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The Malaysian general election of 1986
ANDREINJ Torr prepared to make any gestures to accommodate them. And so, while the media persuaded large numbers of Whites who had never been fervent Afrikaner nationalists or even party members to vote for the NP. the insider Afrikaner academics who had at long last become frustrated by the failures of the party’s internal democratic processes went the other way and rallied around Dennis Worrall and the Independents. When it came to counting the votes the intellectuals were, of course, very much in the minority but in the long run their defection may prove to be of greater significance to the future of the party than the media-induced support of any number of floating voters. (It remains to be seen to what extent the NP will make special efforts to draw its academic critics back into the fold-and how they will respond to such overtures.) On closer analysis, the NP’s massive electoral victory in the 1987 election may thus be some-
279
what less solid than it would at first sight appear. Indeed there may well be circumstances, especially with the media taking a difierent line, in which substantial numbers of those who voted for the NP this time round would be quite prepared to switch their allegiance once more. For the time being, however, the NP remains the only game in town-and it is in effective control of the media. Short of a major crisis in the contest or a rivalry for leadership succession, should P. W. Botha decide to retire, the NP looks set to continue its dominance of white politics well into the next decade. The real challenges to NP-rule is not to be expected in the parliamentary arena at all, but from the extra-parliamentary forces of opposition and resistance. Unless a way can be found to accommodate these within the parliamentary framework future elections will be increasingly peripheral to the central political processes in South African society.
The Malaysian General Election of 1986 A. MALEK HANAFUH*
Malaysia’s seventh general election took place on 3 August 1986’ it was for both the House of Parliament (177 seats were contested) and the State Assembly (3 5 1 seats were contested). However, in the states of Sabah and Sarawak only parliamentary elections were held, Sabah having had its state election in April 1985, while the state election in Sarawak was held in April 1987. Background Before January 1973, Malaysia was ruled by the Alliance party, which took over the administration from the British colonial rule in August 1957. The Alliance was a tripartite intercommunal coalition party of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) headed first by Tunku Abdul Rahman, later by Tun Abdul Razak. The name of the party was then changed to the Barisan Nasional (RN literally means the National Front), after the Alliance offered to cooperate with opposition parties in order to reduce politicking and promote national integration after ’ A postgraduate College, Oxford.
student
at St.
Antony’s
the bloody racial clashes in May 1969. Although the offer was flatly rejected by the Democratic Action Party (DAP) which alleged the BN was an Alliance strategy to weaken the opposition which was getting stronger after the third general election of 1969, other opposition parties, the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan), the Parti Islam Malaysia (PAS), the People’s Progressive Party (PPP), and the Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP), joined the new grand coalition.? For the 1986 general election, ‘the Barisan Nasional’s government was headed by the most controversial Prime Minister Malaysia has ever had, Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohammad, who became the fourth Prime Minister on 16 July 1981, when the third Prime Minister, Datuk Hussein Onn retired for health reasons. Two years before the general election, constituency boundaries were changed. It was a normal process because the last realignment was in 1964. This change had increased the seats, from 154 parliamentary and 408 state seats to 177 parliament and 544 state seats.3 Opposition politicians, particularly from the DAP, were unhappy with the changes because some of their strongholds in the urban areas were split. But no general charge of partisan gerrymandering could be sustained.
280
The Malaysian General Election of 1986 The Lead-up to the Election
Throughout 1985, Mahathir’s government suffered a series of setbacks. Inflation had increased to 26 per cent. The commodity downturn had hit virtually all the nation’s export commodities. Rural communities (a majority of them were Malay), were resentful about the very low prices of their agricultural products. Malay farmers in the government’s land settlement the Federal schemes, Land Development Authority (FELDA), who were traditionally UMNO supporters manifested their discontent by attending, in vast numbers, most of the opposition Islamic Party (PAS) gatherings. Similarly the Chinese tin miners, vegetable growers and the Indian estate workers started to leave their traditional parties of the MCA, MIC and Gerakan for the opposition DAP. As the food prices continued to increase, the biggest trade union for the government employees, the Congress of Union of Employees in the Public and Civil Services (CUEPACS) headed by Ahmad Nor, a Malay leftist, demanded a pay increase of at least 15 per cent. In June 1985, when the government responded by offering a less than 5 per cent increase for employees in categories C and D-the lower income brackets comprising teachers, clerical and manual workers -the CUEPACS, felt insulted. Union leaders reacted by organizing several rallies throughout the Peninsula so as to tell their 870,000 members that the union was preparing a nationwide strike. CUEPACS members picketed during their lunch breaks, which grew from 2,000 in small towns to 8,000 people in state capita1s.l Dr Mahathir refused to negotiate with the union’s leaders, accusing them of trying to threaten his elected government. He argued that he would only be willing to meet the union’s representative if they called off the threat. On 1 October when the CUEPACS finally staged its first nation-wide pickets, Mahathir’s government was shocked. However Ahmad Nor failed to get wider support for the pickets. Many of its Malay members, who were also UMNO members, believed that he was co-operating with the opposition in the latter’s effort to expose government weakness. The battle for a pay rise continued in Parliament when opposition politicians labelled Mahathir’s government as a ‘big spender’. Government ‘prestige projects’ such as the Dayabumi office and shopping complex of MS400m. (USSl53m.), the Penang bridge project of MS850m. (USS326m.) and the national car industry project of MS560m. (US%21 5m.) were frequently quoted as examples. They argued although these projects were good
they should not be built during a period of recession. Government priority should first be given to improving the social and health services, and the rural development programmes rather than to prestige projects. Mahathir’s ways of handling the Bumiputra Merchant Finance (BMF) scandal involving the loss of MS2.5 billion (USS961m.) also came under attack from the opposition. They demanded a Royal Commission to investigate the manner in which a series of loans were approved to the Carrian Property Group in Hong Kong. Although rumours had been circulating since 1983 about the scandal, Mahathir was reluctant to admit to any problem. In fact he sacked the Bank’s chairman and appointed Dr Nawawi in his place. But Mahathir’s man, Dr Nawawi, was also unable to stop the money flowing to Hong Kong. Due to strong pressure from all sides, Mahathir finally set up a committee of inquiry, Auditor-General, Ahmad headed by the Noordin. Many people, especially the professionals, academics and politicians were disappointed with the government for failing to set up a Royal Commission, because they could still remember Mahathir’s promise to lead ‘a clean, efficient and trustworthy’ government, if his party returned to power in the 1982 election campaign. Mahathir’s credibility was seriously questioned in the BMF scandal. Mahathir was further embarrassed in April 1985, when the BN government of Berjaya in Sabah lost the state election to the newly founded Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), led by a Christian minister, despite strong backing from his federal Weeks before the election, government. Mahathir himself went down to campaign for the incumbent Berjaya government with a clear strongly worded statement that ‘we will swim and sink together with the Berjaya’. After Datuk Joseph was sworn in as the new Chief Minister, he was openly challenged by Datuk Harris Salleh of Berjasa who had invited his former rival, Tun Datu Mustapa of the USN0 party to join the pressure group. They openly claimed that Pairin’s sworn-in ceremonial was null and void because the Sabah Yang di Pertuan Negeri had earlier sworn-in Tun Datu Mustapa as the Chief Minister. He only changed his mind after the Acting Prime Minister, Datuk Musa Hitam directed him to appoint Pairin Kitingan. Mahathir who was on an official visit to Switzerland was reported as not happy with Datuk Muss’s decision. ln Sabah, Harris and Mustapa mobilized their supporters, mostly the Muslims, and held a series of demonstrations at Kota Kinabalu, alleging Kitingan’s government were discriminating against Muslim civil
AMALEK
servants. Dr IMahathir’s slow reaction to the Sabah problem had angered the opposition who questioned his sincerity in Parliament. Although Mahathir argued that this was a state problem and he strongly believed that Kitingan’s government and the police could handle it smoothly, the opposition refused to budge.’ Besides having difficulties with the DAP, Mahathir’s government was also under heavy attack from the PAS. UMNO leaders and its followers were labelled as ‘unbelievers and infidels’ because of their constant refusal to adopt the concept of a wholly Islamic state in Malaysia.6 Since many of the PAS leaders were followers of the Iranian Islamic revolutionary government, they then brought the Iranian teaching into the country which added to Mahathir’s mounting problems. Although Mahathir’s government had implemented several projects for the Muslims, such as the setting-up of an international Islamic university in 1982, followed by an Islamic bank in 1983, upgraded the Islamic Court of Law (Syariah Court) in late 1983 and formed an Islamic insurance company (Syarikat Takaful Islam) in 1984, all this received little support from the PAS. In fact, they argued that those policies had not altered the secularizing policies of the government. PAS leaders then continued with its programme of spreading the teaching of an Islamic revolution. Three states which have got large groups of Malay voters came under the PAS’s attack. In a village in Memali, Baling, Kedah police had sent reports to the Home Affairs Minister that the religious teacher, Ibrahim Mahmood, had been gathering his students who came to his house armed with swords and bamboo spears. On 19 November 1985 when the police party went to check Ibrahim’s house, they were confronted by Ibrahim’s followers who stoned and shot at the police. In a battle between them, Ibrahim and 13 of his men were killed.’ The police lost four men. PAS national leaders quickly condemned the government as ‘anti-Islam’ and cowardly. They then organized rallies throughout the Peninsula to explain the government cruelty against fellow Muslims and Malay villagers. Most of the PAS rallies had attracted huge crowds. UMNO members, particularly in the rural areas, felt sympathy with the PAS after listening to the talks. Some of them even urged the government to set up an inquiry into the incident. Opinion polls carried out by a tabloid Malay language newspaper, the Watan, at the end of 1985 showed that Mahathir’s popularity was sharply reduced from 85 per cent, after winning the 1982 general election, to just slightly above 50 per cent.8 Although UMNO leaders at the
281
HANAFMH
national level were not worried by the opinion polls, UMNO leaders at the state and division levels who were obviously closer to the grassroots, were worried. Internal
Crises
Throughout 1985, the BN component parties also had their own internal problems. The Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) was hit by a long power struggle between the acting president. Datuk Dr Neo Yee Pan, and its vice president, Tan Koon Swan. The crisis first erupted publicly in March 1984 and dragged on for about two years, when Tan Koon Swan, who was in the running for the party presidency, accused Neo of padding the party membership register to ensure his confirmation as party president at the party election. At the height of the crisis, Neo and his men in the Central Committee expelled Tan Koon Swan and his minority supporters in the Central Committee. Although Tan and his men were reinstated after the BIN’S secretary general intervened. the crisis continued. Finally when the MCA held its long overdue general assembly in November 1985, Tan Koon Swan won the contest as the MCA president with 2,7 15 votes, 77 per cent of votes cast.9 Neo and his men were not happy with the result and accused Dr Mahathir of interfering in the MCA affairs. His followers at the state and division levels were worried that their political future as members of parliament or state assemblymen would be at stake, suspecting that the winning group would take the opportunity to remove all ‘opponents’ at every level. The Malayan Indian Congress (MIC). another partner in the BN was also unhappy with the administration when its leader, Datuk Sammy Vellu (a senior minister in Mahathir’s cabinet), openly criticized the Malay dominated civil servants for discriminating against Indians. He argued that although most decisions reached in the cabinet were for the benefit of the multiracial society, their implementation by the civil servants was very different. Sammy Vellu’s criticism provoked angry reactions from the UMNO politicians. A spokesman from the UMNO youth wing described the minister as ‘a tiger outside but a mouse inside the cabinet’, arguing that he should raise the complaint in the weekly cabinet meeting not in public. The spokesman’s comments angered the hIIC Youth, which retaliated by questioning the special position of the Malays in the federal constitution. This was followed by a demand from some quarters of the UMNO for the resignation of Sammy Vellu. To the Indian’s shock. hlahathir
282
The Malay&n General Election of 1986
backed the UMNO Youth, pointing out that in no constituency did Indians form a majority-a remark which upset some Indians. MIC members were disappointed and felt IMahathir had belittled the importance of Indian votes to the BN, particularly in constituencies where the Chinese and half of the Malay votes had been for the opposition.‘0 In early 1986, Mahathir faced a big and serious problem in his own party, the UMNO, when his deputy leader who was also Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister resigned from the cabinet due to differences of opinion in the way the country should be run. *I To avoid demonstrations from his followers in Johore, the southern state of the Peninsula, he left for Britain. However, the demonstration occurred. Demonstrators, from the Johore UMNO, demanded Dr Mahathir sack those responsible for the rift between him and Musa. The development in the UMNO had worried all parties in the coalition Barisan Nasional because UMNO had been the backbone of the ruling party since 1954 when the first coalition party, the Alliance, was formed. However, before the dissolution of Parliament and State Assemblies, the UMNO crisis was temporarily resolved when Datuk Musa agreed to resume as deputy leader although he still refused to serve in the cabinet. The Announcement After realizing that the country’s economy was improving, businesses were back to normal and most of the other problems had either been solved or improved, Dr Mahathir was persuaded by senior BN leaders to call an early general election in August 1986. Prior to the announcement, there had been speculation about the date (which did not have to be before April 1987). Nothing pointed to August because during that month about 20,000 Muslims from Malaysia were expected to travel to Mecca for a pilgrimage. Thus, the announcement of the dissolution first by the Prime Minister and followed by the Chairman of the Election Commission caught the opposition by surprise, particularly the Islamic Party (PAS) which believed that the general election would not be held until after many of the Muslims returned from Mecca in October 1986. The announcement was immediately challenged by the opposition leader, Lim Kit Siang, who argued that the Chairman of the Election Commission should first announce the dates for the nomination and polling only then could the Prime Minister announce the dissolution. He also challenged that the fifteen days notice between the dissolution and the polling day was
inadequate, as required by the 1986 amendment of the election law.12 The DAP took its complaint to the High Court in the hope that the announcement would be considered as null and void. After the court had heard the case on 26 July 1986, it ruled that the Prime Minister was in the right when he announced the dissolution, after receiving consent from the Yang di Petuan Agong (the Malaysian constitutional monarchy). The Chairman must make his announcement after the Prime Minister and the fifteen days’ notice which includes the weekends was proper because the law does not state fifteen ‘working’ days.t3 The opposition parties were unhappy with the time available for campaigning and canvassing. Opposition politicians argued that although the shorter period was first introduced in the 1974 general election in order to avoid manipulation of communal sentiments which had occurred in the 1969 elections and had led to racial clashes, it was not as short as in 1986. In response to the complaint, Dr Mahathir argued that the opposition parties had been campaigning for four years, since the last general election in April 1982. The Contestants For the 1986 general election, 20 political parties were involved, 15 were component partners in the grand coalition party of the Barisan Nasional (BIN) and five opposition parties. The BN components were: 1. The United Malays National Organization
(UMNO) :: 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.
The Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) The Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) The Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan) The People’s Progressive Party (PPP) The Hisbul Muslim Party (Hamim) Parti Berjasa (Berjasa) Sarawak United People’s Partv (SUPP) Sarawak Nationalist Party (SNAP) Parti Bumiputra Bersatu (PBB) Sarawak Sarawak Chinese Association (SCA) Parti Berjaya Sabah (Berjaya) The United Sabahan National Organization
(USNO) 14. Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak (PBDS) 15. Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) While the opposition parties were: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
The The The The The
Democratic Action Party (DAP) Islamic Party (PAS) Parti Sosialis Rakyat Malaya (PSRM) Social Democratic Party (SDP) Parti Nasionalis Malaysia (NASMA)
However, not all the parties put up candidates.
A. MALEK HANAFL~H From the BN components, only five out of seven member parties in the Peninsula took part. The Berjasa and Hamim did not ask for seats from the BN’s Supreme Council but their leaders helped to campaign for BN’s candidates. In Sarawak, all five members, the SUPP, SNAP, SCA, PBB and the PBDS helped each other to win the 24 parliamentary seats. Their opponents were the DAP and independent candidates. Similarly in Sabah, the three member parties of the BN, the USNO, Berjaya and PBS, although they were rivals in the state election held a year before the general election, co-operated quite well in the parliamentary election against the DAP. Among the opposition parties, only the DAP and PAS had some impact on the BN. The SDP and NASMA were new and had little experience. The PSRM did not participate in the election because its members were demoralized with their long term leader, Kassim Ahmad, having left the party to join the UMNO in 1985.
The Campaign During the campaign, the issues were the ones that had already been raised by the opposition: such as the BMF scandal, government ‘white elephant’ projects, increases in the inflation rate, higher unemployment, no freedom of press and the Internal Security Act (ISA). BN’s 1982 election slogan of ‘A Clean, Efficient and Trustworthy Government’ was the opposition’s first target. They argued that Mahathir’s government had failed to keep promises made in 1982 because in four years after winning the last election the administration was never clean and efficient. The government, they argued, had not done enough to eradicate corruption and poverty in the multiracial society. Mahathir’s decision to change the name of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to its original name, the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA), a few months after winning the 1982 general election, was seen as a political gimmick because no ‘big fish’ was arrested and charged in the courts BN’s politicians holding public offices were, allegedly, abusing their authority and position. Barisan Nasional’s 1986 slogan of ‘A Tradition of Serving The People’ became the laughing-stock of the opposition parties. They argued if the Barisan government sincerely wanted to serve the people it should find ways to reduce the inflation rate and stop spending on ‘big projects’ such as the national car industry. To counter the BN, the DAP publicized its slogan of ‘Deny them the 2/3 majority’. To the DAP this slogan was very important because the public should be taught not to give the BN a two-
283
thirds majority which would enable them to amend the Constitution or get any Bill through easily. One thing that was very clear was that the DAP for the first time since it was founded in 1968. did not highlight so much its traditional issues of Chinese education, Chinese language university and Chinese culture. On the other hand the Islamic Party (PAS) maintained its traditional slogan of ‘Forming an Islamic nation’ if it came to power. However, its overall strategy was changed. Instead of wooing the hlalay votes in the rural areas as it had done in every election since independence, PAS focused on the urban Chinese. PAS leaders believed that if they could convince the nonwho Muslims, particularly the Chinese, dominated the urban areas of the good and fairness of an Islamic nation they could get some support from the Chinese voters who seemed very open and willing to change their party affiliations. In fact, before PAS leaders decided to adopt this strategy, they had tried successfully to attract the Chinese, when a symposium entitled ‘Islam and National Unity’ organized by them at the Chinese Assembly Hall in Kuala Lumpur received a huge attendance by the Chinese. During the discussion, PAS leader Hadi Awang, startled the audience by suggesting that in Islam, anybody could become a prime minister, even the Chinese, provided he was a Muslim with leadership qualities. The Islamic state as proposed by PAS would not discriminate against people on racial or religious grounds. Later at a public meeting in Trengganu, Hadi Awang again told the Chinese audience that if the PAS came into power. it would abolish the constitutional provision for a special position for the indigenous population. To further convince the Chinese, PAS leaders announced that it was co-operating with the Chinese Consultative Committee (CCC), a body formed by Chinese intellectuals who did not affiliate with any Chinese party. During the campaign, CCC members organized talks all over the Peninsula, to mobilize Chinese support for the PAS. The Results When the results were announced in the early hours of 4 August 1986, to the opposition’s surprise, Barisan Nasional had won another landslide victory. With 152 out of 177 parliamentary seats, and retained control of all the eleven states in the Peninsula (see Table 1). In the parliamentary election, the DAP had failed to stop BN achieving a two-thirds majority, although it managed to increase its members of parliament from 9 in the 1982 election to 24. All
The Malaysian General Election of 19886
284
TABLE 1. State election results in the PeninsuIa. 1986 State Perlis Kedah Pahang Selangor N. Sembilan Malacca Johore Perak Penang Kelantan Terangganu Total
BN
PAS
14
:;: 30
0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 2
300
14
:: 37 24 17 ::
DAP
Total
0 0
14 28
: 4 3
43: 28 20
1: 10 0 0
:: 33
37
351
::
the 24 constituencies won by DAP were in urban areas. The party had captured 24 out of the 33 parliamentary constituencies which have a Chinese majority. For the PAS, it was a disastrous ending to a good start. Despite several predictions made before the elections that the party would at least capture 15 parliamentary seats, it won only 1 seat. All PAS leaders in the ‘inner circle’ including its president, deputy president, three vice presidents, secretary general and supreme council members lost their contests. The BN landslide victory was due mainly to its well organized party machinery and the advantage of being a ruling government. Its slogan of ‘A Tradition of Serving the People’ had helped the party to capture a majority of the Malay votes in the rural areas which saw the UMNO as their sole protector and obliged them to express their gratitude by voting for the UMNO and the BN. Although the PAS had made a good start in the beginning of 1985, its popularity suddenly declined among the rural Malays who did not agree with the PAS strategy of co-operating with the non-Muslims (Chinese). They were surprised at PAS politicians who had condemned the UMNO for the last two decades for ‘selling-out’ to the Chinese through cooperation in the coalition government, when they themselves in turn tried to co-operate with the ‘infidels’ (Chinese). The PAS had made another blunder, a few days before the election, when instead of concentrating on getting more votes, it was busy trying to form an opposition front with the Parti Sosialis Rakyat Malaya (PSRM), Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Parti Nasionalist Malaysia (NASMA). This move had provided a
weapon for UMNO politicians to slaughter the PAS with when they openly accused the funda mentalist Islamic party of adopting a double standard. because, while condemning UMNO as a secularist party, the PAS itself was involved in a pact with non-religious parties. While UMNO attacked PAS over its attempts to co-operate with the non-religious group, BN’s Chinese politicians told their fellow Chinese not to believe the PAS because the party was controlled by religious fanatics who were not in sympathy with the non-llluslims. They reminded the Chinese voters of the case in Iran where Khomeini’s mullahs appealed for co-operation from non religious groups in their effort to overthrow the Shah of Iran but eliminated them wshen Khomeini came to power. I’ Thus, the PAS not only lost its traditional votes from the rural Malays but also failed to get support from the urban Chinese. The DAP on the other hand, although it did not make any gains in the state elections, increased its representation in parliament. Its successes were mainly due to its adroit projection of its image as the people’s champion. Although the DXP had played down the communal issues, it still maintained its traditional image as a party fighting for Chinese interests. This had helped the party to capture most of the Chinese new voters who felt that the government had discriminated against them in education and emplovment.rs DAP successes in capturing 72 per cent of the urban constituencies showed strong anti-government feelings in the urban areas. Another image projected by DAP was its
TABLE
2. Parliamentary
election Malaysia, 1986
State Perlis Kedah Pahang Selangor N. Sembiian Malacca Johore Perak Penang Kelantan Terangganu Federal Territory Sabah Saran-ak TotaI
BIN 20 14 10 12 50 40 18 19 5 12 80 40
PAS
0 0 0
0 0 0 I
:;
0 0
152
1
results
in
DAP
Total
0 0 0 2 2 15 0 4 6 0 0 4 4 1
2 14 10 14 7
24
18 23 11 13 8 8 20 24 177
A. MALEK HAN~FIAH brave stand on national issues such as the BMF scandal, government ‘big spending’ behaviour, abuse of authority and position, unemployment, racial discrimination, corruption and religious extremism. This image had helped them to get support from the middle class English educated Chinese professionals who were traditionally supporters of either MCA or Gerakan. Thus, besides maintaining its traditional support from the Chinese-educated Chinese, for the first time English-educated Chinese professionals and the younger generation had helped them to win more seats than before.
Conclusion Having examined the outcome of the 1986 general election what does the electoral verdict mean for the future of Malaysian politics? Obviously the first impact is that the parliament is split into two communal groups, a Malay dominated government and a Chinese dominated opposition. If the DAP continues its previous role as the spokesman for Chinese grievances and is likely to be opposed by BN backbenchers, parliamentary proceedings will look like a ‘confrontation’ between the Malays and Chinese. It is also feared that communal ill-feeling which the government has been trying to control since the May 1969 incident, might reemerge in the next election. A bipolar political tussle between the Malays and the Chinese which started in the colonial days will continue to dominate the Malaysian political scene because the 60 per cent of Chinese electors who voted for the DAP would like to defend their political gain.” The ethnic polarization, if deepened by communal manipulation will then contribute to political instability in Malaysia in the next decade. However, as Rabushka and Shepsle” have suggested, the key element in maintaining stability in a highly fractionalized society like Malaysia is the ability of its leaders to accommodate various demands in that society. Whether this can be achieved will depend greatly on the new leadership of the Barisan Nasional in the coming years.
285 Notes and References
1. The first general election in Malaysia (previously known as Malaya) took place in 1959. However, before independence in 1957, a general election was held in 1955. It was only for 54 parliamentary seats to the Federal Legislative Council. 2. See R. S. Milne and D. K. Mauzy, Politics and Government in Maiaysia, (Kuala Lumpur: Federal Publication, 1978), pp. 173-91. See also A. M. Hanafiah, ‘Coalition Politics in Malaysia: A Study of the Grand Coalition Government, 19721978’, (MA Dissertation, University of Essex, 1978). see Harold Crouch, 3. For comparison General Elections, Malaysia‘s 1982 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982). 4. The Star, 2 October 1985. 5. The Star, 28 October 1985. See also Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 130, No. 46, 21 November 1985, pp. 16-17. 6. Utusan Malaysia, 17 June 1985. 7. See Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 130, No. 48, 5 December 1985. pp. 2829. ‘8. See Watan, 22 December 1985. 9. See Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 130, No. 48,5 December 1985. pp. 26-7. 10. See Far .&stern Economic Review, Vol. 129, No. 27, 11 July 1985, pp. 27-8. 11. S. H. Drummond, ‘Mahathir in a Sea of Trouble?’ The Round Tab/e. No. 300, October 1986, pp. 403-19. 12. Utusan Malaysia, 20 April 1986. 13. The New Straits Times, 27 July 1986. 14. Utusan Maiaysia, 1 August 1986. 15. The Star, 29 July 1986. 16. A concept of bipolar politics in Alalaysia is clearly discussed by Joseph ‘Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Concept& Framework, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981). 17. See arguments by A. Rabushka and Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability, (New York, 1972).
279
what less solid than it would at first sight appear. Indeed there may well be circumstances, especially with the media taking a difierent line, in which substantial numbers of those who voted for the NP this time round would be quite prepared to switch their allegiance once more. For the time being, however, the NP remains the only game in town-and it is in effective control of the media. Short of a major crisis in the contest or a rivalry for leadership succession, should P. W. Botha decide to retire, the NP looks set to continue its dominance of white politics well into the next decade. The real challenges to NP-rule is not to be expected in the parliamentary arena at all, but from the extra-parliamentary forces of opposition and resistance. Unless a way can be found to accommodate these within the parliamentary framework future elections will be increasingly peripheral to the central political processes in South African society.
The Malaysian General Election of 1986 A. MALEK HANAFUH*
Malaysia’s seventh general election took place on 3 August 1986’ it was for both the House of Parliament (177 seats were contested) and the State Assembly (3 5 1 seats were contested). However, in the states of Sabah and Sarawak only parliamentary elections were held, Sabah having had its state election in April 1985, while the state election in Sarawak was held in April 1987. Background Before January 1973, Malaysia was ruled by the Alliance party, which took over the administration from the British colonial rule in August 1957. The Alliance was a tripartite intercommunal coalition party of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) headed first by Tunku Abdul Rahman, later by Tun Abdul Razak. The name of the party was then changed to the Barisan Nasional (RN literally means the National Front), after the Alliance offered to cooperate with opposition parties in order to reduce politicking and promote national integration after ’ A postgraduate College, Oxford.
student
at St.
Antony’s
the bloody racial clashes in May 1969. Although the offer was flatly rejected by the Democratic Action Party (DAP) which alleged the BN was an Alliance strategy to weaken the opposition which was getting stronger after the third general election of 1969, other opposition parties, the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan), the Parti Islam Malaysia (PAS), the People’s Progressive Party (PPP), and the Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP), joined the new grand coalition.? For the 1986 general election, ‘the Barisan Nasional’s government was headed by the most controversial Prime Minister Malaysia has ever had, Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohammad, who became the fourth Prime Minister on 16 July 1981, when the third Prime Minister, Datuk Hussein Onn retired for health reasons. Two years before the general election, constituency boundaries were changed. It was a normal process because the last realignment was in 1964. This change had increased the seats, from 154 parliamentary and 408 state seats to 177 parliament and 544 state seats.3 Opposition politicians, particularly from the DAP, were unhappy with the changes because some of their strongholds in the urban areas were split. But no general charge of partisan gerrymandering could be sustained.
280
The Malaysian General Election of 1986 The Lead-up to the Election
Throughout 1985, Mahathir’s government suffered a series of setbacks. Inflation had increased to 26 per cent. The commodity downturn had hit virtually all the nation’s export commodities. Rural communities (a majority of them were Malay), were resentful about the very low prices of their agricultural products. Malay farmers in the government’s land settlement the Federal schemes, Land Development Authority (FELDA), who were traditionally UMNO supporters manifested their discontent by attending, in vast numbers, most of the opposition Islamic Party (PAS) gatherings. Similarly the Chinese tin miners, vegetable growers and the Indian estate workers started to leave their traditional parties of the MCA, MIC and Gerakan for the opposition DAP. As the food prices continued to increase, the biggest trade union for the government employees, the Congress of Union of Employees in the Public and Civil Services (CUEPACS) headed by Ahmad Nor, a Malay leftist, demanded a pay increase of at least 15 per cent. In June 1985, when the government responded by offering a less than 5 per cent increase for employees in categories C and D-the lower income brackets comprising teachers, clerical and manual workers -the CUEPACS, felt insulted. Union leaders reacted by organizing several rallies throughout the Peninsula so as to tell their 870,000 members that the union was preparing a nationwide strike. CUEPACS members picketed during their lunch breaks, which grew from 2,000 in small towns to 8,000 people in state capita1s.l Dr Mahathir refused to negotiate with the union’s leaders, accusing them of trying to threaten his elected government. He argued that he would only be willing to meet the union’s representative if they called off the threat. On 1 October when the CUEPACS finally staged its first nation-wide pickets, Mahathir’s government was shocked. However Ahmad Nor failed to get wider support for the pickets. Many of its Malay members, who were also UMNO members, believed that he was co-operating with the opposition in the latter’s effort to expose government weakness. The battle for a pay rise continued in Parliament when opposition politicians labelled Mahathir’s government as a ‘big spender’. Government ‘prestige projects’ such as the Dayabumi office and shopping complex of MS400m. (USSl53m.), the Penang bridge project of MS850m. (USS326m.) and the national car industry project of MS560m. (US%21 5m.) were frequently quoted as examples. They argued although these projects were good
they should not be built during a period of recession. Government priority should first be given to improving the social and health services, and the rural development programmes rather than to prestige projects. Mahathir’s ways of handling the Bumiputra Merchant Finance (BMF) scandal involving the loss of MS2.5 billion (USS961m.) also came under attack from the opposition. They demanded a Royal Commission to investigate the manner in which a series of loans were approved to the Carrian Property Group in Hong Kong. Although rumours had been circulating since 1983 about the scandal, Mahathir was reluctant to admit to any problem. In fact he sacked the Bank’s chairman and appointed Dr Nawawi in his place. But Mahathir’s man, Dr Nawawi, was also unable to stop the money flowing to Hong Kong. Due to strong pressure from all sides, Mahathir finally set up a committee of inquiry, Auditor-General, Ahmad headed by the Noordin. Many people, especially the professionals, academics and politicians were disappointed with the government for failing to set up a Royal Commission, because they could still remember Mahathir’s promise to lead ‘a clean, efficient and trustworthy’ government, if his party returned to power in the 1982 election campaign. Mahathir’s credibility was seriously questioned in the BMF scandal. Mahathir was further embarrassed in April 1985, when the BN government of Berjaya in Sabah lost the state election to the newly founded Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), led by a Christian minister, despite strong backing from his federal Weeks before the election, government. Mahathir himself went down to campaign for the incumbent Berjaya government with a clear strongly worded statement that ‘we will swim and sink together with the Berjaya’. After Datuk Joseph was sworn in as the new Chief Minister, he was openly challenged by Datuk Harris Salleh of Berjasa who had invited his former rival, Tun Datu Mustapa of the USN0 party to join the pressure group. They openly claimed that Pairin’s sworn-in ceremonial was null and void because the Sabah Yang di Pertuan Negeri had earlier sworn-in Tun Datu Mustapa as the Chief Minister. He only changed his mind after the Acting Prime Minister, Datuk Musa Hitam directed him to appoint Pairin Kitingan. Mahathir who was on an official visit to Switzerland was reported as not happy with Datuk Muss’s decision. ln Sabah, Harris and Mustapa mobilized their supporters, mostly the Muslims, and held a series of demonstrations at Kota Kinabalu, alleging Kitingan’s government were discriminating against Muslim civil
AMALEK
servants. Dr IMahathir’s slow reaction to the Sabah problem had angered the opposition who questioned his sincerity in Parliament. Although Mahathir argued that this was a state problem and he strongly believed that Kitingan’s government and the police could handle it smoothly, the opposition refused to budge.’ Besides having difficulties with the DAP, Mahathir’s government was also under heavy attack from the PAS. UMNO leaders and its followers were labelled as ‘unbelievers and infidels’ because of their constant refusal to adopt the concept of a wholly Islamic state in Malaysia.6 Since many of the PAS leaders were followers of the Iranian Islamic revolutionary government, they then brought the Iranian teaching into the country which added to Mahathir’s mounting problems. Although Mahathir’s government had implemented several projects for the Muslims, such as the setting-up of an international Islamic university in 1982, followed by an Islamic bank in 1983, upgraded the Islamic Court of Law (Syariah Court) in late 1983 and formed an Islamic insurance company (Syarikat Takaful Islam) in 1984, all this received little support from the PAS. In fact, they argued that those policies had not altered the secularizing policies of the government. PAS leaders then continued with its programme of spreading the teaching of an Islamic revolution. Three states which have got large groups of Malay voters came under the PAS’s attack. In a village in Memali, Baling, Kedah police had sent reports to the Home Affairs Minister that the religious teacher, Ibrahim Mahmood, had been gathering his students who came to his house armed with swords and bamboo spears. On 19 November 1985 when the police party went to check Ibrahim’s house, they were confronted by Ibrahim’s followers who stoned and shot at the police. In a battle between them, Ibrahim and 13 of his men were killed.’ The police lost four men. PAS national leaders quickly condemned the government as ‘anti-Islam’ and cowardly. They then organized rallies throughout the Peninsula to explain the government cruelty against fellow Muslims and Malay villagers. Most of the PAS rallies had attracted huge crowds. UMNO members, particularly in the rural areas, felt sympathy with the PAS after listening to the talks. Some of them even urged the government to set up an inquiry into the incident. Opinion polls carried out by a tabloid Malay language newspaper, the Watan, at the end of 1985 showed that Mahathir’s popularity was sharply reduced from 85 per cent, after winning the 1982 general election, to just slightly above 50 per cent.8 Although UMNO leaders at the
281
HANAFMH
national level were not worried by the opinion polls, UMNO leaders at the state and division levels who were obviously closer to the grassroots, were worried. Internal
Crises
Throughout 1985, the BN component parties also had their own internal problems. The Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) was hit by a long power struggle between the acting president. Datuk Dr Neo Yee Pan, and its vice president, Tan Koon Swan. The crisis first erupted publicly in March 1984 and dragged on for about two years, when Tan Koon Swan, who was in the running for the party presidency, accused Neo of padding the party membership register to ensure his confirmation as party president at the party election. At the height of the crisis, Neo and his men in the Central Committee expelled Tan Koon Swan and his minority supporters in the Central Committee. Although Tan and his men were reinstated after the BIN’S secretary general intervened. the crisis continued. Finally when the MCA held its long overdue general assembly in November 1985, Tan Koon Swan won the contest as the MCA president with 2,7 15 votes, 77 per cent of votes cast.9 Neo and his men were not happy with the result and accused Dr Mahathir of interfering in the MCA affairs. His followers at the state and division levels were worried that their political future as members of parliament or state assemblymen would be at stake, suspecting that the winning group would take the opportunity to remove all ‘opponents’ at every level. The Malayan Indian Congress (MIC). another partner in the BN was also unhappy with the administration when its leader, Datuk Sammy Vellu (a senior minister in Mahathir’s cabinet), openly criticized the Malay dominated civil servants for discriminating against Indians. He argued that although most decisions reached in the cabinet were for the benefit of the multiracial society, their implementation by the civil servants was very different. Sammy Vellu’s criticism provoked angry reactions from the UMNO politicians. A spokesman from the UMNO youth wing described the minister as ‘a tiger outside but a mouse inside the cabinet’, arguing that he should raise the complaint in the weekly cabinet meeting not in public. The spokesman’s comments angered the hIIC Youth, which retaliated by questioning the special position of the Malays in the federal constitution. This was followed by a demand from some quarters of the UMNO for the resignation of Sammy Vellu. To the Indian’s shock. hlahathir
282
The Malay&n General Election of 1986
backed the UMNO Youth, pointing out that in no constituency did Indians form a majority-a remark which upset some Indians. MIC members were disappointed and felt IMahathir had belittled the importance of Indian votes to the BN, particularly in constituencies where the Chinese and half of the Malay votes had been for the opposition.‘0 In early 1986, Mahathir faced a big and serious problem in his own party, the UMNO, when his deputy leader who was also Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister resigned from the cabinet due to differences of opinion in the way the country should be run. *I To avoid demonstrations from his followers in Johore, the southern state of the Peninsula, he left for Britain. However, the demonstration occurred. Demonstrators, from the Johore UMNO, demanded Dr Mahathir sack those responsible for the rift between him and Musa. The development in the UMNO had worried all parties in the coalition Barisan Nasional because UMNO had been the backbone of the ruling party since 1954 when the first coalition party, the Alliance, was formed. However, before the dissolution of Parliament and State Assemblies, the UMNO crisis was temporarily resolved when Datuk Musa agreed to resume as deputy leader although he still refused to serve in the cabinet. The Announcement After realizing that the country’s economy was improving, businesses were back to normal and most of the other problems had either been solved or improved, Dr Mahathir was persuaded by senior BN leaders to call an early general election in August 1986. Prior to the announcement, there had been speculation about the date (which did not have to be before April 1987). Nothing pointed to August because during that month about 20,000 Muslims from Malaysia were expected to travel to Mecca for a pilgrimage. Thus, the announcement of the dissolution first by the Prime Minister and followed by the Chairman of the Election Commission caught the opposition by surprise, particularly the Islamic Party (PAS) which believed that the general election would not be held until after many of the Muslims returned from Mecca in October 1986. The announcement was immediately challenged by the opposition leader, Lim Kit Siang, who argued that the Chairman of the Election Commission should first announce the dates for the nomination and polling only then could the Prime Minister announce the dissolution. He also challenged that the fifteen days notice between the dissolution and the polling day was
inadequate, as required by the 1986 amendment of the election law.12 The DAP took its complaint to the High Court in the hope that the announcement would be considered as null and void. After the court had heard the case on 26 July 1986, it ruled that the Prime Minister was in the right when he announced the dissolution, after receiving consent from the Yang di Petuan Agong (the Malaysian constitutional monarchy). The Chairman must make his announcement after the Prime Minister and the fifteen days’ notice which includes the weekends was proper because the law does not state fifteen ‘working’ days.t3 The opposition parties were unhappy with the time available for campaigning and canvassing. Opposition politicians argued that although the shorter period was first introduced in the 1974 general election in order to avoid manipulation of communal sentiments which had occurred in the 1969 elections and had led to racial clashes, it was not as short as in 1986. In response to the complaint, Dr Mahathir argued that the opposition parties had been campaigning for four years, since the last general election in April 1982. The Contestants For the 1986 general election, 20 political parties were involved, 15 were component partners in the grand coalition party of the Barisan Nasional (BIN) and five opposition parties. The BN components were: 1. The United Malays National Organization
(UMNO) :: 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.
The Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) The Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) The Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan) The People’s Progressive Party (PPP) The Hisbul Muslim Party (Hamim) Parti Berjasa (Berjasa) Sarawak United People’s Partv (SUPP) Sarawak Nationalist Party (SNAP) Parti Bumiputra Bersatu (PBB) Sarawak Sarawak Chinese Association (SCA) Parti Berjaya Sabah (Berjaya) The United Sabahan National Organization
(USNO) 14. Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak (PBDS) 15. Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) While the opposition parties were: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
The The The The The
Democratic Action Party (DAP) Islamic Party (PAS) Parti Sosialis Rakyat Malaya (PSRM) Social Democratic Party (SDP) Parti Nasionalis Malaysia (NASMA)
However, not all the parties put up candidates.
A. MALEK HANAFL~H From the BN components, only five out of seven member parties in the Peninsula took part. The Berjasa and Hamim did not ask for seats from the BN’s Supreme Council but their leaders helped to campaign for BN’s candidates. In Sarawak, all five members, the SUPP, SNAP, SCA, PBB and the PBDS helped each other to win the 24 parliamentary seats. Their opponents were the DAP and independent candidates. Similarly in Sabah, the three member parties of the BN, the USNO, Berjaya and PBS, although they were rivals in the state election held a year before the general election, co-operated quite well in the parliamentary election against the DAP. Among the opposition parties, only the DAP and PAS had some impact on the BN. The SDP and NASMA were new and had little experience. The PSRM did not participate in the election because its members were demoralized with their long term leader, Kassim Ahmad, having left the party to join the UMNO in 1985.
The Campaign During the campaign, the issues were the ones that had already been raised by the opposition: such as the BMF scandal, government ‘white elephant’ projects, increases in the inflation rate, higher unemployment, no freedom of press and the Internal Security Act (ISA). BN’s 1982 election slogan of ‘A Clean, Efficient and Trustworthy Government’ was the opposition’s first target. They argued that Mahathir’s government had failed to keep promises made in 1982 because in four years after winning the last election the administration was never clean and efficient. The government, they argued, had not done enough to eradicate corruption and poverty in the multiracial society. Mahathir’s decision to change the name of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to its original name, the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA), a few months after winning the 1982 general election, was seen as a political gimmick because no ‘big fish’ was arrested and charged in the courts BN’s politicians holding public offices were, allegedly, abusing their authority and position. Barisan Nasional’s 1986 slogan of ‘A Tradition of Serving The People’ became the laughing-stock of the opposition parties. They argued if the Barisan government sincerely wanted to serve the people it should find ways to reduce the inflation rate and stop spending on ‘big projects’ such as the national car industry. To counter the BN, the DAP publicized its slogan of ‘Deny them the 2/3 majority’. To the DAP this slogan was very important because the public should be taught not to give the BN a two-
283
thirds majority which would enable them to amend the Constitution or get any Bill through easily. One thing that was very clear was that the DAP for the first time since it was founded in 1968. did not highlight so much its traditional issues of Chinese education, Chinese language university and Chinese culture. On the other hand the Islamic Party (PAS) maintained its traditional slogan of ‘Forming an Islamic nation’ if it came to power. However, its overall strategy was changed. Instead of wooing the hlalay votes in the rural areas as it had done in every election since independence, PAS focused on the urban Chinese. PAS leaders believed that if they could convince the nonwho Muslims, particularly the Chinese, dominated the urban areas of the good and fairness of an Islamic nation they could get some support from the Chinese voters who seemed very open and willing to change their party affiliations. In fact, before PAS leaders decided to adopt this strategy, they had tried successfully to attract the Chinese, when a symposium entitled ‘Islam and National Unity’ organized by them at the Chinese Assembly Hall in Kuala Lumpur received a huge attendance by the Chinese. During the discussion, PAS leader Hadi Awang, startled the audience by suggesting that in Islam, anybody could become a prime minister, even the Chinese, provided he was a Muslim with leadership qualities. The Islamic state as proposed by PAS would not discriminate against people on racial or religious grounds. Later at a public meeting in Trengganu, Hadi Awang again told the Chinese audience that if the PAS came into power. it would abolish the constitutional provision for a special position for the indigenous population. To further convince the Chinese, PAS leaders announced that it was co-operating with the Chinese Consultative Committee (CCC), a body formed by Chinese intellectuals who did not affiliate with any Chinese party. During the campaign, CCC members organized talks all over the Peninsula, to mobilize Chinese support for the PAS. The Results When the results were announced in the early hours of 4 August 1986, to the opposition’s surprise, Barisan Nasional had won another landslide victory. With 152 out of 177 parliamentary seats, and retained control of all the eleven states in the Peninsula (see Table 1). In the parliamentary election, the DAP had failed to stop BN achieving a two-thirds majority, although it managed to increase its members of parliament from 9 in the 1982 election to 24. All
The Malaysian General Election of 19886
284
TABLE 1. State election results in the PeninsuIa. 1986 State Perlis Kedah Pahang Selangor N. Sembilan Malacca Johore Perak Penang Kelantan Terangganu Total
BN
PAS
14
:;: 30
0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 2
300
14
:: 37 24 17 ::
DAP
Total
0 0
14 28
: 4 3
43: 28 20
1: 10 0 0
:: 33
37
351
::
the 24 constituencies won by DAP were in urban areas. The party had captured 24 out of the 33 parliamentary constituencies which have a Chinese majority. For the PAS, it was a disastrous ending to a good start. Despite several predictions made before the elections that the party would at least capture 15 parliamentary seats, it won only 1 seat. All PAS leaders in the ‘inner circle’ including its president, deputy president, three vice presidents, secretary general and supreme council members lost their contests. The BN landslide victory was due mainly to its well organized party machinery and the advantage of being a ruling government. Its slogan of ‘A Tradition of Serving the People’ had helped the party to capture a majority of the Malay votes in the rural areas which saw the UMNO as their sole protector and obliged them to express their gratitude by voting for the UMNO and the BN. Although the PAS had made a good start in the beginning of 1985, its popularity suddenly declined among the rural Malays who did not agree with the PAS strategy of co-operating with the non-Muslims (Chinese). They were surprised at PAS politicians who had condemned the UMNO for the last two decades for ‘selling-out’ to the Chinese through cooperation in the coalition government, when they themselves in turn tried to co-operate with the ‘infidels’ (Chinese). The PAS had made another blunder, a few days before the election, when instead of concentrating on getting more votes, it was busy trying to form an opposition front with the Parti Sosialis Rakyat Malaya (PSRM), Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Parti Nasionalist Malaysia (NASMA). This move had provided a
weapon for UMNO politicians to slaughter the PAS with when they openly accused the funda mentalist Islamic party of adopting a double standard. because, while condemning UMNO as a secularist party, the PAS itself was involved in a pact with non-religious parties. While UMNO attacked PAS over its attempts to co-operate with the non-religious group, BN’s Chinese politicians told their fellow Chinese not to believe the PAS because the party was controlled by religious fanatics who were not in sympathy with the non-llluslims. They reminded the Chinese voters of the case in Iran where Khomeini’s mullahs appealed for co-operation from non religious groups in their effort to overthrow the Shah of Iran but eliminated them wshen Khomeini came to power. I’ Thus, the PAS not only lost its traditional votes from the rural Malays but also failed to get support from the urban Chinese. The DAP on the other hand, although it did not make any gains in the state elections, increased its representation in parliament. Its successes were mainly due to its adroit projection of its image as the people’s champion. Although the DXP had played down the communal issues, it still maintained its traditional image as a party fighting for Chinese interests. This had helped the party to capture most of the Chinese new voters who felt that the government had discriminated against them in education and emplovment.rs DAP successes in capturing 72 per cent of the urban constituencies showed strong anti-government feelings in the urban areas. Another image projected by DAP was its
TABLE
2. Parliamentary
election Malaysia, 1986
State Perlis Kedah Pahang Selangor N. Sembiian Malacca Johore Perak Penang Kelantan Terangganu Federal Territory Sabah Saran-ak TotaI
BIN 20 14 10 12 50 40 18 19 5 12 80 40
PAS
0 0 0
0 0 0 I
:;
0 0
152
1
results
in
DAP
Total
0 0 0 2 2 15 0 4 6 0 0 4 4 1
2 14 10 14 7
24
18 23 11 13 8 8 20 24 177
A. MALEK HAN~FIAH brave stand on national issues such as the BMF scandal, government ‘big spending’ behaviour, abuse of authority and position, unemployment, racial discrimination, corruption and religious extremism. This image had helped them to get support from the middle class English educated Chinese professionals who were traditionally supporters of either MCA or Gerakan. Thus, besides maintaining its traditional support from the Chinese-educated Chinese, for the first time English-educated Chinese professionals and the younger generation had helped them to win more seats than before.
Conclusion Having examined the outcome of the 1986 general election what does the electoral verdict mean for the future of Malaysian politics? Obviously the first impact is that the parliament is split into two communal groups, a Malay dominated government and a Chinese dominated opposition. If the DAP continues its previous role as the spokesman for Chinese grievances and is likely to be opposed by BN backbenchers, parliamentary proceedings will look like a ‘confrontation’ between the Malays and Chinese. It is also feared that communal ill-feeling which the government has been trying to control since the May 1969 incident, might reemerge in the next election. A bipolar political tussle between the Malays and the Chinese which started in the colonial days will continue to dominate the Malaysian political scene because the 60 per cent of Chinese electors who voted for the DAP would like to defend their political gain.” The ethnic polarization, if deepened by communal manipulation will then contribute to political instability in Malaysia in the next decade. However, as Rabushka and Shepsle” have suggested, the key element in maintaining stability in a highly fractionalized society like Malaysia is the ability of its leaders to accommodate various demands in that society. Whether this can be achieved will depend greatly on the new leadership of the Barisan Nasional in the coming years.
285 Notes and References
1. The first general election in Malaysia (previously known as Malaya) took place in 1959. However, before independence in 1957, a general election was held in 1955. It was only for 54 parliamentary seats to the Federal Legislative Council. 2. See R. S. Milne and D. K. Mauzy, Politics and Government in Maiaysia, (Kuala Lumpur: Federal Publication, 1978), pp. 173-91. See also A. M. Hanafiah, ‘Coalition Politics in Malaysia: A Study of the Grand Coalition Government, 19721978’, (MA Dissertation, University of Essex, 1978). see Harold Crouch, 3. For comparison General Elections, Malaysia‘s 1982 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982). 4. The Star, 2 October 1985. 5. The Star, 28 October 1985. See also Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 130, No. 46, 21 November 1985, pp. 16-17. 6. Utusan Malaysia, 17 June 1985. 7. See Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 130, No. 48, 5 December 1985. pp. 2829. ‘8. See Watan, 22 December 1985. 9. See Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 130, No. 48,5 December 1985. pp. 26-7. 10. See Far .&stern Economic Review, Vol. 129, No. 27, 11 July 1985, pp. 27-8. 11. S. H. Drummond, ‘Mahathir in a Sea of Trouble?’ The Round Tab/e. No. 300, October 1986, pp. 403-19. 12. Utusan Malaysia, 20 April 1986. 13. The New Straits Times, 27 July 1986. 14. Utusan Maiaysia, 1 August 1986. 15. The Star, 29 July 1986. 16. A concept of bipolar politics in Alalaysia is clearly discussed by Joseph ‘Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Concept& Framework, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981). 17. See arguments by A. Rabushka and Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability, (New York, 1972).