of the enterprise of language description and grammar construction. It is of course my own fault if I can’t be persuaded by the realist point of view; but more on the problems of realism later. A second reason why ontological matters are contentious with regard to rules and grammars is that rules of different kinds will have different characters and ‘causal powers’ (to use Harre and Madden’s [ 19751 term) depending on the nature of the system in which they are embedded and the claims that are made for it. A number of different mentalist interpretations have been argued in relation to Chomskyan rules. Chomsky (1980, p. IO) himself says that grammatical competence is a ‘system of rules that generate and relate certain mental representations’. He makes it clear that ‘generative grammar does not, in itself, prescribe the character or functioning of a perceptual model or a model of speech production’ (Chomsky, 1965, p. 9). I noted earlier the confusion which has arisen over Chomsky’s use of the term ‘generate’. For Chomsky, generation is mathematical and not psychological. Grammar is internally represented whether or not speakers generate sentences according to its rules. Rules in this sense are not objects that can be used or executed. Fodor (1975) explicates in detail this sort of representational theory of mind, in which grammar is seen as a system of encoded mentally represented rules which are followed in the exercise of certain linguistic abilities, e.g. making intuitive judgements. The fact that psycholinguistic research does not yet appear to have shown that there is a connection between the production of sentences by a grammar and the production of sentences by a speaker demonstrates that a ‘real time computational’ interpretation is at present misguided. Nevertheless, there has been considerable discussion of computational

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theories of cognition, although the arguments in support of them are largely nondemonstrative since computational models of neurophysiology are not well developed (cf. the discussion in Fodor, 1980). Pylyshyn (1980) elaborates the conditions which would need to be met if a literal view of mental activity as computation is to serve as the basis of explanatory theories. It is for further research in cognitive science to spell out what is entailed by claims to the effect that mental states, events or processes are computational, and whether the analogy between computation and cognition which has given rise to the computational view of mind can be defended. Sterelny (1983, pp. 65-66) is clearly an advocate of realism. Therefore, objections to Labov’s assumptions (and those of others) of isomorphism and the phenomenon described by a model. Thus, Labov:

he dismisses my between models

. . . we can say that the kinds of solutions offered to probkms such as consonant dusta simptificstion. copula deletion and negative concord represent abstract relations of linguistic elements that are deeply embedded in the data. It is reasonable to suppose that they are more than the constructions of the analyst, they are the properties of language itself (Labov, 1972, p. 259).

There is clearly no warrant at this stage for interpreting variable rules as mentally represented program rules used in the execution of the behavior they attempt to describe. Pylyshyn (1980, p. 124) draws a distinction between executing an algorithm and emulating a functional architecture, which in my view is crucial. This has a bearing on the question of which aspects of computation can be taken as part of a model and which aspects are merely technical implementation details necessitated by the fact that at the level of actual hardware, electronic computers have a functional architecture different from that of the brain. For example, the Cedergren-Sankoff program, which is used to compute the probabilities associated with variable rules assumes that variable constraints are independent in carrying out its calculations. The non-interaction of constraints follows however, not from properties of the data (since there are cases where these constraints have been shown to interact); nor can this assumption be part of a model of language change because change is impossible without interaction (cf. Romaine [ 1981, pp. 98-991 and Kay [ 19781 for further discussion). Since it can only derive from computational properties of the model, we are not entitled to ascribe real status to the non-interaction principle. Only the program’s output can be interpreted as referring to the model and no claims can be supported about the intermediate states. Sterelny (1983, p. 59) appears to agree with me in the view that variable rules cannot be seen as primitive computational processes in the mind; nor can they be understood as intrinsic features of human mental architecture. The latter is a term used by Pylyshyn to refer to functions that are explicable biologically rather than in terms of rules and representations. In other words, it does not make sense to interpret variable rules as either encoded or computed programs. I don’t condemn realism per se, but surely there is a naive correspondence theory of truth behind Labov’s view that a language is like its description. Sterelny (1983, p. 65) believes that ‘we must take a realist attitude towards the entities posited by our theories’. I have argued instead for instrumentalism since the kind of phenomena (socio-) linguists want to account for involves the behavior of human beings. Sterelny implies in his brief remarks about physics that there is a simple route of inference relating the unobservables of theories to the observables of the ‘real’ world. Even neo-positivist philosophers of science like Popper (1972) consider this idea to be unfounded. There is a basic difference between the so-called physical sciences and the sciences which deal with human beings, which has

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a number of theoretical and methodological implications. In particular, the notion of causality and the role it plays in explanation are critically different (cf. Romaine [ 19841 for further discussion). One reason why the computational theory of mind is often rejected by philosophers is that computers lack intentionality and understanding and they have no mental states. Sterelny (1983, p. 64) does not accept my argument that knowledge involves understanding. The laws which scientists posit as governing the behavior of entities are generally required to be causally efficacious in order to be considered truly explanatory. Within the representational theory of mind the assumption is made that there are causal relations between representations. And within social sciences in general, rules or laws are understood as causing the behavior they explain. Thus, in Chomsky’s theory, when a person makes judgements of grammaticality, etc., his behavior is caused by a representation of a rule or rules. This is a different state of affairs to what happens in the practice of the physical sciences, where laws are formulated to explain the behavior of certain phenomena, but play no role in producing it. Physicists don’t talk about the laws of gravity being encoded in physical objects which are governed by them. Nor do astronomers talk about planets having symbolic representations of their orbits. The kinds of rules one would want to make reference to in the study of sociolinguistic behavior are partly social and man-made. Therefore, they will not admit formulation in the same system of notation that Chomsky adopts for the representation of rules in universal grammar. It does not make sense to me to postulate the existence of a grammar with an ad hoc mixture of biological, computational and representation processes. If the construction of sociolinguistic grammars is a reasonable task at all, it requires a considerable conceptual leap or departure from currently fashionable views about grammar. NOTES ‘I am especially grateful to Beatriz Lavandera for stimulating discussion of the issues raised in Chomsky (1980). *I will not be concerned here with the phonological level of representation or universal phonetics-nor with variable phonological rules or processes. I will also ignore the problem of how the phonological component is interrelated with the syntactic and semantic components, and whether some phonological rules need to be interspersed with transformations. Chomsky and Lasnik (1977, p. 432, n. 18) also admit an alternative solution to lexical insertion which would allow it to take place in surface structure. These details of execution are irrelevant to the general points I make here.

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