Attention: smog alert! Citizen engagement for clean air and its consequences for fuel poverty in Poland

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Attention: smog alert! Citizen engagement for clean air and its consequences for fuel poverty in Poland Jan Frankowski PII: DOI: Reference:

S0378-7788(18)31992-3 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2019.109525 ENB 109525

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Energy & Buildings

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15 July 2018 29 June 2019 11 October 2019

Please cite this article as: Jan Frankowski , Attention: smog alert! Citizen engagement for clean air and its consequences for fuel poverty in Poland, Energy & Buildings (2019), doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2019.109525

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Manuscript Details Manuscript number ENB_2018_1883_R2 Title Attention: smog alert! Citizen engagement for clean air and its consequences for fuel poverty in Poland Article type Full Length Article Abstract Fuel poverty has become a mainstream term in public debate in Poland thanks to activities of smog alert organizations. Increasing socio-ecological crisis, an emerging awareness of the common good and growth in popularity of mobile applications brought bottom-up movements to the fight for clean air. Smog alerts emerged in every major Polish city affected by dramatically low air quality. Because of the spontaneous and informal character of smog alerts, knowledge about the scale, precise scope of their activities and attitudes towards fuel poverty is limited. The aim of this paper is to explore the role of smog alerts in resolving air pollution and fuel poverty issues. The web content mining, media discourse analysis and individual interviews with policymakers have been employed to examine smog alerts scale, focal subject, impact and role in fuel poverty alleviation. Results suggested that the majority of active smog alerts acknowledged the importance of fuel poverty and were far from stigmatizing less affluent people. They also played an essential role in fostering air pollution awareness among national and local policymakers. Keywords air quality, fuel poverty, smog alerts, grassroots engagement, Poland Taxonomy Energy Resources, Energy Sustainability Corresponding Author Jan Frankowski Corresponding Author's Institution Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences Order of Authors Jan Frankowski

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1. Introduction Socialist period in Poland brought some positive elements for the energy sector. Apart from inglorious legacy such as harmful environmental pollution, massive energy inefficiency and dependence from Eastern supplier, former regime also left accessible light rail transport systems, integrated settlement planning and a wide coverage of district heating networks. The particular socialist ideology assumed that the distribution of goods such as housing and heating should be available for all (Buzar, 2007). As a part of housing provision, the state built large housing estates, developed district heating systems and subsidized prices for citizens without reflecting economic costs of production. Instead, high financial burdens were charged to the industry, the revenues of which supported household prices (Gray, 1995). As a result, even low-income households tended to preserve well-located apartments with affordable costs. However, over time these large housing estates, which dominated urban landscapes in Central and Eastern Europe, became energy inefficient. When the post-socialist transition arrived, the energy system was in poor condition overall (Urge-Vorsatz et al., 2006). Large multi-apartment dwellings suffered from heat losses due to low thermal efficiency, the lack of attention to the quality in construction materials, and the limited level of maintenance (Lampietti and Mayer, 2002). An increase in energy prices and other private goods after the collapse of socialism resulted in energy poverty – a situation in which a household is unable to secure a materially and socially necessitated level of energy services (Bouzarovski et al., 2016b). At this point it is important to emphasize that in this article, the term ‘fuel poverty’ will be used: despite terminological messiness between energy-fuel poverty dichotomy and theoretical obsolescence of the notion ‘fuel poverty' (Bouzarovski and Petrova, 2015), it better represents the source of the problem in Poland and the relations with air quality. Fuel poverty first appeared in Polish discourse in 2009 in the report of Energy Regulatory Office (Figaszewska, 2009). Initial efforts to measure the scale of the problem defined it as fuel costs at or above a threshold of 10% of net monthly income, indicated that fuel poverty affected even 40% of the society (Kurowski, 2011). However, these results were overestimated due to using actual, not

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required energy costs (Owczarek and Miazga, 2015). In the fledgling discussion, some voices criticised the potential risks of a transition to low-carbon sources for the Polish household economies (Jurdziak, 2012). Thereafter, Polish think-thanks tried to define fuel poverty (Stępniak and Tomaszewska-Kula, 2013), quantify the scale of the problem with local authorities (Pyka et al., 2014) and address the problem through policy recommendations (Węglarz et al., 2014). Other studies pointed out regional (Szamrej-Baran, 2014) and urban disparities (Frankowski and Tirado-Herrero, 2015; Libor and Bouzarovski, 2018). In 2015, the Institute of Structural Research estimated the scale of fuel poverty by calculating a Low Income High Cost (LIHC) ratio from the regular household budget survey (Miazga and Lis, 2015). They also found only partial overlap between fuel and income poverty (Owczarek and Miazga, 2015), as well as a significant difference between rural peripheries and core urban areas (Miazga et al., 2017). Furthermore, the biggest Polish social policy programme since the post-socialist era – the distribution of 500 PLN [115 EUR] monthly per child – mitigated only a fraction of the causes underlying income-based fuel poverty (Sałach and Lewandowski, 2018). The latest data using a LIHC indicator point out that fuel poverty affects 4.6 million people in Poland, 12.2% of the nation’s inhabitants. Most of them use individual solid fuel stoves to heat buildings (Rutkowski et al., 2018). Rural areas experience fuel poverty more than cities, but in the city centres, air pollution is urgent and recognized. City centres accumulate pollution not only through the high density of old housing stock with coal stoves, but also through intensive congestion (Dzikud, Adamczyk, Piwowar, 2017). However, during the post-socialist transformation period, little attention has been devoted to the harmful consequences of smog in policy circles. Coal-oriented government policy ignored the relationship between air pollution and increased death rate (Rabczenko et al., 2005), estimated life expectancy (Cembrzyoska et al., 2012) and the infant mortality rate (Genowska et al., 2015). Nonetheless, an awakening ecological awareness combined with the common nuisance of air pollution, as well as social media expansion, led to the emergence of smog alerts – bottom-up grassroots movements focused on the fight for clean air.

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The main aim of this paper is to evaluate the role of smog alerts in resolving air pollution and fuel poverty in Poland. It describes the scale and participation rates in these bottom-up movements, their main activities and relationship to air quality and fuel poverty mitigation. The paper is structured as follows. The “Background: Linking air pollution with public-led energy injustices” section describes the relationship between air pollution and fuel poverty, pointing out in what ways fuel poverty is a specific form of injustice (Bouzarovski and Simcock, 2017) and may be caused not only by income inequalities but also public sector ignorance. This is followed by the “Methodology: Investigating scale and impact of smog alert” section which provides details about web content mining methods, media discourse and interview analysis. The “Results: Increasing environmental awareness: bottom-up answer from smog alerts” section depicts smog alerts, their activities and relationship to fuel poverty. The “Discussion: Politicizing air quality: fuel poverty as an argument for defending energy sector interests” section examines the politicization of the air pollution problem through the inclusion of fuel poverty in the agenda of the government representatives. The “Conclusions” section summarizes the role of smog alerts within the current discussion about air quality and fuel poverty in Poland.

2. Background: Linking air pollution with public-led energy injustices The energy system exhibits inequities. Many examples of energy injustice are known from Central and Eastern Europe (Bouzarovski 2009; Urge-Vorsatz, Tirado-Herrero, 2012; Bouzarovski 2016b; Turcu, 2017), but this topic has been British-centric, similarly as fuel poverty (Thomson et. al., 2017). The consequences of climate change drive heavy interest in human-environment relationships and affect other regions more than Poland (Kundzewicz and Matczak, 2012). Rapid development of energy research in the social sciences (Sovacool, 2014) is beginning to expand knowledge into other areas, but to date relatively little has been written about socio-spatial injustices resulting from energy policymaking.

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Injustice can stem from a total lack of access to the energy system. For instance, one-sixth of Polish cities were deprived of electricity prior to the Second World War (Musiał, 2013). Even at the beginning of the 21st century, there were households without connection to the grid (Markiewicz, 2014). Nowadays, electricity access is common, but a large percentage of households in rural areas have no access to a gas network. This lack forces households to use heavy residential propane tanks, expensive renewable energy sources or fossil fuels such as coal or wood (Dzikud, Adamczyk, 2015; Adamczyk et. al, 2017). The existing spatial planning system escalated this problem. Private ownership of resources became heavily dominant in reaction to the socialist era (Kolipioski, 2015), but this led to a tragedy of the insufficient commons, visible in exclusive and chaotic common space (Wagner 2016). Spatial planning deregulation increased the costs of transport , energy, sewage and water systems, lighting and broadband networks (Słysz et al., 2013; Lityoski, Hołuj, 2017). These costs limited reserves for public investments. Energy injustice can also stem from lack of access to the district heating, the only energy network fully liberalized during the post-socialist transition period (Regulski et al., 2014). Since local authorities respect non-economic criteria such as living comfort or ecological impact, private investors firstly anticipate commercial rates of return of their actions (Bush, Bale, Taylor, 2016). In cities lacking district heating control, there is no local authority to decide about investments. Another problem is fuel used in combined heat and power plants. Even though district heating terminates in low emissions, it contributes to the global emission of carbon dioxide. Nevertheless, combined heat and power plants in Poland are fuelled by national coal (Szulecki et. al, 2017; Kuchler, Bridge, 2018) and biomass imported from western Africa [Olszewski, 2014]. In contrast to the Czech Republic (Bouzarovski et al., 2016a) and Hungary (Tirado-Herrero and Urge-Vorsatz, 2012), district heating in Poland was smoothly adapted to the new system following the transition from socialism. It remained an attractive energy source because of national retrofit programmes for housing cooperatives and an established regulatory office controlling prices at a socially acceptable level. Even though Poland

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experienced problems arising from privatisation, energy degradation – turning back to fossil fuels, as occurred in Hungary (Bouzarovski et al., 2016b) – remains marginal. The most unfair energy-related practices in Poland are connected to social housing. After the Second World War, Polish state nationalised the housing stock remaining after the Holocaust and departures of Germans (Coudroy de Lille, 2013; Springer, 2016). Because of the emergence of the post-war baby boomer generation and the housing pressures of the 1950s and 1960s, the socialist regime focused on building large-scale estates from scratch rather than renovating older infrastructure (Schmidt, 1992; Grabkowska et. al., 2015). The prominent role in the production of housing was assigned to the cooperatives, mobilised to construct new buildings (Coudroy de Lille, 2013). After the political changes of 1989, the cooperatives saved a significant share of the housing sector (Czischke, van Bortel, 2018). The management of social housing, which provides dwellings for below average incomes, was devoluted to local governments as a result of administration reform (Donner, 2006; Lux, 2010; Tsenkova, 2014). These dwellings were characterised by the worst access to gas, central heating and sewerage system (Thiel, Zaniewska, 2007). Retrofits and investments were often neglected because of high renovation costs (Grabkowska, 2016). But increasing rental gap boosted the need for urban regeneration (Jakóbczyk-Gryszkiewicz et al., 2014). Neoliberal urban policy fostered gentrification, and low-carbon investment could play a significant role in this process: in Gdaosk, an unclear investment process and fear of higher rents caused by the retrofitting improvements stimulated residential displacements and social exchange (Bouzarovski et. al., 2018). Consequently, in Warsaw, local authorities chose not to connect to the network or retrofit buildings that might be able to be reclaimed by representatives of the pre-war owners. As a result, electricity costs in these dwellings are enormous during the heating season (Jankowska, 2018).

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Photo 1. Protests against fuel poverty and neoliberal urban policy in Praga District, Warsaw

Photo 2. Old municipal building with 28 apartments heated by coal stoves in Rembertów, Warsaw

Source: own photos of the author (February 2019)

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Beyond these energy system inequalities, the state’s technocratic approach rarely recognizes the social responsibility of energy investments. Lack of access to the grid, increasing transmission fees and lack of individual retrofitting programmes make inhabitants in transition period more vulnerable (Buchan, 2010). For these reasons, people continue to use solid fuels and postpone decisions about thermo-modernisations or buying more efficient devices (Owczarek, 2018). The state does nothing to discourage less efficient technologies or the use of solid fuels because powerful state-led energy and mining sectors benefit from them (Stala-Szlugaj, 2011). Defending this status quo thus caused a socio-ecological crisis, exacerbated by people's increasing quality of life expectations. A new bourgeoisie (Kubicki, 2011), an urban middle-class, forced to inhale pollution became more and more frustrated. That frustration triggered smog alerts. Citizen engagement in environmental issues in Poland remains relatively weak. The green movement is extensive but fragmented, divided and politically marginal (Millard, 1998). However, social mobilisation has been seen during influential investments such as a nuclear power station in Żarnowiec, a hydroelectric power plant in Czorsztyn, an express road in Augustów under the Rospuda Valley (Szulecki and Szulecka, 2017) and selected legal acts pushed forward by the powerful hunting or forestry lobbies. Because they are subjects of nationwide media interest and politicization, such conflicts engage people from the whole country. On the local level, grassroots organisations have focused on potentially bothersome investments, particularly wind turbines (20% of all local conflicts between 2006–2014), local roads, biogas plants and poultry farms (Bednarek-Szczepaoska, 2016). Thus, mostly opposing organisations dominated among energy community initiatives in Poland, whereas in other countries their activity was driven by a variety of economic, environmental and social factors (Walker, 2011; Martiskainen, 2016). Because of higher prosperity and citizen expectations, the environment has become an important issue in urban movements. Such movements are highly decentralized networks focused more on urban policy than ideology (Kubicki, 2016). The majority of the smog alerts constitute

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bottom-up urban initiatives and utilise social media as a mobilisation and knowledge-sharing platform. This kind of engagement remains typical for such organisations in Poland (Grabkowska et al., 2013). The main advantages of such approaches compared to more traditional NGOs are high accessibility, few formal rules and more authenticity of citizenship (Makowski, 2015), because of their bottom-up, non-profit and independent character.

3. Methodology: Investigating scale and impact of smog alerts In order to investigate the role of smog alerts in resolving air pollution and fuel poverty in Poland, web content mining methods were applied, complemented by media discourse analysis and individual in-depth interviews with policymakers. Firstly, smog alert organisations were identified through the Polish Smog Alert website, a nationwide umbrella organisation. To include organisations from beyond the Polish Smog Alert in the sample, keywords ’smog+alert‘ and ’clean+air‘ were typed in Polish via Facebook search engine. This procedure identified 96 urban smog alerts and 11 subregional or regional initiatives as of May 2018. For the analysis, competing organisations that occupied the same town as other groups but contained a small number of supporters and had inactive portals with no posts for at least two years were excluded. In that way, 89 local initiatives were selected. Since Facebook remains the basic social mobilization platform of smog alerts, the web content scrapping tool, Netvizz 1.45 application, was used. This application is mostly used for creating social network analysis on the basis of Facebook data (Rieder, 2013). Netvizz also archives a Facebook page activity in the selected time interval (Bellstrom, Magnusson, Petterson and Thoren, 2016). Secondly, 89 content packages from smog alert Facebook profiles were generated. In the case of 6 smog alerts with particularly extensive content, the number of posts was limited to the maximum possible value of 999, as permitted by the application. These data covered the period between February 2014 and May 2018.

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Thirdly, individual data packages were combined into one dataset covering 18575 posts. Then, data were analysed quantitatively (number, frequency and time) and qualitatively through thematic analysis. Every post was individually analysed and marked if it included fuel poverty alleviation actions. Then, declarations of such actions were investigated more deeply using search engines. Fourthly, a time axis for every smog alert was developed. These four steps allowed to assess activities undertaken by smog alerts, their institutional capacity and attitude toward energyvulnerable households. Apart from content analysis, to explore the influence on fuel poverty awareness, media discourse analysis and interviews with policy makers were conducted. Media discourse analysis based on the combination of following keywords: “mayor surname” + “smog alert” and/or “fuel poverty”. It was decided to exclude the leading newspapers in Poland because of the local nature of smog alert. The majority of relevant articles and other materials (interviews, comments, debate transcripts) were published in the local press. The analysis was complemented with 6 individual indepth interviews with regional and local officers: the representatives of environmental regional agencies and city offices responsible for energy policies (Table 1). Interview questions covered regional and local energy policies, the scale of fuel poverty and bottom-up, energy-driven local initiatives. These complementary methods helped to assess to what extent smog alerts increased the awareness of air pollution and fuel poverty among decision-makers. Table 1. Interviews with regional and local policymakers LP

Position

Date

Institution

#1

Regional Energy Advisor

18.07.2017

Regional Environmental Fund

#2

Head of Energy Unit

18.09.2017

City Office, medium city

#3

Municipal Economy Officer

20.09.2017

Commune Office, suburban area

#4

Environmental Policy Officer

20.09.2017

City Office, small city

#5

Director of Environmental Department

21.09.2017

City Office, large city

#6

Mayor Plenipotentiary for Energy Policy

27.09.2017

City Office, small city

Source: own elaboration

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4. Results: Increasing environmental awareness: bottom-up answer from smog alerts 4.1 Identification of the smog alerts The first smog alert was established in Cracow as a response to an inefficient urban policy concerning air pollution (Mazurek, 2017). After a short period of strikes, pickets and demands issued to city leaders, the 2013 Cracow Smog Alert registered itself as an organization and implemented educational campaigns and air quality monitoring. During the next year, similar initiatives sprang up in Warsaw and Katowice. In 2015, 13 alerts were established; in 2016 there were 28 alerts; and in 2017, there were 30. During the first half of 2018, inhabitants organized a further 15 alerts. Interestingly, the newest smog alerts represent smaller cities. The umbrella organisation Polish Smog Alert grew out of the oldest alert organisation, which united various urban smog alerts and a dozen regional initiatives.

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Figure 1. Locations of urban smog alerts in Poland and their popularity on Facebook

Source: Location and popularity of smog alerts is own elaboration of the author based on the Netvizz application; the number of smog days per year comes from Adamkiewicz and Mucha, 2017.

Following such exclusions, the highest number of bottom-up air quality movements were found in Silesia (18), Małopolska (11), Mazovia (12) and Wielkopolska (11). The smallest number of smog alerts occurred in Northern and Eastern Poland, where air quality is better (Figure 1). The content analysis results suggested that smog alerts tended to emerge in areas with easy access to the worst quality fuels (Silesia, Małopolska) and within a certain distance of urban centres.

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Additionally, some cities affected by smog, such as Zakopane, Sosnowiec, Nowy Sącz or Sucha Beskidzka, are united within regional and suburban alerts, but these were excluded from the analysis in order to maintain comparability of the results. The oldest smog alerts from large cities exhibited the highest number of supporters – in Cracow (50.5 thousand), Warsaw (44.5 thousand), Poznan (8.7 thousand), Gliwice (6 thousand) and Łódź (4.7 thousand). Cracow also became the city with the highest percentage of people engaged in smog alerts (6.6%), followed by small and wealthy cities with easy access to green areas (Izabelin), health resort status (Rabka-Zdrój) or strong local initiative (Chełmek, Table 2). Higher social mobility also affected conditions in suburban cities such as Skawina, Piastów and in middle-sized cities, located in the valleys (Nowy Targ, Oświęcim). All in all, the most popular initiatives were organised in cities with poor air quality. Table 2. Smog alerts with the largest share of supporters (compared to the size of the city) Rank

Name of organisation

Year

Town/region

Supporters

% of citizens

1

Krakowski Alarm Smogowy

2013

Cracow (Małopolska)

50531

6.6%

2

Chełmecki Alarm Smogowy

2018

Chełmek (Małopolska)

208

5.3%

3

Izabelioski Alarm Smogowy

2017

Izabelin (Mazovia)

447

4.2%

4

Rabczaoski Alarm Smogowy

2015

Rabka-Zdrój (Małopolska)

716

4.2%

5

Skawioski Alarm Smogowy

2016

Skawina (Małopolska)

1622

3.7%

6

Czyste Powietrze dla Piastowa

2016

Piastów (Mazovia)

825

3.6%

7

Oświęcimski Alarm Smogowy

2018

Oświęcim (Małopolska)

1286

3.3%

8

Gliwicki Alarm Smogowy

2016

Gliwice (Upper Silesia)

5983

3.3%

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Nowotarski Alarm Smogowy

2017

Nowy Targ (Małopolska)

1030

3.1%

10

Noworudzki Alarm Smogowy

2016

Nowa Ruda (Lower Silesia)

637

2.8%

Source: Information drawn from the Netvizz application (10-05-2018) All Polish cities ranking within the top ten European cities for pollution had established smog alerts. For smaller cities also ranked poorly, pollution evidently spurred the establishment of bottomup contestation movements. This was the case for smaller towns such as Opoczno, Jarosław and Pleszew, where smog alerts have been in existence since 2018.

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4.2 Activities of the smog alerts Content analysis revealed that smog alerts generated different stages of organisational capacity. First, they reported about the air quality level and required a response from the mayor or president of the city on the Facebook profile. In the second phase, their activities occurred at the local level. These activities included interviews with the local press, distribution of leaflets, organisation of events and initial contacts with city office representatives, and exerting pressure on low-carbon investments (e.g., stove replacement, extension of energy networks, traffic reduction, municipal guard inspections, thermomodernisation). The third phase included meetings with the mayors and active participation in self-government events during municipal councils or thematic commissions as well as raising funds for projects. The last phase of smog alert activity included advocacy and lobbying at the national level, participation in international conferences, interviews for nationwide media, and preparing research reports. Along with the range of impact, the scope of the subject raised by smog alerts increased. At the national level, it is not only issues related to air protection that are discussed, but also other areas of environmental policy, such as the centralization of regional environmental funds (Table 3). Table 3. Smog alerts: four phases of development Phase

Typical activities

Scope

1. Reporting

Information about air quality, legal acts concerning the environment, stove

Internet

exchange efforts, health diagnostics, publishing “hall of shame” photos of buildings emitting smoke, gathering signatures through the internet 2. Local actions

Gathering signatures, initial contact with local city officers/councillors/parishes,

Urban

educational actions, organising events and strikes, delivering letters/yellow cards

district

to the mailboxes of neighbours emitting smog, participation in local events, providing interviews for local newspapers, planting trees 3. Urban policy

Meetings with decision-makers (mayors), participation in thematic policy groups,

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City-

engagement

convincing households/companies to exchange stoves, participation in national-

wide

level conferences 4. State policy

Delivering opinions for legal acts and policy solutions, interviews for nationwide

Nation-

engagement

media, informing members of Parliament, participation in international projects

wide

and conferences, cooperation with big companies, preparing analytical reports

Source: Adapted from the results of web content mining through the Netvizz application Smog alerts share information from mobile applications, hyperlinks and photos. The most frequently linked portals are other Facebook pages, smoglab.pl, YouTube, wyborcza.pl, portalsamorzadowy.pl and local governance portals. They are also highly enthusiastic to foster social innovations such as participatory budget, citizens’ panel, hackathons as well as technological inventions, such as drones controlling the air quality and smog-cars with built-in mobile laboratories. The smog alerts became most active in January 2017 when the Minister of Health commented that "smog remains a bit of a theoretical problem" [Howard, 2017], and at the same time, the air quality decreased far below average due to the low temperature. One year later, increased activity around smog became visible again, but there was half the reaction (Figure 2). However, the number of commenters on the topic increased; discussions began to outweigh the transfer of information itself. More than half (47) of urban smog alerts limit their activity to the internet. Twenty initiatives maintain a neighbourhood and citywide impact. Only Cracow Smog Alert can be considered a nationwide organization. Many organizations migrate through activity levels, while some – especially in small towns – smoothly pass from the first to the third phase. Only four smog alerts have established legal associations; others still operate informally as neighbourhood initiatives. The dynamics of smog alert development also depends on the number of people involved. At the first stage, there is usually just one person maintaining the Facebook profile, which is a serious obstacle to increased organisational capacity. Figure 2. Interest in smog alert internet activities between February 2015 and May 2018

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Source: Adapted from the results of web content mining through the Netvizz application

4.3 Influence of smog alerts towards fuel poverty Until 2017, fuel poverty was a poorly recognized topic in Poland. The content analysis indicated that smog alerts, due to their advocacy for ecological technologies and roots in the urban middle class, could not empathise with less affluent people for whom solid fuels remain the only affordable energy choice. However, the attitude of active smog alerts to less affluent people seems to be promising. The national umbrella organization, Polish Smog Alert, led by activists from the Cracow Smog Alert organised advocacy about air pollution and fuel poverty issues. The representatives combined smog alert with a research institute. Research capacity enabled them to conduct joint studies about housing conditions of the poorest people (Cracow Smog Alert and PwC, 2018). The Polish Smog Alert precisely diagnosed the condition, age of heating sources and the lack of warm water access as a characteristic symptoms of fuel poverty. Their experts also co-authored the World Bank Report – a roadmap to the national programme for individual housing thermomodernisation with the special preference for the fuel-poor (Wang et. al., 2018). Fundraising skills and logistic capacity of Cracow Smog Alert were also confirmed by participation in the LIFE+ programme consortium as well as conducting projects from other international sources such as Erasmus+ and Norway Funds.

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The municipal authorities clearly acknowledged the contribution of smog alerts in highlighting low air quality problems [Zaniewicz, 2018]. In Cracow, the mayor even proposed the leader of the Cracow Smog Alert to be the city office plenipotentiary for air quality; however, he refused, wishing to maintain the independence of the organization [Maj, 2017]. If smog alert activists engaged themselves in politics (i.e. taking part in elections), they were excluded from the Polish Smog Alert due to the requirement of political independence of the network [Polish Smog Alert, 2018], which was deemed to be essential for effective, long-term actions. Activities of smog alerts pushed the coal stove replacement and household energy transition shield programmes to the local policy mainstream. Numerous local and original initiatives have also emerged [interviews 1, 2 and 5]. In the suburban satellite cities around Warsaw, smog alerts enforced urban ‘ecopatrol’ which shows how to burn solid fuel emitting less smoke and saving more money. The Smog Alert from Czestochowa criticized the urban energy policy for limited ecological and saving effects of investments, recommending change from supporting solar collectors and partial thermomodernization into more complex insulation works [Kwiatkowska, 2018]. In the smallest municipalities, smog alerts quickly reached local policymakers, accelerating implementation of low-emission protection programmes [Gierałtowicki Alarm Smogowy, 2018]. Especially village chiefs [interview 3] or councillors [interviews 4, 6] are important channel to pursue local clean air activities. In one case, the first local plan to combat energy poverty was included in the appendix of such a programme [Haczek, 2018]. The most spectacular example of the local smog alert operation was Skawina city near Cracow. Under the influence of the Skawina Smog Alert, the air protection department was established in the office structure and a national laboratory for combating fuel poverty was set up. This alert also recognized the need to include the most vulnerable groups in their actions. For example, they forced air purifiers in nurseries and kindergartens, and informed people through other channels than Internet [Kurlit, 2017]. The actions of chosen local smog alerts also had a more household-oriented, direct character [interview 1, 2 ]. For example, the local smog alert in cooperation with municipal office declared the

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installation of special smoke burners [Bronk, 2018]. Smog alerts also spread knowledge about fuel and wood banks ideas for the most needy people, but the actions in this matter were rather coordinated by the social welfare municipal offices and charity foundations. Reporting alerts, however, concentrated mainly on distributing information about air pollution, ignoring the complex reasons behind it. A popular smog alert activity was sharing photographs of buildings that emitted smoke, together with their addresses. In other case, a picture of fence with "they burn garbage" graffiti was uploaded on Facebook. While the smog alert coordinator treated the last act as a kind of black humour, it was met with serious applause in comments and a number of shares. Therefore, misrecognition can evoke stigmatization of some groups, also fuel-poor people, in the name of better air quality. On the wave of discussions focused on air protection and the popularity of smog alerts, another interesting bottom-up movement appeared. The ‘Clean Heating’ portal, established in 2013, disseminates knowledge gleaned from discussions on technical portals devoted to construction and heating. The aim of the portal is to improve a technical culture of burning coal and wood in Poland. The portal treats the improvement of air quality as a fundamental result of actions just as smog alerts do, but is more focused on solving problems than spreading information. Faster than the majority of smog alerts, the portal drew attention to fuel poverty and how it harms somewhat less affluent people, demanding that they throw away the old furnace and install a more ecological one. The portal promotes the combustion of good-quality coal by applying the "from-the-top" method. In this method, the ember slowly heats the fuel under ignition, volatile tars are released gradually, and the ember layer achieves a high temperature that is highly efficient and burns so much fuel that the remaining exhaust is transparent. This method reduces smoke emission and the amount of burned coal. For several years people associated with the portal have advocated the “from-the-top” technique in Polish cities. The technique’s promoter opposed some smog alerts, accusing them of working toward their own business goals and unfair competition [Treter, 2017]. On the other hand, he cooperated with selected smog alerts during presentations, solid fuel stove advisory for less

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affluent households [interview 1, 2] or crowdfunding efforts aiming to conduct emission studies of various combustion methods. The portal gathered the support of 4.7 thousand people, equal to the number of the first five smog alerts in Poland. The nationwide expansion of urban bottom-up movements and emerging discussions about smog finally gained the notice of the people in power. Journalists and think-tanks strengthened the discussion with analytical studies and mobile application developers brought to bear data on air pollution from both government and private measurement stations. Also, thanks to their efforts, for the first time in the history of post-socialist Poland, the state government recognized fuel poverty as a political issue.

5. Discussion: Politicizing air quality: fuel poverty as an argument for defending energy sector interests Air pollution is a political issue because there is a tradeoff between expensive ecological fuel and harmful but cheaper fuel. Every Polish government’s primary objective is to enhance energy security and low, stable prices (Ancygier, 2013). The government rarely raised the subject of smog and air protection due to the political strength of the informal interest group operating among the managerial staff of energy companies and in the decision-making units of ministries responsible for economic issues as well as among MPs, trade unions and private business (Ruszkowski, 2015). The introduction of fuel poverty into the public debate has changed this status quo. For the first time in Polish history, the Prime Minister mentioned fuel poverty in his new government opening speech [Morawiecki, 2017]. The need to address air quality and fuel poverty at the same time was recognized. The government sought the golden mean between environmentally-friendly smog alerts and the interests of coal-oriented public companies and trade unions. This decision was accompanied by significant changes in the government's structure. A position of undersecretary for smog was appointed and given responsibility for a Clean Air Programme. Interestingly, he obtained a position in the Ministry of Entrepreneurship and Technology, and not in the Ministry of Environment

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or Health, which were associated with politicians marginalizing the problem. Placing the person responsible for clean air outside the Ministry of Energy ensured autonomy from people associated with the energy sector interests [Wantuch, 2018a]. A short time after the nomination, the new undersecretary announced the ‘Stop Smog’ Programme, as well as the decision to withdraw the worst fuels and furnaces from circulation, and declared an amendment to the law on thermomodernization and its dedicated operational programme for the period of 2021–2027 [Polish Press Agency, 2018]. These activities are positive, especially since he has included fuel poverty reduction in his political agenda – hence the strong emphasis on thermo-modernization of individual and municipal buildings in an effort to achieve the "golden mean", balancing interests of the coal industry and ecological organisations (Urge-Vorsatz, Tirado 2012). Some of the undersecretary’s activities significantly undermined the industrial energy lobby interests, but were simultaneously balanced by the declarations of support for coal-based power plant in the electoral district of the Minister of Energy [Tomaszewski, 2018]. The Chamber of Commerce of Polish Coal Sellers proposed a withdrawal from the anti-smog policy, pointing to the threat of changes in the fuel poverty level, but since fuel poverty had already been taken up as an issue by the Ministry, their postulates found no political acceptance [Wantuch, 2018b]. The discussion on fuel poverty in the context of smog was also noticed at the regional level. Some regions, after the adoption of their development programmes, transferred funds toward subsidies for insulation of individual households [Banek, 2018]. With the arrival of spring, the discussion on smog and fuel poverty became less audible and proceeded to the intra-departmental level, where solutions were brainstormed. Interestingly, the Cracow Smog Alert, jointly with the Ministry of Entrepreneurship and Technology and three scientific institutes, implemented an integrated system of support for low emission policies, with the contribution of the National Centre for Research and Development (called ZONE project). The leaders of smog alerts have been partially incorporated into public policy creation during a constructive dialogue with open-minded authorities,

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even though they remained also rigorous critics of the insufficient progress of governmental household energy transition policies.

6. Conclusions Smog alerts have played a large role in increasing air pollution awareness in Poland. Applying social media and mobile applications, a massive bottom-up ecological movement covered the whole country and incorporated air quality into the public debate. What factors contributed to the success of this civic movement? Based on this policy review and web data mining, three factors are identified: (1) business and political independence, (2) evidence-based communication and (3) the consistency of the activities performed. Independence from business, political circles and a narrow range of interests has allowed smog alerts to maintain their political credibility. Most of the smog alerts represent a moderate programme, opposed primarily to the burning of poor quality fuels. Interestingly, smog alerts remain independent of typical urban movements: they are better networked within themselves and avoid labelling as typical, left-wing ecology-oriented organizations. The method used by smog alerts to oppose arguments by conservatives was evidence-based communication, which is particularly encouraging in the times of "fake news" and simplification of public policies. Smog alerts possess a technological proficiency: quoting publicly available measurements through open-source mobile applications proved more reliable than trying to tag smog as a fictional problem [Borejza, 2017]. Smog alerts consequently cited reports and examples from abroad as well as scientific publications and public opinion polls, which turned out to be an effective strategy. Resistant government representatives were removed from their positions, while the smog alerts gained credibility within almost every political leaning. The Prime Minister also appreciated their contribution in the expose. The government appointed a special plenipotentiary responsible for air quality. He has utilised the experience and innovative ideas of smog alerts to design public policy at the national level. It goes

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hand in hand with social innovations like citizenship panels, participatory budgets, hackathons and technological innovations: such as smog-cars and drones to measure pollution. Along with the discussion about air quality, research on fuel poverty has been developed and neatly included in the political agenda by the government. The government proposed fair, Solomonic solutions, partially implementing the postulates of smog alerts without antagonizing the powerful energy sector. Whether these solutions actually translate to clean air still depends on the regulation details and determination to keep up the activities of smog alerts. At the same time, most of the smog alerts – which are in principle environmentally oriented – recognised the importance of fuel poverty. Active smog alerts that are not only on the internet better understand the problems of less affluent people. Reporting alerts may sometimes stigmatize households using solid fuels, without knowledge of the sources of their problems. The opposing bottom-up movement which does not demand the elimination of solid fuels but rather restricts their harmful consequences, seems to be more fair and effective. There is also a lack of specialised charity organisations focused on fuel poverty alleviation. These practices should go hand-in-hand with lowcarbon investment support for individual households and expanded energy networks, especially gas. However, the active smog alerts mobilize more people, more effectively animate the discussion, get access to decision-makers and consider consequences for less affluent people. Their determination allows positive thinking about the development of ecological awareness, the fight against fuel poverty and the low-carbon policy pursued in Poland.

Conflicts of interest

I wish to confirm that there are no known conflicts of interest associated with this publication and there has been no significant financial support for this work that could have influenced its outcome.

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