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Welfare of farm animals
Applied Animal Behaviour Science, 20 (1988) 105-117 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., Amsterdam - - Printed in The Netherlands
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Welfare of F a r m A n i m a l s J.F. HURNIK
Department of Animal and Poultry Science, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ont. NIG 2W1 (Canada)
ABSTRACT
Hurnik, J.F., 1988. Welfare of farm animals. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 20: 105-117. Concern for animal well-being is increasing in technologically advanced societies that practise a strong respect for human liberty and have available a broad selection of affordable food. The predominant philosophical position of animal welfarists is that the capacity of animals' sentience, rather than species-affiliation, should serve as the guiding principle for human treatment of animals. In several Western countries, serious pressure enforced by law has required animal agriculture industries to alter or discontinue some systems of production in an attempt to improve the well-being of farm animals. It is important that the admirable goal of improving animal well-being is achieved in a methodical way to prevent serious, far-reaching errors affecting farmers, farm animals and society at large. A necessary prerequisite for this goal is a reliable definition of characteristics that pertain to an animal's quality of life. In this paper, it is proposed that quality of life is positively correlated with satisfaction of animal needs, comprised of life-, health- and comfort-sustaining needs. An objective assessment of quality of life should encompass all three categories of needs. A realistic parameter proposed to serve this purpose is longevity. The prime responsibility for the well-being of farm animals should be assigned to the professional associations of producers. To be effective, such self-administered responsibility would necessitate legislation specifically designed for the purpose.
INTRODUCTION T e c h n o l o g i c a l p r o g r e s s a n d a p p l i c a t i o n o f n e w scientific d i s c o v e r i e s in agr i c u l t u r e d u r i n g t h e l a s t few d e c a d e s h a s s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n c r e a s e d t h e p r o d u c t i v ity of p l a n t s a n d a n i m a l s . C o n t e m p o r a r y c r o p yields a n d p r o d u c t i o n p e r a n i m a l h a v e b y - p a s s e d levels which, j u s t a b o u t o n e h u m a n g e n e r a t i o n ago, w e r e considered to be u n a c h i e v a b l e . N e w genetic v a r i e t i e s o f p l a n t s a n d a n i m a l s w e r e d e v e l o p e d in o r d e r to e x p a n d a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n into n o n - t r a d i t i o n a l zones. T h i s d e v e l o p m e n t h a d a p o s i t i v e i m p a c t o n f o o d a f f o r d a b i l i t y , a t l e a s t in t h o s e c o u n t r i e s w h i c h were able to p r o p e r l y a p p l y t h e t e c h n o l o g i c a l a d v a n c e s . F a r m ers a n d a g r o l o g i s t s r e f e r to t h e e t h i c a l v a l u e of a f f o r d a b i l i t y a n d t h e u n p r e c e -
106 dented selection of food available to our modern societies with justified pride. Nevertheless, technological progress has also raised some serious ethical questions, questions regarding the impact of technological progress on the social structure of contemporary farm populations (gradual disappearance of family farms), on the ecosystem (imbalance due to high concentration of production in small areas), on the quality of animal products (the use of additives, growth promotants and antibiotics), on the distribution of food around the globe (starvation in some countries, overproduction in others), etc. In the last two decades, serious questions were also raised with regard to the cost that farm animals are expected to bear in modern intensive husbandry systems. Although all the above concerns can be considered integral parts of bio-ethics, in my lecture I will limit myself exclusively to the topic of farm animal welfare. With increasing frequency, agricultural communities, producer organizations and individual farmers are being faced with questions about the wellbeing of farm animals raised in modern production units. These inquiries are more commonly asked by people outside the direct production sphere of agriculture, by urbanized people, news media, consumer associations, and most particularly, the representatives of animal welfare associations. Are such questions justified or should they be considered offensive to the producer? Is the animal welfare issue a temporary fashion of the urbanized segment of our society or a new social trend? Could this trend in any way affect the marketability of animal products and thus the livelihood of farmers? These and many other similar concerns are frequently expressed by farmers and producers. Concern for the quality of animal life is increasing in numerous countries. It has surprised many of those who work with animals or operate animal facilities and consider economic parameters and satisfactory performance of animals as reliable, rational safeguards for sound animal care. Now, this historical, firmly established assumption is being challenged. To assess the seriousness of such a challenge, which does not have any direct precedent in the history of agriculture, one has to search for its rational roots and analyze the circumstances surrounding the arousal of concern for animals in our modern society. In this paper, I intend to discuss briefly the following four topics: ( 1 ) the ethical base of animal welfare concerns; (2) the necessity to identify objectively the quality of animal life; {3) the relationship between the quality of life and satisfaction of animal needs; (4) professional responsibilites of producers for farm animal well-being. ETHICAL BASE OF ANIMALWELFARE CONCERNS In order to establish some common ground of mutual understanding, I will start my discussion with a definition of animal well-being which, I hope, we all could more or less agree with.
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Animal well-being is a state or condition of physical and psychological harmony between the organism and its surroundings. The most reliable indicators of well-being are normal physical and psychological development of the organism, absence of behavioural symptoms of deprivation or over-stimulation, good health and longevity. Although most of you would probably agree with the framework of this definition, problems usually arise when we try to define the term "harmony". We may expect very different interpretations from different professionals of what constitutes "harmony" between the animal and its surroundings. The animal producer will probably accentuate the productiveness of the enterprise as a key criterion for an assessment of harmony, stressing that a respectable harmony between animals and their surroundings was achieved if the productivity of his/her animal operation is very high. Animal scientists, on the other hand, will attempt to use the highest individual performance per animal to identify harmony between the animals and their surroundings. Veterinarians will probably stress good health performance of the herd. Animal welfarists will agree only if they are convinced that the animals in question do not suffer during any stage of their lives. Those concerned with animal rights will probably deny any harmony between the animal and its surroundings if the life of the animals are artificially terminated to suit human means. It is obvious that in our open and democratic society it is legitimate for people who are not involved in animal production practices to express their concern for animal welfare. There are several positive aspects of human nature that seem to reinforce strong interest in animal well-being, particularly: ( 1 ) application of moral standards to actions that fall within the perceived sphere of personal responsibility; (2) protection of those who cannot effectively protect themselves; (3) prevention of suffering which is preventable. All three tendencies, in themselves, are highly commendable and in ethically advanced societies are broadly used as valid moral principles, safeguarding the moral fabrics of such societies. Many people consider animals to be perfect subjects for practical manifestation of such personal responsibility. The assertion of welfarists that the capacity to experience quality of life, rather than species-affiliation, should be the criterion to guide human behavior towards animals appears to be in line with the evolution of human morality. Those who own, use or manage animals should realize this important point. It is rational, then, to assume that we are witnessing the beginning of an irreversible trend in human relationships to animals. This does not necessarily mean
108 that the most extreme conclusions of animal rights philosophers will be put into practice. However, there are moderate positions that are based on ethical assumptions which are widely accepted in Western societies, and we may expect that these views will have significant impact on the future development of animal agriculture. Our Canadian society possesses two basic characteristics that provide fertile ground for an animal welfare movement, namely: (1) high standards of human liberty applied to all segments of our society; (2) historically unprecedented affordability and selection of food. A simple geopolitical analysis provides relatively strong evidence that the two conditions mentioned above exist in all countries where the animal welfare movement has a solid base. Since we all expect that our level of liberty and the affordability of food for humans will continue, we may logically expect that a favourable environment for the social appeal of animal welfare philosophy and concern for the quality of life of farm animals will continue also. It has been strongly argued that it is valid to consider animals as worthy of our moral concern. Because of neural, physiological and behavioural similarities between humans and animals, rational human beings now accept this position without any serious reservation. If animals are worthy of moral concern regarding their well-being, it stands to reason that humans, on ethical grounds, cannot be oblivious to suffering caused to animals by humans. There may be some situations in which the suffering is unjustified; that is, the reasons for causing suffering are not sufficiently weighty. Such suffering has often been given the term "unnecessary suffering", and would include situations in which the purpose necessitating suffering is not suitably important, or the suffering can be avoided by adopting alternatives that would achieve the same purpose, provided the alternative is affordable to the society in question. Most people would intuitively assume that suffering of certain forms or in certain situations is unnecessary. However, many animal welfare organizations believe that there is a need for complete re-examination of the housing and management practices to which contemporary agricultural animals are subjected, in conjunction with a rigorous evaluation of the necessity of any related suffering. The three facts (1) that animals can suffer, (2) that animal suffering may be unnecessary in some circumstances, and (3) that animals are worthy of moral concern have led to the introduction of a new concept of ethical costs with regard to animal production for human purposes. This means that there may be an ethical cost inherent in some aspects of animal production which would be sufficiently great to make unacceptable the use of animals for production of the commodity in question. Traditionally, cost has been defined in economic terms. This is not to say that individual farmers have not had strong ethical convictions about maintaining the well-being of animals in their care, but for the industry in general, concern for animal well-being is economically, rather than ethically, based.
109 Costs of production Economic costs
Ethical costs
Labour Feed Buildings Overheads Other
H u m a n suffering Animal suffering Genetic extinctions Imbalance in ecosystems Other
Some animal welfare groups claim that the ethical cost of many aspects of production is too great, and so seek to convince the public to take such costs into consideration and choose not to buy animal products, or at least to reduce the consumption or the use of such products. Concerns about the ethical costs inherent in products derived from animals are commendable and represent a step forward in the evolution of our society. However, it is very important that such ethical costs be assessed accurately. This is not necessarily always the case at present. Many assumptions tend to be made regarding the well-being of animals in certain circumstances that are based on human emotional response, without any proper assessment of the animal's actual well-being. Another aspect of ethical cost that requires further investigation has to do with the social and economic changes that may occur if action is taken with regard to animal welfare; i.e. what if changing some production system results in improvement in animal well-being but also results in a decrease in h u m a n well-being. At the present time, these aspects seem to be largely ignored by animal welfarists. IDENTIFYING OBJECTIVELYTHE QUALITYOF ANIMALLIFE Criticism raised by welfarists regarding the quality of life of farm animals has been generating significant political and economic pressure on the animal agriculture industries of some countries to introduce changes to, or discontinue, some existing production techniques. In several Western European countries, new housing systems have been developed with the intention of improving the quality of life of farm animals. It has been proposed that the complexity and quality of features of housing facilities should be such as to provide an environment which animals are genetically predisposed to experience in order to avoid deprivation. This admirable goal has found its greatest application in poultry housing. In some countries, for example, battery cage systems are being replaced with large colony cages, floor pens or aviaries by requirem e n t of law. Nevertheless, some serious questions remain to be answered. For example, is this trend for change based on relevant objective assessment of welfare and
110 factual proof that alternatives to existing intensive housing systems result in improved quality of life? This is not a question rooted in a conservative inclination to maintain the status quo, but rather a question raised to prevent error. It is essential that, if possible, any extensive change to animal agriculture be preceded by vigorous investigation to substantiate the endeavor. In such important matters, we should not rely on subjective intuition, nor make changes as a result of political pressure, without obtaining objective evidence that what is being advocated will not cause undue harm vo farmers and will be beneficial to the animals. Without such objective proof, serious mistakes remain a distinct possibility. It is equally important in this regard that the investigations cover a broad enough spectrum of characteristics relevant to the assessment of an animal's quality of life. Also in this context, there is a need to exercise extreme care to avoid the emotional tendency to rely exclusively on characteristics which may be of concern to humans, but that are not necessarily central to the overall quality of animal life. One of the greatest problems in addressing the animal welfare issue is the lack of objective information. At the present time, there is no rigorous way to assess accurately animal well-being, nor is there any clear understanding of what well-being involves for a given species or a given age-group of animals. All we know is that to exist and prosper, living organisms must have an environment that satisfies their biological needs. If these requirements are not met, death, illness or distress will occur. The repertoire of biological needs required to achieve a high quality of animal life is very broad. In animal agriculture, there are three major areas which have strong direct or indirect impact on the satisfaction of animal needs and thus on the well-being af animals: (a) stockmanship; (b) management; (c) housing. In more specific terms, the quality of stockmanship depends on: the ethical sensitivity of the person; familiarity with the animals; skillfulness in interpretation of behavioural symptoms indicative of deprivation, suffering, or morbidity; carefulness of handling (including transporting) of animals. The quality of management relates to: regularity of feeding and watering; quality of diet and water; group size; the stability of group composition;
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effectiveness of sanitation and prophylactic measures; quality and availability of handling equipment; provision for emergency situations (occurrence of injuries and disease outbreak, mechanical breakdowns, food and water supply emergencies, etc. ). The quality of housing conditions is determined by: the amount of feeding and watering space; the amount and quality of resting space; ventilation and quality of microclimate; availability of shelters; quality of floors; safety of walking routes; freedom of movement and quality of restraint; noise level; evacuation ease; availability of an isolation compartment; design and availability of chutes. Each of the above-mentioned factors has a significant influence on the quality of animal care, and this cannot be ignored in a meaningful promotion or analysis of the well-being of agricultural animals. QUALITY OF LIFE AND THE SATISFACTION OF ANIMAL NEEDS
In this section, I would like to deal with the complexities involved in objective assessment of animal well-being. The proposal stands on the assumptions that: (1) animals can have either a better or poorer quality of life; (2) that the quality of life of animals is directly related to the satisfaction of animal needs; (3) that animal needs differ in weight or importance to the animal; that is, satisfaction of some needs has a greater effect on the animal's wellbeing than does satisfaction of other needs. In my interpretation, the term"needs" can be defined as a physiological and psychological requirement of an organism necessary for normal development and maintenance o/good health. It should be noticed that the satisfaction of need is not necessarily identical with the satisfaction of animal desires which can be defined as motivation of an organism to acquire control or experience some feature of its environment. Desires are interpreted operationally from observed behaviour, and may or may not be indications of underlying needs. The distinction between these two terms
112 can be understood if we consider that animals may desire to behave in ways which may harm their health or endanger their life. The animals, for example, might have a desire to eat something poisonous or harm other animals. In this context it is safer to assume that animal welfare is regarded rather as a function of satisfaction of animal needs than as a function of satisfaction of animal desires. As mentioned earlier, the needs of an organism might differ in weight and importance for the animal. For an animal suffering from malnutrition, for example providing appropriate nutrition might yield greater increment to the quality of the animal's life than would providing the opportunity to have social contact with other animals. In accordance with a proposal by Hurnik and Lehman (1985) animal needs can be sub-divided into three categories. (1) In the first category are needs which if not satisfied lead to rapid or immediate death of the organism. Among such needs are the need for a minimal volume of space, for barometric pressure and temperature within certain ranges, for a sufficient amount of oxygen, for some water and food, for air sufficiently free of toxic chemicals, etc. These needs can be classified as life-sustaining needs, which due to their critical proximity to the death of living organisms are assumed to have the greatest weight for the animal. (2) In the second category are needs which if not satisfied lead to illness, progressive deterioration and eventual death of the animal. Among such needs are the need for food that satisfies all the nutritional requirements of the animal, for fresh air, for a temperature within a narrower range than that necessary mainly to sustain life for a very short time, etc. These needs are called health-sustaining needs, and their satisfaction has great weight for the animal, since if only one of these needs is not satisfied the quality of the animal's life will be relatively poor. (3) In the third category are needs for appropriate environmental complexity, social contact, avoidance of aversive stimulation, etc. Failure to satisfy such needs results in occurrence of behavioural abberrations (often called non-functional behaviours) and undesirable behaviours which are behaviours harmful either to individual health, normal development or reproduction. When these needs, called comfort-sustaining needs, are frustrated, animal welfare will be adversely affected either through the animal performing behaviour which leads to injury to itself or others, or through the failure of the animal to perform actions which contribute to its well-being. While short-term failure to satisfy needs in this category may not have serious consequence for the animal's health or survival, long-term failure to satisfy these needs will have many adverse consequences. Based on these observations, it might be assumed that needs in the third category, while weighty, are less critical than needs of the first or second cat-
113 egory. However, judgement concerning the relative weight of needs must be understood only as a generalization which is true for the most part. Persistent, long-term failure to satisfy comfort-sustaining needs may have consequences which are worse for the individuals affected than temporary failure to satisfy health-sustaining needs. This is an area which requires much more attention by researchers. Let us now focus on the behavioural indicators of failure to satisfy needs in the above three categories. As mentioned earlier, if life-sustaining needs are not satisfied, the consequence is instant, or nearly instant, death of the organism. This means that the detectability of environmental inadequacies is equally instant and very obvious to the observer. The consequences of failure to satisfy health-sustaining needs are much more complex and depend on the duration and magnitude of such a failure. Characteristic behavioural symptoms include: search for required resources; increased competition for detected resources; increased excitability and frustration; higher level of aggression; higher occurrence of displacement activities, stereotypies, and vacuum activities; occurrence of distress signals; reduced production performance; occurrence of energy-saving postures; reduced motor activity; increased recumbency; learned helplessness; progressive physical weakening; high susceptibility to diseases; lethargy; death. The outlined order of behavioural symptoms may change depending on which factors of the environment are missing and how serious is the deprivation. Behavioural symptoms of failure to satisfy comfort-sustaining needs usually develop as follows: search for appropriate stimuli (including seeking of social stimuli); increased excitability and frustration; tendency for higher level of aggression; higher occurrence of displacement activities, stereotypies and vacuum activities;
114 increased recumbency; learned helplessness; lethargy In this case, also, the order of the outlined symptoms should serve only as a useful generalization. In specific situations, the order of the symptoms may change and not all of them need be manifested, depending on the length and intensity of deprivation. It is important to note that needs for physical movement or exercise of limbs are health-sustaining needs, not merely comfort-sustaining needs. Failure to exercise muscles sufficiently causes atrophy or weakening. Production systems which do not provide an opportunity for adequate exercise fail to satisfy relatively important needs of the animals. From the above outline, we may conclude that the behavioural symptoms of a failure to satisfy life-sustaining needs are very obvious and easy to detect. Behavioural symptoms of the failure to satisfy health-sustaining needs usually require some time to develop and properly identify. The detection of failure to satisfy comfort-sustaining needs may be rather difficult, depending on the observer's knowledge of animal psychology and familiarity with the behaviour of a given species or breed of animal. The three outlined categories provide some guidelines regarding a weighting of animal needs, which can be applied in order to avoid the mistake of focusing on needs of a lower priority and neglecting those which are of more urgent significance to the animals. Nevertheless, some serious problems still remain. Suppose one production system, say System A, satisfies more comfort-sustaining needs than the second system, say System B, but System B satisfies some health-sustaining needs to a greater degree of proficiency than does System A. To come to a decision as to which of the two systems yielded better animal well-being would require some method of taking into account the different weight of their needs in each category, as well as differences in the efficiency of satisfying those needs. How should such differences be taken into account? It is perhaps reasonable to try to assign numbers to represent the weight of different needs and, perhaps, multiply such weights by some coefficient to represent the efficiency with which the needs were satisfied. As plausible as this suggestion may look, such an approach would not be satisfactory, since we do not have a reasonably accurate methodology on which the assignment of particular weights to needs could be justified. Perhaps some health-sustaining needs are three, or maybe even four, times as important as some comfort-sustaining needs. Perhaps it is a mistake to think of needs as having weight in some absolute sense. Perhaps the contribution which satisfaction of a need makes to an animal's well-being varies in relation to which other needs are satisfied and how well they are satisfied. How can such questions be answered? Arbitrary answers could be given, but if that is done, then why should someone who disagrees with the outcome of the decision accept it? If the answer to these
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questions can only be given by making arbitrary assignments of numbers, then anyone could manipulate the decision process to favour the outcome that he personally prefers. Is there some way to avoid making this assignment of weight to needs arbitrary? According to Hurnik and L e h m a n (1985) there is such a way. Their approach rests on the assumption that there is a direct correlation between an organism's overall well-being and its lifespan or longevity. The more adequately the organism's needs are satisfied, the longer it may be expected to live. Thus, it is suggested that longevity should be used as an indicator of how well the organism's needs are being satisfied. Longevity then may serve as an indicator of quality of life indirectly--by way of its association with the satisfaction of needs. It is reasonable to assume that the longevity of animals reflects the importance of needs as well as the adequacy with which particular needs are being satisfied. If more important needs are poorly satisfied, the lifespan of the animal will be shorter than it would be if important needs are well satisfied but less important needs are poorly satisfied. Therefore, consideration of longevity provides the possibility of overcoming the difficulty noted above in regard to weighting needs. Since longevity should reflect the degree of satisfaction of all needs, measuring longevity should be a relatively reliable indicator of wellbeing as well as having a great advantage from the point of view of simplicity. Longevity studies will also provide an additional opportunity to compare behavioural and economic parameters and thus broaden the base of assessment of various production systems. The strategy to evaluate and compare the well-being of farm animals outlined above would obviously be time-consuming and probably also expensive. Nevertheless, such an effort is unavoidable in order to obtain the objective data necessary for a methodical and productive approach to improvement of the welfare of farm animals. RESPONSIBILITIES OF PRODUCERS
A question asked with increasing frequency by farmers, welfarists and others is, "Who should be responsible for the promotion and administration of standards of animal well-being in animal agriculture"? Essentially, any profession that has some close link with animal agriculture is directly or indirectly affected by the animal welfare issue and should participate in discussions. Nevertheless, the prime responsibility for a solution lies in the hands of animal producers within each given commodity. All others may be participants in the discussion and help search for a solution, but are not central figures because each of these groups has other interests, loyalties and priorities which must be kept in perspective. The prime responsibility for the welfare of food animals lies with their owners. These are the people who pro-
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vide daily care for the animals, and whose own livelihood may be positively or negatively affected, depending on their actions. It is unrealistic to expect that, in societies characterized by high standards of human liberty and abundance of food supply, the animal welfare issue will ever disappear. Rather, it may be expected that concern for food-animal welfare will rise further, probably in conjunction with increasing consumer preference for food perceived as "natural" and produced with a minimum of biochemical interference. It is, therefore, important that the animal producers take active steps to develop a system that would effectively supervise the welfare of food animals. There is no reason why producer organizations cannot cope with such a responsibility as effectively as other professional organizations that supervise their own professional standards, and thus protect their own professional reputation. In fact, there are several good reasons for producers to self-administer the control of animal welfare, backed by corresponding legislation designed for such a purpose. Some of the reasons are listed below. (a) It would effectively increase the feeling of professional responsibility among producers regarding ethical and social issues in a way fully comparable to other established professional associations. (b) Entrusted professional self-regulation of animal welfare by producer organizations will provide proof to the rest of our society of the ethical maturity of producers. (c) It would lead to improvement and, hopefully, protection of animal wellbeing without expensive, and potentially less efficient and less sensitive, government or other external mechanisms. (d) Self-administered animal welfare responsibilities, effectively linked with corresponding marketing policies within each given commodity, will provide additional social justification for marketing systems, particularly those in dairy and poultry. There is no objective reason why producer organizations should not be entrusted to exercise self-discipline in protecting the quality of farm animal wellbeing. This suggestion stems from the simple fact that producers are those who are the central people in the "practice of animal care". Leaving the leading role to others may in the long term develop into the existence of another expensive supervisory body with limited real impact on the well-being of farm animals and possibly detrimental to farmers' perception of independence. I believe that producers, through their associations, have the capacity and surely the motivation to be the leaders of their own destiny in this regard, and thus I tend to oppose the concept that in matters of discipline and responsibility they have to be "supervised, controlled or inspected" from outside. Such steps would be warranted only after proof that a commodity or profession is, for whatever reason, unable to practise self-discipline. My suggestion does not preclude producer associations from cooperating,
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employing or contracting specific experts to do certain tasks. They can and should do so in the same way that they hire or consult economists, administrators, lawyers, etc., to provide expertise if needed. However, it is important that the producer associations are entrusted with the responsibility of the principal organizer. Producers need to demonstrate to society and themselves that they can fully accept the responsibility of self-administration of internal ethical matters with a m i n i m u m need for outside control, in the same way as many other professions tend to do. Such an endeavour, if successful, will raise the confidence of producers in the future and generate healthy professional pride and assure balanced attention to the well-being of the farmer, as well as farm animals. Canadian and Ontario animal-producer organizations have demonstrated their skill and effectiveness in administering complex marketing policies. It may be expected that the same organizations would be able to self-administer animal welfare standards. Furthermore, increasing social interest in farm animal welfare will be a strong and continuous impetus for the best possible reputation and, in turn, future marketability of some animal products. Entrusting and encouraging producer organizations to impose and internally control standards of animal welfare is probably the most sensitive, effective, and least costly alternative to the state of agriculture in our society at the present time.
REFERENCES Hurnik, J.F. and Lehman, H., 1985.A contribution to the assessmentof animal well-being.Proc. 2nd Eur. Symp. Poultry Welfare,Celle,Germany,pp. 67-76.
105
Welfare of F a r m A n i m a l s J.F. HURNIK
Department of Animal and Poultry Science, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ont. NIG 2W1 (Canada)
ABSTRACT
Hurnik, J.F., 1988. Welfare of farm animals. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 20: 105-117. Concern for animal well-being is increasing in technologically advanced societies that practise a strong respect for human liberty and have available a broad selection of affordable food. The predominant philosophical position of animal welfarists is that the capacity of animals' sentience, rather than species-affiliation, should serve as the guiding principle for human treatment of animals. In several Western countries, serious pressure enforced by law has required animal agriculture industries to alter or discontinue some systems of production in an attempt to improve the well-being of farm animals. It is important that the admirable goal of improving animal well-being is achieved in a methodical way to prevent serious, far-reaching errors affecting farmers, farm animals and society at large. A necessary prerequisite for this goal is a reliable definition of characteristics that pertain to an animal's quality of life. In this paper, it is proposed that quality of life is positively correlated with satisfaction of animal needs, comprised of life-, health- and comfort-sustaining needs. An objective assessment of quality of life should encompass all three categories of needs. A realistic parameter proposed to serve this purpose is longevity. The prime responsibility for the well-being of farm animals should be assigned to the professional associations of producers. To be effective, such self-administered responsibility would necessitate legislation specifically designed for the purpose.
INTRODUCTION T e c h n o l o g i c a l p r o g r e s s a n d a p p l i c a t i o n o f n e w scientific d i s c o v e r i e s in agr i c u l t u r e d u r i n g t h e l a s t few d e c a d e s h a s s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n c r e a s e d t h e p r o d u c t i v ity of p l a n t s a n d a n i m a l s . C o n t e m p o r a r y c r o p yields a n d p r o d u c t i o n p e r a n i m a l h a v e b y - p a s s e d levels which, j u s t a b o u t o n e h u m a n g e n e r a t i o n ago, w e r e considered to be u n a c h i e v a b l e . N e w genetic v a r i e t i e s o f p l a n t s a n d a n i m a l s w e r e d e v e l o p e d in o r d e r to e x p a n d a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n into n o n - t r a d i t i o n a l zones. T h i s d e v e l o p m e n t h a d a p o s i t i v e i m p a c t o n f o o d a f f o r d a b i l i t y , a t l e a s t in t h o s e c o u n t r i e s w h i c h were able to p r o p e r l y a p p l y t h e t e c h n o l o g i c a l a d v a n c e s . F a r m ers a n d a g r o l o g i s t s r e f e r to t h e e t h i c a l v a l u e of a f f o r d a b i l i t y a n d t h e u n p r e c e -
106 dented selection of food available to our modern societies with justified pride. Nevertheless, technological progress has also raised some serious ethical questions, questions regarding the impact of technological progress on the social structure of contemporary farm populations (gradual disappearance of family farms), on the ecosystem (imbalance due to high concentration of production in small areas), on the quality of animal products (the use of additives, growth promotants and antibiotics), on the distribution of food around the globe (starvation in some countries, overproduction in others), etc. In the last two decades, serious questions were also raised with regard to the cost that farm animals are expected to bear in modern intensive husbandry systems. Although all the above concerns can be considered integral parts of bio-ethics, in my lecture I will limit myself exclusively to the topic of farm animal welfare. With increasing frequency, agricultural communities, producer organizations and individual farmers are being faced with questions about the wellbeing of farm animals raised in modern production units. These inquiries are more commonly asked by people outside the direct production sphere of agriculture, by urbanized people, news media, consumer associations, and most particularly, the representatives of animal welfare associations. Are such questions justified or should they be considered offensive to the producer? Is the animal welfare issue a temporary fashion of the urbanized segment of our society or a new social trend? Could this trend in any way affect the marketability of animal products and thus the livelihood of farmers? These and many other similar concerns are frequently expressed by farmers and producers. Concern for the quality of animal life is increasing in numerous countries. It has surprised many of those who work with animals or operate animal facilities and consider economic parameters and satisfactory performance of animals as reliable, rational safeguards for sound animal care. Now, this historical, firmly established assumption is being challenged. To assess the seriousness of such a challenge, which does not have any direct precedent in the history of agriculture, one has to search for its rational roots and analyze the circumstances surrounding the arousal of concern for animals in our modern society. In this paper, I intend to discuss briefly the following four topics: ( 1 ) the ethical base of animal welfare concerns; (2) the necessity to identify objectively the quality of animal life; {3) the relationship between the quality of life and satisfaction of animal needs; (4) professional responsibilites of producers for farm animal well-being. ETHICAL BASE OF ANIMALWELFARE CONCERNS In order to establish some common ground of mutual understanding, I will start my discussion with a definition of animal well-being which, I hope, we all could more or less agree with.
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Animal well-being is a state or condition of physical and psychological harmony between the organism and its surroundings. The most reliable indicators of well-being are normal physical and psychological development of the organism, absence of behavioural symptoms of deprivation or over-stimulation, good health and longevity. Although most of you would probably agree with the framework of this definition, problems usually arise when we try to define the term "harmony". We may expect very different interpretations from different professionals of what constitutes "harmony" between the animal and its surroundings. The animal producer will probably accentuate the productiveness of the enterprise as a key criterion for an assessment of harmony, stressing that a respectable harmony between animals and their surroundings was achieved if the productivity of his/her animal operation is very high. Animal scientists, on the other hand, will attempt to use the highest individual performance per animal to identify harmony between the animals and their surroundings. Veterinarians will probably stress good health performance of the herd. Animal welfarists will agree only if they are convinced that the animals in question do not suffer during any stage of their lives. Those concerned with animal rights will probably deny any harmony between the animal and its surroundings if the life of the animals are artificially terminated to suit human means. It is obvious that in our open and democratic society it is legitimate for people who are not involved in animal production practices to express their concern for animal welfare. There are several positive aspects of human nature that seem to reinforce strong interest in animal well-being, particularly: ( 1 ) application of moral standards to actions that fall within the perceived sphere of personal responsibility; (2) protection of those who cannot effectively protect themselves; (3) prevention of suffering which is preventable. All three tendencies, in themselves, are highly commendable and in ethically advanced societies are broadly used as valid moral principles, safeguarding the moral fabrics of such societies. Many people consider animals to be perfect subjects for practical manifestation of such personal responsibility. The assertion of welfarists that the capacity to experience quality of life, rather than species-affiliation, should be the criterion to guide human behavior towards animals appears to be in line with the evolution of human morality. Those who own, use or manage animals should realize this important point. It is rational, then, to assume that we are witnessing the beginning of an irreversible trend in human relationships to animals. This does not necessarily mean
108 that the most extreme conclusions of animal rights philosophers will be put into practice. However, there are moderate positions that are based on ethical assumptions which are widely accepted in Western societies, and we may expect that these views will have significant impact on the future development of animal agriculture. Our Canadian society possesses two basic characteristics that provide fertile ground for an animal welfare movement, namely: (1) high standards of human liberty applied to all segments of our society; (2) historically unprecedented affordability and selection of food. A simple geopolitical analysis provides relatively strong evidence that the two conditions mentioned above exist in all countries where the animal welfare movement has a solid base. Since we all expect that our level of liberty and the affordability of food for humans will continue, we may logically expect that a favourable environment for the social appeal of animal welfare philosophy and concern for the quality of life of farm animals will continue also. It has been strongly argued that it is valid to consider animals as worthy of our moral concern. Because of neural, physiological and behavioural similarities between humans and animals, rational human beings now accept this position without any serious reservation. If animals are worthy of moral concern regarding their well-being, it stands to reason that humans, on ethical grounds, cannot be oblivious to suffering caused to animals by humans. There may be some situations in which the suffering is unjustified; that is, the reasons for causing suffering are not sufficiently weighty. Such suffering has often been given the term "unnecessary suffering", and would include situations in which the purpose necessitating suffering is not suitably important, or the suffering can be avoided by adopting alternatives that would achieve the same purpose, provided the alternative is affordable to the society in question. Most people would intuitively assume that suffering of certain forms or in certain situations is unnecessary. However, many animal welfare organizations believe that there is a need for complete re-examination of the housing and management practices to which contemporary agricultural animals are subjected, in conjunction with a rigorous evaluation of the necessity of any related suffering. The three facts (1) that animals can suffer, (2) that animal suffering may be unnecessary in some circumstances, and (3) that animals are worthy of moral concern have led to the introduction of a new concept of ethical costs with regard to animal production for human purposes. This means that there may be an ethical cost inherent in some aspects of animal production which would be sufficiently great to make unacceptable the use of animals for production of the commodity in question. Traditionally, cost has been defined in economic terms. This is not to say that individual farmers have not had strong ethical convictions about maintaining the well-being of animals in their care, but for the industry in general, concern for animal well-being is economically, rather than ethically, based.
109 Costs of production Economic costs
Ethical costs
Labour Feed Buildings Overheads Other
H u m a n suffering Animal suffering Genetic extinctions Imbalance in ecosystems Other
Some animal welfare groups claim that the ethical cost of many aspects of production is too great, and so seek to convince the public to take such costs into consideration and choose not to buy animal products, or at least to reduce the consumption or the use of such products. Concerns about the ethical costs inherent in products derived from animals are commendable and represent a step forward in the evolution of our society. However, it is very important that such ethical costs be assessed accurately. This is not necessarily always the case at present. Many assumptions tend to be made regarding the well-being of animals in certain circumstances that are based on human emotional response, without any proper assessment of the animal's actual well-being. Another aspect of ethical cost that requires further investigation has to do with the social and economic changes that may occur if action is taken with regard to animal welfare; i.e. what if changing some production system results in improvement in animal well-being but also results in a decrease in h u m a n well-being. At the present time, these aspects seem to be largely ignored by animal welfarists. IDENTIFYING OBJECTIVELYTHE QUALITYOF ANIMALLIFE Criticism raised by welfarists regarding the quality of life of farm animals has been generating significant political and economic pressure on the animal agriculture industries of some countries to introduce changes to, or discontinue, some existing production techniques. In several Western European countries, new housing systems have been developed with the intention of improving the quality of life of farm animals. It has been proposed that the complexity and quality of features of housing facilities should be such as to provide an environment which animals are genetically predisposed to experience in order to avoid deprivation. This admirable goal has found its greatest application in poultry housing. In some countries, for example, battery cage systems are being replaced with large colony cages, floor pens or aviaries by requirem e n t of law. Nevertheless, some serious questions remain to be answered. For example, is this trend for change based on relevant objective assessment of welfare and
110 factual proof that alternatives to existing intensive housing systems result in improved quality of life? This is not a question rooted in a conservative inclination to maintain the status quo, but rather a question raised to prevent error. It is essential that, if possible, any extensive change to animal agriculture be preceded by vigorous investigation to substantiate the endeavor. In such important matters, we should not rely on subjective intuition, nor make changes as a result of political pressure, without obtaining objective evidence that what is being advocated will not cause undue harm vo farmers and will be beneficial to the animals. Without such objective proof, serious mistakes remain a distinct possibility. It is equally important in this regard that the investigations cover a broad enough spectrum of characteristics relevant to the assessment of an animal's quality of life. Also in this context, there is a need to exercise extreme care to avoid the emotional tendency to rely exclusively on characteristics which may be of concern to humans, but that are not necessarily central to the overall quality of animal life. One of the greatest problems in addressing the animal welfare issue is the lack of objective information. At the present time, there is no rigorous way to assess accurately animal well-being, nor is there any clear understanding of what well-being involves for a given species or a given age-group of animals. All we know is that to exist and prosper, living organisms must have an environment that satisfies their biological needs. If these requirements are not met, death, illness or distress will occur. The repertoire of biological needs required to achieve a high quality of animal life is very broad. In animal agriculture, there are three major areas which have strong direct or indirect impact on the satisfaction of animal needs and thus on the well-being af animals: (a) stockmanship; (b) management; (c) housing. In more specific terms, the quality of stockmanship depends on: the ethical sensitivity of the person; familiarity with the animals; skillfulness in interpretation of behavioural symptoms indicative of deprivation, suffering, or morbidity; carefulness of handling (including transporting) of animals. The quality of management relates to: regularity of feeding and watering; quality of diet and water; group size; the stability of group composition;
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effectiveness of sanitation and prophylactic measures; quality and availability of handling equipment; provision for emergency situations (occurrence of injuries and disease outbreak, mechanical breakdowns, food and water supply emergencies, etc. ). The quality of housing conditions is determined by: the amount of feeding and watering space; the amount and quality of resting space; ventilation and quality of microclimate; availability of shelters; quality of floors; safety of walking routes; freedom of movement and quality of restraint; noise level; evacuation ease; availability of an isolation compartment; design and availability of chutes. Each of the above-mentioned factors has a significant influence on the quality of animal care, and this cannot be ignored in a meaningful promotion or analysis of the well-being of agricultural animals. QUALITY OF LIFE AND THE SATISFACTION OF ANIMAL NEEDS
In this section, I would like to deal with the complexities involved in objective assessment of animal well-being. The proposal stands on the assumptions that: (1) animals can have either a better or poorer quality of life; (2) that the quality of life of animals is directly related to the satisfaction of animal needs; (3) that animal needs differ in weight or importance to the animal; that is, satisfaction of some needs has a greater effect on the animal's wellbeing than does satisfaction of other needs. In my interpretation, the term"needs" can be defined as a physiological and psychological requirement of an organism necessary for normal development and maintenance o/good health. It should be noticed that the satisfaction of need is not necessarily identical with the satisfaction of animal desires which can be defined as motivation of an organism to acquire control or experience some feature of its environment. Desires are interpreted operationally from observed behaviour, and may or may not be indications of underlying needs. The distinction between these two terms
112 can be understood if we consider that animals may desire to behave in ways which may harm their health or endanger their life. The animals, for example, might have a desire to eat something poisonous or harm other animals. In this context it is safer to assume that animal welfare is regarded rather as a function of satisfaction of animal needs than as a function of satisfaction of animal desires. As mentioned earlier, the needs of an organism might differ in weight and importance for the animal. For an animal suffering from malnutrition, for example providing appropriate nutrition might yield greater increment to the quality of the animal's life than would providing the opportunity to have social contact with other animals. In accordance with a proposal by Hurnik and Lehman (1985) animal needs can be sub-divided into three categories. (1) In the first category are needs which if not satisfied lead to rapid or immediate death of the organism. Among such needs are the need for a minimal volume of space, for barometric pressure and temperature within certain ranges, for a sufficient amount of oxygen, for some water and food, for air sufficiently free of toxic chemicals, etc. These needs can be classified as life-sustaining needs, which due to their critical proximity to the death of living organisms are assumed to have the greatest weight for the animal. (2) In the second category are needs which if not satisfied lead to illness, progressive deterioration and eventual death of the animal. Among such needs are the need for food that satisfies all the nutritional requirements of the animal, for fresh air, for a temperature within a narrower range than that necessary mainly to sustain life for a very short time, etc. These needs are called health-sustaining needs, and their satisfaction has great weight for the animal, since if only one of these needs is not satisfied the quality of the animal's life will be relatively poor. (3) In the third category are needs for appropriate environmental complexity, social contact, avoidance of aversive stimulation, etc. Failure to satisfy such needs results in occurrence of behavioural abberrations (often called non-functional behaviours) and undesirable behaviours which are behaviours harmful either to individual health, normal development or reproduction. When these needs, called comfort-sustaining needs, are frustrated, animal welfare will be adversely affected either through the animal performing behaviour which leads to injury to itself or others, or through the failure of the animal to perform actions which contribute to its well-being. While short-term failure to satisfy needs in this category may not have serious consequence for the animal's health or survival, long-term failure to satisfy these needs will have many adverse consequences. Based on these observations, it might be assumed that needs in the third category, while weighty, are less critical than needs of the first or second cat-
113 egory. However, judgement concerning the relative weight of needs must be understood only as a generalization which is true for the most part. Persistent, long-term failure to satisfy comfort-sustaining needs may have consequences which are worse for the individuals affected than temporary failure to satisfy health-sustaining needs. This is an area which requires much more attention by researchers. Let us now focus on the behavioural indicators of failure to satisfy needs in the above three categories. As mentioned earlier, if life-sustaining needs are not satisfied, the consequence is instant, or nearly instant, death of the organism. This means that the detectability of environmental inadequacies is equally instant and very obvious to the observer. The consequences of failure to satisfy health-sustaining needs are much more complex and depend on the duration and magnitude of such a failure. Characteristic behavioural symptoms include: search for required resources; increased competition for detected resources; increased excitability and frustration; higher level of aggression; higher occurrence of displacement activities, stereotypies, and vacuum activities; occurrence of distress signals; reduced production performance; occurrence of energy-saving postures; reduced motor activity; increased recumbency; learned helplessness; progressive physical weakening; high susceptibility to diseases; lethargy; death. The outlined order of behavioural symptoms may change depending on which factors of the environment are missing and how serious is the deprivation. Behavioural symptoms of failure to satisfy comfort-sustaining needs usually develop as follows: search for appropriate stimuli (including seeking of social stimuli); increased excitability and frustration; tendency for higher level of aggression; higher occurrence of displacement activities, stereotypies and vacuum activities;
114 increased recumbency; learned helplessness; lethargy In this case, also, the order of the outlined symptoms should serve only as a useful generalization. In specific situations, the order of the symptoms may change and not all of them need be manifested, depending on the length and intensity of deprivation. It is important to note that needs for physical movement or exercise of limbs are health-sustaining needs, not merely comfort-sustaining needs. Failure to exercise muscles sufficiently causes atrophy or weakening. Production systems which do not provide an opportunity for adequate exercise fail to satisfy relatively important needs of the animals. From the above outline, we may conclude that the behavioural symptoms of a failure to satisfy life-sustaining needs are very obvious and easy to detect. Behavioural symptoms of the failure to satisfy health-sustaining needs usually require some time to develop and properly identify. The detection of failure to satisfy comfort-sustaining needs may be rather difficult, depending on the observer's knowledge of animal psychology and familiarity with the behaviour of a given species or breed of animal. The three outlined categories provide some guidelines regarding a weighting of animal needs, which can be applied in order to avoid the mistake of focusing on needs of a lower priority and neglecting those which are of more urgent significance to the animals. Nevertheless, some serious problems still remain. Suppose one production system, say System A, satisfies more comfort-sustaining needs than the second system, say System B, but System B satisfies some health-sustaining needs to a greater degree of proficiency than does System A. To come to a decision as to which of the two systems yielded better animal well-being would require some method of taking into account the different weight of their needs in each category, as well as differences in the efficiency of satisfying those needs. How should such differences be taken into account? It is perhaps reasonable to try to assign numbers to represent the weight of different needs and, perhaps, multiply such weights by some coefficient to represent the efficiency with which the needs were satisfied. As plausible as this suggestion may look, such an approach would not be satisfactory, since we do not have a reasonably accurate methodology on which the assignment of particular weights to needs could be justified. Perhaps some health-sustaining needs are three, or maybe even four, times as important as some comfort-sustaining needs. Perhaps it is a mistake to think of needs as having weight in some absolute sense. Perhaps the contribution which satisfaction of a need makes to an animal's well-being varies in relation to which other needs are satisfied and how well they are satisfied. How can such questions be answered? Arbitrary answers could be given, but if that is done, then why should someone who disagrees with the outcome of the decision accept it? If the answer to these
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questions can only be given by making arbitrary assignments of numbers, then anyone could manipulate the decision process to favour the outcome that he personally prefers. Is there some way to avoid making this assignment of weight to needs arbitrary? According to Hurnik and L e h m a n (1985) there is such a way. Their approach rests on the assumption that there is a direct correlation between an organism's overall well-being and its lifespan or longevity. The more adequately the organism's needs are satisfied, the longer it may be expected to live. Thus, it is suggested that longevity should be used as an indicator of how well the organism's needs are being satisfied. Longevity then may serve as an indicator of quality of life indirectly--by way of its association with the satisfaction of needs. It is reasonable to assume that the longevity of animals reflects the importance of needs as well as the adequacy with which particular needs are being satisfied. If more important needs are poorly satisfied, the lifespan of the animal will be shorter than it would be if important needs are well satisfied but less important needs are poorly satisfied. Therefore, consideration of longevity provides the possibility of overcoming the difficulty noted above in regard to weighting needs. Since longevity should reflect the degree of satisfaction of all needs, measuring longevity should be a relatively reliable indicator of wellbeing as well as having a great advantage from the point of view of simplicity. Longevity studies will also provide an additional opportunity to compare behavioural and economic parameters and thus broaden the base of assessment of various production systems. The strategy to evaluate and compare the well-being of farm animals outlined above would obviously be time-consuming and probably also expensive. Nevertheless, such an effort is unavoidable in order to obtain the objective data necessary for a methodical and productive approach to improvement of the welfare of farm animals. RESPONSIBILITIES OF PRODUCERS
A question asked with increasing frequency by farmers, welfarists and others is, "Who should be responsible for the promotion and administration of standards of animal well-being in animal agriculture"? Essentially, any profession that has some close link with animal agriculture is directly or indirectly affected by the animal welfare issue and should participate in discussions. Nevertheless, the prime responsibility for a solution lies in the hands of animal producers within each given commodity. All others may be participants in the discussion and help search for a solution, but are not central figures because each of these groups has other interests, loyalties and priorities which must be kept in perspective. The prime responsibility for the welfare of food animals lies with their owners. These are the people who pro-
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vide daily care for the animals, and whose own livelihood may be positively or negatively affected, depending on their actions. It is unrealistic to expect that, in societies characterized by high standards of human liberty and abundance of food supply, the animal welfare issue will ever disappear. Rather, it may be expected that concern for food-animal welfare will rise further, probably in conjunction with increasing consumer preference for food perceived as "natural" and produced with a minimum of biochemical interference. It is, therefore, important that the animal producers take active steps to develop a system that would effectively supervise the welfare of food animals. There is no reason why producer organizations cannot cope with such a responsibility as effectively as other professional organizations that supervise their own professional standards, and thus protect their own professional reputation. In fact, there are several good reasons for producers to self-administer the control of animal welfare, backed by corresponding legislation designed for such a purpose. Some of the reasons are listed below. (a) It would effectively increase the feeling of professional responsibility among producers regarding ethical and social issues in a way fully comparable to other established professional associations. (b) Entrusted professional self-regulation of animal welfare by producer organizations will provide proof to the rest of our society of the ethical maturity of producers. (c) It would lead to improvement and, hopefully, protection of animal wellbeing without expensive, and potentially less efficient and less sensitive, government or other external mechanisms. (d) Self-administered animal welfare responsibilities, effectively linked with corresponding marketing policies within each given commodity, will provide additional social justification for marketing systems, particularly those in dairy and poultry. There is no objective reason why producer organizations should not be entrusted to exercise self-discipline in protecting the quality of farm animal wellbeing. This suggestion stems from the simple fact that producers are those who are the central people in the "practice of animal care". Leaving the leading role to others may in the long term develop into the existence of another expensive supervisory body with limited real impact on the well-being of farm animals and possibly detrimental to farmers' perception of independence. I believe that producers, through their associations, have the capacity and surely the motivation to be the leaders of their own destiny in this regard, and thus I tend to oppose the concept that in matters of discipline and responsibility they have to be "supervised, controlled or inspected" from outside. Such steps would be warranted only after proof that a commodity or profession is, for whatever reason, unable to practise self-discipline. My suggestion does not preclude producer associations from cooperating,
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employing or contracting specific experts to do certain tasks. They can and should do so in the same way that they hire or consult economists, administrators, lawyers, etc., to provide expertise if needed. However, it is important that the producer associations are entrusted with the responsibility of the principal organizer. Producers need to demonstrate to society and themselves that they can fully accept the responsibility of self-administration of internal ethical matters with a m i n i m u m need for outside control, in the same way as many other professions tend to do. Such an endeavour, if successful, will raise the confidence of producers in the future and generate healthy professional pride and assure balanced attention to the well-being of the farmer, as well as farm animals. Canadian and Ontario animal-producer organizations have demonstrated their skill and effectiveness in administering complex marketing policies. It may be expected that the same organizations would be able to self-administer animal welfare standards. Furthermore, increasing social interest in farm animal welfare will be a strong and continuous impetus for the best possible reputation and, in turn, future marketability of some animal products. Entrusting and encouraging producer organizations to impose and internally control standards of animal welfare is probably the most sensitive, effective, and least costly alternative to the state of agriculture in our society at the present time.
REFERENCES Hurnik, J.F. and Lehman, H., 1985.A contribution to the assessmentof animal well-being.Proc. 2nd Eur. Symp. Poultry Welfare,Celle,Germany,pp. 67-76.