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Watergate and détente: A content analysis of five communist newspapers
LEON HURWITZ
Watergate and DCtente: A Content Analysis of Five Communist Newspapers*
This paper inquires into a sample of perceptions of the American political system and society as expressed in Communist press coverage of news relating to the Watergate affair during 31 days of political uncertainty in the United States. It is a cross-national content analysis of five newspapers’ interpretations during two periods between July 24 and September 15, 1974. My previous research l has shown that the Watergate affair generated considerable attention and “ news play ” in the Western democratic elite press. This paper focuses upon the Communist press in order to note (1) the extent to which Watergate* I would like to acknowledge the extraordinary assistance given me during the preparation of this article by Ms. Carol Patrick of the Cleveland State University Libraries. Professors Barbara Green, Sidney Kraus, Jae-won Lee, and Hans Segal read portions of an earlier version and their comments are appreciated. The Department of Political Science, Cleveland State University, provided financial assistance; Ms. Lidia Catena, Mr. Philip Gerstein, and Mr. John Yurkiw graciously provided translation assistance; and Ms. Jeannette Kaufman provided excellent typing assistance. I alone am responsible for the errors contained in this essay. A complete methodological appendix and raw data are available upon request from the author. Press Reactions to the Resigna1. See Leon Hurwitz et -al., “International tion and Pardon of Richard M. Nixon: A Content Analvsis of Four Elite Newspapers,” paper delivered at the Association for Education in Journalism Convention, International Communication Division, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada (August 1975), 32 pp. SNIXES M Cohiplrrunvs
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relevant news was communicated to its readers, (2) the images of the United States projected by such news, and (3) the extent to which the current policy of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union affected the amount and type of information relevant to President Nixon’s resignation and subsequent pardon. The newspapers reviewed in this study were selected in accordance with two a priori goals: 1. The newspapers selected were to be divided roughly into those considered to be “ official ” newspapers of the state and those considered to be only one among many newspapers competing in an “ open ” society. This division was employed to facilitate the observation of differences, if any, between the official policy of the Soviet Union and the views of Communist parties within non-Communist countries. 2. The newspapers were to represent a reasonable cross-cultural mix, ” nearness ” to Watergate, and different journalistic standards. From the newspapers that met these goals, five were selected for analysis: the Daily World (New York), I’Humanite’ (Paris), Izvestiia (Moscow), Pravda (Moscow), and I’Unitci (Rome). Zzvestiia and Pravda * are “ official ” newspapers and, as Soviet publications, originate in a world power whose views and policies 2. Zzvesliia is the official organ of the Soviet Presidium and devotes more attention than Pravda to international affairs. Izvestiia’s editor between 1959 and 1964 was Alexei Adzhubei, but he was dismissed when his father-in-law, Nikita Khrushchev, lost power. Izvestiia is characterized by John Merrill as trying “ to raise the cultural level of the Soviet people, an objective in common with the other big, national or ‘all-union ’ dailies. Whatever is considered harmful, degrading or purely entertaining is not printed. Such subjects as crime, romance, social items, and human interest features do not find a place in the pages of Izvestiia.” See John C. Merrill, The Elite Press: Great Newspapers of the World (New York: Pitman, 1968), p. 98. Izvestiia is published six days a week (not on Monday) in 22 cities across the Soviet Union. The Sunday issue is six pages and the other issues run to four pages. The Europa Yearbook, Vol. I, Part II (London: Europa Publications, 1976), p. 1223, approximates Izvestiia’s circulation at 8,600,OOO. Merrill (pp. 90-100) writes that Pravda “stands at the apex of the Soviet press system and sets policy journalistically and disseminates official Party doctrine throughout the entire Union. . . . Its editor is usually a very high Party member.. . and its reputation for giving the official ‘line ’ on all important matters makes it essential reading.. . . It is so important that it can be considered a special state institution. . . . [It is] the ‘ guardian of the Party line ’ . . . and the other media follow its lead.” Pruvda’s approximate daily (Sunday included) circulation is 9,700,OOO. c.c.-2
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have a direct and immediate impact upon U.S. domestic and external political processes and policies. These two Soviet publications are also generally considered to be examples of the “ international elite ” press. Although the term “ international’ elite ” does not have a precise meaning, there is general agreement on some of the characteristics that a newspaper should possess in order to be classified as “ elite.” Such a newspaper has at least a national and often an international circulation rather than a limited regional or local circulation; its readership comprises the educated, influential, and politically active segments of its society; its content stresses national and international news and downplays strictly local concerns; and it emphasizes political, social, economic, and cultural issues rather than crime, sex, sports, or human interest stories3 L’Humanifk, published by the French Communist Party, and I’Ur~itci,~ published by the Italian Communist Party, are not “ official ” state newspapers; they must compete with other French and Italian newspapers in the open market. The French and Italian Left are not, however, dormant ideologies. Witness the close election between the Federation of the Left’s Francois Mitterrand and Giscard d’Estaing in the 1974 French Presidential election and the growing aperturu ad sinistra in Italy. L’Humanite’ and I’Unitci are newspapers of standing in their respective societies, although neither approaches the status of Pravda or Qvestiia. The tifth newspaper-the American Communist Party’s Daily World 5-is an anomaly among the five newspapers in the study. The 3. See Merrill, op. cit., pp. 3-54 for an excellent discussion of the attributes of an elite newspaper. Merrill places Pravda in the top ten of all elite newspapers and Zzvestiia within the secondary elite (positions 11-20). 4. Founded in 1904, I’Humanitt has had a long history as a radical Paris newspaper. Published in a daily early morning edition, its circulation is approximately 161,000 and there are usually IO-12 pages per issue. The Sunday publication of the French Communist Party, l’Humanit&Dimanche, is not included in this study. Published by the Italian Communist Party since 1924, I’Vnitd is an articulate and responsible spokesman of the large (1,715,900 members) PCI. The Party advocates far-reaching economic, social, and political reforms for Italy; it insists upon a purely Italian path to socialism; it has had a responsible history of efficient municipal management; and it advocates an independent foreign policy for peace, cooperation, and East-West detente. L’Vnitd is published seven days a week, and has a circulation of 150,000. 5. The Daily World traces its journalistic lineage to the Ohio Socialist (1918). The Toiler (1918), The Worker (1922), The baily Worker (1922), and The Worker (1958). The newspaper characterizes itself as “the only daily Marxist newspaper in the United States” and advertises that it presents a Marxist-Leninist working-class analysis of most phenomena and that it sup-
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Daily World is totally submerged by most, if not all, other American
newspapers, and it is simply not a very viable force in the American political communication process. The Daily World exhibits a standard of journalism far below even that of 1’Humanit.G and I’lJnifd, and its blatant ideological nature far overwhelms that of Pravda or Zzvestiia. The study covers a span of 31 days consisting of two separate time units: the 23-day period between July 24 and August 15, 1974, and the S-day period between September 8 and 15, 1974. It is, of course, grossly inaccurate to assert that Nixon’s resignation stemmed from events that occurred only after July 23, 1974. One would, at least on one level of analysis, have to identify the June 17, 1972, break-in at the Watergate, or the opening of the Ervin Committee Hearings in May 1973, or even the removal of Special Prosecutor Cox in October 1973, as events leading to the resignation. On a deeper and more abstract level, some commentators have pointed to flaws within Nixon himself-flaws that pre-date Watergate-which led inexorably to the resignation.@ But this study is not an attempt to identify psychological first causes, and July 24-a crucial turning point within the Watergate affair-has been isolated as the beginning date. Prior to this date, the President still maintained widespread support and had various options open to him; after it, the only realistic options still remaining were either resignation or impeachment. This span includes the following frenetic and explosive events from immediately prior to the resignation until President Ford’s pardon of Nixon : A. The July 24 unanimous (8-O) Supreme Court ruling against President Nixon in The United States v. Richard Nixon (confidentiality of executive documents did not extend to alleged criminal activity and the President had to furnish the required tapes to Special Prosecutor Jaworski). B. The opening of the televised segment of the House Judiciary Committee Hearings (the Rodino Impeachment Hearings). C. The House Judiciary Committee votes on the Articles of Impeachment. D. The White House release of the Nixon-Haldeman conversation of June 21, 1972 (Nixon’s “ confession ” of obstructing justice). the Black Liberation Movement, equal rights for women, and all oppressed people. The circulation manager of the Daily World puts its circulation at 35,000. 6. Gary Wills, in “The Hiss Connection Through Nixon’s Life,” The New York Times Magazine, August 25, 1974, p. 8ff., presents a persuasive argument that the resignation of President Nixon had as a “first cause ” his involvement in the Hiss-Chamber case.
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E. The almost total loss of Republican support for the President, particularly within the House Judiciary Committee, over Impeachment Article I (obstruction of justice) by former Nixon supporters (especially Rep. Wiggins of California). F. The resignation of the President (August 7). G. Ford’s accession to the Presidency and his first week in office (August 8-15). H. President Ford’s total and complete pardon of Nixon, and the week subsequent to the pardon (September 8-15). Methodology
All articles and printed material other than advertisements which dealt with or treated the United States, its societal processes, or its population (either singly or jointly) and which appeared in the five reviewed papers during the two time periods were coded in a display analysis, and the Watergate-relevant articles were further coded within a directional analysis. A display analysis was employed to derive an “ attention score ” for each article or printed item and thus account quantitatively for the very real qualitative differences and physical characteristics of the printed material. Newspaper articles are of differing length, placement, page location, graphics, and source. Because the unit of analysis was the entire printed article, all articles could not be treated equally. The display analysis identified and gave greater weight to the more “ important” articles through the assignment of a higher “ attention score.” These attention scores provided, in turn, the necessary raw data for the directional analysis. In order to analyze the perceptions of American political and social processes appearing in the five Communist newspapers during this period of political uncertainty, six attributes, or “ traits,” were identified and listed within the Watergate-relevant category. They were (1) President Nixon, (2) President (and Vice-President) Ford, (3) the Administration, (4) the political system, (5) U.S. society, and (6) foreign policy. The six traits focus upon the Executive and then expand from the central actor(s) in concentric rings to the Administration, to the public governmental political process, through to the people and society, ending at foreign policy, the cutting edge of the perceptions of the United States attributable to four of these newspapers. A given newspaper could have disparate but logical views toward the six distinct traits. By isolating the traits within Watergate, and determining whether the content of each article was favorable, unfavorable or neutral-balanced toward the trait(s), one is able to analyze the
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attitudes of the newspapers toward the United States when Watergate is at issue. One newpaper might very well be supportive of the former President and present unfavorable content regarding the Jaworski “ witch-hunt ” or the Rodino Committee’s “ kangaroo court “; another might very well praise the decorum and solemnity of the vote on the Articles of Impeachment and offer pejorative comments on President Nixon’s intelligence, ability to govern, or capability for criminal activity. The totality of the individual newspaper’s perceptions -the combination of all six traits-represented its printed image of the United States when seen through Watergate-tinted newsprint.’ Data Presentation
This section contains a brief discussion of some attributes of Watergate-relevant articles as compared with other U.S. news articles, some comments on the actual amount of Watergate news published by the newspapers, and a discussion of the degree of bias toward the six traits. The Daily World, l’Humanite’, Izvestiia, Pravda, and I’Unitd all perceived Watergate-relevant articles as more salient than other U.S. news; these articles received more “play ” than non-Watergate articles.8 Watergate articles were on the whole longer and had a higher mean attention score than non-Watergate articles. Most of the values presented in footnote 8 appear too high to warrant the view that this greater “ play ” was unconscious or unintended. In regard to the variable of length within the display analysis, the percentage differences range from a high of +97*4 (Zzvestiia) to a low of +38.0 (Daily World). All five newspapers perceived the 23day period of the resignation as more salient than the 8-day period of the pardon. This can be seen on two levels: first, in the smaller percentage increase in the mean length of pardon-relevant articles compared with the percentage increase in the mean length of resignation-relevant articles (in fact, three newspapers-l’Huma&P, Izvestiia, and Pravda-printed shorter pardon-relevant articles than those of U.S. newspapers during September 8-15); and, second, in the smaller 7. The degree of imbalance or bias present in the newspapers reviewed was calculated by employing the Janis-Fadner Coefficient of Imbalance statistic. See Irving L. Janis and Raymond Fadner, “The Coefficient of Imbalance,” Chap, 8 of Language of Politics: Studies in Quantitative Semantics, edited by Harold D. Lasswell, Nathan Leites and Associates (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965), pp. 153-169. For a summary version of the Coefficients, see Richard W. Budd et al., Content Analysis of Communications (New York: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 55-56. 8. For footnote, see p. 250.
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absolute mean length of pardon-relevant articles compared with resignation articles. The pardon was seen as anticlimactic, and the Communist press gave it less emphasis and “ news play ” than it gave the resignation. But mean length is only one of the five display variables. When the totality of the display analysis is examined-the attention scores-the salience of Watergate compared with non-Watergate news attention, 8. The following figures illustrate the salience of Watergate news compared with other (non-Watergate) U.S. news: A. Mean Length (column inches) of Watergate-Relevant and Other U.S. News Articles: DAILY
III;goition -rootal
w%Ye 222 247
Resignation
WFYe
Pardon Total
Reegtion Total
Il.5
16 7 Wa7igare ;:;
WORLD
yy!; 20.5 179 L’HUMANITE “77 12% IO.0 IZVESTIIA “%
45 3.8 PRAVDA
o%r ;:g
B. Mean Attention
Score, Watergate-Relevant
Dif&e$ce
% D;f&c
+1.7 +W3 Difpgy
-1.1 +67 Difference -k&2
7::: DiH;;egncc -1.5 +43
+ 8.3 + 38.0 To Difference
flll.9
T
6%
% ,“;ff$,,, +
33.3 97.4
% Difference +476 -31.3 +a.4
and Other U.S. News Articles:
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and the salience of resignation compared with pardon news attention, are underscored. All five newspapers generate a higher mean attention score for Watergate than for non-Watergate articles. The range for the full 31-day period is from a 27 increase (29.1 percent) for the Daily World to a 06 increase (9.1 percent) for Izvestiia. This greater salience of, and emphasis upon, Watergate-relevant news compared with other U.S. news should not be surprising, for Watergate did represent a significant and newsworthy event. But the press discussion of the salience of Watergate dealt only with internalized relations, offering no comment whatsoever as to the actual amount of Watergate news. In other words, the salience of Watergate says that if and when a newspaper printed a Watergate article, such an article would, on the whole, receive greater emphasis than nonWatergate news. In this section I wish to discuss briefly the actual amount of coverage that these newspapers presented on Watergate, in terms of both inter- and intranewspaper comparisons. An examination of the raw article frequencies, column inches, and attention scores generated in the display analysis indicates that the two Soviet newspapers did not, on either quantitative or evaluative grounds, publish the full Watergate “ story.” Pravda and Zzvestiia published very little on Watergate, and what was printed was incomplete, misleading, or both. Pravda, in fact, constantly referred to Watergate as the “ so-called Watergate affair ” as if there were doubts to its actual existence. The Communist newspapers in the Western democracies-the Daily World, l’Humanite’, and I’Vnitd-presented the obverse of the Soviet newspapers. Again, on empirical and evaluative grounds, these latter three newspapers printed a great deal of Watergate-relevant material, and their readers, while perhaps not having as much information as, say, the readers of The New York Times or the Washington Post, had available a reasonably detailed account of the events between July 24 and September 15, 1974. The extent of Watergate information published by the Communist newspapers in the Western European democracies compares favorably with that of information published by three leading Western nonCommunist newspapers (Le Monde, The Times, Die Welt). Table 1 presents these differences among the cited newspapers. Table 1 points to two findings: (1) the “ low” level of Watergate news in the Soviet press, and (2) the “ high ” level of such news in the Communist press of the democratic societies. Some tentative explanations of the data contained in Table 1 are as follows: 1. It is obvious that Moscow does not “ control ” the non-Soviet Communist press. The Daily World, l’riumanitc!, and I’Vnitct may very well take cues from Pravda and be sympathetic to the Soviet
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Newspaper Le Monde Daily World The Times l’Unit?i Die Welt I’Humaniti Pravda Izvestiia
AMOUNT NEWSPAPERS,
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Table 1 OF WATERGATE INFORMATION IN SELECTED JULY ~~SEPTEMBER 15, 1974
Total Articles 172 97 117 109 110 57 22 13
Toral Length Total Attention (column inches) Score 3575 2398 2580 2685 2931 951 249 97
1628 1161 1127 1075 992 49s 177 94
Union, but these publications are autonomous and indigenous newspapers with an independent editorial policy. 2. The presence of competition (other independent newspapers) in Italy, France, and the United States and the lack of such media competition in the Soviet Union cannot be ignored. Assuming that the readers of the Daily World, I’Humanite’, and I’Unitci knew about Watergate (an assumption difficult to disprove) and that they were interested in the affair (a more tenuous assumption), one may conclude that the Communist press in these Western countries was required to print information about Watergate. Such information was available on a grand scale from the non-Communist press and the necessity of maintaining circulation figures may be relevant. Pravda and Zzvestiia, on the other hand, do not have media competition and were thus able to base editorial policy on political rather than Enancial or business grounds. 3. The Soviet Union and its policy of East-West dCtente was served by this low level of information. This point is discussed in greater detail below. The only comment offered here is that some basic national interests of the Soviet Union were being served. The Daily World, l’tiunzanite’, and I’Unitci, on the other hand, while supporting the general policy of dttente, did not feel constrained when the internal political crisis of Watergate was the issue. When attention is directed at the degree of bias vis-ti-vis the traits, one of the more striking findings concerns the unfavorable manner in which President Ford’s pardon of Nixon was presented. Except for Izvestiia, the Communist media display negative images among the relevant traits or levels of analyses. Seen from the Communist perspective, the pardon was not an admirable event. Pravda, I’Unitci, and the Daily World linked the event to basic flaws within the American political system rather than regarding it as simply an
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aberration in a sound political system. Observed reactions by the newspapers to President Ford’s role in the pardon were likewise unfavorable except in the reporting of Pravda and Zzvestiia. A significant pattern here is that, except for Zzvestiia, the Communist press had a more unfavorable image of President Ford during September 8-15 than during July 24-August 15. Ford assumed the Presidency with a balanced image in Izvestiia and favorable images in I’Unitc? and Pravda. These newspapers welcomed Ford to office, and used adjectives such as “honest,” “ simple and hardworking,” and “ open ” to characterize the new President. These images became less favorable when Nixon was pardoned. A further finding concerns the perceptions of Nixon. The Daily World, I’Humanite’, and L’Unitci appeared to rejoice in his passing, printing very critical comments on all aspects of the former President. The Soviet newpapers are again the exception. Zzvestiia printed only unadorned reports, and Pravda supported Nixon during his troubles. As noted, Pravda constantly referred to the entire nexus as the “ socalled Watergate affair ” as if there were doubts about its existence, and more than one article hinted that the whole affair was fabricated by certain circles (the military in particular) in the United States in order to remove the one man in America responsible for the blossoming U.S.-U.S.S.R. detente. On August 11, 1974, a Pravda article commented that “ certain circles in the United States would like to use Watergate to dampen U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations,” and Nixon was not linked to any wrongdoing whatsoever.g It is significant, and this is discussed below, that Nixon could find solace and support in Pravda and very mild opposition in Izvestiia. Nixon was portrayed by Pravda as a victim of political assassination by elements unfriendly to the U.S.S.R., and the readers of Pravda or Zzvestiia, unlike those of the Daily World, I’Humanite’, and I’lJnith, had no conception of the true nature of the events within, and the meaning of, Watergate. Pravda is again the exception when the U.S. society and foreign policy traits are examined. The other four newspapers saw some paralysis in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy during Watergate, or that the content of such policy was unacceptable. But Pravda (August IO), presumably to maintain detente, commented that “a good foreign policy will be inherited ” by Ford, and it presented a favorable image of American foreign policy. When the six traits are viewed together, the reporting of the Water9. Pravda was not alone, however, with this perception. Le Monde printed a dispatch from Saudi Arabia which said that King Faisal thought the entire Watergate affair was a Zionist-Israeli plot against Nixon in retribution for his overtures to the Arab States.
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gate affair conveyed a highly negative and unfavorable image of the United States to readers of the Communist newspapers in the Western democracies. Izvestiia also conveyed a negative image, but compared with that in the Western Communist press, Zzvestiia’s negative image was mild. It was only in Pravda that the United States was depicted in a favorable light for all six traits during the full 31-day period. Concluding
Comments
Pravda was the only newspaper among the five reviewed in this paper to present a favorable image of the United States on all six traits combined. Zzvestiia, the second Soviet publication, presented a very slight overall negative image. These images are, of course, based upon a limited number of articles, since both Pravda and Zzvestiia published very little on Watergate, and what was published was incomplete, misleading, or both. The three Communist newspapers in the Western democracies (I’Humanite’, I’Unitci, and the Daily World), on the other hand, printed a reasonably accurate and complete description of the Watergate affair, and were not averse to criticizing the United States. My concluding comments concern the circumstance that the two Soviet publications were relatively lenient toward the United States, either by not printing unfavorable information or by printing material coded as neutral or positive toward the United States. One explanation of this remarkable instance of non-information available to the Soviet population concerns the U.S.-U.S.S.R. policy of detente. Basic national political interests of the Soviet Union were being served by not commenting upon Watergate, and the communications media were made subservient to these political demands. The Soviet Union had no desire to print anything that might have been construed as an offense to Nixon or Ford, for such an action might have upset the precarious U.S.-Soviet detente. A controlled press cannot portray the Soviet Union’s detente partner as unworthy of trust or as incompetent (the comment that one finds in the Communist press in the Western democracies) if at the same time official Soviet policy portrays the United States as trustworthy and capable. A reinforcing factor was that the Soviet Union was at the time attempting to overcome U.S. Congressional support for the Jackson Amendment to the bill granting the U.S.S.R. most-favored-nation status. Both the Soviet Union and the opponents to the Jackson Amendment within the Congress found themselves in an implicit but uneasy alliance-detente should not be affected by domestic policies.
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Although not explicitly stated by the Soviet media, the linkage between detente and the cursory coverage given to Watergate was clear. The U.S.S.R. would not comment on or take sides in the American “ domestic ” problem of Watergate; therefore, the United States should not comment on or seek to influence, via the Jackson Amendment, Soviet “ domestic ” policies such as the treatment of potential Jewish Bmigrts or dissident intellectuals. The Soviet Union’s clear interest in improved relationships with the United States (and its desire to overcome the Jackson Amendment) led Pravda and Zzvestiia to de-emphasize Watergate; by so doing, the Soviet media gave tacit support to former President Nixon. ,While the requirements of dCtente shaped the Soviet Union’s media treatment of Watergate, the detente question was not relevant with the Dairy World, L’Vnitci, and 1’Hurnanite’. These three newspapers, although supporting the policy of detente, were not locked into supporting Nixon, and thus had free rein to discuss, criticize, and moralize about the American political system and the personnel who ran the system. The detente was relevant but it was not controlling. A persuasive argument can be made that even in the absence of d&ente, perhaps during a period of heightened tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, the results obtained regarding Pravda’s and Izvestiia’s images of the United States would have been similar to those obtained during detente. At first glance, one is tempted to state that the Soviet press would have relished the opportunity to parade the immorality and squalor of Watergate across the columns of Pravda and Zzvestiia. Watergate presented an excellent opportunity to flay an (alleged) defective political system and the leaders produced by such a system. But to yield to the temptation would be rash-a reaction determined by an inability to comprehend the full import of Watergate as it might concern the Soviet Union. Watergate most assuredly exhibited amoral politicians and a defective political system, but this was only at the surface. At a deeper and more analytical level, Watergate comprehends actions that, for a Soviet reader, might be perceived to strike uncomfortably close to home. The Soviet media recognized it for what it was and thus could not comment extensively. To moralize about the true meaning of Watergate, even during a period of tension, would have led the Soviet Union to question its own philosophies. It is this, rather than detente, which explains the very low coverage atforded to Watergate by Pravda and Zzvestiia. The outcome of Watergate was a victory for constitutionality, the rule of law, and the importance of the individual vis-ii-vis the state. It was a defeat for raison d’etat, executive privilege, and the view that
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the national interest comes before the right of the individual. Watergate demonstrated that even the President of the United States was subject to the rule of law, and that no illegal acts would be condoned under the guise of state security or national interest. It is this, and not detente, which made Watergate so unpalatable to the Soviet Union. The true meaning of Watergate ran directly counter to Soviet jurisprudence and severely questioned the relationship between the state and the individual in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has institutionalized and exaggerated the necessity of the state’s interest to take precedence over the interest of any individual. Soviet jurisprudence allows an official to ignore the legal code when the interests of the state are involved.‘0 Nixon attempted to act in a similar manner and was soundly rejected by the American public. The Soviet Union simply could not even hint that perhaps the state was subservient to the people. In that sense, Watergate provided parallels to the entire basis of Soviet jurisprudence, and thus little was printed about Watergate in the Soviet press. The behavior that the Communist press in the Western democracies (especially I’Unitci) viewed as abhorrent and dangerous is hardly unusual in the Soviet Union. It is difficult to imagine the Soviets being shocked by news that a psychiatrist’s office was entered illegally, that an opposition party headquarters was burglarized by the state, or that political leaders who violated legal and constitutional norms were not punished. Extended commentary and moralizing by Pravda and Zzvestiiu might well have led their readers to question Soviet political behavior. It should not, therefore, be surprising that Pravda and Zzvesfiiu, newspapers of a party and country not known for its protection of human rights, printed little on the Watergate affair.
10. See, for example, Valery Chalidze, To Defend These Rights: Human Rights and the Soviet Union, translated by Guy Daniels (New York: Random House, 1974), pp. 14-16.
Watergate and DCtente: A Content Analysis of Five Communist Newspapers*
This paper inquires into a sample of perceptions of the American political system and society as expressed in Communist press coverage of news relating to the Watergate affair during 31 days of political uncertainty in the United States. It is a cross-national content analysis of five newspapers’ interpretations during two periods between July 24 and September 15, 1974. My previous research l has shown that the Watergate affair generated considerable attention and “ news play ” in the Western democratic elite press. This paper focuses upon the Communist press in order to note (1) the extent to which Watergate* I would like to acknowledge the extraordinary assistance given me during the preparation of this article by Ms. Carol Patrick of the Cleveland State University Libraries. Professors Barbara Green, Sidney Kraus, Jae-won Lee, and Hans Segal read portions of an earlier version and their comments are appreciated. The Department of Political Science, Cleveland State University, provided financial assistance; Ms. Lidia Catena, Mr. Philip Gerstein, and Mr. John Yurkiw graciously provided translation assistance; and Ms. Jeannette Kaufman provided excellent typing assistance. I alone am responsible for the errors contained in this essay. A complete methodological appendix and raw data are available upon request from the author. Press Reactions to the Resigna1. See Leon Hurwitz et -al., “International tion and Pardon of Richard M. Nixon: A Content Analvsis of Four Elite Newspapers,” paper delivered at the Association for Education in Journalism Convention, International Communication Division, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada (August 1975), 32 pp. SNIXES M Cohiplrrunvs
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relevant news was communicated to its readers, (2) the images of the United States projected by such news, and (3) the extent to which the current policy of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union affected the amount and type of information relevant to President Nixon’s resignation and subsequent pardon. The newspapers reviewed in this study were selected in accordance with two a priori goals: 1. The newspapers selected were to be divided roughly into those considered to be “ official ” newspapers of the state and those considered to be only one among many newspapers competing in an “ open ” society. This division was employed to facilitate the observation of differences, if any, between the official policy of the Soviet Union and the views of Communist parties within non-Communist countries. 2. The newspapers were to represent a reasonable cross-cultural mix, ” nearness ” to Watergate, and different journalistic standards. From the newspapers that met these goals, five were selected for analysis: the Daily World (New York), I’Humanite’ (Paris), Izvestiia (Moscow), Pravda (Moscow), and I’Unitci (Rome). Zzvestiia and Pravda * are “ official ” newspapers and, as Soviet publications, originate in a world power whose views and policies 2. Zzvesliia is the official organ of the Soviet Presidium and devotes more attention than Pravda to international affairs. Izvestiia’s editor between 1959 and 1964 was Alexei Adzhubei, but he was dismissed when his father-in-law, Nikita Khrushchev, lost power. Izvestiia is characterized by John Merrill as trying “ to raise the cultural level of the Soviet people, an objective in common with the other big, national or ‘all-union ’ dailies. Whatever is considered harmful, degrading or purely entertaining is not printed. Such subjects as crime, romance, social items, and human interest features do not find a place in the pages of Izvestiia.” See John C. Merrill, The Elite Press: Great Newspapers of the World (New York: Pitman, 1968), p. 98. Izvestiia is published six days a week (not on Monday) in 22 cities across the Soviet Union. The Sunday issue is six pages and the other issues run to four pages. The Europa Yearbook, Vol. I, Part II (London: Europa Publications, 1976), p. 1223, approximates Izvestiia’s circulation at 8,600,OOO. Merrill (pp. 90-100) writes that Pravda “stands at the apex of the Soviet press system and sets policy journalistically and disseminates official Party doctrine throughout the entire Union. . . . Its editor is usually a very high Party member.. . and its reputation for giving the official ‘line ’ on all important matters makes it essential reading.. . . It is so important that it can be considered a special state institution. . . . [It is] the ‘ guardian of the Party line ’ . . . and the other media follow its lead.” Pruvda’s approximate daily (Sunday included) circulation is 9,700,OOO. c.c.-2
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have a direct and immediate impact upon U.S. domestic and external political processes and policies. These two Soviet publications are also generally considered to be examples of the “ international elite ” press. Although the term “ international’ elite ” does not have a precise meaning, there is general agreement on some of the characteristics that a newspaper should possess in order to be classified as “ elite.” Such a newspaper has at least a national and often an international circulation rather than a limited regional or local circulation; its readership comprises the educated, influential, and politically active segments of its society; its content stresses national and international news and downplays strictly local concerns; and it emphasizes political, social, economic, and cultural issues rather than crime, sex, sports, or human interest stories3 L’Humanifk, published by the French Communist Party, and I’Ur~itci,~ published by the Italian Communist Party, are not “ official ” state newspapers; they must compete with other French and Italian newspapers in the open market. The French and Italian Left are not, however, dormant ideologies. Witness the close election between the Federation of the Left’s Francois Mitterrand and Giscard d’Estaing in the 1974 French Presidential election and the growing aperturu ad sinistra in Italy. L’Humanite’ and I’Unitci are newspapers of standing in their respective societies, although neither approaches the status of Pravda or Qvestiia. The tifth newspaper-the American Communist Party’s Daily World 5-is an anomaly among the five newspapers in the study. The 3. See Merrill, op. cit., pp. 3-54 for an excellent discussion of the attributes of an elite newspaper. Merrill places Pravda in the top ten of all elite newspapers and Zzvestiia within the secondary elite (positions 11-20). 4. Founded in 1904, I’Humanitt has had a long history as a radical Paris newspaper. Published in a daily early morning edition, its circulation is approximately 161,000 and there are usually IO-12 pages per issue. The Sunday publication of the French Communist Party, l’Humanit&Dimanche, is not included in this study. Published by the Italian Communist Party since 1924, I’Vnitd is an articulate and responsible spokesman of the large (1,715,900 members) PCI. The Party advocates far-reaching economic, social, and political reforms for Italy; it insists upon a purely Italian path to socialism; it has had a responsible history of efficient municipal management; and it advocates an independent foreign policy for peace, cooperation, and East-West detente. L’Vnitd is published seven days a week, and has a circulation of 150,000. 5. The Daily World traces its journalistic lineage to the Ohio Socialist (1918). The Toiler (1918), The Worker (1922), The baily Worker (1922), and The Worker (1958). The newspaper characterizes itself as “the only daily Marxist newspaper in the United States” and advertises that it presents a Marxist-Leninist working-class analysis of most phenomena and that it sup-
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Daily World is totally submerged by most, if not all, other American
newspapers, and it is simply not a very viable force in the American political communication process. The Daily World exhibits a standard of journalism far below even that of 1’Humanit.G and I’lJnifd, and its blatant ideological nature far overwhelms that of Pravda or Zzvestiia. The study covers a span of 31 days consisting of two separate time units: the 23-day period between July 24 and August 15, 1974, and the S-day period between September 8 and 15, 1974. It is, of course, grossly inaccurate to assert that Nixon’s resignation stemmed from events that occurred only after July 23, 1974. One would, at least on one level of analysis, have to identify the June 17, 1972, break-in at the Watergate, or the opening of the Ervin Committee Hearings in May 1973, or even the removal of Special Prosecutor Cox in October 1973, as events leading to the resignation. On a deeper and more abstract level, some commentators have pointed to flaws within Nixon himself-flaws that pre-date Watergate-which led inexorably to the resignation.@ But this study is not an attempt to identify psychological first causes, and July 24-a crucial turning point within the Watergate affair-has been isolated as the beginning date. Prior to this date, the President still maintained widespread support and had various options open to him; after it, the only realistic options still remaining were either resignation or impeachment. This span includes the following frenetic and explosive events from immediately prior to the resignation until President Ford’s pardon of Nixon : A. The July 24 unanimous (8-O) Supreme Court ruling against President Nixon in The United States v. Richard Nixon (confidentiality of executive documents did not extend to alleged criminal activity and the President had to furnish the required tapes to Special Prosecutor Jaworski). B. The opening of the televised segment of the House Judiciary Committee Hearings (the Rodino Impeachment Hearings). C. The House Judiciary Committee votes on the Articles of Impeachment. D. The White House release of the Nixon-Haldeman conversation of June 21, 1972 (Nixon’s “ confession ” of obstructing justice). the Black Liberation Movement, equal rights for women, and all oppressed people. The circulation manager of the Daily World puts its circulation at 35,000. 6. Gary Wills, in “The Hiss Connection Through Nixon’s Life,” The New York Times Magazine, August 25, 1974, p. 8ff., presents a persuasive argument that the resignation of President Nixon had as a “first cause ” his involvement in the Hiss-Chamber case.
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E. The almost total loss of Republican support for the President, particularly within the House Judiciary Committee, over Impeachment Article I (obstruction of justice) by former Nixon supporters (especially Rep. Wiggins of California). F. The resignation of the President (August 7). G. Ford’s accession to the Presidency and his first week in office (August 8-15). H. President Ford’s total and complete pardon of Nixon, and the week subsequent to the pardon (September 8-15). Methodology
All articles and printed material other than advertisements which dealt with or treated the United States, its societal processes, or its population (either singly or jointly) and which appeared in the five reviewed papers during the two time periods were coded in a display analysis, and the Watergate-relevant articles were further coded within a directional analysis. A display analysis was employed to derive an “ attention score ” for each article or printed item and thus account quantitatively for the very real qualitative differences and physical characteristics of the printed material. Newspaper articles are of differing length, placement, page location, graphics, and source. Because the unit of analysis was the entire printed article, all articles could not be treated equally. The display analysis identified and gave greater weight to the more “ important” articles through the assignment of a higher “ attention score.” These attention scores provided, in turn, the necessary raw data for the directional analysis. In order to analyze the perceptions of American political and social processes appearing in the five Communist newspapers during this period of political uncertainty, six attributes, or “ traits,” were identified and listed within the Watergate-relevant category. They were (1) President Nixon, (2) President (and Vice-President) Ford, (3) the Administration, (4) the political system, (5) U.S. society, and (6) foreign policy. The six traits focus upon the Executive and then expand from the central actor(s) in concentric rings to the Administration, to the public governmental political process, through to the people and society, ending at foreign policy, the cutting edge of the perceptions of the United States attributable to four of these newspapers. A given newspaper could have disparate but logical views toward the six distinct traits. By isolating the traits within Watergate, and determining whether the content of each article was favorable, unfavorable or neutral-balanced toward the trait(s), one is able to analyze the
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attitudes of the newspapers toward the United States when Watergate is at issue. One newpaper might very well be supportive of the former President and present unfavorable content regarding the Jaworski “ witch-hunt ” or the Rodino Committee’s “ kangaroo court “; another might very well praise the decorum and solemnity of the vote on the Articles of Impeachment and offer pejorative comments on President Nixon’s intelligence, ability to govern, or capability for criminal activity. The totality of the individual newspaper’s perceptions -the combination of all six traits-represented its printed image of the United States when seen through Watergate-tinted newsprint.’ Data Presentation
This section contains a brief discussion of some attributes of Watergate-relevant articles as compared with other U.S. news articles, some comments on the actual amount of Watergate news published by the newspapers, and a discussion of the degree of bias toward the six traits. The Daily World, l’Humanite’, Izvestiia, Pravda, and I’Unitd all perceived Watergate-relevant articles as more salient than other U.S. news; these articles received more “play ” than non-Watergate articles.8 Watergate articles were on the whole longer and had a higher mean attention score than non-Watergate articles. Most of the values presented in footnote 8 appear too high to warrant the view that this greater “ play ” was unconscious or unintended. In regard to the variable of length within the display analysis, the percentage differences range from a high of +97*4 (Zzvestiia) to a low of +38.0 (Daily World). All five newspapers perceived the 23day period of the resignation as more salient than the 8-day period of the pardon. This can be seen on two levels: first, in the smaller percentage increase in the mean length of pardon-relevant articles compared with the percentage increase in the mean length of resignation-relevant articles (in fact, three newspapers-l’Huma&P, Izvestiia, and Pravda-printed shorter pardon-relevant articles than those of U.S. newspapers during September 8-15); and, second, in the smaller 7. The degree of imbalance or bias present in the newspapers reviewed was calculated by employing the Janis-Fadner Coefficient of Imbalance statistic. See Irving L. Janis and Raymond Fadner, “The Coefficient of Imbalance,” Chap, 8 of Language of Politics: Studies in Quantitative Semantics, edited by Harold D. Lasswell, Nathan Leites and Associates (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965), pp. 153-169. For a summary version of the Coefficients, see Richard W. Budd et al., Content Analysis of Communications (New York: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 55-56. 8. For footnote, see p. 250.
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absolute mean length of pardon-relevant articles compared with resignation articles. The pardon was seen as anticlimactic, and the Communist press gave it less emphasis and “ news play ” than it gave the resignation. But mean length is only one of the five display variables. When the totality of the display analysis is examined-the attention scores-the salience of Watergate compared with non-Watergate news attention, 8. The following figures illustrate the salience of Watergate news compared with other (non-Watergate) U.S. news: A. Mean Length (column inches) of Watergate-Relevant and Other U.S. News Articles: DAILY
III;goition -rootal
w%Ye 222 247
Resignation
WFYe
Pardon Total
Reegtion Total
Il.5
16 7 Wa7igare ;:;
WORLD
yy!; 20.5 179 L’HUMANITE “77 12% IO.0 IZVESTIIA “%
45 3.8 PRAVDA
o%r ;:g
B. Mean Attention
Score, Watergate-Relevant
Dif&e$ce
% D;f&c
+1.7 +W3 Difpgy
-1.1 +67 Difference -k&2
7::: DiH;;egncc -1.5 +43
+ 8.3 + 38.0 To Difference
flll.9
T
6%
% ,“;ff$,,, +
33.3 97.4
% Difference +476 -31.3 +a.4
and Other U.S. News Articles:
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and the salience of resignation compared with pardon news attention, are underscored. All five newspapers generate a higher mean attention score for Watergate than for non-Watergate articles. The range for the full 31-day period is from a 27 increase (29.1 percent) for the Daily World to a 06 increase (9.1 percent) for Izvestiia. This greater salience of, and emphasis upon, Watergate-relevant news compared with other U.S. news should not be surprising, for Watergate did represent a significant and newsworthy event. But the press discussion of the salience of Watergate dealt only with internalized relations, offering no comment whatsoever as to the actual amount of Watergate news. In other words, the salience of Watergate says that if and when a newspaper printed a Watergate article, such an article would, on the whole, receive greater emphasis than nonWatergate news. In this section I wish to discuss briefly the actual amount of coverage that these newspapers presented on Watergate, in terms of both inter- and intranewspaper comparisons. An examination of the raw article frequencies, column inches, and attention scores generated in the display analysis indicates that the two Soviet newspapers did not, on either quantitative or evaluative grounds, publish the full Watergate “ story.” Pravda and Zzvestiia published very little on Watergate, and what was printed was incomplete, misleading, or both. Pravda, in fact, constantly referred to Watergate as the “ so-called Watergate affair ” as if there were doubts to its actual existence. The Communist newspapers in the Western democracies-the Daily World, l’Humanite’, and I’Vnitd-presented the obverse of the Soviet newspapers. Again, on empirical and evaluative grounds, these latter three newspapers printed a great deal of Watergate-relevant material, and their readers, while perhaps not having as much information as, say, the readers of The New York Times or the Washington Post, had available a reasonably detailed account of the events between July 24 and September 15, 1974. The extent of Watergate information published by the Communist newspapers in the Western European democracies compares favorably with that of information published by three leading Western nonCommunist newspapers (Le Monde, The Times, Die Welt). Table 1 presents these differences among the cited newspapers. Table 1 points to two findings: (1) the “ low” level of Watergate news in the Soviet press, and (2) the “ high ” level of such news in the Communist press of the democratic societies. Some tentative explanations of the data contained in Table 1 are as follows: 1. It is obvious that Moscow does not “ control ” the non-Soviet Communist press. The Daily World, l’riumanitc!, and I’Vnitct may very well take cues from Pravda and be sympathetic to the Soviet
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Newspaper Le Monde Daily World The Times l’Unit?i Die Welt I’Humaniti Pravda Izvestiia
AMOUNT NEWSPAPERS,
IN
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Table 1 OF WATERGATE INFORMATION IN SELECTED JULY ~~SEPTEMBER 15, 1974
Total Articles 172 97 117 109 110 57 22 13
Toral Length Total Attention (column inches) Score 3575 2398 2580 2685 2931 951 249 97
1628 1161 1127 1075 992 49s 177 94
Union, but these publications are autonomous and indigenous newspapers with an independent editorial policy. 2. The presence of competition (other independent newspapers) in Italy, France, and the United States and the lack of such media competition in the Soviet Union cannot be ignored. Assuming that the readers of the Daily World, I’Humanite’, and I’Unitci knew about Watergate (an assumption difficult to disprove) and that they were interested in the affair (a more tenuous assumption), one may conclude that the Communist press in these Western countries was required to print information about Watergate. Such information was available on a grand scale from the non-Communist press and the necessity of maintaining circulation figures may be relevant. Pravda and Zzvestiia, on the other hand, do not have media competition and were thus able to base editorial policy on political rather than Enancial or business grounds. 3. The Soviet Union and its policy of East-West dCtente was served by this low level of information. This point is discussed in greater detail below. The only comment offered here is that some basic national interests of the Soviet Union were being served. The Daily World, l’tiunzanite’, and I’Unitci, on the other hand, while supporting the general policy of dttente, did not feel constrained when the internal political crisis of Watergate was the issue. When attention is directed at the degree of bias vis-ti-vis the traits, one of the more striking findings concerns the unfavorable manner in which President Ford’s pardon of Nixon was presented. Except for Izvestiia, the Communist media display negative images among the relevant traits or levels of analyses. Seen from the Communist perspective, the pardon was not an admirable event. Pravda, I’Unitci, and the Daily World linked the event to basic flaws within the American political system rather than regarding it as simply an
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aberration in a sound political system. Observed reactions by the newspapers to President Ford’s role in the pardon were likewise unfavorable except in the reporting of Pravda and Zzvestiia. A significant pattern here is that, except for Zzvestiia, the Communist press had a more unfavorable image of President Ford during September 8-15 than during July 24-August 15. Ford assumed the Presidency with a balanced image in Izvestiia and favorable images in I’Unitc? and Pravda. These newspapers welcomed Ford to office, and used adjectives such as “honest,” “ simple and hardworking,” and “ open ” to characterize the new President. These images became less favorable when Nixon was pardoned. A further finding concerns the perceptions of Nixon. The Daily World, I’Humanite’, and L’Unitci appeared to rejoice in his passing, printing very critical comments on all aspects of the former President. The Soviet newpapers are again the exception. Zzvestiia printed only unadorned reports, and Pravda supported Nixon during his troubles. As noted, Pravda constantly referred to the entire nexus as the “ socalled Watergate affair ” as if there were doubts about its existence, and more than one article hinted that the whole affair was fabricated by certain circles (the military in particular) in the United States in order to remove the one man in America responsible for the blossoming U.S.-U.S.S.R. detente. On August 11, 1974, a Pravda article commented that “ certain circles in the United States would like to use Watergate to dampen U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations,” and Nixon was not linked to any wrongdoing whatsoever.g It is significant, and this is discussed below, that Nixon could find solace and support in Pravda and very mild opposition in Izvestiia. Nixon was portrayed by Pravda as a victim of political assassination by elements unfriendly to the U.S.S.R., and the readers of Pravda or Zzvestiia, unlike those of the Daily World, I’Humanite’, and I’lJnith, had no conception of the true nature of the events within, and the meaning of, Watergate. Pravda is again the exception when the U.S. society and foreign policy traits are examined. The other four newspapers saw some paralysis in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy during Watergate, or that the content of such policy was unacceptable. But Pravda (August IO), presumably to maintain detente, commented that “a good foreign policy will be inherited ” by Ford, and it presented a favorable image of American foreign policy. When the six traits are viewed together, the reporting of the Water9. Pravda was not alone, however, with this perception. Le Monde printed a dispatch from Saudi Arabia which said that King Faisal thought the entire Watergate affair was a Zionist-Israeli plot against Nixon in retribution for his overtures to the Arab States.
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gate affair conveyed a highly negative and unfavorable image of the United States to readers of the Communist newspapers in the Western democracies. Izvestiia also conveyed a negative image, but compared with that in the Western Communist press, Zzvestiia’s negative image was mild. It was only in Pravda that the United States was depicted in a favorable light for all six traits during the full 31-day period. Concluding
Comments
Pravda was the only newspaper among the five reviewed in this paper to present a favorable image of the United States on all six traits combined. Zzvestiia, the second Soviet publication, presented a very slight overall negative image. These images are, of course, based upon a limited number of articles, since both Pravda and Zzvestiia published very little on Watergate, and what was published was incomplete, misleading, or both. The three Communist newspapers in the Western democracies (I’Humanite’, I’Unitci, and the Daily World), on the other hand, printed a reasonably accurate and complete description of the Watergate affair, and were not averse to criticizing the United States. My concluding comments concern the circumstance that the two Soviet publications were relatively lenient toward the United States, either by not printing unfavorable information or by printing material coded as neutral or positive toward the United States. One explanation of this remarkable instance of non-information available to the Soviet population concerns the U.S.-U.S.S.R. policy of detente. Basic national political interests of the Soviet Union were being served by not commenting upon Watergate, and the communications media were made subservient to these political demands. The Soviet Union had no desire to print anything that might have been construed as an offense to Nixon or Ford, for such an action might have upset the precarious U.S.-Soviet detente. A controlled press cannot portray the Soviet Union’s detente partner as unworthy of trust or as incompetent (the comment that one finds in the Communist press in the Western democracies) if at the same time official Soviet policy portrays the United States as trustworthy and capable. A reinforcing factor was that the Soviet Union was at the time attempting to overcome U.S. Congressional support for the Jackson Amendment to the bill granting the U.S.S.R. most-favored-nation status. Both the Soviet Union and the opponents to the Jackson Amendment within the Congress found themselves in an implicit but uneasy alliance-detente should not be affected by domestic policies.
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Although not explicitly stated by the Soviet media, the linkage between detente and the cursory coverage given to Watergate was clear. The U.S.S.R. would not comment on or take sides in the American “ domestic ” problem of Watergate; therefore, the United States should not comment on or seek to influence, via the Jackson Amendment, Soviet “ domestic ” policies such as the treatment of potential Jewish Bmigrts or dissident intellectuals. The Soviet Union’s clear interest in improved relationships with the United States (and its desire to overcome the Jackson Amendment) led Pravda and Zzvestiia to de-emphasize Watergate; by so doing, the Soviet media gave tacit support to former President Nixon. ,While the requirements of dCtente shaped the Soviet Union’s media treatment of Watergate, the detente question was not relevant with the Dairy World, L’Vnitci, and 1’Hurnanite’. These three newspapers, although supporting the policy of detente, were not locked into supporting Nixon, and thus had free rein to discuss, criticize, and moralize about the American political system and the personnel who ran the system. The detente was relevant but it was not controlling. A persuasive argument can be made that even in the absence of d&ente, perhaps during a period of heightened tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, the results obtained regarding Pravda’s and Izvestiia’s images of the United States would have been similar to those obtained during detente. At first glance, one is tempted to state that the Soviet press would have relished the opportunity to parade the immorality and squalor of Watergate across the columns of Pravda and Zzvestiia. Watergate presented an excellent opportunity to flay an (alleged) defective political system and the leaders produced by such a system. But to yield to the temptation would be rash-a reaction determined by an inability to comprehend the full import of Watergate as it might concern the Soviet Union. Watergate most assuredly exhibited amoral politicians and a defective political system, but this was only at the surface. At a deeper and more analytical level, Watergate comprehends actions that, for a Soviet reader, might be perceived to strike uncomfortably close to home. The Soviet media recognized it for what it was and thus could not comment extensively. To moralize about the true meaning of Watergate, even during a period of tension, would have led the Soviet Union to question its own philosophies. It is this, rather than detente, which explains the very low coverage atforded to Watergate by Pravda and Zzvestiia. The outcome of Watergate was a victory for constitutionality, the rule of law, and the importance of the individual vis-ii-vis the state. It was a defeat for raison d’etat, executive privilege, and the view that
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the national interest comes before the right of the individual. Watergate demonstrated that even the President of the United States was subject to the rule of law, and that no illegal acts would be condoned under the guise of state security or national interest. It is this, and not detente, which made Watergate so unpalatable to the Soviet Union. The true meaning of Watergate ran directly counter to Soviet jurisprudence and severely questioned the relationship between the state and the individual in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has institutionalized and exaggerated the necessity of the state’s interest to take precedence over the interest of any individual. Soviet jurisprudence allows an official to ignore the legal code when the interests of the state are involved.‘0 Nixon attempted to act in a similar manner and was soundly rejected by the American public. The Soviet Union simply could not even hint that perhaps the state was subservient to the people. In that sense, Watergate provided parallels to the entire basis of Soviet jurisprudence, and thus little was printed about Watergate in the Soviet press. The behavior that the Communist press in the Western democracies (especially I’Unitci) viewed as abhorrent and dangerous is hardly unusual in the Soviet Union. It is difficult to imagine the Soviets being shocked by news that a psychiatrist’s office was entered illegally, that an opposition party headquarters was burglarized by the state, or that political leaders who violated legal and constitutional norms were not punished. Extended commentary and moralizing by Pravda and Zzvestiiu might well have led their readers to question Soviet political behavior. It should not, therefore, be surprising that Pravda and Zzvesfiiu, newspapers of a party and country not known for its protection of human rights, printed little on the Watergate affair.
10. See, for example, Valery Chalidze, To Defend These Rights: Human Rights and the Soviet Union, translated by Guy Daniels (New York: Random House, 1974), pp. 14-16.