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Verdict of "Aggravated by Neglect" Quashed
1135 put shortly, the Court found that it could not align this case with R v Quick (1973) QB 910, which was the case of a diabetic who was suffering from hypoglycaemia and who inflicted actual bodily harm. On appeal it was held that the alleged mental condition was caused not by his diabetes, but by his use of insulin prescribed by the doctor. This was an external factor and the defence of automatism should have been left to the jury. If the condition had been caused by the diabetes, then it would seem the defence would have been
insanity. Irresistible impulse had never been a complete defence in English law. The criminal law had a duty to protect the public. If the law required changing, then it would be a matter for Parliament to bring in legislation; the matter would need consideration by the Law Commission. It was not the Court’s function to change the law.
Comment When directing the jury, the Recorder of London had indicated that the evidence was that the appellant had acted consciously and knowingly; she knew what she was doing and could not ’control it. There was no evidence of automatism. Insanity was not pleaded and it is doubtful whether it could have succeeded on the evidence. I would therefore agree that there was no complete substantive defence for the appellant under English law as it stands. When considering the argument for change, two factors must be weighed in the balance: fairness to the individual woman suffering from PMS and fairness to the public at large. The courts have now shown themselves willing to accept PMS as a mitigating factor, so that, in suitable cases, a charge of murder may be commuted to manslaughter and a prison sentence exchanged for a probation and medical treatment order. What would not be in the public interest would be to remove the court’s control over an individual who is prevalent to acts of violence and whose conduct might constitute a real menace to public safety and public property. It would be most undesirable for a woman suffering from PMS and prone to violence to be able to go out and commit a series of offences without restraint. Lord Devlin’s defence of the M’Naghten rules has general applicability in this situation, and I should like to endorse his’
comment2:
"As it is a matter of theory, I think there is something logical-it may be astringently logical, but it is logical-in selecting as the test of responsibility to the law, reason and reason alone. It is reason which makes a man responsible to the law. It is reason which gives him sovereignty over animate and inanimate things. It is what distinguishes him from animals, which emotional disorder
does not; it is what makes him man; it is what makes him subject to the law. So it is fitting that nothing other than a defect of reason should give complete absolution." "
R v Smith. Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, Griffiths L3; Pain and Beldam 11. April 27, 1982.
At 3.15 p.m. the station officer and constable gave Mr Langdale a breath test which was positive. They called the police surgeon, who arrived at 3.45 and took a blood sample (which was later reported to have an alcohol level of 33 mg/dl). He concluded that Mr Langdale was drunk and unfit to drive. Mr Langdale was put in a detention cell where he lay slumped until nearly 10 p.m. His condition, if anything, appeared worse. The new duty sergeant was concerned and recalled the surgeon. Various inquiries were made as unease and suspicion of complications grew; clearly, Mr Langdale should have sobered up to some extent after so many hours, whereas he in fact appeared worse. He was admitted to hospital, where a casualty officer diagnosed drunkenness. X-ray examination was normal and the patient was put to bed. At 3 a.m. next morning, the duty doctor recorded diminished plantar responses. At 5.30 a.m. a lumbar puncture led to a diagnosis of subarachnoid haemorrhage. The patient suffered a further haemorrhage that morning and died the next day. Understandably, the widow could not accept his death as being solely due to natural causes. At an inquest before a jury, the verdict was death due to "natural causes aggravated by neglect".
There was no suggestion of neglect after admission to hospital, so the verdict related to the time spent in police custody. The coroner made recommendations which were reported in the press; the police surgeon was concerned as to his professional reputation, and brought an application under s.6 of the Coroner Act 1877 for an order to quash the verdict given on Feb. 10, 1981, the chief submission being that there was no evidence on which the verdict of "aggravated by neglect" could properly be based. Glidewell J considered this ground first and reviewed the evidence. The doctor was an experienced police surgeon; Mr Langdale had shown all the symptoms of drunkenness and no clinical signs of subarachnoid haemorrhage; there was no previous medical history; the police surgeon did not believe Mr Langdale’s claim to have drunk only 31/2 pints of beer; he was only recalled 7 hours later at 10 p.m., when he suspected complications; when Mr Langdale was admitted to hospital, the diagnosis of drunkenness was confirmed by a casualty officer. A pathologist testified that spontaneous rupture of cerebral aneurysm was a known cause of unexpected death, and the symptoms were identical to drunkenness, so, when drink was consumed, it was very difficult to distinguish the two conditions. Another witness explained that only a few people survived rupture of a cerebral aneurysm: one third died immediately, almost all the others after hours or days, often after a second haemorrhage. Here the first haemorrhage would have been sufficient to cause death. Had the patient been admitted to hospital earlier, the diagnosis would have been the same a few hours sooner. It was no more probable, however, that the second haemorrhage would not have occurred, and he would still have died, since he had a fatal condition. The judge held that before a verdict of neglect could properly be given, there must be some evidence that the neglect, if any, caused death. In conclusion, there was only the slimmest of evidence of any
given that "with hindsight" perhaps haemorrhage should have been considered as a possibility), on which it would be unsafe to rely. The matter became quite clear, however, when causation was considered. There was no evidence at all that what happened between Mr Langdale’s arrival at the police station and his admission to hospital in any way caused his death. The only relevant evidence was clearly and categorically to the contrary. Thus, the jury was not entitled to bring in a verdict of "aggravated by neglect"; the coroner should not have left it to them, and the inquisition would be quashed. It was not necessary to consider the question of natural justice: the police surgeon had not been legally represented at the inquest and had not been warned or given the opportunity to meet any accusation of neglect; the last ground of appeal contended that a breach of rule 33 of Coroners Rules 1953, as amended in 1977, had been committed by bringing in a verdict of "aggravated by neglect". Applying Campbell v McEwen, which was a binding authority, Glidewell _7 said that it neglect (i.e.,
two answers
subarachnoid
Verdict of "Aggravated
by Neglect" Quashed
AN
apparently healthy young married man of 27, Mr Stephen Langdale, was employed by a firm of butchers as an assistant district manager. On Nov. 23, 1980, he and two colleagues went to inspect a shop in Ware, Herts. They finished by midday, and went to a pub for drinks. Mr Langdale later said he had drunk 31f2 pints of beer. After dropping off one of his colleagues he set off for home. At about 2.45 p.m. when almost home, his car ran off the road at a roundabout and crashed into railings. He was not badly injured; he got out and staggered backwards, clutching his head. People nearby thought he was drunk. He sat on a chair outside a nearby pub. Shortly afterwards a young police constable in a van was called to the scene. He found the car much damaged with vomit over the driver’s seat; Mr Langdale had since vomited again. His breath smelt of alcohol, he was incoherent, and he stood up unsteadily. He was arrested for being unfit to drive through drink and taken to Chingford police station in the van. 2. Mental
abnormality and the criminal
Objectives. Toronto, 1963. 71,
law. In: MacDonald R
85.
St J,
ed.
Changing Legal
was
difficult
to
understand how he could hold that the verdict of
aggravated by neglect could be a breach of rule R v County of London Coroner 1982. QBD.
ex
33.
parte Rubinstein. Glidewell _7. Feb. 19,
DIANA BRAHAMS Barrister-at-Law
insanity. Irresistible impulse had never been a complete defence in English law. The criminal law had a duty to protect the public. If the law required changing, then it would be a matter for Parliament to bring in legislation; the matter would need consideration by the Law Commission. It was not the Court’s function to change the law.
Comment When directing the jury, the Recorder of London had indicated that the evidence was that the appellant had acted consciously and knowingly; she knew what she was doing and could not ’control it. There was no evidence of automatism. Insanity was not pleaded and it is doubtful whether it could have succeeded on the evidence. I would therefore agree that there was no complete substantive defence for the appellant under English law as it stands. When considering the argument for change, two factors must be weighed in the balance: fairness to the individual woman suffering from PMS and fairness to the public at large. The courts have now shown themselves willing to accept PMS as a mitigating factor, so that, in suitable cases, a charge of murder may be commuted to manslaughter and a prison sentence exchanged for a probation and medical treatment order. What would not be in the public interest would be to remove the court’s control over an individual who is prevalent to acts of violence and whose conduct might constitute a real menace to public safety and public property. It would be most undesirable for a woman suffering from PMS and prone to violence to be able to go out and commit a series of offences without restraint. Lord Devlin’s defence of the M’Naghten rules has general applicability in this situation, and I should like to endorse his’
comment2:
"As it is a matter of theory, I think there is something logical-it may be astringently logical, but it is logical-in selecting as the test of responsibility to the law, reason and reason alone. It is reason which makes a man responsible to the law. It is reason which gives him sovereignty over animate and inanimate things. It is what distinguishes him from animals, which emotional disorder
does not; it is what makes him man; it is what makes him subject to the law. So it is fitting that nothing other than a defect of reason should give complete absolution." "
R v Smith. Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, Griffiths L3; Pain and Beldam 11. April 27, 1982.
At 3.15 p.m. the station officer and constable gave Mr Langdale a breath test which was positive. They called the police surgeon, who arrived at 3.45 and took a blood sample (which was later reported to have an alcohol level of 33 mg/dl). He concluded that Mr Langdale was drunk and unfit to drive. Mr Langdale was put in a detention cell where he lay slumped until nearly 10 p.m. His condition, if anything, appeared worse. The new duty sergeant was concerned and recalled the surgeon. Various inquiries were made as unease and suspicion of complications grew; clearly, Mr Langdale should have sobered up to some extent after so many hours, whereas he in fact appeared worse. He was admitted to hospital, where a casualty officer diagnosed drunkenness. X-ray examination was normal and the patient was put to bed. At 3 a.m. next morning, the duty doctor recorded diminished plantar responses. At 5.30 a.m. a lumbar puncture led to a diagnosis of subarachnoid haemorrhage. The patient suffered a further haemorrhage that morning and died the next day. Understandably, the widow could not accept his death as being solely due to natural causes. At an inquest before a jury, the verdict was death due to "natural causes aggravated by neglect".
There was no suggestion of neglect after admission to hospital, so the verdict related to the time spent in police custody. The coroner made recommendations which were reported in the press; the police surgeon was concerned as to his professional reputation, and brought an application under s.6 of the Coroner Act 1877 for an order to quash the verdict given on Feb. 10, 1981, the chief submission being that there was no evidence on which the verdict of "aggravated by neglect" could properly be based. Glidewell J considered this ground first and reviewed the evidence. The doctor was an experienced police surgeon; Mr Langdale had shown all the symptoms of drunkenness and no clinical signs of subarachnoid haemorrhage; there was no previous medical history; the police surgeon did not believe Mr Langdale’s claim to have drunk only 31/2 pints of beer; he was only recalled 7 hours later at 10 p.m., when he suspected complications; when Mr Langdale was admitted to hospital, the diagnosis of drunkenness was confirmed by a casualty officer. A pathologist testified that spontaneous rupture of cerebral aneurysm was a known cause of unexpected death, and the symptoms were identical to drunkenness, so, when drink was consumed, it was very difficult to distinguish the two conditions. Another witness explained that only a few people survived rupture of a cerebral aneurysm: one third died immediately, almost all the others after hours or days, often after a second haemorrhage. Here the first haemorrhage would have been sufficient to cause death. Had the patient been admitted to hospital earlier, the diagnosis would have been the same a few hours sooner. It was no more probable, however, that the second haemorrhage would not have occurred, and he would still have died, since he had a fatal condition. The judge held that before a verdict of neglect could properly be given, there must be some evidence that the neglect, if any, caused death. In conclusion, there was only the slimmest of evidence of any
given that "with hindsight" perhaps haemorrhage should have been considered as a possibility), on which it would be unsafe to rely. The matter became quite clear, however, when causation was considered. There was no evidence at all that what happened between Mr Langdale’s arrival at the police station and his admission to hospital in any way caused his death. The only relevant evidence was clearly and categorically to the contrary. Thus, the jury was not entitled to bring in a verdict of "aggravated by neglect"; the coroner should not have left it to them, and the inquisition would be quashed. It was not necessary to consider the question of natural justice: the police surgeon had not been legally represented at the inquest and had not been warned or given the opportunity to meet any accusation of neglect; the last ground of appeal contended that a breach of rule 33 of Coroners Rules 1953, as amended in 1977, had been committed by bringing in a verdict of "aggravated by neglect". Applying Campbell v McEwen, which was a binding authority, Glidewell _7 said that it neglect (i.e.,
two answers
subarachnoid
Verdict of "Aggravated
by Neglect" Quashed
AN
apparently healthy young married man of 27, Mr Stephen Langdale, was employed by a firm of butchers as an assistant district manager. On Nov. 23, 1980, he and two colleagues went to inspect a shop in Ware, Herts. They finished by midday, and went to a pub for drinks. Mr Langdale later said he had drunk 31f2 pints of beer. After dropping off one of his colleagues he set off for home. At about 2.45 p.m. when almost home, his car ran off the road at a roundabout and crashed into railings. He was not badly injured; he got out and staggered backwards, clutching his head. People nearby thought he was drunk. He sat on a chair outside a nearby pub. Shortly afterwards a young police constable in a van was called to the scene. He found the car much damaged with vomit over the driver’s seat; Mr Langdale had since vomited again. His breath smelt of alcohol, he was incoherent, and he stood up unsteadily. He was arrested for being unfit to drive through drink and taken to Chingford police station in the van. 2. Mental
abnormality and the criminal
Objectives. Toronto, 1963. 71,
law. In: MacDonald R
85.
St J,
ed.
Changing Legal
was
difficult
to
understand how he could hold that the verdict of
aggravated by neglect could be a breach of rule R v County of London Coroner 1982. QBD.
ex
33.
parte Rubinstein. Glidewell _7. Feb. 19,
DIANA BRAHAMS Barrister-at-Law