Who formulates renewable-energy policy? A Swedish example

Energy Policy 38 (2010) 6674–6683

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Energy Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol

Who formulates renewable-energy policy? A Swedish example Katrin Uba Uppsala University, Department of Government, Box 514, Uppsala 75120, Sweden

a r t i c l e in f o

a b s t r a c t

Article history: Received 14 March 2010 Accepted 16 June 2010 Available online 10 July 2010

A broad participation by stakeholders and an extensive reliance on expert advice are often seen as preconditions for a legitimate and successfully implemented renewable energy policy. However, we have lacked systematic data for testing this argument. This article’s contribution is to examine the actors who take part in the making of Swedish energy policy with the help of data on the composition of various committees of inquiry over the last twenty years (1988–2009). Swedish renewable energy policy is often characterised with words like ‘‘pioneering’’ and ‘‘forerunner’’, suggesting that the policymaking process in this area engages many different experts and stakeholders. Our data give only some support to this argument. Results point to a noteworthy predominance of politicians, civil servants, and representatives of state agencies within the policy-process. Producers of uranium and fossils based energy have been engaged more often than producers of renewable energy. Experts have played a prominent role, but this is mostly due to the participation of expert bureaucrats rather than of scientists. The study suggests that a better understanding of the making of energy policy, both in Sweden and elsewhere, requires greater attention to the networks and role of various state employees. & 2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Keywords: Swedish energy policy Stakeholders Experts

1. Introduction The mitigation of global climate change requires policies that encourage the production and use of renewable energy. It is often argued that such policies are best achieved via processes that involve many actors: not just bureaucrats and decision-makers, but also citizens, stakeholders, scientists, and other energy experts (Alberts, 2007; Pielke, 2004; Kemp and Rotmans, 2009; van Rooijen and van Wees, 2006). If policy-makers rely only on the advice of one type of actor – e.g., energy producers – the legitimacy of the policy is diminished, and its implementation is hindered (Mazey and Richardson, 1997). Moreover, this might lead to policy proposals biased towards non-renewable energy production. A reliance on expert advice is expected to increase the legitimacy (e.g., Radaelli, 2009) and effectiveness of the policy pursued (Alberts, 2007; Heinrichs, 2005). Such arguments usually ˚ cite excellent case studies (e.g., Nilsson, 2005; Astrand, 2005); however, there is little systematic long-term research indicating which actors are actually engaged in the formulating of energy policy. Do those countries with successful policies for renewable energy engage many different stakeholders and experts in the policy-making process? If we can answer that question, we will better understand the opportunities enjoyed by different actors to influence the content of these policies. Although involvement in the policy-making process is no guarantee of influence, gaining a

E-mail address: [email protected] 0301-4215/$ - see front matter & 2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2010.06.037

detailed picture of the participants is a necessary step towards learning more about the role played by different stakeholders in the making of energy policy. The aim of this article, then, is to ascertain what kinds of actors took part in the formulation of Swedish energy policy between 1988 and 2009. By painting a systematic picture of the different interests represented within the process, we hope to contribute to the increasing body of research on the influence wielded by interest groups over the making of energy policy (e.g., Nilsson et al., 2009). Recently, Florini and Sovacool (2009) asked: ‘‘Who governs energy at the global level?’’ we seek to answer their question at the national level. Sweden is often presented as a successful, pioneering, and long-term promoter of renewable energy (Nilsson et al., 2004; Sarasini, 2009; Wang, 2006), despite its significant lack of support for wind energy (Bergek and Jacobsson, 2010). We might accordingly expect Swedish policy-making in this area to be characterised by a broad participation by stakeholders and experts. However, previous studies on Swedish environmental and energy policy have reached to contradictory results. Some argue that certain important interest groups – e.g., industrial bodies (Stigson et al., 2009) and environmental organisations (Nilsson, 2006) – have not taken much part in the process. Others show, however, that industry in fact plays an important role in the making of energy policy (Daugbjerg and Pedersen, 2004). There is also some disagreement over the role of experts. Some studies show that Swedish policy-making vis-a -vis energy, the climate, and the environment has been characterised by political conflict

K. Uba / Energy Policy 38 (2010) 6674–6683

rather than by learning from experts (Nilsson, 2005; Gerger ¨ Swartling and Nilsson, 2007; Engstrom et al., 2008). Other scholars, by contrast, emphasise the strong Swedish tradition of scientific deliberation (Lundqvist, 1996), and of good conditions for learning through collaboration between scientists and policymakers (de Vries et al., 2010). The present study helps to clarify these contradictory findings. The focus here is on the composition of committees of inquiry that deal with ex-ante policy assessment, which is considered an important phase in the formulation of Swedish public policy (Hermansson, 1993; SOU, 1991:121; Nilsson et al., 2008). In particular, we examine data on the actors involved in the committees responsible for energy questions, as well as data on the various bodies and organisations that submit comments on the reports published by these committees (i.e. a remiss procedure).1 The work of these committees has been examined in earlier studies on the making of Swedish energy policy (e.g., Nilsson, 2006; Nilsson, 2005; Hertin et al., 2009). However, none of these studies provides a systematic picture of the actors engaged in the work of the committees. With the approach used here, we can establish not only what kinds of actors have participated in the formulation of Swedish energy policy, but also what changes have taken place in the pattern of engagement over time. The discussion is structured as follows. Section 1 provides a short description of the Swedish case, particularly its policies in the area of renewable energy and its institutional framework for stakeholder participation. This is followed in Section 2 by an account of the theoretical framework, and in Section 3 by a presentation of five main hypotheses. Section 4 describes the means and methods used in collecting the data, and Section 5 sets out the findings. The paper ends with a discussion of the implications of the findings, and some suggestions for further research.

2. Sweden as an interesting example of stakeholder participation 2.1. A long-term commitment to renewables Sweden’s long-term policies in favour of the production and use of renewable energy are well-known (Nilsson et al., 2004; Wang, 2006). Swedish environmental and energy policies are often described using terms like ‘‘forerunner’’ and ‘‘pioneer’’ (e.g., Nilsson, 2005; Reiche and Bechberger, 2004; Petterson and ¨ Soderholm, 2009).2 This nicely reflects the ambition of the Swedish government to ‘‘lead by example’’ (Sarasini, 2009). For example, the government aims to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions by 40% by 2020—while the goal in the EU is to do so by just 20% (Swedish Energy Agency, 2009). While the EU directive requires that 49% of Swedish total energy use should come from renewable energy sources (RES) by 2020, the Swedish government aims at 50%. In 2008, about 44% of Sweden’s total energy use was based on RES and the majority of it came from hydro- and bioenergy (Swedish Energy Agency, 2009). Thus, Sweden’s status as a forerunner mainly reflects the wide availability of local 1 The remiss procedure in Sweden is a process by which different groups of actors (local government institutions, state agencies, various interest groups, and so on) are invited to comment the report made by the committee of inquiry. As the report is public, uninvited actors can also send their comments that are analysed equally to the invited ones by the ministry in charge of summoning the committee. 2 Austria is another oft-mentioned forerunner (Swider et al., 2008), but its system for policy-making differs from the Swedish one and would complicate the analysis.

6675

resources for the production of hydropower and bioenergy, as well as its long-term political commitment to renewable energy production (Nilsson et al., 2004). Today, Swedish energy policy has also come under fire on various points: e.g., that it favours bioenergy over wind energy (Meyer, 2007); that its system of tradable green certificates has not encouraged new investments in RES (Bergek and Jacobsson, 2010); and that there are still too many tax exemptions for energy-intensive industry (Sarasini, 2009). Sweden’s status as a pioneer relates to the adoption of many policy instruments which were novel at the time of their introduction. In the late 1970s, massive subsidies were given to demonstration projects on bioenergy development; while, in 1990, the world’s first CO2 tax was passed. The energy market was also liberalised early on (in 1994); a system for tradable green certificates was set up in 2003 (Bergman and Radetzki, 2003; Nilsson et al., 2004; Bergek and Jacobsson, 2010). In short, despite the aforementioned critique, energy policy in Sweden has arguably succeeded, to a greater extent than in other countries, in promoting renewable energy production and use (Sarasini, 2009). Policies of this kind usually involve a broad participation by stakeholders and/or an extensive reliance on expert knowledge (Heinrichs, 2005; Kemp and Rotmans, 2009). We might accordingly expect to find a similar picture when examining the data on committee involvement over the last twenty years. 2.2. An institutional setting that promotes participation Due to its institutional framework for policy-making, Sweden is a good case for the study of stakeholder participation. The system of committees of inquiry (CIs) makes for a kind of prelegislative stage of policy-making, with a history of 400 years behind it (Gunnarsson and Lemne, 1998). Similar systems for exante policy assessment are used in other countries too; however, international comparisons have shown that the Swedish system is one of the most open ones (Hertin et al., 2009). This is explained by a tradition of consensus-based policy-making that encourages the participation of many different interest groups (Hermansson, 1993). The members of each committee are named by the ministry responsible for the issue in question, but said members are free to seek out advice from any expert they deem appropriate (Regeringskansliet, 2000a).3 CI members are usually politicians, civil servants, representatives of various state agencies, or representatives of private and public interest groups (Hermansson, 1993). It also falls to the government to define the task of these committees—a fact which has raised questions about their autonomy (Nilsson and Eckerberg, 2007). It has been shown, for example, that the government sometimes uses CIs to postpone decision-making on sensitive issues (Nilsson et al., 2008). On the other hand, the extent of government control is limited due to the tradition of publishing the committee’s report and of inviting interested actors (i.e., remiss bodies) to comment on it. The responsible ministry then uses the report and the comments to formulate a government bill, which parliament discusses and usually accepts without major modification. The degree of internal consensus within the CIs has declined over years, but 3 Each committee has members, experts, and administrative staff. Members, including the chairman or a special investigator, have the right to decide over the disposition of the committee’s work; and they take responsibility for the final report. Experts have no decisive voice on the proposals presented in the report, but they can insert a specific note of disagreement if they find it necessary (Regeringskansliet, 2000a). The role of the experts is to advise the members in their work. Both members and experts may be tied to universities, i.e., academia or represent some private enterprise or public organisation.

6676

K. Uba / Energy Policy 38 (2010) 6674–6683

their reports continue to constitute an important basis for the making of policy (Lindvall and Rothstein, 2006). Thus, persons who participate on the committees and in the remiss bodies have a good opportunity to influence the framing of energy policy ¨ (Hogselius and Kaijser, 2010).

3. Expectations—what kinds of actors can we expect to find? Research on pioneering environmental policies has shown that such policies require a high domestic capacity for environmental policy-making (Liefferink et al., 2009). The same is probably true in the case of energy policy. This high capacity is a question of open institutions, and of a willingness on the part of decisionmakers to use technical and political knowledge provided by various societal actors. With the benefit of such knowledge, decision-makers may conclude that new policy goals are in order, or that existing goals require new instruments (Bennett and Howlett, 1992). Thus, it is important to know who has the opportunity to provide such knowledge. An open institutional framework, it is often thought, can take the form of either a pluralist or a corporatist system. The first aims to engage as many interested players as possible, without allowing the domination of any of them. Corporatist systems, by contrast, provide some groups with easier access (Siaroff, 1999). Sweden is usually seen as a corporatist state, where trade unions and industrial organisations enjoy direct access to policy-making. However, Sweden’s corporatist system has become more open to other organisational interests as well (SOU, 1999:121). Accordingly, one might expect the framing of energy policy in that country not to be entirely dominated by any specific group. Nevertheless, previous studies of the composition of CIs have demonstrated a predominance of civil servants and politicians during 1970–1997 (Gunnarsson and Lemne, 1998). This research further indicates that representatives of interest groups rarely serve as CI members (Gunnarsson and Lemne, 1998; SOU, 1999:121). While none of these studies have focused on committees responsible for environmental or energy questions, it must be deemed likely that the patterns they describe are rather general. One study on trends in energy policy notes that the process has changed: from a closed corporatist system towards a more open pluralist one (Nilsson and Eckerberg, 2007; Gerger Swartling and Nilsson, 2007). Thus, we could expect to find the increasing number of different actors participating on the CIs. We shall focus here on five different kinds of actors likely to be involved in the formulation of energy policy: representatives of heavy industry; producers of both RES and non-RES energy; representatives of environmental organisations; experts and scientists; and representatives of the public authorities (i.e., bureaucrats and politicians). First, previous studies on the role of energy-intensive industry in the making of Swedish energy policy have reached inconsistent results. For example, Daugbjerg and Pedersen (2004) find that the industrial lobby did not take part in the process which resulted in the adoption of the CO2 tax in January 1990. Industrial stakeholders only became active after this policy was implemented in 1991, and their subsequent predominance with the process partly explains why the tax was radically reduced by the centreright government in 1992.4 Energy-intensive industry continued 4 The tax has tripled for non-industrial users over the years, but remained almost the same for industry. All energy users together paid, on average, 0.25 SEK for each emitted kg of CO2 in 1990; industry, however, paid only 25% of this price in 1992 (Regeringskansliet, 2000b). Since July 1997, industry has paid half the rate paid by other energy users (the latter rate being about 106 Euros per ton of emitted CO2 in 2008).

to be active in the making of energy policy in later years (Daugbjerg and Pedersen, 2004). These findings differ from those of Stigson et al. (2009), according to which representatives of Swedish industry perceive their role in the making of energy policy as small. Their motivation to take active part in the process is weak (Stigson et al., 2009). We take the lead of this more recent analysis, and hypothesise that: The involvement of industrial stakeholders in the formulation of energy policy is relatively small (H1a), and that it has decreased over time (H1b).5 The second group is composed of energy producers, who actually represent two different types of interests. On the one hand, there are distributors and producers of renewable energy (wind and solar energy, bioenergy, and small hydropower). On the other, there are the actors who mainly focus on the distribution and production of energy from non-renewable sources (uranium and fossil fuels). It has been shown that renewable energy (RE) producers, as well as those producing the carriers for renewables play an important role in the making of EU energy policy (Nilsson et al., 2009). We lack data for arguing the same about Sweden. However, it is known that Swedish RE producers and distributors are weakly organised and lack collaborative structures (Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001). The lobby of nuclear-energy producers, ¨ however, has been rather significant (Hogselius and Kaijser, 2010; Nohrstedt, forthcoming). Notwithstanding the fact, then, that Swedish policy has involved long-term support for RE production, we hypothesise that: The involvement of renewable energy producers in the formulation of energy policy is relatively small—i.e., it is smaller than that of non-RE producers (H2a). Swedish energy policy is also said to be biased towards ˚ ¨ bioenergy (Soderholm et al., 2007; Astrand et al., 2005) and actors involved in bioenergy production are shown to be particularly active in the policy-making process (Nilsson, 2005). Our next hypothesis, accordingly, is that: The involvement of bioenergy producers in the formulation of energy policy is higher than that of other RE producers (H2b). Studies on environmental, climate, and energy policy have shown that environmental groups in Sweden are more active in the policy-making process than in other countries, but that they still feel excluded from the formulation of energy policy (Nilsson, 2006). In the 1970s, the environmental movement mobilised actively against nuclear energy; in the 1990s, when Swedish energy policy was framed more in accordance with industrial than with environmental needs, it began to decline (Nohrstedt, ¨ forthcoming). Hogselius and Kaijser (2010) show that the environmental movement was surprisingly absent from the debates about energy regulation in the early 1990s. This allows us to hypothesise that: The involvement of environmental organisations in the formulation of energy policy is relatively small (H3a), and it has remained stable over time (H3b). The fourth group of actors consists of advisors (experts, scientists, etc.), whose involvement is particularly important in connection with technical issues like energy policy (de Vries et al., 2010). Although the use of expert ideas6 in the policy-making process is usually thought to legitimise the decisions of the public authorities (Lindvall, 2009), two views may in fact be distinguished here. According to the first, scientists are actors who provide decision-makers with independent and objective

5 As there are no other studies with which to compare the Swedish case, we use our own subjective scale: ‘‘small’’ means that no more than 20% of the actors represent the group under discussion; ‘‘medium’’ means that 21–40% do; ‘‘high’’ means that more than 41% do. 6 Lindvall (2009:704) defines expert ideas as ‘‘shared beliefs about cause-andeffect relationships developed and disseminated by actors, who are widely recognized as having special knowledge about a certain policy’s target area—often, but not necessarily, as a result of academic training’’.

K. Uba / Energy Policy 38 (2010) 6674–6683

information—which should result in the ‘‘best available’’ decision (Steel et al., 2004). According to the second view, the advice proffered by experts could be equated with that given by representatives for stakeholder interests that are not necessarily the ‘‘best’’ option (see more in Owens, 2005). Accordingly, we make a distinction between the category of experts and that of scientists: the first includes advisors of a more general kind (e.g., energy experts in state agencies like Swedish Energy Agency, universities or industry). The second embraces actors with an academic affiliation. Previous studies acknowledge the openness of the policy-making process in Sweden to expert knowledge (Nilsson, 2005; SOU, 1999:121). This permits the following hypothesis: The involvement of experts in the formulation of energy policy is relatively high and stable over time (H4a). Less is known about the role of scientists in the making of Swedish energy policy; it has been shown, however, that many scientists of climate change avoid ¨ discussing the policy implications of their work (Lovbrand, 2007). Our next hypothesis, consequently, is that: The involvement of scientists in the framing of energy policy is relatively small (H4b). Finally, our study of the actors involved in the policy-making process would be incomplete if we neglected the role of bureaucrats and politicians. In general, CI membership in Sweden is dominated by national and local-level civil servants, by representatives of various state agencies, and by representatives of political parties (Hermansson, 1993; SOU, 1999:121; Lindvall and Rothstein, 2006). Civil servants too may represent political interests, as there is an increasing trend towards political ¨ appointments in Swedish ministries (Dahlstrom, 2009). As the members of political parties are directly representing the interests of their electorate, their behaviour in the committees is different from the civil servants who have to follow the directives of the government. The distinction between civil servants and representatives of state agencies is important, because the latter are less subject to political control (SOU, 2008:118), and many area experts work in state agencies (e.g., the Swedish Energy Agency). Considering the strategic importance of the energy sector for the Swedish state (Nilsson, 2005) and the fact that the sector is highly politicized (Nilsson and Eckerberg, 2007, Nohrstedt, forthcoming), it is likely that political interests are well-represented in policy-making in this area. We therefore hypothesise that: The participation of civil servants in the formulation of energy policy is higher than that of representatives of state agencies (H6a); the involvement of representatives of political parties is relatively high (H6b); and the participation of state actors in general is dominant and stable over time (H6c).

6677

2004:4), and so on. The remaining reports focused on other energy sources (gas, for example, in SOU, 1999:115); or on such broader questions as energy-market regulation (SOU, 1999:44), energy and CO2 taxes (SOU, 1994:85; SOU, 2003:38), or climate change (e.g., SOU, 1995:96; SOU, 2007:60). One could suggest that the policy issues discussed by the CIs define the constellation of actors involved, but the list in Appendix shows that there is a relative balance between the reports focusing on general environmental and climate change aspects (15 reports), general energy production issues (18 reports), and economical issues (18 reports). There is difference in terms of reports focusing on different energy sources (wind, bioenergy, nuclear energy), and this will be accounted for in the analysis. Authors of committee reports are recorded and coded on the basis of their status (member or expert) and their type of organisational affiliation (described below). While their status was specified in the reports, their type of organisational affiliation was ascertained with the help of internet and media searches.8 The same categories are also used for the remiss bodies. Taken together, then, the actors are divided among the following categories:

1. Bureaucracy: 1.1. National or local-level civil servants (e.g., Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications) 1.2. Employees of state agencies (e.g., Swedish Energy Agency) 2. Politicians, members of parliament (e.g., from Social Democratic Party) 3. Energy producing/distributing companies 3.1. Mainly focused on renewable energy 3.1.1. Bioenergy producers/distributors (e.g., SVEBIO, municipal heat) 3.1.2. Other RE producers/distributors (wind or solar energy) 3.2. Mainly fossil-energy, large hydro, or nuclear-energy producers/distributors (e.g., Vattenfall, Sydkraft) 4. Energy consumers 4.1. Large industries (e.g., cement, forestry, pulp, and paper industry) 4.2. Small-scale energy users (businesses, construction companies, farmers) 5. Environmental organisations (e.g., Swedish Society for Nature Conservation) 6. Academia/scientists (e.g., Uppsala University, Royal Institute of Technology) 7. Civil-society organisations (e.g., trade unions, Swedish Union of Tenants) 8. Other (e.g., Nord Pool, banks, insurance companies)

4. Data collection Our data bear on the composition of (1) committees of inquiry in the energy area, and (2) remiss bodies that commented on committees’ reports during 1988–2009. We use 72 reports from 62 different CIs, various government bills, and lists and summaries of the comments submitted by remiss bodies to the ministries in charge of each respective CI (the reports are listed in the Appendix).7 Half of the reports focused directly on questions of renewable energy: e.g., suitable locations for wind farms (SOU, 1988:32), the development of biofuels (SOU, 1991:93; SOU, 7

The actual number of energy-related reports during the selected period is 86; however, data on remiss bodies are lacking in 14 of these cases, which have therefore been excluded. In any event, the reports in these 14 cases were mainly about nuclear energy, and so were not very relevant for an examination of the policy-making process in the field of renewable energy.

We differentiate between civil servants in the ministries and representatives of various state agencies, because the latter are subject to less political control, and they are more often experts on some specific issue (e.g., energy or sustainable development). The academic category mainly relates to universities (Sweden lacks a strong tradition of think tanks). The seventh category (civil-society organisations) is heterogeneous: it even included trade unions, which historically have enjoyed preferential access to Swedish policy-making. 8 Reports mention whether the actor is a member or expert in the committee, but only half of the reports also provided data about the profession and employer of the actors. This missing info was collected with the help of newspaper reports and Google searches. It is important to note that people do move from politics to state agencies or from state agencies to private sector, but such actors do not form more than 3% of the actors.

6678

K. Uba / Energy Policy 38 (2010) 6674–6683

We also classified actors according to whether or not they are likely to champion environmental interests, as environmental organisations are not alone in favouring the environment. We use a crude measure that is based prior research and preferences presented by actors in their comments to committee reports. Representatives of environmental organisations, civil servants form the Ministry of Environment and the employees of the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency are labelled as ‘‘proenvironmental’’ (see also Nilsson, 2006; Nilsson, 2009). Politicians representing the Green Party and Centre Party are also categorised as ‘‘pro-environmental’’ due to their long-term opposition to nuclear energy production (Nilsson, 2006; Nohrstedt, forthcoming). All large energy intensive industries and producers of fossil or nuclear energy were set to another category ‘‘anti-environmental’’. For small energy users the decision was more complicated, but if a given enterprise made arguments similar to those presented by large industry, or by fossil-fuel and nuclear-energy producers, we have classified it as ‘‘not environment friendly’’. Finally, we divided remiss bodies into two groups, depending on whether they (1) were asked to send in their comments, or (2) sent in their comments on their own initiative. This lastmentioned distinction is important for determining which types of actors enjoy direct access to the policy-making process.9

5. Findings The data reveal that, during the 1988–2009 period 1399 representatives of various institutions participated in CIs, and 1087 remiss bodies submitted their comments on 72 reports. About 67% of the reports were written under the direction of a single investigator. A third of these single investigators represented the civil service, 23% were from the state agencies, 15% belonged to the political parties, and 15% hailed from academia. Producers of non-renewable energy were the only stakeholder group represented among the single investigators (13%). These results are very similar to those of previous studies (Hermansson, 1993; SOU, 1999:121). While these single investigators all relied on the assistance of various experts, the increasing use of this type of committee structure points to a progressively more closed process of policy assessment. A detailed examination of the actors engaged in the policymaking process through committees of inquiry turns up a number of interesting patterns that are presented in Figs. 1 and 2 (see Appendix, Table 1, for details). Representatives of energy-intensive (large) industry form a very small proportion (3.5%) of the actors, and none has been a ‘‘member’’ of any energy-related CI during the period under examination (Fig. 1). The number of remiss bodies from this group is also small (Fig. 2). It is noteworthy that the total number of those commenting on their own initiative is higher than the number of those invited to comment (4240 vs. 387). The small involvement of large industries shown in Figs. 1 and 2 may be misleading, however. There are relatively few organisations representing the interests of energy-intensive industry in Sweden and therefore these numbers are not fully comparable to large groups like small-scale energy users.10 For example, The Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (which participated in the 9

Some remiss bodies submitted only a short note, to the effect that they could not comment on the report due to lack of time. Moreover, since we largely used official lists of the submissions received by the ministries, our data set probably over-estimates the number of meaningful comments. 10 Umbrella organisations for large industries include: the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (6 reports; 33 comments); SKGS, which is the branch organisation for the forestry, chemicals, mining, and steel industries (1; 6); the Swedish Steel Producers’ Association (3; 19); the Swedish Forest Industries Federation (3; 22); and the Swedish Plastics & Chemicals Federation (3; 8). In

writing of six reports) represents the interests of about 50,000 large and small industrial companies. As we lack data of total numbers of actors for every category it is impossible to present the involvement proportional to the population of organisations. Still, Fig. 3 provides us the second best option by presenting the percentage of reports examined where at least one representative of the category was involved as a member or as an expert. Fig. 3 demonstrates that at least one representative for industrial stakeholders was engaged as an expert in half of the reports examined and suggests that energy-intensive large industry has a voice – indeed, an important one – in the making of Swedish energy policy.11 The same could be said for the case of fossil or nuclear energy producers, while the producers of renewable energy have been engaged much less frequently and civil servants and employees of state agencies much more frequently. Thus, the hypothesis H1a on small involvement of industrial actors holds if we compare the industry with state-actors or fossil-energy producers, but it does not hold if we take into consideration the environmental organisations or civil society. Moreover, the involvement of industrial actors has also remained relatively stable over time—declined slightly in the early and mid-1990s and increased since 2001 (Fig. 4).12 This contradicts our expectation that the participation of such actors would decline (H1b). Hence, Stigson et al. (2009)’s argument on low levels of participation of industrial actors in the energy policymaking process probably refers more to the perceptions among the industrial actors than the long-term trends. Consequently, our results may explain why there are significant industrial exemptions from the CO2 tax; and why the level of this tax was actually lower for industry in 2007 than it had been in 1990, when the tax was introduced (Larsson, 2008). Representatives of stakeholders from the non-RE sector are found about twice as frequently among CI members and experts than the actors representing large industries or RE producers (Fig. 1). Notwithstanding some temporary fluctuations, the involvement of the fossil, large hydro or nuclear energy producers is similar to the one of the members of parliament (Fig. 4). The most likely reason for this is that the utilities which mainly produce energy from non-RES are the oldest and largest ones in Sweden (e.g., Vattenfall), and that the above-mentioned corporatist system favours ‘‘established’’ actors. Such an interpretation is also supported by the fact that almost 20% of the remiss bodies that submitted comments on their own initiative i.e. these who lack the direct access to policy process represented RE producers (Fig. 2). It also bears noting that many of these ‘‘older’’ energy companies are investing today in the production of renewable energy. Therefore, it cannot be said that RE stakeholders are not engaged at all. Rather, the policy-making process favours older and larger players. This has resulted in policies which do not encourage new investments in RE production, and which allow current utilities to earn windfall profits (Bergek and Jacobsson, 2010). Our more detailed hypothesis (H2b) about a bias towards bioenergy producers also finds support in the data. The majority of RE-related actors involved in the policy-making process were representing the interests of bioenergy producers directly (e.g.,

(footnote continued) addition, one of the largest pulp and paper companies, Stora Enso, was involved on its own in the writing of 4 of the 72 reports examined. 11 Representatives of political parties could also represent the interests of large industries, but the Swedish multi-party system provides similar opportunities of interest representation also for other actors. 12 The data in Fig. 4 is aggregated to five periods in order to simplify the overview of the trends. The number of published CI’s reports during these years varies: 1987–90 (7), 1990 1995 (17), 1996 2000 (15), 2001 2005 (24), and 2006 2009 (9).

K. Uba / Energy Policy 38 (2010) 6674–6683

6679

Fig. 1. Distribution of authors of the committee reports (% of total number).

Fig. 2. Distribution of remiss bodies (% of total number).

SVEBIO, Swedish Biogas Society) or indirectly (the biomass-based municipal heating companies).13 It is further likely that these

13 Half of the members or experts representing the renewable energy industry (33 of 62) had an interest in the use or production of biofuel or biomass. Entire 74% of the remiss bodies representing the interests of the renewable energy producers, who were asked and answered to calls to comment the committee reports, had an interest in the use or production of bioenergy. The responses sent by bodies answering by own initiatives were more equally divided between bioenergy, wind energy, and small hydro energy producers.

actors form coalitions with agricultural organisations and the forestry industry (Nilsson, 2005), and that they have many allies among municipal politicians and civil servants (McCormick and ˚ Kaberger, 2005). Wind-energy producers advised in the writing of just 4 reports (which furthermore were specifically focused on this type of energy). Bioenergy interests were represented even in the committees not solely focusing on the issues of bioenergy (e.g., SOU, 1989:83; SOU, 1999:75; SOU, 2008:25). On the other hand, wind-energy utilities were as active as bioenergy producers in commenting on reports on their own initiative. It is not a

6680

K. Uba / Energy Policy 38 (2010) 6674–6683

Table 1 ‘‘Pro-environment’’ state actors involved in committees of inquiry. Percentage

Members

Experts

Total

Bureaucracy Civil servants State agencies Politicians

42.9 (21) 27.8 (36) 25.5 (157)

23.5 (370) 15.6 (237) 0.0 (1)

24.6 (391) 17.2 (372) 25.3 (158)

Note: Members representing the Green Party, Centre Party, and the Ministry of the Environment and the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency are coded as ‘‘pro-environment’’.

question, then, of a lack of interest or of a small number of companies. It is a sign, rather, of ‘‘corporatist’’ exclusion from the process of policy-making.14 The paltry presence of wind-energy interests may help to explain why the public authorities in Sweden are not sufficiently informed about the benefits of wind energy (Bergek, 2010). Our third hypothesis concerned the involvement of environmental interests. The results in Figs. 1–4 support our expectation that environmental organisations will be under-represented among actors taking part in CIs (H3a), and that their level of involvement will be stable over time (H3b). It is noteworthy that the representatives of environmental organisations are never the members, but just experts in the committees. It was also, for the most part, just a few organisations that were involved: for example, the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation was involved as an ‘‘expert’’ in the writing of ten reports—i.e., in more than half of the cases where environmental groups took part. It is noteworthy that this organisation does not always support large-scale renewable-energy production; for example, it perceives wind farms as a possible threat to ¨ conservationist goals (Soderholm et al., 2007). Other civil-society organisations took part more often as CI members and experts—a result reflecting the involvement of trade unions in particular, which traditionally have enjoyed direct access to Swedish policymaking.15 All the same, environmental interests are not championed just by environmental organisations. In a debate over whether to define peat as a source of renewable energy, for instance, a few state agencies took the same negative stance as the environmental organisations (Regeringskansliet, 2005). The environmental aspects of energy production are emphasised more often by civil servants from the Ministry of the Environment, or representatives of the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, than by persons from agencies like the Ministry of Finance or the Swedish National Board for Industrial and Technical Development (see also Nilsson, 2005; Nilsson and Eckerberg, 2007). Moreover, since civil servants, politicians, and representatives for various state agencies form a majority of CI participants (Figs. 1 and 3), we have divided them according to whether or not they take a ‘‘pro-environmental’’ stance (Table 1). Although we could not show any predominance for representatives of environmental organisations, the participation of ‘‘proenvironmental’’ civil servants as CI members is rather high (43%). Also, about 26% of party representatives who served as CI members came from the Green or Centre Party. This is a large number, if we recall that both of the parties have only held about 5–8% of the seats in parliament. Thus, while Swedish policy-

14

The participation of the Swedish Solar Energy Society was restricted to 3 invited comments. 15 For example, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation, which opposed the government’s nuclear phase-out policy in the late 1980s (Nilsson and Eckerberg 2007), advised the writing of 10 reports while civil society organisations altogether were involved in 23 cases of 72.

making on energy is not under the clear control of proenvironmental actors, there is a medium representation of such interests. Moreover, actors who are engaged in the making of Swedish energy policy may be more aware of, and more concerned about, environmental issues than their counterparts elsewhere (Worcester, 1993). Further cross-country studies of elite attitudes and environmental policies will be necessary for improving our understanding on this matter. The fourth group of interest is experts and scientists. The data support our hypothesis (H5a) on the participation of experts, as all of the CIs examined engaged at least one expert. Wholly 80% of the persons involved in the committees are labelled as ‘‘experts’’. The number of experts increased beginning in the mid-1990s, as the questions became more technical and a greater number of committees came to be chaired by a single investigator (cf. SOU, 1999:121). However, the number of experts expressing disagreement with the policies proposed in their committee’s report, or with the methods of assessment presented therein, has not increased. This suggests that the CIs in the area of energy policy still achieve their goal of providing consensus based policy advice. Although there was at least one scientist among the experts involved in writing half of the reports examined, the data lend support to our hypothesis (H5b) about a relatively minor engagement by scientists in the framing of Swedish energy policy. Less than 10% of CI members and experts hail from academia (Fig. 1), as do less than 10% of the remiss bodies (Fig. 2). The situation has worsened over the last twenty years, as the involvement of scientists has declined since the mid-1990s (Fig. 4). If we add representatives of state agencies with a high academic degree then the proportion of scientists rises to 11% (among members). In sum, while many scientists have been leading CI members,16 overall scholarly involvement is relatively low—almost at the level of small energy consumers, or of producers of energy based on uranium or fossil fuels. The final hypothesis related to the involvement of state actors, by expecting the general domination of state actors in the process, relatively high involvement of the members of political parties, and higher participation of civil servants than the representatives of state agencies (H6a–c). The data furnish clear support for our hypothesis in this regard. While the membership of energyrelated committees is dominated by politicians (59%), experts are most frequent among members who are civil servants (37%), or who represent a less politically controlled state agency (22%). The pattern is the same for the remiss bodies (Fig. 2), and the results in general conform to those presented in prior studies (e.g., Hermansson, 1993). Finally, although politicians predominate among CI members, there is a trend towards a slight diminution in this predominance since 2006 (Fig. 4). The participation by representatives of state agencies and civil servants is continuously at high levels (Fig. 4). Thus, direct control by parties seems to be in decline; increasingly, political control is exercised indirectly, via the participation of civil servants.

6. Discussion and conclusion Our data confirm that, while many different groups of stakeholders have been involved in the assessment and formula16 For example, two important committees – The Committee on Taxation of Power Companies (1990–1991) and The Committee on Energy Taxation of Swedish Industry (1991–1992) – were chaired by Lennart Hjalmarsson, an economics professor from Gothenburg University. In the latter case, the CI proposed a radical change in the recently implemented (1991) CO2 tax, which led to significant political turbulence during the early 1990s (see more in Daugbjerg and Pedersen 2004).

K. Uba / Energy Policy 38 (2010) 6674–6683

6681

Fig. 3. Percentage of reports where at least one representative of the category was involved as a member or as an expert.

Fig. 4. Committee participation over time (% of total number of actors per time period).

tion of Swedish energy policy, the process has been dominated by the state authorities. Some interest groups, like energy-intensive industry, have been represented in many cases via their branch organisations. This keeps the overall proportion of these actors among CI members and experts relatively low. In addition, while the limitations of our method of analysis make definite conclusions in this area difficult, it would appear to be the case that large industry has a voice – indeed, a prominent one – in the making of Swedish energy policy. It also appears, however, that it must compete with other stakeholders in order to have an impact.

Producers of energy based on uranium or fossil fuels (who have been allies of large industry) have taken part in the process much more frequently, especially as compared with producers of renewable energy. This imbalance reflects Swedish corporatist traditions, as well as the fact that renewable energy producers are weakly organised; in addition, the largest and oldest utilities mainly produce energy based on uranium or fossil fuels. However, this has not hindered the formulation of renewable-energy policies that many have characterised as ‘‘forerunner’’ and ‘‘pioneering’’.

6682

K. Uba / Energy Policy 38 (2010) 6674–6683

The last-mentioned circumstance is likely explained by two factors. First, there is a significant presence of environmental interests among agents of the state, who dominate the process of policy assessment in the CIs. It is true that environmental organisations are not often involved in the process. However, members and experts who represent the ministries and state agencies often champion environmental interests. This also has the effect, most likely, of promoting renewable-energy production. The reasons for these patterns might be rather specific for Sweden and require further research, where one possible factor could be the significant support for environmental protection among the Swedish population (Inglehart, 1995; Boman and Mattsson, 2008). Second, the committees of inquiry engage many experts even though just a small number of them hail from academia. This suggests that the proposals presented by the contemporary CIs are likely to enjoy high degree of legitimacy (see also Lindvall, 2009). On the other hand, the small representation of academia, that often perceived as more objective than experts representing different stakeholders, could lead to proposals that are more dominated by special interests of (renewable) energy producers than ‘‘the best available knowledge’’ (see also Owens, 2005). The involvement and co-operation of different actors has encouraged broader societal consensus regarding the policies in Sweden for a long period of time, although disagreements over energy issues certainly persist. The increasing engagement of experts, the predominance of state actors, and the relatively even balance among various stakeholders keeps the level of political conflict lower than in countries without such an institutional setting. Conflicts between sectors remain, and the low participation of renewable energy producers other than those in bioenergy has resulted in a long-term bias towards the promotion of bioenergy. Participating in CIs and commenting on their reports does not guarantee an equal heeding of all viewpoints in the policy-making process overall. The small impact of tradable green certificates – the policy instrument aimed to promote renewable energy – on the level of new investments in renewables is just one example hereof (Bergek and Jacobsson, 2010). It is also important to recall that we have examined the work of committees, whose tasks are defined by the government i.e. there is a problem of autonomy of proposed policy solutions. This suggests that the full understanding of the making of Swedish energy policy would require more information on ongoing lobbying in state agencies, ministries as well as in the parliament. Moreover, the limitations of our data do not allow us to examine the impact of actors in the policy-making process, but this could be improved by future analysis using interview data, as well as examining the proposed policies and committee reports in a more detail. Finally, the data also encourage us to consider two interesting questions of further comparative research. First, what is the role of experts and scientists in the making of energy policy in Sweden and elsewhere? Very little is known about how much expert advice on energy issues actually finds its way into final policy documents. Second, how much do the attitudes and knowledge of state employees affect the process of policy assessment and formulation; and what is the role of networks among civil servants, experts working in state agencies and scientists? When we are able to answer these questions, we will have a better understanding of prevailing differences in the making and implementation of energy policy across countries.

Acknowledgements This work has been supported by Swedish Energy Agency ¨ berg, (Project NO. 30283-1). The author is grateful to PerOla O

Helena Wockelberg and Hans Blomkvist (Uppsala University), as well as two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions.

Appendix A. Supporting information Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the online version at doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2010.06.037.

References Alberts, D.J., 2007. Stakeholders or subject matter experts, who should be consulted? Energy Policy 35 2336–2346. ˚ Astrand, K., 2005. Examining influences of EU policy on instrument choice: the selection of a green certificate trading scheme in sweden. Policy and Society 24 (2), 100–128. ˚ Astrand, K., Nordqvist, J., Khan, J., 2005. Stakeholder participation in the policy process: What are the effects on the implementation of policy instruments? Conference paper at European Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, Mandelieu, France, 30-4 May-June. Bennett, C., Howlett, M., 1992. The lessons of learning: reconciling theories of policy learning and policy change. Policy Sciences 25, 275–294. Bergek, A., 2010. Levelling the playing field? The influence of national wind power planning instruments on conflicts of interests in a Swedish county. Energy Policy, 38, 2357–2369. Bergek, A., Jacobsson, S., 2010. Are tradable green certificates a cost-efficient policy driving technical change or a rent-generating machine? Lessons from Sweden 2003–2008. Energy Policy 38, 1255–1271. Bergman, L., Radetzki, M., 2003. The Continue Project: global climate policy and implications for the energy sector in a small open economy: the case of Sweden. Multi-Science Publishing Company Ltd., Stockholm. Boman, M., Mattsson, L., 2008. A note on attitudes and knowledge concerning environmental issues in Sweden. Journal of Environmental Management 86 (3), 575–579. ¨ Dahlstrom, Carl, 2009. Political appointments in 18 Democracies, 1975–2007. The Quality of Government Institute Working Paper series No 18. Daugbjerg, C., Pedersen, A., 2004. New policy ideas and old policy networks: implementing green taxation in scandinavia. Journal of Public Policy 24, 219–249. ¨ Engstrom, R., Nilsson, M., Finnveden, G., 2008. Which environmental problems get policy attention examining energy and agricultural sector policies in Sweden. Environmental Impact Assessment Review 28, 241–255. Florini, A., Sovacool, B.K., 2009. Who governs energy? The challenges facing global energy governance. Energy Policy 37, 5239–5248. ˚ ˚ Gerger Swartling, Asa, Nilsson, Mans, 2007. Social Learning and EPI: communicative governance in Swedish climate policy formation, EPIGOV Paper No. 12. Ecologic—Institute for International and European Environmental Policy, Berlin. Gunnarsson, V., Lemne, M., 1998. Kommitte´erna och bofinken: kan en kommitte´ se ¨ studier i offentlig ekonomi, ut hur som helst?: rapport till Expertgruppen for Ds 1998:57, Stockholm (in Swedish). Heinrichs, H., 2005. Democratization of expertise? Exploring novel forms of scientific advice in political decision-making. In: Maasen, S., Weingart, P. (Eds.), Advisory Systems in Pluralistic Knowledge Societies: A Criteria-Based Typology to Assess and Optimize Environmental Policy Advice Democratization of Expertise?. Springer Netherlands, pp. 41–61. Hermansson, J., 1993. Politik som intressekamp. Parlamentariskt beslutsfattande och organiserade intressen i Sverige. Norstedts Juridik, Stockholm (in Swedish). Hertin, J., Turnpenny, J., Jordan, A., Nilsson, M., Russel, D., Nykvist, B., 2009. Rationalising the policy mess? Ex ante policy assessment and the utilisation of knowledge in the policy process. Environment and Planning A 41, 1185–1200. ¨ Hogselius, P., Kaijser, A., 2010. The politics of electricity deregulation in Sweden: the art of acting on multiple arenas. Energy Policy 38, 2245–2254. Inglehart, R., 1995. Public support for environmental protection: objective problems and subjective values in 43 societies. PS: Political Science and Politics 28 (1), 57–72. Johnson, A., Jacobsson, S., 2001. Inducement and blocking mechanisms in the development of a new industry: the case of renewable energy technology in Sweden. In: Coombs, R., Green, K., Richards, A. (Eds.), Technology and the Market: Demand, Users and Innovation. Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 89–112. Kemp, R., Rotmans, J., 2009. Transitioning policy: co-production of a new strategic framework for energy innovation policy in the Netherlands. Policy Sciences 42, 303–322. ¨ Larsson, J., 2008. Produktivitet och miljoeffektivitet i den svenska till-verkning¨ tillvaxtpolitiska ¨ sindustrin. Institutet for studier (in Swedish). Liefferink, D., Arts, B., Kamstra, J., Ooijevaar, J., 2009. Leaders and laggards in environmental policy: a quantitative analysis of domestic policy outputs. Journal of European Public Policy 16, 677–700. Lindvall, J., 2009. The real but limited influence of expert ideas. World Politics 61, 703–730.

K. Uba / Energy Policy 38 (2010) 6674–6683

Lindvall, J., Rothstein, B., 2006. Sweden: the fall of the strong state. Scandinavian Political Studies 29, 47–63. Lundqvist, L., 1996. Sweden. In: Christiansen, Munk (Ed.), Governing the Environment: Politics, Policy, and Organization in the Nordic Countries, vol. 1996. Nordic Council of Ministers, pp. 5. ¨ Lovbrand, E., 2007. Pure science or policy involvement? Ambiguous boundary-work for Swedish carbon cycle science. Environmental Science & Policy 10, 39–47. Mazey, S., Richardson, J., 1997. Policy framing: interest groups and the lead up to 1996 inter-governmental conference. West European Politics 20, 111–133. ˚ McCormick, K., Kaberger, T., 2005. Exploring a pioneering bioenergy system: the ¨ case of Enkoping in Sweden. Journal of Cleaner Production 13, 1003–1014. Meyer, N.I., 2007. Learning from wind energy policy in the EU: lessons from Denmark, Sweden and Spain. European Environment 17, 347–362. ˚ ¨ Nilsson, L.J., Johansson, B., Astrand, K., Ericsson, K., Svenningsson, P., Borjesson, P., Neij, L., 2004. Seeing the wood for the trees: 25 years of renewable energy policy in Sweden. Energy for Sustainable Development 8, 67–81. Nilsson, M., 2009. New Dawn for Electricity? EU Policy and the Changing Decision Space for Electricity Production in Sweden Fridtjof Nansen Institute. CANES Working paper 11/2009. Nilsson, M., 2006. The role of assessments and institutions for policy learning: A study on Swedish climate and nuclear policy formation. Policy Sciences 38, 225–249. Nilsson, M., 2005. Learning, frames, and environmental policy integration: the case of Swedish energy policy. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 23, 207–226. Nilsson, M., Eckerberg, K., 2007. Environmental policy integration in practice: shaping institutions for learning. Earthscan. Nilsson, M., Nilsson, L.J., Ericsson, K., 2009. The rise and fall of GO trading in European renewable energy policy: the role of advocacy and policy framing. Energy Policy 37, 4454–4462. Nilsson, M., Jordan, A., Turnpenny, J., Hertin, J., Nykvist, B., Russel, D., 2008. The use and non-use of policy appraisal tools in public policy making: an analysis of three European countries and the European Union. Policy Sciences 41, 335–355. Nohrstedt, D., 2010. Do Advocacy Coalitions Matter? Crisis and Change in Swedish Nuclear Energy Policy. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 20, 309–333. Owens, S., 2005. Making a difference? Some perspectives on environmental research and policy. Transactions of the British Geographer 30, 287–295. Pielke, R.A., 2004. When scientists politicize science: making sense of controversy over The Skeptical Environmentalist. Environmental Science & Policy 7, 405–417. ¨ Pettersson, F., Soderholm, P., 2009. The diffusion of renewable electricity in the presence of climate policy and technology learning: the case of Sweden. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 13, 2031–2040. Radaelli, C.M., 2009. Measuring policy learning: regulatory impact assessment in Europe. Journal of European Public Policy Sciences 16, 1145–1164. ¨ Regeringskansliet, 2005. Ds 2005:29 Forslag om ett utvecklat elcertifikatsystem. Regeringskansliet, Stockholm (in Swedish). Regeringskansliet, 2000a. Ds 2000:1 Kommitte´handboken. Regeringskansliet, Stockholm (in Swedish).

6683

˚ fornybara ¨ ¨ Regeringskansliet, 2000b. Ds 2000:20 Elproduktion fran energikallor – ¨ ¨ ekonomiska foruts attningar och marknadsmekanismer. Regeringskansliet, Stockholm (in Swedish). Reiche, D., Bechberger, M., 2004. Policy differences in the promotion of renewable energies in the EU member states.’’. Energy Policy 32, 843–849. van Rooijen, S.N., van Wees, M.T., 2006. Green electricity policies in the Netherlands: an analysis of policy decisions. Energy Policy 34, 60–71. Sarasini, S., 2009. Constituting leadership via policy: Sweden as a pioneer of climate change mitigation. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 14, 635–653. Siaroff, A., 1999. Corporatism in 24 industrial democracies: meaning and measurement European. Journal of Political Research 36, 175–205. ¨ ¨ vindkraft. Regeringskansliet, (in Swedish). SOU, 1988:32. Lage for ¨ SOU, 1989:83. Ekonomiska styrmedel i miljopolitiken. Energi och trafik. Regeringskansliet, (in Swedish). ˚ biobranslen. ¨ SOU, 1991:93. El fran Regeringskansliet, (in Swedish). SOU, 1994:85. Ny lag om skatt pa˚ energi. Regeringskansliet, (in Swedish). ¨ andras. ¨ ˚ ard ¨ SOU, 1995:96. Jordens klimat for En analys av hotbild och globala atg strategier. Regeringskansliet, (in Swedish). ¨ SOU, 1999:44. Oppen elmarknad. Regeringskansliet, (in Swedish). SOU, 1999:121. Avkorporativisering och lobbyism—konturerna till en ny svensk ¨ berg. ¨ modell, by Hermansson, Jorgen, Anna Lund, Torsten Svensson & PerOla O Demokratiutredningens forskarvolym XIII, (in Swedish). ˚ skatter. Regeringskansliet, (in Swedish). SOU, 2003:38. Svara ¨ ¨ SOU, 2004:4. Fornybara fordonsbranslen. Regeringskansliet, (in Swedish). ¨ klimatfor ¨ andringarna ¨ ¨ SOU, 2007:60. Sverige infor – hot och mojligheter. Regeringskansliet, (in Swedish). ¨ ¨ ¨ SOU, 2008:118. Styra och stalla—f orslag till en effektivare satsforvaltning, by ´ . Regeringskansliet, (in Swedish). ¨ Forvaltningskommitte Steel, B., List, Peter, Denise, Lach, Bruce, Shindler, 2004. The role of scientists in the environmental policy process: a case study from the American west. Environmental Science and Policy 7, 1–13. Stigson, P., Dotzauer, E., Yan, J., 2009. Improving policy making through government-industry policy learning: the case of a novel Swedish policy framework. Applied Energy 86, 399–406. ¨ Soderholm, P., Ek, K., Pettersson, M., 2007. Wind power development in Sweden: global policies and local obstacles. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 11, 365–400. ¨ orjningen ¨ Swedish Energy Agency, 2009. Energifors i Sverige. Kortskits prognos 2009-07-08 (in Swedish). Swider, D.J., Beurskens, L., Davidson, S., Twidell, J., Pyrko, J., Pruggler, W., Auer, H., Vertin, K., Skema, R., 2008. Conditions and costs for renewables electricity grid connection: examples in Europe. Renewable Energy 33, 1832–1842. de Vries, A., Halffman, W., Hoppe, R., 2010. Working for policy. In: Colebatch, H.K., Hoppe, R., Noordegraaf, M. (Eds.), Policy Workers Tinkering with Uncertainty: Dutch Econometric Policy Advice in Action. Amsterdam University Press. Wang, Y., 2006. Renewable electricity in Sweden: an analysis of policy and regulations. Energy Policy 34, 1209–1220. Worcester, R.M., 1993. Public and elite attitudes to environmental issues. International Journal of Public Opinion Research 5, 315–334.