- Email: [email protected]
Presidential and national assembly elections, The Gambia 2006 and 2007
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 151e190
results, changes in the composition of the government reflect a move towards a more pro-European and reformist agenda. Equally, though, the negotiation process highlighted the internal animosity and fragility of the coalition. References Bieber, F., Winterhagen, J., 2006. Ethnic Violence in Vojvodina: Glitch or Harbinger of Conflicts to Come? ECMI Working Paper 27. ECMI, Flensburg. B92, 2006. O Sˇesˇeljevom testamentu, 4 December. B92, 2007. RIK dobio 14 izvesˇtaja, 1 February. Centar za Slobodne Izbore i Demokratiju (Cesid), 2007. Preliminarni izvesˇtaj o izborima za narodne poslanike u Narodnoj skupsˇtini Republike Srbije, januar 2007. Cesid, Beograd. Danas, 2006. Od danas e podizanje izbornih obrazaca, 16 November. Goati, V., 2006. Partijske borbe u Srbiji u postoktobarskom razdoblju. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/Institut drusˇtvenih nauka, Beograd.
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International Crisis Group, 2006. Serbia’s New Constitution: Democracy Going Backwards. Crisis Group Europe Briefing No. 44, Belgrade/Brussels, 8 November 2006. Jovanovic´, M., 2005. Izborni prag i stranacki sistem. In: Lutovac, Z. (Ed.), Politicke stranke u Srbiji. Struktura i funkcionisanje. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/Institut drusˇtvenih nauka, Beograd, pp. 187e206. Kurir, 2006a. Milioner, 1 December, p. 3. Kurir, 2006b. Izdaja!, 9 December. Kurir, 2006c. Pedersong, 21 December, p. 3. Kurir, 2006d. Cedin mason, 29 December, p. 3. Nin, 2006a. Sˇta nudim Srbiji, 16 November. Nin, 2006b. U vladu samo sa manjinama, 21 December, pp. 16e18. OSCE, 2007. Republic of Serbia. Parliamentary Elections 21 January 2007. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report. OSCE, Warsaw. Republicka izborna komisija, 2007. Izvesˇtaj o kontroli finansijskih izvesˇtaja podnosilaca proglasˇene izborne liste o poreklu, visini i strukturi prikupljenih i utrosˇenih sredstava za izbornu kampanju za izbor narodnih poslanika Narodne skupsˇtine Republike Srbije. Republicka izborna komisija, Beograd. 19 May 2007. Vreme, 2006. Izborna Kampanja: Dvojci i Kormilari, 7 December.
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2007.10.002
Presidential and national assembly elections, The Gambia 2006 and 2007 Abdoulaye Saine Department of Political Science, Miami University, Oxford, OH 45056, USA Received 14 April 2007; accepted 16 July 2007
On 22 September 2006, electors in Gambia defied intense heat and heavy rains to vote in the third presidential election since Yahya Jammeh, a one-time soldier, came to power in a bloodless coup d’etat in 1994.1 President Jammeh’s ruling party, the Alliance for Patriotic Re-orientation, and Construction (APRC), defeated two ideologically and programmatically similar political alliances. One was an alliance between Ousainou Darboe’s United Democratic Party (UDP), Hamat Bah’s National Reconciliation Party (NRP), and Henry Gomez’s Gambia People’s Democratic Party (GPDP). Darboe, a third-time presidential Tel.: þ1 513 529 2489; fax: þ1 513 529 1709. E-mail address: [email protected] 1 For discussion of the coup, see Wiseman and Vidler (1995).
contender, headed the UDP/NRP/GPDP ticket, following his resignation in February 2006 from the fiveparty National Alliance for Democracy and Development (NADD). Meanwhile, NADD was constituted by three parties: the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) led by Omar Jallow (aka O.J.), People’s Democratic Organisation for Independence and Socialism (PDOIS), headed by Halifa Sallah (also NADD’s Coordinator), and Lamin Waa Juwara’s National Democratic Action Movement (NDAM). 1. Background The election was held against the backdrop of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) amongst the political parties concluded on 2 September 2005,
166
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 151e190
brokered by the Commonwealth and presided over by President Obasanjo of Nigeria. The MoU sought to create the atmosphere for a peaceful and orderly election. Although the objective was achieved, pre-election political arrests, voter intimidation, and other irregularities made it clear that the MoU had not been adhered to by the APRC government. Following the disputed 2001 presidential election, Jammeh amended the constitution to a ‘first-pastthe-post’ electoral system, to avoid a run-off if he should win less than 50% of the vote in future elections.2 In 2002, the APRC-dominated National Assembly passed the Media Commission Bill to muzzle the press, which enabled the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) to harass journalists and suppress dissidents.3 These developments had two galvanizing effects: it forced the splintered opposition political parties to re-evaluate their separation and gave rise to the formation, or strengthening, of several diaspora-based political organizations.4 In July 2003, an opposition leaders’ summit was held in Atlanta, which led, in May 2005, to the formation of the NADD alliance of five political parties: UDP, NRP, PPP, PDOIS, and NDAM. In July 2005, Juwara, Sallah, O.J., and Kemesseng Jammeh (standing in for Darboe)5 returned to Atlanta to launch the new alliance, afterwards travelling to eight US cities to discuss NADD’s 2006 election platform with Gambians living in the USA. The formation of NADD generated considerable excitement and high expectations in the diaspora and in The Gambia because of the political threat it posed to President Jammeh’s rule. Perhaps for the first time, 2 In reaction to Jammeh’s (53%) margin over Darboe (33%), which was relatively modest by the standards of elections in The Gambia. 3 For example, on 16 December 2004 Deyda Hydara, editor and coowner of The Point newspaper, was killed while driving home and two co-workers sustained life-threatening injuries. ‘The GreenBoys’, a vigilante group supporting the APRC, and members of the Presidential Guard have been implicated, but at the time of writing no arrests have been made. 4 In February 2001, the UK-based Movement for the Restoration of Democracy in The Gambia (MRDGUK) met with members of the Human Rights Parliamentary Group at the House of Commons. Chaired by John McDonnell MP, the meeting was attended by several exiled Gambian politicians, including former President Jawara, excivil servants, and leaders of The Gambia’s three main opposition party leaders (Bah (NRP), Omar Jallow (PPP), and Femi Peters standing in for Darboe (UDP)). PDOIS did not send a delegation. The meeting ended with MP’s Dianne Abbot and Jeremy Corbyn pledging support for MRDGUK and unveiling a comprehensive proposal for a united opposition party (Gambia-L 3.4 2001; see Kanteh, 2001). 5 Kemesseng Jammeh is unrelated to President Jammeh.
Jammeh felt politically threatened, which led him to inveigh against opposition leaders, followed by arrests and detentions. Jammeh also primed the APRC-controlled judiciary to act on his behalf. In July 2005, the Supreme Court expelled Bah, Sallah, Kemesseng Jammeh, and Sidia Jatta, all members of NADD’s executive, from the National Assembly. The APRC contended, which the Supreme Court upheld, that the four could not simultaneously belong to NADD, hold on to their Assembly seats, and retain their previous party affiliations. By-elections were subsequently held (29 September 2005), which the four had to contest to regain their seats. Only Bah lost his seat, amid allegations of vote buying and intimidation by APRC security personnel. The NADD’s victories were not taken lightly by the APRC; thereafter, it waged an aggressive nationwide campaign to discredit NADD and its politicians. On 15 November 2005, the NIA arrested three of NADD’s executive members (Halifa Sallah, O.J., and Hamat Bah) following their criticism of the APRC government and President Jammeh; they had accused Jammeh of ‘political intolerance’, ‘corruption’, and ‘mismanagement’. It took the combined efforts of international and domestic human rights organizations to get the three released. By the time they were released (13 December 2005), the selection of NADD’s presidential candidate was further delayed. Shortly afterwards, on 1 February 2006, Darboe resigned from the NADD executive amid allegations of ‘mistrust’, ‘insincerity’, and ‘hate’ within its ranks.6 The NADD Chairman, Alhaji Assan Musa Camara, and a handful of other PPP members of NADD’s executive also resigned, throwing their weight behind Darboe. Amid the rancor, a UDP/NRP alliance crystallized; shortly afterwards, the NADD selected Halifa Sallah as its presidential candidate, in hopes of stemming the deepening political and leadership crisis within NADD’s ranks. While Gambians reeled from Darboe’s resignation and the subsequent political realignmentsdmostly defections to the ruling APRCdthe military allegedly attempted to stage a coup (21 March 2006). This shook President Jammeh’s confidence and he reacted with characteristic vengeance, unleashing a wave of arrests, ‘disappearances’, and alleged killings of coup leaders, civilian co-conspirators, and key security officers. By nomination day (2 September 2006) there were only three candidates for the presidential contest: Jammeh (APRC), Darboe (UDP/NRP alliance), and Sallah (NADD). Henry Gomez, GPDP’s 6
For further details, see Sidebeh (2007) and Jeng (2007).
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 151e190
presidential aspirant, was disqualified and subsequently threw in his lot with the UDP/NRP alliance. 2. Electoral system The Gambia’s constitution mandates that presidential elections be conducted every five years under the supervision of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). Appointed by the president, the IEC is headed by a Chairman who is assisted by five commissioners and an administrative staff with branch offices located in each of the country’s seven administrative headquarters. The president is elected directly for a five-year term in a ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system. In practice, the president is the sole effective head of government with real decision-making power.7 Of the 53 members of the unicameral National Assembly, 48 are elected for five-year terms from single-member constituencies; a further five members are nominated by the president. National Assembly elections are also based on a plurality vote. In practice, neither the IEC nor the National Assembly is independent. Both have been reduced by President Jammeh to rigging elections and rubber-stamping repressive laws, respectively. For the 2006 election, the IEC’s Chairman advanced the election date by a month, putatively to avoid coinciding with the Muslim Holy Month of Ramadan, which severely disadvantaged the opposition. The Gambia uses an unusual system for casting ballots. Electors vote by inserting marbles (called ballot tokens) in a spout attached to the ballot drum of the party of their choice. As few tokens are rejected, few invalid votes are cast. 3. Electoral campaign Although scheduled for October, the presidential election was brought forward to 22 September 2006, to be followed by National Assembly election, scheduled for 25 January 2007 (see Section 5). The official campaign period for the presidential election was 7e 21 September 2006. President Jammeh mounted a strong campaign in the presidential election, centered around his 12-year record of infrastructural development, and promising to transform The Gambia into Africa’s Silicon Valley. Images of Jammeh appeared on posters adorning walls, trees, taxis, and trucks, with billboards carrying Jammeh’s campaign slogan, ‘Vote for peace and prosperity’, 7 As instanced in President Jammeh amending the constitution to abolish the run-off round in presidential elections.
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dominating the landscape. Images of Darboe and Sallah were conspicuously absent. Jammeh toured the country in his limousine, throwing T-shirts from the sunroof to the delight of his supporters. He also threatened to single out for punishment those who did not vote for him by depriving their constituency of aid. For Darboe, his campaign platform centered around ‘regime change’. He vowed to improve the welfare of farmers, and promised to restore ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’ and ‘the rule of law’. Sallah, a first-time contender, promised that under his presidency the rule of law would prevail coupled with sound financial discipline in the public sector. He described Jammeh’s government a ‘failure’, and promised that the NADD alliance would end Jammeh’s ‘self-perpetuating rule’. Both alliances and their leaderships were committed to democratic principles, to reinvigorating a market economy, and the restoration of good relations with the Commonwealth, Western powers, the World Bank, and the IMF. While Sallah has socialist leanings, his economic policies, like Darboe’s, proceed mainly from neo-liberal presumptions. Election-day observers included groups from the Commonwealth,8 the Economic Community of West African States, the West African Civil Society Forum, 40 domestic NGOs (belonging to the Association of nonGovernmental Organizations), some international NGOs, and a few international government-level organizations.9 4. Presidential election results Turnout in the election was estimated at 59%, considerably lower than the 88% and 90% turnouts in the 1996 and 2001 presidential elections.10 This was due primarily to voter apathy (The Gambia Journal, 2006), and very probably to anger over the disarray of the opposition parties and NADD’s subsequent break-up. Election observers concluded, however, that the election was conducted in a generally peaceful atmosphere.11 8 The Commonwealth Observer Group’s terms of reference were to determine whether conditions existed for a free expression of the will of the people and whether the results reflected the wishes of the people. 9 Such as Reporters Without Borders, The African Union, The African Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, and the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights. 10 For details of the 1996 and 2001 presidential elections, see Saine (1997, 2002, 2003). See also http://www.iec.gm 11 Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, chairman of the Commonwealth Observer Group, however, noted that the president’s ‘Dialogue with the People Tour’ and open demonstrations of support by public officers, especially amongst the security services, led to an unlevel playing field. These, together with other incumbency abuses, impacted on the entire process and its outcome.
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 151e190
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Table 1 Results of the presidential election, The Gambia, 22 September 2006 Candidate
Party
Votes
%
Yahya Jammeh
Alliance for Patriotic Re-orientation and Construction (APRC) United Democratic Party (UDP)/National Reconciliation Party (NRP)/Gambia People’s Democratic Party (GPDP) National Alliance for Democracy and Development (NADD)
264,404
67.3
104,808
26.7
23,473
6.0
392,685
58.6
Ousainou Darboe
Halifa Sallah
Total
Registered electors: 670,000. Turnout: 59%. Sources: http://psephos. adam-carr.net/countries/g/gambia/gambia2007.txt; http://www.iec.gm.
In the presidential election, Jammeh scored a resounding victory over his opponents. He won 67% of the vote, as against Darboe’s 27% and Sallah’s poor showing of 6% (see Table 1). Jammeh swept to victory in 47 of The Gambia’s 48 constituencies. Despite changing to a plurality vote and numerous documented electoral irregularities, Jammeh would probably have won the presidential vote in any event. Disarray amongst the opposition parties and the disintegration of NADD (precipitated by Darboe’s resignation) aided Jammeh’s victory considerably. The high expectations following NADD’s creation were replaced by low turnout and disillusionment; the resulting voter anger was targeted at Sallah and Darboe. It seems probable that even with a higher turnout Jammeh would still have triumphed, perhaps with a larger margin. The performance of NADD under Sallah was poor, nationally. Sallah even lost in his own Serrekunda Central constituency, winning 986 votes to Darboe’s 5820 and Jammeh’s overwhelming 12,460 votes. Even in Wuli East where one would ordinarily expect a NADD victory,12 Sallah failed to pull it off. Darboe’s performance was even more disappointing. Surprisingly, even where the UDP/NRP/GPDP alliance was expected to do well, e.g., Lower and Central Badibu, Jarra East, Janjanbureh, and the Kombos, partly because of their heavy concentration of the Mandinka ethnic group, Jammeh had a clean sweep. Similarly, in Bansang, Darboe’s home town, and Basse and Lower Fuladu, home to ethnic Fulani and where the 12 On account of Sidia Jatta, longtime co-leader of PDOIS, who comes from the region and represents the region in the National Assembly.
UDP/NRP coalition was expected to win without a struggle, Jammeh was the victor. Predictably in Foni, home to Jammeh’s co-ethnic Jolas, Jammeh won handily. Kiang West was the only constituency won by Darboe (with 3133 votes to Jammeh’s 2057 and Sallah’s 986). In the event, Darboe dismissed the 2006 presidential election results just as he had done in 1996 and 2001, alleging widespread opposition and voter intimidation by local chiefs, governors, and security agents. Incumbency also worked in Jammeh’s favor, providing him with the visibility that neither Sallah nor Darboe could hope for. Added to this was Jammeh’s war chest, which was far stronger than that of the opposition candidates combined. Electors received material inducements from Jammeh during his campaign, and guarantees of more gains for their community if they voted for himdand threats of deprivation if they did not. Neither Darboe nor Sallah could offer material inducements because their coalitions were financially strapped. With an electorate where poverty is endemic and where material inducements are expected as a matter of course, political careers are doomed if candidates cannot deliver material goods. Jammeh’s victory was also aided immeasurably by the IEC’s decision to advance the presidential election by a month. By truncating the usual election process, Jammeh gained leverage over his opponents. Jammeh had employed this strategy before, in 1996, to weaken his opponents’ chances. Although Ramadan was a convenient excuse, it had resonance with a predominantly Muslim electorate. Jammeh and the APRC also used the July summit of the African Union in Banjul, The Gambia’s capital, to showcase his growing prestige and continent-wide acceptance. This flew in the face of intense adverse international media scrutiny of his administration’s poor human rights record. The wave of arrests and alleged killing of military officers and civilians following the March 2006 alleged foiled coup further intimidated a fear-gripped nation. Moreover, Jammeh’s victory, it has been alleged, was also aided by votes from his co-ethnic Jolas, who crossed over from Senegal’s Southern Casamance province to cast ballots in adjoining villages and towns in The Gambia. 5. National Assembly election The election for the National Assembly was held on 25 January 2007. Political campaigning was set against a backdrop of voter apathy and the expectation that the APRC would once more make a clean sweep at the polls.
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 151e190
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Table 2 Results of the National Assembly election, The Gambia, 25 January 2007
further strengthened by the five members nominated by the president.
Party
Votes
6. Conclusion
Alliance for Patriotic Re-orientation and Construction (APRC) United Democratic Party (UDP) National Reconciliation Party (NRP) National Alliance for Democracy and Development (NADD) Others Totals
157,392
%
Seats
59.7
42
57,545
21.8
4
15,783
6.0
0
13,990
5.3
1
18,751 263,461
7.1 100.0
1 48
Registered voters: 628,160. Turnout: 41.9%. Source: http://psephos. adam-carr.net/countries/g/gambia/gambia2007.txt; http://www.iec.gm.
APRC candidates seized the opportunity to highlight improvements in infrastructure as well as increased access to health care and education under their watch. For the opposition, in spite of promises to improve human rights and build up the economy, the continued disarray and failure to establish a tactical alliance across the several parties, weakened their campaign. Turnout in the election was down further (49.1%), and Jammeh scored another crushing defeat against a splintered and poorly financed opposition (see Table 2). Jammeh’s APRC party won 42 of the 48 constituencies, including five APRC candidates returned unopposed. Of the six seats held by the opposition, the UDP won four, whilst NADD and an independent candidate secured one each. That the NRP ran on its own and won no seats, and that the GPDP sponsored no candidates, reflects the disarray among the opposition parties. The APRC’s victory over the opposition was made even more remarkable by the failure of Halifa Sallah, NADD’s presidential candidate and a long-time representative of Serrekunda Central, to retain his seat in the National Assembly. Hamat Bah, leader of the NRP was also soundly defeated in his lower Saloum constituency; the same fate befell Kemesseng Jammeh in Jarra West. For President Jammeh and his supporters, the defeat of Sallah, Bah, and Kemesseng Jammeh was icing on the cake; the National Assembly was rid of them not by extra-constitutional means but by the ballot box. However, the APRC’s victory was made possible primarily because opposition party leaders failed to enter a tactical alliance to improve their chances of winning. The bitter fallout from the presidential election some four months earlier lingered long enough to intensify mutual suspicions and pre-existing divisions. The 42seat APRC majority in the National Assembly was
The 2006 presidential and the 2007 National Assembly elections have not moved The Gambia appreciably closer to a more democratic political culture. Rather, the elections resulted in the consolidation of authoritarian rule under President Jammeh, and gave the ruling APRC a stamp of legitimacy. Thus, the Observer Missions, except the Commonwealth’s, may have been unwittingly complicit in anointing Jammeh with legitimacy. The prospects for a stronger opposition alliance among the current crop of politicians remain bleak, given their failed attempts in 2001 and 2006. Intense political and personal differences are to blame and likely to remain stumbling blocks. A likely outcome of this political impasse is more political instability in the form of another successful coup, for which chances grow by the day. Jammeh can avert this prospect only if he uses the powers of the presidential office to widen political participation, undertake genuine political reconciliation, protect press freedom, and put the economy on a course to mend. Unfortunately, these reforms are unlikely given Jammeh’s proclivity for repression of the press, opposition parties, and dissidents. Such failure to reform could push The Gambia further along the road to economic and political collapse, which may spread to neighboring Senegal, an already politically volatile country. It would take ‘big-brother’ Nigeria working in concert with the Commonwealth, international financial institutions, and a rejuvenated civil society to set Jammeh on a reformist course. If such efforts fail, state collapse is likely sooner rather than later. That would make The Gambia fertile ground for home-grown and foreign-born Muslim extremist activity, which has serious implications for the USled and UK-supported ‘war on terror’. References Kanteh, H., 2001. Jammeh under fire in London. Gambia-L 3.21.2001 (Archives of [email protected]. 4.3.2001). Jeng, M., 2007. Why NADD broke up. [email protected]. 22 February. Saine, A., 1997. The 1996/1997 presidential and national assembly elections in The Gambia. Electoral Studies 16 (4), 554e559. Saine, A., 2003. The October 2001 presidential election in The Gambia. Electoral Studies 22 (2), 375e381. Saine, A., 2002. Post-coup politics in The Gambia. Journal of Democracy 13 (4), 167e172.
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Sidebeh, M., 2007. Why NADD broke up. Gambia-Llistserv.icors. org. Parts 1 and 2. 16 February.
Wiseman, J.A., Vidler, E., 1995. The July 1994 coup d’etat in The Gambia: the end of an era. The Round Table 333, 53e65.
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2007.07.002
The presidential and congressional elections in Brazil, October 2006 Jairo Nicolau Instituto Universitario de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ), Rua da Matriz, 82 Botafogo, Rio de Janeiro 22260-100, Brazil
In 2006, electors in Brazil went to the polls for the fifth time to choose a president and for the sixth time to elect the National Congress since re-democratization in 1985. With an electorate of over 100 million, Brazil’s elections today are a success story: voters use an electronic balloting machine (urna eletroˆnica), which has practically eliminated electoral fraud and the results are proclaimed a few hours after voting closes. The highlight of 2006 was the re-election of President Luı´s Ina´cio Lula da Silva (known as Lula); Brazilian politics over the last few decades cannot be understood without reference to Lula. As expected, the whole election campaign centered on his governmentdits achievements and shortcomingsdand comparisons with the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002). 1. Electoral system Since 1994, the president and members of the Chamber of Deputies (Caˆmara dos Deputados) and the Senate (Senado) have been elected simultaneously. State governors and the federal district’s governor, and members of the Legislative Assemblies of the states and Federal District are also elected at the same time. The Chamber of Deputies has 513 members; the Senate, 81 members. Both the president and the 27 governors are elected using a majority runoff system (unless one candidate wins more than 50% of the vote in the first round). Again, both the president and state governors are Tel.: þ55 21 2537 8020; fax: þ55 2 2228 67146. E-mail address: [email protected]
elected for four-year terms and may be re-elected for only one consecutive term. The 513 deputies are elected from 27 electoral districts (26 states and the federal district) by a proportional electoral system,1 again for a four-year term. The number of seats for electoral districts varies between 8 and 70, with seats allocated according to an open list system: parties put a forward a list of candidates in no order of preference and voters may vote for a party (legenda) or for a candidate (nominal). Votes are totalled in each electoral district, with nominal plus legenda votes determining the distribution of seats among the parties; the candidates of each party receiving the most votes take up the number of seats won by their party. Electoral registration and voting are mandatory for citizens over 18 but optional for those aged 16e17 and citizens over 70. The 81 Senate seats are made up of three members for each state and the Federal District. Senators are elected by simple majority for an eight-year term. Part of the Senate is renewed at each election, (twothirds in one election, one-third in the next election). In 2006, one senator was elected for each state. Any person wishing to stand for public office in Brazil must belong to a political party, and all parties have to be registered with the Superior Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, TSE). Parties define their own structure, organization, operation, and rules about party discipline. In preparing for elections, parties may ally by presenting joint lists (apparentements) for the 1 To win representatation, a party (or apparentement) must exceed the Hare quota (total valid votes divided by number of seats) in a constituency. Each party is entitled to as many seats as the number of times its vote reaches the quota; unallocated seats are apportioned according to the d’Hondt formula.
results, changes in the composition of the government reflect a move towards a more pro-European and reformist agenda. Equally, though, the negotiation process highlighted the internal animosity and fragility of the coalition. References Bieber, F., Winterhagen, J., 2006. Ethnic Violence in Vojvodina: Glitch or Harbinger of Conflicts to Come? ECMI Working Paper 27. ECMI, Flensburg. B92, 2006. O Sˇesˇeljevom testamentu, 4 December. B92, 2007. RIK dobio 14 izvesˇtaja, 1 February. Centar za Slobodne Izbore i Demokratiju (Cesid), 2007. Preliminarni izvesˇtaj o izborima za narodne poslanike u Narodnoj skupsˇtini Republike Srbije, januar 2007. Cesid, Beograd. Danas, 2006. Od danas e podizanje izbornih obrazaca, 16 November. Goati, V., 2006. Partijske borbe u Srbiji u postoktobarskom razdoblju. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/Institut drusˇtvenih nauka, Beograd.
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International Crisis Group, 2006. Serbia’s New Constitution: Democracy Going Backwards. Crisis Group Europe Briefing No. 44, Belgrade/Brussels, 8 November 2006. Jovanovic´, M., 2005. Izborni prag i stranacki sistem. In: Lutovac, Z. (Ed.), Politicke stranke u Srbiji. Struktura i funkcionisanje. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/Institut drusˇtvenih nauka, Beograd, pp. 187e206. Kurir, 2006a. Milioner, 1 December, p. 3. Kurir, 2006b. Izdaja!, 9 December. Kurir, 2006c. Pedersong, 21 December, p. 3. Kurir, 2006d. Cedin mason, 29 December, p. 3. Nin, 2006a. Sˇta nudim Srbiji, 16 November. Nin, 2006b. U vladu samo sa manjinama, 21 December, pp. 16e18. OSCE, 2007. Republic of Serbia. Parliamentary Elections 21 January 2007. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report. OSCE, Warsaw. Republicka izborna komisija, 2007. Izvesˇtaj o kontroli finansijskih izvesˇtaja podnosilaca proglasˇene izborne liste o poreklu, visini i strukturi prikupljenih i utrosˇenih sredstava za izbornu kampanju za izbor narodnih poslanika Narodne skupsˇtine Republike Srbije. Republicka izborna komisija, Beograd. 19 May 2007. Vreme, 2006. Izborna Kampanja: Dvojci i Kormilari, 7 December.
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2007.10.002
Presidential and national assembly elections, The Gambia 2006 and 2007 Abdoulaye Saine Department of Political Science, Miami University, Oxford, OH 45056, USA Received 14 April 2007; accepted 16 July 2007
On 22 September 2006, electors in Gambia defied intense heat and heavy rains to vote in the third presidential election since Yahya Jammeh, a one-time soldier, came to power in a bloodless coup d’etat in 1994.1 President Jammeh’s ruling party, the Alliance for Patriotic Re-orientation, and Construction (APRC), defeated two ideologically and programmatically similar political alliances. One was an alliance between Ousainou Darboe’s United Democratic Party (UDP), Hamat Bah’s National Reconciliation Party (NRP), and Henry Gomez’s Gambia People’s Democratic Party (GPDP). Darboe, a third-time presidential Tel.: þ1 513 529 2489; fax: þ1 513 529 1709. E-mail address: [email protected] 1 For discussion of the coup, see Wiseman and Vidler (1995).
contender, headed the UDP/NRP/GPDP ticket, following his resignation in February 2006 from the fiveparty National Alliance for Democracy and Development (NADD). Meanwhile, NADD was constituted by three parties: the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) led by Omar Jallow (aka O.J.), People’s Democratic Organisation for Independence and Socialism (PDOIS), headed by Halifa Sallah (also NADD’s Coordinator), and Lamin Waa Juwara’s National Democratic Action Movement (NDAM). 1. Background The election was held against the backdrop of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) amongst the political parties concluded on 2 September 2005,
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Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 151e190
brokered by the Commonwealth and presided over by President Obasanjo of Nigeria. The MoU sought to create the atmosphere for a peaceful and orderly election. Although the objective was achieved, pre-election political arrests, voter intimidation, and other irregularities made it clear that the MoU had not been adhered to by the APRC government. Following the disputed 2001 presidential election, Jammeh amended the constitution to a ‘first-pastthe-post’ electoral system, to avoid a run-off if he should win less than 50% of the vote in future elections.2 In 2002, the APRC-dominated National Assembly passed the Media Commission Bill to muzzle the press, which enabled the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) to harass journalists and suppress dissidents.3 These developments had two galvanizing effects: it forced the splintered opposition political parties to re-evaluate their separation and gave rise to the formation, or strengthening, of several diaspora-based political organizations.4 In July 2003, an opposition leaders’ summit was held in Atlanta, which led, in May 2005, to the formation of the NADD alliance of five political parties: UDP, NRP, PPP, PDOIS, and NDAM. In July 2005, Juwara, Sallah, O.J., and Kemesseng Jammeh (standing in for Darboe)5 returned to Atlanta to launch the new alliance, afterwards travelling to eight US cities to discuss NADD’s 2006 election platform with Gambians living in the USA. The formation of NADD generated considerable excitement and high expectations in the diaspora and in The Gambia because of the political threat it posed to President Jammeh’s rule. Perhaps for the first time, 2 In reaction to Jammeh’s (53%) margin over Darboe (33%), which was relatively modest by the standards of elections in The Gambia. 3 For example, on 16 December 2004 Deyda Hydara, editor and coowner of The Point newspaper, was killed while driving home and two co-workers sustained life-threatening injuries. ‘The GreenBoys’, a vigilante group supporting the APRC, and members of the Presidential Guard have been implicated, but at the time of writing no arrests have been made. 4 In February 2001, the UK-based Movement for the Restoration of Democracy in The Gambia (MRDGUK) met with members of the Human Rights Parliamentary Group at the House of Commons. Chaired by John McDonnell MP, the meeting was attended by several exiled Gambian politicians, including former President Jawara, excivil servants, and leaders of The Gambia’s three main opposition party leaders (Bah (NRP), Omar Jallow (PPP), and Femi Peters standing in for Darboe (UDP)). PDOIS did not send a delegation. The meeting ended with MP’s Dianne Abbot and Jeremy Corbyn pledging support for MRDGUK and unveiling a comprehensive proposal for a united opposition party (Gambia-L 3.4 2001; see Kanteh, 2001). 5 Kemesseng Jammeh is unrelated to President Jammeh.
Jammeh felt politically threatened, which led him to inveigh against opposition leaders, followed by arrests and detentions. Jammeh also primed the APRC-controlled judiciary to act on his behalf. In July 2005, the Supreme Court expelled Bah, Sallah, Kemesseng Jammeh, and Sidia Jatta, all members of NADD’s executive, from the National Assembly. The APRC contended, which the Supreme Court upheld, that the four could not simultaneously belong to NADD, hold on to their Assembly seats, and retain their previous party affiliations. By-elections were subsequently held (29 September 2005), which the four had to contest to regain their seats. Only Bah lost his seat, amid allegations of vote buying and intimidation by APRC security personnel. The NADD’s victories were not taken lightly by the APRC; thereafter, it waged an aggressive nationwide campaign to discredit NADD and its politicians. On 15 November 2005, the NIA arrested three of NADD’s executive members (Halifa Sallah, O.J., and Hamat Bah) following their criticism of the APRC government and President Jammeh; they had accused Jammeh of ‘political intolerance’, ‘corruption’, and ‘mismanagement’. It took the combined efforts of international and domestic human rights organizations to get the three released. By the time they were released (13 December 2005), the selection of NADD’s presidential candidate was further delayed. Shortly afterwards, on 1 February 2006, Darboe resigned from the NADD executive amid allegations of ‘mistrust’, ‘insincerity’, and ‘hate’ within its ranks.6 The NADD Chairman, Alhaji Assan Musa Camara, and a handful of other PPP members of NADD’s executive also resigned, throwing their weight behind Darboe. Amid the rancor, a UDP/NRP alliance crystallized; shortly afterwards, the NADD selected Halifa Sallah as its presidential candidate, in hopes of stemming the deepening political and leadership crisis within NADD’s ranks. While Gambians reeled from Darboe’s resignation and the subsequent political realignmentsdmostly defections to the ruling APRCdthe military allegedly attempted to stage a coup (21 March 2006). This shook President Jammeh’s confidence and he reacted with characteristic vengeance, unleashing a wave of arrests, ‘disappearances’, and alleged killings of coup leaders, civilian co-conspirators, and key security officers. By nomination day (2 September 2006) there were only three candidates for the presidential contest: Jammeh (APRC), Darboe (UDP/NRP alliance), and Sallah (NADD). Henry Gomez, GPDP’s 6
For further details, see Sidebeh (2007) and Jeng (2007).
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 151e190
presidential aspirant, was disqualified and subsequently threw in his lot with the UDP/NRP alliance. 2. Electoral system The Gambia’s constitution mandates that presidential elections be conducted every five years under the supervision of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). Appointed by the president, the IEC is headed by a Chairman who is assisted by five commissioners and an administrative staff with branch offices located in each of the country’s seven administrative headquarters. The president is elected directly for a five-year term in a ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system. In practice, the president is the sole effective head of government with real decision-making power.7 Of the 53 members of the unicameral National Assembly, 48 are elected for five-year terms from single-member constituencies; a further five members are nominated by the president. National Assembly elections are also based on a plurality vote. In practice, neither the IEC nor the National Assembly is independent. Both have been reduced by President Jammeh to rigging elections and rubber-stamping repressive laws, respectively. For the 2006 election, the IEC’s Chairman advanced the election date by a month, putatively to avoid coinciding with the Muslim Holy Month of Ramadan, which severely disadvantaged the opposition. The Gambia uses an unusual system for casting ballots. Electors vote by inserting marbles (called ballot tokens) in a spout attached to the ballot drum of the party of their choice. As few tokens are rejected, few invalid votes are cast. 3. Electoral campaign Although scheduled for October, the presidential election was brought forward to 22 September 2006, to be followed by National Assembly election, scheduled for 25 January 2007 (see Section 5). The official campaign period for the presidential election was 7e 21 September 2006. President Jammeh mounted a strong campaign in the presidential election, centered around his 12-year record of infrastructural development, and promising to transform The Gambia into Africa’s Silicon Valley. Images of Jammeh appeared on posters adorning walls, trees, taxis, and trucks, with billboards carrying Jammeh’s campaign slogan, ‘Vote for peace and prosperity’, 7 As instanced in President Jammeh amending the constitution to abolish the run-off round in presidential elections.
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dominating the landscape. Images of Darboe and Sallah were conspicuously absent. Jammeh toured the country in his limousine, throwing T-shirts from the sunroof to the delight of his supporters. He also threatened to single out for punishment those who did not vote for him by depriving their constituency of aid. For Darboe, his campaign platform centered around ‘regime change’. He vowed to improve the welfare of farmers, and promised to restore ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’ and ‘the rule of law’. Sallah, a first-time contender, promised that under his presidency the rule of law would prevail coupled with sound financial discipline in the public sector. He described Jammeh’s government a ‘failure’, and promised that the NADD alliance would end Jammeh’s ‘self-perpetuating rule’. Both alliances and their leaderships were committed to democratic principles, to reinvigorating a market economy, and the restoration of good relations with the Commonwealth, Western powers, the World Bank, and the IMF. While Sallah has socialist leanings, his economic policies, like Darboe’s, proceed mainly from neo-liberal presumptions. Election-day observers included groups from the Commonwealth,8 the Economic Community of West African States, the West African Civil Society Forum, 40 domestic NGOs (belonging to the Association of nonGovernmental Organizations), some international NGOs, and a few international government-level organizations.9 4. Presidential election results Turnout in the election was estimated at 59%, considerably lower than the 88% and 90% turnouts in the 1996 and 2001 presidential elections.10 This was due primarily to voter apathy (The Gambia Journal, 2006), and very probably to anger over the disarray of the opposition parties and NADD’s subsequent break-up. Election observers concluded, however, that the election was conducted in a generally peaceful atmosphere.11 8 The Commonwealth Observer Group’s terms of reference were to determine whether conditions existed for a free expression of the will of the people and whether the results reflected the wishes of the people. 9 Such as Reporters Without Borders, The African Union, The African Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, and the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights. 10 For details of the 1996 and 2001 presidential elections, see Saine (1997, 2002, 2003). See also http://www.iec.gm 11 Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, chairman of the Commonwealth Observer Group, however, noted that the president’s ‘Dialogue with the People Tour’ and open demonstrations of support by public officers, especially amongst the security services, led to an unlevel playing field. These, together with other incumbency abuses, impacted on the entire process and its outcome.
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 151e190
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Table 1 Results of the presidential election, The Gambia, 22 September 2006 Candidate
Party
Votes
%
Yahya Jammeh
Alliance for Patriotic Re-orientation and Construction (APRC) United Democratic Party (UDP)/National Reconciliation Party (NRP)/Gambia People’s Democratic Party (GPDP) National Alliance for Democracy and Development (NADD)
264,404
67.3
104,808
26.7
23,473
6.0
392,685
58.6
Ousainou Darboe
Halifa Sallah
Total
Registered electors: 670,000. Turnout: 59%. Sources: http://psephos. adam-carr.net/countries/g/gambia/gambia2007.txt; http://www.iec.gm.
In the presidential election, Jammeh scored a resounding victory over his opponents. He won 67% of the vote, as against Darboe’s 27% and Sallah’s poor showing of 6% (see Table 1). Jammeh swept to victory in 47 of The Gambia’s 48 constituencies. Despite changing to a plurality vote and numerous documented electoral irregularities, Jammeh would probably have won the presidential vote in any event. Disarray amongst the opposition parties and the disintegration of NADD (precipitated by Darboe’s resignation) aided Jammeh’s victory considerably. The high expectations following NADD’s creation were replaced by low turnout and disillusionment; the resulting voter anger was targeted at Sallah and Darboe. It seems probable that even with a higher turnout Jammeh would still have triumphed, perhaps with a larger margin. The performance of NADD under Sallah was poor, nationally. Sallah even lost in his own Serrekunda Central constituency, winning 986 votes to Darboe’s 5820 and Jammeh’s overwhelming 12,460 votes. Even in Wuli East where one would ordinarily expect a NADD victory,12 Sallah failed to pull it off. Darboe’s performance was even more disappointing. Surprisingly, even where the UDP/NRP/GPDP alliance was expected to do well, e.g., Lower and Central Badibu, Jarra East, Janjanbureh, and the Kombos, partly because of their heavy concentration of the Mandinka ethnic group, Jammeh had a clean sweep. Similarly, in Bansang, Darboe’s home town, and Basse and Lower Fuladu, home to ethnic Fulani and where the 12 On account of Sidia Jatta, longtime co-leader of PDOIS, who comes from the region and represents the region in the National Assembly.
UDP/NRP coalition was expected to win without a struggle, Jammeh was the victor. Predictably in Foni, home to Jammeh’s co-ethnic Jolas, Jammeh won handily. Kiang West was the only constituency won by Darboe (with 3133 votes to Jammeh’s 2057 and Sallah’s 986). In the event, Darboe dismissed the 2006 presidential election results just as he had done in 1996 and 2001, alleging widespread opposition and voter intimidation by local chiefs, governors, and security agents. Incumbency also worked in Jammeh’s favor, providing him with the visibility that neither Sallah nor Darboe could hope for. Added to this was Jammeh’s war chest, which was far stronger than that of the opposition candidates combined. Electors received material inducements from Jammeh during his campaign, and guarantees of more gains for their community if they voted for himdand threats of deprivation if they did not. Neither Darboe nor Sallah could offer material inducements because their coalitions were financially strapped. With an electorate where poverty is endemic and where material inducements are expected as a matter of course, political careers are doomed if candidates cannot deliver material goods. Jammeh’s victory was also aided immeasurably by the IEC’s decision to advance the presidential election by a month. By truncating the usual election process, Jammeh gained leverage over his opponents. Jammeh had employed this strategy before, in 1996, to weaken his opponents’ chances. Although Ramadan was a convenient excuse, it had resonance with a predominantly Muslim electorate. Jammeh and the APRC also used the July summit of the African Union in Banjul, The Gambia’s capital, to showcase his growing prestige and continent-wide acceptance. This flew in the face of intense adverse international media scrutiny of his administration’s poor human rights record. The wave of arrests and alleged killing of military officers and civilians following the March 2006 alleged foiled coup further intimidated a fear-gripped nation. Moreover, Jammeh’s victory, it has been alleged, was also aided by votes from his co-ethnic Jolas, who crossed over from Senegal’s Southern Casamance province to cast ballots in adjoining villages and towns in The Gambia. 5. National Assembly election The election for the National Assembly was held on 25 January 2007. Political campaigning was set against a backdrop of voter apathy and the expectation that the APRC would once more make a clean sweep at the polls.
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 151e190
169
Table 2 Results of the National Assembly election, The Gambia, 25 January 2007
further strengthened by the five members nominated by the president.
Party
Votes
6. Conclusion
Alliance for Patriotic Re-orientation and Construction (APRC) United Democratic Party (UDP) National Reconciliation Party (NRP) National Alliance for Democracy and Development (NADD) Others Totals
157,392
%
Seats
59.7
42
57,545
21.8
4
15,783
6.0
0
13,990
5.3
1
18,751 263,461
7.1 100.0
1 48
Registered voters: 628,160. Turnout: 41.9%. Source: http://psephos. adam-carr.net/countries/g/gambia/gambia2007.txt; http://www.iec.gm.
APRC candidates seized the opportunity to highlight improvements in infrastructure as well as increased access to health care and education under their watch. For the opposition, in spite of promises to improve human rights and build up the economy, the continued disarray and failure to establish a tactical alliance across the several parties, weakened their campaign. Turnout in the election was down further (49.1%), and Jammeh scored another crushing defeat against a splintered and poorly financed opposition (see Table 2). Jammeh’s APRC party won 42 of the 48 constituencies, including five APRC candidates returned unopposed. Of the six seats held by the opposition, the UDP won four, whilst NADD and an independent candidate secured one each. That the NRP ran on its own and won no seats, and that the GPDP sponsored no candidates, reflects the disarray among the opposition parties. The APRC’s victory over the opposition was made even more remarkable by the failure of Halifa Sallah, NADD’s presidential candidate and a long-time representative of Serrekunda Central, to retain his seat in the National Assembly. Hamat Bah, leader of the NRP was also soundly defeated in his lower Saloum constituency; the same fate befell Kemesseng Jammeh in Jarra West. For President Jammeh and his supporters, the defeat of Sallah, Bah, and Kemesseng Jammeh was icing on the cake; the National Assembly was rid of them not by extra-constitutional means but by the ballot box. However, the APRC’s victory was made possible primarily because opposition party leaders failed to enter a tactical alliance to improve their chances of winning. The bitter fallout from the presidential election some four months earlier lingered long enough to intensify mutual suspicions and pre-existing divisions. The 42seat APRC majority in the National Assembly was
The 2006 presidential and the 2007 National Assembly elections have not moved The Gambia appreciably closer to a more democratic political culture. Rather, the elections resulted in the consolidation of authoritarian rule under President Jammeh, and gave the ruling APRC a stamp of legitimacy. Thus, the Observer Missions, except the Commonwealth’s, may have been unwittingly complicit in anointing Jammeh with legitimacy. The prospects for a stronger opposition alliance among the current crop of politicians remain bleak, given their failed attempts in 2001 and 2006. Intense political and personal differences are to blame and likely to remain stumbling blocks. A likely outcome of this political impasse is more political instability in the form of another successful coup, for which chances grow by the day. Jammeh can avert this prospect only if he uses the powers of the presidential office to widen political participation, undertake genuine political reconciliation, protect press freedom, and put the economy on a course to mend. Unfortunately, these reforms are unlikely given Jammeh’s proclivity for repression of the press, opposition parties, and dissidents. Such failure to reform could push The Gambia further along the road to economic and political collapse, which may spread to neighboring Senegal, an already politically volatile country. It would take ‘big-brother’ Nigeria working in concert with the Commonwealth, international financial institutions, and a rejuvenated civil society to set Jammeh on a reformist course. If such efforts fail, state collapse is likely sooner rather than later. That would make The Gambia fertile ground for home-grown and foreign-born Muslim extremist activity, which has serious implications for the USled and UK-supported ‘war on terror’. References Kanteh, H., 2001. Jammeh under fire in London. Gambia-L 3.21.2001 (Archives of [email protected]. 4.3.2001). Jeng, M., 2007. Why NADD broke up. [email protected]. 22 February. Saine, A., 1997. The 1996/1997 presidential and national assembly elections in The Gambia. Electoral Studies 16 (4), 554e559. Saine, A., 2003. The October 2001 presidential election in The Gambia. Electoral Studies 22 (2), 375e381. Saine, A., 2002. Post-coup politics in The Gambia. Journal of Democracy 13 (4), 167e172.
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Sidebeh, M., 2007. Why NADD broke up. Gambia-Llistserv.icors. org. Parts 1 and 2. 16 February.
Wiseman, J.A., Vidler, E., 1995. The July 1994 coup d’etat in The Gambia: the end of an era. The Round Table 333, 53e65.
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2007.07.002
The presidential and congressional elections in Brazil, October 2006 Jairo Nicolau Instituto Universitario de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ), Rua da Matriz, 82 Botafogo, Rio de Janeiro 22260-100, Brazil
In 2006, electors in Brazil went to the polls for the fifth time to choose a president and for the sixth time to elect the National Congress since re-democratization in 1985. With an electorate of over 100 million, Brazil’s elections today are a success story: voters use an electronic balloting machine (urna eletroˆnica), which has practically eliminated electoral fraud and the results are proclaimed a few hours after voting closes. The highlight of 2006 was the re-election of President Luı´s Ina´cio Lula da Silva (known as Lula); Brazilian politics over the last few decades cannot be understood without reference to Lula. As expected, the whole election campaign centered on his governmentdits achievements and shortcomingsdand comparisons with the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002). 1. Electoral system Since 1994, the president and members of the Chamber of Deputies (Caˆmara dos Deputados) and the Senate (Senado) have been elected simultaneously. State governors and the federal district’s governor, and members of the Legislative Assemblies of the states and Federal District are also elected at the same time. The Chamber of Deputies has 513 members; the Senate, 81 members. Both the president and the 27 governors are elected using a majority runoff system (unless one candidate wins more than 50% of the vote in the first round). Again, both the president and state governors are Tel.: þ55 21 2537 8020; fax: þ55 2 2228 67146. E-mail address: [email protected]
elected for four-year terms and may be re-elected for only one consecutive term. The 513 deputies are elected from 27 electoral districts (26 states and the federal district) by a proportional electoral system,1 again for a four-year term. The number of seats for electoral districts varies between 8 and 70, with seats allocated according to an open list system: parties put a forward a list of candidates in no order of preference and voters may vote for a party (legenda) or for a candidate (nominal). Votes are totalled in each electoral district, with nominal plus legenda votes determining the distribution of seats among the parties; the candidates of each party receiving the most votes take up the number of seats won by their party. Electoral registration and voting are mandatory for citizens over 18 but optional for those aged 16e17 and citizens over 70. The 81 Senate seats are made up of three members for each state and the Federal District. Senators are elected by simple majority for an eight-year term. Part of the Senate is renewed at each election, (twothirds in one election, one-third in the next election). In 2006, one senator was elected for each state. Any person wishing to stand for public office in Brazil must belong to a political party, and all parties have to be registered with the Superior Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, TSE). Parties define their own structure, organization, operation, and rules about party discipline. In preparing for elections, parties may ally by presenting joint lists (apparentements) for the 1 To win representatation, a party (or apparentement) must exceed the Hare quota (total valid votes divided by number of seats) in a constituency. Each party is entitled to as many seats as the number of times its vote reaches the quota; unallocated seats are apportioned according to the d’Hondt formula.