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World Food Problem: A Hard Look Ahead1
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM: MILK AND MILK PRODUCTS IN THE WORLD FOOD SUPPLY 1
HARleY C. TRELOGAN Statistical Reporting Service, U.S.D.A., Washington,
D.C.
INTRODUCTION The axiomatic observation that what may happen to any of us can happen to all of us has diverse applications. The sense in which it is cited most frequently pertains to the dispensation of ,justice. Its application to food is no less real and merits consideration by scientists concerned with the production and distribution of food. Biological scientists have long recognized the impossibility of maintaining healthy populations interspersed with disease-ravaged people. Public health measures, accordingly, are administered to protect the health of all the people of a comnmnity and not just some of them. Social scientists have similarly recognized that a prosperous society rests on solid foundations only when all members of the society participate in the prosperity. Accordingly, trickle-down theories have been discarded in favor of more direct approaches toward bolstering the econonfically weak or less prosperous groups. The debilitating effects of malnutrition contribute to the incidence of disease and economic deprivation. Attacks upon substandard living conditions must incorporate methods to overcome all of these types of deficiencies if Presented at the Sixtieth Annual Meeting of the American Dairy Science Association, University of Kentucky, Lexington, June 1965. WORLD FOOD PROBLEM:
they are to be successful over time. We may note, perhaps with a high degree of satisfaction, that such a balanced approach is being employed domestically. The acceleration of world-wide human communications brings into sharp focus the fact that these observations and requirements apply among nations as well as among comnmnities and individuals within communities. The disparities are clearly evident in international comparisons, and the consequences of neglecting their implications are reflected in physical suffering and social conflict all over this planet. Potentially, they may worsen. Dairy scientists confidently believe that the foods with which they are concerned contribute more than a proportionate share to the health and welfare of people. It is entirely fitting and proper, therefore, that dairy scientists evince interest in the food problems of the world, with special emphasis on those countries where deficiencies a.re most prominent. Our program today is designed to east these problems in perspective, so that we may better comprehend the obligations of dairy scientists now and in the future. For this purpose we have been fortunate in obtaining speakers whose breadth of view, breadth of experience, and probing inquiries make them ably fitted to help us gain a true picture of the universe in which we labor. A HARD LOOK AHEAD 1
LESTER R. BROWN U. S. Department of Agriculture Washington, D.C.
At the outset of this symposium, I will distinguish between problems and symptoms of problems. We will spend much of the next half-hour discussing current and prospective food shortages. But food shortages~like housing shortages, lack of classrooms, and rising numbers of unemployed--are symptmns of a much deeper problem. The problem is the unprecedented rates of population growth prevailing in ahnost every developing country.
To illustrate: Western Europe's agricultural production has increased about 2.5% annually over the past decade. With population increasing at only 1% per year, this has resulted in steady improvement in diets. A comparable agricultural performance in Latin America, however, where population grows more than 3% each year, has resulted in a steady decline in per capita output in recent years. Populations growing at 3% or more per year require a lot of running just to stand still. I n country after country the story is the same. India had planned to be self-sufficient in food by 1965. Today it is importing nmre food than ever before. Last year it experienced the worst food crisis in many years. It is now importing seven million tons of grain per year.
Much of the material in this paper is drawn from a more detailed USDA study entitled Increaslng World Food Output: Problems and Prospecks, FAER no. 25. Copies of this study are available from the Division of Information, Office of Management Services, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D. C. 20250. 1541
1542
JOUI%NAL O~ DAIP~Y S C I E N C E
This past year one-fifth of the United States wheat crop was shipped to India, accounting for nearly all of India's grain imports. Even so, food grain prices climbed some 30 to 40% as demand continued to outstrip supply. l-V[ainland China, containing' nearly one-fourth of the world's people, was a net food exporter as recently as 1960. I t was the third ranking rice exporter, close behind Burma and Thailand. Since then, it has become a leading grain importer, importing five to six million tons of grain per year over the past few years. There are now signs that grain imports will rise to even higher levels this year. China must now use nearly 40% of its annual foreign exchange earnings to import food and fertilizer. The need to divert resources from industry to agriculture has set industrialization back by at least a few years, perhaps more.
Latin America's experience is similar to that of Asia's two population giants. During the late 1930's, this region exported more grain than North America. Today Latin America is scarcely self-sufficient, and North America, exporting 40 to 50 million tons per year, has emerged as the world's breadbasket. The plight of the less-developed world is ver.y evident in the changing pattern of world gram trade. During the late 1930's, grain flowed from the less-developed regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to the developed regions at the rate of 11 million tons per year. Groin exports were an important source of foreign exchange earnings. A f t e r W o r l d W a r I[, the less-developed world lost its exportable surplus, becoming a net importer. Imports averaged four million tons per year during the early postwar years. As population growth rates accelerated, grain imports increased, aven~ging 1.3 million tons in the late 1950's. (See Figure 1 for world population trends.) In 1961, net imports of grain into the less-developed region were 21
TWENTY CENTURIESOF WORLD POPULATIONGROWTH BID PERSONS
--
61
million tons. Preliminary estimates for 1964 show grain inlports at 25 million tons. W h a t will import needs be in 19707 in 19807 Production indicators show the same trends as the shifts in trade patterns. Both indicators are heavily influenced by the accelerating rates of population growth. Food production per person in Latin America, reaching a postwar peak in 1958, has declined about 1% per year since then. P e r capita food output in Mainland China, also reaching a postwar high in 1958, has declined considerably. F o r the rest of Asia the postwar high came in 1961. Ttl:E TWOFOLD CttALLENGE
The projected increase in food needs in the less-developed regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America can readily be divided into two parts. Population growth requires more food. Improving the quality of diets also requires more food. Let us first examine the impact of the projected increases in population, ignoring, for the moment, the need to iraprove diets. In 1960, the population of the less-developed world was just over two billion. According to the new United Nations medium-level projections, it should pass the five billion mark by the end of the century, 35 years hence. Increasing the food supply to provide for this vast increase in numbers will seriously tax the resources of the less-devch)ped countries. The arithmetic is staggering. I)uring the fourdecade span in which the population of the developed world is projected to increase by 0.4 billion, the population of the less-developed world is projected to increase by three billion. (Figure 2 contrasts the projected population increases in North America and Latin America.) Although the area of' cropland in these two major economic regions is about the same, one must prepare to feed a projected increase seven times larger than the other. Asia, Africa, and Latin America must prepare to feed an addition to their present popu-
WESTERNHEMISPHEREPOPULATION GROWTH IN THE 2OTH CENTURY M'L'tIP~ERSONS~ ,~: i~l
-- I
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I /
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4
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0
Lm;. Am,,~[o
1
?
500
,ooo
YEAR
F I G . ].
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0 --~:.----.-1900 1920
..___.. 1940
F l a . 2.
I 1960.
1980
2000
s~MPOSlU~ lation nearly equal to the current population of the entire world. To provide for this projected addition--assuming no change in consumption levels--would require an increase in grain production from the 450 million tons of 1960 to more than 1,100 million tons by the end of the century. Now let us set aside the projected population growth and focus our thoughts on what it will take to improve diets for the existing numbers. Per capita grain availabilities give a good indication of the quality of diets. Annual grain availability per person varies widely between major geographic regions of the world, ranging from a high of 900 kg in North America to 220 kg in Asia. The difference between these two levels of grain availability is the difference between an economy which can afford to convert most of its grain supplies into meat, milk, and eggs and one in which nmst of the limited grain supplies must be consumed directly to meet minimal food energy requirements. North Americans consume an average of about I qt of milk (in all forms) each day and one egg each day. In Asia, with only 220 kg of grain p e r person per year, and very little of this available for feeding to livestock, milk consumption is limited to something like 1 qt of milk every 2 wk and one egg' every ten days. Not only are these diets inadequate from a nutritional point of view, but they are f a r from satisfactory from an economic point of view. I f we assume that a per capita grain availability of 450 kg per year, which would provide for something like 3 qt of milk per week and one egg every three days, is a satisfactory consumption level, then grain requirements can be easily calculated. This would require a doubling of grain production in the less-developed regions, going from the 1960 output of 450 million tons to 900 million tons. A doubling of grain production in the tra.ditional societies of Asia, Africa, and Latin America would not be easy. North America, with a very advanced agricultural technology, has taken 25 years to double its grain production. In summary, feeding the projected increases in population of the three less-developed regions at the currently inadequate levels of food consumption will require vast increases in food production, going from 450 million tons in 1960 to 1,100 nEillion tons by the end of the century. Providing diets intermediate between those currently prevailing in the less-developed countries and in North America for the current population would require a doubling of production. Ideally, it would be desirable to provide both for the projected increase in numbers and for more satisfactory diets. Unfortunately, it does not seem likely that this will be possible. Indeed, producing enough food to simply sustain the projected addition of nearly three billion
1543
to the current population of the less-developed regions may prove to be a considerable achievement. THE DIFFICULT TRANSITION" There are two ways of increasing food output: expanding the area under cultivation and increasing the output p e r acre of cultivated land. Expanding the area under cultivation is the age-old method of increasing the food supply. Man has been practicing this method even since agriculture began. 5Iany less-developed, densely populated countries have nearly exhausted the supply of new land that can be brought under cultivation. Planned expansion in the cultivated area in India, for example, during the next two FiveYear Plans (1966-76) cannot account for more than a very small fraction of the projected increase in food needs dm'ing this ten-year period. Reliable data on land reclamation for Mainland China are not available, but the possibilities for expanding the cultivated area are probably not too different from those in India. Several other smaller countries in Asia, the Middle East, and No~th Africa are in a similar situation. Together, these countries, rapidly becoming fixed-land economies, contain from one-third to one-half of the world's people. Once the area of new land that can readily be brought under cultivation is exhausted, the ability to increase food output is directly dependent on the ability to raise yields. Over the past quarter-century, both North America and Western Europe have been very successful in raising per-acre yields. Although production has expanded greatly, the area under cultivation in both regions is less than it was in the years preceding W o r l d W a r I I . Between 193438 and 1961, average per-acre grain yields in North America, the region with the most technologically advanced agriculture, increased 109% (Figure 3). During the same period, grain yields in Asia, the region with the greatest food needs, increased 7%. The average INCREASE IN G R A I N YIELDS
PER ACRE, 1 9 3 4 - 3 8 TO 1960 [
1
t
I
i
I
I
I
J
NORTH . . . . I AMERICA I OCEANIA "
'
WESTERN EUROPE " " E. EUROPE A N D U.S.S.R. i
~ ~ I
T 2 2 ......
A M E R I C A. . . . . ASIA .........
t 0
20
i 40
I 60 PERCENT
FIG. 3.
I 80
~ 100
-120
1544
J O U I ¢ N A L OF D A I R Y S C I E N C E
increase for the three less-developed regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America was 8%. The yield-raising performance of the lessdeveloped regions has been very discouraging. There are some good reasons for this. There seems to be a very close relationship between the level of literacy in a country and the ability of its farmers to raise per-acre yields. A grouping of countries according to levels of literacy shows that those major grain-producing countries with literacy levels below 50% have had little success in raising yields. The average rate of yield increase over the past quarter-century was 0.17% per year (see Figure ~ for wheat). Those countries with literacy levels between 50 and 80% were able to raise yields 1.12% during the same period. Major grain-producing countries with literacy levels above 80% were able to increase yields 1.43% per year. The available evidence indicates that it is exceedingly difficult for largely illiterate societies to raise yields in a rapid, sustained fashion. LITERACY LEVELS AND CHANGES IN WHEAT YIELDS
0
20
40
60
80
100
PEKC,~NTC'F POPULATIO~ LITERATL
Fro. 4. The ability to raise yields also seems to be closely related to the level of income. Increasing the food supply by expanding the area under cultivation requires relatively little capital. Increasing output per acre, however, requires a substantial increase in capital inputs in the form of fertilizers, pesticides, and improved implements. The relationship between the level of per capita, income, used as an indicator of potential capital a~ailable for investment in agriculture, and the capacity to raise yields is revealing. Stone 24 major grain-producing countries have average per capita incomes below $200 per year. The average rate of yield increase in these countries was 0.18% p e r year over the past 25 years. In the middle-income countries-those with average incomes between $200 and $1,000 per year--yields increased at a rate of 1.03% per year. High-income countries, with Der capita incomes above $1,000 per year, raised yields at the rate of 2,21% per year
(see ]~igure 5 for wheat). Clearly, there is a close relationship between the level of per capita income and the ability to raise yields. INCOME LEVELS AND CHANGES IN WHEAT YIELDS ~NG~ IN YLELOPERAC~E
I
I
80
~,o°~: •
Algeria
• W. G e ~ y
Australia
-
=~a;o.~ ° o I ° ~ ' ~ l * o l y # ~I ~ p t a F'ok~to. s. Afdoo ° ° " 3 , ~ -'k., . [
0
400
/
800 1,200 1,600 2,000 ANNUAL JNCOME PERPERSON(tN U.S. DOLLARS/
2,400
~IG. 5.
Another factor which seems closely associated with the ability to raise yields is the extent to which agriculture is market-oriented. In subsistence economies, the low levels of farm productivity leave little farm output available for marketing. With little cash income, subsistence farmers lack the capital needed to purchase yield-raising inputs. Still another important factor in the development of a yield-raising capability in agriculture is the existence of a well-developed nonfarm sector. The nonfarm sector must supply farmers with agricultural chemicals, such as fertilizers and pesticides, and with inlproved implements. I t must provide credit, transport, and storage facilities. The inability of farmers to raise yields in many countries may be due more to the inadequate development of the nonfarm sector than to any other single factor. Perhaps the most important single factor needed to generate a trend of steadily rising yields is favorable prices for farm products. The term favorable prices for farm products may be variously defined, but in this context it means favorable with respect to the purchased inputs required to raise yields. Less-developed economies arc often characterized by lower prices for farm products and much higher costs for fertilizer and other capital inputs than those prevailing in the more advanced economies. F o r example, 1 lb of rice in J a p a n may buy three times as much ammonium sulfate as a pound of rice in India. A favorable relationship between prices received and prices paid is essential if a yield take-off is to be achieved. THE GROOVINGYIELD GAP One of the most significant developments in world agriculture during the past quarter-century has been the growing disparity in per-acre
SYMPOSIUM
yields between the developed and the less-developed countries. During this period, grain yields in the United States have more than doubled, but in Asia, where food needs are much greater, yields have increased only 7%. The average increase for all less-developed regions was 8%. Countries in which food needs are greatest have had the least success in increasing output per acre. The yield gap between the developed and less-developed countries is growing wider year by year. The ratio between rice yields m the major rice producing countries with the highest and lowest per acre yields increased from 3 to 1 during the 1935-39 period, to more than 4 to 1 in the early 1960's. For wheat, the yield gap widened even more dramatically, going from 5 to 1 prewar to 10 to 1 in recent years. And for corn, the third nmjor grain, the ratio of 4 to 1 increased 6 to 1. Corn yields in the United States, averaging 25 bushels per acre in the late 1930's, are fast approaching 70 bushels per acre. Corn yields in Brazil, another major corn producing country, have not increased, in fact, they have actually declined slightly since the late 1930's. A difference of 4 bushels separated per acre corn yields in these two countries during the late 1930's; today this has widened to nearly 50 bushels per acre (Fig. 6). This gap is likely
CORN YIELDS IN M A J O R PRODUCING COUNTRIES, 1963 BUSHELS PER ACRE
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1545
YIELD TAKEOFF iqEEDED We noted earlier that the anmunt of new land that could readily be brought under cultivation was diminishing rapidly, especially in the densely populated countries of Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. Since these countries lack new land, they must generate a yield.takeoff if they arc to feed their rapidly growing populatiorts. The s~tuation facing many of these countries is similar to that which faced Japan during the latter part of the last century. Fortunately, the Japanese recognized early the need for a yield takeoff. By placing heavy emphasis on agricultural development, Japan~ able to generate a yield takeoff by the beginning of the present century, may have been the first country to achieve a yield peracre takeoff (Figure 7). The first yield takeoffs in the Western world, apparently occurring in Demuark and the Netherlands, came just after the turn of the century. Although population had become quite dense in several countries in Western Europe during the 19th Century, most were able to alleviate population pressure through emigration or by importing additional foodstuffs in exchange for their manufactured products. These alternatives are not generally available to today's densely populated, less-developed countries. They must strive for a yield takeoff.
CURRENT RICE YIE~.DS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES RELATED TO JAPAN'S HISTORICAL TREND
,ooo
ol 750AD
.
.
.
.
1000
.
i,,,
1200
L, 7°77":'°7", , , , , 1400
1600
1800
2000
FIG. 6.
FIO. 7.
to widen much more before it begins to narrow. The inability to raise yields significantly, common to many less-developed countries, has made many of these countries dependent on food imports. Brazil, now a consistent net importer of grain, imported some three million tons of wheat in 1964. The more advanced countries have generated yield per-acre takeoffs. They are now raising yields in a rapid, sustained fashion. Unless densely populated, less-developed counh~ies with little new land to bring under cultivation can generate a yield takeoff, they will be faced with ever-growing food shortages.
I n the preceding section, we discussed the many difficulties involved in getting a yield takeoff. I n those countries which have experienced yield takeoffs, output per acre has continued to rise indefinitely. Corn yields in the United States, now nearly triple the pretakeoff level, show no signs of leveling off (Figure 8). Rice yields in Japan, among the highest in the world and now more than twice the pre-takeoff level, are continuing to trend upward. There are undoubtedly some upper limits on outl~ut per acre, but none of the highyield countries appears to be close to this ceiling yet.
]546
JOURNAL
NONCO-,~VENTION-AL
SOURCES
OF
OF DAII~Y S C I E N C E
FOOD
Any serious discussion of the world food problem over the remaining one-third of this century must deal with the prospects of meeting world food needs from nonconventional sources. Man now depends on conventional agriculture for nearly all of his food supply. But what about some of the nonconventional sources of food, such as the sea, the petrochemical industry, or deserts irrigated with desalted sea water? CURRENI CORN YIELDS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES RELATED TO UNITED STATES' HISTORICAL TREND st/, PER ACRE
UNITED STATES'
Eg~t
nomieally competitive with the products of conventional agriculture does not offer a near-term solution to the food problem. The use of desalted sea water to make the deserts produce offers a third nonconventional solution to the food problem. I t is now technically possible to remove the salt from sea water so that it can be used for irrigation purposes. One day it may be possible to irrigate some of the world's vast deserts, such as the Sahara Desert in North Africa, and the arid interior o£ Australia. Despite the progress made in reducing the costs of desalting and in lowering the costs of atomic power, it will probably be close to a generation before large-scale commercial cultivation of the deserts is possible. As of now, it appears that man will continue to look to conventional agriculture for the bulk of his additional food needs for many years to come. CONCLUSIONS
........ 1800 1820 1840
I
7"°7
TTFI
1860 1880 1900 1920 1 9 4 0 1960 1980
Fro. 8. Looking to the sea as a source of food to support the world's evergrowing population is not a new idea. It has been discussed at least since the time of Jules Verne and possibly long before that. Tile fact remains, however, that man is still dependent on conventional agriculture for 99% of his food energy. Fish and other products from the ocean supply only ~%. Contrary to popular opinion, the oceans do not contain unlinfited quantities of fish. Countries with large fishing fleets, such as Japan, Norway, the Soviet Union, and the United States compete vig'orously in the best fishing areas. Considerable concern exists in some areas over the tendency to over-fish. The possibility of producing algae for food is often mentioned. Although technically possible, a marketable product with wide appeal has yet to be developed. It is now possible to synthesize food from basic raw materials, such as petroleum. But the large-scale production of synthetic foodstuffs that are nutritious, palatable, and e c o -
Uncontrolled population growth in the lessdeveloped countries poses a more serious threat to nutritional well-being and to ultimate economic viability than any other single factor. Per capita food output in the less-developed regions has shown a disturbing tendency to trend downward in recent years. Arresting and reversing this trend will require a much greater allocation of cesources than is presently in prospect. The adverse trends in per capita food production and food imports in less-developed countries are too pervasive and their implications too serious to be taken lightly. The densely populated, less-developed countries must generate a yield takeoff within the near future if they are to feed their rapidly growing populations. ] f we commit ourselves to winning the foodpopulation race, we face a prospective shortage of agTonomists comparable to the shortages of engineers experieneed when we entered the soace race. The food shortage emerging in the lessdeveloped regions may pose one of the most nearly insoluble problems facing man over the next few decades. When the economic and political history of the remaining one-third of the 20th Century is written, food, or the lack of' it, may occupy a very important place.
HARleY C. TRELOGAN Statistical Reporting Service, U.S.D.A., Washington,
D.C.
INTRODUCTION The axiomatic observation that what may happen to any of us can happen to all of us has diverse applications. The sense in which it is cited most frequently pertains to the dispensation of ,justice. Its application to food is no less real and merits consideration by scientists concerned with the production and distribution of food. Biological scientists have long recognized the impossibility of maintaining healthy populations interspersed with disease-ravaged people. Public health measures, accordingly, are administered to protect the health of all the people of a comnmnity and not just some of them. Social scientists have similarly recognized that a prosperous society rests on solid foundations only when all members of the society participate in the prosperity. Accordingly, trickle-down theories have been discarded in favor of more direct approaches toward bolstering the econonfically weak or less prosperous groups. The debilitating effects of malnutrition contribute to the incidence of disease and economic deprivation. Attacks upon substandard living conditions must incorporate methods to overcome all of these types of deficiencies if Presented at the Sixtieth Annual Meeting of the American Dairy Science Association, University of Kentucky, Lexington, June 1965. WORLD FOOD PROBLEM:
they are to be successful over time. We may note, perhaps with a high degree of satisfaction, that such a balanced approach is being employed domestically. The acceleration of world-wide human communications brings into sharp focus the fact that these observations and requirements apply among nations as well as among comnmnities and individuals within communities. The disparities are clearly evident in international comparisons, and the consequences of neglecting their implications are reflected in physical suffering and social conflict all over this planet. Potentially, they may worsen. Dairy scientists confidently believe that the foods with which they are concerned contribute more than a proportionate share to the health and welfare of people. It is entirely fitting and proper, therefore, that dairy scientists evince interest in the food problems of the world, with special emphasis on those countries where deficiencies a.re most prominent. Our program today is designed to east these problems in perspective, so that we may better comprehend the obligations of dairy scientists now and in the future. For this purpose we have been fortunate in obtaining speakers whose breadth of view, breadth of experience, and probing inquiries make them ably fitted to help us gain a true picture of the universe in which we labor. A HARD LOOK AHEAD 1
LESTER R. BROWN U. S. Department of Agriculture Washington, D.C.
At the outset of this symposium, I will distinguish between problems and symptoms of problems. We will spend much of the next half-hour discussing current and prospective food shortages. But food shortages~like housing shortages, lack of classrooms, and rising numbers of unemployed--are symptmns of a much deeper problem. The problem is the unprecedented rates of population growth prevailing in ahnost every developing country.
To illustrate: Western Europe's agricultural production has increased about 2.5% annually over the past decade. With population increasing at only 1% per year, this has resulted in steady improvement in diets. A comparable agricultural performance in Latin America, however, where population grows more than 3% each year, has resulted in a steady decline in per capita output in recent years. Populations growing at 3% or more per year require a lot of running just to stand still. I n country after country the story is the same. India had planned to be self-sufficient in food by 1965. Today it is importing nmre food than ever before. Last year it experienced the worst food crisis in many years. It is now importing seven million tons of grain per year.
Much of the material in this paper is drawn from a more detailed USDA study entitled Increaslng World Food Output: Problems and Prospecks, FAER no. 25. Copies of this study are available from the Division of Information, Office of Management Services, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D. C. 20250. 1541
1542
JOUI%NAL O~ DAIP~Y S C I E N C E
This past year one-fifth of the United States wheat crop was shipped to India, accounting for nearly all of India's grain imports. Even so, food grain prices climbed some 30 to 40% as demand continued to outstrip supply. l-V[ainland China, containing' nearly one-fourth of the world's people, was a net food exporter as recently as 1960. I t was the third ranking rice exporter, close behind Burma and Thailand. Since then, it has become a leading grain importer, importing five to six million tons of grain per year over the past few years. There are now signs that grain imports will rise to even higher levels this year. China must now use nearly 40% of its annual foreign exchange earnings to import food and fertilizer. The need to divert resources from industry to agriculture has set industrialization back by at least a few years, perhaps more.
Latin America's experience is similar to that of Asia's two population giants. During the late 1930's, this region exported more grain than North America. Today Latin America is scarcely self-sufficient, and North America, exporting 40 to 50 million tons per year, has emerged as the world's breadbasket. The plight of the less-developed world is ver.y evident in the changing pattern of world gram trade. During the late 1930's, grain flowed from the less-developed regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to the developed regions at the rate of 11 million tons per year. Groin exports were an important source of foreign exchange earnings. A f t e r W o r l d W a r I[, the less-developed world lost its exportable surplus, becoming a net importer. Imports averaged four million tons per year during the early postwar years. As population growth rates accelerated, grain imports increased, aven~ging 1.3 million tons in the late 1950's. (See Figure 1 for world population trends.) In 1961, net imports of grain into the less-developed region were 21
TWENTY CENTURIESOF WORLD POPULATIONGROWTH BID PERSONS
--
61
million tons. Preliminary estimates for 1964 show grain inlports at 25 million tons. W h a t will import needs be in 19707 in 19807 Production indicators show the same trends as the shifts in trade patterns. Both indicators are heavily influenced by the accelerating rates of population growth. Food production per person in Latin America, reaching a postwar peak in 1958, has declined about 1% per year since then. P e r capita food output in Mainland China, also reaching a postwar high in 1958, has declined considerably. F o r the rest of Asia the postwar high came in 1961. Ttl:E TWOFOLD CttALLENGE
The projected increase in food needs in the less-developed regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America can readily be divided into two parts. Population growth requires more food. Improving the quality of diets also requires more food. Let us first examine the impact of the projected increases in population, ignoring, for the moment, the need to iraprove diets. In 1960, the population of the less-developed world was just over two billion. According to the new United Nations medium-level projections, it should pass the five billion mark by the end of the century, 35 years hence. Increasing the food supply to provide for this vast increase in numbers will seriously tax the resources of the less-devch)ped countries. The arithmetic is staggering. I)uring the fourdecade span in which the population of the developed world is projected to increase by 0.4 billion, the population of the less-developed world is projected to increase by three billion. (Figure 2 contrasts the projected population increases in North America and Latin America.) Although the area of' cropland in these two major economic regions is about the same, one must prepare to feed a projected increase seven times larger than the other. Asia, Africa, and Latin America must prepare to feed an addition to their present popu-
WESTERNHEMISPHEREPOPULATION GROWTH IN THE 2OTH CENTURY M'L'tIP~ERSONS~ ,~: i~l
-- I
Lfi
I /
,t
4
3 ~ 2 L___
0
Lm;. Am,,~[o
1
?
500
,ooo
YEAR
F I G . ].
iioi
0 --~:.----.-1900 1920
..___.. 1940
F l a . 2.
I 1960.
1980
2000
s~MPOSlU~ lation nearly equal to the current population of the entire world. To provide for this projected addition--assuming no change in consumption levels--would require an increase in grain production from the 450 million tons of 1960 to more than 1,100 million tons by the end of the century. Now let us set aside the projected population growth and focus our thoughts on what it will take to improve diets for the existing numbers. Per capita grain availabilities give a good indication of the quality of diets. Annual grain availability per person varies widely between major geographic regions of the world, ranging from a high of 900 kg in North America to 220 kg in Asia. The difference between these two levels of grain availability is the difference between an economy which can afford to convert most of its grain supplies into meat, milk, and eggs and one in which nmst of the limited grain supplies must be consumed directly to meet minimal food energy requirements. North Americans consume an average of about I qt of milk (in all forms) each day and one egg each day. In Asia, with only 220 kg of grain p e r person per year, and very little of this available for feeding to livestock, milk consumption is limited to something like 1 qt of milk every 2 wk and one egg' every ten days. Not only are these diets inadequate from a nutritional point of view, but they are f a r from satisfactory from an economic point of view. I f we assume that a per capita grain availability of 450 kg per year, which would provide for something like 3 qt of milk per week and one egg every three days, is a satisfactory consumption level, then grain requirements can be easily calculated. This would require a doubling of grain production in the less-developed regions, going from the 1960 output of 450 million tons to 900 million tons. A doubling of grain production in the tra.ditional societies of Asia, Africa, and Latin America would not be easy. North America, with a very advanced agricultural technology, has taken 25 years to double its grain production. In summary, feeding the projected increases in population of the three less-developed regions at the currently inadequate levels of food consumption will require vast increases in food production, going from 450 million tons in 1960 to 1,100 nEillion tons by the end of the century. Providing diets intermediate between those currently prevailing in the less-developed countries and in North America for the current population would require a doubling of production. Ideally, it would be desirable to provide both for the projected increase in numbers and for more satisfactory diets. Unfortunately, it does not seem likely that this will be possible. Indeed, producing enough food to simply sustain the projected addition of nearly three billion
1543
to the current population of the less-developed regions may prove to be a considerable achievement. THE DIFFICULT TRANSITION" There are two ways of increasing food output: expanding the area under cultivation and increasing the output p e r acre of cultivated land. Expanding the area under cultivation is the age-old method of increasing the food supply. Man has been practicing this method even since agriculture began. 5Iany less-developed, densely populated countries have nearly exhausted the supply of new land that can be brought under cultivation. Planned expansion in the cultivated area in India, for example, during the next two FiveYear Plans (1966-76) cannot account for more than a very small fraction of the projected increase in food needs dm'ing this ten-year period. Reliable data on land reclamation for Mainland China are not available, but the possibilities for expanding the cultivated area are probably not too different from those in India. Several other smaller countries in Asia, the Middle East, and No~th Africa are in a similar situation. Together, these countries, rapidly becoming fixed-land economies, contain from one-third to one-half of the world's people. Once the area of new land that can readily be brought under cultivation is exhausted, the ability to increase food output is directly dependent on the ability to raise yields. Over the past quarter-century, both North America and Western Europe have been very successful in raising per-acre yields. Although production has expanded greatly, the area under cultivation in both regions is less than it was in the years preceding W o r l d W a r I I . Between 193438 and 1961, average per-acre grain yields in North America, the region with the most technologically advanced agriculture, increased 109% (Figure 3). During the same period, grain yields in Asia, the region with the greatest food needs, increased 7%. The average INCREASE IN G R A I N YIELDS
PER ACRE, 1 9 3 4 - 3 8 TO 1960 [
1
t
I
i
I
I
I
J
NORTH . . . . I AMERICA I OCEANIA "
'
WESTERN EUROPE " " E. EUROPE A N D U.S.S.R. i
~ ~ I
T 2 2 ......
A M E R I C A. . . . . ASIA .........
t 0
20
i 40
I 60 PERCENT
FIG. 3.
I 80
~ 100
-120
1544
J O U I ¢ N A L OF D A I R Y S C I E N C E
increase for the three less-developed regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America was 8%. The yield-raising performance of the lessdeveloped regions has been very discouraging. There are some good reasons for this. There seems to be a very close relationship between the level of literacy in a country and the ability of its farmers to raise per-acre yields. A grouping of countries according to levels of literacy shows that those major grain-producing countries with literacy levels below 50% have had little success in raising yields. The average rate of yield increase over the past quarter-century was 0.17% per year (see Figure ~ for wheat). Those countries with literacy levels between 50 and 80% were able to raise yields 1.12% during the same period. Major grain-producing countries with literacy levels above 80% were able to increase yields 1.43% per year. The available evidence indicates that it is exceedingly difficult for largely illiterate societies to raise yields in a rapid, sustained fashion. LITERACY LEVELS AND CHANGES IN WHEAT YIELDS
0
20
40
60
80
100
PEKC,~NTC'F POPULATIO~ LITERATL
Fro. 4. The ability to raise yields also seems to be closely related to the level of income. Increasing the food supply by expanding the area under cultivation requires relatively little capital. Increasing output per acre, however, requires a substantial increase in capital inputs in the form of fertilizers, pesticides, and improved implements. The relationship between the level of per capita, income, used as an indicator of potential capital a~ailable for investment in agriculture, and the capacity to raise yields is revealing. Stone 24 major grain-producing countries have average per capita incomes below $200 per year. The average rate of yield increase in these countries was 0.18% p e r year over the past 25 years. In the middle-income countries-those with average incomes between $200 and $1,000 per year--yields increased at a rate of 1.03% per year. High-income countries, with Der capita incomes above $1,000 per year, raised yields at the rate of 2,21% per year
(see ]~igure 5 for wheat). Clearly, there is a close relationship between the level of per capita income and the ability to raise yields. INCOME LEVELS AND CHANGES IN WHEAT YIELDS ~NG~ IN YLELOPERAC~E
I
I
80
~,o°~: •
Algeria
• W. G e ~ y
Australia
-
=~a;o.~ ° o I ° ~ ' ~ l * o l y # ~I ~ p t a F'ok~to. s. Afdoo ° ° " 3 , ~ -'k., . [
0
400
/
800 1,200 1,600 2,000 ANNUAL JNCOME PERPERSON(tN U.S. DOLLARS/
2,400
~IG. 5.
Another factor which seems closely associated with the ability to raise yields is the extent to which agriculture is market-oriented. In subsistence economies, the low levels of farm productivity leave little farm output available for marketing. With little cash income, subsistence farmers lack the capital needed to purchase yield-raising inputs. Still another important factor in the development of a yield-raising capability in agriculture is the existence of a well-developed nonfarm sector. The nonfarm sector must supply farmers with agricultural chemicals, such as fertilizers and pesticides, and with inlproved implements. I t must provide credit, transport, and storage facilities. The inability of farmers to raise yields in many countries may be due more to the inadequate development of the nonfarm sector than to any other single factor. Perhaps the most important single factor needed to generate a trend of steadily rising yields is favorable prices for farm products. The term favorable prices for farm products may be variously defined, but in this context it means favorable with respect to the purchased inputs required to raise yields. Less-developed economies arc often characterized by lower prices for farm products and much higher costs for fertilizer and other capital inputs than those prevailing in the more advanced economies. F o r example, 1 lb of rice in J a p a n may buy three times as much ammonium sulfate as a pound of rice in India. A favorable relationship between prices received and prices paid is essential if a yield take-off is to be achieved. THE GROOVINGYIELD GAP One of the most significant developments in world agriculture during the past quarter-century has been the growing disparity in per-acre
SYMPOSIUM
yields between the developed and the less-developed countries. During this period, grain yields in the United States have more than doubled, but in Asia, where food needs are much greater, yields have increased only 7%. The average increase for all less-developed regions was 8%. Countries in which food needs are greatest have had the least success in increasing output per acre. The yield gap between the developed and less-developed countries is growing wider year by year. The ratio between rice yields m the major rice producing countries with the highest and lowest per acre yields increased from 3 to 1 during the 1935-39 period, to more than 4 to 1 in the early 1960's. For wheat, the yield gap widened even more dramatically, going from 5 to 1 prewar to 10 to 1 in recent years. And for corn, the third nmjor grain, the ratio of 4 to 1 increased 6 to 1. Corn yields in the United States, averaging 25 bushels per acre in the late 1930's, are fast approaching 70 bushels per acre. Corn yields in Brazil, another major corn producing country, have not increased, in fact, they have actually declined slightly since the late 1930's. A difference of 4 bushels separated per acre corn yields in these two countries during the late 1930's; today this has widened to nearly 50 bushels per acre (Fig. 6). This gap is likely
CORN YIELDS IN M A J O R PRODUCING COUNTRIES, 1963 BUSHELS PER ACRE
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1545
YIELD TAKEOFF iqEEDED We noted earlier that the anmunt of new land that could readily be brought under cultivation was diminishing rapidly, especially in the densely populated countries of Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. Since these countries lack new land, they must generate a yield.takeoff if they arc to feed their rapidly growing populatiorts. The s~tuation facing many of these countries is similar to that which faced Japan during the latter part of the last century. Fortunately, the Japanese recognized early the need for a yield takeoff. By placing heavy emphasis on agricultural development, Japan~ able to generate a yield takeoff by the beginning of the present century, may have been the first country to achieve a yield peracre takeoff (Figure 7). The first yield takeoffs in the Western world, apparently occurring in Demuark and the Netherlands, came just after the turn of the century. Although population had become quite dense in several countries in Western Europe during the 19th Century, most were able to alleviate population pressure through emigration or by importing additional foodstuffs in exchange for their manufactured products. These alternatives are not generally available to today's densely populated, less-developed countries. They must strive for a yield takeoff.
CURRENT RICE YIE~.DS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES RELATED TO JAPAN'S HISTORICAL TREND
,ooo
ol 750AD
.
.
.
.
1000
.
i,,,
1200
L, 7°77":'°7", , , , , 1400
1600
1800
2000
FIG. 6.
FIO. 7.
to widen much more before it begins to narrow. The inability to raise yields significantly, common to many less-developed countries, has made many of these countries dependent on food imports. Brazil, now a consistent net importer of grain, imported some three million tons of wheat in 1964. The more advanced countries have generated yield per-acre takeoffs. They are now raising yields in a rapid, sustained fashion. Unless densely populated, less-developed counh~ies with little new land to bring under cultivation can generate a yield takeoff, they will be faced with ever-growing food shortages.
I n the preceding section, we discussed the many difficulties involved in getting a yield takeoff. I n those countries which have experienced yield takeoffs, output per acre has continued to rise indefinitely. Corn yields in the United States, now nearly triple the pretakeoff level, show no signs of leveling off (Figure 8). Rice yields in Japan, among the highest in the world and now more than twice the pre-takeoff level, are continuing to trend upward. There are undoubtedly some upper limits on outl~ut per acre, but none of the highyield countries appears to be close to this ceiling yet.
]546
JOURNAL
NONCO-,~VENTION-AL
SOURCES
OF
OF DAII~Y S C I E N C E
FOOD
Any serious discussion of the world food problem over the remaining one-third of this century must deal with the prospects of meeting world food needs from nonconventional sources. Man now depends on conventional agriculture for nearly all of his food supply. But what about some of the nonconventional sources of food, such as the sea, the petrochemical industry, or deserts irrigated with desalted sea water? CURRENI CORN YIELDS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES RELATED TO UNITED STATES' HISTORICAL TREND st/, PER ACRE
UNITED STATES'
Eg~t
nomieally competitive with the products of conventional agriculture does not offer a near-term solution to the food problem. The use of desalted sea water to make the deserts produce offers a third nonconventional solution to the food problem. I t is now technically possible to remove the salt from sea water so that it can be used for irrigation purposes. One day it may be possible to irrigate some of the world's vast deserts, such as the Sahara Desert in North Africa, and the arid interior o£ Australia. Despite the progress made in reducing the costs of desalting and in lowering the costs of atomic power, it will probably be close to a generation before large-scale commercial cultivation of the deserts is possible. As of now, it appears that man will continue to look to conventional agriculture for the bulk of his additional food needs for many years to come. CONCLUSIONS
........ 1800 1820 1840
I
7"°7
TTFI
1860 1880 1900 1920 1 9 4 0 1960 1980
Fro. 8. Looking to the sea as a source of food to support the world's evergrowing population is not a new idea. It has been discussed at least since the time of Jules Verne and possibly long before that. Tile fact remains, however, that man is still dependent on conventional agriculture for 99% of his food energy. Fish and other products from the ocean supply only ~%. Contrary to popular opinion, the oceans do not contain unlinfited quantities of fish. Countries with large fishing fleets, such as Japan, Norway, the Soviet Union, and the United States compete vig'orously in the best fishing areas. Considerable concern exists in some areas over the tendency to over-fish. The possibility of producing algae for food is often mentioned. Although technically possible, a marketable product with wide appeal has yet to be developed. It is now possible to synthesize food from basic raw materials, such as petroleum. But the large-scale production of synthetic foodstuffs that are nutritious, palatable, and e c o -
Uncontrolled population growth in the lessdeveloped countries poses a more serious threat to nutritional well-being and to ultimate economic viability than any other single factor. Per capita food output in the less-developed regions has shown a disturbing tendency to trend downward in recent years. Arresting and reversing this trend will require a much greater allocation of cesources than is presently in prospect. The adverse trends in per capita food production and food imports in less-developed countries are too pervasive and their implications too serious to be taken lightly. The densely populated, less-developed countries must generate a yield takeoff within the near future if they are to feed their rapidly growing populations. ] f we commit ourselves to winning the foodpopulation race, we face a prospective shortage of agTonomists comparable to the shortages of engineers experieneed when we entered the soace race. The food shortage emerging in the lessdeveloped regions may pose one of the most nearly insoluble problems facing man over the next few decades. When the economic and political history of the remaining one-third of the 20th Century is written, food, or the lack of' it, may occupy a very important place.