Nuclear Terrorism Redux: Conventionalists, Skeptics, and the Margin of Safety

Nuclear Terrorism Redux: Conventionalists, Skeptics, and the Margin of Safety by Todd Masse Todd Masse is a senior national security analyst with The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. He is the author of the forthcoming Nuclear Jihad: A Clear and Present Danger? This book will be published in August 2010 by Potomac Books, Inc. The views expressed in this article are his own.

Abstract: The casual media observer might well believe that nuclear terrorism is highly likely in the United States and it is a question of ‘‘when, not if.’’ This is the view of the ‘‘conventionalists.’’ But there is a second school, the ‘‘skeptics,’’ that believes the nuclear world is more secure than at any time in history and that the possibility of a nuclear terrorist event is overstated. This article articulates arguments made by these two schools of thought and develops a framework for analyzing the issue. It concludes that while enhanced national and international vigilance against nuclear terrorism is necessary, when viewed through an historical lens, today’s margin of nuclear safety may actually be higher than in the past.

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umerous commissions, government officials, terrorism experts, and effective al Qaeda propaganda have convinced the public that a nuclear attack by terrorists is, if not imminent, inevitable. This conclusion is generally driven by arguments about technical determinism; the inherent limitations of existing, deployed nuclear detection technologies; periodic arrests of nuclear smugglers trafficking in alleged fissile material; the stated determination of al Qaeda to kill millions of Americans, and concerns about cascading nuclear proliferation should Iran develop nuclear weapons.1 Other arguments supporting this school of thought include the demonstrated operational sophistication of some terrorist groups; ‘‘rogue’’ regimes like North Korea that are assessed as likely to sell either fissile material or an intact nuclear weapon to the highest bidder; and the fact that a substantial amount of fissile material, particularly high enriched uranium (HEU), remains in nuclear research reactors in over forty countries and is protected to varying standards. 1

See Iran: Where We Are Today, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee Print, May 4, 2009. See also Chain Reaction: Avoiding a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East, Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, S.Prt. February 2008, pp. 110-134. # 2010 Published by Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute.

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Nuclear Terrorism Redux Many of these arguments are compelling, particularly when their cumulative weight is considered. However, there is another side to the nuclear terrorism debate which believes that such an event is neither imminent nor inevitable. Adherents to this school of thought argue that from a nuclear threat perspective, the world is more secure today than at any other point in atomic history.2 They argue that while projections dating to the 1960s and 1970s had the number of nuclear states in the 20s, today there are only nine de facto nuclear nations.3 Furthermore, numerous states have foregone the nuclear option or abandoned nuclear weapons programs,4 and substantial progress has been made in securing fissile materials in the former Soviet Union through the NunnLugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program since 1991.5 Additionally, formal arms control agreements have significantly decreased the number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed,6 the non-proliferation regime continues to function despite numerous challenges, and the nuclear supply chain for a terrorist is relatively lengthy with many opportunities for a defense-in-depth system of systems to disrupt terrorist acquisition efforts. No matter where one stands on this issue, it is useful to develop a framework for analyzing the problem. Clearly ‘‘conventionalists’’ and ‘‘skeptics’’ agree on the necessity for enhanced national and international vigilance against nuclear terrorism. However, when viewed through an historical lens, today’s margin of nuclear safety may actually be higher than it has been for decades. Iranian and North Korean actions are certainly cause for grave concern 2

Michael Krepon, ‘‘The Mushroom Cloud That Wasn’t,’’ Foreign Affairs, May/June 2009. For a skeptical perspective on Iran providing Hezbollah, Hamas, or any other terrorist group with nuclear weapons should it ever acquire them, see Frank Procida ‘‘Overblown: Why an Iranian Nuclear Bomb Is Not the End of the World,’’ Foreign Affairs, June 9, 2009. 3 The United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, and France are declared weapons states (or ‘‘nuclear-weapon State Parties to the Treaty’’ in the parlance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT]) and India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea are undeclared nuclear weapons states. India, Pakistan and Israel have never signed the NPT, while North Korea once was a nonnuclear weapon State Party to the NPT, but subsequently withdrew in 2003. India and Pakistan and possibly Israel and North Korea continue to produce fissionable material for nuclear weapons. 4 Countries that have abandoned nuclear weapons prior to the NPT entering into force (1970) include: Egypt, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and West Germany. Since the NPT’s entry into force, Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Brazil, Canada, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Libya, Romania, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia all abandoned nuclear weapons programs or nuclear weapons (or both). See Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons, (Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 43. 5 For an up-to-date assessment of Cooperative Threat Reduction Progress, see the NunnLugar ‘‘Scorecard’’ available at http://lugar.senate.gov/nunnlugar/scorecard.html. 6 Amy Woolf, ‘‘Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty,’’ CRS Report for Congress, January 12, 2010. For an assessment of the relationship between nuclear terrorism and U.S. nuclear weapons policy (as outlined in the nuclear posture review), see Micah Zenko and Michael Levi, ‘‘Three steps to reducing nuclear terrorism; America’s nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear terrorism are interconnected. How the U.S. handles its arsenal must change,’’ Christian Science Monitor, January 25, 2010.

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MASSE and have put the nuclear non-proliferation regime under great stress. The security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and fissile material is also of concern given that the country has ‘‘. . .more terrorists per square mile than anyplace else on earth, and it has a nuclear weapons program that is growing faster than anyplace on earth.’’7 Yet while nuclear proliferation and the general state of the international nuclear order8 can facilitate non-state nuclear terrorism by increasing the target set for terrorist groups, it is not axiomatic that such an increase translates into a greater willingness by national leaders to transfer weapons and/or fissile materials to terrorist groups.9 While there may be some very limited circumstances under which a nation state would transfer a nuclear weapon or fissile materials to a terrorist group, there are several reasons why a nation state would not undertake such transfers. Both schools of thought agree that a nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist group represents a grave threat to U.S. and international security. However, these two schools differ regarding preferred policy remedies. Conventionalists believe, largely, that because the acquisition of fissile material is the paramount hurdle to a terrorist building a nuclear weapon, securing fissile material and halting nuclear proliferation are primary means of preventing nuclear terrorism. While skeptics would agree with the need to protect fissile materials at their source and not increase the number of nuclear weapons states, they also argue that there are no perfect physical security regimes. Due to imperfect security regimes, tandem and concomitant efforts must be dedicated to ensuring that a terrorist group’s intent to detonate a nuclear weapon in the United States is never married to the capability to achieve the same. The lack of a meaningful correlation between mass casualty attacks and the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) may cause skeptics to find demand-side nuclear terrorism risk reduction measures (counterterrorism efforts to decrease all terrorist attacks, not just those involving WMD) as important as nuclear security initiatives. From a policymaker’s perspective, the case of nuclear terrorism is the classic case of a high-consequence, low-probability problem. It is imprudent not to take any action against such a potential threat, but an argument can be made that resources really should be focused on more likely non-nuclear events. The focus on nuclear terrorism and other worst-case scenarios: (1) distracts U.S. 7

Reported statement of Bruce Riedel, former CIA Officer and current Brookings Institution scholar, in Thom Shanker and David E. Sanger, ‘‘Pakistan Is Rapidly Adding Nuclear Arms, U.S. Says,’’ New York Times, May 18, 2009. 8 For a conventional assessment of broad current and future challenges related to nuclear weapons, see Graham Allison, ‘‘Nuclear Disorder,’’ Foreign Affairs, January/February 2010. For a more skeptical assessment of the nuclear threat, see Michael Krepon, ‘‘The Mushroom Cloud That Wasn’t: Why Inflating Threats Won’t Reduce Them,’’ Foreign Affairs, May/June 2009. 9 For an assessment of the ‘‘rationality’’ of national leaders with respect to transferring nuclear weapons or fissile material to non-state actors, including terrorist groups, see STRATFOR, ‘‘Debunking Myths about Nuclear Weapons and Terrorism,’’ May 29, 2009.

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Nuclear Terrorism Redux attention from more likely Mumbai-style or transportation-related terrorist attacks that demonstrate the terrorist propensity for operational conservatism—that is—the use of tried and reliable conventional weapons that can inflict mass casualties;10 (2) engenders an environment in which the populace lives in fear instead of with fear; and (3) does not accurately reflect the unsuccessful history of terrorist attempts to use unconventional weapons. As nuclear expert Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center argues ‘‘. . .when worst case scenarios do not materialize, those who issued dire warnings can take credit. And if attacks do occur, the alarmists can always say, ‘I told you so.’’’11 Conventionalists and Skeptics: The Arguments While the two schools of nuclear terrorism agree that a nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist group is a grave national security threat, their assessment of the nuclear terrorism threat is very different. Table 1 outlines these differences. The conventionalists tend to view the nuclear terrorism threat as more likely than not over the next five-to-ten years. Although they concede that nonnuclear tools, such as sound national and international law enforcement and intelligence are useful in combating nuclear terrorism, their primary focus and policy prescriptions are on nuclear security. Some conventionalists might even argue that a physical nuclear security regime can be fail-safe. Conventionalists also believe that if a sophisticated terrorist group acquires fissile material, it will be relatively easy for the group to develop an improvised nuclear device (IND). Skeptics, on the other hand, while recognizing the grave consequences of any nuclear detonation, tend to discount the nuclear terrorism threat. They argue that there is a long supply chain of events between a terrorist group’s potential acquisition of a nuclear weapon (unlikely) or fissile material (more likely, but not necessarily a guarantor of detonation success in the United States), and there are many opportunities for a multilayered system of defense to disrupt a terrorist plot.12 Skeptics view the history of the use of the broader category of WMD by terrorists as unsuccessful and believe that terrorist groups wanting to garner public attention and inflict fear will revert to tried and true conventional attacks. Moreover, they may argue that relying on a perfect or near perfect physical security regime for fissile materials is unrealistic and imprudent.13 10

For thoughts on operational conservatism, see Craig Whitlock, ‘‘Homemade, Cheap, and Dangerous: Terror Cells Favor Simple Ingredients in Building Bombs,’’ Washington Post, July 5, 2007. 11 Michael Krepon, ‘‘The Mushroom Cloud That Wasn’t,’’ Foreign Affairs, May/June 2009. 12 Professor John Mueller, Ohio State University, ‘‘The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood,’’ presentation at the program on International Security Policy, University of Chicago, January 15, 2008. 13 Michael Levi, ‘‘Stopping Nuclear Terrorism: The Dangerous Allure of a Perfect Defense,’’ in Foreign Affairs, January./February 2008.

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MASSE Table 1. Competing Nuclear Terrorism Threat Assumptions and Arguments Issue

Conventionalists

Skeptics

Are terrorist groups rational?

Assume all groups have potential for nuclear terrorism and may be irrational/unpredictable.

Assume all terrorists have malevolent intent but all may not be interested in nuclear terrorism. All groups are not necessarily irrational or unpredictable; some act strategically.

Which terrorist groups credibly threaten United States with nuclear terrorism?

Not simply al Qaeda, numerous and perhaps unknown, groups might attack U.S. with nuclear weapon. Core al Qaeda remains a threat.

Largely concerned with al Qaeda as the only group that has specifically threatened the U.S. homeland. Core al Qaeda operations capability degraded, but not defeated.

If a terrorist group acquires a nuclear weapon or builds an IND, will they detonate it?

Yes. If not in the United States than in other Western cities that represent ‘‘softer’’ targets.

Not necessarily. Terrorist may act in a parastatal manner, e.g., to deter attacks against safe haven(s).

Are terrorist groups operationally conservative?

No. Should not allow historic precedents to discount ‘‘break out’’ and increasingly violent techniques, like nuclear terrorism.

Yes. Tend to stick with what works – operationally and technically.

Can terrorist groups be deterred from nuclear terrorism?

Unlikely. ‘‘Expanded’’ deterrence for enabling states might work.

Possible if increase the terrorists’ perceived risk of failure— operationally, politically, and theologically.

Would a state provide a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group?

Yes. Mercantilist states have sold nuclear technology and advanced conventional. weapons, why not a nuclear weapon?

Unlikely. States realize attribution capabilities may lead to massive retaliation even without irrefutable evidence. Little plausible deniability.

Could terrorist groups acquire an intact nuclear weapon on the black market?

Possibly. Russian ‘‘suitcase’’ nukes or special atomic demolitions question not fully resolved.

Unlikely. Even if acquired, unlikely to have ability to override potential detonation codes or successfully deconstruct.

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Nuclear Terrorism Redux Table 1 (Continued ) Issue

Conventionalists

Skeptics

Could terrorist groups acquire enough fissile material on the black market to build an IND?

Yes. There is no way of reliably knowing how much material may have been lost, especially in the earlyto-mid 1990s. In one unofficial instance, 18.5 kg of HEU were nearly stolen from Russia.

Possible, but unlikely given imperfect state of market, increasing security for fissile material, government stings, international collaboration. Only 5.96 kg of HEU in illicit trafficking according to official IAEA data.

Do terrorist groups have the capability to construct an IND (gun-type) device?

Likely. Once fissile material is acquired, it is quite possible a terrorist group could recruit necessary skill sets to construct an IND. No need to test. Machine tools – low tech. and available.

Possible. While challenge is not insurmountable, it is exceedingly difficult to do, even once fissile material is acquired. ‘‘Explicit’’ knowledge does not constitute ‘‘tacit,’’ experience-based knowledge.

Can terrorist groups transport and detonate an IND in the United States?

Possible given porous borders, ineffective detection technology, and technical assistance on detonation.

Possible, yet many steps involved, absolute loyalty required, numerous single points of failure in terrorist operation.

What is the probability of terrorist nuclear detonation within U.S. in the next decade?

Conceivable. Mediumto-high range probability.

Vanishingly small probability.

What is the status of al Qaeda nuclear knowledge?

Dynamic – assume recruitment for techs., chemists, metallurgists, and engineers continues.

Elemental based on ‘‘safe house’’ documents seized. CT, nuclear security efforts constraining recruitment.

Iranian nuclear weapons

Will result in cascading nuclear proliferation, regional civilian nuclear programs progressing, increased nuclear terrorism risks, and regional destabilization resulting from an emboldened Iran.

May not necessarily lead to cascading nuclear proliferation. Extended deterrence and positive U.S. security guarantees might preclude proliferation. If not, stable regional deterrence dyads may develop as in India/Pakistan.

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MASSE Defining Nuclear Terrorism Nuclear terrorism can be considered a subset of WMD terrorism. Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons have different effects and consequences. While all WMDs might have similar psychological impacts on a victimized polity—the imposition of fear and anxiety—the physical blast, thermal, and radiation effects of nuclear weapons and attendant consequences, including the casualties which would result from a detonated device, put nuclear weapons in a category by themselves. When nuclear terrorism is discussed it is often assumed that there is one common definition—the detonation of a nuclear weapon, whether that results from the terrorist theft of an intact nuclear weapon, or from the building of an IND using illicitly acquired fissile material. The focus here is on a terrorist detonation of a stolen nuclear weapon or IND because either event is likely to result in the most catastrophic of the numerous nuclear terrorism threat scenarios. However, it is not the sole nuclear terrorism threat, nor is it the most probable. As Charles Ferguson and William Potter point out in The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, there are two additional nuclear terrorism threat scenarios under which a terrorist group:  acquires a radiological isotope, such as cesium-137, strontium-90, wraps it in conventional explosives and detonates it in a populated area (radiological dispersion device or ‘‘dirty bomb’’); and  infiltrates a civilian nuclear power plant and sabotages its operation resulting in the release of radiation (an intentional Chernobyl). Given the relative ease of acquisition of radiological isotopes, the probability of a terrorist group detonating a radiological dispersion device is generally assessed as far higher than the probability of the detonation of a true fission device.14 Terrorist Nuclear Weapons Versus State Nuclear Weapons Because people often equate nation-states failure to acquire nuclear weapons with the certain failure of non-state actors to acquire or build nuclear weapons, it is important to differentiate between a state’s nuclear weapons program and an IND that a terrorist group might build. The first difference 14

Only one known instance exists in which a terrorist group has constructed and deployed, yet not detonated, a radiological dispersion device. In 1996, Chechen separatists threatened to turn Moscow into a desert by using radioactive waste. The group reportedly tipped off Moscow law enforcement to a radioactive package containing cesium-137 it had placed in Moscow’s popular Izmailovsky Park. The device was located by police prior to detonation. See Walter Lacqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, Oxford, 1999, p. 73.

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Nuclear Terrorism Redux between national and potential sub-national nuclear weapons programs is that states attempting to develop nuclear weapons will likely want to develop a fullscale nuclear fuel cycle. In other words, states will seek the capability to enrich natural uranium and reprocess spent nuclear fuel for nuclear weapons use. States do not want one, two or a handful of nuclear weapons—indeed such small numbers would be destabilizing insofar as it may invite pre-emptive ‘‘decapitation’’ attacks by regional adversaries. One of Pakistan’s primary nuclear weapons concerns, for example, is ensuring that its relatively small nuclear force (estimated to be between 60 and 100 warheads)15 cannot be eliminated by an Indian first strike. According to former IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei a ‘‘nuclear weapons capable state’’16 is one that can enrich uranium indigenously. While such an infrastructure-intensive effort is incredibly costly and time consuming (with some states, such as Libya, failing despite substantial investments) successful programs may meet the multi-dimensional motivations17 that cause states to seek nuclear weapons in the first place. One of the central conundrums of nuclear non-proliferation is that if a nation possesses the ability to enrich natural uranium (which has .7 percent 235 U) to low-enriched uranium used for nuclear power plants (usually having an isotopic makeup of 3-5 percent 235U), the same process can be used to 15

Natural Resources Defense Council, ‘‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2007,’’ in Bulletin of Atomic Scientists: Nuclear Notebook, Vol, 63, No. 3, p. 71. 16 Speech of former IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei at the Beijing International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Energy in the 21st Century, April 20, 2009, Beijing, China. According to the IAEA, Iran has manufactured at least 2,065 kilograms of LEU (in the form of uranium hexafluoride [UF6]), which may be sufficient to enrich enough HEU for one bomb. See IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008,) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, February 18, 2010, p. 2. This does not necessarily mean however, that Iran has the technological capability and has made the political decision to build and deploy a nuclear weapon. However, the IAEA has recently concluded that information it possesses ‘‘raises concerns about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.’’ For an official U.S. assessment of Iran’s nuclear programs, see U.S. National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, November 2007. See also Joseph Cirincione, ‘‘Five Myths About Iran’s Nuclear Program,’’ Washington Post, October 18, 2009, and for an assessment of Iran’s alleged weaponization activities, including nuclear ‘‘triggers,’’ see Institute for Science and International Security, New Document Reopens Question of Whether Iran’s Nuclear Weaponization Work Continues Past 2003, December 14, 2009. 17 Scott D. Sagan, ‘‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,’’ International Security, 1996/97, 21(3), pp. 54-86. Sagan posits three models—a ‘‘security model’’ under which states acquire nuclear weapons to increase national security from foreign threats, a ‘‘domestic politics model’’ which envisions nuclear weapons as political tools used to advance parochial domestic and bureaucratic interests, and a ‘‘norms model’’ under which nuclear weapons decisions are made because weapons acquisition or restraint provides an important normative symbol of a state’s modernity and identity. Non-state actors may seek to acquire nuclear weapons so they can approximate the power of a nation state and, depending on the non-state actor, realize what may be apocalyptic goals.

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MASSE produce weapons-grade uranium (about 85 percent 235U). While possessing the requisite amount18 of fissile material does not, by itself, mean a country or non-state actor can construct and deliver a nuclear weapon, acquiring fissile material is the greatest barrier to nuclear weapons construction. Under Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), all parties to the Treaty have an ‘‘inalienable right. . .to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. . .’’ in conformity with other articles of the Treaty. The idea of a nuclear fuel bank controlled by the International Atomic Energy Agency has been offered numerous times in the atomic era. Iranian mastery of uranium enrichment (via centrifuges) for allegedly peaceful purposes has, however, given the fuel bank concept renewed interest. While Iran may likely not relinquish its current enrichment capability even if such a bank were established, the availability of nuclear fuel on attractive terms would substantially undermine Iran’s (or any other nations) argument for producing nuclear fuel indigenously.19 The second difference between national and potential sub-national nuclear weapons programs is that states need to develop a nuclear doctrine to govern the command and control over nuclear weapons, which can be especially important in countries where the military may be prominently involved in national politics. Who has operational control over the weapons and decides under which circumstances to use them? One central question about how nuclear-armed states formulate nuclear security doctrine is addressing what is known as the ‘‘always/never’’ dilemma.20 Emerging nuclear powers ‘‘always’’ want their nuclear weapons to be survivable and capable of a retaliatory strike to deter an adversary’s first strike, but ‘‘never’’ want their weapons to be used in an unauthorized manner. This has implications for how weapons are stored and under which circumstances the weapons might be deployed. The ‘‘always’’ side of the dilemma calls for nuclear weapons to be mobile, stored in a decentralized manner, on hair-trigger alert, and with control over these weapons possibly devolved to field commanders to ensure 18 Requisite amounts of fissile material depend on many factors, not the least of which are the design chosen, the type of fissile material used, skill levels of participating technicians, and the enrichment level of the fissile material. For a ‘‘gun-type’’ design without a reflector, it is estimated that terrorists would need approximately 50 kilograms (94 percent 235U, 6 percent 238 U metal with a density of 18.7 gm/cc). Higher density fissile material or weapons designs incorporating a reflector would require less material – perhaps as little as 25 kilograms weapons-grade HEU. See J. Carson Mark, Theodore Taylor, Eugene Eyster, William Maraman, and Jacob Wechsler, ‘‘Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons,’’ in Paul Leventhal et al. Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, Nuclear Control Institute, 1987. 19 IAEA, In Focus: Revisiting the Nuclear Fuel Cycle – Multilateral Approaches to Nuclear Fuel-Cycles in Historical Context. Available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/FuelCycle/key_events.shtml accessed August 27, 2008. See also Bryan Bender, ‘‘Obama seeks global uranium fuel bank: Plan could counter Iran’s weapon quest,’’ Boston Globe, June 8, 2009. 20 Peter D. Feaver, ‘‘Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations,’’ International Security, Winter 1992/1993, pp. 160-187.

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Nuclear Terrorism Redux the weapons could be used should national leaders become decapitated in a first strike. The ‘‘never’’ side of the dilemma calls for weapons components and delivery mechanisms to be stored separately, yet in a centralized manner; not to be on hair-trigger alert; and to have only a few select leaders with the authority to authorize the weapons’ use. Pakistan’s primary adversary is India, a country larger in geography, conventional military forces, and unconventional weapons. Pakistan and India have fought three full-scale wars (1947, 1965, and 1971) and continue to engage one another through proxies over the disputed territory of Kashmir. On at least three occasions, Pakistan has placed its nuclear weapons on alert status, and in two of these instances Pakistan removed its nuclear weapons from storage facilities.21 The problem becomes one of relative threat perceptions. If Pakistani leaders view India as their prime threat, they will err on the side of ‘‘always,’’ while U.S. leaders might view unauthorized use or terrorist acquisition of a nuclear weapon or fissile material as the greatest threat and thus urge Pakistani leaders to err on the side of ‘‘never.’’ The third difference between national and potential sub-national nuclear weapons programs is that states want to ensure the security and survivability of nuclear weapons in which they have invested much treasure. In the discourse over ‘‘loose nukes,’’ the fact that nation-states understand the imperative to protect their nuclear weapons to prevent these weapons from being turned against them (the so-called ‘‘boomerang effect’’) without foreign pressure to do so is often discounted. A fourth difference between national and potential sub-national nuclear weapons programs is that states will want to have some level of certainty that their weapons are reliable and will achieve a certain yield. This final requirement implies some level of nuclear testing or, at a minimum, sophisticated computer modeling. Yet, the terrorist model is different. Most terrorist groups attempting to acquire or build nuclear weapons are unlikely to:  possess the interest, resources, appropriate skill sets, logistical capability, time, and (if terrorists continue to be kept under a state of constant pressure globally) sustained safe haven to develop a fullscale nuclear fuel cycle.  develop any formal ‘‘doctrine’’ to govern the use of their nuclear weapon(s)—a single charismatic leader may likely exercise dictatorial control over the weapon should a terrorist group acquire or build one.

21 Steven R. David, Catastrophic Consequences: Civil Wars and American Interests, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008, pp. 50-81. See also Scott D. Sagan, ‘‘Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Weapons: For Better or Worse?,’’ in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2003), pp. 88-124.

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MASSE  be concerned with security and survivability per se, as much as they are with hiding the weapon(s) from military, intelligence, and law enforcement services which may be searching for the weapon,22 if they are aware such a weapon exists.  care about the yield of the weapon; even if it ‘‘fizzles,’’ and achieves a sub-one kiloton yield, a detonation in a U.S. or other Western city will still cause massive fear and panic—a primary terrorist objective. This is particularly so given that the state of U.S. readiness to respond to a nuclear attack has been assessed as not highly advanced.23 Can Terrorists Build a Nuclear Weapon? It is neither impossible nor simple for a terrorist group to construct a nuclear weapon if it possessed the requisite amount of fissile material. Numerous studies have assessed the possibility that a terrorist group could build an IND. One such study, conducted by the former Office of Technology Assessment, concluded: Given the weapons material and a fraction of a million dollars, a small group of people, none of whom have ever had access to the classified literature, could possibly design and build a crude nuclear explosive device. The group would have to include, at a minimum, a person capable of searching and understanding the technical literature in several fields, and a jack-of-all-trades technician. They would probably not be able to develop an accurate prediction of the yield of their device, and it could be a total failure because of either faulty design or faulty construction. If a member of the group is careless or incompetent, he might suffer serious or fatal injury. However, there is a clear possibility that a clever and competent group could design and construct a device which would produce a significant nuclear yield.24

Others, however, have concluded the opposite. Stephen Younger, former director of the nuclear research and development at the Los Alamos 22

For an assessment of U.S. efforts to find, retrieve, and render safe a lost nuclear weapon or fissile material, see Jeffrey T. Richelson, Defusing Armageddon: Inside NEST, America’s Secret Nuclear Bomb Squad (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2009). 23 In a June 26, 2008 hearing entitled ‘‘Nuclear Terrorism: Providing Medical Care and Meeting Basic Needs in the Aftermath – the Federal Response,’’ before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, three senior federal officials were asked to rate their agency’s readiness for a nuclear attack. On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being best, the ratings were as follows: (A) Federal Emergency Management Agency 7, (B) Health and Human Services 5 6, and (C) Department of Defense 5. ‘‘Feds, Local, Differ About How Prepared U.S. Is to Respond to a Nuclear Attack,’’ CQ Homeland Security, June 26, 2008. 24 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards, June 1977, p. 17.

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Nuclear Terrorism Redux National Laboratory and former director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, found that: It would be wrong to assume that nuclear weapons are now easy to make, that once the secret was out anyone could read the instruction book and make one with materials found around the house. I am constantly amazed when self-declared ‘‘nuclear weapons experts,’’ many of whom have never seen a real nuclear weapon, hold forth on how easy it is to make a functioning nuclear explosive. In fact, and thank goodness, there are some significant challenges. . .while it is true that one can obtain the general idea behind a rudimentary nuclear explosive from article on the Internet, none of these sources has enough detail to enable the confident assembly of a real nuclear explosive. . .There are tricks of the trade that even the most complete set of instructions won’t contain. . .you need a working knowledge of how parts fit together, what tolerances are permitted or required, the compatibility of material.25

Assessments of terrorist capability are largely based on analysis of classified and open source information and intelligence, informed speculation, and assumptions which may or may not be valid. Under certain sets of circumstances and making certain assumptions, anything is possible and can be accepted on faith. Stochastic assessments of a successful terrorist nuclear detonation range from near zero to near one over varying time frames.26 It seems that the answer to the build question is a function of at least three fundamental issues. Table 2 summarizes some conditions which, if met, increase the probability that a terrorist group may develop the capability to build an IND. Some questions that must be answered include how much do the United States, and other nations participating in the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, and multilateral institutions like the IAEA know about the

25 Stephen M. Younger, Endangered Species: How We Can Avoid Mass Destruction and Build a Lasting Peace (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007), pp. 86-95. 26 Numerous experts have offered their assessment of the probability of a nuclear terrorism attack within the United States in the next decade. Some of these include former Secretary of Defense William Perry and Harvard University professor Graham Allison—better than 50 percent; Senator Richard Lugar’s (June 2005) Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses—20 percent (median response—nuclear explosion anywhere in the world); and Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy, Harvard University—29 percent (see ‘‘A Mathematical Model of the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism,’’ in Confronting the Specter of Nuclear Terrorism—The Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, September 2006). Warren Buffet, Chairman of investment firm Berkshire Hathaway and a consummate assessor of risk, has stated the reported probability of WMD attacks ‘‘. . .can’t be meaningful. . .I would not regard any specific number as being meaningful. I would regard the importance of reducing the probability as terribly meaningful.’’ See Carl Bialik, ‘‘Pondering the Chances of a Nuclear Attack,’’ Wall Street Journal, July 7, 2005.

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MASSE Table 2. Conditions Affecting Whether Terrorists Can Build Nuclear Weapons. Condition

Implication

Fissile Material. Have terrorists been able to acquire sufficient fissile material to build a weapon? And

Acquiring weapons-grade fissile material can facilitate, yet not guarantee terrorist success. If materials of varying enrichment, density, and form are acquired, the process of weaponization becomes more difficult, although not necessarily insurmountable if appropriate metallurgists and chemists are part of the team.

Experienced-Based Knowledge. Have terrorists been able to recruit the required scientific, engineering, and technical personnel—including those with ‘‘tacit’’ knowledge of nuclear weapons construction? And

Arguably, a critical path to success in a nuclear terrorism plot. In the absence of experience-based knowledge, there would likely be more trial and error efforts which increase discovery risk.

Safe Havens.27 Do terrorists have a safe haven from which to operate, and/or tacit or explicit state sponsorship?

Safe havens allow terrorists to operate in an unimpeded fashion, thus facilitating the aggregation of personnel, equipment, and knowledge to plan a sophisticated attack. Even tacit state support can substantially advance, without guaranteeing success, of a terrorist nuclear plot.

global universe of individuals who possess nuclear weapons construction skill sets?28 What are their identities, travel patterns, levels of job security, and potential associations with Jihadists? How vulnerable are these individuals to terrorist recruitment? What mechanisms and intelligence relationships and 27 The existence of safe havens may not be essential to all types of terrorist attacks. See Paul Pillar, ‘‘Who’s Afraid of a Terrorist Haven?’’ Washington Post, September 16, 2009. However, while cyber interactions might facilitate the acquisition or building of a nuclear weapon, these interactions alone are not sufficient for a successful nuclear terrorism attack. 28 Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, former Director of the Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, has advocated that the IAEA establish an intelligence capability to overcome a general lack of urgency amongst nation-states to share information on nuclear smuggling. See Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: A Global Intelligence Imperative, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch, April 30, 2009. See also The Armageddon Test, Belfer Center for Science and International Security, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, August 2009. If not already in place, elite and interdisciplinary U.S. intelligence teams with direct access to the Special Assistant to the President and White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, and Terrorism, should be established to collect, analyze and share intelligence relating to the prevention of nuclear terrorism. Information sharing, particularly with Russia and Pakistan, with respect to illicit transfers of fissile material, must be creatively reinvigorated to enhance early detection and interdiction. Part of the intelligence sharing challenge is overcoming national intelligence cultures designed to protect, not share, information. See Rens Lee, ‘‘Toward an Intelligence-based Nuclear Cooperation Regime,’’ Foreign Policy Research Institute, E-Notes, July 2009.

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Nuclear Terrorism Redux practices are in place to trigger timely notification of the United States or a friendly foreign intelligence service that such an individual is—or may be— facilitating any terrorist group’s attempts to acquire fissile material and construct a nuclear weapon? Do the terrorists have a safe haven from which to operate long-term and possess either tacit or explicit state assistance? Safe havens do not necessarily need to be in nuclear or nearly nuclear-armed nations; such nations, or semi-autonomous ungoverned areas within nations, can provide a safe base of operations for a terrorist group’s clandestine procurement networks, terrorist training, and covert test and weapons construction facilities. For example, although Afghanistan is a member of the NPT, it did not have a civilian nuclear power generation program, and, according to nonproliferation exert David Albright, despite open source reporting on al Qaeda’s possible nuclear acquisition efforts based out of the country, ‘‘the IAEA showed little inclination to investigate these reports. The IAEA was also unmotivated to inspect Afghanistan because Kabul has no declared nuclear activities, and the IAEA traditionally has minimized its activities in such nations.’’29 After reviewing documents located in al Qaeda’s safe houses in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom, Albright concluded, ‘‘. . .if al Qaeda’s had remained in Afghanistan, it would have likely acquired nuclear weapons eventually.’’30 While such a conclusion may be debatable, it is clear safe havens can assist terrorist groups attempting to construct an IND. If these three conditions were met, it seems likely that a terrorist could engage in a narrow construction of a nuclear weapon. However, depending on where such a weapon would be constructed, successful detonation in the United States does not automatically flow from an IND construction effort.31 Nation State Intentional Transfers of Nuclear Weapons Unlikely An intentional state transfer of an intact nuclear weapon cannot be ruled out .32 Some foreign leaders whose nations possess nuclear weapons 29 David Albright, Kathryn Beuhler, and Holly Higgins, ‘‘Bin Laden and the Bomb,’’ Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January/February 2002, p. 24. Arguments have long been made to enhance the IAEA’s authority and make its nuclear security investigative missions more pro-active with respect to undeclared nuclear activities. Sovereignty, among other factors, acts as a governor on such efforts. 30 David Albright, ‘‘Al-Qa’ida’s Nuclear Program: Through the Window of Seized Documents,’’ in Policy Forum Online, Special Forum 47, November 6, 2002, the Nautilus Institute. 31 Although most nuclear terrorism scenarios envision the construction of an IND outside of the United States, one scenario has a terrorist cell smuggling fissile material into the United States and constructing the IND on a secluded farm. See Peter D. Zimmerman and Jeffrey G. Lewis, ‘‘The Bomb in the Backyard,’’ in Foreign Policy, November/December 2006. 32 While such an illicit transfer may be perceived by Western policymakers as being irrational, given their unique national goals, adversarial nations may find it risky, yet nevertheless worth the risk. ‘‘Mirror-imaging,’’ or projecting Western-style thought processes onto an adversary, can yield strategic surprises. Understanding an adversary’s culture, means of processing information, and decision-making style is essential to projecting how it might act under various scenarios.

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MASSE Table 3. Reasons Why Intentional Transfers of Nuclear Weapons Are Unlikely Reason

Rationale

Nuclear weapons are national ‘‘crown jewels.’’ Substantial human and financial capital invested.

Beyond national survival, and perhaps money that might be perceived as prolonging that survival, foreign national leaders may perceive that there are few compelling national interests that justify a transfer of a nuclear weapon to an uncontrollable terrorist group.

Nuclear attribution and forensics.

Nuclear forensics, when combined with intelligence and law enforcement, will eventually provide (perhaps imperfect) indications of which nation was responsible for the transfer. Retaliation may rest upon very low evidentiary standards.

Relationships between state sponsors of terrorism and terrorist groups.

Relationships tend to be unstable over time. Trust and plausible deniability between a state contemplating a nuclear weapon transfer and its terrorist proxy are inversely related33 and, therefore, militate against such a transfer.

Only ‘‘irrational’’ leaders will transfer nuclear weapons.

Deterrence is based more on fear and emotion than on subjective determinations of national leadership rationality.

De-legitimization/ De-existence

Any nation-state suspected to have intentionally transferred a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group at a minimum becomes a pariah, and quite possibly jeopardizes the survival of its regime.

may calculate that if their very existence is in question, transferring a weapons to a terrorist group which may be successful in striking the United States may have some psychic benefit. However, it seems unlikely that a state would willingly take this risk for several reasons outlined above in Table 3. Conclusion While a nuclear terrorism threat to the United States exists, there is no inexorable march to Armageddon. The primary nuclear terrorism threat is from ‘‘leakage’’ or unintentional and/or unauthorized transfers of fissile material, not from an intentional national transfer of a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group. Optimal nuclear terrorism risk reduction measures include, inter alia, securing vulnerable fissile materials,34 strengthening the IAEA’s inspection and nuclear security functions, enhancing international intelligence cooperation and coordination, continued aggressive counterterrorism operations to undermine terrorist nuclear capabilties (including effective drone strikes and other non-kinetic measures), and enhancing the nuclear non-proliferation regime and arms control measures to decrease existing nuclear weapons and fissile 33

Daniel Byman, ‘‘Do Counterproliferation and Counterterrorism Go Together?’’ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 122, No. 1, (2007), p. 33. 34 For one future model for the Cooperative Threat Reduction, see National Academy of Sciences, Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction, Committee on Strengthening and Expanding the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Program, 2009.

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Nuclear Terrorism Redux material stockpiles. Banning any further production of fissile material for weapons purposes through a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty would also prove beneficial. Progress on some of these measures has already increased the margin of nuclear terrorism safety. However, sustained, high-level international attention regarding fissile material security must be enhanced to realize President Barack Obama’s stated goal to ‘‘. . .secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.’’35 While there may be other groups that have the intent and operational capability to buy, steal, or construct an IND, al Qaeda currently represents the greatest nuclear terrorism threat. Al Qaeda may intend to attack the United States with unconventional (although not necessarily nuclear) weapons, as demonstrated by the messages disseminated through its sophisticated communications network. However, its current capability to construct, deliver, and detonate a nuclear device in the United States is unknown, at least according to open sources. The nuclear terrorism threat, then, may be clear insofar as nefarious intent is concerned, but not necessarily present, insofar as a terrorist group’s nuclear capabilities are concerned. The likelihood that a number of members of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb were reportedly killed in an attempt to weaponize a chemical or biological agent36 is a positive sign—if they cannot weaponize these agents, it casts further doubt on their ability to build a nuclear weapon. However, such reports, even if substantiated, should not provide a false sense of security. Al Qaeda continues to refine its international strategy37 and remains a serious national security threat to the United States, as demonstrated by its recent successful counterintelligence plot against U.S. and Jordanian intelligence personnel in Khost, Afghanistan, and broader continuing recruitment efforts. Yet, among other events, the Christmas Day 2009 attempt to destroy an aircraft destined for Detroit, Michigan, illustrates that affiliated al Qaeda groups, such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, seem to be heeding the advice offered in an al Qaeda training manual to: ‘‘Make use of that which is available at your disposal and. . .bend it to suit your needs, (improvise) rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.’’38 While such operational conservatism among groups affiliated 35

Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic. For information on meeting future nuclear security challenges, see Kenneth N. Luongo, ‘‘Securing Vulnerable Nuclear Material: Meeting the Global Challenge,’’ Policy Analysis Brief, The Stanley Foundation, November 2009. In order to reach this far-reaching goal, an international nuclear security summit will take place in Washington, DC in mid-April 2010. 36 Eli Lake, ‘‘Al Qaeda bungles arms experiment,’’ Washington Times, January 20, 2009. 37 Bruce Hoffman, ‘‘Overwhelm, Divide, Spread, Bankrupt, Diversify: Al-Qaeda’s New Grand Strategy,’’ Washington Post, January 10, 2010. 38 Whitlock, Washington Post, July 5, 2007. This directive was found in a 39-page memo recovered from an al Qaeda laptop in Pakistan in 2004. The author of the directive, Dhiren Barot, a British citizen, said he developed the philosophy by ‘‘observing senior planners at an alQa’ida training camp.’’

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MASSE with al Qaeda should not blind policymakers to potential WMD threats possibly directed by core al Qaeda, neither should they ignore indications that given continued global pressure on core al Qaeda, truly sophisticated terrorist plots, such as nuclear terrorism, may be far less likely in 2010 than in 2002. The central importance of core al Qaeda financial, logistical and operational resources for executing a successful nuclear terror attack should not be understated. For without such core al Qaeda resources, affiliated groups will be hard-pressed to acquire an intact nuclear weapon, or the fissile material to build, deliver, and detonate an IND in the United States. Terrorist groups affiliated with al Qaeda may have the inspiration to detonate an IND in the United States, but inspiration unmarried to capability, while worthy of monitoring and undermining, does not translate into a clear and present nuclear terrorism threat. As former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Michael V. Hayden stated, ‘‘We are fortunate that those with the clearest intent to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction are also the least capable of developing them.’’39 While one should be cautious about prematurely drafting core al Qaeda’s obituary, it has been weakened.40 National Counterterrorism Center Director Michael E. Leiter recently concluded, while al Qaeda’s senior leadership continues to plot, recruit, and train individuals within Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to attack the United States, because of a series of . . .successful endeavors, core al Qaeda and its ability to project threats to Western Europe and the United States is much lower than it was last year, and I think in many ways lower than it has been for quite some time. . .their ability to train and deploy recruits has certainly been seriously diminished over the past year.41

Pakistan remains, however, the primary outlier and cause for concern. The Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism rightly concluded: ‘‘Were one to map terrorism and weapons of mass destruction today, all roads would intersect in Pakistan.’’ While the United States has provided significant counterterrorism, economic and humanitarian, as well as nuclear security assistance to Pakistan, given the sensitivity surrounding nuclear weapons, and Pakistan’s suspicions about U.S. intentions vis-a`-vis its nuclear weapons, there are limits to how much the United States and the international community can help Pakistan build its nuclear security capacity. Without stronger governance, enhanced police, intelligence and military efforts dedicated against the domestic and regional insurgency and not India, and improved economic development prospects, Pakistan is likely to remain 39

Remarks of former CIA Director Michael V. Hayden before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, September 16, 2008. 40 Peter Beinart ‘‘What al-Qaeda Can’t Do,’’ Time, January 18, 2010. 41 Remarks by the Honorable Michael E. Leiter, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center at the Aspen Institute, Washington, D.C., April 9, 2009.

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Nuclear Terrorism Redux the primary nuclear terrorism threat in the near-to-mid-term.42 The fact that senior-level officials within the Obama administration, as well as in allied nations, have repeatedly expressed confidence in the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons should not, however, be disregarded.43 As many analysts have pointed out, there are ongoing weaknesses in implementing measures to prevent nuclear terrorism—the continued use of HEU in civilian commerce—particularly in research reactors, the need to improve nuclear forensics and nuclear attribution, the need to develop ‘‘appropriate effective’’44 international standards for nuclear security, and the continued need to enhance measures to effectively deter both nation states from selling nuclear weapons or fissile materials and terrorist groups from believing that the risks of failure of a nuclear terrorism plot are sufficiently low so as to make an effort worthwhile, to name a few. However, conventional wisdom should not discount the progress that has been made in increasing the ‘‘margin of safety’’ in the effort to deter, detect, and prevent nuclear terrorism, while concurrently advocating continued vigilance and expanded international nuclear security and counterterrorism efforts against nuclear terrorism.

42 For more information on U.S.-Pakistan relations, see K. Alan Kronstadt ‘‘Pakistan-U.S. Relations,’’ A CRS Report for Congress, February 6, 2009, and available at assets.opencrs.com/ rpts/RL33498_20090206.pdf. 43 Some might argue, however, that such repeated, public assurances should not be necessary and may even represent wishful thinking, given that there may be few good options for recovering any potentially loose nuclear weapons in Pakistan. 44 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 on weapons of mass destruction terrorism, issued April 28, 2004, and available at http://www.un.org/sc/1540/.

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