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What risk management teaches us about ecosystem management
Landscape and Urban Planning 40 Ž1998. 141–150
What risk management teaches us about ecosystem management Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette
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EnÕironmental Sciences and Policy Program and Department of Philosophy, UniÕersity of South Florida, Tampa, FL 33620-5550, USA
Abstract This paper outlines two of the dominant ecosystem-management paradigms, one based on the traditional paradigm of ecological risk assessment and the other based on the health paradigm of ecological risk assessment. After showing the central ethical strengths and weaknesses of the traditional paradigm and the health paradigm, the essay argues that the uncertainties surrounding these two paradigms require ecosystem management to focus on default assumptions. The argument is that, just as most of the major battles of risk management are being fought on the ground of stakeholder participation and default assumptions, so most of the important battles of ecosystem management need to be fought on the battleground of stakeholder participation and default assumptions. Otherwise massive scientific uncertainties will compromise the credibility of both ecology and environmental management. Coping with problems from dioxin to nuclear power, the contemporary risk-management community is witnessing a dramatic battle between ‘environmental hypochondriacs’ and ‘industrial cannibals’ wShrader-Frechette, K., 1994. Risk and ethics. In: Lindell, B. ŽEd.., Comprehending Radiation Risks. Swedish Risk Academy, Stockholm, pp. 167–182x. The environmental hypochondriacs often argue that only zero risk is ethically and environmentally acceptable. They forget that virtually nothing has zero risk, provided analysis can detect the smallest threats. The industrial cannibals frequently maintain that almost any level of risk is justifiable, provided that the economic benefits are substantial enough. They forget that not everything has a price. In more sophisticated and realistic risk-management circles, a similar battle pits the wholists against the reductionists. The wholists believe that risk is a multiattribute concept. For them, health and environmental risks are complex and extra-scientific, involving not only threats to human and planetary safety but also threats to values—to trust, autonomy, sustainability, cultural integrity, equal protection, due process, future generations, and free informed consent wSlovic, P., Flynn, J., Layman, M., 1991. Perceived risk, trust, and the politics of nuclear waste. Science, 254, pp. 1604–1605; Shrader-Frechette, K., 1991. Risk and Rationality. Univ. of California Press, Berkeleyx. The wholists believe that we manage health and environmental risks by reducing them and by enlisting the active participation of stakeholders in risk management. The reductionists, following part of the classic National Research CouncilrNational Academy of Sciences ‘Redbook’ account of risk, maintain that risk is a scientific concept. For them, health and environmental risks must be assessed scientifically, typically as an average annual probability of fatality wNational Research Council, 1983. Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process. National Academy Press, Washington, DCx. Following this definition, many reductionists believe that we handle health and environmental risks by educating members of the public—who supposedly are irrational, scientifically ignorant, and paranoid wWeinberg, A., 1988. Risk assessment, regulation, and the limits. In: Woodhead, A., Bender, M., Leonard, R.
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0169-2046r98r$19.00 q 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. PII S 0 1 6 9 - 2 0 4 6 Ž 9 7 . 0 0 1 0 6 - 0
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ŽEds.., Phenotypic Variation in Populations. Plenum, New York, pp. 126–127x —and by having technical experts control risk management. q 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. Keywords: Ecosystem management; Ecological risk assessment; Ecological-health paradigm
1. Overview After several decades of fighting between alleged hypochondriacs and cannibals, between wholists and reductionists, risk managers have come to many realizations. Some of these are that: Ž1. Credible risk management is possible only with open participation by all stakeholders, not just scientists ŽNational Research Council, 1994a, p. 24.. Ž2. Managers should consider the full range of risks of concern to the stakeholders, not just the scientific or probabilistic aspects ŽNational Research Council, 1994a, p. 24.. Ž3. ‘Managers need to consider scientific uncertainties more fully’ and to avoid ‘best estimates’ that are ‘misleading and simplistic’ ŽNational Research Council, 1994b, pp. 41, 242; National Research Council, 1994a, pp. 18–20.. Instead they need to provide a range of possibilities and ‘report the sources and magnitudes’ of their uncertainties about risks ŽNational Research Council, 1994b, p. 263.. Ž4. Because of massive scientific uncertainties, risk management is dominated by default options, ‘policy judgments of how to accommodate uncertainties’ ŽNational Research Council, 1994b, pp. 5, 79.. Many experts in ecosystem management have already arrived at some of the same insights, Ž1. and Ž2., now being realized in risk management. Ecosystem mangers know, for example, that all stakeholders, not just scientists, need to be involved. 1 They know that ecosystem management must involve consideration of a full range of risks, not just the scientific or probabilistic aspects Žsee, for example, Lackey, 1995a, Malone, 1995, p. 1; Grumbine, 1994; Slocombe, 1993.. 2 Ecosystem management needs to make more progress, however, in recognizing insights Ž3. and Ž4.. Instead of using best estimates of ecosystem concepts and methods, often ecologists
1 Christensen, N.L. et al., 1995. Draft Report of the Ecological Society of America Committee on the Scientific Basis for Ecosystem Management, 10 January 1995, pp. 31–33, unpublished.
and managers could provide more information about the sources and magnitudes of their uncertainty. Of course, if they are clear about the uncertainties in ecological science, they could jeopardize environmental protection. To avoid this jeopardy, ecological managers need to rely on default options. In the state of uncertainty characterizing ecological science and risk science, managing both ecosystems and health risks requires more emphasis on Ž4., on specifying default options. These remarks outline two of the dominant ecosystem-management paradigms, one based on the traditional paradigm of ecological risk assessment and the other based on the health paradigm of ecological risk assessment. After showing the central ethical strengths and weaknesses of the traditional paradigm and the health paradigm, the essay argues that the uncertainties surrounding these two paradigms require ecosystem management to focus on default assumptions. The argument is that, just as most of the major battles of risk management are being fought on the ground of stakeholder participation and default assumptions, so most of the important battles of ecosystem management need to be fought on the battleground of stakeholder participation and default assumptions. Otherwise massive scientific uncertainties will compromise the credibility of both ecology and environmental management.
2. Two main approaches to ecosystem management Avoiding both human and planetary disasters requires that we develop the equivalent of canaries in coal mines, early warning systems to help us detect environmental degradation and threats to public health before they reach catastrophic proportions. Many policymakers tout ecological risk assessment as one such ‘canary,’ an early warning system to direct environmental management. Indeed, in large part, ecological risk assessment has been driven by
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environmental, legislative, public health, and political concerns. Recently the Science Advisory Board of the US Environmental Protection Agency ŽEPA. recommended that ecological risk assessment be used as the cornerstone for environmental decisionmaking within EPA and that it receive priority equal to that of health risk assessment ŽEnvironmental Protection Agency, 1990; Gentile et al., 1993, p. 242.. At the present time, however, there is no uncontroversial paradigm for ecological risk assessment, and therefore no uncontroversial paradigm for ecosystem management. The Deputy Director of one of the major EPA labs involved in environmental monitoring and assessment recently sketched out five basic approaches to ecological risk assessment: the animal-toxicity approach, the ecological-health approach, the modelling approach, the expert-judgment approach, and the political-process or muddling-through approach ŽLackey, 1994.. 2 Much recent work on ecological risk assessment combines several of these five approaches Žsee, for example, Harwell et al., 1990.. The first ecological risk assessment approach, the animal-toxicity approach, based on health risk assessment, is currently the dominant one Žsee, for example, Suter et al., 1993; Graney et al., 1994., although many ecologists have pointed out that its set of concerns, while important, is narrow. The second approach, the ecological-health approach, one response to this narrowness, relies on the analogy between ecological health and the broad spectrum of concerns relevant to human health Žsee, for example, Rapport, 1989; Cairns et al., 1993.. The third approach, the modelling approach, incorporates a variety of models, from systems approaches to different ecological indicators Žsee, for example, Karr, 1987, 1990; Ulanowicz, 1992; Kay, 1993.. The two main paradigms to be addressed in this essay are the animal-toxicity approach and the ecological-health approach, because they are the two dominant approaches to ecological risk assessment. Also, the fourth paradigm, the expert-judgment approach, does not incorporate a distinct subset of methods, but is used in many types of assessment. Likewise, the fifth paradigm, the political-process approach, is not primarily a scientific method of ecological risk assessment, but mainly a political approach. Excluding explicit consideration of the modelling, expert-judg-
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ment, and political-process paradigms, the essay will focus on the animal-toxicity and the ecological-health paradigms.
3. Ethics and the traditional ecosystem management paradigm The animal-toxicity paradigm, as EPA Deputy Director Lackey ŽLackey, 1994, p. 17. notes, is ‘‘the most commonly used’’ approach to ecological risk assessment. 2 According to this ecological risk assessment paradigm, based on the older health risk assessment, there is a stressor of concern, usually a chemical. Assessors select a surrogate for an ecosystem—a species of fish, for example—on which to evaluate the effects of the stressor, usually by means of a bioassay. They test the stressor chemical for toxicity under laboratory and highly controlled field conditions, using an approach similar to animal tests conducted in traditional risk assessments. Just as traditional assessment presupposes that lab or field conditions are representative and that the responses of surrogate animals are representative of human responses, so also the animal-toxicity approach—of traditional-paradigm ecological risk assessment and ecosystem management—presupposes that lab or field conditions are representative of those found in nature and that the responses of animals or plants are representative of ecosystem responses Žsee, for example, Suter, 1989; Bascietto et al., 1990; Landis and Van der Schalie, 1990; Thomasma et al., 1991; Cairns et al., 1992; Kutz et al., 1992; Robel et al., 1993; Suter et al., 1993; Graney et al., 1994.. The advantages and disadvantages of animaltoxicity-paradigm ecological risk assessment stem from its being simple to use and easy to understand ŽLackey, 1994.. Because a large database exists for many chemicals and species, animal-toxicity-paradigm assessment provides an accurate and precise basis for ecosystem management. Moreover, because it is similar to traditional risk assessment and management, many of the traditional insights and lessons are applicable to it. As a number of authors have shown, the animal-toxicity paradigm also can be extended beyond its narrow focus on single species or chemical effects Žsee, for example, Cairns et al., 1993; Mauriello, 1993.. Unfortunately, the animal-
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toxicity paradigm works best for assessing and managing chemicals Žsee Suter and Loar, 1992., but most ecosystem stressors are probably nonchemical. Also, proponents of the paradigm sometimes assume that responses of a simple surrogate are adequate to represent ecosystem responses, although even chemical responses vary widely across species, across complex ecosystems, across wide spatial or temporal regions, and for low-level but persistent effects Ževen of chemicals.. The approach is narrow but precise for an important class of ecosystem effects Žsee Cairns et al., 1993, pp. 1–2.. In clarifying the animal-toxicity paradigm and investigating the ethical questions it raises, it is important to note that ecosystem managers are dependent upon the implicit evaluative and ethical judgments assessors make when they choose a particular species or set of species as representative of ecosystem effects. They implicitly value some ecological effects Žloss of species, loss of certain ecosystem functions, and so on. more than others. They presuppose that there is a greater ethical mandate for preserving some ecological effects rather than others. For example, often assessors’ judgments presuppose an anthropocentric vs. a biocentric ethics, or vice versa, when they give more weight to preserving the aesthetic appeal of an ecosystem rather than its thermodynamic functions. Or, assessors’ judgments presuppose an anthropocentric vs. a biocentric ethics when they give more weight to preserving ‘glamour’ species like the Florida panther or the grizzly bear Žin which there is great human interest. rather than more mundane ‘keystone’ species whose existence supports that of other species. In investigating and clarifying the animal-toxicity paradigm and its ethical aspects, ecologists and ecosystem managers need to determine the respects in which this paradigm supports anthropocentric vs. biocentric ethics, individualistic vs. wholistic ethics, and precision Žof scientific results. over ethical and policy relevance. Likewise assessors and managers need to determine the respects in which the ecological-health paradigm supports biocentric vs. anthropocentric ethics, wholistic vs. individualistic ethics, and policy-relevant vs. precise results. They also need to discover whether the more narrow methods and data generated within the animal-toxicity paradigm vs. the more wholistic and broad approach of the
ecological-health paradigm are likely to lead to desirable ecosystem management or to erroneous ethical and policy judgments about management Žsee Cairns et al., 1992: p. 67 ff.; Lackey, 1994, 1995a.. 2
4. Ethics and the wholistic health paradigm Whereas the traditional paradigm is precise and reliable but narrow, the more wholistic health approach to ecological risk assessment and ecosystem management is less precise and less reliable but more comprehensive. How is the health paradigm more comprehensive? When ecologists assess ecological health in health-paradigm ecological risk assessment and use it to guide ecosystem management, they investigate all relevant aspects of ecological well being, especially those that are analogous to human health. For David Rapport ŽRapport, 1990, p. 609; see also Rapport, 1984, 1989; Karr et al., 1986; Innes, 1988; Gray and Clark, 1992; Hannon, 1992; Kay, 1993; Karr, 1993. and other proponents of the health paradigm, ecological health involves at least three things: an ecosystem’s ability to maintain desirable vital signs, to handle stress, and to recover equilibrium after perturbations Žsee Rapport, 1989, p. 121; Costanza et al., 1992.. The advantages of using the health paradigm to assess ecological health and manage ecosystems are that it helps people to focus on wholistic, systems approaches to biotic welfare and to use human disease as an analogue for discovering various causes of environmental degradation Žsee Rapport et al., 1981; Policansky, 1993, p. 47.. The health paradigm also helps people to recognize that both medical and ecological systems are open, hierarchically structured, and cybernetic and that the best medicine is preventive ŽHargrove, 1989; Norton, 1991, pp. 103– 105.. On the negative side, health-paradigm ecological risk assessment is problematic because there are no 2
Lackey, R.T., 1995b. What are the critical research priorities for successfully implementing ecosystem management? Environmental Research Laboratory, US EPA, 200 SW 35th Street, Corvallis, OR 97333, p. 2. ŽUnpublished paper presented at Oregon State University, Department of Fisheries and Wildlife, Corvallis, OR, April 12, 1995..
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non-normative, uncontroversial ways to operationalize the notion of ecological health. Also, complex human medical systems are usually examined piece by piece, not by aggregating various aspects of ecological systems—as many ecologists do when they use models, indices, or indicators to evaluate ecological health ŽSchaeffer et al., 1988, p. 445.. Medical doctors generally do not use some wholistic measure of health, because they need specialized tests to give a diagnosis. The same might be true in assessing environmental problems. Second, physicians as diagnosticians do not collect data without a purpose ŽSchaeffer et al., 1988, p. 445.. Medical doctors have to foresee the causes of a potential problem, before running tests for it, and the same is often true for ecologists. Medical doctors likewise seek to maximize the welfare of an individual patient, while the goal of proponents of ecological health is more difficult to define, precisely because it is wholistic. Also, physicians have extensive inductive knowledge of healthy subjects, including explicit tables for various values—from hemoglobin to blood sugar level—on which to base their diagnoses. Because of the uniqueness of different ecological phenomena, ecologists rarely have extensive, general, inductive knowledge of ecological health ŽSchaeffer et al., 1988, p. 446.. Medical theory is so well developed that physicians are able to diagnose diseases even before the patient realizes something is wrong. Ecological theory, however, is rarely developed enough to predict a problem before it manifests. Also, as Toby Page ŽPage, 1992, p. 113. points out, the concept of human health is tractable because of the relative constancy of the outside environment that serves as a benchmark. Often there is no relatively constant outside environment against which we can evaluate ecological changes. Ecological health likewise is a vague concept in several ways. It does not enable assessors to explain, for example, how many native species must be lost or how much standing crop biomass must change, in order to say that ecological health is decreased or lost. The boundary conditions for health of an ecological system are not as clear as they are for humans and for single-species or multiple-species animal bioassays. In clarifying the ecological-health paradigm and investigating the ethical questions it raises, ecologists and ecosystem managers need to examine the im-
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plicit evaluative judgments assessors make when they choose criteria for ecological health and operationalize them. They implicitly posit some ecological effects Žloss of resiliency, and so on. as more valuable than others, and they presuppose that there is a greater ethical mandate for assessing and preserving some ecological effects rather than others. In investigating and clarifying the health paradigm and its ethical aspects, researchers need to answer questions such as whether ecological health can be defined only conventionally or pragmatically ŽNorton, 1992.; whether the health paradigm supports stipulative definitions of ecological health that rely on expert judgement rather than empirical substantiation, and if so, the degree to which stipulative judgments provide ethically binding criteria for environmental management. Are the more wholistic, but less precisely defined, methods and data of the health paradigm likely to lead to desirable ecosystem management or to erroneous ethical and policy judgments ŽCairns et al., 1992, p. 67 ff.; Lackey, 1994.. 2
5. Evaluating the ethical strengths of each of the two paradigms Investigating whether the traditional or health paradigm—or neither—presupposes specific ethical goals thrusts ecologists and ecosystem managers onto the horns of a dilemma. Either they attempt to manage ecological risks by means of the traditional paradigm and rely on some indicator species, or they attempt to manage it by means of the health paradigm and employ a more complex measure, such as evaluating multiple species and effects, as Karr and others have proposed ŽKarr et al., 1986, p. 4 ff... On the one hand, if managers use indicator species as a basis for their actions, then they may be misled because one species rarely provides adequate information about an entire habitat or community. Moreover, although single-species tests provide the most convincing evidence for potential harm ŽCairns et al., 1992, pp. 334–335., individual species commonly vary as much as two orders of magnitude in their response to stress and may vary as much as seven orders of magnitude ŽCairns et al., 1992, p. 330.. On the other hand, if assessors and ecosystem managers use more complex tools as part of the health
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paradigm, then either they may be aggregating ‘apples and oranges,’ or they may be unable to replicate their results. Different ecosystems respond differently to stress. Some are perturbation dependent, and others are dependent on floods ŽCairns et al., 1992, p. 330.. Particular soil chemistry or synchronized flowering time, necessary for some collections of species, requires fires ŽAtkinson and Cairns, 1992, pp. 244–245.. Use of wholistic, system-wide management criteria presupposes that such ecosystem differences are minimal. Hence, the single-species vs. system tests typically force an ethical choice between action based on incomplete Žbut precise. information vs. action based on more complete Žbut less reliable. information. Part of the problem is that both the US EPA and a committee of the National Research CouncilrNational Academy of Sciences describe ecological health as a ‘societal value’ ŽNational Research Council, 1994c, p. 46. that involves ‘normative’ assessments. The health-paradigm use of value judgments thus leads to at least two problems. As Diamond Ž1987. Žp. 331. asserts, ‘‘different people with different values would make different choices about the same wecologicalx site.’’ The second problem is that including values in the discussion may jeopardize the scientific underpinnings of ecological risk assessment ŽLevin, 1988; Policansky, 1993, p. 44.. Although, as Allen and Hoekstra Ž1992. Žp. 50. point out, ‘‘ valueless accounts of physical systems have limited utility,’’ De Angelis et al. Ž1990. Žp. 557., and others emphasize that ecological systems always reflect a value system. Thus the ethically astute assessor faces a paradox: to the degree that ecological risk is a value-laden concept, it lacks scientific credibility needed for sound ecosystem management, but to the degree that it is a purely scientific concept it lacks human utility also needed for management. For example, society expects certain ‘services’ from ecosystems, such as filtering dust, absorbing carbon dioxide emissions, degrading sewage and other pollutants, and providing food, fiber and energy. Should managers try to be scientific? Or should they protect societally ‘desirable’ attributes of ecosystems ŽMiller, 1991, p. 209; Pickett et al., 1994, p. 180 ff..? As experts on environmental indices know ŽOtt, 1978, p. 2; McKenzie, 1992; McKenzie et al., 1992., managers cannot possibly answer this question un-
less they know the purpose for which ecological risk assessment will be used. To specify the purpose requires us to make a value judgment. As a 1993 National Research CouncilrNational Academy of Sciences committee put it: ‘‘Goal setting is a riskmanagement function’’ ŽNational Research Council, 1993.. In thermodynamic accounts of ecological risk, for example, a human value judgment is required to specify which of many changes in optimum operating points of the system are desirable ŽKay, 1990, 1991, 1993.. More generally, minimizing ecological risk presupposes sustaining some normal or natural state; specifying and applying this norm thus requires value judgments Žsee King, 1993, p. 29.. One practical ethical problem raised by the value judgments used in ecosystem management is that we do not have the money to make even reserves naturally risk-free or healthy. In the case of prairies, for example, Diamond Ž1987. Žp. 333; see also Cowell, 1993. asks whether we should use restoration funds ‘‘to weed out exotic plants that are structurally compatible with prairies . . . worx leave those exotics there and use the money to go restore some other prairie lands?’’ The solution of Diamond Ž1987. Žp. 334. is ‘‘to decide what our real goals are.’’ 5.1. Default assumptions about the burden of proof Different paradigms for ecological risk assessment and different applications of them in ecosystem management also raise questions about where the burden of proof lies. On the risk imposer or on the risk bearer? The traditional paradigm, because of its emphasis on precise, reliable species testing, may miss ecosystem damage that is poorly defined or misunderstood. Thus it appears to presuppose that more of the burden of proof belongs on those who assert the presence of an undesirable ecological risk. The health paradigm, however, because of its wholistic emphasis on lack of human disruption, appears to presuppose that more of the burden of proof belongs on those who deny the presence of an undesirable ecological risk. Such differences are likely to signal quite different ethical assumptions about false positives rather than false negatives Žsee Cairns et al., 1992, p. 69 ff.; Gillroy and Wade, 1992; ShraderFrechette and McCoy, 1993.. Ethical questions about false negatives and false positives also raise issues
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about the normative and policy dangers of ‘crying wolf’ ŽCairns et al., 1992, p. 87.: such cries could hurt environmental causes when the public begins to disbelieve the various environmental ‘wolves.’ Despite these difficulties, there are strong ethical and environmental reasons for arguing that, in a case of uncertainty, when both types of errors are unavoidable, environmental managers should minimize false negatives rather than false positives. We do not repeat the reasoning here, because its details are elsewhere. Minimizing public risk and threats to the common good require minimizing false negatives rather than false positives in cases of ecosystem management. Such a default rule means that, even when ecologists and managers cannot confirm potential ecosystem damage, the burden of proof rests on whoever asserts there is no threat. The traditional and health paradigms likewise raise quite different questions about the ethical assumptions presupposed by using alternative assessment and management endpoints. One of the biggest potential problems with the health paradigm and using ecological health as an assessment and management endpoint is that there is a gap between it and monitoring endpoints such as changes in diversity, reduction in some population, or changes in the production of the community. As Suter et al. Ž1993. Žp. 291. points out, at least two problems occur when assessors and managers commit the ‘ecological fallacy’ of assuming that measured differences between two environmental monitoring endpoints cause measured differences in the frequency of stress at the assessment or management endpoints. First, there is a greater probability that ecologists will confuse correlation with causation, that they will fall victim to pseudo replication, and that they will miss the ‘hidden variables’ or the real causes of particular effects. Second, this monitoring-assessment mismatch raises the question of the ethical justifiability of assuming uniform ecosystem responses that could either overestimate or underestimate risks. Not all exposed ecosystems respond to stress in the same way Žsee Suter et al., 1993, p. 292.. Because they do not, it is difficult to substantiate environmental damage and therefore ethical responsibility for it. Also, for most ecological systems, because ‘there has been no baseline monitoring against which to measure changes’ ŽMiller, 1991, p. 209., and because fundamental
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cause–effect relationships in ecology are not understood, it is not possible to develop fully reliable measures for concepts such as ecological health ŽNational Research Council, 1994c, p. 12.. The tendency of many assessors and managers— to presuppose that all ecosystems function and respond in the same way and therefore to make ad hoc hypotheses ŽSuter et al., 1993, pp. 328–333. —could cause already-degraded environments, particularly those typical of situations of environmental injustice, to become further degraded. This degradation, in turn, could cause disproportionate, ethically questionable environmental burdens on those least able to bear them ŽWestra and Wenz, 1995.. In a situation of ecological uncertainty, where should assessors and managers place the burden of proof Žsee Cranor, 1985, 1992.? Stuart Pimm says: ‘‘when we see major environmental changes, it is likely humans are the cause, even if we do not yet understand the mechanisms and cannot rule out other suspects’’ ŽMiller, 1991.. 5.2. Default assumptions about public rights Because the traditional and health paradigms incorporate alternative accounts of ecological risk, they rely—to different degrees—on expert judgments about the nature, magnitude, and status of that risk. In general, the more precise and narrow measures of risk embodied in the traditional paradigm rely somewhat less on expert judgment than do the broader, more wholistic measures of risk discussed in the health paradigm. As a consequence of these differences, use of each ecological-risk-assessment paradigm raises questions about the ethical justification for experts’ Žvs. stakeholders’. making decisions about ecological risk Žsee Thomson, 1990; Lyons, 1994; Pickett et al., 1994, p. 180 ff... To the degree that such decisions include value judgments about the ethical acceptability of various risks or their ranking, they are in part the prerogative of the public as well as experts ŽShrader-Frechette, 1991.. Moreover, problematic decisions about the nature of risk or its ethical acceptability seem more likely to occur to the degree that a particular risk paradigm is not operationalizable and not empirically determined. The traditional paradigm appears more operationalizable and empirical than the health paradigm
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because it relies so heavily on a narrower conception of ecological risk, a conception with which ecologists and toxicologists have had much experience through animal bioassays. The health paradigm, however, seems less operationalizable and empirical because, as Haskell, Norton, Costanza ŽCostanza et al., 1992, p. 14., and others admit, we are ‘‘lacking a compendium of diseases and diagnostic tools’’ for assessing ecological health. But if assessors lack diagnostic tools and a list of diseases, then they will need to investigate and evaluate the ethical justification for the apparently larger role for expert judgment in the health paradigm. If ecologists need a theory about disease and diagnosis to justify the choice of risk measures, as Hannon Ž1992. Žpp. 207–222. and Ulanowicz Ž1992. Žpp. 190–206. argue, and if assessors lack these predictive and consensual theories, then the only alternative appears to rely on expert judgments. Meanwhile, stakeholders, ecologists, and ecosystem managers need to determine the ethical limits on these judgments, given the public’s right to define and evaluate ecological risks Žsee Lyons, 1979; Thomson, 1990; Nino, 1991; Lyons, 1994..
6. Conclusion Perhaps the most significant ethical issue raised by use of ecological risk assessment’s traditional paradigm vs. its health paradigm for ecosystem assessment and management is the degree to which either is likely to lead to good consequences such as greater protection of the environment, equal treatment of risk imposers and risk bearers, and equal consideration of relevant interests in decisions about ecological risk. The ethically desirable consequences of each paradigm are, in part, a function of the assumptions, methods, and decision models employed in it. Yet, in spite of the fact that repeated National Research Council ŽNRC. reports ŽNational Research Council, 1981, 1986. have called for validation studies to improve the mathematical models and predictive tools used in ecological risk assessment, ‘‘the resources currently being expended win the USx for improvement of predictive tools are much smaller than those devoted to repetitive assessments and routine monitoring of compliance with
permit requirements’’ ŽNational Research Council, 1993.. As a 1994 NRCrNAS committee put it, ‘‘a more explicit conceptual model is needed’’ to direct research on ecological risks. One ethical question Žthis modelling problem raises. is the nature and significance of the good consequences each ecological-risk paradigm may generate, given the differences in the conceptual models each paradigm employs Žsee Johnson, 1991.. Because of its emphasis on indicator species and toxicological testing, use of the traditional Žanimaltoxicity. paradigm likely will lead to greater protection of species, populations, and ecological structures. Yet, because of its emphasis on wholistic ecosystem health, use of the health paradigm will likely lead to greater protection of ecological processes and functions. Both consequences are ethically desirable, yet each set of consequences mirrors quite different ethical goals: protection of individuals vs. protection of the common good. To the degree that assessing and managing ecological risk and its consequences mirror traditional choices between individualistic vs. wholistic paradigms, ecosystem management will require raising some of the same questions that already dominate social and political theory, ethics, economics, and law. Human health risk assessment and management have moved from expert determination to stakeholder participation. Ecosystem management must make the same transition.
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K.S. Shrader-Frechetter Landscape and Urban Planning 40 (1998) 141–150 Costanza, R., Norton, B.G., Haskell, B.D. ŽEds.., 1992. Ecosystem Health: New Goals of Environmental Management. Island Press, Washington, DC. Cowell, M., 1993. Ecological restoration and environmental ethics. Environ. Ethics 15 Ž1., 19–32. Cranor, C.F., 1985. Collective and individual duties to protect the environment. J. Appl. Phil. 2, 243–259. Cranor, C.F., 1992. Regulating Toxic Substances. Oxford Univ. Press, New York. De Angelis, D.L., Barnthouse, L.W., Van Winkle, W., Otto, R.G., 1990. A critical appraisal of population approaches in assessing fish community health. J. Great Lakes Res. 16 Ž4., 576– 590. Diamond, J., 1987. Goals: Theory and practice in restoration ecology. In: Jordan, W.R., Gilpin, M.E., Aber, J.D. ŽEds.., Restoration Ecology: A Synthetic Approach to Ecological Research. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 329– 336. Environmental Protection Agency ŽEPA., Science Advisory Board, 1990. Reducing Risk. EPA SAB-EC-90-021. US EPA, Washington, DC. Gentile, J.H., Harwell, M.A., van der Schalie, W.H., Norton, A.B., Rodier, D.J., 1993. Ecological risk assessment: a scientific perspective. J. Hazard. Wastes 35, 241–253. Gillroy, J.M., Wade, M. ŽEds.., 1992. The Moral Dimensions of Public Policy Choice: Beyond the Market Paradigm. Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, PA. Graney, R.L., Kennedy, J.H., Rogers, J.H. ŽEds.., 1994. Aquatic Mesocosm Studies in Ecological Risk Assessment. Lewis Publishers, Boca Raton, FL. Gray, G., Clark, L., 1992. The changing science of forest health. Am. For. 98, 13–16. Grumbine, R.E., 1994. What is ecosystem management?. Conserv. Biol. 8, 27–38. Hannon, B., 1992. Measures of economic and ecological health. In: Costanza, R., Norton, B.G., Haskell, B.D. ŽEds.., Ecosystem Health: New Goals of Environmental Management. Columbia Univ. Press, New York, pp. 207–222. Hargrove, E.C., 1989. Foundations of Environmental Ethics. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Harwell, M., Harwell, C.C., Weinstein, D.A., Kelly, J.R., 1990. Characterizing ecosystem responses to stress. In: Grodinski, W., et al. ŽEds.., Ecological Risks. National Academy of Science, Washington, DC, pp. 91–115. Innes, J.L., 1988. Forest health surveys—a critique. Environ. Pollut. 54, 1–15. Johnson, L., 1991. A Morally Deep World: An Essay on Moral Significance and Environmental Ethics. Cambridge Univ. Press, New York. Karr, J.R., 1987. Biological monitoring and environmental assessment: a conceptual framework. Environ. Manage. 11, 249–256. Karr, J.R., 1990. Bioassessment and non-point source pollution: an overview. Second National Symposium on Water Quality Assessment, Meeting Summary, October 16–19, 1989, Fort Collins, Colorado, USA. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, pp. 4-1 through 4-18. Karr, J.R., 1993. Measuring biological integrity: lessons from streams. In: Woodley, S., Kay, J., Francis, G. ŽEds.., Ecologi-
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cal Integrity and the Management of Ecosystems. St. Lucie Press, Delray Beach, FL, pp. 83–103. Karr, J.R., Fausch, K.D., Angermeler, P.L., Yant, P.R., Schlosser, I.J., 1986. Assessing Biological Integrity in Running Waters: A Method and Its Rationale. Special Publication 5. Illinois Natural History Survey, Champaign. Kay, J., 1990. A non-equilibrium thermodynamic framework for discussing ecosystem integrity. In: Edwards, C.J., Regier, H.A. ŽEds.., An Ecosystems Approach to the Integrity of the Great Lakes in Turbulent Times, Special Publication a90-4. Great Lakes Fishery Commission, Ann Arbor, MI, pp. 209– 237. Kay, J., 1991. A nonequilibrium thermodynamic framework for discussing ecosystem management. Environ. Manage. 15, 483–495. Kay, J., 1993. On the nature of ecological integrity. In: Woodley, S., Francis, J., Kay, J.K. ŽEds.., Ecological Integrity and the Management of Ecosystems. St. Lucie Press, Delray Beach, FL, pp. 201–214. King, A.W., 1993. Considerations of scale and hierarchy. In: Woodley, S., Kay, J., Francis, G. ŽEds.., Ecological Integrity and the Management of Ecosystems. St. Lucie Press, Delray Beach, FL, pp. 19–45. Kutz, F.W., Linthurst, R.A., Riordan, C., Slimak, M., Frederick, R., 1992. Ecological research at EPA: new directions. Environ. Sci. Tech. 26 Ž5., 860–866. Lackey, R.T., 1994. Ecological risk assessment. Fisheries 19 Ž4., 14–18. Lackey, R.T., 1995a. Is ecological risk assessment useful for resolving complex ecological problems? In: Stouder, D.J., Bisson, P.A., Naiman, R.J. ŽEds.., Pacific Salmon and Their Ecosystems: Status and Future Options. Chapman & Hall, in press. Environmental Research Laboratory, US EPA, 200 SW 35th Street, Corvallis, OR. Landis, W.G., Van der Schalie, W.H. ŽEds.., 1990. Aquatic Toxicology and Risk Assessment, Vol. 13. ASTM, Philadelphia, PA. Levin, S., 1988. Sea otters and nearshore benthic communities: a theoretical perspective. In: Van Blaricom, G.R., Estes, J.A. ŽEds.., The Community Ecology of Sea Otters. Ecology Study Series 65. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, pp. 202–209. Lyons, D. ŽEd.., 1979. Rights. Wadsworth, Belmont, CA. Lyons, D., 1994. Rights, Welfare, and Mill’s Moral Theory. Oxford Univ. Press, New York. Malone, C.R., 1995. Ecosystem management: status of the federal initiative. Bull. Ecol. Soc. Am. 76, 158–161. Mauriello, D.A., 1993. Stress to indicator species as assessment endpoints. J. Hazard. Mater. 35, 273–282. McKenzie, S. ŽEd.., 1992. Ecological Indicators. Elsevier, Barkiep, UK. McKenzie, D.H., Hyatt, D.E., McDonald, V.J. ŽEds.., 1992. Ecological Indicators. Elsevier, Ft. Lauderdale, FL. Miller, J.A., 1991. Biosciences and ecological integrity. BioScience 41 Ž4., 206–210. National Research Council ŽNRC., 1981. Testing for Effects of Chemicals on Ecosystems. National Academy Press, Washington, DC. National Research Council ŽNRC., 1986. Ecological Knowledge
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and Environmental Problem-Solving: Concepts and Case Studies. National Academy Press, Washington, DC. National Research Council ŽNRC., 1993. Issues in Risk Assessment. National Academy Press, Washington, DC. National Research Council ŽNRC., 1994a. Building Consensus Through Risk Assessment and Management. National Academy Press, Washington, DC. National Research Council ŽNRC., 1994b. Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment. National Academy Press, Washington, DC. National Research Council ŽNRC., 1994c. Review of EPA’s Environmental Monitoring and Assessment Program. National Research Council, Washington, DC. Nino, C.S., 1991. The Ethics of Human Rights. Oxford Univ. Press, New York. Norton, B.G., 1991. Ecological health and sustainable resource management. In: Costanza, R. ŽEd.., Ecological Economics: The Science and Management of Sustainability. Columbia Univ. Press, New York, pp. 102–117. Norton, B.G., 1992. A new paradigm for environmental management. In: Costanza, R., Norton, B.G., Haskell, B.D. ŽEds.., Ecosystem Health: New Goals of Environmental Management. Island Press, Washington, DC, pp. 23–41. Ott, W.R., 1978. Environmental Indices: Theory and Practice. Ann Arbor Sci. Publ., Ann Arbor, MI. Page, T., 1992. Environmental existentialism. In: Costanza, R., Norton, B.G., Haskell, B.D. ŽEds.., Ecosystem Health: New Goals of Environmental Management. Island Press, Washington, DC. Pickett, S.T.A., Kolasa, J., Jones, C.G., 1994. Ecological Understanding. Academic Press, New York. Policansky, D., 1993. Application of ecological knowledge to environmental problems: ecological risk assessment. In: Cothern, C.R. ŽEd.., Comparative Environmental Risk Assessment. Lewis Publishers, Boca Raton, FL. Rapport, D.J., 1984. State of ecosystem medicine. In: Cairns, V.W., Hodson, P.V., Nriagu, J.O. ŽEds.., Contaminate Effects on Fisheries. Wiley, New York, pp. 315–324. Rapport, D.J., 1989. What constitutes ecosystem health?. Perspect. Biol. Med. 33 Ž1., 120–132. Rapport, D.J., 1990. Challenges in the detection and diagnosis of pathological change in aquatic ecosystems. J. Great Lakes Res. 16 Ž4., 609–618.
Rapport, D.J., Regier, H.A., Thorpe., C., 1981. Diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment under stress. In: Barrett, G.W., Rosenberg, R. ŽEds.., Stress Effects and Natural Ecosystems. Wiley, New York, pp. 269–280. Robel, R.J., Fox, L.B., Kemp, K.E., 1993. Relationship between habitat suitability index values and ground counts of beaver colonies in Kansas. Wildl. Soc. Bull. 21, 415–421. Schaeffer, D.J., Herricks, E.E., Kerster, H.W., 1988. Ecosystem health: I. Measuring ecosystem health. Environ. Manage. 12 Ž4., 445–455. Shrader-Frechette, K., 1991. Risk and Rationality. Univ. of California Press, Berkeley. Shrader-Frechette, K., McCoy, E.D., 1993. Method in Ecology: Strategies for Conservation Problems. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge. Slocombe, D.S., 1993. Environmental planning, ecosystem science, and ecosystem approaches for integrating environment and development. Environ. Manage. 17, 289–303. Suter, G.W., 1989. Ecological endpoints. In: Warren-Hicks, W., Parkhurst, B.R., Baker Jr., S.S. ŽEds.., Ecological Assessment of Hazardous Waste Sites: A Field and Laboratory Reference Document. EPA 600r3-89-013. Corvallis Environmental Research Laboratory, Corvallis, OR, pp. 2-1 to 2-28. Suter, G.W., Loar, J.M., 1992. Weighing the ecological risks of hazardous waste sites: the Oak Ridge case. Environ. Sci. Tech. 26 Ž3., 432–438. Suter, G.W. ŽEd.., Barnthouse, L.W., Bartell, S.M., Mill, T., Mackay, D., Paterson, S., 1993. Ecological Risk Assessment. Lewis Publishers, Boca Raton, FL. Thomasma, L.E., Drummer, T.D., Peterson, R.O., 1991. Testing the habitat suitability index model for the fisher. Wildl. Soc. Bull. 19, 291–297. Thomson, J., 1990. The Realm of Rights. Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA. Ulanowicz, R.E., 1992. Ecosystem health and trophic flow networks. In: Costanza, R., Norton, B.G., Haskell, B.D. ŽEds.., Ecosystem Health: New Goals of Environmental Health. Island Press, Washington, DC, pp. 190–206. Westra, L., Wenz, P. ŽEds.., 1995. Faces of Environmental Racism. Rowman and Littlefield, Savage, MD.
What risk management teaches us about ecosystem management Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette
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EnÕironmental Sciences and Policy Program and Department of Philosophy, UniÕersity of South Florida, Tampa, FL 33620-5550, USA
Abstract This paper outlines two of the dominant ecosystem-management paradigms, one based on the traditional paradigm of ecological risk assessment and the other based on the health paradigm of ecological risk assessment. After showing the central ethical strengths and weaknesses of the traditional paradigm and the health paradigm, the essay argues that the uncertainties surrounding these two paradigms require ecosystem management to focus on default assumptions. The argument is that, just as most of the major battles of risk management are being fought on the ground of stakeholder participation and default assumptions, so most of the important battles of ecosystem management need to be fought on the battleground of stakeholder participation and default assumptions. Otherwise massive scientific uncertainties will compromise the credibility of both ecology and environmental management. Coping with problems from dioxin to nuclear power, the contemporary risk-management community is witnessing a dramatic battle between ‘environmental hypochondriacs’ and ‘industrial cannibals’ wShrader-Frechette, K., 1994. Risk and ethics. In: Lindell, B. ŽEd.., Comprehending Radiation Risks. Swedish Risk Academy, Stockholm, pp. 167–182x. The environmental hypochondriacs often argue that only zero risk is ethically and environmentally acceptable. They forget that virtually nothing has zero risk, provided analysis can detect the smallest threats. The industrial cannibals frequently maintain that almost any level of risk is justifiable, provided that the economic benefits are substantial enough. They forget that not everything has a price. In more sophisticated and realistic risk-management circles, a similar battle pits the wholists against the reductionists. The wholists believe that risk is a multiattribute concept. For them, health and environmental risks are complex and extra-scientific, involving not only threats to human and planetary safety but also threats to values—to trust, autonomy, sustainability, cultural integrity, equal protection, due process, future generations, and free informed consent wSlovic, P., Flynn, J., Layman, M., 1991. Perceived risk, trust, and the politics of nuclear waste. Science, 254, pp. 1604–1605; Shrader-Frechette, K., 1991. Risk and Rationality. Univ. of California Press, Berkeleyx. The wholists believe that we manage health and environmental risks by reducing them and by enlisting the active participation of stakeholders in risk management. The reductionists, following part of the classic National Research CouncilrNational Academy of Sciences ‘Redbook’ account of risk, maintain that risk is a scientific concept. For them, health and environmental risks must be assessed scientifically, typically as an average annual probability of fatality wNational Research Council, 1983. Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process. National Academy Press, Washington, DCx. Following this definition, many reductionists believe that we handle health and environmental risks by educating members of the public—who supposedly are irrational, scientifically ignorant, and paranoid wWeinberg, A., 1988. Risk assessment, regulation, and the limits. In: Woodhead, A., Bender, M., Leonard, R.
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Corresponding author. Tel.: q1-813-974-5224; fax: q1-813-974-5914.
0169-2046r98r$19.00 q 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. PII S 0 1 6 9 - 2 0 4 6 Ž 9 7 . 0 0 1 0 6 - 0
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ŽEds.., Phenotypic Variation in Populations. Plenum, New York, pp. 126–127x —and by having technical experts control risk management. q 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. Keywords: Ecosystem management; Ecological risk assessment; Ecological-health paradigm
1. Overview After several decades of fighting between alleged hypochondriacs and cannibals, between wholists and reductionists, risk managers have come to many realizations. Some of these are that: Ž1. Credible risk management is possible only with open participation by all stakeholders, not just scientists ŽNational Research Council, 1994a, p. 24.. Ž2. Managers should consider the full range of risks of concern to the stakeholders, not just the scientific or probabilistic aspects ŽNational Research Council, 1994a, p. 24.. Ž3. ‘Managers need to consider scientific uncertainties more fully’ and to avoid ‘best estimates’ that are ‘misleading and simplistic’ ŽNational Research Council, 1994b, pp. 41, 242; National Research Council, 1994a, pp. 18–20.. Instead they need to provide a range of possibilities and ‘report the sources and magnitudes’ of their uncertainties about risks ŽNational Research Council, 1994b, p. 263.. Ž4. Because of massive scientific uncertainties, risk management is dominated by default options, ‘policy judgments of how to accommodate uncertainties’ ŽNational Research Council, 1994b, pp. 5, 79.. Many experts in ecosystem management have already arrived at some of the same insights, Ž1. and Ž2., now being realized in risk management. Ecosystem mangers know, for example, that all stakeholders, not just scientists, need to be involved. 1 They know that ecosystem management must involve consideration of a full range of risks, not just the scientific or probabilistic aspects Žsee, for example, Lackey, 1995a, Malone, 1995, p. 1; Grumbine, 1994; Slocombe, 1993.. 2 Ecosystem management needs to make more progress, however, in recognizing insights Ž3. and Ž4.. Instead of using best estimates of ecosystem concepts and methods, often ecologists
1 Christensen, N.L. et al., 1995. Draft Report of the Ecological Society of America Committee on the Scientific Basis for Ecosystem Management, 10 January 1995, pp. 31–33, unpublished.
and managers could provide more information about the sources and magnitudes of their uncertainty. Of course, if they are clear about the uncertainties in ecological science, they could jeopardize environmental protection. To avoid this jeopardy, ecological managers need to rely on default options. In the state of uncertainty characterizing ecological science and risk science, managing both ecosystems and health risks requires more emphasis on Ž4., on specifying default options. These remarks outline two of the dominant ecosystem-management paradigms, one based on the traditional paradigm of ecological risk assessment and the other based on the health paradigm of ecological risk assessment. After showing the central ethical strengths and weaknesses of the traditional paradigm and the health paradigm, the essay argues that the uncertainties surrounding these two paradigms require ecosystem management to focus on default assumptions. The argument is that, just as most of the major battles of risk management are being fought on the ground of stakeholder participation and default assumptions, so most of the important battles of ecosystem management need to be fought on the battleground of stakeholder participation and default assumptions. Otherwise massive scientific uncertainties will compromise the credibility of both ecology and environmental management.
2. Two main approaches to ecosystem management Avoiding both human and planetary disasters requires that we develop the equivalent of canaries in coal mines, early warning systems to help us detect environmental degradation and threats to public health before they reach catastrophic proportions. Many policymakers tout ecological risk assessment as one such ‘canary,’ an early warning system to direct environmental management. Indeed, in large part, ecological risk assessment has been driven by
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environmental, legislative, public health, and political concerns. Recently the Science Advisory Board of the US Environmental Protection Agency ŽEPA. recommended that ecological risk assessment be used as the cornerstone for environmental decisionmaking within EPA and that it receive priority equal to that of health risk assessment ŽEnvironmental Protection Agency, 1990; Gentile et al., 1993, p. 242.. At the present time, however, there is no uncontroversial paradigm for ecological risk assessment, and therefore no uncontroversial paradigm for ecosystem management. The Deputy Director of one of the major EPA labs involved in environmental monitoring and assessment recently sketched out five basic approaches to ecological risk assessment: the animal-toxicity approach, the ecological-health approach, the modelling approach, the expert-judgment approach, and the political-process or muddling-through approach ŽLackey, 1994.. 2 Much recent work on ecological risk assessment combines several of these five approaches Žsee, for example, Harwell et al., 1990.. The first ecological risk assessment approach, the animal-toxicity approach, based on health risk assessment, is currently the dominant one Žsee, for example, Suter et al., 1993; Graney et al., 1994., although many ecologists have pointed out that its set of concerns, while important, is narrow. The second approach, the ecological-health approach, one response to this narrowness, relies on the analogy between ecological health and the broad spectrum of concerns relevant to human health Žsee, for example, Rapport, 1989; Cairns et al., 1993.. The third approach, the modelling approach, incorporates a variety of models, from systems approaches to different ecological indicators Žsee, for example, Karr, 1987, 1990; Ulanowicz, 1992; Kay, 1993.. The two main paradigms to be addressed in this essay are the animal-toxicity approach and the ecological-health approach, because they are the two dominant approaches to ecological risk assessment. Also, the fourth paradigm, the expert-judgment approach, does not incorporate a distinct subset of methods, but is used in many types of assessment. Likewise, the fifth paradigm, the political-process approach, is not primarily a scientific method of ecological risk assessment, but mainly a political approach. Excluding explicit consideration of the modelling, expert-judg-
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ment, and political-process paradigms, the essay will focus on the animal-toxicity and the ecological-health paradigms.
3. Ethics and the traditional ecosystem management paradigm The animal-toxicity paradigm, as EPA Deputy Director Lackey ŽLackey, 1994, p. 17. notes, is ‘‘the most commonly used’’ approach to ecological risk assessment. 2 According to this ecological risk assessment paradigm, based on the older health risk assessment, there is a stressor of concern, usually a chemical. Assessors select a surrogate for an ecosystem—a species of fish, for example—on which to evaluate the effects of the stressor, usually by means of a bioassay. They test the stressor chemical for toxicity under laboratory and highly controlled field conditions, using an approach similar to animal tests conducted in traditional risk assessments. Just as traditional assessment presupposes that lab or field conditions are representative and that the responses of surrogate animals are representative of human responses, so also the animal-toxicity approach—of traditional-paradigm ecological risk assessment and ecosystem management—presupposes that lab or field conditions are representative of those found in nature and that the responses of animals or plants are representative of ecosystem responses Žsee, for example, Suter, 1989; Bascietto et al., 1990; Landis and Van der Schalie, 1990; Thomasma et al., 1991; Cairns et al., 1992; Kutz et al., 1992; Robel et al., 1993; Suter et al., 1993; Graney et al., 1994.. The advantages and disadvantages of animaltoxicity-paradigm ecological risk assessment stem from its being simple to use and easy to understand ŽLackey, 1994.. Because a large database exists for many chemicals and species, animal-toxicity-paradigm assessment provides an accurate and precise basis for ecosystem management. Moreover, because it is similar to traditional risk assessment and management, many of the traditional insights and lessons are applicable to it. As a number of authors have shown, the animal-toxicity paradigm also can be extended beyond its narrow focus on single species or chemical effects Žsee, for example, Cairns et al., 1993; Mauriello, 1993.. Unfortunately, the animal-
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toxicity paradigm works best for assessing and managing chemicals Žsee Suter and Loar, 1992., but most ecosystem stressors are probably nonchemical. Also, proponents of the paradigm sometimes assume that responses of a simple surrogate are adequate to represent ecosystem responses, although even chemical responses vary widely across species, across complex ecosystems, across wide spatial or temporal regions, and for low-level but persistent effects Ževen of chemicals.. The approach is narrow but precise for an important class of ecosystem effects Žsee Cairns et al., 1993, pp. 1–2.. In clarifying the animal-toxicity paradigm and investigating the ethical questions it raises, it is important to note that ecosystem managers are dependent upon the implicit evaluative and ethical judgments assessors make when they choose a particular species or set of species as representative of ecosystem effects. They implicitly value some ecological effects Žloss of species, loss of certain ecosystem functions, and so on. more than others. They presuppose that there is a greater ethical mandate for preserving some ecological effects rather than others. For example, often assessors’ judgments presuppose an anthropocentric vs. a biocentric ethics, or vice versa, when they give more weight to preserving the aesthetic appeal of an ecosystem rather than its thermodynamic functions. Or, assessors’ judgments presuppose an anthropocentric vs. a biocentric ethics when they give more weight to preserving ‘glamour’ species like the Florida panther or the grizzly bear Žin which there is great human interest. rather than more mundane ‘keystone’ species whose existence supports that of other species. In investigating and clarifying the animal-toxicity paradigm and its ethical aspects, ecologists and ecosystem managers need to determine the respects in which this paradigm supports anthropocentric vs. biocentric ethics, individualistic vs. wholistic ethics, and precision Žof scientific results. over ethical and policy relevance. Likewise assessors and managers need to determine the respects in which the ecological-health paradigm supports biocentric vs. anthropocentric ethics, wholistic vs. individualistic ethics, and policy-relevant vs. precise results. They also need to discover whether the more narrow methods and data generated within the animal-toxicity paradigm vs. the more wholistic and broad approach of the
ecological-health paradigm are likely to lead to desirable ecosystem management or to erroneous ethical and policy judgments about management Žsee Cairns et al., 1992: p. 67 ff.; Lackey, 1994, 1995a.. 2
4. Ethics and the wholistic health paradigm Whereas the traditional paradigm is precise and reliable but narrow, the more wholistic health approach to ecological risk assessment and ecosystem management is less precise and less reliable but more comprehensive. How is the health paradigm more comprehensive? When ecologists assess ecological health in health-paradigm ecological risk assessment and use it to guide ecosystem management, they investigate all relevant aspects of ecological well being, especially those that are analogous to human health. For David Rapport ŽRapport, 1990, p. 609; see also Rapport, 1984, 1989; Karr et al., 1986; Innes, 1988; Gray and Clark, 1992; Hannon, 1992; Kay, 1993; Karr, 1993. and other proponents of the health paradigm, ecological health involves at least three things: an ecosystem’s ability to maintain desirable vital signs, to handle stress, and to recover equilibrium after perturbations Žsee Rapport, 1989, p. 121; Costanza et al., 1992.. The advantages of using the health paradigm to assess ecological health and manage ecosystems are that it helps people to focus on wholistic, systems approaches to biotic welfare and to use human disease as an analogue for discovering various causes of environmental degradation Žsee Rapport et al., 1981; Policansky, 1993, p. 47.. The health paradigm also helps people to recognize that both medical and ecological systems are open, hierarchically structured, and cybernetic and that the best medicine is preventive ŽHargrove, 1989; Norton, 1991, pp. 103– 105.. On the negative side, health-paradigm ecological risk assessment is problematic because there are no 2
Lackey, R.T., 1995b. What are the critical research priorities for successfully implementing ecosystem management? Environmental Research Laboratory, US EPA, 200 SW 35th Street, Corvallis, OR 97333, p. 2. ŽUnpublished paper presented at Oregon State University, Department of Fisheries and Wildlife, Corvallis, OR, April 12, 1995..
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non-normative, uncontroversial ways to operationalize the notion of ecological health. Also, complex human medical systems are usually examined piece by piece, not by aggregating various aspects of ecological systems—as many ecologists do when they use models, indices, or indicators to evaluate ecological health ŽSchaeffer et al., 1988, p. 445.. Medical doctors generally do not use some wholistic measure of health, because they need specialized tests to give a diagnosis. The same might be true in assessing environmental problems. Second, physicians as diagnosticians do not collect data without a purpose ŽSchaeffer et al., 1988, p. 445.. Medical doctors have to foresee the causes of a potential problem, before running tests for it, and the same is often true for ecologists. Medical doctors likewise seek to maximize the welfare of an individual patient, while the goal of proponents of ecological health is more difficult to define, precisely because it is wholistic. Also, physicians have extensive inductive knowledge of healthy subjects, including explicit tables for various values—from hemoglobin to blood sugar level—on which to base their diagnoses. Because of the uniqueness of different ecological phenomena, ecologists rarely have extensive, general, inductive knowledge of ecological health ŽSchaeffer et al., 1988, p. 446.. Medical theory is so well developed that physicians are able to diagnose diseases even before the patient realizes something is wrong. Ecological theory, however, is rarely developed enough to predict a problem before it manifests. Also, as Toby Page ŽPage, 1992, p. 113. points out, the concept of human health is tractable because of the relative constancy of the outside environment that serves as a benchmark. Often there is no relatively constant outside environment against which we can evaluate ecological changes. Ecological health likewise is a vague concept in several ways. It does not enable assessors to explain, for example, how many native species must be lost or how much standing crop biomass must change, in order to say that ecological health is decreased or lost. The boundary conditions for health of an ecological system are not as clear as they are for humans and for single-species or multiple-species animal bioassays. In clarifying the ecological-health paradigm and investigating the ethical questions it raises, ecologists and ecosystem managers need to examine the im-
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plicit evaluative judgments assessors make when they choose criteria for ecological health and operationalize them. They implicitly posit some ecological effects Žloss of resiliency, and so on. as more valuable than others, and they presuppose that there is a greater ethical mandate for assessing and preserving some ecological effects rather than others. In investigating and clarifying the health paradigm and its ethical aspects, researchers need to answer questions such as whether ecological health can be defined only conventionally or pragmatically ŽNorton, 1992.; whether the health paradigm supports stipulative definitions of ecological health that rely on expert judgement rather than empirical substantiation, and if so, the degree to which stipulative judgments provide ethically binding criteria for environmental management. Are the more wholistic, but less precisely defined, methods and data of the health paradigm likely to lead to desirable ecosystem management or to erroneous ethical and policy judgments ŽCairns et al., 1992, p. 67 ff.; Lackey, 1994.. 2
5. Evaluating the ethical strengths of each of the two paradigms Investigating whether the traditional or health paradigm—or neither—presupposes specific ethical goals thrusts ecologists and ecosystem managers onto the horns of a dilemma. Either they attempt to manage ecological risks by means of the traditional paradigm and rely on some indicator species, or they attempt to manage it by means of the health paradigm and employ a more complex measure, such as evaluating multiple species and effects, as Karr and others have proposed ŽKarr et al., 1986, p. 4 ff... On the one hand, if managers use indicator species as a basis for their actions, then they may be misled because one species rarely provides adequate information about an entire habitat or community. Moreover, although single-species tests provide the most convincing evidence for potential harm ŽCairns et al., 1992, pp. 334–335., individual species commonly vary as much as two orders of magnitude in their response to stress and may vary as much as seven orders of magnitude ŽCairns et al., 1992, p. 330.. On the other hand, if assessors and ecosystem managers use more complex tools as part of the health
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paradigm, then either they may be aggregating ‘apples and oranges,’ or they may be unable to replicate their results. Different ecosystems respond differently to stress. Some are perturbation dependent, and others are dependent on floods ŽCairns et al., 1992, p. 330.. Particular soil chemistry or synchronized flowering time, necessary for some collections of species, requires fires ŽAtkinson and Cairns, 1992, pp. 244–245.. Use of wholistic, system-wide management criteria presupposes that such ecosystem differences are minimal. Hence, the single-species vs. system tests typically force an ethical choice between action based on incomplete Žbut precise. information vs. action based on more complete Žbut less reliable. information. Part of the problem is that both the US EPA and a committee of the National Research CouncilrNational Academy of Sciences describe ecological health as a ‘societal value’ ŽNational Research Council, 1994c, p. 46. that involves ‘normative’ assessments. The health-paradigm use of value judgments thus leads to at least two problems. As Diamond Ž1987. Žp. 331. asserts, ‘‘different people with different values would make different choices about the same wecologicalx site.’’ The second problem is that including values in the discussion may jeopardize the scientific underpinnings of ecological risk assessment ŽLevin, 1988; Policansky, 1993, p. 44.. Although, as Allen and Hoekstra Ž1992. Žp. 50. point out, ‘‘ valueless accounts of physical systems have limited utility,’’ De Angelis et al. Ž1990. Žp. 557., and others emphasize that ecological systems always reflect a value system. Thus the ethically astute assessor faces a paradox: to the degree that ecological risk is a value-laden concept, it lacks scientific credibility needed for sound ecosystem management, but to the degree that it is a purely scientific concept it lacks human utility also needed for management. For example, society expects certain ‘services’ from ecosystems, such as filtering dust, absorbing carbon dioxide emissions, degrading sewage and other pollutants, and providing food, fiber and energy. Should managers try to be scientific? Or should they protect societally ‘desirable’ attributes of ecosystems ŽMiller, 1991, p. 209; Pickett et al., 1994, p. 180 ff..? As experts on environmental indices know ŽOtt, 1978, p. 2; McKenzie, 1992; McKenzie et al., 1992., managers cannot possibly answer this question un-
less they know the purpose for which ecological risk assessment will be used. To specify the purpose requires us to make a value judgment. As a 1993 National Research CouncilrNational Academy of Sciences committee put it: ‘‘Goal setting is a riskmanagement function’’ ŽNational Research Council, 1993.. In thermodynamic accounts of ecological risk, for example, a human value judgment is required to specify which of many changes in optimum operating points of the system are desirable ŽKay, 1990, 1991, 1993.. More generally, minimizing ecological risk presupposes sustaining some normal or natural state; specifying and applying this norm thus requires value judgments Žsee King, 1993, p. 29.. One practical ethical problem raised by the value judgments used in ecosystem management is that we do not have the money to make even reserves naturally risk-free or healthy. In the case of prairies, for example, Diamond Ž1987. Žp. 333; see also Cowell, 1993. asks whether we should use restoration funds ‘‘to weed out exotic plants that are structurally compatible with prairies . . . worx leave those exotics there and use the money to go restore some other prairie lands?’’ The solution of Diamond Ž1987. Žp. 334. is ‘‘to decide what our real goals are.’’ 5.1. Default assumptions about the burden of proof Different paradigms for ecological risk assessment and different applications of them in ecosystem management also raise questions about where the burden of proof lies. On the risk imposer or on the risk bearer? The traditional paradigm, because of its emphasis on precise, reliable species testing, may miss ecosystem damage that is poorly defined or misunderstood. Thus it appears to presuppose that more of the burden of proof belongs on those who assert the presence of an undesirable ecological risk. The health paradigm, however, because of its wholistic emphasis on lack of human disruption, appears to presuppose that more of the burden of proof belongs on those who deny the presence of an undesirable ecological risk. Such differences are likely to signal quite different ethical assumptions about false positives rather than false negatives Žsee Cairns et al., 1992, p. 69 ff.; Gillroy and Wade, 1992; ShraderFrechette and McCoy, 1993.. Ethical questions about false negatives and false positives also raise issues
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about the normative and policy dangers of ‘crying wolf’ ŽCairns et al., 1992, p. 87.: such cries could hurt environmental causes when the public begins to disbelieve the various environmental ‘wolves.’ Despite these difficulties, there are strong ethical and environmental reasons for arguing that, in a case of uncertainty, when both types of errors are unavoidable, environmental managers should minimize false negatives rather than false positives. We do not repeat the reasoning here, because its details are elsewhere. Minimizing public risk and threats to the common good require minimizing false negatives rather than false positives in cases of ecosystem management. Such a default rule means that, even when ecologists and managers cannot confirm potential ecosystem damage, the burden of proof rests on whoever asserts there is no threat. The traditional and health paradigms likewise raise quite different questions about the ethical assumptions presupposed by using alternative assessment and management endpoints. One of the biggest potential problems with the health paradigm and using ecological health as an assessment and management endpoint is that there is a gap between it and monitoring endpoints such as changes in diversity, reduction in some population, or changes in the production of the community. As Suter et al. Ž1993. Žp. 291. points out, at least two problems occur when assessors and managers commit the ‘ecological fallacy’ of assuming that measured differences between two environmental monitoring endpoints cause measured differences in the frequency of stress at the assessment or management endpoints. First, there is a greater probability that ecologists will confuse correlation with causation, that they will fall victim to pseudo replication, and that they will miss the ‘hidden variables’ or the real causes of particular effects. Second, this monitoring-assessment mismatch raises the question of the ethical justifiability of assuming uniform ecosystem responses that could either overestimate or underestimate risks. Not all exposed ecosystems respond to stress in the same way Žsee Suter et al., 1993, p. 292.. Because they do not, it is difficult to substantiate environmental damage and therefore ethical responsibility for it. Also, for most ecological systems, because ‘there has been no baseline monitoring against which to measure changes’ ŽMiller, 1991, p. 209., and because fundamental
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cause–effect relationships in ecology are not understood, it is not possible to develop fully reliable measures for concepts such as ecological health ŽNational Research Council, 1994c, p. 12.. The tendency of many assessors and managers— to presuppose that all ecosystems function and respond in the same way and therefore to make ad hoc hypotheses ŽSuter et al., 1993, pp. 328–333. —could cause already-degraded environments, particularly those typical of situations of environmental injustice, to become further degraded. This degradation, in turn, could cause disproportionate, ethically questionable environmental burdens on those least able to bear them ŽWestra and Wenz, 1995.. In a situation of ecological uncertainty, where should assessors and managers place the burden of proof Žsee Cranor, 1985, 1992.? Stuart Pimm says: ‘‘when we see major environmental changes, it is likely humans are the cause, even if we do not yet understand the mechanisms and cannot rule out other suspects’’ ŽMiller, 1991.. 5.2. Default assumptions about public rights Because the traditional and health paradigms incorporate alternative accounts of ecological risk, they rely—to different degrees—on expert judgments about the nature, magnitude, and status of that risk. In general, the more precise and narrow measures of risk embodied in the traditional paradigm rely somewhat less on expert judgment than do the broader, more wholistic measures of risk discussed in the health paradigm. As a consequence of these differences, use of each ecological-risk-assessment paradigm raises questions about the ethical justification for experts’ Žvs. stakeholders’. making decisions about ecological risk Žsee Thomson, 1990; Lyons, 1994; Pickett et al., 1994, p. 180 ff... To the degree that such decisions include value judgments about the ethical acceptability of various risks or their ranking, they are in part the prerogative of the public as well as experts ŽShrader-Frechette, 1991.. Moreover, problematic decisions about the nature of risk or its ethical acceptability seem more likely to occur to the degree that a particular risk paradigm is not operationalizable and not empirically determined. The traditional paradigm appears more operationalizable and empirical than the health paradigm
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because it relies so heavily on a narrower conception of ecological risk, a conception with which ecologists and toxicologists have had much experience through animal bioassays. The health paradigm, however, seems less operationalizable and empirical because, as Haskell, Norton, Costanza ŽCostanza et al., 1992, p. 14., and others admit, we are ‘‘lacking a compendium of diseases and diagnostic tools’’ for assessing ecological health. But if assessors lack diagnostic tools and a list of diseases, then they will need to investigate and evaluate the ethical justification for the apparently larger role for expert judgment in the health paradigm. If ecologists need a theory about disease and diagnosis to justify the choice of risk measures, as Hannon Ž1992. Žpp. 207–222. and Ulanowicz Ž1992. Žpp. 190–206. argue, and if assessors lack these predictive and consensual theories, then the only alternative appears to rely on expert judgments. Meanwhile, stakeholders, ecologists, and ecosystem managers need to determine the ethical limits on these judgments, given the public’s right to define and evaluate ecological risks Žsee Lyons, 1979; Thomson, 1990; Nino, 1991; Lyons, 1994..
6. Conclusion Perhaps the most significant ethical issue raised by use of ecological risk assessment’s traditional paradigm vs. its health paradigm for ecosystem assessment and management is the degree to which either is likely to lead to good consequences such as greater protection of the environment, equal treatment of risk imposers and risk bearers, and equal consideration of relevant interests in decisions about ecological risk. The ethically desirable consequences of each paradigm are, in part, a function of the assumptions, methods, and decision models employed in it. Yet, in spite of the fact that repeated National Research Council ŽNRC. reports ŽNational Research Council, 1981, 1986. have called for validation studies to improve the mathematical models and predictive tools used in ecological risk assessment, ‘‘the resources currently being expended win the USx for improvement of predictive tools are much smaller than those devoted to repetitive assessments and routine monitoring of compliance with
permit requirements’’ ŽNational Research Council, 1993.. As a 1994 NRCrNAS committee put it, ‘‘a more explicit conceptual model is needed’’ to direct research on ecological risks. One ethical question Žthis modelling problem raises. is the nature and significance of the good consequences each ecological-risk paradigm may generate, given the differences in the conceptual models each paradigm employs Žsee Johnson, 1991.. Because of its emphasis on indicator species and toxicological testing, use of the traditional Žanimaltoxicity. paradigm likely will lead to greater protection of species, populations, and ecological structures. Yet, because of its emphasis on wholistic ecosystem health, use of the health paradigm will likely lead to greater protection of ecological processes and functions. Both consequences are ethically desirable, yet each set of consequences mirrors quite different ethical goals: protection of individuals vs. protection of the common good. To the degree that assessing and managing ecological risk and its consequences mirror traditional choices between individualistic vs. wholistic paradigms, ecosystem management will require raising some of the same questions that already dominate social and political theory, ethics, economics, and law. Human health risk assessment and management have moved from expert determination to stakeholder participation. Ecosystem management must make the same transition.
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