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When is a reason properly pragmatic?
Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2012) 613–614
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog
Commentary
When is a reason properly pragmatic? q Jennifer Corns CUNY Graduate Center, Philosophy, 365 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States
In ‘‘Inductive Parsimony and the Methodological Argument,’’ Suchy-Dicey (this issue) argues that the claim that conscious perception requires attention (hereafter, CPA) is not undermined by the argument against it she thinks is most common. She reconstructs this argument and labels it the methodological argument from inductive parsimony, only to ultimately reject it. According to the methodological argument, the evidence in favor of CPA equally supports the weaker claim that attention is necessary only for accessed conscious perception. It is then claimed that we should accept a principle of inductive parsimony according to which it is legitimate to accept only the weaker of two claims when the evidence equally supports both. The argument concludes that CPA should, therefore, be rejected as its supporting evidence only substantiates the weaker claim that attention is necessary for accessed conscious perception. Suchy-Dicey’s rejection of this argument rests mainly on her distinction between pragmatic and logical inductive parsimony. For pragmatic inductive parsimony, we need some reason to be skeptical about generalizing from observed to unobserved cases. For logical inductive parsimony, it need only be possible that there is a relevant difference between observed and unobserved cases. Suchy-Dicey then plausibly claims that we ought to accept only pragmatic inductive parsimony within the special sciences—including neuroscience and consciousness studies. Applying these considerations to the argument against CPA, we need some reason to think that there are any cases of conscious perceptions that are not accessed. Suchy-Dicey thinks there is no such reason. Without one, the appeal to inductive parsimony is merely logical (it is possible that there are such cases) as against pragmatic (there are reasons to think there are such cases). If there is no reason to think that there are some conscious perceptions that are not accessed, and we accept that attention is necessary for accessed conscious perceptions, then considerations of parsimony are insufficient to reject CPA. Consequently, she thinks that the methodological argument’s employment of inductive parsimony is illegitimate. Therefore, the arguments conclusion that CPA should be rejected in favor of the weaker claim that attention is necessary only for accessed conscious perception is unsupported. I think Suchy-Dicey’s distinction between logical and pragmatic inductive parsimony is an important distinction that philosophers of mind would do well to recognize. Perhaps doing so would contribute to hushing the cacophony of imagined, far-fetched scenarios that obstructs progress in our understanding of the actual. It is, however, not obvious to me that the distinction gets any purchase in the present debate. It is simply not clear what sorts of reasons we are recommended to accept as properly pragmatic in neuroscience and consciousness studies. As Suchy-Dicey rightly points out, the success of the Methodological Argument and her attack on it crucially depends on ‘‘. . . whether the difference between p-consciousness and a-consciousness (or imagistic and propositional consciousness) is properly pragmatic.’’ I agree. The truth of this makes it imperative that the conditions for pragmatic reasons, as against those merely logical or metaphysical, be clearly stated and defended. The closest the article comes is noting that mere possibility is not properly pragmatic. This does not come close enough. Clear conditions on what sorts of reasons would legitimately support the existence of conscious perceptions that are not accessed is particularly pressing given that Suchy-Dicey’s stated opponents are Christopher Mole and Ned Block. Both Mole and Block offer reasons that do not appear in Suchy-Dicey’s article. Are these reasons properly pragmatic? If so, then the distinction between logical and pragmatic parsimony is irrelevant, and the reasons will need to be directly refuted to reject the Methodological Argument.
q Commentary on Suchy-Dicey, C.M. (2012). Inductive parsimony and the methodological argument. Consciousness and Cognition, 21, 605–609. This article is part of a special issue of this journal on Standing on the Verge: Lessons and Limits from the Empirical study of Consciousness. E-mail address: [email protected]
1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2011.03.011
614
J. Corns / Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2012) 613–614
While Mole’s alternatives to CPA are discussed by Suchy-Dicey, his reasons for countenancing these alternatives as genuine are not. I take Mole’s argument for the claim that there are unattended conscious states to be: (1) common sense decrees both that consciousness is necessary for attention and that only some conscious states require attention; (2) commonsensical positions should be accepted as accurate until experimentally undermined; and (3) experimental evidence to date does not, in this case, undermine common sense. This argument may well be faulty, but as Mole (2008) is the stated opponent, his given reasons should be directly addressed or shown merely logical and not pragmatic. Similarly, while Suchy-Dicey does discuss Block’s experiential overflow argument, his position deserves more discussion. I take Block’s position to be that reports of accessed conscious states can be used to establish the limits of reports. This is so, in part, because we can use reports to identify the mechanisms underlying consciousness. Having established the relevant mechanisms, we can mesh first-person reports with the third-personal evidence concerning the neural mechanisms. Block (2007) argues that the resultant mesh supports the claim that there are phenomenally conscious states that are not accessed. Again, this argument may be faulty, but if Block is construed as Suchy-Dicey’s opponent, it ought to be addressed in more detail. Surely the argument presents reasons that are properly pragmatic and not merely logical. Should anyone actually reject CPA because it is merely possible that there are conscious perceptions that are not accessed, then Suchy-Dicey’s distinction between logical and pragmatic inductive parsimony may be appealed to as a rather decisive refutation. The only person who seems to construct such an argument, however, is Suchy-Dicey. Both Block and Mole offer reasons to think not just that conscious perceptions that are not accessed are possible, but that they are actual. These reasons strike me, at any rate, as properly pragmatic. If they are not, we need to be told why. If they are properly pragmatic after all, then they need to be directly addressed before the arguments against CPA are rejected. References Block, N. (2007). Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 481–499. Mole, C. (2008). Attention and consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15(4), 86–104. Suchy-Dicey, C. M. (2012). Inductive parsimony and the methodological argument. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(2), 605–609.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog
Commentary
When is a reason properly pragmatic? q Jennifer Corns CUNY Graduate Center, Philosophy, 365 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States
In ‘‘Inductive Parsimony and the Methodological Argument,’’ Suchy-Dicey (this issue) argues that the claim that conscious perception requires attention (hereafter, CPA) is not undermined by the argument against it she thinks is most common. She reconstructs this argument and labels it the methodological argument from inductive parsimony, only to ultimately reject it. According to the methodological argument, the evidence in favor of CPA equally supports the weaker claim that attention is necessary only for accessed conscious perception. It is then claimed that we should accept a principle of inductive parsimony according to which it is legitimate to accept only the weaker of two claims when the evidence equally supports both. The argument concludes that CPA should, therefore, be rejected as its supporting evidence only substantiates the weaker claim that attention is necessary for accessed conscious perception. Suchy-Dicey’s rejection of this argument rests mainly on her distinction between pragmatic and logical inductive parsimony. For pragmatic inductive parsimony, we need some reason to be skeptical about generalizing from observed to unobserved cases. For logical inductive parsimony, it need only be possible that there is a relevant difference between observed and unobserved cases. Suchy-Dicey then plausibly claims that we ought to accept only pragmatic inductive parsimony within the special sciences—including neuroscience and consciousness studies. Applying these considerations to the argument against CPA, we need some reason to think that there are any cases of conscious perceptions that are not accessed. Suchy-Dicey thinks there is no such reason. Without one, the appeal to inductive parsimony is merely logical (it is possible that there are such cases) as against pragmatic (there are reasons to think there are such cases). If there is no reason to think that there are some conscious perceptions that are not accessed, and we accept that attention is necessary for accessed conscious perceptions, then considerations of parsimony are insufficient to reject CPA. Consequently, she thinks that the methodological argument’s employment of inductive parsimony is illegitimate. Therefore, the arguments conclusion that CPA should be rejected in favor of the weaker claim that attention is necessary only for accessed conscious perception is unsupported. I think Suchy-Dicey’s distinction between logical and pragmatic inductive parsimony is an important distinction that philosophers of mind would do well to recognize. Perhaps doing so would contribute to hushing the cacophony of imagined, far-fetched scenarios that obstructs progress in our understanding of the actual. It is, however, not obvious to me that the distinction gets any purchase in the present debate. It is simply not clear what sorts of reasons we are recommended to accept as properly pragmatic in neuroscience and consciousness studies. As Suchy-Dicey rightly points out, the success of the Methodological Argument and her attack on it crucially depends on ‘‘. . . whether the difference between p-consciousness and a-consciousness (or imagistic and propositional consciousness) is properly pragmatic.’’ I agree. The truth of this makes it imperative that the conditions for pragmatic reasons, as against those merely logical or metaphysical, be clearly stated and defended. The closest the article comes is noting that mere possibility is not properly pragmatic. This does not come close enough. Clear conditions on what sorts of reasons would legitimately support the existence of conscious perceptions that are not accessed is particularly pressing given that Suchy-Dicey’s stated opponents are Christopher Mole and Ned Block. Both Mole and Block offer reasons that do not appear in Suchy-Dicey’s article. Are these reasons properly pragmatic? If so, then the distinction between logical and pragmatic parsimony is irrelevant, and the reasons will need to be directly refuted to reject the Methodological Argument.
q Commentary on Suchy-Dicey, C.M. (2012). Inductive parsimony and the methodological argument. Consciousness and Cognition, 21, 605–609. This article is part of a special issue of this journal on Standing on the Verge: Lessons and Limits from the Empirical study of Consciousness. E-mail address: [email protected]
1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2011.03.011
614
J. Corns / Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2012) 613–614
While Mole’s alternatives to CPA are discussed by Suchy-Dicey, his reasons for countenancing these alternatives as genuine are not. I take Mole’s argument for the claim that there are unattended conscious states to be: (1) common sense decrees both that consciousness is necessary for attention and that only some conscious states require attention; (2) commonsensical positions should be accepted as accurate until experimentally undermined; and (3) experimental evidence to date does not, in this case, undermine common sense. This argument may well be faulty, but as Mole (2008) is the stated opponent, his given reasons should be directly addressed or shown merely logical and not pragmatic. Similarly, while Suchy-Dicey does discuss Block’s experiential overflow argument, his position deserves more discussion. I take Block’s position to be that reports of accessed conscious states can be used to establish the limits of reports. This is so, in part, because we can use reports to identify the mechanisms underlying consciousness. Having established the relevant mechanisms, we can mesh first-person reports with the third-personal evidence concerning the neural mechanisms. Block (2007) argues that the resultant mesh supports the claim that there are phenomenally conscious states that are not accessed. Again, this argument may be faulty, but if Block is construed as Suchy-Dicey’s opponent, it ought to be addressed in more detail. Surely the argument presents reasons that are properly pragmatic and not merely logical. Should anyone actually reject CPA because it is merely possible that there are conscious perceptions that are not accessed, then Suchy-Dicey’s distinction between logical and pragmatic inductive parsimony may be appealed to as a rather decisive refutation. The only person who seems to construct such an argument, however, is Suchy-Dicey. Both Block and Mole offer reasons to think not just that conscious perceptions that are not accessed are possible, but that they are actual. These reasons strike me, at any rate, as properly pragmatic. If they are not, we need to be told why. If they are properly pragmatic after all, then they need to be directly addressed before the arguments against CPA are rejected. References Block, N. (2007). Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 481–499. Mole, C. (2008). Attention and consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15(4), 86–104. Suchy-Dicey, C. M. (2012). Inductive parsimony and the methodological argument. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(2), 605–609.