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Policy making in communist states
:REVIEW ARTICLE
ARCHIE BROWN
‘Polikymakidg ih Communist Staids
Robert ,;4:..Qahl N(ed.),‘.Regim& and Oppositibns (New Haven: Yale University Press;1973),411’pp. Werner G.. Hahn, The Politics of SNiet Agriculture, 19604970 (Baltimore: JohnsHopkins Press,1972),xix + 311pp. Carmelo Mesa-Lago,and Carl Beck, Comparhtive Socialist %ysteF.@ +ays on Politics and Ec6nqmifs (Pittsburgh: University, of FttsburghCenter for International,!+dles. ‘19753,xv + 450 pp. . Bgon. ,S+berger and William Quffy, .Comparative Ec,onqm[c Gystems: A @e&ori:Making Approach (Boston: Allyn ,& Bacon, .1976),vi + 378pp. .Karl-Eugen Wiidekin, .The’ “Private Sector in Sobiet Agriculiui& translated by Keith Bush (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,1973).xviii + 407pp. Elizabeth Ann Weinberg, The Development of Sociology in the Soviet Union (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974),xv + 173pp. Our knowledge of the policymaking process within Communist stateshas advancedvery fitfully over the past two decades.There is still no book available that sets out to study Communist states comparatively from a policy processstandpoint-very few books, indeed,that are comparativeCommunist studiesat all, in the sense that they apply a common framework of analysisto a variety of Communist statesor are unified by a common organizingprinciple. %iJDlSS
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(The only book among thoselisted abovethat consciouslyattempts to make a contribution to comparariveCommunism (or socialism) is Carmelo Mesa-Lag05 and Carl Beck’s Comparative Socialist Systems; and it ,is-in more sensesthan one-a very disparate ,: collection of essays.) So far as individual Communist statesare concerned,there has, on the whole, beena declinesince the 1960sand early 197Osinthe attention paid to “ interest groups” or quasi-groups;and only a few detailed studies have been published of particular areas of policy, the latter (including the works of Hahn, W&de&, ‘and Weinberg reviewed here) devoted,in the main, to areas of: policy ,I within the SovietUnion; The apparentdecline of Westernacademicinterest in .“ groups” within Communist stateswill not be universally regretted;Joseph LaPalombara,in a very stimulating contribution to a recent’isstie of this journal,’ rightly warns against a concentration on !‘ those aspectsof politics that are distant from the ’ black bojr ’ ;of government, from those institutions .and processesthat’ produce’public policies and are involved in their implementation.”a It .does‘not necessarilyfollow, however,as LaPalombaraseemsto imply,s that we should eschewa “ group” approachto Comniunist politics. One could not begin to understandthe processof political changewithin Czechoslovakiain the 1960swithout paying very careful ‘attention to the part played by groups of different kinds, many-though not all-of which cut acrossbureaucraticboundaries.b(I am referring to. a longish-term processand not only to that annus’ mirabilis, 1968.If what happenedin Czechoslovakiain the first eight .months of, 1968is unique in the Communist world, the.,patternof politics in the almost equallyimportant years,1963-1967,bearscomparison . : 1. Joseph LaPaiombara, “Monoliths .or Plural Systems: Through Con; ceptual Lenses Darkly,” Studies in Comparative Communism, VIII;‘. 3 (Autumn 1975), pp. 305-332. .. 2. Ibid., p. 328. .., _, 3. Ibid., pp. 311, 326-327. 4. From the impressive literature published thus far on Czechoslovak politics, the books that throw most light on group activity are: ‘H. Cordon Skilling, Cze~hoslovakia’s Znierrupted’ Revolu#on (Princeton: -P&c&on University Press, 1976); Vladimir V. Kusin? The Zntellectlial Origins of ih# Prague Spring (Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press, 1971); V@mir V: Kusin, Political Grouping in the Czechoslovuk Reform iUov&ze# @on&jn: Macmillan,1972); Vladimir V. Kusin (ed.), The Czechoslovak Reforni Move: inent I968 (London: International Research Documents,’ 1973); and Alex Pravda, Reform and Change in the Czechosloiak PO;lifitial ,Syitem:: Jan&& August.. 19681 (Beverly Hills: Sage Research, -Papers :$r the Se&alScience+ 1975).
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with the nature of political activity in several other East European states.) It is entirely right that the nonsense of political institutions being unfashionable objects of study should come to an end’ and that a place of central importance be allocated to analysis of the part played by formal institutions in the various stages of the policymaking process-from policy formation to policy implementation (or nonimplementation). But the attempt (difhcult though it may. be) to locate influential groups and to assess the part played by them in the policy process both complements and overlaps with an institution-oriented approach to the study of Communist politics. pluralist, and bureaucratic “ models ” of the Soviet political system,6 Daniel Tarschys, in a perceptive survey of the totalitarian, rightly notes that “while the totalitarian model exaggerates the structural differences between the Western and socialist social orders, the pluralist .model exaggerates their functional similarities,” this notwithstanding “ the partial insights in both perspectives ” which are “ of lasting value.” ’ Tarschys follows Alfred Meyer 8 and among others, in arguing the case for a William Taubman. greater concentration on the “bureaus.” Citing the now familiar aphorism of Harold Seidman lo (who attributes it to Rufus Miles 11) -“Where one stands depends on where one sits “--Tarschys suggests that the “ positionally ” conditioned splits, conflicts of interest, and interplay within the Soviet system are most deserving of attention. 5. I have argued this point at some length in my Soviet Politics and Politicul Science (London: Macmillan, 1974; New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1976). The best argument, however, for the point that analysis of political institutions can be combined with sensitivity to develonments in middle-range social science theory is the actual existence of several excellent detailid studies of this type which have appeared within the past ten years. The most outstanding example is Jerry F. Hough’s The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making (Cambridge, Mass;: Harvard University Press, 1969). 6. Daniel Tarschys, “The Soviet Political System: Three Models,” European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 1977), pp. 287320. 7. Ibid., p. 308. 8. Alfred G. Meyer, “USSR, Incorporated,” Slavic Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 (October 1961), pp. 369-376; and the same author’s The Soviet Political System: An Interpretation (New York: Random House. 1965). -9. Wiliiam Taubman, Governing Soviet Cities: Bureaucraiic Politics and Urban Development in the USSR (New York: Praeger, 1973). 10. Harold Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power: The Dynamics of FederaI Organization (London: Oxford University Press,.1970), p. 20. 11. A former Assistant Secretary for Administration in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare of the United States.
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While the “ tensions among different- ‘ bureaus ’ ” la are an important guide to understanding of the policymaking process within Communist states, it does not, however, represent a great improvement on totalitarian and pluralist interpretations if all Communist politics .are reduced to this. What needs to be said is that argument among ministries and departments over. the allocation of scarce resources is normal conflict within any political system, including Communist systems, but one should not adopt as an exclusive approach a framework of analysis-the “ bureaucratic model ” -which prematurely rules out other elements and influences within the policy process and other conflicts within society. Tarschys is perfectly correct in holding that “ the most conspicuous political competition ” in Soviet-type societies “ is a rivalry between organizations ” and that the result of this competition “ can be perceived in the decisions made by the rulers.” Is But this is all very well only so long as it is remembered that “inconspicuous” does not mean “ less important ” but, rather, “ harder to research.” The growing appeal of the “ bureaucratic politics ” approach to the study of the Soviet Union and other Communist states has not, as it happens, been accompanied by much attention on the part of political scientists to the concrete activities of ministries-surely the most important institutions within Communist systems to suffer from Western academic neglect. Economists, though they may use such terms as “pluralism ” and “interest groups ” rather more loosely than would earn the approval of the more circumspect of political scientists, have been far less myopic in this respect. Alec Nove, in a chapter of his latest book entitled “ ‘ Centralised Pluralism ‘: Ministries and Regional Planning,” puts the basic points very clearly: In practice the sheer volume of work and of decisions in Gosplan places very considerable powers in the hands of the. ministries. They are more likely than the planning agencies to have information about the existing situation and future possibilities. Their proposals, and their reaction to proposals made by “ their ” enterprises, affects [.Cc] the plans and instructions which they receive. Those with experience of these matters speak of a constant tug-of-wa; between the ministries a& Gosplan.
Ministries become interest groups. The motive may be aggrandizement, or empire-building, a motive familiar in Western writings 12. Tars&s, .” The Soviet Political System,” p. 317. 13. Ibid., pp. 317-318.
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both with regard, to corporation executives and government officials,,.The head of a, division, be it of a private concern or. a ministry, c’an usually see very good reasons why more resources should be .allocated to the’ sector. for which he is responsible. Nor is he,necessarily insincere.-This principle extends to all kinds of Soviet ministries. Under. conditions of relative scarcity, and with investment. allocations virtually free, ‘demands for such allocations, combined with pressure to obtain them, cause Gospl& and the government many problems.14
The locus of authoritative decisionmaking, the sources of influence upon a policy, and the ways and places in which a policy is implemented or frustrated naturally -vary from one area of policymaking to another. If in Communist states the Politburo is; de facto, the highest policymaking body of all within ‘Party and country, it is perfectly obvious that only a small proportion of important decisions can be ,taken at that level. This is especially so in a country as vast as the Soviet Union with problems on a correspondingly .large. scale. Even ~Gosplari. as Nove points out, is dependent, despite its great size and power within the ministerial network, on information supplied by other ministries and state committees, with the result that much real policymaking power devolves to the .. latter organizations. Of the books that sparked off this review article, those that contribute most to an appreciation of the interplay among various. central Party and state institutions are the two on agriculture.’ Werner G. Hahn and Karl-Eugen W5idekin have written books of a very different type. Hahn is more interested in politics, and especially in the rivalries among Soviet politicians, than in agriculture; but he provides many useful insights and hypotheses on policymaking in this sphere. Wtidekin not only is deeply interested in agriculture but has strong. claims to be regarded as the most knowledgeable of all Western experts on Soviet agriculture (and especialiy its private sector). Though he is not primarily concerned with the policy process, the evidence he adduces on ‘the implementation stage of the process is highly relevant for the political scientist. Where large-scale investment is involved, it is clear that changes in its distribution-other than incremental changes-are difbcult to achieve. Khrushchev was able to bring off many bold policy initiatives (though, paradoxically, he might have held ofhce longer if he had been less successful in pushingsome of them through), 14. Alec Nove, The Soviet Econom$
1977), p. 63
System (Londoni Allen & U&n,
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but’ he’- was unable to divert funds for- the development of the chemical industry (and .chemical fertilizers) .on th,e scale ‘he wished. On July 12, 1963, he “ declared that agriculture needed ‘86 million tons’of fertilizer”‘; by the plenary’s’ession of the CentraKommittee held on December 9 of the same ‘year; this had been scaled down ‘to 70-80 miliion tons; and by the ,February 1’4 Central Committee plenum of 1964 Khrushchev “was singling out “‘ the’ leaders of Gosplan ‘and the metallurgical industry for opposing chemical development ” and complaining of “ the difEculties of changing the division of resources to develop any new branches 7’ (Hahn, pp.. ll& ,115). ‘. . . Though neither Khrushchev- nor, it ‘.would appear, l3rezhneir achieved as much as they would have liked in terms of agricul: tti@ investments, and though they encountered opposition ‘from some industrial ministries and a’ dragging of feet by Gosplan, the personal commitment to, and high’ priority placed upon, agriculture by two successive general secretaries’has, in fact, enabled a, very significant increase of production of chemical fertilizer to take place. Production ‘rose’from 1l-4 million tons in 1960to 548’million tons in ,l972. And as Alec Nove has observed; “an almost fiyefold increase in ‘twelve ,years is impressive, -and explains more than any single’factor the much higher yields now being achieved in the non-black-earth areas, where fertilizer is the sine qua ngn’ ,of progress.” Id But this result was not achieved without a struggle. Hahn quotes Bre&nev as complaining at the September 1965. plenum of the Central Committee of continuing attempts in Gosplan “ to ‘ balance ! the figures at the expense of agriculture . . ..in spite of.the perfectly clear decisions of the March 1965 Central Committee’ plenum Y,Y (p. 171). Since heavy industry and defense traditionally had enjoyed top priority, Gosplan got into the habit of diverting resources intended for agriculture and consumer goods toward. those ,sectors. When by. 1968 agricultural deliveries had fallen almost 4 ,bihion rubles below the target set by the five-year plan, Brezhnev drew attention to nonimplementation of policy decisions by Gosplan and other, agencies, which were, of course,. in principle subordinate to the,Central Commi’ttee, which had approved the .plan targets. The general secretary noted: “ Often planning organs, encountering difficulties in finding capital ,,investments, seek to overcome them : I$.. Alec Nove, chapter on aghculture in Archie Brown and ,Michael Kase? (edq.), The Soufet Union Since thk Fall of Khrushchev’ (Lonfqn: ‘~acmillm, 1975; New York: Free Press,1976). p. 9.
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with funds designated for agriculture. There are also cases where material-technical resources allotted to agriculture are transferred to other purposes ” (p. 194). One aspect of Khrushchev’s agricultural policy, during his period of greatest power (after 1958 when he ,added the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers to his first secretaryship of. the Central Committee), was his hostility to what he regarded as excessive private livestock holdings, especially among sovkhoz workers, though the squeeze was applied to the private plots and livestock of kolkhozniki also. But this policy of Khrushchev had many opponents, some of whom published cautious warnings against it as early as 1959 (Widekin, p. 288). and the extent to which it was implemented varied from one part of the’ country to another. Wtidekin notes that after the fall of Khrushchev the first secretary of the Estonian Party organization, as well as the Lithuanian first secretary, were quick to boast that no reduction in the private plots or in the output of the personal farms of kolkhozniki had taken place in their republics (p. 314). If the case just cited involved deliberate bureaucratic inertia on the part of republican organizations opposed to a more stringent policy toward private agriculture, this does not mean that lower Party organs are necemdy more liberal in their interpretation of agricultural-or any other-policy than their all-Union superiors. The more benign view toward the private sector adopted by Khrushchev’s successors had its enemies within the state bureaucracy and among some republican Party organs. As Wadekin notes, free kolkhoz markets violate “ the planning principle” and are “a particularly irksome aspect of private production for the economic bureaucracy.” There was, as he goes on to observe, “ a lack of unanimous support among the middle and lower strata of the. party and government for the leadership’s more liberal attitude toward the entire private sector. As late as 1969, the Ukrainian local authorities were denounced for creating ‘ all kinds of difficulties’ for private producers who wanted to sell on the collective farm market ” (Wadekin, p., 336). Carmelo Mesa-Lago’s and Carl Beck’s symposium on Compurative SociuZist Systems has regrettably little to say about the policymaking process in Communist states. It is at’ too general a level of abstraction to do so and is rather uneven in quality. -Certain contributors (such as John M. Montias in his chapter on classification of Communist economic systems) succeed in saying a lot within brief compass. Some of the others say very little at considerable length. Too many of the numbers and graphs are of the kind that
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lend a spurious precision to the subjective judgments of the indivii dual scholar-on, for example, degrees of liberalization within various Communist states--and one of the offenders, Andrxej Korbonski, comes refreshingly close to admitting as much (p. 194). One of the most ambitiously comparative and successful chapters in the book, William N. Dunn’s “Revolution and Modernization in Economic Organizations,” is also one of the few to provide interesting generalizations on decisionmaking grounded in empirical research. Thus, for instance, he points out that even in Yugoslavia -where efforts to promote workers? participation have been taken further than in other Communist states-the link between greater technological complexity, on the one hand, and a greater decisionmaking role for managers and experts, on the other (with a correspondingly reduced say for production workers), holds good, a pattern, he suggests, that has also established itself in China and Cuba (p. 161). Egon Neuberger’s and William Duffy’s Comparative Economic Systems: A Decision-Making Approach is aimed at undergraduates rather than specialists and is a clearly written and well-organized attempt to. apply what (using a rather unfortunate acronym) the authors call the DIM approach to comparative economic analysis. DIM stands for decisionmaking, information, and motivation, and the four Communist systems included in Neuberger’s and Duffy’s eight-country study are the Soviet Union, China, Yugoslavia, and Hungary. Among the book’s points of relevance to students of the policymaking~ process is the truly tremendous problem of information flow within the Soviet economy. Academician Aganbegian is quoted as saying that “because of the growing interconnections of its sectors, the flow of information in the economy expands approximately as the square (and sometimes as the cube) of the expansion in the volume of production. . . and requires that ever more people be drawn into the sphere of planning and management ” @. 179). In Hungary, the authors note (p. 284). “ the quality of information and the efficiency of coordination have risen by implementation of markets, and the relegation of the plan to priority goal questions,” but they also observe that the Hungarian reforms represent a somewhat uneasy compromise between “the desired redistribution of production decisionmaking authority and the realities of industrial concentration.” The chapter on China provides a good summary of the history of economic organization in Communist China, but since it was completed before the death of Mao, there was no opportunity, unfortunately, to consider the significant changes that have already taken place there since then.
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The Yugoslav economic system (almost as difficult to analyze in detail as the Chinese, .though access to people and papers IS incomparably easier) is summed up as being “ no longer a ‘ visible hand ’ system but one with virtually no effective plan, an imperfectly functioning market, and lots of government ad hoc interventions ” (p. 257). Elizabeth Weinberg’s study of The Development of Sociology in the Soviet Union does throw some light on the policy process as it relates to the social sciences, though her main concerns are to study the terms in which sociological enquiry has been .legitimated in the U.S.S.R., to note the gradual institutionalization of ‘the discipline, and to give examples of the kind of empirical sociological research being conducted. The research work of Soviet sociologists is, in fact, very much policy-oriented. It is also frequently quite critical of the status quo, though not, of course, of the ideological foundations or basic power structure of the system. Studies of the position of. women in. Soviet society, of juvenile delinquency; of religious rituals, of urban development and city planning, to name but a few areas of sociological enquiry, can, however, be important influences on policymakers, and in some cases clearly are. Public opinion polls; if they are suitably. designed and taken. account of by those in positions .of institutional authority, can also -be important inputs in the policy process, facilitating influence on the.part .of the public at large and not just specialized “ publics ” or groups of experts. Dr. Weinberg suggests that some poll data have, been “ utilised with the explicit intention of. bringing about policy changes,” as, for instance, when KomsomoJ’skaia Pravda interviewers successively questioned three different Soviet ministers about shortcomings in the ,qonsumer good and service.sectors and based themselves on the results of a questionnaire submitted to 6,127 respondents by the newspaper’s Public Opinion Institute (pp. 82-107, esp. 98-99). The excellent symposium, Regimes and Oppositions; edited by Robert A. Dahl, contains four first-class chapters of particular relevance to., the student of Communist politics-the editor’s own theoretical and comparative introduction to the volume, Frederick C. Barghoorn’s “ Factional, Sect oral and, Subversive Opposition in Soviet Politics,” and H. Gordon Skilling’s two chapters, “ Opposition in, Communist East Europe ” and “ Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution.” Communist: states (with a few exceptions, notably, Yugoslavia and Cxechoslovakia during, the . . “ Prague Spring “) are, in, terms of Dahl?s typology .@p. 24) “ hegemonies ?‘; and the hegemonic. regime, as he appositely points out,,engenders a self;fulfilling prophecy,@. l3): s’ :
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Since all opposition is potentially dangerous, no distinction can be made between acceptable and unacceptable opposition, between loyal and disloyal opposition, between opposition that is protected and opposition that .must be repressed.Yet, if all oppositions are treated as dangerous and subject to’repression, opposition that would be loyal. if it were tolerated becomes disloyal because it is not tolerated. Since all opposition ls lilcely to be disloyal, all opposition must be repressed.
Thus, in no Communist state is opposition legitimated, and with few exceptions (Yugoslavia -and Czechoslovakia 1968 are again the most obvious ones) political activity by autonomous groups is officially disavowed (which is not the same thing as saying that no such group activity exists). In spite of the constant ‘danger, .howi ever, for “ within-system ” reformers that their proposals: will over; step the bounds of political propriety and that they will be branded as dissidents or oppositionists, the political’ leaderships in most Communist states recognize that they need to listen to a variety of views and take account of various interests, no matter how resolutely opposed they remain to the institutionalization of pluralism. Frederick Barghoorn, in his contribution ‘to this symposium, was, perhaps, the first. Western observer to note. that while the postKhrushchev leadership might be treating writers and artists more severely than they were’ treated by Khrushchev, it ,had ? on the whole : pursued a more enlightened ,policy than did Khrushchev toward natural scientists ” (p. 29). I have. suggested elsewhere that the Brezhnev leadership has attempted ,“ to make a much ‘clearer dividing line than was ever made by Khrushchev between what kind of intellectual activity is essential for the economic-progress of the Soviet Union and what is not, and between what is .essential for the bexisting structure of power within the Soviet Union (as well; of course, as for Soviet power in an .international context) and what might threaten this.” le The .greater “ rationality,” in this sense; of ,Soviet policymaking during the., Brezhnev years has involved the Party leadership in listening more attentively not only to d,epartmental views (to the “ bureaus,” in Tarschys’ terms; to “ sectoral opposition ” in Barghoorn’s) but also to “ within-system” reformist groups in research institutes and other havens of ‘the ever-growing intelligentsia. Frederic J. Fleron has written about the phenomenon of ‘: cooptation ” as a mechanism of adaptation to ,change within ‘the Soviet political-leadership-the coopting to’ high Party (and, .indeed, 16. Archie Brown, chapter on political developments, in ibid., pp. 23W23f.
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governmental)
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expert,ise, is being prepared. Interesting accounts of such roles played by Soviet economists,” family law specialists,2o and other lawyers *I have been published. The partial economic decentralization envisaged in the Soviet economic reform of 1965 has to be understood not only in the context of the slowdown in Soviet economic growth, which made some change of policy essential, but also in the light of the sharp debate among groups of Soviet economists which preceded it.22 Similarly, the emphasis on systems theory and the application of computer technology to administration-which can be seen as “ an attractive alternative in the eyes of political conservatives to the seemingly anarchic model of individual or small-group decision-making toward which the original 1965 reform and its more radical Czechoslovak counterpart seemed to be heading ” ‘*-owes its present dominant position in Soviet thinking not only to its ideological convenience but to the advocacy of.a group of scholars who put this item on the political agenda before “the entry of authoritative, orthodox philosophers, ideologists, and legal scholars. . . into the ranks of the exponents of the systems approach gradually legitimized it for general use.“‘” Likewise, the significant doctrinal innovation represented by the introduction of the concept of “the political system ” into Soviet constitutional law-in the new (1977) Constitution a5-is a direct result of the influence of some of the less dogmatic Soviet jurists and political scientists on the constitu19. See, e.g., Richard Judy, “The Economists,” in H. Gordon Shilling and Franklyn GrBths (eds.), Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 209-251; Jere L. Felker, Soviet Economic Controversies: The Emerging Marketing Concept and Changes in Planning, 19604965 (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966); Michael Elhnan. Phmning Problems in the USSR: The Contribution of Mathematical Economics to Their Solution 1960-1971 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), and Elhnan, Economic Reform in the Soviet Union (London: PEP. 1969). 20. See, in particular, Peter H. Juviler, “Family Reforms on the Road to Communism ” in Peter H. Juviler and‘Henry W. Morton (eds.), Soviet PolicyMaking: Studies of Communism in Transition (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), pp. 29-60. 21. See Donald D. Barry and Harold J. Berman, “The Jurists ” in Skiing and Grilflths, Interest Groups in Soviet Politics, pp. 291-333. 22. See note 19. 23. R. F. Miller, “ Organizing for the Scientific and Technical Revolution ” in T. H. Rigby and R. F. Miller, Political and Administrative Aspects of the Scientific and Technical Revolution in the USSR (Canberra: Occasional Paper No. 11 of Department of Political Science, Australian National University, 1976), p. 83. 24. Ibid., p. 82. 25. Konstitutsiya (osnovnoy zakon) Soyuza Sovetskikh ‘Sotsiahsticheskikh Respublik (Moscow: Politizdat, 1977), p. 6.
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tional commission(and,though they would not wish to acknowledge dt; of the influenceoftheir ,readingof Westernpolitical scienceupon . 2,‘. .. them).: ’ ! ., ::’ . .:‘l‘ Most of the examplesof policies in the making which I have touched upon :here concern.the Soviet Union. (In this; I ,have followed the bias toward the U.S.S.R. of the books underreview.) It .is surprising,how. few case,studiesof policymaking,,or broader analyses,of the policy process;have been basedupon researchon East, Europe ‘as distinct from the Soviet Union1 Yet information; both in’ terms.of .publishedamaterialand the, availability for interview of well-informed .participants, is greater.in ‘several of these societies..As things.stand, one must rely ‘on a number of books of a -more.generalnature..only a-.few of which throw much light on the, policy process.Examples of‘such ‘books on three different countries which do illuminate the policy processare H. Gordon Skilling’s Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution,ae” ‘Dennison Rusinow’s The Yugoslav Experimbat 1948-1974,“. and (on a miniature’ scale by .comparison)Peter A. Toma’s and Ivan Volgyes’s Politics in Hungary.a’
(
.. To a surprising degree,the idea !(once-iagain gaining the upper handin the scholarly literature on Communist politics) that group activity, other than the clashesof institutional interests,is to be discountedis basedupon preoccupation.with the Soviet case.Even there, evidenceis to be found (and some of it has been alluded to in this review-article)that points t,o such a conclusionbeing premature. It is, however,to the further.study of East Europe that we must look for more rapid advancesin our ,knowledgeand under: standing.of”policymaking’in ‘Communist‘states.Such studies may well confirm the usefulnessof the ” bureaucraticmodel,” but they are unlikely to endorsethe claim that. it is the key #tounderstanding of Communist politics. The political significance of groups outside the ‘bureaucratic structures as well as the cleavagesof opinion within thesestructuresare’of far greater consequencethan is allowedfor in’ the latest orthodoxy.
.26.:Princeton:Princeton UniversityPre+ 1976. . 27.tond.on:Hurst 1977. 28.SanFrancisco:Freeman, 1977.
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Robert ,;4:..Qahl N(ed.),‘.Regim& and Oppositibns (New Haven: Yale University Press;1973),411’pp. Werner G.. Hahn, The Politics of SNiet Agriculture, 19604970 (Baltimore: JohnsHopkins Press,1972),xix + 311pp. Carmelo Mesa-Lago,and Carl Beck, Comparhtive Socialist %ysteF.@ +ays on Politics and Ec6nqmifs (Pittsburgh: University, of FttsburghCenter for International,!+dles. ‘19753,xv + 450 pp. . Bgon. ,S+berger and William Quffy, .Comparative Ec,onqm[c Gystems: A @e&ori:Making Approach (Boston: Allyn ,& Bacon, .1976),vi + 378pp. .Karl-Eugen Wiidekin, .The’ “Private Sector in Sobiet Agriculiui& translated by Keith Bush (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,1973).xviii + 407pp. Elizabeth Ann Weinberg, The Development of Sociology in the Soviet Union (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974),xv + 173pp. Our knowledge of the policymaking process within Communist stateshas advancedvery fitfully over the past two decades.There is still no book available that sets out to study Communist states comparatively from a policy processstandpoint-very few books, indeed,that are comparativeCommunist studiesat all, in the sense that they apply a common framework of analysisto a variety of Communist statesor are unified by a common organizingprinciple. %iJDlSS
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(The only book among thoselisted abovethat consciouslyattempts to make a contribution to comparariveCommunism (or socialism) is Carmelo Mesa-Lag05 and Carl Beck’s Comparative Socialist Systems; and it ,is-in more sensesthan one-a very disparate ,: collection of essays.) So far as individual Communist statesare concerned,there has, on the whole, beena declinesince the 1960sand early 197Osinthe attention paid to “ interest groups” or quasi-groups;and only a few detailed studies have been published of particular areas of policy, the latter (including the works of Hahn, W&de&, ‘and Weinberg reviewed here) devoted,in the main, to areas of: policy ,I within the SovietUnion; The apparentdecline of Westernacademicinterest in .“ groups” within Communist stateswill not be universally regretted;Joseph LaPalombara,in a very stimulating contribution to a recent’isstie of this journal,’ rightly warns against a concentration on !‘ those aspectsof politics that are distant from the ’ black bojr ’ ;of government, from those institutions .and processesthat’ produce’public policies and are involved in their implementation.”a It .does‘not necessarilyfollow, however,as LaPalombaraseemsto imply,s that we should eschewa “ group” approachto Comniunist politics. One could not begin to understandthe processof political changewithin Czechoslovakiain the 1960swithout paying very careful ‘attention to the part played by groups of different kinds, many-though not all-of which cut acrossbureaucraticboundaries.b(I am referring to. a longish-term processand not only to that annus’ mirabilis, 1968.If what happenedin Czechoslovakiain the first eight .months of, 1968is unique in the Communist world, the.,patternof politics in the almost equallyimportant years,1963-1967,bearscomparison . : 1. Joseph LaPaiombara, “Monoliths .or Plural Systems: Through Con; ceptual Lenses Darkly,” Studies in Comparative Communism, VIII;‘. 3 (Autumn 1975), pp. 305-332. .. 2. Ibid., p. 328. .., _, 3. Ibid., pp. 311, 326-327. 4. From the impressive literature published thus far on Czechoslovak politics, the books that throw most light on group activity are: ‘H. Cordon Skilling, Cze~hoslovakia’s Znierrupted’ Revolu#on (Princeton: -P&c&on University Press, 1976); Vladimir V. Kusin? The Zntellectlial Origins of ih# Prague Spring (Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press, 1971); V@mir V: Kusin, Political Grouping in the Czechoslovuk Reform iUov&ze# @on&jn: Macmillan,1972); Vladimir V. Kusin (ed.), The Czechoslovak Reforni Move: inent I968 (London: International Research Documents,’ 1973); and Alex Pravda, Reform and Change in the Czechosloiak PO;lifitial ,Syitem:: Jan&& August.. 19681 (Beverly Hills: Sage Research, -Papers :$r the Se&alScience+ 1975).
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with the nature of political activity in several other East European states.) It is entirely right that the nonsense of political institutions being unfashionable objects of study should come to an end’ and that a place of central importance be allocated to analysis of the part played by formal institutions in the various stages of the policymaking process-from policy formation to policy implementation (or nonimplementation). But the attempt (difhcult though it may. be) to locate influential groups and to assess the part played by them in the policy process both complements and overlaps with an institution-oriented approach to the study of Communist politics. pluralist, and bureaucratic “ models ” of the Soviet political system,6 Daniel Tarschys, in a perceptive survey of the totalitarian, rightly notes that “while the totalitarian model exaggerates the structural differences between the Western and socialist social orders, the pluralist .model exaggerates their functional similarities,” this notwithstanding “ the partial insights in both perspectives ” which are “ of lasting value.” ’ Tarschys follows Alfred Meyer 8 and among others, in arguing the case for a William Taubman. greater concentration on the “bureaus.” Citing the now familiar aphorism of Harold Seidman lo (who attributes it to Rufus Miles 11) -“Where one stands depends on where one sits “--Tarschys suggests that the “ positionally ” conditioned splits, conflicts of interest, and interplay within the Soviet system are most deserving of attention. 5. I have argued this point at some length in my Soviet Politics and Politicul Science (London: Macmillan, 1974; New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1976). The best argument, however, for the point that analysis of political institutions can be combined with sensitivity to develonments in middle-range social science theory is the actual existence of several excellent detailid studies of this type which have appeared within the past ten years. The most outstanding example is Jerry F. Hough’s The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making (Cambridge, Mass;: Harvard University Press, 1969). 6. Daniel Tarschys, “The Soviet Political System: Three Models,” European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 1977), pp. 287320. 7. Ibid., p. 308. 8. Alfred G. Meyer, “USSR, Incorporated,” Slavic Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 (October 1961), pp. 369-376; and the same author’s The Soviet Political System: An Interpretation (New York: Random House. 1965). -9. Wiliiam Taubman, Governing Soviet Cities: Bureaucraiic Politics and Urban Development in the USSR (New York: Praeger, 1973). 10. Harold Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power: The Dynamics of FederaI Organization (London: Oxford University Press,.1970), p. 20. 11. A former Assistant Secretary for Administration in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare of the United States.
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While the “ tensions among different- ‘ bureaus ’ ” la are an important guide to understanding of the policymaking process within Communist states, it does not, however, represent a great improvement on totalitarian and pluralist interpretations if all Communist politics .are reduced to this. What needs to be said is that argument among ministries and departments over. the allocation of scarce resources is normal conflict within any political system, including Communist systems, but one should not adopt as an exclusive approach a framework of analysis-the “ bureaucratic model ” -which prematurely rules out other elements and influences within the policy process and other conflicts within society. Tarschys is perfectly correct in holding that “ the most conspicuous political competition ” in Soviet-type societies “ is a rivalry between organizations ” and that the result of this competition “ can be perceived in the decisions made by the rulers.” Is But this is all very well only so long as it is remembered that “inconspicuous” does not mean “ less important ” but, rather, “ harder to research.” The growing appeal of the “ bureaucratic politics ” approach to the study of the Soviet Union and other Communist states has not, as it happens, been accompanied by much attention on the part of political scientists to the concrete activities of ministries-surely the most important institutions within Communist systems to suffer from Western academic neglect. Economists, though they may use such terms as “pluralism ” and “interest groups ” rather more loosely than would earn the approval of the more circumspect of political scientists, have been far less myopic in this respect. Alec Nove, in a chapter of his latest book entitled “ ‘ Centralised Pluralism ‘: Ministries and Regional Planning,” puts the basic points very clearly: In practice the sheer volume of work and of decisions in Gosplan places very considerable powers in the hands of the. ministries. They are more likely than the planning agencies to have information about the existing situation and future possibilities. Their proposals, and their reaction to proposals made by “ their ” enterprises, affects [.Cc] the plans and instructions which they receive. Those with experience of these matters speak of a constant tug-of-wa; between the ministries a& Gosplan.
Ministries become interest groups. The motive may be aggrandizement, or empire-building, a motive familiar in Western writings 12. Tars&s, .” The Soviet Political System,” p. 317. 13. Ibid., pp. 317-318.
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both with regard, to corporation executives and government officials,,.The head of a, division, be it of a private concern or. a ministry, c’an usually see very good reasons why more resources should be .allocated to the’ sector. for which he is responsible. Nor is he,necessarily insincere.-This principle extends to all kinds of Soviet ministries. Under. conditions of relative scarcity, and with investment. allocations virtually free, ‘demands for such allocations, combined with pressure to obtain them, cause Gospl& and the government many problems.14
The locus of authoritative decisionmaking, the sources of influence upon a policy, and the ways and places in which a policy is implemented or frustrated naturally -vary from one area of policymaking to another. If in Communist states the Politburo is; de facto, the highest policymaking body of all within ‘Party and country, it is perfectly obvious that only a small proportion of important decisions can be ,taken at that level. This is especially so in a country as vast as the Soviet Union with problems on a correspondingly .large. scale. Even ~Gosplari. as Nove points out, is dependent, despite its great size and power within the ministerial network, on information supplied by other ministries and state committees, with the result that much real policymaking power devolves to the .. latter organizations. Of the books that sparked off this review article, those that contribute most to an appreciation of the interplay among various. central Party and state institutions are the two on agriculture.’ Werner G. Hahn and Karl-Eugen W5idekin have written books of a very different type. Hahn is more interested in politics, and especially in the rivalries among Soviet politicians, than in agriculture; but he provides many useful insights and hypotheses on policymaking in this sphere. Wtidekin not only is deeply interested in agriculture but has strong. claims to be regarded as the most knowledgeable of all Western experts on Soviet agriculture (and especialiy its private sector). Though he is not primarily concerned with the policy process, the evidence he adduces on ‘the implementation stage of the process is highly relevant for the political scientist. Where large-scale investment is involved, it is clear that changes in its distribution-other than incremental changes-are difbcult to achieve. Khrushchev was able to bring off many bold policy initiatives (though, paradoxically, he might have held ofhce longer if he had been less successful in pushingsome of them through), 14. Alec Nove, The Soviet Econom$
1977), p. 63
System (Londoni Allen & U&n,
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but’ he’- was unable to divert funds for- the development of the chemical industry (and .chemical fertilizers) .on th,e scale ‘he wished. On July 12, 1963, he “ declared that agriculture needed ‘86 million tons’of fertilizer”‘; by the plenary’s’ession of the CentraKommittee held on December 9 of the same ‘year; this had been scaled down ‘to 70-80 miliion tons; and by the ,February 1’4 Central Committee plenum of 1964 Khrushchev “was singling out “‘ the’ leaders of Gosplan ‘and the metallurgical industry for opposing chemical development ” and complaining of “ the difEculties of changing the division of resources to develop any new branches 7’ (Hahn, pp.. ll& ,115). ‘. . . Though neither Khrushchev- nor, it ‘.would appear, l3rezhneir achieved as much as they would have liked in terms of agricul: tti@ investments, and though they encountered opposition ‘from some industrial ministries and a’ dragging of feet by Gosplan, the personal commitment to, and high’ priority placed upon, agriculture by two successive general secretaries’has, in fact, enabled a, very significant increase of production of chemical fertilizer to take place. Production ‘rose’from 1l-4 million tons in 1960to 548’million tons in ,l972. And as Alec Nove has observed; “an almost fiyefold increase in ‘twelve ,years is impressive, -and explains more than any single’factor the much higher yields now being achieved in the non-black-earth areas, where fertilizer is the sine qua ngn’ ,of progress.” Id But this result was not achieved without a struggle. Hahn quotes Bre&nev as complaining at the September 1965. plenum of the Central Committee of continuing attempts in Gosplan “ to ‘ balance ! the figures at the expense of agriculture . . ..in spite of.the perfectly clear decisions of the March 1965 Central Committee’ plenum Y,Y (p. 171). Since heavy industry and defense traditionally had enjoyed top priority, Gosplan got into the habit of diverting resources intended for agriculture and consumer goods toward. those ,sectors. When by. 1968 agricultural deliveries had fallen almost 4 ,bihion rubles below the target set by the five-year plan, Brezhnev drew attention to nonimplementation of policy decisions by Gosplan and other, agencies, which were, of course,. in principle subordinate to the,Central Commi’ttee, which had approved the .plan targets. The general secretary noted: “ Often planning organs, encountering difficulties in finding capital ,,investments, seek to overcome them : I$.. Alec Nove, chapter on aghculture in Archie Brown and ,Michael Kase? (edq.), The Soufet Union Since thk Fall of Khrushchev’ (Lonfqn: ‘~acmillm, 1975; New York: Free Press,1976). p. 9.
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with funds designated for agriculture. There are also cases where material-technical resources allotted to agriculture are transferred to other purposes ” (p. 194). One aspect of Khrushchev’s agricultural policy, during his period of greatest power (after 1958 when he ,added the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers to his first secretaryship of. the Central Committee), was his hostility to what he regarded as excessive private livestock holdings, especially among sovkhoz workers, though the squeeze was applied to the private plots and livestock of kolkhozniki also. But this policy of Khrushchev had many opponents, some of whom published cautious warnings against it as early as 1959 (Widekin, p. 288). and the extent to which it was implemented varied from one part of the’ country to another. Wtidekin notes that after the fall of Khrushchev the first secretary of the Estonian Party organization, as well as the Lithuanian first secretary, were quick to boast that no reduction in the private plots or in the output of the personal farms of kolkhozniki had taken place in their republics (p. 314). If the case just cited involved deliberate bureaucratic inertia on the part of republican organizations opposed to a more stringent policy toward private agriculture, this does not mean that lower Party organs are necemdy more liberal in their interpretation of agricultural-or any other-policy than their all-Union superiors. The more benign view toward the private sector adopted by Khrushchev’s successors had its enemies within the state bureaucracy and among some republican Party organs. As Wadekin notes, free kolkhoz markets violate “ the planning principle” and are “a particularly irksome aspect of private production for the economic bureaucracy.” There was, as he goes on to observe, “ a lack of unanimous support among the middle and lower strata of the. party and government for the leadership’s more liberal attitude toward the entire private sector. As late as 1969, the Ukrainian local authorities were denounced for creating ‘ all kinds of difficulties’ for private producers who wanted to sell on the collective farm market ” (Wadekin, p., 336). Carmelo Mesa-Lago’s and Carl Beck’s symposium on Compurative SociuZist Systems has regrettably little to say about the policymaking process in Communist states. It is at’ too general a level of abstraction to do so and is rather uneven in quality. -Certain contributors (such as John M. Montias in his chapter on classification of Communist economic systems) succeed in saying a lot within brief compass. Some of the others say very little at considerable length. Too many of the numbers and graphs are of the kind that
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lend a spurious precision to the subjective judgments of the indivii dual scholar-on, for example, degrees of liberalization within various Communist states--and one of the offenders, Andrxej Korbonski, comes refreshingly close to admitting as much (p. 194). One of the most ambitiously comparative and successful chapters in the book, William N. Dunn’s “Revolution and Modernization in Economic Organizations,” is also one of the few to provide interesting generalizations on decisionmaking grounded in empirical research. Thus, for instance, he points out that even in Yugoslavia -where efforts to promote workers? participation have been taken further than in other Communist states-the link between greater technological complexity, on the one hand, and a greater decisionmaking role for managers and experts, on the other (with a correspondingly reduced say for production workers), holds good, a pattern, he suggests, that has also established itself in China and Cuba (p. 161). Egon Neuberger’s and William Duffy’s Comparative Economic Systems: A Decision-Making Approach is aimed at undergraduates rather than specialists and is a clearly written and well-organized attempt to. apply what (using a rather unfortunate acronym) the authors call the DIM approach to comparative economic analysis. DIM stands for decisionmaking, information, and motivation, and the four Communist systems included in Neuberger’s and Duffy’s eight-country study are the Soviet Union, China, Yugoslavia, and Hungary. Among the book’s points of relevance to students of the policymaking~ process is the truly tremendous problem of information flow within the Soviet economy. Academician Aganbegian is quoted as saying that “because of the growing interconnections of its sectors, the flow of information in the economy expands approximately as the square (and sometimes as the cube) of the expansion in the volume of production. . . and requires that ever more people be drawn into the sphere of planning and management ” @. 179). In Hungary, the authors note (p. 284). “ the quality of information and the efficiency of coordination have risen by implementation of markets, and the relegation of the plan to priority goal questions,” but they also observe that the Hungarian reforms represent a somewhat uneasy compromise between “the desired redistribution of production decisionmaking authority and the realities of industrial concentration.” The chapter on China provides a good summary of the history of economic organization in Communist China, but since it was completed before the death of Mao, there was no opportunity, unfortunately, to consider the significant changes that have already taken place there since then.
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The Yugoslav economic system (almost as difficult to analyze in detail as the Chinese, .though access to people and papers IS incomparably easier) is summed up as being “ no longer a ‘ visible hand ’ system but one with virtually no effective plan, an imperfectly functioning market, and lots of government ad hoc interventions ” (p. 257). Elizabeth Weinberg’s study of The Development of Sociology in the Soviet Union does throw some light on the policy process as it relates to the social sciences, though her main concerns are to study the terms in which sociological enquiry has been .legitimated in the U.S.S.R., to note the gradual institutionalization of ‘the discipline, and to give examples of the kind of empirical sociological research being conducted. The research work of Soviet sociologists is, in fact, very much policy-oriented. It is also frequently quite critical of the status quo, though not, of course, of the ideological foundations or basic power structure of the system. Studies of the position of. women in. Soviet society, of juvenile delinquency; of religious rituals, of urban development and city planning, to name but a few areas of sociological enquiry, can, however, be important influences on policymakers, and in some cases clearly are. Public opinion polls; if they are suitably. designed and taken. account of by those in positions .of institutional authority, can also -be important inputs in the policy process, facilitating influence on the.part .of the public at large and not just specialized “ publics ” or groups of experts. Dr. Weinberg suggests that some poll data have, been “ utilised with the explicit intention of. bringing about policy changes,” as, for instance, when KomsomoJ’skaia Pravda interviewers successively questioned three different Soviet ministers about shortcomings in the ,qonsumer good and service.sectors and based themselves on the results of a questionnaire submitted to 6,127 respondents by the newspaper’s Public Opinion Institute (pp. 82-107, esp. 98-99). The excellent symposium, Regimes and Oppositions; edited by Robert A. Dahl, contains four first-class chapters of particular relevance to., the student of Communist politics-the editor’s own theoretical and comparative introduction to the volume, Frederick C. Barghoorn’s “ Factional, Sect oral and, Subversive Opposition in Soviet Politics,” and H. Gordon Skilling’s two chapters, “ Opposition in, Communist East Europe ” and “ Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution.” Communist: states (with a few exceptions, notably, Yugoslavia and Cxechoslovakia during, the . . “ Prague Spring “) are, in, terms of Dahl?s typology .@p. 24) “ hegemonies ?‘; and the hegemonic. regime, as he appositely points out,,engenders a self;fulfilling prophecy,@. l3): s’ :
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Since all opposition is potentially dangerous, no distinction can be made between acceptable and unacceptable opposition, between loyal and disloyal opposition, between opposition that is protected and opposition that .must be repressed.Yet, if all oppositions are treated as dangerous and subject to’repression, opposition that would be loyal. if it were tolerated becomes disloyal because it is not tolerated. Since all opposition ls lilcely to be disloyal, all opposition must be repressed.
Thus, in no Communist state is opposition legitimated, and with few exceptions (Yugoslavia -and Czechoslovakia 1968 are again the most obvious ones) political activity by autonomous groups is officially disavowed (which is not the same thing as saying that no such group activity exists). In spite of the constant ‘danger, .howi ever, for “ within-system ” reformers that their proposals: will over; step the bounds of political propriety and that they will be branded as dissidents or oppositionists, the political’ leaderships in most Communist states recognize that they need to listen to a variety of views and take account of various interests, no matter how resolutely opposed they remain to the institutionalization of pluralism. Frederick Barghoorn, in his contribution ‘to this symposium, was, perhaps, the first. Western observer to note. that while the postKhrushchev leadership might be treating writers and artists more severely than they were’ treated by Khrushchev, it ,had ? on the whole : pursued a more enlightened ,policy than did Khrushchev toward natural scientists ” (p. 29). I have. suggested elsewhere that the Brezhnev leadership has attempted ,“ to make a much ‘clearer dividing line than was ever made by Khrushchev between what kind of intellectual activity is essential for the economic-progress of the Soviet Union and what is not, and between what is .essential for the bexisting structure of power within the Soviet Union (as well; of course, as for Soviet power in an .international context) and what might threaten this.” le The .greater “ rationality,” in this sense; of ,Soviet policymaking during the., Brezhnev years has involved the Party leadership in listening more attentively not only to d,epartmental views (to the “ bureaus,” in Tarschys’ terms; to “ sectoral opposition ” in Barghoorn’s) but also to “ within-system” reformist groups in research institutes and other havens of ‘the ever-growing intelligentsia. Frederic J. Fleron has written about the phenomenon of ‘: cooptation ” as a mechanism of adaptation to ,change within ‘the Soviet political-leadership-the coopting to’ high Party (and, .indeed, 16. Archie Brown, chapter on political developments, in ibid., pp. 23W23f.
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governmental)
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expert,ise, is being prepared. Interesting accounts of such roles played by Soviet economists,” family law specialists,2o and other lawyers *I have been published. The partial economic decentralization envisaged in the Soviet economic reform of 1965 has to be understood not only in the context of the slowdown in Soviet economic growth, which made some change of policy essential, but also in the light of the sharp debate among groups of Soviet economists which preceded it.22 Similarly, the emphasis on systems theory and the application of computer technology to administration-which can be seen as “ an attractive alternative in the eyes of political conservatives to the seemingly anarchic model of individual or small-group decision-making toward which the original 1965 reform and its more radical Czechoslovak counterpart seemed to be heading ” ‘*-owes its present dominant position in Soviet thinking not only to its ideological convenience but to the advocacy of.a group of scholars who put this item on the political agenda before “the entry of authoritative, orthodox philosophers, ideologists, and legal scholars. . . into the ranks of the exponents of the systems approach gradually legitimized it for general use.“‘” Likewise, the significant doctrinal innovation represented by the introduction of the concept of “the political system ” into Soviet constitutional law-in the new (1977) Constitution a5-is a direct result of the influence of some of the less dogmatic Soviet jurists and political scientists on the constitu19. See, e.g., Richard Judy, “The Economists,” in H. Gordon Shilling and Franklyn GrBths (eds.), Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 209-251; Jere L. Felker, Soviet Economic Controversies: The Emerging Marketing Concept and Changes in Planning, 19604965 (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966); Michael Elhnan. Phmning Problems in the USSR: The Contribution of Mathematical Economics to Their Solution 1960-1971 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), and Elhnan, Economic Reform in the Soviet Union (London: PEP. 1969). 20. See, in particular, Peter H. Juviler, “Family Reforms on the Road to Communism ” in Peter H. Juviler and‘Henry W. Morton (eds.), Soviet PolicyMaking: Studies of Communism in Transition (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), pp. 29-60. 21. See Donald D. Barry and Harold J. Berman, “The Jurists ” in Skiing and Grilflths, Interest Groups in Soviet Politics, pp. 291-333. 22. See note 19. 23. R. F. Miller, “ Organizing for the Scientific and Technical Revolution ” in T. H. Rigby and R. F. Miller, Political and Administrative Aspects of the Scientific and Technical Revolution in the USSR (Canberra: Occasional Paper No. 11 of Department of Political Science, Australian National University, 1976), p. 83. 24. Ibid., p. 82. 25. Konstitutsiya (osnovnoy zakon) Soyuza Sovetskikh ‘Sotsiahsticheskikh Respublik (Moscow: Politizdat, 1977), p. 6.
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tional commission(and,though they would not wish to acknowledge dt; of the influenceoftheir ,readingof Westernpolitical scienceupon . 2,‘. .. them).: ’ ! ., ::’ . .:‘l‘ Most of the examplesof policies in the making which I have touched upon :here concern.the Soviet Union. (In this; I ,have followed the bias toward the U.S.S.R. of the books underreview.) It .is surprising,how. few case,studiesof policymaking,,or broader analyses,of the policy process;have been basedupon researchon East, Europe ‘as distinct from the Soviet Union1 Yet information; both in’ terms.of .publishedamaterialand the, availability for interview of well-informed .participants, is greater.in ‘several of these societies..As things.stand, one must rely ‘on a number of books of a -more.generalnature..only a-.few of which throw much light on the, policy process.Examples of‘such ‘books on three different countries which do illuminate the policy processare H. Gordon Skilling’s Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution,ae” ‘Dennison Rusinow’s The Yugoslav Experimbat 1948-1974,“. and (on a miniature’ scale by .comparison)Peter A. Toma’s and Ivan Volgyes’s Politics in Hungary.a’
(
.. To a surprising degree,the idea !(once-iagain gaining the upper handin the scholarly literature on Communist politics) that group activity, other than the clashesof institutional interests,is to be discountedis basedupon preoccupation.with the Soviet case.Even there, evidenceis to be found (and some of it has been alluded to in this review-article)that points t,o such a conclusionbeing premature. It is, however,to the further.study of East Europe that we must look for more rapid advancesin our ,knowledgeand under: standing.of”policymaking’in ‘Communist‘states.Such studies may well confirm the usefulnessof the ” bureaucraticmodel,” but they are unlikely to endorsethe claim that. it is the key #tounderstanding of Communist politics. The political significance of groups outside the ‘bureaucratic structures as well as the cleavagesof opinion within thesestructuresare’of far greater consequencethan is allowedfor in’ the latest orthodoxy.
.26.:Princeton:Princeton UniversityPre+ 1976. . 27.tond.on:Hurst 1977. 28.SanFrancisco:Freeman, 1977.