A path forward to better space security: Finding new solutions to space debris, space situational awareness and space traffic management

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A path forward to better space security: Finding new solutions to space debris, space situational awareness and space traffic management Joseph N. Pelton International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety, The Netherlands

ARTICLE INFO

ABSTRACT

Keywords: International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Kessler syndrome Protospace Space debris Space situational awareness (SSA) Space traffic management (STM) Working Group on the Longer Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities (LTSOSA) Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO)

This article addresses the growing problems of space debris elevating the increased risk of orbital collisions as well as the difficulty of accurate space situational awareness, especially with regard to smaller space debris. These problems of space situational awareness (SSA) and space traffic management (STM) will become more acute as perhaps as many as twenty thousand new satellites are deployed in low Earth orbit (LEO) as part of new large scale constellations. This problem will grow as these LEO satellites need to be replaced within a cycle of perhaps every five to seven years . Many believe that there is now a need for space traffic management (STM) capabilities to cope with all these issues. There are no specific agreements, however, on how space traffic management might be systematically accomplished at the international level. The good news is that the Working Group on the Long Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities (LTSOSA) and COPUOS agreed to 21 new guidelines relating to the longer term sustainability of space and which help to establish a foundation for future efforts to create a process that could aid future space traffic control processes. Several key guidelines which were discussed extensively within the Working Group which could have aided the future prospects for traffic management, however, were not agreed before the Working Group adjourned in June 2018. This article also highlights the problem of space traffic management in near-space or ‘protospace’. These concerns grow as there is more activity in the stratosphere due to deployment of high altitude platform systems, more launches through the stratospher to deploy satellite constellation, more de-orbit operations, and perhaps increased operation of spaceplanes and hypersonic transportation in these upper altitude areas not covered by current commercial air traffic management and control. This article not only addresses these types of issues in terms of safety concerns and increased risks, but also suggests new and innovative ways that these concerns might be addressed through regulatory reforms and codification of best practices. These proposals thus outline new ways forward and suggest reforms that could supplement the efforts of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in its efforts to address these safety and security concerns.

1. Introduction In the late 1960s Donald Kessler, a scientist working for NASA, first raised the possibility that space debris generated by man-made space activities could potentially build up in Earth orbit and lead to a critical mass that ultimately could lead to an out-of-control avalanche of runaway space junk. At the time, such a possibility was generally dismissed as totally unlikely. In the late 1960s and early 1970s natural threats

from meteor showers and solar storms were seen as representing a much greater peril for satellites and crewed spacecraft. Year by year, however, the problem of space debris has increased. The Chinese missile shooting down of the Fengyun FY-1C polar orbiting satellite on January 11, 2007 created over 2000 major new debris elements. Then on February 10, 2009 the Russian Cosmos 2251 defunct satellite collided with the Iridium 33 satellite which, at the time was still operating. This very high velocity collision at a relative speed of 42,000 km/h

E-mail address: [email protected]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsse.2019.04.005 Received 7 December 2018; Received in revised form 23 April 2019; Accepted 23 April 2019 2468-8967/ © 2019 International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article as: Joseph N. Pelton, The Journal of Space Safety Engineering, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsse.2019.04.005

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Fig. 1. The increase in orbital space debris (Graphic courtesy of NASA).

Fig. 2. The impetus toward more space activities and greater difficulty of Space Traffic Management and greater difficulty in conducting future space initiatives.1

again gave rise to thousands of new debris elements. It was perhaps after this collision that the true scope of the problem of space debris began to be fully appreciated as the great risk it now poses to all future space activities. The current studies on space debris carried out by NASA, the European Space Agency and others have concluded that even without new launches a new collision that gives rise to major new debris increases will likely happen, on average, somewhere between every five to ten years. These studies suggest that five to ten major debris elements—i.e., those with the greatest potential cross sections for collisions – need to be actively removed from orbit in order to cope with the rising space debris threat. Others, such as the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) have suggested that debris elements

could be reconstituted or reconstructed as active new spacecraft with new control capabilities.2 Of course it is not existing debris that has caused the latest area of concern. It is the proposals for the deploying of over a dozen new large scale constellations of small satellites in low Earth orbit within the next five years. Some of these constellation filings include plans for over 3000 satellites in just one network. The growing number of projected constellations containing a very large number of satellites has fueled new concerns about the creation of increasing levels of debris. Even if

1 Regina Peldszus, Foresight Methods for Multilateral Collaboration in Space Situational Awareness (SSA) Policy and Operations, DLR, August 2018. 2 DARPA Project Aims To Turn Space Junk into Satellites” Space News, Oct. 24, 2011 https://spacenews.com/darpa-project-aims-turn-space-junk-satellites/.

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these constellations are perfectly managed and none of the satellites within these networks collide with each other, there is the potential of collision with space debris within the increasingly congested low Earth orbits, especially in polar orbital regions. On major concern is the shorter lifetime of satellites in low earth orbit which is typically about five to eight years. This cycle of rapid deployment but leisurely removal creates what could be described as a ‘mathematical problem’ of too many satellites going up but too few coming down. If the large satellite constellations were fully replenished on a cycle of every five to eight years but the defunct satellites were not be removed on a comparable cycle the problem of debris would become exponentially worse over time. Currently the United Nations voluntary guideline is removal from orbit within 25 years of end of life. A number of concerned commentators as well as satellite operators have noted that such a 25 year guideline for debris removal would be untenable if tens of thousands of new satellites were launched every five to eight years but satellites were to remain on a 25 year removal cycle. Others have noted the previous experience in the case of low earth orbit constellations already deployed where consistent ability to remove all satellites at end of life has not been achieved. Operators of some of the new LEO constellations have themselves expressed and indicated that perhaps a five year guideline should apply.3 Today there are many key topics that face space scientists and engineers and space policy-makers and regulators alike. With hundreds of billions of dollars (U.S.) in assets in orbit and hundreds of billions of dollars more planned there is growing concern for how to achieve global agreement as to how best to achieve ‘Space Infrastructure Security.’ Today, the broadest interpretations of that phrase would perhaps be stated as: “Undertaking all means and measures to reduce vulnerabilities of space systems to intentional and unintentional threats from natural causes, commercial and civil space operations, and military actions.” Achieving enhanced Space Infrastructure Security requires consideration of a global system of space traffic management as well as active and passive space debris mitigation, collision avoidance and active debris removal. All of these type steps need to be considered. It does need to be clearly recognized that these steps are mutually beneficial ways to cope with ‘Space Infrastructure Security”, but they are indeed different and separate activities that would benefit from common oversight and would not necessarily be undertaken by a single entity. In fact national entities and associated regulatory bodies might be required to undertake these actions and then coordinate such actions on a global basis—failing agreement on international processes. This paper addresses not only man-made risks, but also suggests that serious attention must be given to natural cosmic risks that include solar flares, coronal mass ejections, changes to the Earth's magnetosphere and its effect on the natural shield against cosmic hazards, and even potentially hazardous asteroids, comets and other celestial threats. Part of the problem is that space-based problems and issues are looked at on a piecemeal basis rather than in a holistic way.4

as well as the inert-or-only-partially-steerable space objects in Earth orbit; (ii) The best path forward to undertake some form of space traffic management and perhaps active debris removal to reduce the risk of new orbital collisions; (iii) Concerns and consideration of whether new plans to deploy objects in so-called sub-space or “Protozone” regions (i.e., above 20 km and below 160 km) including high altitude platforms, hypersonic transportation, military weapons systems such as hypersonic missiles and robotic freighters need some improved form of enhanced form of safety control and collision avoidance; and (iv) Possible changes in space governance to better cope with such issues as space security for space operations, space liability provisions, national or regional ‘best practices’ with regard to space situational awareness and information sharing processes, possible space traffic management activities and processes and new procedures or guidelines for active debris removal. This paper addresses these issues and addresses actions that might be taken at the national, regional and international level to alleviate concerns and improve international coordination in these areas. It assesses the value of steps that might be taken at the national, regional or international level to achieve better coordination and cooperation both with regard to SSA and STM. It suggests that the definitions, processes and improvements set forth in the U.S. recently signed Space Policy Directive Three with regard to both SSA and STM could perhaps serve as a model for other nations to use to improve capabilities in these areas. It also explores whether better cooperation can be achieved at the regional or international level via'bottom up’ coordination achieved via soft law (i.e., transparency and confidence building measures, codification of best practices, or codes of conduct). It also addresses efforts that might be undertaken via the InterAgency space Debris Committee (IADC) and COPUOS in the future. 3. Assessing the nature of the problem The reality of the problem is clear to anyone that looks at the data. The chart that is provided in Fig. 1 clearly shows why there should be concern about the buildup of space debris – that is 10 cm or larger in diameter in low Earth orbit. And indeed there is a much larger amount of debris that is currently not actively tracked that could represent serious dangers and efforts to track as small as 1 cm debris elements is being sought with improved SSA systems such as the newest Space Fence installations. This chart, of course, does not make any forwardlooking prediction about the consequences of the deployment of many new large scale constellations in low Earth orbit, particularly in the 300 km–1500 km range that are now likely to be launched in the next decade. It is only a matter of logical deduction to conclude that this will undoubtedly increase the problem of tracking of space debris and space situational awareness. 4. Why sub-space or the protozone should be considered a part of the discussion There are clear and apparent reasons why the increasing deployment of spacecraft, especially in low Earth orbit, and rising amounts of space debris call for some form of space traffic management, space situational awareness and debris removal process. It is not so clear-cut that such a process is needed for the region above commercial air space and below ‘outer space’ which as yet is not clearly defined. The area that has for years been a no man's land that extends above 20 km (i.e., the ceiling of commercial space) and below 160 km (i.e., the altitude that is required for long term sustaining of spacecraft in a stable orbit) has not be subject to any type of safety or regulatory control. This region, that is sometimes called sub-space, near-space, or the ‘Protozone’, is today being considered for a variety of activities. These potential uses include hypersonic transportation flights, spaceplane excursions and dirigible ascents for ‘space tourism’, robotic air freighters, dark sky stations for research and deployment of space satellites to orbit using

2. Key issues addressed in this paper The issues addressed in this paper thus include: (i) How to cope with space debris and how to create improved global space situational awareness capabilities to track the increasing number of spacecraft and 3 These viewpoints were expressed in public for a such as the ReedSmit-based Seventh Colloquium on Space and Satellites, October 18-19, 2018, Washington, D.C. and the Hudson Institute Event on the FCC and Space 2.0 Initiatives, Washington, D.C., Nov. 8, 2018. 4 Joseph N. Pelton, Scott Madry, and Carmen Felix, Institutional Risk Management and Cosmic Hazards: A major potential liability for space agencies, September 2016 Paper number: IAC-16,E3,6,x33000.

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electronic ion propulsion, hypersonic missile systems and high altitude platform systems (HAPS) for telecommunications, broadcasting, remote sensing, police and fire surveillance, etc. If there is a need for traffic management and control operations for these and other applications, then the regulatory regime and a cost structure for carrying out these essential protective control functions, are best established sooner rather than later. Clearly there are already more than enough problems to be considered with regard to space debris, space traffic management and space security for space operations, but it is argued in this paper that a holistic consideration of problems is the key to making progress. The region known as sub-space, near-space, or the ‘Protozone’ is important to include when defining what are key issues that must be addressed. The increasing uses of this now unregulated area for different purposes and at vastly different rates of speed raises important issues with regard to ‘space traffic management’ and space security for space operations. Concerns about the ‘Protozone’ will only increase in scope and concern unless they are included in a ‘holistic’ assessment of the types of problems to be addressed and solved. The establishment of the process to carry out ‘global traffic management and control operations’, is not only important to provide space infrastructure protection and security, but such action would also allow commercial users to better assess the costs implications of such global space traffic management and control activities in their business planning models. Thus one step forward would to include ‘Protozone’ safety control measures in the definition of ‘space traffic management’ rather than defining this activity to relate exclusively. The definition provided by Contant-Jorgenson, Lala, and Schrogl needs to be updated to include stratospheric operations. Their definition states: Space traffic management means the set of technical and regulatory provisions promoting safe access to outer space, operations in outer space, and return from outer space to Earth free from physical or radio-frequency interference.” The solution is to define the ‘Protozone’ as the stratospheric region from 20 km to 160 km and include this region in the definition.5 Proactive planning to implement new regulatory policies to provide for safety regulations and some form of oversight at this time makes a good deal of sense. This is much to be preferred, rather than acting post facto after accidents and catastrophes have occurred.

be taken. There have been meetings held between the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the U.N. Office of Outer Space Affairs and representatives of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. These discussions have helped to focus on the need for space traffic management and control and they also noted the evolving problem of need for safety precautions in the stratosphere, but they have done little to resolve how global space traffic management and control might be undertaken or how active debris removal might be accomplished. There have been proposals to create an organization based on the models of Intelsat or Inmarsat to undertake space debris removal and space traffic management. There are a number of practical, financial, institutional and political reasons why the current global environment makes such an outcome unlikely, and in terms of timetable for action, this type of approach also seems way too late.6 Another type of proposal is that the debris removal function might be addressed in the form of an insurance fund, similar to launch insurance, with private commercial operators being compensated for removing debris under contract from the insurance fund operator. The insurance fund model would at least provide a viable funding mechanism to support active debris removal activities.7 There is also a COPUOS Working Group on the Longer Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activites (LTSOSA) that has been assigned the task of addressing the issue of space debris but they have not been able to find new solutions either. In terms of the COPUOS activities there are today only the voluntary guidelines for Space Debris Mitigation adopted in 2010. These guidelines have no enforcement provisions and are less exacting than the IADC guidelines on which the COPUOS recommendations are based. These seven guidelines applications are introduced in the following manner: “Member States and international organizations should voluntarily take measures, through national mechanisms or through their own applicable mechanisms, to ensure that these guidelines are implemented, to the greatest extent feasible, through space debris mitigation practices and procedures.”8 The international study of possible improvements to global space governance carried in 2016 and 2017 concluded the following with regard to space traffic management and control:

5. Early protective steps that might be taken now

“Although there may be sufficient information on functional space objects to produce a space traffic control system modeled on the existing air traffic control system, the risk from space debris remains and, hence, requires serious consideration. ………Having available and real-time information on all participating spacecraft (whether they are active, partially active, or defunct) in a designated volume of space is a necessary first step in establishing a traffic control system. However, this information will not allow for the mitigation of risk from space debris. The ability to detect and track space debris is a different operational concept than creating a traffic control for space.”9

One concept that is based on precedents from air traffic control would be to establish a way to limit and control, via a central air traffic management process, the number of aircraft in a particular sector of airspace or altitude. The analogy would to establish a centralized process to limit the number of spacecraft introduced into Earth orbit, and especially for the lower altitudes or low Earth orbit. Unfortunately that ship has already sailed. Currently there are over a dozen large-scale low Earth orbit constellations already pending either licensing, official ITU interference coordination, or actual deployment. Other systems still to be filed will clearly follow. Those that seek to be licensed by national administrations and then filed with the ITU in coming years would claim discrimination if those entities who have filed early should somehow receive precedence. This seems to mean that remaining remedies are largely limited to improved methods of in-orbit traffic coordination and management, better collision avoidance for systems that are deployed, and/or active debris removal, especially those debris elements that pose the greatest threat of collision. There are many questions about how such ameliorative steps might

6 Ram Jakhu, Regulatory framework and organization for space debris removal, Journal of Space Safety Engineering, Vol. VII, 2017 http://www.jsse. space-safety.org/article/S2468-8967(17)30083-6. 7 Joseph N. Pelton, “A global fund for space debris remediation: A new way forward to address the mounting space debris problem”, International Space University Symposium, Strasbourg France, 2012. 8 Space debris mitigation guidelines of the committee on the peaceful uses of outer space, Feb., 2017 http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/sd/ COPUOS-GuidelinesE.pdf. 9 “Space traffic management and coordinated controls for near space” in Ram Jakhu and Joseph N. Pelton (eds) global space governance: an international study, (2017) Springer Press, Switzerland, Chapter 13, P.318.

5 Corinne, Contant-Jorgenson, Petr Lala, and Kaiw-Uwe Schrogl (eds) International Academy of Astronautics (IAA), Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management” (2006) IAA, Paris.

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6. Drawing on the precedents of the ICAO and ITU

The key is not only to extend the SSA capabilities using S-band radar, optical tracking and sharing to network spacecraft tracking data among satellite fleet operators, but to have reliable means to share this data with all those operating satellites—particularly those with satellites in polar orbits and those operating networks in the 300 km–1500 km range. The ability to provide timely alerts as to possible collision is increasingly critical. Further there would apparently be significant value if alerts were to be provided in advance as to any or all Rendezvous and Proximity Operations that are planned so that such activities are not mistaken for an accidental conjunction or even a possible hostile act. In a time where there is active discussions of the possible creation of a ‘space force’ and possible military actions in space the urgency of such an alert system and other space traffic management capabilities only increase in importance.13

The one specific common element that is shared by the ICAO and the ITU is that they are funded by their member states to carry out their stated function. The ITU differs from the ICAO in that there is a mechanism for additional funding to come from industry associate member who are dependent on the recommended standards that are key to their corporate service offerings to customers around the world. Since the funding of the activities is related to space traffic management, space debris mitigation, space situational awareness and prevention of interference to spacecraft operations, it seems that a mechanism whereby industry might be able to contribute to these operations would likewise make a good deal of sense.10 7. Improved capabilities for SSA, information sharing, and space traffic management

8. The clear distinction between space traffic management and control versus risk minimization related to orbital debris collisions and active debris removal operations

The first step forward that nations could take is to improve space situational awareness, information sharing and to consider extension of air traffic management and control for the Protozone and at least low Earth orbit space. Clearly the problem of precise SSA, Information sharing, and Space traffic management will only become more demanding in future years. This is because, as shown in Fig. 2, there are more space actors, there is a proliferation of space assets and operations, and policy and regulatory changes are likely to enable more space actors and operations over time. Much is already currently underway. The United States is implementing improved S-Band radar systems in the Pacific Ocean region known as the space fence. Additional S-Band radar tracking systems might also be installed in Australia. DARPA has also reached agreement to ship a new high performance optical tracking system to operate in Australia. This optical tracking system would better cover Southern Hemisphere debris tracking operations. Germany has developed a new radar system for debris tracking which involves a 34 m dish radar installed at the Research Establishment for Applied Science (FGAN) in Wachtberg, near Bonn, Germany. All of these increased capabilities will allow more precise space situational awareness, but the possibility of more On-Orbit Servicing and Rendezvous and Proximity Operation will require not only greater accuracy of orbital tracking to understand the nature of space objects coming together and whether this is an intentional or unintentional event and what is the actual nature of orbital conjunctions or near proximity events that occur. There are many optical tracking systems that are being installed in various locations. The Space Data Association (SDA) that was started by Intelsat, SES and Inmarsat has now developed increased capability to prevent conjunctions (i.e., collisions) using tracking information supplied by its membership. As the membership of the SDA has now grown to over twenty commercial organizations and space system operators its capabilities have expanded greatly. SDA's ManSat-based operations are performed by Analytical Graphics Inc. (AGI) which provides the software and computer processing systems to help predict possible collisions.11 The number of private providers of space situational awareness services, close approach alarms and potential RF interference alerts continues to grow. Currently these providers, in addition to AGI, include ExoAnalytics, Rincon, Lockheed Martin, LeoLabs, Boeing, Schafer Corp. and Applied Defense.12

Currently the main opportunity for avoiding orbital collisions is the alerting of satellite operators of possible conjunctions with sufficient warning times. This collision avoidance is accomplished by means of sending commands to active spacecraft in time to change an orbit so as to avoid a collision. The U.S. Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) has developed methods to share such alerts with network operators around the world. The Space Data Center and other providers of space situational awareness (SSA) services are constantly improving these capabilities for international data sharing. Ironically, such alerts now go to the Chinese National Space Agency to warn of threats to Chinese satellites that are imperiled by debris from the 2007 Chinese missile event since a new collision creates new space vulnerabilities for everyone. Of course there is no maneuverability for inert space debris. Space traffic management commands cannot be sent to inert space debris objects to avoid collisions. It might be possible for ground based lasers or directed energy beams to alter the orbit of debris to avoid a collision, but otherwise collision avoidance must depend on sending commands to space objects with active control systems. There is a reluctance to use ground based beaming systems to alter the orbit of space objects of other states. There have been suggestions, however, that representatives of countries who have debris that threaten collision with other satellites or debris might be positioned at the controls of a directed beam system to send the commands that could help to avoid in-orbit collisions. It has been recommended that active debris removal be undertaken to de-orbit the debris that most threatens major collisions, with a top priority being given to Envirsat and like inert space objects that constitute the highest level of risk.14 Several experiments with active de-orbiting of satellites, such as the DARPA Phoenix mission, Swiss CleanOne, the German DEOS project and the most recent NASA sponsored NanoRacks-Remove Debris mission developed by the Surrey Space Centre, have been completed or initiated. These experimental efforts have sought to develop the needed technologies to undertake active debris removal capabilities.15 There are many approaches that have been outlined in books, studies and articles about how to minimize the risks associated with space debris, to mandate various forms of ‘fail safe’ removal of satellites from orbit at end of life and many forms of active debris removal that need to be considered either by the COPUOS Working Group on the Long Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities (LTSOSA), the InterAgency

10

Ibid. Space Data Association https://www.space-data.org/sda/about/ membersandparticipants/ (Last accessed as of Aug. 3, 2018). 12 Brian Weeden, “Time for the U.S. military to let go of the civil space situational awareness mission” Space News, Sept 20, 2016 https://spacenews. com/time-for-the-u-s-military-to-let-go-of-the-civil-space-situationalawareness-mission/ 11

13 Congressional Research Service, “Toward the creation of a U.S. Space Force” August 16, 2018 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF10950.pdf. 14 Joseph N. Pelton, New Solutions for the Space Debris Problem (2015) Springer Press, Switzerland. 15 “NanoRacks-Remove Debris” NASA March 21, 2018 .https://www.nasa. gov/mission_pages/station/research/experiments/2456.html.

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space Debris Committee (IADC) or via national initiatives seeking to develop soft law precedence to diminish space debris risk.16 Some of the more interesting ideas involve on-orbit systems using a variety of different types of propulsion systems with a heavy focus on cleaning up low Earth Orbiting systems. Others have suggested improved methods for address space debris issues in the geosynchronous Earth orbit.17 The key to active debris removal depends on the development of improved “On-Orbit Servicing (OOS)” and what is now characterized as “Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO). Although there are governmental capabilities in these areas being developed. Many of the capabilities being developed are by commercial operators. Such activities need to be ‘licensed’ by national governments, but the current licensing operations for private space activities are essentially for launches and deployment of spacecraft and not for anticipated activities such as active debris removal, deployment of systems to hasten debris removal, or even servicing, reconstituting, or salvaging parts from defunct spacecraft. It is not clear that national licensing processes as now conceived are sufficient to cover the types of OOS and RPO now envisioned by private space operators. Further those that provide space situational awareness (SSA) services might mistake such OOS and RPO activities as possible hostile acts or unauthorized operations. There are now processes underway to address these types of concerns. The latest in the so-called AMOS-D Dialogue series held in Maui, Hawaii, USA on September 11–12, 2018 addressed these delicate issues. The purpose of these discussion have been characterized as follows: “The goal of the AMOS Dialogue series is to facilitate discussion among key stakeholders in the SSA community, thereby promoting greater collaboration and cooperation to enhance SSA for safe and responsible space activities. To accomplish this, the Dialogue brings together representatives from current and future SSA programs and initiatives around the world with a variety of end users and stakeholders so that they may exchange information and views in a not-for-attribution setting. Previous Dialogues looked at bringing together SSA providers and end users, collaboration between private sector and governmental SSA programs, evolving current close approach warnings processes towards space traffic management (STM), the links between small satellites and SSA, and future scenarios for global SSA and STM.”18 The effort to create international standards, or at least best practices for On-Orbit Servicing and Rendezvous and Proximity Operations is being currently spearheaded by the Consortium For Execution of Rendezvous and Servicing Operations (CONFERS) that was formed in November 2016. This CONFERS Consortium envisions the development of consensus-based technical standards that would encourage responsible on-orbit commercial servicing operations. It still has a long way to go because of the sensitivities that is complicated by the fact that it was the U.S. DARPA that has been the prime funder of this initiative.19

one might be tempted to almost despair at any comprehensive solution being found to what seems to be an escalating problem of huge dimensions. The shorter term approach to such large problem might well be to break it down into component parts and see what small and concrete steps forward might be possible. In this regard, it might be possible for several nations, perhaps through their space agencies, and perhaps by means of the IADC, to seek to devise a series of specific steps that might be taken without huge expenditures of money and any broad global agreements. In this regard, here are a number of possible suggestions of what might be considered a preliminary list of those that ‘soft law’ initiatives might consider in this regard: (a) Develop a new guideline that all small satellites without active deorbit thrusters must have a passive system that can deploy at end of life to aid deorbit and improved procedures to facilitate ease of registration. (b) Develop a new guideline for an accelerated schedule for deorbiting at the end of life. Operators of large LEO constellations themselves are concerned that the current guideline, that allows for two 11 year solar cycles to take place, is much too slow. OneWeb representatives have suggested that the guideline should rather quickly reduced to 5 years for removal after end of life because of the need to resupply large constellations on something like a 7 year cycle. This would clearly be desirable in terms of debris removal but difficult to quickly implement. The French Operations Satellite Act imposes fines only after the current 25 year timelines has expired. Certainly if space faring nations all imposed fines based on a 5 year time limit this would clearly help with space debris mitigation. (c) Develop a new guideline that a small satellite deployed at a specified altitude such as 500 km or above must have an active de-orbit capability and possibly that there also be a reserved fuel tank for deorbit use only and it be independently controlled. (d) Develop a new guideline that within 3 months of the specified end of life date for a licensed operation satellite there must be consultation with the “launching state’ licensing agency. This consultation would be to discuss plans for de-orbit of a satellite or to place it into a parking orbit above GEO orbit. Thus there would be a mandatory consultation every six months until the satellite is de-orbited. (e) As an addendum to the above guideline, there might be an agreed ‘ultimate date’ specified for de-orbitthat is a date certain, such as up to 3 years beyond the specified end of life date. A variation on this is that every six months beyond the end of life date there is a command automatically programmed into the satellite, but that this command can be cancelled by mutually agreed commands of the satellite operator and the registered ‘launching state’ officials. (f) Develop a new recommended standard for a ground based command system for an “autonomous kill and deorbit switch” for satellites that have become so-called “zombie satellites” and that are sending interfering transmissions impeding the operation of other satellites. This has been a limited case condition in the past, but the impending increase in the number of operational satellites, by perhaps as much as an order of magnitude, might see more of these conditions occurring in the future. (g) New experiments might be set up via the Space Data Association, JSpOC, ESA, NASA or other entities to create expanded networks to exchange improved SSA data from optical, S-band radar, and/or commercial sources. Another experiment would be to change the orbits of space debris to avoid potential conjunctions where different country representatives would be trained to send the needed commands or initiate the laser or directed energy transmission from the ground.

9. Interim steps that might be taken to cope with orbital space debris problems The issues of orbital space debris, space situational awareness, space traffic management and control, RF interference and the other aspects of space security for space operations sometimes seem so daunting that 16

Op cit, Pelton. Mark Skinner, “Orbital debris: What are the best near-term actions to take? A view from the field” Journal of Space Safety Engineering, Summer 2017. 18 Brian Weeden, “Space situational awareness and commercial rendezvous and proximity operations” Insight by the Secure World Foundation, Nov. 5, 2018 https://swfound.org/news/all-news/2018/11/insight-space-situationalawareness-and-commercial-rendezvous-and-proximity-operations?mc_cid= 46587e5901&mc_eid=6a85a7d9d0. 19 DARPA Creating Industry/Government Group for Safe Operation of Space Robotics, OUTREACH, Nov 29, 2916 https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/ 2016-11-29. 17

These are simply suggestions of potential mitigation or information sharing processes that could be discussed and agreed for trial experimentation. The key point is that until significant new agreements can ultimately be reached in terms of how to carry out and coordinate 6

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global space traffic management, and the broader scope of global governance established with regard to space security for space operations, smaller steps are possible and can help ameliorate space debris and RF interference problems.

improved registry of space objects in Earth orbit, the need for better sharing of information with regard to operational spacecraft and space debris, the need for an improved space traffic management system and support for collision avoidance services. In a broader context, it addresses what might be called the need for an improved approach to ‘space security for space operations’ for commercial space systems. This Executive Directive stated that the Department of Commerce should be the U.S. civil agency “to focus on maintaining access to and freedom of action in space” and “should be the focal point for this collision avoidance support service.”21

10. Summation of current status of global space operations and risk minimization There are several important conclusions that can be derived from this review of the status of risk minimization with regard to orbital collisions and seeking ways to improve the safety for current spacecraft operations and to reduce risk via improved space traffic management and control.

It charged the Department of Commerce, working with other Departments of the U.S. Government, to develop for civil commercial space activities the “minimum standards for safe operation and debris mitigation derived in part from the U.S. Government ODMSP, but incorporating other standards and best practices, will best ensure the safe operation of U.S. space activities. These safety guidelines should consider maneuverability, tracking, reliability, and disposal.” This Directive essentially called for the U.S. Government to take on a leadership role to make improvements in all of the areas set forth in this Directive and to share these results with the world space community for consideration as what might be called “best practices” and to thus hope that other countries, especially space faring-nations, might adopt parallel practices. It is still too early to project the outcome of this Directive in terms of the resulting policy in the U.S. or whether other nations will consider this outcome a useful guide to best practices going forward. Further it only addresses commercial space and not military or defensive uses of space that is still a key part of the equation. Nevertheless this could be a milestone for positive ‘soft law’ activity and create a useful framework for best practices with regard to space debris, space situational awareness and space traffic management.

(1) Improved space situational awareness capabilities and more extensive and real time global sharing of information about potential collisions is a high priority. Governmental systems such as U.S. JSoOC and other national space agency capabilities, private SSA capabilities, and international commercial systems for sharing potential conjunctions of space objects, need to continue to create better ways to share information and avert collisions since this creates liabilities for all. (Note the importance of sharing information with regard to potentially hazardous asteroids is also critical. The International Asteroid Warning Network (IAWN) that has been established in response to the actions of the U.N. General Assembly might provide some useful precedence with regard to sharing of SSA information for due consideration.)20 (2) National mechanisms for information exchange as to orbital collision risk and space situational awareness will continue as the prime method of risk avoidance until other mechanisms are developed. Technical capabilities, national security concerns and cost sharing arrangements for both SSA activities and risk warning exchanges remain key issues to be addressed. These types of concerns remain a barrier to a functioning international system for space object risk of collision information exchange. In the interim open information exchanges at the national level need to operate freely and openly. (3) Currently there is an absence of any globally-agreed mechanism or process for space traffic management and control. For that matter even national or regional air traffic control systems such as the FAA, EASA, etc. have not formally addressed the issue of safety and control for the stratosphere (sub-space, near-space or the Protozone). (4) Here soft law, best practices or so-called transparency and confidence building measures will need to play a central role. The U.S. has developed regulatory processes and legislation that govern the licensing and control procedures with regard to spaceplane flights under experimental licensing and plans are now advancing to create a systematic approach to on-going commercial operation. In response to these U.S. initiatives there has been a largely parallel response from a number of licensing agencies in Europe (i.e., the EASA), in Australia, Canada, and Japan, which have moved to adopt similar approaches. The largest challenge is with regard to space debris mitigation and space traffic management and where soft law initiatives at the national level can create a base for best practices that are widely agreed by space faring nations. (5) Thus what is most significant may be the Space Policy Directive 3: National Space Traffic Management Policy issued on June 18, 2018 by the U.S. White House. This Directive to all concerned agencies has specifically addressed the problem of ‘congested and contested space’ and the specific issues of space debris and space traffic management policy. This U.S. Executive Office Space Policy Directive-3 sets forth the problems of space situational awareness, the need for an

11. Creation of improved processes for “Space security for space Operations” or “Space Infrastructure Security” Each year there is a Space Security Index published by a coalition of organizations that is dedicated to the peaceful uses of outer space and compiled from experts from around the world. This report that is sponsored by the Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies, Project Ploughshares, the Simons Foundation, the Institute of Air and Space Law at McGill and several other Universities, notes a continuing rise in space security problems and an increased need to cope with space debris and space traffic management issues.22 The concern in a general sense looks at all the potential threats to space infrastructure that have been variously described as “Space Security for Space Operations” or “Space Infrastructure Security” and has many dimensions in terms of whether one looks to commercial space operations, military or defense related uses of outer space, and various concerns, rather than from space weather, space debris, proliferation of new weapons systems in space, increases in orbital debris, space traffic management, radio frequency interference and jamming, or possibly even terrorist attacks. ´Space Infrastructure Security´, in a holistic and comprehensive sense, is considered to address “all means and measures to reduce vulnerabilities of space systems to intentional and unintentional threats. This includes protective measures aimed at guaranteeing systems dependability and resilience.” This effort to achieve improved Space Infrastructure Security is often divided into at least two parts. 21 U.S. Space Policy Directive 3: National Space Traffic Management Policy, June 18, 2018 https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/space-policydirective-3-national-space-traffic-management-policy. 22 Space Security Index 2017 http://spacesecurityindex.org/wp-content/ uploads/2017/10/SSI-2017-Executive-Summary.pdf (Last accessed August 7, 2018).

20 International Asteroid Warning Network (IAWN) http://www.unoosa.org/ oosa/en/ourwork/topics/neos/iawn.html (Last accessed August 6, 2018).

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These are ‘Security-by-Design’ and ‘Security in Operation’ This process needs to give special attention to the hazards represented by solar storms and what might be done to protect extreme solar storms that appear to occur with a frequency of perhaps once every 150 years such as the Carrington Event of 1859 or an earlier event that occurred in China in the 1700s.23 One aspect that should be added to the equation is to suggest that the area described as ‘near-space’, ‘sub-space’ or ‘the Protozone’ give rise to increased safety and security concerns and that attempts to reach agreement on means to insure international means and methods to enhance ‘Space Infrastructure Security need to consider this sector as well Earth orbit, and outer space beyond the Earth's gravity well.

regional and global level as well. The modest proposals set forth in Section 9 above might be considered within national policy discussion or international forums. Clearly there is great potential that come from the nine additional guidelines that the U.N. COPUOS agreed upon in June 2018 in addition to the 12 guidelines approved in June 2016 as developed by the Working Group the Long Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities (LTSOSA) The ability to reach consensus agreement on various best practices with regard to among the 87 members of COPUOS represents a clear step forward.24 These latest guidelines covered such helpful subjects as improved registration of space objects and sharing of information about them, performing conjunction assessments for all objects with in-orbit controls, improved methods for addressing risks associated with the uncontrolled reentry of space objects, and better precautions when using lasers in outer space. The fact that these guidelines did not include some consensus with regard to space traffic management and a number of proposed guidelines were left pending after eight years of discussions dating back to 2010 suggests that global agreement on how to coordinate space traffic management is still a work in process. These various proposed guidelines that were essentially left pending represented a disappointment for many of the Working Group participants, although it was agreed that these issues could be considered at future sessions of COPUOS.25 The latest versions of the agreed guidelines can be found in COPUOS document A/AC.105/C.1/L.366 http://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2019/aac_ 105c_1l/aac_105c_1l_366_0_html/V1805022.pdfThe remaining DRAFT guidelines that did not reach consensus can be found in document A/ AC.105/C.1/L.367 http://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2019/aac_ 105c_1l/aac_105c_1l_367_0_html/V1804974.pdf This outcome within COPUOS represents clear progress, yet also signals much more work remains to be done in the areas of active debris removal, Rendezvous and Proximity Operations, space situational awareness and the general area of space traffic management. This suggests that perhaps one way forward might be best achieved by something akin to the InterAgency process that ultimately achieved consensus within the IADC and then led to COPUOS achieving consensus based on the IADC guidelines. Thus it seems that expanding the IADC's terms of reference to consider all aspects of SSA, On-Orbit Servicing (OOS) and Rendezvous and Proximity Operation (RPO), active debris removal and space traffic management. Such expanded terms of reference might be the only way to achieve consensus within the consultative process among space agencies that could then be transferred to the discussions and deliberations within COPUOS. OOS and RPO operations that involve close approach or mating with spacecraft of other nations will likely remain a difficult area to clearly specify with wide international agreement. The issue of licensing of any type of RPO operation becomes much more difficult and challenging when the mission involves approach to foreign space objects. (5) What is clear is that time to act in the matters of space safety and security is now. There are many vital resources available to help. These include the International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety (IAASS), the Secure World Foundation (SWF), the International Academy of Astronautics (IAA), the Space Security Index research team, and dozens of universities with relevant research programs and

12. Conclusions and recommended actions going forward The problem of outer space safety suffers today from two broad problems. One is that broad international agreement on global space governance that was once possible through International Treaty and International Agreements, as in the 1960s and 1970s when the Outer Space Treaty and its four subsidiary agreements were reached and ratified, seems to be extremely difficult to achieve today. Today the path forward seems to focus much more on soft law. Thus progress is more likely to involve national leadership. This can be efforts to create ‘best practices’, or ‘codes of conduct’ or ‘model laws and regulations.’ Efforts such as the French Space Operations Act (FSOA), the current U.S. initiatives with regard to spaceplane licensing and safety regulations, or the U.S. the Space Policy Directive-3 initiative, may represent the best current way forward in space safety initiatives. This is not to say that efforts by the U.N. COPUOS Working Group on the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities (LTSOSA), the U.N. Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), the InterAgency Space Debris Committee (IADC), safety standards developed by the IAASS, or studies by the International Academy of Astronautics (IAA) are not important ways to seek international space safety or space security agreement. Nevertheless national policy leadership may be essential to ultimately finding the best way forward to key ‘Rules of the Road’ in Space Policy essentially if national enforcement penalties or incentives motivate responsible actions. Secondly, there is a problem with a lack of a holistic approach to finding a comprehensive approach to the many areas of concern that relate to what might be called space safety and security. Researchers and policy makers concerned with space safety are divided up into various silos, each separated from one another. Some people are concerned with studying solar flares, others with coronal mass ejections, others with reversals of the Earth's magnetic poles, and yet others study the issue of the Ozone hole. Of course, different people are concerned with orbital space debris, space situational awareness, and the potential military or defensive use of outer space. Those concerned with issues of space traffic management and control focus entirely on orbital space and do not even consider sub-space or the Protozone or commercial air space to be a part of the problems that they are trying address. This leads to economic inefficiencies and key gaps in safety policies. Space safety and security covers a wide range of issues and dozens of scientific disciplines. The current dissection of these safety and security concerns works against a likely comprehensive set of policies that can be globally agreed and implemented. Despite these inefficiencies and the piecemeal nature of how current space safety and security issues have been divided, there are indeed opportunities for progress. The U.S. initiatives, as outlined in Space Policy Directive-3, offers opportunity for sharing of information and that can be helpful. The outcomes from this Directive should be widely shared and considered at the level of national space policy and at the

24 Peter Martinez, Socialization and Implementation of the UN COPUOS Space Sustainability Guidelines, Insight, Secure World Foundation, October 5, 2018 https://swfound.org/news/all-news/2018/10/insight-socialization-andimplementation-of-the-un-copuos-space-sustainability-guidelines. 25 A/AC.105/L.314/Add.7, Paagraphs 13-15, June 28, 2018 http://www. unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2018/aac_105l/aac_105l_314add_7_ 0_html/AC105_L314Add07E.pdf.

23 Research notes from Martin Sarret, European Space Policy Institute, July 2018.

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international law institutes. All of these resources and more can be drawn on to help make progress in this critical area. Certainly the new U.S. initiatives with Space Policy Directive-3 in particular, must be considered an opportunity to make progress in this area. Progress is essential, because failure in addressing the space debris problem in particular is no longer a viable option.

(6) The future of space activities is moving ahead ever more rapidly future decades could see efforts to create space colonies, engage in space mining, attempts at terraforming planets, creating space shields to protect planets, and more. Progress now is essential to realizing future potentials in space and even to protecting the future of the human race.

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