TECHNOLOGICAL
FORECASTING
AND SOCIAL
CHANGE
15, 24 l-244
( 1979)
Book Reviews Ferkiss, Victor C., Futurology-Promise, Performance, Prospects, The Washington Papers, Vol. 50, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills and London, 1977, 65 pp., $3.00. Victor Ferkiss is listed by the World Future Society [ 11 as a person prominent in futures-oriented activity. This book, however, is written for outsiders, not for futurists, and is written from the standpoint of an outsider to the field. It attempts to give an overview of the field for the outsider. There are seven chapters in the book, short as it is. These are as follows: I-Futurology as Movement and Ideology; II-Futurist Methodologies and the Social Sciences; III-Futurology in Government and Politics; IV-Futurology to Date: A Look at the Record; V-Current Debates on the Global Future: Optimists vs. Pessimists; VI-Predicting the Political and Economic Future: Speculations and Evaluations; and VII-Conclusions. Each of these are discussed briefly here. The first chapter presents a discussion of the history of the futurist movement. Ferkiss attributes the current surge of interest in futurology to the cultural attitude that natural and social events are determined by “impersonal natural forces acting according to observable scientific laws and are thus subject to measurement and prediction.” This cultural attitude differs from the attitudes of other cultures. He observes that Judaism, for instance, felt it was contrary to the will of God to attempt to know the future. Other cultures accepted magic as the way the future was formed, rather than the action of natural laws. He also attributes part of the interest in futurology to the Utopian tradition in Western literature. He discusses some highlights of the Utopian tradition that led to scientific Utopianism. He asserts that futurology shares with scientific Utopianism an “all-important methodological premise,” that science and technology are the primary factors in social change. Futurology also shares with scientific Utopianism the idea of “Future with a capital F.” All cultures believed in a future, in the sense that life would go on, people would be born, live, and die, and so on. Both futurology and scientific Utopianism hold that life will not just go on; it will be transformed. History will come to an end, in an unchanging situation of “a happy life for the individual and vast powers over nature for the species.” He traces yet one more influence on modem futurology, namely, science fiction. He attributes to science fiction the popularization among the general public of the idea of technology-driven social change. He also traces a thread leading from military technological forecasting to forecasting the social impacts of technology. This thread, according to Ferkiss, includes individuals such as this reviewer, Olaf Helmer, and Erich Jantsch. He then sketches more recent developments such as the Commission on the Year 2000, the growth of the World Future Society, and a number of non-U.S. futures-oriented organizations. I would disagree with his history in only one respect. I believe there is more to the present futures movement in the way of exploring alternative futures for choice than Ferkiss gives credit for. That is, the futures movement is not oriented solely toward a Future with a capital F. In his second chapter, Ferkiss discusses the issue of predictability (i.e., cultural discontinuity, the problem of unique individuals in key places, etc.). He concludes that some elements are predictable. He then briefly sketches forecasting methods. This is a @ Elsevier
North Holland, Inc., 1979
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short but good treatment for the outsider. He asserts that “No concise, easily accessible introduction to futurist methodology exists.” He seems to be unaware of books such as those by Bright, Ayres, and this reviewer, which have seen wide circulation. The third chapter examines futurology in government. He notes that Republican administrations have been more futures-oriented than have Democratic administrations, with major national goals projects taking place under both Eisenhower and Nixon, but nothing comparable in other administrations. He claims there exist large numbers of working-level people in government whose activity involves planning and forecasting, who think of themselves as futurists, and who constitute an invisible network providing support and encouragement to futurist activity. He also mentions the Environmental Protection Agency and the Office of Technology Assessment as directly futures-oriented organizations and mentions Coates of the OTA as having been drawn from the futurist ranks. My only disagreement would be that most of the working-level futurists in government commiserate with one another about their inability to “sell” futures-oriented activity to their higher management, rather than providing an invisible network of supporters for futurology. The fourth chapter takes a look at the record of futurology and concludes that it is poor. Ferkiss cites Arthur C. Clarke’s compendium of prediction errors and also cites errors in the forecasts of scientists such as Steinmetz, Furnas, and Harrison Brown as being too conservative. On the other hand, he cites a CBS special on biological advances, G. R. Taylor on the same subject, and The Wall Street Journal as overstating the extent of technological change. He also reviews the forecasting errors of economists, educators, demographers, and social commentators. One might argue that’ his is a superficial survey; that The Wall Street Journal is not really typical of the futurist enterprise whose post-World War II history he sketched in Chapter I. Nevertheless, more scholarly reviews of professionally done forecasts by mainstream futurists have come to the same conclusions as Ferkiss [2]. In Chapter V Ferkiss discusses the debate between the optimists (e.g., Herman Kahn [3]) and the pessimists (e.g., Club of Rome). He describes the “cornucopian” and the “catastrophic” views as Kuhnian paradigms, into which virtually all existing data can be fitted, and that, therefore, cannot be demolished by citing facts and figures. Hence, he argues, the debate between the two sides is inconclusive. He speculates that we may not have one single future, but may be heading for a “mosaic culture” [3, p. 851. Chapter VI is devoted to economic and political predictions. The author sketches the mixed, even contradictory, variety of forecasts on economics and politics with which the public is currently bombarded. In his view this is not a desirable state of affairs, nor does it speak well for futurology. In Chapter VII the author draws his conclusions. He recognizes the necessity of futurology. “We cannot avoid attempting to assess and in some sense predict the future, whatever label we choose to attach to such an operation.” He regards the status of futurology, as either a movement or a discipline, as problematical. However, his views can be summed up in the final sentence of the book. “As long as men and women seek to remain free they will seek to control their destinies; to control their destinies they will have to try to anticipate them; and to anticipate them they will have to become in some sense futurists.” As a summary of the futures field for outsiders, written from the viewpoint of an outsider, the book comes off well. Its factual errors (about individuals named, etc.) are
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few and unimportant. There are no startling conclusions. Indeed, there conclusions at all. Overall it is a balanced, if sketchy, overview. It is the sort of could hand to someone who wants to know what the futures field is all about. provide a good introduction, as well as some indication of where to go next information.
are few book one It would for more
JOSEPH P. MARTIN0
References I. World Future Society, The Future: A Guide to lnformution Sources, 1971. 2. Ascher, William, Formuting: An Appraisal for Policy-Makers and Planners, Johns Hopkins Baltimore, 1978. 3. II., Kahn, and Bruce-Briggs, B., Things to Come, Macmillan, New York, 1972. Received I8 October 1978
Univ. Press,