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When negative expectancies turn into negative performance: The role of ease of retrieval
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 41 (2005) 535–541 www.elsevier.com/locate/jesp
When negative expectancies turn into negative performance: The role of ease of retrieval夽 Johannes Keller¤, Herbert Bless Mikrosoziologie & Sozialpsychologie, University of Mannheim, 68131 Mannheim, Germany Received 4 July 2003; revised 28 July 2004
Abstract The present research relates recent work on the ease of retrieval heuristic to the impact of negative stereotypic expectations on test performance. It is argued that when individuals recall information that supports negative stereotypic expectations, this activation may impair test performance relative to conditions when no stereotypic expectations are activated. This impairment, however, should be most pronounced when the information is brought to mind with ease. If the retrieval of the respective information is associated with diYculty, the impairment should be attenuated. The results of the present study conWrm this hypothesis. In line with prior research, the results suggest that the experienced ease of retrieval is an important moderator of how accessible information is used. Going beyond existing evidence on attitude and frequency judgments, the results demonstrate an impact of ease of retrieval on test performance. 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
It seems almost like a truism that individuals’ judgments and behaviors are based on what comes to mind at the time of judgment. However, both theoretical as well as empirical work suggests that the impact of the accessible information depends not only on the content but also to a large degree on the subjective experiences that accompany information processing (for reviews see Schwarz, 1998; see contributions in Bless & Forgas, 2000). Besides other experiences, the experienced ease with which information comes to mind has been considered as a major moderator with respect to how activated information inXuences judgments and behavior. Perhaps most “classically” the role of how information comes to 夽 We are grateful to Karin Alles, Sabine Auracher-Haug, SteY Dorn, and Katharina Holaschke for their help in data collection. This research was supported by a grant from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft within the SFB 504 at the University of Mannheim, and by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMFT) within the framework of the German-Israeli Project Cooperation (DIP). * Corresponding author. Fax: +49 621 181 2038. E-mail address: [email protected] (J. Keller).
0022-1031/$ - see front matter 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2004.09.002
mind has been emphasized by Tversky and Kahneman (1973) who suggested that individuals may base judgments on the experienced ease with which information comes to mind. Interestingly, the implications of how information and what information comes to mind are often very similar. For example, in one of Tversky and Kahneman’s experiments, individuals overestimated the number of words starting with the letter “k” relative to words having “k” as the third letter. On the one hand, individuals may have based their judgments on the ease of retrieval heuristic. Because words with “k” as the Wrst letter came to mind more easily than words with “k” as the third letter, participants overestimated their frequency. On the other hand, instead of relying on the ease with which the information came to mind, participants may have simply based their judgment on the content: Because more words with “k” as the Wrst letter came to mind, participants may have inferred a higher number of those words. Note, that this latter explanation does not require a subjective experience in the form of the experienced ease of retrieval. Judgments may simply be based on the content that comes to mind. Obviously, both the
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ease and the content explanation may account for many Wndings because in many situations the two allow for similar implications. Addressing the ambiguity of the ease versus the content explanation, Schwarz et al. (1991) have oVered a paradigm that allows to disentangle the two accounts. Participants recalled either 6 or 12 examples of assertive behaviors. Prior pretesting had indicated that participants could retrieve 6 behaviors easily, whereas recalling 12 behaviors was diYcult. After recalling the behaviors, participants were asked to rate their own assertiveness. Within this paradigm, the ease and the content account allow for diVerent predictions. If participants base their judgment on the content that comes to mind, they should rate themselves as more assertive the more information they recalled, that is, when 12 rather than 6 assertive behaviors were made more accessible. Conversely, if participants base their judgment on the ease with which the content comes to mind, they should rate themselves as more assertive when the relevant information came to mind easily, that is, when they recalled 6 (easy) rather than 12 (diYcult) assertive behaviors. The results of a series of studies support this latter explanation (for additional evidence, conceptual replications, and extensions see Dijksterhuis, Macrae, & Haddock, 1999; Haddock, 2000; Rothman & Schwarz, 1998; Stepper & Strack, 1993; Wänke, Bless, & Biller, 1996; Wänke, Bohner, & Jurkowitsch, 1997, for an overview see Schwarz, 1998). In line with other theorizing (e.g., Schwarz, 1998) we argue that the distinction between ease of retrieval and the content has very important implications for a better understanding of many phenomena in social psychology. In pursuing this idea, the present research relates the concept of ease of retrieval to the consequences of expectancies on performance in test situations. Moreover, the present research aims at demonstrating that ease of retrieval eVects are not restricted to judgments but also aVect behavior. Research that avoids the described confound of ease and content has revealed consistent support for the impact of experienced ease on attitudes and judgments—however, there is rather little evidence that relates the impact of ease of retrieval to behavior. Empirical research has revealed ample evidence of expectancy eVects on test performance (e.g., Baumeister, Hamilton, & Tice, 1985; Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996; Dixon & Baumeister, 1991; Seta & Seta, 1995; Sherman, Skov, Hervitz, & Stock, 1981). Most recently, focusing on negative stereotypic expectations, Stereotype Threat Theory (STT, Steele, 1997; Steele & Aronson, 1995) has received considerable attention. STT holds that when negative stereotypic expectations (e.g., “women can’t do math”) are activated and applicable in testing situations individuals will experience stereotype threat. Stereotype threat is thereby deWned as the “sense that one can then be judged or treated in terms of the stereotype or that one might do something that would inadvertently con-
Wrm it” (Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002, p. 389). As a result of stereotype threat the performance of persons targeted by those negative stereotypic expectations is undermined. In line with this assumption, consistent research shows that stereotype threat resulted in decreased performance of the targets of negative stereotypic performance expectations. Rendering the expectations irrelevant to the testing situations eliminated performance pressure and in turn underperformance (for an overview see Steele et al., 2002). For example, Spencer, Steele, and Quinn (1999) found that the performance of women on a math test was signiWcantly better when negative stereotypic expectancies were ostensibly not applicable to the test at hand. STT proposes that the detrimental stereotype threat eVect is most likely to appear in situations (1) where the test pushes ability to the limit, that is, when the test consists of test items of a high level of diYculty, (2) when ability is submitted to evaluative scrutiny, and (3) when a negative stereotype is directly applicable to the test performance. Moreover, it is assumed that “stereotype threat is most likely to aVect individuals who are highly identiWed with the domain in question, and least likely to bother individuals who care little about the domain” (Aronson et al., 1999, p. 93). In experimental research addressing stereotype threat eVects on task performance participants are usually exposed to a speciWc task (for example, mental rotation, mathematical or verbal ability task, etc.). Given a suYcient association of the task with the stereotype, this exposure may itself activate individuals’ expectancy that is related to the respective type of tasks (“I know that females are not good at this”). In these cases, stereotype threat can be reduced by rendering the test in question as non-diagnostic with regard to the stereotypic ability in question (e.g., informing participants that the test in question assesses “divergent thinking” rather than “intelligence,” cf., Croizet & Claire, 1998; Steele & Aronson, 1995) or by informing participants that prior research has revealed no indication of any diVerences between the social groups in question (cf., Keller & Dauenheimer, 2003; Quinn & Spencer, 2001; Spencer et al., 1999 [Exp. 3]). In addition or alternatively to assuming that the nature of the task activates the corresponding stereotypic expectancies and stereotype threat, the stereotypic expectation can be experimentally introduced (“prior research has shown that males outperform females on this task”; for examples see Spencer et al., 1999 [Exp. 2]; Keller, 2002). Independent of whether the stereotypic expectancy is explicitly provided or not, it has been consistently demonstrated that the introduction of a stereotypic expectation leads to stereotype threat, that is, individuals fear of being judged in terms of the stereotype and/or that they could do something that would conWrm the stereotype (Steele et al., 2002). How does the mere introduction of a
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negative stereotypic expectation lead to stereotype threat? One potential answer rests of course on the notion that in response to the respective activation individuals retrieve knowledge and generate arguments related to the expectation. The retrieved information may either support or speak against the expectation, for example, individuals may recall that they have observed an example in line with the negative expectancy (“my friend Mary failed on the math exam”) or they may generate an argument that speaks against the expectation (“in high school the girls in my class had better grades in math than the boys”). Given the above discussion of the inXuence of content versus ease of retrieval, at least two diVerent mechanisms are plausible with respect to individuals’ responses to stereotypic expectations. On the one hand, it might be argued that the more supportive information individuals retrieve in response to the negative stereotypic expectation, the more impact the expectancy should have on their performance. In other words, performance should be impaired more, when a large rather than only a small amount of information corresponding to the expectancy is activated. On the other hand, it could be argued that it is not the amount of information, but the ease with which the information is brought to mind. In this case, impaired test performance should be particularly likely when the information corresponding to the negative expectation comes to mind with ease rather than with diYculty. Experiencing diYculty when generating supportive arguments might in fact undermine the perceived validity and/or applicability of the activated stereotypic expectation (see also Schwarz, 1998; Wänke et al., 1996, for a discussion of how ease aVects attitude judgments). Presumably, in many real life situations the amount versus the ease hypothesis will result in similar predictions. Targets of stereotypes are likely to be very frequently exposed to negative stereotypic expectations and to arguments proposed in order to support the validity of the stereotypic expectancies. If so, they will be able to retrieve a lot of information that corresponds with the negative expectation and due to the frequent activation, this information will come to mind easily. Although the two accounts may often result in similar predictions, from a theoretical perspective it is important to distinguish the two mechanisms. This is particularly the case because on the one hand stereotype threat has been documented as a consistent eVect (Steele et al., 2002) with important implications in an applied sense, but at the same time, on the other hand, it has been argued that the exact nature of the underlying processes remains still unclear (see for example, Quinn & Spencer, 2001). To investigate the issues above, we exposed participants either to a stereotypic or to a non-stereotypic expectancy. In addition, we asked participants to retrieve either much or only little information that corresponds with the respective expectation. Based on a pretest,
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retrieving much information was considered as diYcult, whereas retrieving little information was considered as easy. If the amount of information corresponding to a stereotypic expectancy plays the crucial role then the “classical” stereotype threat eVect (diVerence between stereotypic and non-stereotypic expectancy) should be more pronounced when much rather than only little corresponding information is activated. A reversed pattern is predicted, however, if the ease with which corresponding information comes to mind plays a crucial role. In this case, the classical stereotype threat eVect should be more pronounced when the corresponding information comes to mind with ease (little information) rather than with diYculty (much information).
Method Participants and design Participants were 96 male students at the University of Mannheim who were oVered € 2 for participation in a study on emotional intelligence. They were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (topic: stereotypic vs. non-stereotypic expectancy) £ 2 (ease of retrieval: easy [few arguments] vs. diYcult [many arguments]) factorial design. Performance on the test was the primary dependent variable. Procedure When participants arrived at the laboratory, a female experimenter led them to individual cubicles and handed them over the questionnaire including all experimental manipulations. Questionnaires were shuZed before distribution to ensure that the experimenter remained blind to the experimental conditions. Participants read that the questionnaire consisted of diVerent parts that focussed on diVerent topics. Then a short paragraph introduced the concept of emotional intelligence. Depending on the topic condition they read either a stereotypic or non-stereotypic statement concerning gender diVerences in emotional intelligence (see below). Subsequently, they were asked to report either few or many personal experiences concerning emotional intelligence in line with the stereotypic or the non-stereotypic statement. Then, participants worked on an ostensible test of emotional intelligence. Expectancy manipulation All participants read that the investigation of gender diVerences in cognitive abilities play a major role in current psychological research. Participants assigned to the stereotypic condition read that the available evidence suggests that on average women score higher on emotional intelligence than men. They were then asked to
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recall personal experiences or arguments that reXected higher emotional intelligence of women rather than men, that is information corresponding to the stereotypic expectation. Participants in the non-stereotypic condition learned that there are no conclusive Wndings with respect to women having higher emotional intelligence and that some research suggests higher emotional intelligence of men. They were then asked to recall personal experiences or arguments that reXected higher emotional intelligence of men rather than women (non-stereotypic expectation).
countdown timer in front of them which displayed the remaining time for working on the test and signalled the end of the test period after 4 min. Subsequently participants Wlled in the remainder of the questionnaire including several demographic questions, most importantly we asked participants to indicate if German was their native language (since the test assessed verbal ability this information was critical). Finally, all participants were thoroughly debriefed.
Results Ease of retrieval manipulation The ease of retrieval manipulation was based on a pretest with an independent sample. In this pretest, we asked participants to recall personal experiences or arguments either with respect to females having higher emotional intelligence than males or vice versa (betweensubjects). Examining the number of retrieved examples in the pretest (for this logic see Schwarz et al., 1991), participants in the main study were either asked to generate 2 (few) or 5/61 (many) examples or arguments in support of the respective expectancy statement. Subsequently, participants responded to two items that served as a manipulation check (“The arguments came to my mind easily,” and “I had to think a lot to come up with the arguments”). Answers were given on nine-point scales anchored by 1 (do not at all agree) to 9 (agree completely). Ability test After providing the requested number of examples and working on the manipulation check, participants read that the current research was not only concerned with individuals’ personal experiences concerning emotional intelligence but in the second section also with the actual performance of men and women on tests of emotional intelligence. Participants learned that they would be working on a sub-test taken from a standardized test of emotional intelligence. The alleged test of emotional intelligence was actually a 20 item test of verbal ability taken from a standard intelligence test (IST 2000; Amthauer, Brocke, Liepmann, & Beauducel, 1999). Participants learned that they had 4 min to work on the test. When participants indicated to the experimenter that they were ready to start, the experimenter placed a
1 Since the pretest had revealed that participants generated somewhat more arguments or examples in support of the stereotypic (M D 3.4) than the non-stereotypic (M D 2.9) topic we asked our participants in the stereotypic low ease of retrieval condition to mention 6 arguments or examples whereas those in the non-stereotypic low ease of retrieval condition were asked to mention 5 arguments or examples. It is important to note that this diVerence can not account for the obtained pattern of Wndings.
Since four participants indicated that German was not their native language these participants were excluded from further analyses. In addition, we excluded six participants who did not report the required number of arguments. Manipulation check To test the eVectiveness of the ease manipulation we computed an index including the two manipulation check items, r(86) D .66, and submitted this index to a 2 (topic: stereotypic vs. non-stereotypic expectancy) £ 2 (ease of retrieval: easy [few arguments] vs. diYcult [many arguments]) factorial analysis of variance. The analysis resulted in a signiWcant main eVect of ease manipulation, F(1, 82) D 4.72, p < .04. Supporting the success of the manipulation, participants who generated few arguments found the task easier than those who generated many arguments (Ms D 3.3 and 2.6, respectively). Importantly, no other eVect reached signiWcance, all Fs < 1. Test performance Test performance was assessed according to the test manual by counting the number of items solved correctly. This score was entered into a 2 (topic: stereotypic vs. non-stereotypic expectancy) £ 2 (ease of retrieval: easy [few arguments] vs. diYcult [many arguments]) factorial analysis of variance (the respective means are displayed in Fig. 1). This analysis revealed a signiWcant
Fig. 1. Test performance as a function of expectancy and ease of retrieval.
J. Keller, H. Bless / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 41 (2005) 535–541
interaction pattern, F(1, 82) D 4.45, p < .04, reXecting diVerential eVects of expectations as a function of the ease with which corresponding information was retrieved. When participants recalled the information with ease, activating stereotypic expectations resulted in poorer performance than activating non-stereotypic expectations (M D 10.8 vs. M D 12.8, t(43) D 2.54, p < .02, Cohen’s d D 0.77). This pattern reXects the classic stereotype threat eVect that poorer performance is observed when negative expectancies are activated and applicable. In contrast, this stereotype threat eVect was eliminated and even slightly reversed when the information corresponding to the stereotypic and non-stereotypic expectancies came to mind with diYculty. Activating negative stereotypic expectancies resulted in slightly better performances than activating positive non-stereotypic expectancies (M D 12.3 vs. M D 11.8, t < 1, Cohen’s d D ¡0.17). Additional analyses As it has been documented that changes in the working self-concept may aVect test performance (Ruvolo & Markus, 1992), it might be possible that the observed performance diVerences are due to diVerential activation of self-knowledge rather than to stereotypic expectations. In order to address the possibility that depending on the experimental conditions participants recalled more or less self-related personal experiences or arguments that reXect higher emotional intelligence of women (men) we analysed the content of participants’ responses. Each listed response was assigned to one out of six categories: (a) self-related stereotype consistent, (b) self-related stereotype inconsistent, (c) self-related without any relation to the stereotype, (d) not selfrelated stereotype consistent, (e) not self-related stereotype inconsistent, and (f) a residual category comprising all other responses. Almost all responses fell into the categories d and e (depending on the experimental condition; two sample statements read “men are often solving conXicts with physical power,” or, “there are many men in jobs that require emotional intelligence”)—only one response fell into a “self-related” category. These Wndings suggest that a diVerential alteration of the working self-concept based on the information brought to mind is presumably not responsible for the observed performance diVerences. Discussion Consistent with prior research (cf., Schwarz, 1998), the results support the assumption that activated information can have very diVerent eVects depending on the ease with which this information is brought to mind. The obtained Wndings strongly suggest that the consequences of negative stereotypic expectancies on task performance
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may depend on the ease with which information corresponding to the expectancy is brought to mind. SpeciWcally, activating a negative stereotypic expectancy led to a poorer performance than activating a non-stereotypic expectancy when participants could easily retrieve information corresponding to the respective expectancy. This Wnding replicates the pattern that is consistently observed in research on stereotype threat (e.g., Steele, 1997; Steele & Aronson, 1995). Most importantly, this pattern was eliminated when participants retrieved the corresponding information with diYculty. Although in this case more information corresponding to the expectancies was brought to mind, the diVerential impact of the stereotypic and the non-stereotypic expectancy was eliminated and even slightly reversed. This pattern of Wndings has a number of implications, both for research on ease of retrieval and research on the consequences of stereotypic expectancies. With respect to research on the ease of retrieval the obtained Wndings provide further evidence for the assumption that the experienced ease of information retrieval plays a major role in how activated information inXuences judgments and behavior. While prior research has primarily focused on (attitude) judgments in various domains (for examples, see Rothman & Schwarz, 1998; Schwarz et al., 1991; Wänke et al., 1996) the present research extends this research in at least two ways. First, with focusing on the consequences of stereotypic expectancies, the general ease of retrieval logic was applied to a new domain. The obtained Wndings emphasize the stability and generalizability of eVects observed in other domains. They demonstrate that the ease with which information is retrieved is not only a by-product but an important element that is often essential in understanding the consequences of activated information. Second, going beyond judgmental eVects, the results clearly suggests that the impact of the ease of retrieval is also observable when behavior, here in form of test performance, is in the focus of the attention. With respect to research on stereotype threat the results suggest that the consequences of introducing a stereotypic expectation does not necessarily result in stereotype threat and impaired performance. The results suggest that the negative impact of stereotypic expectations is observed when information corresponding to the stereotypic or non-stereotypic expectation comes to mind easily. It is likely that the ease with which the corresponding information comes to mind may inXuence the degree to which the stereotype is perceived as valid and as applicable to the current situation. When information comes to mind easily, then the stereotype is presumably perceived as valid information that is relevant in the testing situation (see also Schwarz, 1998). In contrast, when the information comes to mind with diYculty, then individuals may question the relevance and validity of the stereotypic expectation. They may not
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experience stereotype threat, and as a consequence no detrimental eVects are observed. In line with this argument, we observed an absence (and even a slight reversal) of the consequences of the stereotype-consistent versus the stereotype-inconsistent expectancy when participants felt that it was diYcult to retrieve information corresponding to the respective expectancy. The reported Wndings suggest that in order to reduce the negative consequences of stereotypic expectancies one should try to decrease the ease with which thoughts that are corresponding to the implications of the negative stereotypic expectation come to mind. However, this may be a rather diYcult and long-term enterprise given that the negative expectations are likely to be activated in many situations either by being directly expressed or by being automatically associated with the performance situation. If so, negative stereotypic expectations may become chronically accessible and may come to mind rather easily. This in turn would account for the rather robust eVects of stereotype threat (Steele et al., 2002). Whereas decreasing accessibility directly may often be a rather diYcult intervention, the presented Wndings point to another possible, more indirect strategy. The Wndings suggest that it is helpful to increase the accessibility of information that pertains to the stereotype threat but has opposite implications. SpeciWcally, it might be a useful strategy to provide the potential targets of stereotype threat with information that questions the validity of the negative stereotypes. In line with this hypothesis, we observed that participants who generated information that opposed the implications of the stereotypic expectation were less likely to show a detrimental performance, in particular when the generation of this information felt easy. Note that this implication is in line with theorizing on stereotype threat. In this respect it has been argued that the detrimental eVects on performance are more likely when individuals perceive a kernel of truth in the negative expectation rather than when individuals do not believe in the negative expectation (Aronson, 2002, p. 288). It seems very plausible that individuals who do not believe in the validity of the stereotypic expectation, can more easily generate information that contradicts the expectation than individuals who believe in the expectation. Given that up to date there is rather little empirical evidence that addresses the role of individuals’ believe in the stereotypic expectation on test performance, the presented Wndings provide a Wrst test for this assumption. On an interesting side note, the present results speak, at least to some degree, to the discussion whether stereotype threat eVects can be explained on the basis of an ideomotor account (Wheeler & Petty, 2001) or whether such a cold cognitive account is less plausible (Davies, Spencer, Quinn, & Gerhardstein, 2002). The obtained Wndings suggest that the mere activation of information that is related to the stereotypic expectation per se is not
suYcient to elicit stereotype threat eVects. If so, activating more information should have increased rather than decreased the detrimental eVect. The data suggest that a potential eVect due to the mere activation can be altered by the subjective experience with which corresponding information is retrieved and generated. In sum, the presented Wndings strongly point to the important role of the ease with which expectancy-related information comes to mind. Detrimental eVects of negative stereotypic expectations seem particularly likely when corresponding information comes to mind very easily. We readily acknowledge that with the focus on how negative expectancies are activated the present Wndings do not speak to how the negative expectancies aVect performance (see also Quinn & Spencer, 2001; for a discussion of the lack of knowledge about the processes mediating between stereotype threat and performance). We believe, however, that despite this limitation the obtained Wndings are important because they point to the fact that meta-cognitive experiences related to the activation of stereotypic (and counter-stereotypic) knowledge can play a crucial role in determining the level of stereotype threat and the impact of activating stereotypic contents on subsequent cognitive performance.
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J. Keller, H. Bless / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 41 (2005) 535–541 Dixon, T. M., & Baumeister, R. F. (1991). Escaping the self: The moderating eVect of self-complexity. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17, 363–368. Haddock, G. (2000). Subjective ease of retrieval on attitudinal judgments: The moderating role of processing motivation. In H. Bless & J. P. Forgas (Eds.), The message within: The role of subjective experience in social cognition and behavior (pp. 125–142). Philadelphia: Psychology Press. Keller, J. (2002). Blatant stereotype threat and women’s math performance: Self-handicapping as a strategic means to cope with obtrusive negative performance expectations. Sex Roles, 47, 193–198. Keller, J., & Dauenheimer, D. (2003). Stereotype threat in the classroom: Dejection mediates the disrupting threat eVect on women’s math performance. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 371–381. Quinn, D. M., & Spencer, S. J. (2001). The interference of stereotype threat with women’s generation of mathematical problem-solving strategies. Journal of Social Issues, 57, 55–71. Rothman, J. A., & Schwarz, N. (1998). Constructing perceptions of vulnerability: Personal relevance and the use of experimental information in health judgments. Personality and Social Psychology, 24, 1053–1064. Ruvolo, A., & Markus, H. (1992). Possible selves and performance: The power of self-relevant imagery. Social Cognition, 10, 95–124. Schwarz, N. (1998). Accessible content and accessibility experiences: The interplay of declarative and experiential information in judgment. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 2, 87–99. Schwarz, N., Bless, H., Strack, F., Klumpp, G., Rittenauer-Schatka, H., & Simons, A. (1991). Ease of retrieval as information: Another look at the availability heuristic. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 195–202. Sherman, S. J., Skov, R. B., Hervitz, E. F., & Stock, C. B. (1981). The eVects of explaining hypothetical future events: From possibility to
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When negative expectancies turn into negative performance: The role of ease of retrieval夽 Johannes Keller¤, Herbert Bless Mikrosoziologie & Sozialpsychologie, University of Mannheim, 68131 Mannheim, Germany Received 4 July 2003; revised 28 July 2004
Abstract The present research relates recent work on the ease of retrieval heuristic to the impact of negative stereotypic expectations on test performance. It is argued that when individuals recall information that supports negative stereotypic expectations, this activation may impair test performance relative to conditions when no stereotypic expectations are activated. This impairment, however, should be most pronounced when the information is brought to mind with ease. If the retrieval of the respective information is associated with diYculty, the impairment should be attenuated. The results of the present study conWrm this hypothesis. In line with prior research, the results suggest that the experienced ease of retrieval is an important moderator of how accessible information is used. Going beyond existing evidence on attitude and frequency judgments, the results demonstrate an impact of ease of retrieval on test performance. 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
It seems almost like a truism that individuals’ judgments and behaviors are based on what comes to mind at the time of judgment. However, both theoretical as well as empirical work suggests that the impact of the accessible information depends not only on the content but also to a large degree on the subjective experiences that accompany information processing (for reviews see Schwarz, 1998; see contributions in Bless & Forgas, 2000). Besides other experiences, the experienced ease with which information comes to mind has been considered as a major moderator with respect to how activated information inXuences judgments and behavior. Perhaps most “classically” the role of how information comes to 夽 We are grateful to Karin Alles, Sabine Auracher-Haug, SteY Dorn, and Katharina Holaschke for their help in data collection. This research was supported by a grant from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft within the SFB 504 at the University of Mannheim, and by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMFT) within the framework of the German-Israeli Project Cooperation (DIP). * Corresponding author. Fax: +49 621 181 2038. E-mail address: [email protected] (J. Keller).
0022-1031/$ - see front matter 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2004.09.002
mind has been emphasized by Tversky and Kahneman (1973) who suggested that individuals may base judgments on the experienced ease with which information comes to mind. Interestingly, the implications of how information and what information comes to mind are often very similar. For example, in one of Tversky and Kahneman’s experiments, individuals overestimated the number of words starting with the letter “k” relative to words having “k” as the third letter. On the one hand, individuals may have based their judgments on the ease of retrieval heuristic. Because words with “k” as the Wrst letter came to mind more easily than words with “k” as the third letter, participants overestimated their frequency. On the other hand, instead of relying on the ease with which the information came to mind, participants may have simply based their judgment on the content: Because more words with “k” as the Wrst letter came to mind, participants may have inferred a higher number of those words. Note, that this latter explanation does not require a subjective experience in the form of the experienced ease of retrieval. Judgments may simply be based on the content that comes to mind. Obviously, both the
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ease and the content explanation may account for many Wndings because in many situations the two allow for similar implications. Addressing the ambiguity of the ease versus the content explanation, Schwarz et al. (1991) have oVered a paradigm that allows to disentangle the two accounts. Participants recalled either 6 or 12 examples of assertive behaviors. Prior pretesting had indicated that participants could retrieve 6 behaviors easily, whereas recalling 12 behaviors was diYcult. After recalling the behaviors, participants were asked to rate their own assertiveness. Within this paradigm, the ease and the content account allow for diVerent predictions. If participants base their judgment on the content that comes to mind, they should rate themselves as more assertive the more information they recalled, that is, when 12 rather than 6 assertive behaviors were made more accessible. Conversely, if participants base their judgment on the ease with which the content comes to mind, they should rate themselves as more assertive when the relevant information came to mind easily, that is, when they recalled 6 (easy) rather than 12 (diYcult) assertive behaviors. The results of a series of studies support this latter explanation (for additional evidence, conceptual replications, and extensions see Dijksterhuis, Macrae, & Haddock, 1999; Haddock, 2000; Rothman & Schwarz, 1998; Stepper & Strack, 1993; Wänke, Bless, & Biller, 1996; Wänke, Bohner, & Jurkowitsch, 1997, for an overview see Schwarz, 1998). In line with other theorizing (e.g., Schwarz, 1998) we argue that the distinction between ease of retrieval and the content has very important implications for a better understanding of many phenomena in social psychology. In pursuing this idea, the present research relates the concept of ease of retrieval to the consequences of expectancies on performance in test situations. Moreover, the present research aims at demonstrating that ease of retrieval eVects are not restricted to judgments but also aVect behavior. Research that avoids the described confound of ease and content has revealed consistent support for the impact of experienced ease on attitudes and judgments—however, there is rather little evidence that relates the impact of ease of retrieval to behavior. Empirical research has revealed ample evidence of expectancy eVects on test performance (e.g., Baumeister, Hamilton, & Tice, 1985; Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996; Dixon & Baumeister, 1991; Seta & Seta, 1995; Sherman, Skov, Hervitz, & Stock, 1981). Most recently, focusing on negative stereotypic expectations, Stereotype Threat Theory (STT, Steele, 1997; Steele & Aronson, 1995) has received considerable attention. STT holds that when negative stereotypic expectations (e.g., “women can’t do math”) are activated and applicable in testing situations individuals will experience stereotype threat. Stereotype threat is thereby deWned as the “sense that one can then be judged or treated in terms of the stereotype or that one might do something that would inadvertently con-
Wrm it” (Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002, p. 389). As a result of stereotype threat the performance of persons targeted by those negative stereotypic expectations is undermined. In line with this assumption, consistent research shows that stereotype threat resulted in decreased performance of the targets of negative stereotypic performance expectations. Rendering the expectations irrelevant to the testing situations eliminated performance pressure and in turn underperformance (for an overview see Steele et al., 2002). For example, Spencer, Steele, and Quinn (1999) found that the performance of women on a math test was signiWcantly better when negative stereotypic expectancies were ostensibly not applicable to the test at hand. STT proposes that the detrimental stereotype threat eVect is most likely to appear in situations (1) where the test pushes ability to the limit, that is, when the test consists of test items of a high level of diYculty, (2) when ability is submitted to evaluative scrutiny, and (3) when a negative stereotype is directly applicable to the test performance. Moreover, it is assumed that “stereotype threat is most likely to aVect individuals who are highly identiWed with the domain in question, and least likely to bother individuals who care little about the domain” (Aronson et al., 1999, p. 93). In experimental research addressing stereotype threat eVects on task performance participants are usually exposed to a speciWc task (for example, mental rotation, mathematical or verbal ability task, etc.). Given a suYcient association of the task with the stereotype, this exposure may itself activate individuals’ expectancy that is related to the respective type of tasks (“I know that females are not good at this”). In these cases, stereotype threat can be reduced by rendering the test in question as non-diagnostic with regard to the stereotypic ability in question (e.g., informing participants that the test in question assesses “divergent thinking” rather than “intelligence,” cf., Croizet & Claire, 1998; Steele & Aronson, 1995) or by informing participants that prior research has revealed no indication of any diVerences between the social groups in question (cf., Keller & Dauenheimer, 2003; Quinn & Spencer, 2001; Spencer et al., 1999 [Exp. 3]). In addition or alternatively to assuming that the nature of the task activates the corresponding stereotypic expectancies and stereotype threat, the stereotypic expectation can be experimentally introduced (“prior research has shown that males outperform females on this task”; for examples see Spencer et al., 1999 [Exp. 2]; Keller, 2002). Independent of whether the stereotypic expectancy is explicitly provided or not, it has been consistently demonstrated that the introduction of a stereotypic expectation leads to stereotype threat, that is, individuals fear of being judged in terms of the stereotype and/or that they could do something that would conWrm the stereotype (Steele et al., 2002). How does the mere introduction of a
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negative stereotypic expectation lead to stereotype threat? One potential answer rests of course on the notion that in response to the respective activation individuals retrieve knowledge and generate arguments related to the expectation. The retrieved information may either support or speak against the expectation, for example, individuals may recall that they have observed an example in line with the negative expectancy (“my friend Mary failed on the math exam”) or they may generate an argument that speaks against the expectation (“in high school the girls in my class had better grades in math than the boys”). Given the above discussion of the inXuence of content versus ease of retrieval, at least two diVerent mechanisms are plausible with respect to individuals’ responses to stereotypic expectations. On the one hand, it might be argued that the more supportive information individuals retrieve in response to the negative stereotypic expectation, the more impact the expectancy should have on their performance. In other words, performance should be impaired more, when a large rather than only a small amount of information corresponding to the expectancy is activated. On the other hand, it could be argued that it is not the amount of information, but the ease with which the information is brought to mind. In this case, impaired test performance should be particularly likely when the information corresponding to the negative expectation comes to mind with ease rather than with diYculty. Experiencing diYculty when generating supportive arguments might in fact undermine the perceived validity and/or applicability of the activated stereotypic expectation (see also Schwarz, 1998; Wänke et al., 1996, for a discussion of how ease aVects attitude judgments). Presumably, in many real life situations the amount versus the ease hypothesis will result in similar predictions. Targets of stereotypes are likely to be very frequently exposed to negative stereotypic expectations and to arguments proposed in order to support the validity of the stereotypic expectancies. If so, they will be able to retrieve a lot of information that corresponds with the negative expectation and due to the frequent activation, this information will come to mind easily. Although the two accounts may often result in similar predictions, from a theoretical perspective it is important to distinguish the two mechanisms. This is particularly the case because on the one hand stereotype threat has been documented as a consistent eVect (Steele et al., 2002) with important implications in an applied sense, but at the same time, on the other hand, it has been argued that the exact nature of the underlying processes remains still unclear (see for example, Quinn & Spencer, 2001). To investigate the issues above, we exposed participants either to a stereotypic or to a non-stereotypic expectancy. In addition, we asked participants to retrieve either much or only little information that corresponds with the respective expectation. Based on a pretest,
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retrieving much information was considered as diYcult, whereas retrieving little information was considered as easy. If the amount of information corresponding to a stereotypic expectancy plays the crucial role then the “classical” stereotype threat eVect (diVerence between stereotypic and non-stereotypic expectancy) should be more pronounced when much rather than only little corresponding information is activated. A reversed pattern is predicted, however, if the ease with which corresponding information comes to mind plays a crucial role. In this case, the classical stereotype threat eVect should be more pronounced when the corresponding information comes to mind with ease (little information) rather than with diYculty (much information).
Method Participants and design Participants were 96 male students at the University of Mannheim who were oVered € 2 for participation in a study on emotional intelligence. They were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (topic: stereotypic vs. non-stereotypic expectancy) £ 2 (ease of retrieval: easy [few arguments] vs. diYcult [many arguments]) factorial design. Performance on the test was the primary dependent variable. Procedure When participants arrived at the laboratory, a female experimenter led them to individual cubicles and handed them over the questionnaire including all experimental manipulations. Questionnaires were shuZed before distribution to ensure that the experimenter remained blind to the experimental conditions. Participants read that the questionnaire consisted of diVerent parts that focussed on diVerent topics. Then a short paragraph introduced the concept of emotional intelligence. Depending on the topic condition they read either a stereotypic or non-stereotypic statement concerning gender diVerences in emotional intelligence (see below). Subsequently, they were asked to report either few or many personal experiences concerning emotional intelligence in line with the stereotypic or the non-stereotypic statement. Then, participants worked on an ostensible test of emotional intelligence. Expectancy manipulation All participants read that the investigation of gender diVerences in cognitive abilities play a major role in current psychological research. Participants assigned to the stereotypic condition read that the available evidence suggests that on average women score higher on emotional intelligence than men. They were then asked to
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recall personal experiences or arguments that reXected higher emotional intelligence of women rather than men, that is information corresponding to the stereotypic expectation. Participants in the non-stereotypic condition learned that there are no conclusive Wndings with respect to women having higher emotional intelligence and that some research suggests higher emotional intelligence of men. They were then asked to recall personal experiences or arguments that reXected higher emotional intelligence of men rather than women (non-stereotypic expectation).
countdown timer in front of them which displayed the remaining time for working on the test and signalled the end of the test period after 4 min. Subsequently participants Wlled in the remainder of the questionnaire including several demographic questions, most importantly we asked participants to indicate if German was their native language (since the test assessed verbal ability this information was critical). Finally, all participants were thoroughly debriefed.
Results Ease of retrieval manipulation The ease of retrieval manipulation was based on a pretest with an independent sample. In this pretest, we asked participants to recall personal experiences or arguments either with respect to females having higher emotional intelligence than males or vice versa (betweensubjects). Examining the number of retrieved examples in the pretest (for this logic see Schwarz et al., 1991), participants in the main study were either asked to generate 2 (few) or 5/61 (many) examples or arguments in support of the respective expectancy statement. Subsequently, participants responded to two items that served as a manipulation check (“The arguments came to my mind easily,” and “I had to think a lot to come up with the arguments”). Answers were given on nine-point scales anchored by 1 (do not at all agree) to 9 (agree completely). Ability test After providing the requested number of examples and working on the manipulation check, participants read that the current research was not only concerned with individuals’ personal experiences concerning emotional intelligence but in the second section also with the actual performance of men and women on tests of emotional intelligence. Participants learned that they would be working on a sub-test taken from a standardized test of emotional intelligence. The alleged test of emotional intelligence was actually a 20 item test of verbal ability taken from a standard intelligence test (IST 2000; Amthauer, Brocke, Liepmann, & Beauducel, 1999). Participants learned that they had 4 min to work on the test. When participants indicated to the experimenter that they were ready to start, the experimenter placed a
1 Since the pretest had revealed that participants generated somewhat more arguments or examples in support of the stereotypic (M D 3.4) than the non-stereotypic (M D 2.9) topic we asked our participants in the stereotypic low ease of retrieval condition to mention 6 arguments or examples whereas those in the non-stereotypic low ease of retrieval condition were asked to mention 5 arguments or examples. It is important to note that this diVerence can not account for the obtained pattern of Wndings.
Since four participants indicated that German was not their native language these participants were excluded from further analyses. In addition, we excluded six participants who did not report the required number of arguments. Manipulation check To test the eVectiveness of the ease manipulation we computed an index including the two manipulation check items, r(86) D .66, and submitted this index to a 2 (topic: stereotypic vs. non-stereotypic expectancy) £ 2 (ease of retrieval: easy [few arguments] vs. diYcult [many arguments]) factorial analysis of variance. The analysis resulted in a signiWcant main eVect of ease manipulation, F(1, 82) D 4.72, p < .04. Supporting the success of the manipulation, participants who generated few arguments found the task easier than those who generated many arguments (Ms D 3.3 and 2.6, respectively). Importantly, no other eVect reached signiWcance, all Fs < 1. Test performance Test performance was assessed according to the test manual by counting the number of items solved correctly. This score was entered into a 2 (topic: stereotypic vs. non-stereotypic expectancy) £ 2 (ease of retrieval: easy [few arguments] vs. diYcult [many arguments]) factorial analysis of variance (the respective means are displayed in Fig. 1). This analysis revealed a signiWcant
Fig. 1. Test performance as a function of expectancy and ease of retrieval.
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interaction pattern, F(1, 82) D 4.45, p < .04, reXecting diVerential eVects of expectations as a function of the ease with which corresponding information was retrieved. When participants recalled the information with ease, activating stereotypic expectations resulted in poorer performance than activating non-stereotypic expectations (M D 10.8 vs. M D 12.8, t(43) D 2.54, p < .02, Cohen’s d D 0.77). This pattern reXects the classic stereotype threat eVect that poorer performance is observed when negative expectancies are activated and applicable. In contrast, this stereotype threat eVect was eliminated and even slightly reversed when the information corresponding to the stereotypic and non-stereotypic expectancies came to mind with diYculty. Activating negative stereotypic expectancies resulted in slightly better performances than activating positive non-stereotypic expectancies (M D 12.3 vs. M D 11.8, t < 1, Cohen’s d D ¡0.17). Additional analyses As it has been documented that changes in the working self-concept may aVect test performance (Ruvolo & Markus, 1992), it might be possible that the observed performance diVerences are due to diVerential activation of self-knowledge rather than to stereotypic expectations. In order to address the possibility that depending on the experimental conditions participants recalled more or less self-related personal experiences or arguments that reXect higher emotional intelligence of women (men) we analysed the content of participants’ responses. Each listed response was assigned to one out of six categories: (a) self-related stereotype consistent, (b) self-related stereotype inconsistent, (c) self-related without any relation to the stereotype, (d) not selfrelated stereotype consistent, (e) not self-related stereotype inconsistent, and (f) a residual category comprising all other responses. Almost all responses fell into the categories d and e (depending on the experimental condition; two sample statements read “men are often solving conXicts with physical power,” or, “there are many men in jobs that require emotional intelligence”)—only one response fell into a “self-related” category. These Wndings suggest that a diVerential alteration of the working self-concept based on the information brought to mind is presumably not responsible for the observed performance diVerences. Discussion Consistent with prior research (cf., Schwarz, 1998), the results support the assumption that activated information can have very diVerent eVects depending on the ease with which this information is brought to mind. The obtained Wndings strongly suggest that the consequences of negative stereotypic expectancies on task performance
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may depend on the ease with which information corresponding to the expectancy is brought to mind. SpeciWcally, activating a negative stereotypic expectancy led to a poorer performance than activating a non-stereotypic expectancy when participants could easily retrieve information corresponding to the respective expectancy. This Wnding replicates the pattern that is consistently observed in research on stereotype threat (e.g., Steele, 1997; Steele & Aronson, 1995). Most importantly, this pattern was eliminated when participants retrieved the corresponding information with diYculty. Although in this case more information corresponding to the expectancies was brought to mind, the diVerential impact of the stereotypic and the non-stereotypic expectancy was eliminated and even slightly reversed. This pattern of Wndings has a number of implications, both for research on ease of retrieval and research on the consequences of stereotypic expectancies. With respect to research on the ease of retrieval the obtained Wndings provide further evidence for the assumption that the experienced ease of information retrieval plays a major role in how activated information inXuences judgments and behavior. While prior research has primarily focused on (attitude) judgments in various domains (for examples, see Rothman & Schwarz, 1998; Schwarz et al., 1991; Wänke et al., 1996) the present research extends this research in at least two ways. First, with focusing on the consequences of stereotypic expectancies, the general ease of retrieval logic was applied to a new domain. The obtained Wndings emphasize the stability and generalizability of eVects observed in other domains. They demonstrate that the ease with which information is retrieved is not only a by-product but an important element that is often essential in understanding the consequences of activated information. Second, going beyond judgmental eVects, the results clearly suggests that the impact of the ease of retrieval is also observable when behavior, here in form of test performance, is in the focus of the attention. With respect to research on stereotype threat the results suggest that the consequences of introducing a stereotypic expectation does not necessarily result in stereotype threat and impaired performance. The results suggest that the negative impact of stereotypic expectations is observed when information corresponding to the stereotypic or non-stereotypic expectation comes to mind easily. It is likely that the ease with which the corresponding information comes to mind may inXuence the degree to which the stereotype is perceived as valid and as applicable to the current situation. When information comes to mind easily, then the stereotype is presumably perceived as valid information that is relevant in the testing situation (see also Schwarz, 1998). In contrast, when the information comes to mind with diYculty, then individuals may question the relevance and validity of the stereotypic expectation. They may not
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experience stereotype threat, and as a consequence no detrimental eVects are observed. In line with this argument, we observed an absence (and even a slight reversal) of the consequences of the stereotype-consistent versus the stereotype-inconsistent expectancy when participants felt that it was diYcult to retrieve information corresponding to the respective expectancy. The reported Wndings suggest that in order to reduce the negative consequences of stereotypic expectancies one should try to decrease the ease with which thoughts that are corresponding to the implications of the negative stereotypic expectation come to mind. However, this may be a rather diYcult and long-term enterprise given that the negative expectations are likely to be activated in many situations either by being directly expressed or by being automatically associated with the performance situation. If so, negative stereotypic expectations may become chronically accessible and may come to mind rather easily. This in turn would account for the rather robust eVects of stereotype threat (Steele et al., 2002). Whereas decreasing accessibility directly may often be a rather diYcult intervention, the presented Wndings point to another possible, more indirect strategy. The Wndings suggest that it is helpful to increase the accessibility of information that pertains to the stereotype threat but has opposite implications. SpeciWcally, it might be a useful strategy to provide the potential targets of stereotype threat with information that questions the validity of the negative stereotypes. In line with this hypothesis, we observed that participants who generated information that opposed the implications of the stereotypic expectation were less likely to show a detrimental performance, in particular when the generation of this information felt easy. Note that this implication is in line with theorizing on stereotype threat. In this respect it has been argued that the detrimental eVects on performance are more likely when individuals perceive a kernel of truth in the negative expectation rather than when individuals do not believe in the negative expectation (Aronson, 2002, p. 288). It seems very plausible that individuals who do not believe in the validity of the stereotypic expectation, can more easily generate information that contradicts the expectation than individuals who believe in the expectation. Given that up to date there is rather little empirical evidence that addresses the role of individuals’ believe in the stereotypic expectation on test performance, the presented Wndings provide a Wrst test for this assumption. On an interesting side note, the present results speak, at least to some degree, to the discussion whether stereotype threat eVects can be explained on the basis of an ideomotor account (Wheeler & Petty, 2001) or whether such a cold cognitive account is less plausible (Davies, Spencer, Quinn, & Gerhardstein, 2002). The obtained Wndings suggest that the mere activation of information that is related to the stereotypic expectation per se is not
suYcient to elicit stereotype threat eVects. If so, activating more information should have increased rather than decreased the detrimental eVect. The data suggest that a potential eVect due to the mere activation can be altered by the subjective experience with which corresponding information is retrieved and generated. In sum, the presented Wndings strongly point to the important role of the ease with which expectancy-related information comes to mind. Detrimental eVects of negative stereotypic expectations seem particularly likely when corresponding information comes to mind very easily. We readily acknowledge that with the focus on how negative expectancies are activated the present Wndings do not speak to how the negative expectancies aVect performance (see also Quinn & Spencer, 2001; for a discussion of the lack of knowledge about the processes mediating between stereotype threat and performance). We believe, however, that despite this limitation the obtained Wndings are important because they point to the fact that meta-cognitive experiences related to the activation of stereotypic (and counter-stereotypic) knowledge can play a crucial role in determining the level of stereotype threat and the impact of activating stereotypic contents on subsequent cognitive performance.
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