The future paradigm for socio-economics: three visions and a call for papers

Journal of Socio-Economics 28 (1999) 511–532

The future paradigm for socio-economics: three visions and a call for papers Richard Hattwick* Western Illinois University, Department of Economics, 442 Stipes Hall, Macomb, IL 61455, USA

1. Introduction Socio-economics had reason to celebrate in 1999: its three leading professional organizations all conducted successful conferences and gave every indication of continued vigor. In January, 1999, the Socio-economics Section of the Association of American Law Schools had a record crowd for its two days of sessions in New Orleans. In June, the Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics sponsored an equally impressive three day meeting in San Diego. And, in July, the largest of the three groups, The Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics (SASE), held an inspiring three-day conference at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. With a critical mass of scholars now in place, it may be time for a bit of soul-searching regarding the future paradigm or paradigms onto which socio-economics will lock as its guiding star. With that in mind, this paper presents visions of three different paradigms that might define the socio-economics of the future. It should be noted that the third paradigm sketched out below is a fairly good description of the scope of interest of the Journal of Socio-Economics and that the hidden agenda of this paper is to present a call for papers for that journal. Papers fitting into any of the three frameworks sketched out below are welcome.

2. The three paradigms in brief By way of introduction, it may be useful to review the nature of a paradigm (Kuhn, 1962). I understand the term to mean a closed body of expert knowledge that guides the work of an

* Corresponding author. Tel.: ⫹1-309-298-1153; fax: ⫹1-309-298-1020. E-mail address: [email protected] (R. Hattwick) 1053-5357/99/$ – see front matter © 2000 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved. PII: S 1 0 5 3 - 5 3 5 7 ( 9 9 ) 0 0 0 4 1 - 4

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identifiable group of scholars or scientists. The paradigm tells the scholars what is appropriate to study and it stipulates what methods area appropriate to use. It provides a focus but in doing so forces the practitioners to exclude topics and methods that may turn out to have been appropriate. The paradigm is agreed upon by the scholars through a process that in theory leads to the best possible approach to the subject matter. In practice, however, the evolutionary act of creating a paradigm can lead to a result that deviates significantly from that ideal state (Lynch, 1996). Thus, the three paradigms discussed in this paper represent only three of a multitude of paradigms that may emerge as Socio-Economics matures. The matter of possible deviation from the founders’ intentions is a subplot of this paper. Bruner (1990) tells of just such deviations in the history of the cognitive revolution in psychology. In his words (p. 1), (T)he Cognitive Revolution . . . was intended to bring ‘mind’ back into the human sciences after a long cold winter of objectivism. . . . (T)hat revolution has now been diverted into issues that are marginal to the impulse that brought it into being. Indeed, it has been technicalized in a manner that even undermines that original impulse. That is not to say that it has failed: far from it, for cognitive science must surely be among the leading growth industries on the academic course. It may be rather that it has become diverted by success . . . Some critics, perhaps unkindly, even argue that the new cognitive science, the child of the revolution, has gained its technical successes at the price of dehumanizing the very concept of the mind it sought to reestablish in psychology.

Will socio-economics meet a similar fate? This paper provides only a modest perspective on the issue. It presents three possible paradigms that might emerge out of the socioeconomics movement. All represent movements in the right direction as defined by the Journal of Socio-Economics. None represents the kind of tragic deviation which Bruner attributes to cognitive psychology. As long as practitioners remain conscious of the limitations of their chosen paradigm, the worst consequences of paradigm imprisonment can be avoided. In this paper, the three paradigms for Socio-Economics (SE) are envisioned as being nested rather than adjacent or overlapping. However, it might alternatively be argued that Visions 1 and 2 are somewhat antagonistic and that Vision 3 represents what amounts to a dialectical transformation of the two into something higher on the evolutionary scale. I have labeled the first vision “Psychological Socio-Economics” (PSE) In this vision SE retains most of what is currently found in mainstream academic economics but replaces the assumption of economic man with the richer concept of psychological economic man. The full body of academic psychology is made a part of the field of study. However, this version ignores significant portions of the knowledge base found in transpersonal psychology and clinical psychology, just as academic departments of psychology tend to pay less attention to them. An excellent recent survey of the potential content of this vision is found in Hugh Schwartz’ recent book Rationality Gone Awry? (Schwartz, 1998). Peter Earl’s earlier survey also spotlights much of the content that would fit here (Earl, 1988). The second vision is labeled “Sociological Socio-Economics.” This case incorporates all of the first vision, but adds a strong emphasis on issues of equity, justice and community as well as a focus on social institutions and their impact on the economy. This vision brings a large amount of the discipline of sociology into the paradigm. It is tempting to suggest that

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the likely future content of this vision is summarized by Amitai Etzioni’s The Moral Dimension (1988), his The New Golden Rule (1996), and his Essays in Socio-Economics (1999). However, Etzioni’s writings do pick up some of the important additional features introduced by the third vision, so his work cannot be fully captured by Vision 2. The third vision is alternatively called “Humanistic Socio-Economics” (HSE) or “Humanistic and Holistic Socio-Economics.” In this vision a large number of the issues dealt with in the humanities and in biology are incorporated into the paradigm. History and even spiritual matters also become legitimate topics of Socio-Economics analysis. History is important because it is needed for the study of evolution and dissolution. The spiritual-self help literature is useful because it helps us understand the images or mental models underlying human behavior in various historical contexts. Books that come reasonably close to illustrating this approach are Robert Solo’s Economic Organizations and Social Systems (Solo, 1967) and Manuel Castells’ three volume work entitled The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture (Castells, 1996, 1997, 1998). Solo’s work stands out in terms of its attention to both static and dynamic matters and in terms of the breadth of its coverage of the normative aspects of economic activity. The static analysis recognizes the multiplicity of systems that influence the production and distribution of goods and services. Four systems are highlighted—the private business system, the political system, the system of community organizations, and the family. Within the private business system separate analysis is presented for various forms of organization. The dynamic analysis focuses on innovation and evolution and relies heavily on sociological and psychological considerations. One part of the dynamic analysis directly addresses the problems of economic development faced by the poor nations of the world. In terms of the normative considerations to be used in assessing economic performance, Solo covers the usual topics of economic efficiency, growth and innovation, income distribution, personal security, macroeconomic stability and environmental impact. But he also adds the consideration of the impact of the economy on the quality of life of the individual worker and member of the household. And he addresses the question of how various forms of organization affect the values of the persons involved. One additional feature of the third vision is its assumption of a self-image that combines a commitment to science with a commitment to service to others. The service component is lacking in the first two visions as will be explained in the discussion of policy differences below. Those are the three visions defined very loosely. Let us now try to add some clarification by comparing the three in terms of methodology, subject matter, and policy orientations. A summary of the comparison to be made in the following paragraphs will be found in Table 1.

3. Methodology across the three visions Ken Wilber (1996) provides a useful framework for comparing the three visions in terms of their methodologies. Wilber argues that any human phenomenon can be studied from four distinct aspects. The four are:

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Table 1 Comparisons of the three paradigms Topic

Psychological socioeconomics

Sociological socioeconomics

Humanistic socioeconomics

Methods

Observation

Observation, interpretation

The person

Constrained utility maximization Constrained profit maximization Both outside the field of study Economy studied independently

Balance of self interest and concern for others Balancing stakeholder claims subject to profit constraint Institutions of central interest Economy interacting with larger social system

Social mechanisms Empirical tests, replication, history Power

Little concern Some concern

Some concern More concern

Observation, interpretation, introspection Self actualization and transcendence Arena for self actualization—multiple images of organization Institutions and memes of interest Interacting and evolving social and natural systems Major concern Most concern

Economic, political

Economic, political, ideological

Leadership, excellence

Entrepreneurship

Good life Good society

Government

Utility maximization Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—(Pareto optimum) Power aggrandizement

Nation state and comparative systems

One broadly defined best system

Entrepreneurship, leadership Community membership Liberty, equality, fraternity (balancing I and we) Statesmanship and utility maximization More than one broadly defined best system

Policy issues

Narrow economic

Broader socioeconomic

Policy posture

Reactive

Reactive

The firm

Institutions and memes Systems

Economic, political, ideological, psychological Entrepreneurship, leadership, excellence Happiness Liberty, equality, fraternity, and the pursuit of happiness Statesmanship and utility maximization More than one more narrowly defined system with evolution Broadest-economic, social, psychological Proactive

1. The exterior of the individual. . . . Here the method of observation is used. 2. The exterior of groups of individuals engaged in some sort of interaction. . . . Here observation and mathematical modeling are used. 3. The interior of groups of individuals (or the meanings attached to social interaction). . . . Here the method of interpretation is used. 4. The interior of the individual. . . . Here the method of introspection is used. A fifth technique that is common in neoclassical economics is deduction from a given set of assumptions. But since this technique can be used in conjunction with any of the other four, it needs no further discussion here.

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For each of the four aspects, one can approach the subject in a “scientific” manner, but the method of verification differs. Wilber suggests that the four methods of verification are: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Exterior dimension of the individual—Truth or correspondence Exterior of the group—Functional fit or systems mesh Interior of the group—Justness or cultural fit Interior of the individual—Truthfulness, integrity

How do our three visions compare in terms of Wilber’s methodological framework? The first, PSE, limits the acceptable methods to observation (including mathematical modeling). It does so believing that SE must be a science and a science cannot use introspection or interpretation. The second vision, SSE, adds the method of interpretation. It does so believing that shared meaning is what human activity is all about and that like it or not, the serious study of social phenomena therefore requires consideration of meaning. The spirit of this vision is still scientific in the sense that hypotheses are formed and tested. But the tests often fail to meet the criteria of the natural sciences or mathematics. (This notion that different branches of science require unique visions is supported by biology philosopher Ernst Mayr (1997), who makes a similar argument for the case of biology.) The third vision, HSE, includes all three methods— observation, interpretation, and introspection. It does so because of the belief that the serious study of social phenomena must include consideration of the matter of the quality of individual lives. This view requires its adherents to act in the spirit of “scientific inquiry” but with the full knowledge that interpretation and introspection defy use of the standard forms of scientific investigation. In passing it is worth noting that two legendary American psychologists—William James and Abraham Maslow—seem to have used this vision while working with colleagues who took a much more restricted view of the appropriate topics and methods. Unlike the first two visions, the third vision is also paradigm conscious or pluralistic. This aspect of the third vision is nicely captured by the following statement about proper scientific procedure by the respected but controversial philosopher of science P. K. Feyerabend (1981, p ix): The. . Idea. . of criticism is found in all civilizations. It plays an important role in philosophies such as Buddhism and Mysticism, it is the cornerstone of late nineteenthcentury science and the philosophy of science . . . Criticism means that we do not simply accept the phenomena, processes, institutions that surround us but we examine them and try to change them. Criticism is facilitated by proliferation: we do not work with a single theory, system of thought or institutional framework until circumstances force us to modify it or give it up; we use a plurality of theories (systems of thought, institutional frameworks) from the very beginning.

Feyerabend goes on to point out the importance of retaining old theories and concepts in the teaching and thinking of a discipline’s practitioners with this observation (p. 139): We find that ideas are often rejected before they can show their strength. Even in a fair competition one ideology, partly through accident, partly because greater attention is devoted to it, may assemble successes and overtake its rivals. This does not mean that the

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beaten rivals are without merit and have ceased to be capable of making a contribution to knowledge. It only means that they have temporarily run out of steam. They may return and defeat their defeaters . . . The lesson to be drawn . . . is that a temporary setback for a theory, a point of view, an ideology must not be taken as a reason for eliminating it. A science interested in finding truth must retain all ideas of mankind for possible use, or, to put it differently: the history of ideas is an essential part of scientific method.

Note the interesting test of the scientific adequacy of a given social science curriculum (economics, political science, sociology, psychology). If students are not adequately exposed to the history of thought in their discipline (and neighboring disciplines?), then by Feyerabend’s standards, the curriculum is lacking an important aspect of scientific training.

4. Subject matter comparisons—positive issues The three visions differ not only in terms of methods, but also in terms of subject matter. The list of topics for comparison is conceptually long. Only a few will be discussed in this section and an additional two will be examined in the following section. 4.1. The person Mainstream economics has achieved exceptional mileage with its primitive economic man definition of the person. But if there is one thing all three visions agree on, it is that the time to trade in the old model for something new has arrived. The question is, what will the new model look like? In the first vision the person is a complex system of interacting psychological processes. Instead of the fully informed rational decision-maker we have a poorly informed individual handicapped in her decision-making abilities by a host of emotional forces and cognitive limitations. With such persons interacting in the firm and market it is clear that much of current economic theory must be reworked. Markets simply do not achieve textbook levels of efficiency. Nevertheless, the current framework of academic economics is still useful. In fact, this vision still finds the concept of utility maximization to be a useful framework to use as the impossible dream against which to evaluate actual behavior of persons (Just as pure competition is used to evaluate the efficiency shortfalls of imperfect competition.). The second vision accepts the psychological complexity of the first. But instead of using the mono-utility maximization template as the analytical framework, SSE, prefers to use a dual utility approach. As articulated by its foremost advocate, the sociologist Amitai Etzioni, this “I-We” framework models the person as being energized by two partly conflicting sets of motives, one selfish and one other regarding. In other words, within each firm manager, worker, and consumer there takes place a constant battle between selfishness and altruism. An important element of this second vision is the belief that preferences are malleable and that the study of the forces causing preferences to be shaped and changed is an important part of the field of study (Etzioni, 1999). Political scientist James Q. Wilson (1993) presents an interesting variation of the second vision in his The Moral Sense. There he argues that in virtually all human communities the

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adult person has evolved four basic other-regarding personality traits that are an integral part of the adult’s self image. The four traits are: a sense of equity, a sense of sympathy for others, self-control and a sense of duty. Persons and communities differ in terms of the weights given to each of the four moral senses and in terms of the extent to which other-regarding behavior is extended to persons outside of the basic community. But the four moral senses are present and they do influence economic behavior in ways not normally recognized by mainstream economics. Another interesting approach that appears to fit into this second vision is Gary Lynne’s recent article in which a three-part self-concept is used to model the person (Lynne, 1999). Lynne’s three part self consists of a “strict father” a “nurturant parent” and an “adult.” The adult manages the conflict between the other two. Readers familiar with Eric Berne’s The Games People Play should readily comprehend this approach for Lynne’s three components of the self are similar to Berne’s parent, adult, and child. The third vision, HSE, incorporates the first two but adds two important changes. First, it introduces more finely defined concepts using the literature of psychology and sociology. For example it might use the framework developed by University of Chicago psychologist Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi (1993) in The Evolving Self. The next paragraph expands upon this framework. Second, it introduces a dynamic dimension in which the selves of individual persons evolve over the course of a lifetime and the self-conception of humanity in general has the potential to evolve as world history unfolds. This aspect could use the thinking of Ken Wilber (1996) or that of the founder of humanistic psychology, Abraham Maslow (1968). Maslow’s framework is discussed further below. Third, this vision remains open to considerations of what might be called fringe phenomena. Examples might be Roger Frantz’ forthcoming article on intuition (Frantz, 2000) and prolific self help writer Wayne Dyer’s books on mental methods of shutting out the self destructive memes of the market place such as “more is always better” and “one should always do one’s best” (Dyer, 1995). Csikszentmihalyi envisions the person as an organism that seeks happiness but is hindered in that quest by six forces. The six are: 1. The agent’s biological inheritance—from which atavistic emotions arise. 2. The agent’s socialized concept of self—from which come drives that are inconsistent with the individual’s own best interests. 3. The agent’s idiosyncratic concept of self—which may also be inconsistent with the individual’s own best interests. 4. Predators— other individuals who use overt power to reduce the individual’s opportunities for happiness. 5. Parasites— other individuals who use covert power to reduce the individual’s opportunities for happiness. 6. Memes—Social institutions that hinder the individual’s ability to pursue happiness (These can be physical objects such as the public transportation system or ideas such as socialism.). Csikszentmihalyi goes on to describe the healthy person as someone who is gradually learning to tame these forces during the course of a lifetime. And he postulates a gradual

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evolution of humans toward higher degrees of success in managing these forces. As noted later in the discussion of normative issues, some of the forces to be tamed or managed are found in the economy. Maslow is the father of both humanistic and transpersonal psychology. His major insight is the notion of a person as a collection of human needs arranged in a hierarchy. All humans have physiological needs, safety needs, needs to be accepted by the group, needs for recognition and power, and needs for self-actualization and transcendence. These needs are arranged in an hierarchical order such that the higher order needs, self actualization and transcendence, cannot be attended to until the lower order needs have been adequately satisfied. At any point in time any individual may be fixated anywhere along the spectrum. Thus, knowing where an individual or group of individuals is in the hierarchy can in theory lead to reasonably accurate predictions regarding how the individuals will behave in various economic situations. Two recent journal articles that use this approach are John Tomer’s “Good Habits and Bad Habits: A New Age Socio-Economics Model of Preference Formation” (Tomer, 1996) and Lok Sung Ho’s “A Model of Human Nature and Personal Development” (Ho, 1998). 4.2. The firm The principle driving the differences among the three visions is a progressive widening of the profession’s field of cognition. PSE replaces the profit-maximizing firm with a more realistic vision of an organization in which fallible human beings struggle to get others to cooperate and economize. The profit-maximizing ideal serves as a template against which to identify and measure shortfalls caused by a range of psychological forces. The phenomenon of x-inefficiency becomes a major focus of interest. Morris Altman’s Human Agency and Material Welfare (Altman, 1996) is a fine example of the value of this approach. Altman incorporates x-inefficiency into otherwise orthodox neoclassical models and is able to show that nations may have a choice of two economic growth paths— one with high overall wages and the other with low wages. SSE shifts the concern to matters of equity and justice. In this vision the concept of stakeholders holds pride of place. A whiff of normative thinking is detectable because this vision assumes a certain equality among stakeholders and the analysis typically focuses on ways in which one stakeholder group or another is able to get more than its fair share of the benefits generated by the firm. HSE recognizes and studies the issues emphasized by the first two. But in addition, this third vision adds the predictable concern with the individual and a concern with the full range of relevant memes. This vision studies how the firm impacts on the happiness, selfactualization or self-transcendence of the individual. The template that provides the ideal frame of reference might be Maslow’s vision of the firm as an arena of self-actualization as portrayed in Maslow on Management (Maslow, 1998). Other excellent works that set forth this view are recent articles by Flora Gill (2000) and Alan Wolfe (1997). In considering the full range of relevant memes, this third vision might follow the lead provided by Gareth Morgan in Images of Organization (Morgan, 1998). Morgan suggests

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that a business firm (or other organization) can be understood using a variety of metaphors and that each of the metaphors unearths different aspects of the firm. The metaphors he discusses are: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

The The The The The The The The

organization organization organization organization organization organization organization organization

as as as as as as as as

a machine (similar to the view of neoclassical economics). an organism. a brain. a culture. a political system (interaction of interests and power). a psychic prison (using psychoanalytic theory). system in flux (using chaos and complexity theory). an instrument of domination and oppression.

One fascinating study that illustrates how the third vision merges and enriches the first two is William Fredericks’ Values, Nature and Culture in the American Corporation (Fredericks, 1995). Fredericks uses the concept of the values held by firm participants to sketch out the clash of forces within a business firm. The most basic clash is between individuals for whom efficiency is a strong value and individuals with a strong need for power. In such a setting what society needs is knowledge of how to tame the power seeking, augment the efficiency seeking and produce x-efficient teamwork. The third vision of SE can contribute much in this area and it can do so in part by tapping into an already large and useful business literature. A fascinating article that illustrates the usefulness of this approach is Tomer’s “Beyond the Machine Model of the Firm: Toward a Holistic Human Model” (Tomer, 1997). 4.3. Institutions and memes Institutions are a prominent feature of the second and third vision, but not of the first. The importance of institutions has long been recognized within the academic field of economics. But that recognition has been largely relegated to the fringe subdiscipline known as institutional economics or, more recently, evolutionary economics. The energizing force behind the first vision of SE does not seem to be any more interested in institutions than is neoclassical economics. The second vision makes institutions a key variable in economic analysis as might be expected by the fact that this vision is heavily influenced by sociology. Institutions are introduced as the constraining factors that make economic activity possible on a large scale and which also contain the alleged negative impacts of the market– based economizing. Etzioni (1988) refers to this perception as the economy being encapsulated in a larger social system. It should be noted that two unorthodox branches of academic economics already do this—institutional economics and radical economics. The third vision picks up where the second leaves off. HSE is interested in the interaction between economic and noneconomic institutions. It sees the influence as bi-directional. In common with the current field of evolutionary economics, this third vision also sees institutions as evolving and studies the evolutionary process. Douglass North’s pioneering work on this issue (North, 1990) would be easily incorporated into this vision but his view

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would be considered incomplete because he stays within the neoclassical paradigm (renamed “the new institutional economics”). The terms institution and meme are often used as synonyms. But the literature on memes gives more prominent attention to ideologies and issues of cognition as well as to the processes whereby these change. In terms of the three visions, the first would probably not pay attention to this aspect of institutions, the second would give it minor attention and the third would pay significant attention to it. Robert Solo provides several excellent examples of this in Economic Organizations and Social Systems (Solo, 1967). For example, his appendix on Mexican economic development over the past several centuries is an excellent study of growth resistant ideologies thwarting what would otherwise have been development producing initiatives. Another good example, this time looking into the future is Carlo Jaeger’s Taming the Dragon (Jaeger, 1994). His concern is with the threat to the environment posed by human economic development. His policy solutions call for a number of changes in dominant memes including the notion that interest rates should be positive. 4.4. Systems All three visions incorporate systems thinking. In fact, even neoclassical economics contains a heavy dose of systems thinking. PSE basically incorporates the current neoclassical approach to systems thinking. As a practical matter, this means that the economic system is analyzed as if it were a closed system. There is no need to examine the interaction between the economic system and other social systems. This vision does incorporate a concern for environmental issues, but limits the analysis to the use of neoclassical economics concepts. SSE does examine such interaction. For example, a recent study by Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997) examines manufacturing systems in different advanced countries and develops the argument the manufacturing methods are part of a larger complex of social systems. They coin the term “Social Systems of Production” as a label for this phenomenon. Apparently independently, a group of evolutionary economists developed a similar vision and labeled the phenomenon “Social Structures of Accumulation” (Kotz, et al., 1994). HSE adds not only social systems but also biological and natural systems. This third vision uses the standard analysis found in the first two visions. But it gives equal respect to more radical treatments such as the spaceship earth thinking of Daly and Cobb (For the Common Good; Daly and Cobb, 1994) or the biology based paradigm of David Korten (The Post Corporate World; Korten, 1999) Daly and Cobb, it will be recalled, argue that unfettered capitalism in the modern era of globalization is unsustainable due to energy constraints and undesirable due to the destruction wrought on local communities and individual lives. Their policy recommendations include largely self-sufficient communities and a cessation of economic growth as we know it. Neoclassical economics lacks the tools to analyze their proposal. So do Visions 1 and 2. But Vision 3 should be able to do the job. Korten takes the insights of leading biologists and presents a systems approach to economic organization in which the economy is organized on the basis of principles of living biological systems. He derives the following set of criteria for a market system that is compatible with other social and natural systems:

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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Markets Markets Markets Markets Markets Markets Markets Markets Markets Markets

521

must sustain life. must put all costs on the decision makers. should favor human-scale firms and stakeholder ownership. must promote equity. must provide full disclosure. must encourage the sharing of knowledge and technology. must promote diversity and self-reliance. must pay attention to borders. must honor government’s necessary role. must foster an ethical culture.

As noted earlier, this living systems approach is one metaphor or meme. There are others and the hallmark of Vision 3 thinking is that the others are also included in the scholar’s tool kit. 4.5. Social mechanisms The term social mechanism is used in sociology to describe a process that produces an identifiable social output. Examples of social mechanisms in contemporary neoclassical economics are the multiplier-accelerator process and the cob-web market adjustment process. Vision 1 of SE would not be particularly interested in social mechanisms. On the other hand, Vision 2 would be since it has adopted the concerns and methods of sociology as part of its program. And Vision 3 would be even more interested in studying social mechanisms. Because mechanisms may involve a variety of different systems, social and other, the vision that incorporates the widest set of systems in its general image of the field is likely to be the one best equipped to study social mechanisms and therefore, the one most likely to pay serious attention to this topic. So Vision 3 would definitely include it but the other two might eventually give up on it out of the sheer frustration of not being able to effectively model the processes. With its interest in social mechanisms, Vision 3 would also be seriously concerned with the study of complexity. This should come naturally to Vision 3 because of its broad vision. The other two visions would undoubtedly give lip service to complexity but would have difficulty dealing with it by virtue of their more limited scopes of topics and methods. 4.6. Empirical tests, replication, history, evolution, and dissolution All three visions accept empirical testing as part of the paradigm. But in practice the degree of concern for empiricism varies. Vision 1 shows some concern but has a bias towards theory and abstract modeling without serious testing Vision 2 shows more concern but runs the risk of overdoing the inductive approach and slighting the theory building and modeling. Vision 3 shows the most concern for empirical investigation whereas at the same time maintaining Vision 1’s concern for theory and modeling. In addition, Vision 3 is distinguished by its commitment to replication of empirical tests. Replication can be boring and, probably for that reason, is largely ignored by the other two

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visions. But it is vital not only for the determination of the validity of previous studies under similar conditions but also for the identification of the cultural, natural and historical settings to which the findings apply. For this reason Vision 3 has a healthy respect for history and is prone to make use it. The historical work would also be particularly interested in evolution of socioeconomic institutions and also in their dissolution. The concern with history also results from Vision 3’s interest in the evolution (and dissolution) of socioeconomic institutions. The literature of institutional economics, both old and new would be an important part of the Vision 3 literature. Perhaps the single work which provides the best overall view of how evolution might be handled is Boulding’s Ecodynamics (1978). There Boulding presents a framework for studying the evolution of social structures, social organizations and social artifacts. He suggests that an understanding of such evolution requires knowledge of several categories of dynamic processes (physical, population, ecological, biological and societal). It also requires recognition and understanding of three types of human relationships which he refers to as the threat system, the exchange system and the integrative system. 4.7. Power Economics has always been about power. From the beginning the discipline has studied the origins and uses of economic power and, to a lesser extent, the interaction of political and economic power. SE would build upon this tradition. Vision 1 would confine its attention to economic and political power. Vision 2 would add ideological power. Vision 3 would incorporate all of the above and add psychological sources of power such as the need for power and the ability to manipulate others. It might even go so far as to consider spiritual sources of power. An interesting use of the power concept is found in Susan Strange’s States and Markets (Strange, 1988). Dealing with power relationships among nations, Strange identifies four types of power: economic production power, economic finance power, military power, and ideological power. At the time she wrote, the U.S. had world leadership in all four (although Japan was challenging the U.S. in terms of economic production power). However, one can conceive of countries that are weak in several areas but compensate with exceptional strength in the others. French ideological hegemony in Latin America up to World War I might be an example. So might the military hegemony of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe after World War II. 4.8. Leadership, entrepreneurship, and excellence The importance of human agency is a common thread among all three SE visions. Vision 1 would focus on agency in the form of entrepreneurship. The driving issue would be to explain how and why individuals introduce new products, new methods and other forms of innovation. Vision 2 would include entrepreneurship but would also add leadership. The driving concern would be to explain how individuals within an organization are able to motivate

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other members of the group to behave in a desired fashion. Obviously, the explanation would include but not be limited to economic incentives. Vision 3 would include the concerns of the other two visions but would also seek to identify and explain examples of superior performance of economic organizations (such as a firm or a regulatory agency) and perhaps of entire economic systems. This, it should be noted, goes against the grain of normal social science that tends to look for averages or normal relationships. When unusual or abnormal phenomena are considered, it is usually in a situation where the departure from the normal is considered to be in some sense undesirable. A healthy respect for historical settings would be important in any attempt to study examples of excellence and leadership and here, too, Vision 3 would have the advantage because it would scan history for examples of excellence and would store the findings in a data bank that would tell us what can conceivably be accomplished under such and such conditions. One of my disappointments, for example, is the tendency for economists to label an economic system a failure if it does well for a period of decades and then begins to falter as external condition change. For example, the success of Germany, Japan, and Sweden in the first three decades after World War II should, in my opinion, be constantly brought to the attention of students and kept in mind as policy planners develop future plans for economic structures and processes.

5. Subject matter comparisons—normative All three versions of SE would maintain a commitment to the scientific spirit and method. But all three would incorporate an image of the good life and the good society. Here is how they would differ. 5.1. The good life The first vision would follow the lead of neoclassical economics. The good life would be assumed to be one of utility maximization. Unlike neoclassical economics, however, this vision would use psychology to show the many ways in which psychological factors make it difficult for persons to achieve utility maximization. The second vision would look at this issue differently. For SSE the good life would consist of one in which the individual achieves a balance between selfish gratification and full participation in the life of several human communities (family, place of work, town, church, etc.). Scholars working out of this paradigm would be interested in how the economy facilitates or hinders individual achievement of this ideal. Charles Handy illustrates this approach in The Hungry Spirit (Handy, 1997). He begins with several chapters pointing out what he regards as ways in which capitalism interferes with the good life—money becomes an end rather than a means, markets lower standards, markets deepen differences, markets ignore the free, competition produces stress and narrow self interest. He then points out how capitalism stimulates some of the virtues that lead to the good life— creativity, choice, responsibility, morality, and community. He next transports

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the argument to the level of our Vision 3 by discussing the nature of the individual in Maslovian terms and going on to stress the importance of spirituality in a good life. To repeat, at this point he has entered into Vision 3 territory. The third vision would take yet a different approach. Because of its willingness to consider the findings from the humanities, including philosophy and religion, it would investigate the interrelationships between economics and the images of the good life found in those literature. One recent example is Robert Lane’s exhaustive literature review of the concept of happiness in The Market Experience (Lane, 1991). Lane concludes that the good life, or happiness, consists of a subjective sense of well being which includes: 1) satisfaction with one’s life as a whole and 2) development of cognitive complexity, self-attribution, and self-esteem. Lane’s second item might be viewed as a representation of selfactualization. A different conceptual approach that appears to have some promise is a University of Helsinki approach recently described by Erik Allardt (1993). This approach postulates three classes of satisfactions that make up the good life—Having (satisfying material and impersonal needs), Loving (satisfying social needs), and Being (satisfying needs for personal growth). The Helsinki group suggests that both objective and subjective indicators could be used to evaluate actual living conditions of groups of people. Following is the example given by Allardt (p. 93): Table 2 Category of need

Objective indicators

Subjective indicators

Having (material and impersonal needs)

1. Objective measures of the level of living and environmental conditions 2. Objective measures of relationships to other people 3. Objective measures of people’s relation to society and nature

4. Subjective feelings of dissatisfaction/satisfaction with living conditions 5. Unhappiness/happinesssubjective feelings about social relations 6. Subjective feelings of alienation/personal growth

Loving (social needs)

Being (needs for personal growth)

Another option is the definition produced by several of the world’s great spiritual traditions—Hinduism, Christianity and Buddhism. In their philosophical forms, these three religions offer a similar definition of the good life, one which still seems to provide useful insight and guidance. Consider, for example, Hindu philosophy as summarized by Huston Smith (1958). In this view there are four human wants: pleasure, worldly success, duty, and liberation. Liberation (joy) can be achieved but for most people it is blocked by one or more of three forces: thwarting of desire, ignorance, and boredom. A person can overcome these barriers and achieve joy or happiness through one of four basic paths or yoga: joy through learning, joy through working joy through serving others, and joy through spiritual practice. Notice how this conception of the good life allows for diversity—there is no single way to live a good life but rather a set of alternatives.

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The recognition of boredom as a motivational factor is worth emphasizing. Boredom is one of the key factors used by economist Tibor Scitovsky in his fascinating and highly relevant discussion of the market and the good life, a discussion which asks whether or not the market system produces joy (The Joyless Economy; Scitovsky, 1992). 5.2. The good society A conception of the good life becomes the basis for identifying the characteristics of a good society. As has been the case consistently throughout this discussion, the first vision would basically accept the neoclassical version of the good society. That vision focuses on processes rather than end results and it further focuses only on the economy. The definition of a good society in this case is a competitive free enterprise economy or a reasonable facsimile thereof. Perhaps this vision would throw in some sort of political democracy as long as property rights were adequately protected. A good slogan for this vision might be the rallying cry of the American Revolution. . . . . LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS. The second vision, SSE, would object to the focus on efficiency. Instead, this vision would conceive of the good society as one would strikes a balance between equity and efficiency. A good slogan for this vision might be the rallying cry of the French Revolution. . . . . LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND FRATERNITY. The point here, of course, is that the good society strikes an appropriate balance between liberty (efficiency) and equity (equality) by creating a strong sense of community (fraternity). Note that as was the case with the first vision, this paradigm also defines the good society in terms of process. Note, also, that two current heterodox branches of academic economics already embrace this vision (Institutional Economics and Radical Economics). Another useful study that would fit into Vision 2 is Hausman and McPherson’s Economic Analysis and Moral Philosophy (Hausman and McPherson, 1996). They argue that neoclassical economics is unknowingly normative with welfare being the norm. They then argue that other norms have a legitimate claim to equal or even superior status. The three alternatives they consider are: freedom, justice, and equality. Finally, a forthcoming article by Diwan carries a title that might be appropriated by Vision 2 economists (Diwan, 2000). Diwan addresses the issue of the quality of life, points out the importance of interpersonal relationships, and coins the term “relational wealth” to help drive home the point to orthodox economists. However, Diwan’s analysis should not be placed in the Vision 2 category. His vision is too broad for that. The third vision, HSE, recognizes the importance of process and would include some sort of political democracy and competitive market economy in its definition of the good society. This version would be wary of the danger of insufficiently allowing for the interests of the individual. So its slogan might combine the first two slogans as follows: LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY, AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS. This is the slogan of a revolution that has not yet taken place. Perhaps the best recent exploration of this third view appears in Etzioni’s The New Golden Rule. His stated rule for proper behavior in a good society is, “Respect and uphold society’s moral order as you would have society respect and uphold your autonomy.” His analysis

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makes it clear that no society ever seems to get the balance just right. Instead history shows periodic swings from one extreme to the other. But the basic standard remains and serves as an attractor to pull society back from the extremes. Two related phenomena that might fit in the second vision but would clearly be part of the third are civility and Covenantal relationships. Civility as discussed, for example, by Stephen Carter (1998) provides a social psychological environment within which cooperative activity is more likely to occur similarly. Covenantal relationships provide the social psychological environment within which other regarding behavior is more likely to occur. Such relationships would apply to society as a whole (Selznick, 1992) and individual organizations such as the business firm (De Pree, 1989). Behavioral economists would have a natural interest in finding out how such psychological environments are fostered or hindered by alternative forms of economic organization. And, of course, behavioral economists would be expected to empirically test for the hypothesized relationship between improved economic performance and the presence of civility and covenant. Vision 3, with its commitment to empiricism and proactive policy, would add one more element to the search for the good society. It would attempt to identify the full range of desirable social results that are related to the economy. Such a list of “objectives” of an economy might look something like this: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Efficiency. Growth and Development. Equity. Security. Freedom and self actualization or happiness. Protection of the Natural Environment. Protection of the Political Environment. Protection of the Community Environments.

In each of these dimensions the third vision would seek to define and develop measures of the concept; to identify conflicts or trade-offs among the objectives; and to identify the social mechanisms whereby economic activity affects society in terms of each objective. The objective of security merits a few additional comments. Casual empiricism suggests that this is a major motive for much economic behavior. Yet explicit discussions of the phenomenon are relatively rare. One interesting exception is Mark Massel’s Competition and Monopoly (Massel, 1964). This book predicted that the desire for personal security was so strong that it would become the future focus of economic policy and research. The most basic issue with regard to security is the size and nature of the trade-offs between security and efficiency and growth. An example of the kind of research that needs to be done is an empirical study of the trade-offs recently published by Goldsmith, et al. (1997). They tested the hypothesis that exposure to economic insecurity would impair the individual’s sense of well– being. Their sample was drawn from the United State’s National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. They found joblessness did damage self-esteem for women although, “the damage is akin to a blemish.” They also found that for both men and women, the longer the exposure to joblessness, the greater the loss of self-esteem.

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One final difference among the three visions has to do with openness to extremist conceptions of the good society. The first two visions would probably have little patience with extreme ideas falling outside the core paradigm. However, the third vision would be open and respectful toward such views. The basic attitude would be that the extremists may or may not have insights that will be useful but that it is important to not only listen to them but to do so repeatedly on the chance that these seemingly “crack pot ideas” may actually point the way toward improved understanding.

6. The place of policy issues across the three paradigms 6.1. Government Once again, Vision 3 would incorporate the first two visions and then create something greater than the sum of the two. Vision 1 would follow the view of neoclassical economics in which government is an arena of self-aggrandizement. Voters and government officials would be viewed as pursuing their own narrow self-interests. The various psychological phenomena now part of Vision 1 would be introduced to show how such self-interest seeking is carried out. The basic ideology regarding government’s place would probably be to replace government with markets wherever possible. Vision 2 would take a position toward the other end of the spectrum because of the intense concern with equity and income redistribution. It would be recognized that self-seeking is common but it would also be argued that statesmanship and concern for others can exist and should be promoted. This vision would introduce an emphasis on public decision-making processes that tend to diminish the self-seeking. A major process that is prominently discussed in this literature is dialogue (Cayer and Minkler, 1998; Etzioni, 1996; Selznick, 1992). Vision 3 would extend the position of Vision 2 by drawing more heavily on humanistic psychology. It would introduce the study of ways of creating effective civil services, voting publics and legislatures not only through institutional changes but also by appealing to the higher natures of the participants (higher on the Maslovian hierarchy). 6.2. Nation states and comparative systems Surely one of the most important policy issues of the present generation is the future of the nation state in the context of the globalization process. Put simply, globalization effectively emasculates the nation state. The nation-state loses a significant amount of the power it traditionally had to regulate and/or promote economic activity. Potential casualties of globalization are the income redistribution and security promoting policies of most industrial nations. And so it would seem logical for economics to be intensively involved in identifying the trade-offs, estimating the magnitudes involved and making that knowledge widely available to the voting public and public officials. Similarly, globalization raises the question of whether or not the nations of the world are evolving toward one common economic system and if so, whether or not that is desirable.

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And so it would seem important for economists to be heavily involved in studying these issues and sharing the results with decision-makers. Vision 1, PSE, would probably not feel obliged to pay attention to these matters because they seem to be largely macroeconomic in nature. Nevertheless, as members of the profession, Vision 1 economists would probably accept what seems to be the dominant professional view that there is one best system, broadly defined, and that the globalization of this system with concomitant loss of national sovereignty is a desirable development. Vision 2 would probably disagree. It would hold that there are several alternative good economic systems. Two examples might be the American version of capitalism and the so-called Alpine alternative (Germany, Sweden). Version 2 would probably take the position that some restrictions on globalization are needed to allow different nations to maintain their versions of capitalism. Vision 3 would begin with Vision 2’s perspective but would also make the study of comparative economic systems a major part of its mission. An important component of that study would be to envision entire new systems and subsystems not yet invented. An example of a subsystem might be the binary economics program of the late Louis Kelso (Ashford, 1996; Kelso and Adler, 1958; Kelso and Hetter, 1967) and recent variations on Kelso’s basic theme (Gates, 1998; Turnbull, 1998). Like Vision 2, Vision 3 would place a value on diversity and would therefore make the study of the viability of nation states a major agenda item. This would not be a dogmatic effort to save the nation state in general. Instead it would be a civil effort to identify the trade-offs involved in protecting national sovereignty in different ways and different settings. 6.3. Policy sets—the range of cognition of policy possibilities As expected, the three visions differ in terms of the range of issues and range of instruments considered appropriate for policy analyses. Vision 1 would be basically neoclassical in scope but with improved details due to the better understanding of psychological processes. Vision 2 would broaden the range of issues and instruments by bringing sociological factors to bear. A major contribution of this vision would be its awareness and, therefore use, of community based conflict resolution processes such as dialogue. Vision Three would have the broadest range of policy issues and instruments. In particular, it would be most likely to work for improved performance within a given institutional framework by securing better motivation and better knowledge on the part of participants and by making use of better role modeling to set the stage for better behavior by economic agents. An example of the differences among the three visions might be illustrated by their respective treatments of “conspicuous consumption” or “positional spending.” This phenomenon has long been recognized, starting with Thorstein Veblen (1934), continuing through Harvey Leibenstein (1950), resurfacing with Tibor Scitovsky (1992) and reappearing most recently in a book by Robert Frank aimed at a broad audience (Frank, 1999). Vision 1 would largely ignore this aspect of the person. Vision 2 would probably follow the line of argument used by Frank to the effect that excessively wide income disparities lead to large scale waste through positional spending and that public policy is therefore needed to contain the excesses

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(Frank considers a wide range of alternatives, including voluntary simplicity and then chooses a progressive consumption tax as the preferred policy instrument). Vision 3 would probably take the position that conspicuous consumption is ultimately a matter of individual choice and that individuals operating at the highest levels on the Maslow hierarchy would not be seriously engaged in the practice. From there Vision 3 would probably look for policy actions consisting of a combination of modifications of the social capsule (institutions) and personal growth of the economic agents. Personal growth would come about as a result, for example, of such developments as better knowledge and role modeling. Of course, Frank has convincingly argued that voluntary simplicity (which is what Vision 3 seeks) has not worked in the past. But the core of Vision 3 is the view that social policy in general and economic policy in particular is still quite primitive compared to its potential. And it will remain so until Socio-Economics or an alternative develops the knowledge base needed for advanced policy-making. 6.4. Policy posture SE operating out of either the Vision 1 or the Vision 2 paradigm would be primarily concerned with acceptance and recognition by their professional peers. They would thus engage in policy studies when and where there were professional rewards to be reaped. They would not be particularly interested in solving pressing policy problems that might make a significant contribution to the welfare of the nation’s residents if their research in such an area would not bring professional recognition. Worse yet, they would actively avoid working in areas that they personally believed would produce social good but which their profession regards as unworthy of the attention of a reputable economist. Even worse, they might tend to let important truths become neglected to focus their research on newer topics more likely to create professional recognition for themselves. An interesting example of the role played by self interest in the paradigm chosen by economists is reported by industrial organization economist Carl Kaysen in his explanation of the reasons why the newest generation of economists seem to be oblivious to the issue of the market power of the large corporation This is an issue that used to be at the forefront of industrial organization analysis and current circumstances in the American economy would seem to dictate continued focus on the issue. Yet the newer generation of industrial economists does not seem interested. Kaysen (1996) thinks it’s a matter of ideology. As he puts it, Perhaps the most important factor in the change is the shift in attitude— one might Almost say ideology—in the economics profession in respect to the virtues and shortcomings of the market as a master institution for organizing economic activity. In the fifties economists . . . on the whole emphasized the shortcomings of the market and the need for government action to correct them, even while acknowledging the market’s virtues . . . Today, the virtues of the market and the shortcomings of government are the baselines of discussion. (p. 17)

What explains this shift? There are alternative possibilities— one is ideology. As Kaysen says, the virtues of the market become the baseline (Vision 2 interpretation). But another force might be the desire of the younger generation to alleviate boredom and achieve quicker

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professional recognition by ignoring the old topics and moving on to new ones (Vision 3 interpretation). As portrayed in this paper, Vision 3 behavioral economists would depart from the narrow professional recognition approach to research. Their primary concern would be to make a genuine contribution to the advancement of society in general and particular groups of individuals in particular. They would not necessarily shun professional recognition but they would not seek it either. And they would readily tackle important policy issues even if their departmental colleagues warned them that being associated with the issue could harm their professional reputation. This, of course, is the story told in this paper and it is quite likely to be more altruistic a view than can be accommodated within the academy. However, the personality traits that would cause a person to embrace Vision 3 as her guiding paradigm also tend to be the traits that permit a person to rise to high levels of altruism. So at least there is a tiny glimmer of hope for my view of the pro-active Vision 3 behavioral economist.

7. Conclusion As this brief presentation makes clear, SABE, SASE, and the Law and Economics Section of AALS face significant paradigm choices in the years ahead. The choices actually made may bear little similarity to the ideas of the associations’ founders. Jerome Bruner’s review of the cognitive revolution in psychology alerts us to that fact. But whatever paradigms eventually emerge will surely represent progress in terms of social scientists’ ability to analyze the economy. The role of The Journal of Socio-Economics in all of this is to provide a forum for the widest possible exposition of germane analyses. The JSE welcomes articles that represent any of the three visions discussed above plus alternative visions not covered in this article. In times of extreme scarcity of space, priority will be given to the frame of reference represented by Vision 3. But all points of view are respected and every effort will be made to accomodate them within the pages of the journal. References Ackerman, F. (1997). Consumed in theory: alternative perspectives on the economics of consumption. J Econ Issues 31(3), 651– 664. Ashford, R. (1996). Louis Kelso’s binary economy. J Socio-Econ 25(1), 1–53. Ashford, R. (1997). Socio-economics: what is its place in law practice? Wisconsin Law Review 3, 611– 623. Berger, S., & Dore, R. (1996). National Diversity and Global Capitalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Carter, S. L. (1998). Civility: Manner, Morals and the Etiquette of Democracy. New York: Basic Books. Castells, M. (1996). The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture: Volume I. The Rise of the Network Society. Malden, MA: Blackwel1. Castells, M. (1997). The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture: Volume II. The Power of Identity. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Castells, M. (1998). The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture: Volume III. End of Millennium. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Cayer, M., & Minkler, L. (1998). Dualism, dialogue, and organizations: reflections on organizational transformation and labor-managed firms. J Socio-Econ 27(1), 53–78.

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