- Email: [email protected]
Whither psychology?
Whither psychology? It is well known that psychology had its origin in philosophy. However, it is less widely realized that philosophy is not, and was not then, a single body of knowledge and belief. Throughout the Middle Ages philosophers debated the nature of the soul and its functions. In the seventeenth century Descartes asserted his belief in a mechanical view of nature, that the bodies of both men and animals were explicable in terms of the principles appropriate to other machines though man, and man alone, had a soul which was responsible for the higher mental processes of thought and volition. Later, Hume argued that belief in the existence of the soul was merely an uncritical acceptance of a tradition and was incapable of proof, whereas Berkeley had chosen to doubt the existence of material objects. Such divisions within philosophy would have been of less importance had it not been for the development of psychology as an independent discipline. ‘Psychology’ is, literally, the ‘science of the soul’. Given this definition it is clearly critical whether the philosophic origin was one in which the soul was regarded as a myth incapable of substantiation, responsible only for higher cognitive processes, or as the only real existent. Unfortunately this was not considered a problem when psychology was established. One of the founding fathers, Gustav Fechner, developed the methods of classical psychophysics in an attempt to demonstrate the truth of non-material monism. Given such heterogeneous origins in philosophy, and a metaphysical orientation in early methodology, it is hardly surprising that psychology encountered difficulties at the outset. Some of the earliest texts on psychology ran into considerable difficulty defining the subject matter. McDougall5 devoted some 30 pages to ‘The Province of Psychology’ and, having wrestled with the derivation of the term and the materiality of the soul, concluded that apparently purposive behaviour was an appropriate topic “because it makes use of no ill-defined and problematical notions. . . but only of familiar facts of observation”. This view clearly anticipated the Behaviourists who were to dominate psychology from 1920 to the early 1960s. William Jamesa, by contrast, devoted only eight lines to definition and opted for *‘description and explanation of states of consciousness as such”, thereby foreshadowing much of the work that was to come to prominence in the psychology of the present decade, e.g. Ornstein’s Psychology of Consciousness”, and
Neisser’s Cognition and Reality ‘O. Applied Psychology, concerned with the conscious or volitional control of purposive behaviour, may also be traced to the beginning of this century when Munsterberg wrote his books applying psychology to LaWe, Medicine’, Educationa, and Industlys. Crisis of identity
However, despite the proliferation of schools, textbooks, and applied psychologies the fundamental problem was far from solved. A comparatively recent introductory text starts with the words, “We may as well have the scandal .out at once and get it over with; ‘psychology’ cannot be
defined . . . Psychology aspires to be a science and we feel that sciences ought to be definable . . . but it (definition) is a misguided venture because psychology as .a whole is not today a single science but a coalition of enterprises”z. It is, of course, questionable whether it ever was ‘a single science’ given the mixed nature of its origin. From the beginning, psychology has suffered a crisis of identity. At no time has it been clear, even to its practitioners, what constituted the boundaries of the d&i.pline. Within the ranks of psychologists divisions arose and fragmentation into schools occurred. On the whole it was agreed, not without argument, that the new science was to be modelled on the methods of the relatively mature nineteenth century sciences of physics and chemistry: observation, prediction, and experimentation. Psychology was to be based upon empiricism. This has produced a mass of data based on controlled observation, however this is not in itself an adequate basis for any science for reasons cogently argued elsewhere’. When we ask how well the old methods served the new science the answer seems ambivalent. Despite the now vast psychological literature there does not seem to be one ‘law’ in the whole of psychology that equals the heuristic power of, for example, Avogadro’s Hypothesis. The majority of psychological texts do not have any entries under ‘Law of . . . ’ and
In this issue C. S. Richards discusses the act&\*‘.-., .,z-. of anaesthetics, and George Mackie- takes a look at jellyfish neurobiology!
TINS - Jnnmry
II those that do occur were formulated over 50 years ago and have long since lost their status as they have been hedged with restrictions and exceptions. Those which retain some semblance of validity, e.g. the Bunsen-Roscoe law, and the Ferry-Porter law, relate to physiological processes in the peripheral sensory systems. The most commonly cited psychological law is Thomdike’s Law of Effect which, “As statedin 1911,. . . pointed out that ‘satisfying consequences’ . . . strengthened an S-R connection, while annoying consequences, weakened it”l*. While this is undoubtedly true, it is so because behaviour that has already occurred is being described. Questionnaires, microeIectrodes
computers and
Within psychology itself there are many psychologies which may be characterized broadly by the terms ‘soft’ and ‘hard’. The ‘soft’ psychologists tend to rely upon questionnaires, rating scales, and the like as their source of data. Despite questions as to the reliability and validity of such data, theories tend to be global and embrace areas such as intelligence, belief systems, and personality variables. The ‘hard’ area of psychology is usually understood to be that which utilizes sophisticated equipment in a laboratory setting. Experiments are designed to test a limited hypothesis within a limited subject population. The findings of such experiments may be criticized (and often are) on the basis of their lack of generality. However, by the time the results have been transcribed from the original research paper to an introductory textbook, this has usually been overlooked. Species or situation specific findings assume the status of generalities by default. Within the general ‘hard’ area of psychology there are numerous subdivisions which are acquiring autonomy because of their ability to work precisely at a micro as well as a macro level. Psychophysiology, psychopharmacology, psychobiology are examples of such divisions. Microelectrode techniques and physiological measures, Fourier analysis and computer data analysis, are supplanting gross behavioural observation and m.anipulation as the major sources of ‘psychological’ data in many areas. Even in areas such as personality theory and mental illness some of the latest advances have come at a biochemical and pharmacological level with the idea that enzyme and neurotransmitter abnormalities may be related to specific personality types and disorders. @ ElsevierlNorth-Holland
Biomedical
Rcs
1980
Redefining psychology
1980
methods. On an alternative realist view of science, the phenomenological method may hope to identify the expficnnclcr of psychology (i.e. which mental functions need to be accounted for. which may hc regarded as incidental) and, in conjunction with the experimental method. contribute to their explanation. The kind of question to be answered will be: how does an organism that cm do cdl the things we know organisms can do. do this particular thing? Computer demonstration that the thing as an end in itself can be done in such and such ways may be beside the point. Perhaps the crowning achievement of science will be the incorporation of the scientist himself into his own scheme of things. but it must be the whole scientist (hc may be a poet or a philosopher in his spare time) not merely the scientist in his laboratory. This is the task ofpsychology.
It is clear that psychology must relinquish whatever hopes it may have entertained of establishing a monopoly on the study of behaviour. It may have served, in the past, to focus attention upon behavioural problems, it may have served to illustrate the feasibility of relating psychic events to physical ones, but it must now relinquish the quest for detailed knowledge of brain function to a new generation of related sciences. It was said in 1953 that “A strong case can be made for the proposition that the importance of psychological problems studied during the past 15 years’ has decreased as a negatively accelerated function approaching an asymptote of complete indifference”3. There is little in the psychological literature of the last quarter of a century that demands revision of Harlow’s sentiments. The question may be asked whether there remains any function Acknowledgements at all for psychology per se? Sutherland** The authors’&&iks are due to Mr Ian Payne insists that psychology has a function com- forchecking referencesand some library starch. plementary to what he calls ‘neuroscience’ P. DAVIES and essential to its future progress but he Senior Lecturer in P.~ycholog~. equates psychology with ‘cognitive science’ School of Swdies in Psychology. Universiry of Bradfurd. which is wholly concerned with computer Bradford 807 IDP. U.K. modelling. The flight of many of the best N. WETHERICK young psychologists either to ‘neurosciSenior Lecntrer i n Psychology, ence’ or to ‘cognitive science’ appears to be of Psychology, motivated by a wholly legitimate passion Deparrmenr Kings College. for scientific respectability which is most Aberdeen, U.K. easily satisfied by close contact with the Both authors are Associure Members of rhe Rrirish hardware of science but it is questionable Psychological Society. whether this flight to related disciplines serves the best interests either of psychol- Reading list ogy or of science as a whole. Scient@ I. Bhaskar. R. ( 197s) A Recdisr Theory of.%%wce. Leeds Books Ltd. Leeds. methods are essentially methods appropri2. Brown. R. and Herrnstcin. R. 1. (lY75) Psycho/ate to the chosen object of study and where ogy. Methuen & Co. Ltd. London. that chosen object is mental function, 3. Harlow. H. F. ( 1YS3) Mice. Monkeys, Men and laboratory hardware may be of only marMotives, Psycho/. Ret’. 60. 23. ginal relevance. 4. James, W. ( IXYZ) Psychology. Macmillan and Wetherick13 argues that the fatuity of much experimental psychology is a direct consequence of the fact that psychology has adopted an empiricist account of science. In the particular case of psychology one result has been the accumulation of a mass of data growing exponentially but having no discernible pattern to it. (This results from the capacity of the object of study of the psychologist to adapt itself to any experimental procedure that the psychologist can devise, the range of possible data is literally unbounded!) Another was that the psychologist has been discouraged from taking any advantage of his status as an object of study of his own science. The mistake of the old introspectionists was to assume that the data of psychology might be discoverable by their
Co. Ltd. 5.
McDougall. Norgate,
London. W. ( I Y IS) Psychology. London.
Williams
and
6.
Miinsterberg, H. (IYOX) On rhe Witness Srund. McClure, New York. 7. Miinsterberg. H. ( i 900) Psychofherupy, Moffat, Yard, New York. 8. Miinsterberg. H. ( IY IO) Psycl~ology and rhe Teacher, Appleton. New York. 9. Miinsterberg, H. ( I Y 13) Psychology and Indurtrial Deficiency. Houghton Mifflin, Boston. 10. Neisser, U. ( 1966) Cognilive Psychology. Appleton-Century-Crofts. New York. I I. Ornstein. R. E. (I 972) The Psychology of Consciousness. Freeman, San Francisco. 12. Sutherland. N. S. (1079) Neurosciences versus cognitive science, Trends NeuroSci. 2 (8) l-11. 13.
14.
Wetherick. N. E. (1979) Is Experimental psycholpgy based on a mistake? Bulletin o/the BririEh Psychological Society. 32. 2X. (Abstract.) Woodworth. R. S. and Schlosberg. H. (1954) Experimenfal Psychology. Methuen & Co. Ltd. London.
Neisser’s Cognition and Reality ‘O. Applied Psychology, concerned with the conscious or volitional control of purposive behaviour, may also be traced to the beginning of this century when Munsterberg wrote his books applying psychology to LaWe, Medicine’, Educationa, and Industlys. Crisis of identity
However, despite the proliferation of schools, textbooks, and applied psychologies the fundamental problem was far from solved. A comparatively recent introductory text starts with the words, “We may as well have the scandal .out at once and get it over with; ‘psychology’ cannot be
defined . . . Psychology aspires to be a science and we feel that sciences ought to be definable . . . but it (definition) is a misguided venture because psychology as .a whole is not today a single science but a coalition of enterprises”z. It is, of course, questionable whether it ever was ‘a single science’ given the mixed nature of its origin. From the beginning, psychology has suffered a crisis of identity. At no time has it been clear, even to its practitioners, what constituted the boundaries of the d&i.pline. Within the ranks of psychologists divisions arose and fragmentation into schools occurred. On the whole it was agreed, not without argument, that the new science was to be modelled on the methods of the relatively mature nineteenth century sciences of physics and chemistry: observation, prediction, and experimentation. Psychology was to be based upon empiricism. This has produced a mass of data based on controlled observation, however this is not in itself an adequate basis for any science for reasons cogently argued elsewhere’. When we ask how well the old methods served the new science the answer seems ambivalent. Despite the now vast psychological literature there does not seem to be one ‘law’ in the whole of psychology that equals the heuristic power of, for example, Avogadro’s Hypothesis. The majority of psychological texts do not have any entries under ‘Law of . . . ’ and
In this issue C. S. Richards discusses the act&\*‘.-., .,z-. of anaesthetics, and George Mackie- takes a look at jellyfish neurobiology!
TINS - Jnnmry
II those that do occur were formulated over 50 years ago and have long since lost their status as they have been hedged with restrictions and exceptions. Those which retain some semblance of validity, e.g. the Bunsen-Roscoe law, and the Ferry-Porter law, relate to physiological processes in the peripheral sensory systems. The most commonly cited psychological law is Thomdike’s Law of Effect which, “As statedin 1911,. . . pointed out that ‘satisfying consequences’ . . . strengthened an S-R connection, while annoying consequences, weakened it”l*. While this is undoubtedly true, it is so because behaviour that has already occurred is being described. Questionnaires, microeIectrodes
computers and
Within psychology itself there are many psychologies which may be characterized broadly by the terms ‘soft’ and ‘hard’. The ‘soft’ psychologists tend to rely upon questionnaires, rating scales, and the like as their source of data. Despite questions as to the reliability and validity of such data, theories tend to be global and embrace areas such as intelligence, belief systems, and personality variables. The ‘hard’ area of psychology is usually understood to be that which utilizes sophisticated equipment in a laboratory setting. Experiments are designed to test a limited hypothesis within a limited subject population. The findings of such experiments may be criticized (and often are) on the basis of their lack of generality. However, by the time the results have been transcribed from the original research paper to an introductory textbook, this has usually been overlooked. Species or situation specific findings assume the status of generalities by default. Within the general ‘hard’ area of psychology there are numerous subdivisions which are acquiring autonomy because of their ability to work precisely at a micro as well as a macro level. Psychophysiology, psychopharmacology, psychobiology are examples of such divisions. Microelectrode techniques and physiological measures, Fourier analysis and computer data analysis, are supplanting gross behavioural observation and m.anipulation as the major sources of ‘psychological’ data in many areas. Even in areas such as personality theory and mental illness some of the latest advances have come at a biochemical and pharmacological level with the idea that enzyme and neurotransmitter abnormalities may be related to specific personality types and disorders. @ ElsevierlNorth-Holland
Biomedical
Rcs
1980
Redefining psychology
1980
methods. On an alternative realist view of science, the phenomenological method may hope to identify the expficnnclcr of psychology (i.e. which mental functions need to be accounted for. which may hc regarded as incidental) and, in conjunction with the experimental method. contribute to their explanation. The kind of question to be answered will be: how does an organism that cm do cdl the things we know organisms can do. do this particular thing? Computer demonstration that the thing as an end in itself can be done in such and such ways may be beside the point. Perhaps the crowning achievement of science will be the incorporation of the scientist himself into his own scheme of things. but it must be the whole scientist (hc may be a poet or a philosopher in his spare time) not merely the scientist in his laboratory. This is the task ofpsychology.
It is clear that psychology must relinquish whatever hopes it may have entertained of establishing a monopoly on the study of behaviour. It may have served, in the past, to focus attention upon behavioural problems, it may have served to illustrate the feasibility of relating psychic events to physical ones, but it must now relinquish the quest for detailed knowledge of brain function to a new generation of related sciences. It was said in 1953 that “A strong case can be made for the proposition that the importance of psychological problems studied during the past 15 years’ has decreased as a negatively accelerated function approaching an asymptote of complete indifference”3. There is little in the psychological literature of the last quarter of a century that demands revision of Harlow’s sentiments. The question may be asked whether there remains any function Acknowledgements at all for psychology per se? Sutherland** The authors’&&iks are due to Mr Ian Payne insists that psychology has a function com- forchecking referencesand some library starch. plementary to what he calls ‘neuroscience’ P. DAVIES and essential to its future progress but he Senior Lecturer in P.~ycholog~. equates psychology with ‘cognitive science’ School of Swdies in Psychology. Universiry of Bradfurd. which is wholly concerned with computer Bradford 807 IDP. U.K. modelling. The flight of many of the best N. WETHERICK young psychologists either to ‘neurosciSenior Lecntrer i n Psychology, ence’ or to ‘cognitive science’ appears to be of Psychology, motivated by a wholly legitimate passion Deparrmenr Kings College. for scientific respectability which is most Aberdeen, U.K. easily satisfied by close contact with the Both authors are Associure Members of rhe Rrirish hardware of science but it is questionable Psychological Society. whether this flight to related disciplines serves the best interests either of psychol- Reading list ogy or of science as a whole. Scient@ I. Bhaskar. R. ( 197s) A Recdisr Theory of.%%wce. Leeds Books Ltd. Leeds. methods are essentially methods appropri2. Brown. R. and Herrnstcin. R. 1. (lY75) Psycho/ate to the chosen object of study and where ogy. Methuen & Co. Ltd. London. that chosen object is mental function, 3. Harlow. H. F. ( 1YS3) Mice. Monkeys, Men and laboratory hardware may be of only marMotives, Psycho/. Ret’. 60. 23. ginal relevance. 4. James, W. ( IXYZ) Psychology. Macmillan and Wetherick13 argues that the fatuity of much experimental psychology is a direct consequence of the fact that psychology has adopted an empiricist account of science. In the particular case of psychology one result has been the accumulation of a mass of data growing exponentially but having no discernible pattern to it. (This results from the capacity of the object of study of the psychologist to adapt itself to any experimental procedure that the psychologist can devise, the range of possible data is literally unbounded!) Another was that the psychologist has been discouraged from taking any advantage of his status as an object of study of his own science. The mistake of the old introspectionists was to assume that the data of psychology might be discoverable by their
Co. Ltd. 5.
McDougall. Norgate,
London. W. ( I Y IS) Psychology. London.
Williams
and
6.
Miinsterberg, H. (IYOX) On rhe Witness Srund. McClure, New York. 7. Miinsterberg. H. ( i 900) Psychofherupy, Moffat, Yard, New York. 8. Miinsterberg. H. ( IY IO) Psycl~ology and rhe Teacher, Appleton. New York. 9. Miinsterberg, H. ( I Y 13) Psychology and Indurtrial Deficiency. Houghton Mifflin, Boston. 10. Neisser, U. ( 1966) Cognilive Psychology. Appleton-Century-Crofts. New York. I I. Ornstein. R. E. (I 972) The Psychology of Consciousness. Freeman, San Francisco. 12. Sutherland. N. S. (1079) Neurosciences versus cognitive science, Trends NeuroSci. 2 (8) l-11. 13.
14.
Wetherick. N. E. (1979) Is Experimental psycholpgy based on a mistake? Bulletin o/the BririEh Psychological Society. 32. 2X. (Abstract.) Woodworth. R. S. and Schlosberg. H. (1954) Experimenfal Psychology. Methuen & Co. Ltd. London.