'Twixt cup and lip organizational behaviour, technical prediction and conservation practice

'Twixt cup and lip Organizational behaviour, technical prediction and conservation practice Peter B. Cebon

Using comparative case data from two universities, an organizational model of energy conservation decision making is developed. Unlike an economic model, this highlights the importance of power and incentive distribution and information acquisition and analysis. It shows how moving closer to a m a r k e t - through organizational decentralization - changes energy conservation behaviour, but does not necessarily improve it. In addition to providing insight into the critical dimensions in new technology design, this model provides a tool for analysing policy. Four generic policy options are presented. The model indicates the need to move from policy models derived strictly from economics to those which treat institutional issues as central. Keywords: Organizational behaviour; Demand-side management; Information Experience in energy conservation marketing, studies of implementation and assessments of conservation potential all suggest that engineering and economic models predict institutional conservation bchaviour poorly. Utilities have had limited success persuading customers to invest in conservation projects which would save money, increase user comfort or plant reliability, and benefit the public by reducing pollution and fuel dependency.1 Implementation of both behavioural and technological energy conservation options in the workplace appears to deviate strongly from predictions derived from economic theory. Consider three examples: Ross observed that implicit hurdle rates of return for projects (which must be exceeded before a company will invest) vary considerably between companies, often in the same industry. 2 G o v e r n m e n t conservation The author is with the Sloan School of Management,

Room E53-415, MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. 802

programmes often support measures with simple payback periods of less than a year; 3 these measures could presumably be funded from annual budgets without raising extra capital. Schipper et al noted extensive market failure in the building sector. 4 Finally, engineering studies using technological and economic criteria predict much more conservation than is observed. For example, Miller et al estimated that New York State's residents could consume 40% less electricity and save money given reasonable discount rates. 5 In this paper, we will use insights from organizational theory to start reconciling the gap between technical predictions and conservation practice. In particular we will highlight and explain institutional obstacles to energy conservation in two universities. 6 The findings can be understood at two levels. At the first level, two organizational phenomena constrain the measures selected. First, the information gathering and analysis capacity of the people formally responsible for energy conservation must exceed the information gathering and analysis requirements implicit in a given solution. Second, these people must exercise sufficient power, through coercion or incentives, over the people whose cooperation or support is necessary for successful implementation of a given technology, to overcome any objections to implementation of that technology. At the second level, the structure of the organization and its institutional environment prescribes managers' abilities to command all the information and power needed for a given solution. If energy conservation is accorded a relatively low priority, energy managers are, in general, relatively peripheral. 7 Because of their peripheral position, they have low power and limited information. They only implement the subset of energy conservation solutions compatible with their power and access to information. As a result, their solutions map on to the rest of the organization's technology as their 0301-4215/92/090802-13(~ 1992 Butterworth-HeinemannLtd

Organizational behaviour and conservation practice

authority maps onto the rest of the organization. Specifically, we will see that one university favours complex, expensive and invisible energy conservation solutions while the other emphasizes inexpensive, technically and conceptually simple solutions. The research was guided by a recognition that organizations have many energy management options. We assumed that the nature of the organization told us something about the choices people made once they chose to act. We wanted to understand how the nature of the organization delimited the smorgasbord of economically feasible options to the small subset from which the organization actually selected. We examined this question using an open ended case study approach since there was little obviously relevant literature from which to draw. 8 In the following sections, decision making at the two sites is compared and the differences are explained. After arguing that we can generalize beyond universities, we discuss policy implications.

Two sites: Tech-U and Prof-U Universities were selected for two reasons. First, their space use, equipment and technology are microcosms of the broader society's capital base. Second, they are true lifecycle managers which conceive, design, construct, use, refurbish and demolish their own buildings. Data were collected primarily through in person interviews, 9 and from archival records. Histories of the organization, energy management and relevant events outside the university were gathered, as were data on current organizational practices and their evolution. These practices included e q u i p m e n t maintenance and replacement procedures, the way energy conserwttion was incorporated into new buildings, and the way energy managers interacted with both users and people responsible for physical facilities. All management levels, from first level supervisors through to the vice-presidential level, or equivalent, were interviewed, as were users, where possible. Architects, shared savings contractors, H V A C engineers, and union officials were also interviewed in person or by telephone. The first site, Tech-U, has built its reputation on its strength in the applied physical, biological and social sciences. The other, Prof-U, also a private university, is famous for its professional faculties. They are matched on all important dimensions except student type and organizational structure (see below). They have virtually identical weather, investment criteria (three to five years simple pay-

ENERGY POLICY September 1992

back), and ready access to capital. While both have multiple, virtually independent, campuses, only the main one was examined. They are about the same size in each case. Those responsible for energy conservation considered it important, although only in one case did senior management make it a faculty priority. Both universities are considered successful energy conservers by other schools; Tech-U was an early implementer of direct digital control, and one Prof-U faculty halved energy use between 1980 and 1985. Their organizational structures differ, however_ 1~ Tech-U is administratively uniform with its different faculties sharing centralized resources, including the Physical Facilities D e p a r t m e n t (Tech-Maint). A specialist office separate from the organization's core ie Tech-Maint's Operations Division, is responsible for energy management_ This allocation of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y is c o n s i s t e n t with o r g a n i z a t i o n theory_ ~1 Prof-U, on the other hand, is much more decentralized. Its 10 autonomous faculties manage their own e n d o w m e n t s , tuition, research funds and expenditures. Each faculty's facilities office purchases services from either the university's Buildings Maintenance Department (Prof-Maint) or outside vendors.~2 We examined the major school for Arts and Sciences (Prof-Arts) and a small graduate professional school (Prof-Grad). Prof-Arts had about 15 people overseeing a part-time army of superintendents (who liaised with the Prof-Maint mechanics) and energy monitors (administrators in the relevant building who dealt with users). Prof-Grad had a facilities office of three people devoting up to three half-days a week each to facilities. This division of responsibility necessitated splitting the energy management task between appropriate people in the facilities offices and in Prof-Maint. ~3 There are two explanations for the differences in structure. The official rhetoric at Prof-U is that the decentralization derives from differences in products. Prof-U's professional schools need the freedom to produce graduates best suited to the external constituencies they serve. Furthermore, by making the faculties financially a u t o n o m o u s , they will develop efficient programmes, fundraising strategies and expenditure systems. In contrast, at Tech-U, the strong research emphasis mandates that ideas and information flow easily across disciplinary boundaries. Hence a centralized administrative structure is more appropriate. More cynical Prof-U interviewees suggested that the decentralization occurred as various power bases emerged and became institutionalized over the university's long history (more

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Organizational behaviour and conservation practice

than 150 years). The data do not differentiate between these two alternatives.

straints obvious and the technical task as simple as changing a light bulb.

Technologies

Selecting energy options

We will focus on two representative technologies computer controllers and compact fluorescent bulbs. Although many decisions for many more technologies were studied, these two are particularly appropriate for several reasons. First, these technologies are very cost effective and are considered the lynchpin of effective conservation. Second, they are polar opposites in many respects: compact fluorescent bulbs are very cheap (as a capital expense), simple and reside in the workplace; computer controllers have historically been very expensive, complex and hidden in the university's infrastructure - beyond users' awareness. They therefore provide a good contrast. Third, neither compromises, to any significant extent, the quality of the academic environment. (In fact, computer control tends to make it more comfortable.) Fourth, once installed, both the light bulbs and the controllers are cheaper and easier to manage than what they have replaced. Finally, these solutions are not mutually exclusive; installing one does not alter the feasibility of implementing the other. Computer control systems manage the timing and temperatures of buildings, and monitor equipment and systems. While they have i m p r o v e d incrementally, two discontinuities have punctuated their evolution. 14 The first generation, supervisory systems, monitored autonomous mechanical control equipment located in the field, often using sophisticated algorithms. The first discontinuity, direct digital control systems (DDC), which were introduced in 1975, replaced the mechanical controllers with digital ones and had many improvements. According to interviewees, they were more reliable, centrally programmable, easier to run and maintain and increased management control over workers.15 Microcomputer based systems, the second discontinuity, introduced in 1984, were cheaper, enabled systems to be bought for single buildings, and had better user interfaces. Lighting technology changed radically in 1984. Incandescent bulbs could be replaced with compact fluorescent tubes which, though expensive initially (then US$10.00-15.00 each) had a lower capital cost once the cost of changing bulbs was considered. They used 70% less energy and hence generated 70% less heat. While shape, weight and the chance of theft precluded installation everywhere, the economics were generally straightforward, the con-

The data suggest two criteria for analysing energy managemcnt: the timing of decisions and extent of implementation of solutions. In some cases, implementation was virtually simultaneous with introduction of a technology to the market. In others, there were lags of up to 12 years. If lags occurred, action was generally precipitated by a (generally external) event. 16 Hence, timing is best understood using a binary variable: the existence, or not, of a significant lag. 17 Second, all sites attempted virtually all options at one time or another. However, their success varied. Therefore, the other indicator of performance became the extent of implementation (proportion of climate controlled buildings retrofitted). Table 1 presents data on the timing and extent of implementation decisions for these two technologies. Tech-U implemented centralized DDC very rapidly (it was actually a prototype site) and the campus upgraded the system in a timely manner as new technology became available_ It has achieved large savings with the system (for example, in 1986 an engineer rewrote algorithms and shaved the annual energy bill by $1 000 000 (8%) in addition to prior savings of 33% of building operators and 15% of energy use in controlled buildings). Although compact fluorescent light bulbs are much simpler and cheaper, the lag here was rclatively long, three years. In contrast, Prof-Maint failed to even consider DDC when it upgraded its simple supervisory computer control system in 1979. Further, Prof-Arts and SPS only started using the supervisory computer for conservation in 1980 and 1986 respectively. Third, Prof-Maint considered how it would accommodate microcomputer based DDC systems, and probably became aware of them only after the faculties started installing them. Finally, interviews indicate that Prof-Grad lacked the skills to decide whether to purchase a DDC system when a shared savings contract ended. Compact fluoresecent light bulbs were introduced promptly by Prof-Arts in 1984. This pattern was repeated for other measures. Tech-U implemented complex, expensive, technical solutions which did not require interactions with users (preventative maintenance, building maintenance, steam pipe management and chilled water production) much better. Prof-U, on the other hand, was much better at implementing inexpensive, simple technologies or those which involved users.

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Organizational behaviour and conservation practice Table 1, Time of introduction to market, lag between introduction and implementation, and extent of implementation of two classes of conservation technology at two universities. First marketed

Tech-U Maint Lag (years)

Centralized D D C Microeomputer based D D C Control system first used for conservation Compact fluorescent bulbs

Prof-U Maint Lag Buildings a (years)

Buildings h

Prof-U Arts Lag (years)

~

Pro~U Grad

Buildings c

Lag {years)

Buildings d

_g

1976

1976 0

34 ~

g

1984

1987 _h

A/N 4

-g

1984 0

4

1986

2

Not relevant

1976

3

34 e

-g

1980

A/A ~

1986

13

6

1984

1987

3

A/N

-g

1984 11

A/A 1

1986

2

1

7

Notes: a There are 115 buildings on the Tech-U campus. b Prof-Maint maintains about 300 buildings. c Prof-Arts is responsible for 175 of the 300 buildings maintained by Prof-Maint. a Prof-Grad is responsible for 6 of the 300 buildings maintained by Prof-Maint. e Initial implementation consisted of 34 buildings; 16 more were added two years later. Failed to act by 1987-88. g Jurisdiction over a decision to implement this technology resides elsewhere in the organization. h Lag not relevant once other actions are considered. i Implemented in all appropriate buildings. At Tech-U, for computer control, this was about 65 (excludes dormitories and unconditioned and remote buildings). For compact fluorescent bulbs, about 100 buildings. In Prof-Arts, for computer scheduling, about 100 buildings, and for lights, extensive changes in 15 buildings and minor changes in many others. Appropriateness is a function of both organizational and technological considerations. J Original centralized system replaced with decentralized microcomputer based system. Operations continued to be centralized. All algorithms rewritten at this time.

These included putting microcomputer controllers on fume-hoods, negotiation with users over times and temperatures of heating and cooling, and simple retrofits, t Table 2 presents a brief chronology of energy conservation at the two sites. In addition to showing that the data are consistent with the light bulb and controller cases, it shows how the energy conservation histories are characterized by punctuating events which ended lag periods. It also presents both those conservation activities which followed punctuating events and those which followed directly from prior conservation experiences.

Explaining the data: organizational level local rationality Differences in structure and events in the institutional environment can explain almost all differences in decision making (ie which decisions have virtually no lag and which do not, and the nature of the events which interrupted the long lags). 19 Allocation of responsibilities, which reflected prior choices of centralized versus decentralized structures, dramatically affected the universities' decision making capacities. Each organization acted as a set of filters which sieved the set of feasible (in an engineering and economic sense) options (and problem definitions which led to feasible options) to a much smaller

ENERGY POLICY September 1992

subset from which it selected. 2° The institutional environment, at key junctures, ended lag periods by providing inputs which compensated for the organizations' deficiencies. However, I extend prior theory and argue that for problems like energy conservation, the filter operates very systematically and has a very fine mesh. To understand why that should be, it is essential to consider the information and power requirements for decision making_

Information acquisition and analysis" Every decision requires the confluence of three distinct classes of information: technical information, c o n t e x t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n , and c o n n e c t e d information. Technical information generally comes, with potential solutions, from outside the organization. Decentralization reduces an organization's ability to collect and analyse technical information by making it less efficient, competent and predictable. Decentralized organizations are less efficient because they must reproduce their decision making apparatus for each subunit (eg faculty). They are less c o m p e t e n t because decentralization reduces the skills each subunit can aggregate. For example, Tech-U had 13 facilities engineers, while Prof-U had two. They are less predictable because external vendors appear to expect universities to have a centralized energy conservation purchasing system. 21 Vendors could not identify the key people

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Organizational behaviour and conservation practice Table 2. Conservation histories, including punctuating events. Punctuating events with origins outside the energy management groups ended lag periods. Punctuating event

Resulting action

1973

Rapid rise in fuel prices

Emergency measures including selective delamping, initiation of night setback, cessation of winter air conditioning, movement of evening classes to low energy using rooms, extensive outreach

1976

DDC computer control system purchased

Complete (unanticipated) restructuring of Tech-Maint. Attrition of 35% of maintenance operators. Computer upgraded in 1978 and replaced m 1987.

1976

Federal government changes rules for charging energy costs to research

Programme to retrofit wasteful buildings initiated. Six buildings retrofitted in four years. Programme terminated in 1980 following dispute between Tech-Mamt and building users over ventilation and humidification rates

1987

Utility initiates shared savings rebate programme

Contractors retrofit most buildings. Includes retrofits of motors, fans, and lighting, including installation of compact fluorescent bulbs throughout. Conflict with safety office over fume-hood retrofits results in only half the anticipated hoods being retrofitted

1973

Rapid rise in fuel prices

Aggressive setback of temperatures and times and dates of building use. Some weatherstripping. Disputes with resident tutors when Dean of Prof-Arts attempted to vacate dormitories in January.

1979

Professor of Engineering invites Dean of Prof-Arts to lunch

Initiation of five-year systematic retrofit and operations programme resulting in 50% reduction in energy use. In addition to technological changes to both envelopes and equipment, includes initiation of scheduling of space use, elimination of steam use in summer, change in nature of purchasing relationship between Prof-Maint and the faculties, and complete reorganization including name change - of Prof-Maint

1982

Prof-Arts eliminates use of summer steam

Other faculties take conservation measures to compensate for 1000% increase in summer fuel price

1984

Prof-Arts purchases first microcomputer control system

Prof-Maint learns of existence of DDC

1985

New Dean of Prof-Arts appointed

Energy conservation given lower priority_ Prof-Arts facilities office initiates shared savings programme with individual buildings

1986

Shared savings contractor approaches Prof-Grad

Prof-Grad schedules space use in contract building and discovers existence of university computer. Begins scheduling other five buildings. Lighting retrofitted in one building

Tech-U

Prof-U

to approach at Prof-U. For example, the smaller faculties at Prof-U stood to benefit enormously from the utility sponsored shared savings retrofit programme Tech-U used to replace its lighting. However, the utility took a year to find these small facul-

806

ties (ie after the programme was initially scheduled to finish). Similarly, while Prof-Arts installed compact fluorescent lights, the decision maker in Prof-Grad had not heard of them at the time of the interviews. We infer that the vendor assumed that either there

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Organizational behaviour and conservation practice

was only one purchasing organization, or that because one faculty had purchased the technology, all had considered it. Given its low technical information acquisition capacity, it should be no surprise that Prof-Maint did not even know about D D C technology until the faculties purchased small systems in 1984, eight years after D D C came to market. Further, the lag periods in some faculties at Prof-U ended when people outside the core energy management group provided technical skills and information. Most important, the move to scheduling the computer system, the five-year 50% reduction in energy consumption, and the purchase of microcomputer based controllers in the SAS can all be traced to a 1979 luncheon discussion between a professor with an expertise and interest in energy conservation and the Dean. Prior to that, the faculty's energy conservation attempts had been disastrous (because the energy managers lacked technical skills). Similarly, ProfGrad's decision to schedule energy use in all its buildings was precipitated by it entering into a shared savings contract for one of its buildings. Technical information, however, is insufficient. Every solution involves a real location which carries contextual information about the space use and dimensions, the intricacies of people's lives, and the idiosyncrasies of the equipment. The energy manager needs this contextual information to implement effective solutions. We expect the energy manager to have much more information about the spaces and people with whom she deals regularly. Hence, decentralization makes contextual information more available within units and less accessible across organizational partitions. Therefore, the energy managers at Prof-U are likely to know more about academic domains than those at Tech-U, while those at Tech-U are likely to know more about the university's infrastructure than the energy managers at Prof-U. For example, when Tech-U finally installed compact fluorescent light bulbs, many were inappropriately placed. The people designing the retrofits lacked the necessary contextual information. However, the nature of the retrofit programme, particularly the use of designers external to the university, made poor solutions more politically acceptable. If the lower powered energy managers who lacked contextual information were also to design and implement solutions which users considered incompetent then they would risk reducing their power further. However, they did not have to take responsibility for context insensitive designs by contractors. Computer control scheduling and motion sensor installation provide similar examples.

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Connected information comes from the people joined institutionally or geographically to the sites of projects (eg allocators of resources, safety professionals). We expect institutional partitions which separate these connected people to inhibit implementation. So, at Tech-U, where the Safety Office reports through the Provost, and Tech-Maint reports through the Vice President for Operations, it is no surprise that Tech-Maint failed to consider the safety implications of installing fume-hood controllers. With decentralization, we expect organizations to have more trouble implementing solutions spanning several units. The fact that the first two generations of computer control spanned the faculties at Prof-U made it much harder for Prof-Maint to enlist support to upgrade it. 22 Power, incentives and resources

Power - making people do what you wish - is important for three reasons. First, every change in technology, no matter how simple, changes the social relations between people and, therefore, potentially threatens everyone affected. 2-~ For example, compact fluorescent light bulbs make 90% of bulb changers redundant. The first D D C system at TechU precipitated a complete restructuring of TechMaint, with changed job roles, reporting arrangements and attrition of 20 maintenance operators. Second, the decision and implementation processes for any technological change disrupt all people involved. Third, resources allocated to a given project are not being allocated to alternatives. 24 Therefore, unless the solution is very robust (cannot be sabotaged), the energy manager must enlist the cooperation of every person who might possibly obstruct implementation of a project. For example, Tech-Maint's failure to consider the safety requirements of fume-hoods led to a turf war with the safety office in which the number of hoods retrofitted was halved. I m p o r t a n t people to consider include workers, users, senior managers who allocate resources and other connected people (eg the safety office). People can be enlisted by aligning a project with their interests (through incentives or simplifying their job task) or through coercion. Decentralization, by definition, increases people's incentives since costs and benefits are shared by a smaller number of people_ Therefore, decentralization increases the specialist manager's power over people within her subunit, but decreases it across organizational partitions. The two case studies provide several examples of power, incentives and resource concerns affecting behaviour. First, for resource allocation, despite their

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Organizational behaviour and conservation practice Table 3. Effect of variations in structure and importance of energy conservation on energy managers' ability to obtain different types of information and control key resources, a

Decentralization a Size Delegation c Contract maintenance d Priority e

Access to technical information

Access to contextual information

Access to connected information

Ability to secure large funds

Ability to secure small funds

Ability to control workers

Ability to control users

Decrease Increase Increase Decrease Increase

Increase

Decrease

Decrease

Increase

Increase

Increase

Decrease Decrease Increase

Increase

Decrease Increase

Increase

Decrease

Increase

Increase

Notes: ~ Power is divided into four categories; ability to attract large and small amounts of capital and power over workers and users. Blank cells indicate multiple countervailing pressures operate on the category. For example, size affects contextual information by attracting better managers but having more isolated facilities departments. All cells indicate ceteris paribus changes eg size = effect of a bigger organization without changing centralization, delegation, use of contractors for maintenance, or the relative importance of energy conservation_ b Decentralization = increased decentralization. c Delegation = decisions pushed further down organization. d Contract maintenance = maintenance functions contracted out. e Priority = energy management accorded higher priority.

apparently identical capital allocation criteria, people at Tech-U found it easier to raise US$1 000 000 than US$50 000. Senior management makes large capital decisions. Capital beyond annual allocations must be large to attract attention. 25 Hence, compact fluorescent bulbs were installed by enlisting a programme which packaged US$10.00 bulbs in multimillion dollar contracts. Prof-U facilities managers, in contrast, have reasonably easy access to capital within their faculty's jurisdiction. B e y o n d that, requests must go to the central university with the dean's support. This is problematic for the smaller, p o o r e r faculties. Hence, the newer microcomputer based D D C systems, which are less than the $50 000 capital ceiling, are easy to acquire. A large D D C system, in contrast, would have required extensive negotiation between Prof-Maint and the faculties. Second, to create incentives, the facilities office in Prof-Arts set up a shared savings programme of sorts with the individual buildings at the end of the formal energy conservation programme. 26 Third, at Tech-U, where the energy managers have little power over users, there have been few successful projects within academic spaces. Projects in which costs are borne by maintenance workers, however, are common. This contrasts sharply with the experience at Prof-U, where extensive work has been done in academic spaces. Traditionally, the faculties had little power over Prof-Maint. In order to achieve its 50% energy use reduction, Prof-Arts forced a renegotiation of the contract joining it to Prof-Maint, and thus increased its power considerably.

Discussion The above argument suggests strongly that energy

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managers must have a greater information acquisition and analysis ability and more power than is required by a given solution to implement that solution. If we neglect risk taking - selection of solutions outside the local bounds - organizations will be restricted to solutions whose characteristics fall within the envelope inscribed by these domains. Structure greatly prescribes these capacities, especially if the responsible subunit is separate from core activities and has low power. For example, decentralization increases incentives and contextual information but decreases skills and access to technical information. This is very constraining because it extends well beyond questions of relative decentralization. Any structural change which increases an organization's capability in one domain penalizes it in another. 27 Table 3 shows the effects of various changes in structure on decision making capacity if everything else is held constant. However, these capacities are not determined exclusively within the organization. Events outside can change the balance of attributes and therefore make more, or different, solutions accessible. The aim of policy is often to manipulate the environment to change these capacities.

Beyond universities This finding extends beyond universities. We can see this in several ways. First, the two cases presented here are more like many businesses than universities. They lack many state schools' crippling resource constraints and capital allocation procedures. T h e y have b e t t e r access to capital than some businesses, and worse access than others. They are larger than many businesses, and can therefore develop reasonable competence if they want. Finally, the energy managers' power has ranged from low at

ENERGY POLICY September 1992

Organizational behaviour and conservation practtce Table 4. The interaction between incentives and information: their impact on sales of solar and heat pump hot water systems, a Promotion level Incentive level

Low

High

Low

1.9 (20 500)

3.3 (33 000)

High

11.0 (174 000)

41.2 (75 000)

Note: ~' Each cell indicates sales of energy-efficient heaters per 10 000 households and ( n u m b e r of households in cell). We can reject the null hypothesis that there is no interaction between the additive effects of incentive and promotion on sales (t - 216, p < 0.(101, df - 300 000). Total population is used as a baseline since, in 86% of cases, systems were bought to increase efficiency of working systems. Source: Bonneville Power Administration, Solar and Heat Pump Water Heater Program, Second Interim Report, 1986.

most times to high during key periods. This appears to match that of their commercial and industrial counterparts_ Second, the variables - information and power are generic, although the balance might differ in business_ In industry, we expect power and the ability to master contextual information to be major constraints, while commercial firms, lacking armies of engineers, are more likely to be deficient in skills and technical information. Third, the data are consistent with studies of industrial energy conservation. For example, Ross notes that the hurdle rates of return for some firms drop with project size while those of others are relatively constant. 28 Consistent with this paper, firms with the declining hurdle rate are relatively centralized. Ross also observes that successful energy managers tended to be very entrepreneurial and w o r k hard to o b t a i n plant-level m a n a g e m e n t support. 29 This suggests, again, significant internal constraints. Finally, he notes that firms with an external cash constraint often centralize resources and therefore abandon conservation efforts. 3° He n o t e d the irrationality of this strategy. 31 F o r example, one company he studied expended more effort raising money for a major capital upgrade than would have been required to save the money through energy conservation. Finally, the model presented here is consistent with other models of the industrial innovation process. 32 That is, in industry, innovation is generally problematic, for reasons similar to those described here. This postulate is supported by Shama's finding that energy conservation measures diffuse much like other innovations. 33 This suggests that the under-

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lying processes are likely to be similar. It also indicates that we can look with reasonable confidence beyond energy conservation to other areas where the central problem is one of encourging technological and behavioural changes (eg the quality, productivity, safety management, and pollution prevention literatures) for insight into how to construct policies that will effectively encourage energy conservation.

Four options for organizational conservation policy This approach allows us to better understand successes and failures of various technologies and policy approaches. Traditional engineering and economic approaches use unrealistically high implicit discount rates, market failures, and irrationality to explain failure to conserve. 34 All of these approaches, however, relegate the thing which is most important to policy makers and programme planners - an understanding of why people do not implement energy conservation technologies - to a residual category. It is the thing which is left over after everything else has been accounted for, ie the economic theories do not provide any sensible tools for dealing with the problem. People building policies from economic approaches are thus forced to deal with institutional obstacles by trial and error. They run the risk of missing important insights. For example, Williams in a paper reviewing a decade of experience in conservation programmes argues, among other things, for the importance of incentives in programme marketing_ 3~ To bolster his argument he reviews a study into the impact of information and incentives on solar and heat pump water heater sales. 36 He argues 'The B P A found that while making better information available can help increase sales, stronger incentives are even more important." The enormous interaction between information and incentives (which he fails to mention) in the data he presents (Table 4) suggests that this is not the case. For a large proportion of people, the incentive serves to get their attention and make them open to the information. 37 A utility which followed Williams's advice of providing incentives would sell only 30% of the conservation it could by providing information as well. 38 It appears that a carefully designed marriage of incentives and information would provide much better results. I doubt whether Williams would have made this omission if he had been building up from a behavioural base (psychology in this case) rather than down from an engineering-economic one. 39 Similar omissions occur throughout the literature.

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Organizational behaviour and conservation practice Policy informed by organizational considerations aims to match technologies to the organizations they penetrate. They can do this by fitting technologies to the organizations, or organizations to the technologies in one of four ways. In each case, the fit can be achieved either by the selection of particular organizations or technologies, or by adaptation, altering the characteristics of the technology or the organization. The following discussion of these options includes examples from the data above where each has, or has not, occurred and some policy alternatives for each option.

Select technologies which fit existing organizations. This is the default. Just as the central argument here is that organizations select solutions where a fit occurs, the data above include many examples of people not selecting technologies, or not being able to implement them, because of a mismatch. Problems occurred especially when technologies spanned organizational boundaries. For example, Prof-U was fundamentally incompatible with large-scale, direct digital control computer systems. Similarly, installing fume-hood microcomputer controllers precipitated organizational conflicts at Tech-U, and concentration of energy management in mechanical operations and maintenance at Tech-U led to limited building envelope conservation. Finally, managers in situations where usage patterns are not highly predictable may grossly underutilize computer control systems to avoid systems not being available, and hence interaction with users. Policies could improve selection two ways. The first is to increase the variety of choices available to all organizations. A simple example of this would be carefully constructed information guides on particular technologies which compare them not only in technical domains, but also in some of the other contextual or connected ones. For example, a comparative guide on motion sensors might include test results in real workplaces. Fume-hood controller comparisons might include safety features. The second is to try to direct the particular technologies to organizations they match well. That is, the policy analyst would attempt to map the characteristics of various technologies and organizations on the dimensions above. This would be difficult. The dimensions of the technology are, to a large part, determined by the way it is introduced to the organization (see the next section on the reconfiguration of technologies) and the dimensions of the organization are determined, in part, by its institutional environment. However, technologies have relatively fixed characteristics, and we do expect to

810

see consistency across organizations within an industry. 4°

Reconfigure technologies to fit existing organizations. This applies to both existing and proposed technologies. For existing technologies, the aim is to make the technology look different to the receiving organization. 41 For example, in 1987 the Tech-U energy managers reconfigured the new more localized direct digital control system to behave like the centralized system it replaced. On another occasion, they reconfigured $10.00 compact fluorescent light bulbs into $1 000 000 capital items, with the utility rebate programme. Those in Prof-Grad used the shared savings contractor to do the opposite: they made expensive and incomprehensible computer control inexpensive and comprehensible. Good marketing will reconfigure the technologies by reducing the technical complexity of a product, although it can operate on the other dimensions as well. For example, attractive and easily comprehensible appliance labels increased the average efficiency of Australian refrigerators purchased by at least 15% in two years. 42 They also provided a huge stimulus for product redesign for greater efficiency. 43 Robinson notes that these programmes have had similar impacts in Canada. 44 Information programmes, in general, can be seen as devices for making a technology easier to understand and, therefore, more likely to be selected. In the longer term, product designers have a set of dimensions to work with. Presumably this should enable them to develop products that are compatible with target organizations. In contrast, it appears that some current technologies are incompatible with most organizations, no matter how much you try to modify the designs. For example, all four research sites had bad luck with motion sensors. Given that this technology has historically required both technical and contextual information, and organizations cannot muster both without making energy conservation a priority, this is to be expected.

Select organizations likely to be receptive to target technologies. The aim would be to go out and find particular organizations that are likely to adopt a particular technology. Selection should have two goals. The first would be to find organizations which will have relatively little difficulty adopting a particular technology because the organization and technology already have compatible characteristics. For example, people with new and complicated technologies would look for technically sophisticated organizations. Similarly, people with low-priced

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Organizational behaviour and conservation practice

capital goods would not hesitate to target highly decentralized ones. E P R I recently carried out a set of needs based market segmentation studies which aim to do this. 45 The approach uses a set of 'firmographic' variables (size, structure etc) and set of needs determined by questionnaire to allocate an organization to one of nine different market segments. E P R I expects all firms in a given segment to respond similarly to a given programme. The approach has some theoretical flaws. In particular, it is static in its outlook and treats the nature of technology poorly. Notwithstanding, this approach deals with behavioural issues in a more sophisticated manner than virtually any other. The second criterion for selecting organizations follows from research into the diffusion of innovations_ The target organizations should be opinion leaders; organizations which adopt an innovation early and positively influence others to do so. 46 The sooner opinion leaders adopt the technology, the faster it will diffuse. This diffusion theory can be cast in terms of the model set out above. As people gain experience with a technology it becomes better understood. Hence, the risks with its use will be characterized and be transformed to 'information' from 'uncertainty'. With luck, marginal improvements are made in the design over time. Both the design improvements and experience in use make information acquisition less problematic and reduce the need for power for potential users. Therefore, the barriers to implementation decline. Shama discusses policy interventions available at the individual level, from a diffusion of innovation perspective. 47 These include development of energy conservation systems which are packaged sets of energy conservation measures; targeting the marketing of these systems to key innovator categories; provision of better information to consumers; and sale of electricity at marginal social cost. Similar interventions can be derived at the organizational level, and are not sufficiently different (except in the definition of target organization) to warrant separate discussion.

Modify organizations so they can select the technology. A modification to the technology alters an organization's ability to adopt only one technology. In contrast, a modification of the organization may enable it to adopt several new technologies. All interventions can modify the organizations they attempt to penetrate. For example, by participation in a subsidized rebate programme, the energy managers at

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Tech-U enhanced their power by bringing in funds. This attracted sufficient senior management support to get approval for the project. Simultaneously, the shared savings programme allowed them to send contractors into the laboratories to face the faculty. This averted perceived conflict with the faculty and allowed solutions to be implemented even when a poor understanding of contextual information meant the solutions were far from optimal. Appropriate policy measures to modify organizations depend on three things. First, where in the organization do the changes need to be made? Should they change relations and capacities within the physical plant department, between the physical plant department and the senior management, or elsewhere? Second, what is the desired duration and rate of the change? Is it to be permanent or simply for the duration of an intervention? Is rapid change needed? Can gradual change be facilitated? And, third, who is the change agent? Is it to be the energy manager, the union, users, public interest groups or the utility? Cebon discusses many policy options for changing organizations, so I will restrict myself to two. 4s The first is a rapid increase in price, such as happened with oil. This price increase can focus attention on energy management and unfreeze organizational rigidities that obstruct decisions and implementation. 49 If external (or covert internal) information sources are poised to exploit the opportunity, then successful implementation can occur. In contrast, gradual price changes are unlikely to be noticed. Several interviewees noted that their behaviour was consistent with this argument. In particular, they had paid much more attention to oil and gas conservation than to electricity because the oil price rises had been steep. Recent electricity demand reductions were due, to a large part, to Public Utility Commission requirements imposed on utilities, rather than market adjustments. 5° The second intervention has been successful in developing and some developed countries_ An outside agency provides credit to a group of businesses in an area. The first business receives a loan and must pay it back before the next business in the group can take one out. The next loan is generally slightly larger than the one before. Superficially, this is a way of providing credit to organizations that would otherwise not be credit worthy. However, the principal function of these groups appears to be to provide information sharing networks. 51 A variation on this approach may be appropriate for energy conservation in particular industries. As well as providing capital, the group would be a focal point

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for the input of technical information and the sharing of experiences. Failures occur when one o f these f o u r is not possible. Interventions which fail to utilize one of these four options will fail. For example, consultants have limited success b e c a u s e t h e y lack c o n t e x t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n and p o w e r to change work place practices. We see the extent of this failure when we compare the results of audit studies with the achievements of high-performing organizations. 52 The engineering based energy conservation literature implicitly recognizes the importance of information and power; technically feasible solutions which may fail because they create institutional conflicts are rarely mentioned. However, many of these solutions offer large savings. This implies that current conservation assessments are underpredicting potentials and that policies which overcome internal conflicts in organizations may well open up whole new classes of options. For example, once the Dean of Prof-Arts exerted considerable power to get researchers to switch from steam-distilled water to alternative sources (reverse osmosis, electrically distilled water or filtered water), the school was able to shut off the hot water for the summer months in academic buildings, dramatically reducing both steam and cooling loads (the steam pipies run through the buildings). Even rationing, which is not generally advocated as an option, can be made palatable if coupled with intelligent intervention. For example, Prof-U, since 1980 (and up to today) keeps dormitory temperatures at 68 ° on winter days, and drops them to 64 ° at midnight. This tends to increase comfort, so long as cold spots are managed. To do this, and maintain student confidence, ProfMaint responds to every complaint with a visit to the student's room to ensure that local leaks (such as poorly dampered fireplaces) are attended to. An earher version of this paper was presented at the ACEEE 1990 Summer Study on Energy Efficiency in Buildings. Numerous people have provided assistance in the formulation of the argument presented here. I am indebted particularly to Bob Thomas and Chuck Caldart. Willett Kempton, Art Rosenfeld, Richard Tabors, the late David Wood, and Marc Ross helped structure this version. Ed Vine, Chris Schabacker and Terry Hill provided valuable editorial comments. The research presented here was supported by the MIT Physical Plant Department. ~For example, see Steven Nadel, 'Electric utility conservation programs: a review of the lessons taught by a decade of program experience', Proceedings of the A CEEE Summer Study on Energy Conservation in Buildings, Monterey, August 1990. 2Marc Ross, 'Capital budgeting practices of twelve large manufacturers', Financial Management, Winter 1986, pp 15-22. 3Peter B. Cebon, The Missing Link: Organizational Behaviour as

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a Key Element in Energy~Environment Regulation and University Energy Management, Unpublished master's thesis, MIT, 1990. 4Lee Schipper et al., 'The national energy conservation act: an evaluation', Natural Resources Journal, Vol 19, October 1979. 5Peter M. Miller, Joseph H. Eto and Howard Geller, The Potential for Electricity Conservation in New York State, American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy, Washington, DC, 1990. This list is by no means exhaustive. Other studies include Edelgard Gruber and Michael Brand, 'Promoting energy conservation in small and medium-sized companies', Energy Policy, Vol 19, No 3, April 1991, pp 279-287; Eberhard Jochem and Edelgard Gruber, 'Obstacles to rational electricity use and measures to alleviate them', Energy Policy, Vol 18, No 4, May 1990, pp 340--350; Paul S. Komor and Richard Katzev, ~Behavioral determinants of energy use in small commercial buildings: implications for energy efficiency', Energy Systems and Policy, Vol 12, No 4, 1988, pp 233-242; Wolfgang Rudig, 'Energy conservation and electric utilities: a comparative analysis of organizational obstacles to CHP/DH', Energy Policy, Vol 14, No 2, April 1986, pp 105-116; and Robert M. Wirtshafter and Andrea Denver, 'Incentives for energy conservation in schools', Energy Policy, Vol 19, No 5, June 1991, pp 480-487. 6The research from which this paper is drawn included four universities; the two universities discussed here, a major state school, and a medium-sized private one. While the findings apply to all four sites, only two are discussed here because they are a well matched pair. 7By energy manager, I mean members of the organization who make energy conservation decisions as economic agents. 8The most relevant literature is that by Stern and Aronson and the literature review by Widman et al. However, Stern and Aronson are concerned with predicting which organizations will attempt to conserve, rather than explaining differences in conservation behaviour between organizations. Widman et al are concerned with the devices available to managers to change organizational participants' behaviour to facilitate conservation. See P.C. Stern and E. Aronson, eds, Energy Use: The Human Dimension, W.H. Freeman, New York, 1984; Ron Widman et al, Behavioral

Approaches to Energy Conservation in Organizations: A Review of the Literature, CPL Bibliography Number 143, CPL Bibliographies, Chicago, IL, November 1984. 9Seventy-five interviews of 60 to 90 minutes duration were conducted between August 1987 and January 1988; 22 of them were transcribed_ 1°Centralization differentiates these two sites. See Table 3 for other structural variations. aaJames D. Thompson, Organizations in Action, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967. lZln contrast, at Tech-U, most routine services are provided using overhead funds. Optional services (eg office renovations) must be purchased from Tech-Maint. 13At various times, this responsibility was shifted around in Prof-Arts. From 1973-79, the dean took principal responsibility and two people in the facilities office worked on selected problems. From 1980-85, when energy use was cut 50%, he and the engineering professor who catalysed the initiative co-chaired an energy management oversight committee. He also expanded the facilities office's energy management staff. At the end of the initiative, in 1985, the facilities office assumed responsibility and used an incentive programme to move some of the onus to individual buildings. 14Michael L. Tushman and Philip Anderson, "Technological discontinuities and organizational environments', Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol 31, 1986, pp 439-465. aSFor example see Richard Edwards, Contested Terrain, Basic Books, New York, 1979. ~rFor a discussion of evolution by punctuated equilibria see Steven Jay Gould, The Panda's Thumb, Norton, New York, 1982. Articles on organizational evolution by punctuated equilibria include Michael Tushman and Sara Keck, Environmental and

Organizational Context and Executive Team Characteristics: An Organizational Learning Approach, Unpublished manuscript,

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Organizational behaviour and conservation practice March 1990; Michael Tushman and Elaine Romanelli, "Organizational evolution: a metamorphosis model of convergence and reorientation', in L.L. Cumming and B.M. Staw, eds, Research in Organizational Behavior, JAI Press, Greenwich, CT, 1985, pp 171-222; Connie J.G. Gersick, 'Revolutionary change theories: a multi-level exploration of the punctuated equilibrium paradigm', Academy of Management Review, Vol 16, No 1, January 1991, pp 1()-36. =7Whether or not a lag is significant depends on the nature of the solution. Longer delays can be expected for expensive and complex solutions. See Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, Free Press, New York, 3rd edn, 1983. ~For an extensive presentation of the data, see op cit, Ref 3. 19As noted above, other probable causal variables, eg wealth, weather, size and marginal incentive are constant across the two sites. The finding was supported by the other two cases in the study. 2°Cyert and March call this consideration of a reduced subset of options because of organizational level constraints on local rationality. See Richard Michael Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N J, 1963. ~-~See Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, 'The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields', American Sociological Review, Vol 48, April 1983, pp 147-160. 22paul R. Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch, Organizatton and Environment: Managing Differentiation and Integration, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston, MA, 1967. 23For example see T. Whisler, Information Technology and Organizational Change, Wadsworth, Belmont, CA, 1970; Langdon Winner, The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1986 240p cit, Ref 8, Stern and Aronson. ~-5Ibid; op tit, Ref 20. 26This part of the programme had a very similar structure to the incentive programme among schools described in op cit, Ref 5, Wlrtshafter and Denver. 27This argument assumes the organization is mechanistic, as is the case at all the sites (see Tom Burns and G.M. Stalker, The Management of Innovation, Tavistock Publications, London, 1961) Historically, mechanistic organizations have been plagued with problems like these, for reasons similar to those discussed here (see op cit, Ref 22). Therefore, alternative forms, such as matrix organizations, have been proposed and implemented (see Stanley M. Davis and Paul R. Lawrence, Matrix, Addison Wesley, Reading, MA, 1977). More recently, there is evidence that in some industries these rigid organizations have started to be replaced with more flexible forms: see, for example, John Paul MacDuffie, Beyond Mass Production: Flexible Production Sys-

tems and Manufacturing Performance in the Worm Auto Industry, Unpublished PhD dissertation, MIT, 1991; and Michael L. Dertouzos, Richard K. Lester and Robert M. Solow, Made in America, Regaining the Productive Edge, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989. These organizations tend to have highly skilled workers, lower status hierarchies, better communications, and a problem solving focus (see MacDuffie, 1991). If organizations move towards these newer forms, and it is by no means certain that all will, the range of accessible energy conservation solutions should expand. An obvious implication is that one effective policy intervention may be to encourage these newer organizational forms. However, this would need to be done in consort with other initiatives (eg quality, safety or pollution), not through energy policy alone. Both Gruber and Brand and Komor and Katzev present data which illustrate the impact of size on these dimensions: op cit, Ref 5. 2SOp cit, Ref 2. 29Marc Ross, personal communication. 3°Op tit, Ref 2; see also Jerald Hage, "An axiomatic theory of organizations', Administrative Science Quarterly, Vo110, 1965, pp 28%320.

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3~Marc Ross, personal interview, March 1990, Cambridge, MA. 32For example, see Richard Normann, 'Organizational innovativeness: product variation and reorientation', Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol 16, 1971, pp 203-215; Marcie Tyre,

Managing Innovation in the Manufacturing Environment: Creating Forums for Change on the Factory Floor, MIT Sloan School of Management, Working paper 3005-89-BPS, December 1989. 33Avraham Shama, 'Energy conservation in US buildings: solving the high potential/low adoption paradox from a behavioural perspective', Energy Policy, gol 11, No 2, June 1983, pp 148-167. See also op cit, Ref 17. 3aFor example, see Jerry A. Hausman, qndividual discount rates and the purchase and utilization of energy-using durables', Bell Journal of Economics, Vol 10, No 1, Spring 1979, pp 33-54; Raymond S. Hartman and Michael J. Doane, "Household discount rates revisited', Energy Journal, Vol 7. No 1, January 1986, pp 139-148; op cit, Ref 5, Miller et al; op cit, Ref 2; Henry Ruderman, Mark D. Levine and James E. McMahon, 'The behavior of the market for energy efficiency in residential appliances, including heating and cooling equipment', Energy Journal, Vol 8, No 1, March 1987, pp 1(11-124. 35Robert H. Williams, qnnovative approaches to marketing energy efficiency', in T.B. Johansson, B. Bodlund and R.H. Williams, eds, Electricity: Efficient-End-Use and New Generation Technologies and Their Planning Implications, Lund University Press, Lund, Sweden, 1989, pp 831-862. ~6Bonneville Power Administration, Solar & Heat Pump Water Heater Program, Second Interim Report, 1986. 37Paul C. Stern, Linda G. Berry and Eric Hirst, "Residential conservation incentives', Energy Policy, Vol 13, No 2, April 1985, ~8p 133-142. The interaction accounts for 70% of sales in the high~gromotion, high-information case. This is particularly surprising given that, for individual and household customers at least, there is now a fairly extensive and reasonably cogent literature on behavioural determinants of energy conservation behaviour. Good reviews of that literature are provided by op cit, Ref 9, Stern and Aronson; Scott Coltrane, Dane Archer and Elliot Aronson, 'The social psychology of successful energy conservation programmes', Energy Policy, Vol 14, No 2, 1986, pp 133-148; Richard D. Katzev and Theodore R Johnson, Promoting Energy Conservation: An Analysis of Behavioral Research, Westview, Boulder, CO, and London, 1987; and John B. Robinson, 'The proof of thc pudding: making energy efficiency work', Energy Poho,, Vol 19, No 7, September 1091, pp 631-645. Collections of papers on behaviour and energy conservation include W. Kempton and M. Nieman, eds, Energy Efficiency: Perspectives on Indivtdual Behavior, American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, Washington, DC and Berkeley, CA, 19b~6; E. Monnier et al, eds, Consumer Behavtor and Energy Poho': An b~ternational Perspectiw', Praeger, New York, 1986, and the biennial proceedings of the ACEEE summer study on energy conservation in buildings. 4°Op cit, Ref 21. 4~Op ctt, Ref 5. Cebon; Ronald E. Rice and Everett M. Rogers, 'Reinvention in the innovative process', Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization, Vol 1, No 4, June 1980. pp 49%514. 42Jim Gallaugher, Three Year Demand Management Action Plan, Joint SECV/DITR Demand Management Development Project, Melbourne, December 1989. 43Alan Pears, Personal interview, Melbourne, Australia, January 1990.

440p cit, Ref 39, Robinson. 4SNational Analysts, End-User Segmentation in Commercial Markets, EPRI report RP 2671-01, November 199(I. 4°Op cit, Ref 17. 470p cit, Ref 33, Shama. 4SOp cit, Ref 5, Cebon. 49For example, see Jean M. Bartunek, 'The dynamics of personal and organizational reframing', in Robert E. Quinn and Kim S. Cameron, eds, Paradox and Transformatton: Towards a Theory of Change in Organization and Management, Ballinger, Cam-

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Organizational behaviour and conservation practice bridge, MA, 1988. 5°No published econometric studies have attempted to isolate this effect, probably because it would not be predicted by economic theory, and it would be virtually impossible to eliminate confounds. The literature in experimental economics has not addressed it either. In theory, you would measure the responses of two sets of consumers to two different price change scenarios for one commodity. Under one scenario, the price would rise rapidly and remain constant. Under the other, it would rise gradually to the same level, and then remain constant for an appropriate lag time for people to respond. You would expect consumption to be more elastic in the case of a shock_ The problems are: (1) that such a situation does not exist, so you would have to compare usage of two different commodities (eg oil and electricity), or one commodity for two different time periods_ In both cases the technological possibilities for abatement would differ. (2) The lag time selected would be arbitrary, and would alter the result. Technologies would change during the lag, as would prices_ (3) It would be very difficult to differentiate long-run technological or behaviou-

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ral responses to a price shock from short-run responses, such as rationing, at the time of the shock, followed by long-run responses to gradual price changes after the shock. 51These programs are generally referred to as peer lending groups, peer group lending, banking circles, borrowing circles or solidarity group lending. See M. Otera, Breaking Through: The

Expansion of Micro-enterprise Programs as a Challenge for Nonprofit Institutions, Action International, Washington, DC, 1989; and Bishwapriya Sanyal and Cynthia Ferrin, The Urban Informal Sector and Small-scale Enterprise, Inter-American Foundation, Rosslyn, VA, 1986. For a discussion of US experience see Jeffrey Ashe, 'Micro-lending', in P. Kinder, ed, Social Investment Almanac 1992, Henry Holt, New York, 1992; and Valjean McLenighan and Jean Pogge, The Business of Self-Sufficiency: Microcredit in the US, Woodstock Institute, 407 Sth Dearborn, Chicago, IL, 1991. 52For example, Prof-Arts here. For an industrial example, see Kenneth E. Nelson, 'Are there are energy savings left?', Chemical Processing, January 1989.

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