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When simplicity outsmarts complexity
Futures 37 (2005) 333–336 www.elsevier.com/locate/futures
Reflections
When simplicity outsmarts complexity K. Mark Smith* Department of Sociology, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Abstract Although there has been a marked increase in the academic study of the “posthuman” it has had a tendency to be polarized: on the one hand, certain elements of academia are mirroring popular culture in a prophetic examination of social nihilism and unfettered technological advance, culminating in the marriage of human and computer. On the other hand, some academics treat the topic as fanciful, part of a general degradation of modern culture, which in turn, leads them to ignore and sometimes even ridicule research done in the name of the posthuman. Unfortunately – and possibly as a result of this ridicule – those who are willing to write from the former, seem to have an overarching desire to do it from a scientific realist standpoint; as if it was the only legitimate position to take. The result of this has been a number of in-depth articles on the computer dynamics necessary – and the vast scientific and technological advances needed – to achieve computational parity with human neurology. But although it follows that there would be limited desire to “upgrade” the human by plugging it into something deemed “inferior”; the scientific realist perspective has resulted in the timeframe for fundamental posthuman change being one of centuries, rather than decades. In opposing the scientific realist position I will argue – using Bostrom’s example of the human computer simulation – that from a more "sceptical" philosophical position, such a device may in fact be practically on our doorstep, rather than light-years away. q 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Whether in the guise of literature or non-print media such as film, video, computer graphics and games, virtual reality or computer simulation, fin-de-millennium science fiction narratives have provided ample opportunities to revisit the question of whether we will (or have already) reached a posthuman stage of evolution. The ‘posthuman’ is a broad term for a new kind of person of unprecedented physical, intellectual and psychological capacity. According to ‘posthumanists’ these enhancements * Tel.: C44-2476-524-771; fax: C44-2476-523-497. E-mail address: [email protected]. 0016-3287/$ - see front matter q 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.futures.2004.07.007
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Reflections / Futures 37 (2005) 333–336
will involve the application of advanced technologies, including but not limited to genetic engineering, computer hardware and software implantation, possible mind-brain uploads, etc. And it is through the active ‘plugging-in’ of the human into the computer that the universal simulation is most likely to be realised. In response to this Nick Bostrom has recently written articles from two interesting and potentially self-undermining positions: that the annals of artificial intelligence are littered with broken promises, half a century after the first electric computer we still have nothing that even resembles an intelligent machine [1] and that there is a significant probability that you are living in computer simulation [2]. Unfortunately just as you are reassuring yourself that the question of self-ignorance in latter statement makes them incommensurable rather than self-undermining, Bostrom confuses the issue in a third connecting article suggesting that unless we are now living in a simulation, our descendants will almost certainly never run an ancestor-simulation [3]. Bostrom seems to marry these positions with the belief that at present we do not have intelligent machines (and may not for a number of decades) let alone ones powerful and complex enough to run detailed human simulations. That said if we are living in a computer simulation then this is ipso facto proof that we have ‘super-powerful’ machines, but are unaware of them due to living within a representation in which such computers do not exist. But is this necessarily the case? Do we need either to build (or have already built) the o42 operations per second planetary-mass super-computer (capable of simulating 10 conscious minds) that Bostrom deems necessary? A conclusion that will inevitably leave even the most optimistic futurologist—who is unwilling to take a science fiction perspective-believing mankind is highly likely to be extinct before reaching such a posthuman stage. Personally I believe not; that is I believe we may in the future live (or at present be living) in a computer simulation without the necessity of super-powerful computers and possibly even without the necessity of an ‘intelligent machine’. If the simulation was analogous to that in The Matrix [4]—i.e. where the all humans within the simulation are digital projections of biological humans interfaced with the computer (that is with the exception in The Matrix of a minuscule number of computer projected ‘Agents’); then there would be no need for it to be anything more than a glorified environmental simulation. It certainly would not need to be complex enough to ‘create’ conscious minds, for it would be able to draw on the interfaced biological minds outside the simulation for its character consciousness. And as long as the lives within the simulation started at birth (i.e. thus negating a memory implant of supposed past history and creating ‘appearance continuity’ with those already inside the simulation) and the memory of lives outside the simulation were either suppressed, or simply lacking (i.e. if humans were plugged-into the simulation at birth); then the biological minds outside the simulation and projected bodies inside the simulation could be married into seamlessly dualism. The biological minds being born (or re-born) as nigh tabula rasa into the environment of the simulation. The lack of knowledge and experience of any world outside of the simulation should result in there being nothing to provoke questions regarding the ‘reality’ of life within the simulation.
Reflections / Futures 37 (2005) 333–336
335
If the simulation was analogous to that in Better Than Life [5]—i.e. where one or a small number of humans are digital projections of biological humans, while the rest are ‘zombies’ or ‘shadow-people’ humans simulated only at a level sufficient for the projected humans not to notice anything suspicious; again there would be no need to simulate conscious minds. As before the projected humans would be able draw on ‘their’ biological minds for consciousness, while the shadow-people would only need to act self-aware, to appear indistinguishable from the projected humans. But if the shadow people were simulated only to a level sufficient not to provoke suspicion, Bostrom questions the computational cheapness of these compared to fullyconscious simulated humans; for he believes it is not even obvious that it is possible for an entity to behave indistinguishably from a real human and yet lack conscious experience. And yes, with all the variables the computer would need to keep track of (or with a computer sufficiently powerful to predict all the actions of the projected humans); it may well seem simpler for the computer to ‘create’ conscious simulated humans rather than shadowpeople. But this would only be the case if the simulation was not linear by design. For what Bostrom seems to have omitted from his argument is the fact that human life outside a simulation is predetermined, linear and unalterable; that our belief in ‘free-will’ (as in the liberty of indifference) is an illusion; and—whether by designed or not—the simulation will be similarly linear and unchanging. This being the case the computer could simply map-out the lives of the projected humans (and their interactions with shadow-people) into one unalterable antecedent simulation. The assumption here is that a biological mind plugged-into a linear simulation at birth, would ‘naturally’ (within infancy) synchronise its consciousness and sense of reality with its simulated environment, resulting in the belief that the antecedent actions of its’ projected body were ultimately its own and of its own ‘volition’. But even if it is argued that simple duration of time will not be enough to synchronise biological minds with a linear simulation; having the knowledge and technology perceived necessary to suppress the requisite brainstates to achieve synchronicity seems more science fact that science fiction. The result of marrying biological mind and linear simulation will also render superfluous the necessity to replicate anything outside the direct experience of the projected humans, for why simulate something that cannot cause suspicion? As for items and shadow-people that are interacted with, these only need to leap into existence where necessary, recite their predetermined lines (if applicable) and exit stage-right. If met again in the future, they will not need simulating in-between; they will simply reappear and respond as the story dictates i.e. as if they had existed in the meantime. As such the computer would simply play-out the simulation as if it were a novel; theoretically there would not even be the necessity to simulate the backs of chairs or the undersides of the tables that do not fall within the direct perceptions of the projected humans. That said if the simulation was analogous to that in Counterfeit World [6]—i.e. where all humans are wholly created by the computer, then the computer would not be able to draw on biological minds for consciousness and thus there would be the need to computationally create at least one (the solipsist would argue) conscious mind. But, without interfaced biological minds there is no question with regards the simulations’ ability to be linear by design, for the illusion of free will and action motivation can be written directly into the simulation as human characteristics. Again all the computer needs
336
Reflections / Futures 37 (2005) 333–336
to do to is map-out and create a linear simulation, the minimal limits of which are determined by the prevalence of conscious simulated humans and their direct interaction with non-conscious items. The crux of my argument is that Bostrom seems to have created a brain-in-a-vat hypothesis paradoxically lacking in scepticism; arguing that humans—and the rest of the universe—are vast and complex and as a result any simulation of this would need a computer equally vast and complex. But the sceptic will counter by arguing that this may not be so, that humans and the universe may be far simpler than ‘common-sense’ dictates (i.e. sceptical brain-in-a-vat hypotheses, anti-realism, solipsism, immaterialism, etc.). In conclusion I propose that no matter which computer simulation is proposed, the embracing of illusion, minimalism and linearity within its design could result in a ‘viable’ simulation requiring only a minute slice of the computation power proposed by Bostrom. Some may even go as far as to suggest that such a simulation is practically on our doorstep. That computer modelling, ‘first-person’ simulations, human/computer interfaces and investigations into brain-state control are already developing at a pace. And we seem to have already developed the life-support technology needed to keep a biological body (and mind) alive while computer interfaced. That said whether the above argument makes any difference to the viability of such computer simulations and ultimately the likelihood that I am living in a computer simulation. It must be remembered that any empirical based calculation suggesting that: I do live in a computer simulation, is ultimately self-undermining. For as Bostrom alludes to in his article: the physics in the universe where the computer is situated that is running the simulation may or may not resemble the physics of the world that we observe. This potentially being the case—and we would have little basis for a belief to the contrary (especially with regards the latter simulation where it cannot be argued that biological interfaces infer some sort of physical similarities)—then such a conclusion entails the causa sine qua non that the grounds for its acceptance be brought into question. For the claimant is arguing that the evidence used to support the claim is ‘unreal’, derived from the illusion, founded on the physics of the simulation.
Acknowledgements I am grateful to many people for comments and especially to Louise Ainley and Clare Pheasey.
References [1] N. Bostrom, When Machines Outsmart Humans, Futures 35 (2003) 759–765. [2] N. Bostrom, The Simulation Argument: Why the Probability that You Are Living in a Matrix is Quite High, Times Higher Education Supplement, May 16 2003. [3] N. Bostrom, Are You Living in a Computer Simulation?, Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211) (2003) 243–255. [4] Film: The Matrix, Dir. Andy and Larry Wachowski US (1999). [5] R. Grant, D. Naylor, Better Than Life, Penguin, London, 1991. [6] D. Galouye, Counterfeit World (aka Simulacron Three), London, Science Fiction Book Club, London, 1964.
Reflections
When simplicity outsmarts complexity K. Mark Smith* Department of Sociology, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Abstract Although there has been a marked increase in the academic study of the “posthuman” it has had a tendency to be polarized: on the one hand, certain elements of academia are mirroring popular culture in a prophetic examination of social nihilism and unfettered technological advance, culminating in the marriage of human and computer. On the other hand, some academics treat the topic as fanciful, part of a general degradation of modern culture, which in turn, leads them to ignore and sometimes even ridicule research done in the name of the posthuman. Unfortunately – and possibly as a result of this ridicule – those who are willing to write from the former, seem to have an overarching desire to do it from a scientific realist standpoint; as if it was the only legitimate position to take. The result of this has been a number of in-depth articles on the computer dynamics necessary – and the vast scientific and technological advances needed – to achieve computational parity with human neurology. But although it follows that there would be limited desire to “upgrade” the human by plugging it into something deemed “inferior”; the scientific realist perspective has resulted in the timeframe for fundamental posthuman change being one of centuries, rather than decades. In opposing the scientific realist position I will argue – using Bostrom’s example of the human computer simulation – that from a more "sceptical" philosophical position, such a device may in fact be practically on our doorstep, rather than light-years away. q 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Whether in the guise of literature or non-print media such as film, video, computer graphics and games, virtual reality or computer simulation, fin-de-millennium science fiction narratives have provided ample opportunities to revisit the question of whether we will (or have already) reached a posthuman stage of evolution. The ‘posthuman’ is a broad term for a new kind of person of unprecedented physical, intellectual and psychological capacity. According to ‘posthumanists’ these enhancements * Tel.: C44-2476-524-771; fax: C44-2476-523-497. E-mail address: [email protected]. 0016-3287/$ - see front matter q 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.futures.2004.07.007
334
Reflections / Futures 37 (2005) 333–336
will involve the application of advanced technologies, including but not limited to genetic engineering, computer hardware and software implantation, possible mind-brain uploads, etc. And it is through the active ‘plugging-in’ of the human into the computer that the universal simulation is most likely to be realised. In response to this Nick Bostrom has recently written articles from two interesting and potentially self-undermining positions: that the annals of artificial intelligence are littered with broken promises, half a century after the first electric computer we still have nothing that even resembles an intelligent machine [1] and that there is a significant probability that you are living in computer simulation [2]. Unfortunately just as you are reassuring yourself that the question of self-ignorance in latter statement makes them incommensurable rather than self-undermining, Bostrom confuses the issue in a third connecting article suggesting that unless we are now living in a simulation, our descendants will almost certainly never run an ancestor-simulation [3]. Bostrom seems to marry these positions with the belief that at present we do not have intelligent machines (and may not for a number of decades) let alone ones powerful and complex enough to run detailed human simulations. That said if we are living in a computer simulation then this is ipso facto proof that we have ‘super-powerful’ machines, but are unaware of them due to living within a representation in which such computers do not exist. But is this necessarily the case? Do we need either to build (or have already built) the o42 operations per second planetary-mass super-computer (capable of simulating 10 conscious minds) that Bostrom deems necessary? A conclusion that will inevitably leave even the most optimistic futurologist—who is unwilling to take a science fiction perspective-believing mankind is highly likely to be extinct before reaching such a posthuman stage. Personally I believe not; that is I believe we may in the future live (or at present be living) in a computer simulation without the necessity of super-powerful computers and possibly even without the necessity of an ‘intelligent machine’. If the simulation was analogous to that in The Matrix [4]—i.e. where the all humans within the simulation are digital projections of biological humans interfaced with the computer (that is with the exception in The Matrix of a minuscule number of computer projected ‘Agents’); then there would be no need for it to be anything more than a glorified environmental simulation. It certainly would not need to be complex enough to ‘create’ conscious minds, for it would be able to draw on the interfaced biological minds outside the simulation for its character consciousness. And as long as the lives within the simulation started at birth (i.e. thus negating a memory implant of supposed past history and creating ‘appearance continuity’ with those already inside the simulation) and the memory of lives outside the simulation were either suppressed, or simply lacking (i.e. if humans were plugged-into the simulation at birth); then the biological minds outside the simulation and projected bodies inside the simulation could be married into seamlessly dualism. The biological minds being born (or re-born) as nigh tabula rasa into the environment of the simulation. The lack of knowledge and experience of any world outside of the simulation should result in there being nothing to provoke questions regarding the ‘reality’ of life within the simulation.
Reflections / Futures 37 (2005) 333–336
335
If the simulation was analogous to that in Better Than Life [5]—i.e. where one or a small number of humans are digital projections of biological humans, while the rest are ‘zombies’ or ‘shadow-people’ humans simulated only at a level sufficient for the projected humans not to notice anything suspicious; again there would be no need to simulate conscious minds. As before the projected humans would be able draw on ‘their’ biological minds for consciousness, while the shadow-people would only need to act self-aware, to appear indistinguishable from the projected humans. But if the shadow people were simulated only to a level sufficient not to provoke suspicion, Bostrom questions the computational cheapness of these compared to fullyconscious simulated humans; for he believes it is not even obvious that it is possible for an entity to behave indistinguishably from a real human and yet lack conscious experience. And yes, with all the variables the computer would need to keep track of (or with a computer sufficiently powerful to predict all the actions of the projected humans); it may well seem simpler for the computer to ‘create’ conscious simulated humans rather than shadowpeople. But this would only be the case if the simulation was not linear by design. For what Bostrom seems to have omitted from his argument is the fact that human life outside a simulation is predetermined, linear and unalterable; that our belief in ‘free-will’ (as in the liberty of indifference) is an illusion; and—whether by designed or not—the simulation will be similarly linear and unchanging. This being the case the computer could simply map-out the lives of the projected humans (and their interactions with shadow-people) into one unalterable antecedent simulation. The assumption here is that a biological mind plugged-into a linear simulation at birth, would ‘naturally’ (within infancy) synchronise its consciousness and sense of reality with its simulated environment, resulting in the belief that the antecedent actions of its’ projected body were ultimately its own and of its own ‘volition’. But even if it is argued that simple duration of time will not be enough to synchronise biological minds with a linear simulation; having the knowledge and technology perceived necessary to suppress the requisite brainstates to achieve synchronicity seems more science fact that science fiction. The result of marrying biological mind and linear simulation will also render superfluous the necessity to replicate anything outside the direct experience of the projected humans, for why simulate something that cannot cause suspicion? As for items and shadow-people that are interacted with, these only need to leap into existence where necessary, recite their predetermined lines (if applicable) and exit stage-right. If met again in the future, they will not need simulating in-between; they will simply reappear and respond as the story dictates i.e. as if they had existed in the meantime. As such the computer would simply play-out the simulation as if it were a novel; theoretically there would not even be the necessity to simulate the backs of chairs or the undersides of the tables that do not fall within the direct perceptions of the projected humans. That said if the simulation was analogous to that in Counterfeit World [6]—i.e. where all humans are wholly created by the computer, then the computer would not be able to draw on biological minds for consciousness and thus there would be the need to computationally create at least one (the solipsist would argue) conscious mind. But, without interfaced biological minds there is no question with regards the simulations’ ability to be linear by design, for the illusion of free will and action motivation can be written directly into the simulation as human characteristics. Again all the computer needs
336
Reflections / Futures 37 (2005) 333–336
to do to is map-out and create a linear simulation, the minimal limits of which are determined by the prevalence of conscious simulated humans and their direct interaction with non-conscious items. The crux of my argument is that Bostrom seems to have created a brain-in-a-vat hypothesis paradoxically lacking in scepticism; arguing that humans—and the rest of the universe—are vast and complex and as a result any simulation of this would need a computer equally vast and complex. But the sceptic will counter by arguing that this may not be so, that humans and the universe may be far simpler than ‘common-sense’ dictates (i.e. sceptical brain-in-a-vat hypotheses, anti-realism, solipsism, immaterialism, etc.). In conclusion I propose that no matter which computer simulation is proposed, the embracing of illusion, minimalism and linearity within its design could result in a ‘viable’ simulation requiring only a minute slice of the computation power proposed by Bostrom. Some may even go as far as to suggest that such a simulation is practically on our doorstep. That computer modelling, ‘first-person’ simulations, human/computer interfaces and investigations into brain-state control are already developing at a pace. And we seem to have already developed the life-support technology needed to keep a biological body (and mind) alive while computer interfaced. That said whether the above argument makes any difference to the viability of such computer simulations and ultimately the likelihood that I am living in a computer simulation. It must be remembered that any empirical based calculation suggesting that: I do live in a computer simulation, is ultimately self-undermining. For as Bostrom alludes to in his article: the physics in the universe where the computer is situated that is running the simulation may or may not resemble the physics of the world that we observe. This potentially being the case—and we would have little basis for a belief to the contrary (especially with regards the latter simulation where it cannot be argued that biological interfaces infer some sort of physical similarities)—then such a conclusion entails the causa sine qua non that the grounds for its acceptance be brought into question. For the claimant is arguing that the evidence used to support the claim is ‘unreal’, derived from the illusion, founded on the physics of the simulation.
Acknowledgements I am grateful to many people for comments and especially to Louise Ainley and Clare Pheasey.
References [1] N. Bostrom, When Machines Outsmart Humans, Futures 35 (2003) 759–765. [2] N. Bostrom, The Simulation Argument: Why the Probability that You Are Living in a Matrix is Quite High, Times Higher Education Supplement, May 16 2003. [3] N. Bostrom, Are You Living in a Computer Simulation?, Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211) (2003) 243–255. [4] Film: The Matrix, Dir. Andy and Larry Wachowski US (1999). [5] R. Grant, D. Naylor, Better Than Life, Penguin, London, 1991. [6] D. Galouye, Counterfeit World (aka Simulacron Three), London, Science Fiction Book Club, London, 1964.