- Email: [email protected]
The Nicaraguan elections of 1984
152
Indian General Ekction
5. These are unofficial figures for 1984, from Press Trust of India and United News of India. For previous elections, see Myron Weiner, India at the Polk, 1980 (Washington and London: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), pp. 145-53. 6. 1984 figures are from United News of India. For previous elections, see Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., India: GovemmentandPoli~icsin a Developing Nation, third edition (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980), table 7-2. 7. The Congress-I won six seats there, but oniy one of their victors was an incumbent. This was one sign, among many others, that voters were impatient with established politicians and the old politics. 8. The results of state-IeveI elections in March 1985 reiterate this point. The Congress-I won 24 of 28 seats in Karnataka in December, but was trounced by the ruling Janata Party in March. The Congress-I won 43 of 48 seats in Maharashtra in December, but gained only a small majority in March. Indian voters clearly possess the sophistication to distinguish between state and national elections. 9. For more on this, see Stanley A. Kochanek, ‘Mrs. Gandhi’s Pyramid: The New Congress’ in H. C. Hart (editor), Indira Gandhi’s India, (Boulder, Cola.: Westview
The Nicaraguan
IO. Il.
12.
13.
14. 15. 16.
17.
Press, 1976). pp. 93-l 24, and James Manor, ‘Party Decay and Political Crisis in India’, 7%e Wahington Quurierb. 4:3, Summer 1981, pp. 25-40. This estimate is based on calculations by the New Delhi staff of United News of India. This is based on interviews with four fulltime organizers for the Congress-I in New Delhi, Bangalore and Hyderabad. The opinion poll was supervised and designed by David Butler, Ashok Lahiri and Prannoy Roy. Results were reported in Indiz Today, 31 December 1984. The journalist who studied women voters was Shahnaz Anklesaria. whose reports appeared in The Statesman, New Delhi, 2-29 December 1984. Most political analysts and activists from all parties were agreed on this by the end of the election campaign. Rajni Kothari first made the point in Seminar, New Delhi, January 1972, p. 23. Indian National Congress (I) Election Mun~do, 1984, (New Delhi, 1984). This is based on numerous interviews with opposition leaders and middle-level operatives who were engaged in negotiations for opposition unity. Detailed evidence of this is presented in Manor, ‘Rajiv Gandhi and Post-Election India’, op. cit.
Elections
of 1984
DAVID CLOSE
On 4 November 1984, 75.6 per cent of Nicaragua’s eligible voters went to the polls in that country’s first election since the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) overthrew the Somoza dictatorship in 1979. To no one’s surprise, the FSLN, which had governed since the revolution, won the presidency and 60 per cent of the seats in the National Assembly, capturing two-thirds of the vote in both contests. Daniel Ortega Saavedra and Sergio Ramirez Mercado who headed the Sandinista ticket, had both been members of the three-person governing junta that had been the instrument of executive power since 1979. But it would be wrong to say the FSLN’s victory meant nothing had changed or would change in the world of
Nicaraguan politics. At the very least, the election forced opposition parties to mobilize their supporters and demonstrate their strength. More importantly, the elections mark a shift from the radical, experimental political institutions of the immediate post-triumph period to more conventional ones. Background Before 19 July 1979 the Nicaraguan state was the property of the Somozas who, father and sons, had ruled the country since 1934. They kept power by co-opting the upper strata of society and ignoring or coercing the lower levels, all with the unflinching support of the United States. The
DAVID CLOSE Somozas’ downfall was precipitated by the greed of the last member of the line, Anastasia, who wrecked the modus vivendi between the state and the upper class after a December 1972 earthquake that levelled the capital, Managua, created opportunities for profit that the dictator could not resist. He greatly expanded the size and scope of his economic interests and put himself into direct competition with Nicaragua’s upper class. The latter perceived Somoza as a threat to then livelihood, and began to withdraw their support. The elite’s discontent with Somoza mounted throughout the 1970s as he added inability to defeat the Sandinista guerrillas to his list of failings. The FSLN had existed since 1961, yet prior to 1977 it had been little more than a nuisance to the old regime. But a combination of governmental ruthlessness and the Sandinistas’ adoption of a strategy of alliances with all antiSomoza sectors gave them new life and a new outlook. They were transformed from a small, sectarian guerrilla band into the representatives of all who opposed the dictatorship: workers, peasants, professionals, and even big business. This multi-class coalition did not last. By early 1980 its more conservative elements, who wished to be rid of Somoza but who did not want a social revolution, were clamouring for the FSLN to stand down and let the pm-1979 centrist parties start governing. When the Sandinistas announced in August 1980 that they did not plan elections before 1985, a rightist opposition formed around the issues of early elections and the rapid dismantling of the revolutionary state (Black, 1981). Through the next four years this oppositional bloc, most effectively represented by the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinator (CDN) or Coordinadora, made immediate elections a key part of each of the several programmes of political reforms it published. The Sandinista revolution also produced an external opposition. Composed originally of members of Somoza’s National Guard and others who had been close to the old regime, it soon included businessmen and politicians who preferred exile in Costa Rica, Honduras, or the United States to dealing with the revolutionary government. These external forces are the heart of the counter-revolution, the ‘Contras on whom the Reagan administration counts to overthrow the FSLN. Primarily seeking a military victorythe contra had killed over 5,000 Nicaraguan civilians by late 1984l-these CIA-funded armies constituted a sufficiently grave threat that Managua declared a state of emergency in March 1982. The most noticeable effects of the emergency decree, which remains in effect in an attenuated form, have been the prohibition of strikes, media
153
censorship regarding military and economic matters, and requiring a police permit to hold outdoor political rallies. But military pressure from the Contras has also affected the Nicaraguan economy by putting it on a war footing. Resources have been diverted from social programmes and development projects to meet the needs of national defence. Consequently the government has had to adjust its social policy priorities: Schemes for improving public services (health, education, and transport) were set back. Basic foodstuffs had to be rationed and consumer items such as toothpaste and toilet paper have been unobtainable at times. Moreover, military mobilization has taken people from then jobs and into the army. This not only reduces the overall efficiency of the economy but has also forced the government to organize production brigades among public employees and students to help harvest coffee and cotton. The country’s economic problems were not limited to those caused by the war. Like all Central America Nicaragua has suffered from declining world demand for coffee, sugar, cotton, and bananas; but unlike its neighbours in the region, Nicaragua must also contend with Washington’s overt hostility. In 1981 the Reagan administration cut off aid to Nicaragua, and since then has used its influence to ensure that international funding agencies do not grant loans to the Sandinistas. Why should the Sandinistas, faced with a recession-weakened economy, the open enmity of the United States, and a war against an enemy financed and equipped from abroad decide to hold elections? This question is especially perplexing because the FSLN, like most revolutionary groups, claims to derive its legitimacy from the revolution itself, and has scorned electoral mandates (Wheelock, 1983). The explanation has two parts: First the FSLN came under pressure from the Socialist International to hold elections in order to continue receiving that Second, even domestic group’s support. supporters of the revolution (such as the Popular Social Christians) sought reforms that would move the country on to a more conventionally democratic path. Having enough enemies, the Sandinistas decided to compromise with their friends. But before elections could be held it was necessary to create their legal and institutional framework. Forty-five years of dictatorship by the Somozas left Nicaragua without any history of serious interparty competition (the Somozas guaranteed l/4 to l/3 of the legislature to their opponents to give the state an air of ‘democratic legitimacy’) or free elections. These conditions were corrected by two laws, the Political Parties
154
The Nicaraguan
Act of 1983 and the EIectoral Act of 1984, which also reveal something of the FSLN’s political thinking. The Parties Act is important because it saw the Sandinistas move from a position which would have reserved to themselves the right to govern to one acknowledging the right of any legal party (one not proposing a return to Somicism or a similar regime) to contest and perhaps gain power.’ In the case of the Electoral from Law, the FSLN yielded to pressure Nicaragua’s other political parties to replace the Council of State--which represented the FSLN, the army, Sandinista mass organizations, other parties, opposition unions, and business groups -with a legislature elected from geographically defined constituencies. Coming into the election, then, one sees a governing revolutionary party conceding political and legal ground to its loyal opposition to cement their support in the face of external aggression and domestic economic hardship. In doing so, the Sandinistas were able to keep together much of the pluralist anti-dictatorial alliance they brought with them when they came to power in 1979. Parties Political parties in Nicaragua can be put into four groups: the FSLN, the right, the left, and the Coordinadora (CDN). The Coordinadora is not reafly a party but a coalition of opposition forces made up of three parties, the rumps of two unions, and the apex organization of Nicaraguan business (COSEP). It represents the most conservative sectors of Nicaraguan public life, and its degree of opposition to the Sandinista state is surpassed only by the expatriate counterrevolutionaries. The most important parts of the CDN are the Social Christian Party (PSC) and COSEP. The PSC, the second-best organized party in the country after the FSLN, is strong among the middle strata. COSEP gives the CDN a source of funds, but also harms the organization by making its ties with big business patent. The CDN is also strengthened by its close ties with the opposition paper, Lo Prensa, and the hierarchy of the Catholic church. The Coordinadora has taken a peculiar role in contemporary Nicaraguan politics. It limits its participation in state institutions as much as possible, preferring to use La Prenra or, especially, foreign tours by its leaders to air its positions. Its platform calls for an enhanced role for private enterprise, negotiations with the counter-revolutionaries, and the ‘de-Sandinization’ of the state. By ‘de-Sandinization’ the CDN
Elections
means removing the title ‘Sandinista’ from all state institutions, e.g., the armv and the N network. It feels that the constant identification of the revolution with the Sandinistas gives the FSLN an unfair political advantage. Less alienated from the Sandinista state are three parties who espouse positions more conservative than the FSLN, but still accept the principles on which the present regime is founded. Two of the parties, the Lndependent Liberals (PLI) and the Popular Social Christians (PPSC), belonged both to pm-1979 radical coalitions and the post-revolutionary Revolutionary Patriotic Front (FPR) which brought parties supporting the revolution into an informal alliance with the FSLN. The third party, the Conservatives (PCD). had been strongly opposed to the Sandinistas until a 1984 split in the party drove out the right wing, leaving moderates in command. These parties distinguish themselves from the government on several grounds. fn the area of foreign policy they seek to weaken ties with the Soviet Union. Domestically, they would reduce the emphasis placed on military matters, and seek a wider role for the entrepreneur, especially in agriculture. None of these parties is either very well organized or possessed of a sure constituency. The PCD and PLi both compete for the support of professionals and technocrats, a contest in which the more urban-oriented Liberals seemed to have the edge, but neither party developed the structures needed to cultivate this support or mobilize it once present. They were, of course, hampered by the emergency decree that restricted public rallies, but they were even more seriously hobbled by lack of experience in competitive politics and a reluctance or inability to do the grassroots work needed to build a reliable base. The PPSC appears even weaker than the other two. Splitting from the mainstream Social Christians in 1976, the PPSC has promoted the politics of liberation theology. They also claimed to be the organizers of Managua’s street vendors and casual labourers (estimated at 113 the city’s workforce), but it has not had the capacity to really begin this work. The parties to the left of the FSLii are also weak, still, two of them have had extremely bitter confrontations with the FSLN. One of these, the Popular Action Movement (MAP), is a Maoist group that accuses the Sandinistas of selling out the revolution. In the first six months after the FSLN took power, the MAP confronted them directly and violently with its union and party militia. Not quite as radical are the Communists (PCN), but they too have had repeated clashes
DAVID CLOSE
with the Sandinistas. Like the MAP, the PCN sees the FSLN as being insufficiently radical to successfully lead the revolution. The Socialists (PSN) are the third party on the left. As with other Moscow-supported parties in Latin America, the PSN has followed a cautious path avoiding insurrectional politics. Although the party withheld its support from the FSLN until early 1979, it later became a member of the FPR and even proposed an electoral alliance with the Sandinistas. It has criticized the Sandinistas for bureaucratism, favouritism, and inefficiency. The dominant political force in Nicaragua is the FSLN. Its role in leading the revolt against Somoza gives it a legitimacy no other group can claim. Its commitment to a politics of mass participation has meant the creation of many Sandinista mass organizations; these recognize the FSLN as the proper leader of the Nicaraguan revolution, and provide an easily mobilizable cadre of activists. But the FXN is also the government party: What its leaders do make news; its aspirations become policy; and its failures and successes are public knowledge. Programmatically, the Sandinistas attempt to give effect to an ideology that emphasizes national sovereignty, non-alignment, and radical social and political democracy, all mixed with economic and political pluralism. A movement named for a nationalist guerrilla (Sandino) who spent years fighting the US Marines in Nicaragua’s mountains, and whose leaders admire the Cuban revolution must produce different visions of pluralism and non-alignment than a party of businessmen would. Thus the Sandinistas seem dangerous totalitarians when seen through the eyes of the Coordinadora or the White House. In reality the FSLN has been prudent and pragmatic in most policy areas. Not only did it compromise with the opposition in setting up electoral machinery, it has also changed its mind about its agrarian reform programme. This was originally conceived to emphasize state-owned farms and producer co-ops (Collins, 1982), but dissatisfaction among peasants with the policy led Sandinistas to favour granting individual titles to land and promoting buying/selling co-ops. Prior to the election call, the party system of Nicaragua featured the dominant, even hege manic, FSLN, the parties of the centre-left allied with the Sandinistas in the FPR, the parties of the right allied with the CDN, and the ultra-left. Once the campaign started things changed, and the Sandinistas stood against the rest. The Campaign Although the campaign officially lasted from 1 August to 2 November, the race really began on
155
21 February when junta co-ordinator Daniel Ortega announced the date of the poll. In some ways the campaign resembled a plebiscite on the revolution, with the Sandinistas being the ‘yes’ option and the six opposition parties the ‘no’. But one could also see the opposition parties scrambling to create a political base on which to build their futures; in this sense, the real race was for second place behind the FSLN and status as leader of the opposition. The most interesting campaign was run by the Coordinadora who decided not to enter a candidate. As was noted above, the CDN has a long-standing set of claims against the government that they also use as an electoral platform. The most important part of this platform contains demands to democratize the revolution by scheduling elections, lifting all state of emergency restrictions on free speech and assembly, and ‘deSandinization’. On learning that elections would be held in eight and one-half months, the Coordinadora decided that this was too soon because the emergency decree had not yet been lifted4 and there had been no steps taken to rename the various Sandinista institutions. The CDN effectively conditioned its participation in the elections on seeing its programme of government enacted. This strengthened the Sandinistas’ conviction that the CDN was less interested in representing conservative interests within the revolutionary framework than in discrediting that framework in the eyes of the world. In late July, just before the deadline for filing nominations, things seemed to change: the CDN named former governing junta member and one time ambassador to the US Arturo Cruz as its candidate. In convincing Cruz to return from Washington, the Coordinadora found a candidate who was as well-known at home as abroad and who, unlike many CDN sympathizers, would not be jailed as a leader of the counter-revolution on arriving in Managua. To put Cruz at the top of the ticket, the CDN bumped Adan Fletes, a PSC leader who held his party’s nomination for president, into the second spot. This suggests that the Social Christians were thinking about running on their own in the elections, but finally decided to stay with their partners in the CDN. Whatever hopes Cruz’s return stirred in the hearts of the Nicaraguan opposition were soon dashed, for the final day for nominations (7 August) passed with the Coordinadora still out. This did not mean that they were finished as a factor in the race, though. The FSLii govemment, recognizing the international weight of the CDN, extended the nomination period to 27 August, the day the ballots had to go to the printer; and the door to Cruz’s candidacy was not finally closed until after talks between the govern-
156
The Nicaraguan Elections
ment and the CDN broke down less than a month before the poll. As long as the CDN was not irrevocably out, Cruz continued his campaign. He returned to Managua in mid-September, and was soon going around the country to consult his followers. These trips to the cities of Leon, Boaco. and Masaya produced major confrontations between Cruz’s people and Sandinista supporters that in each case saw the candidate leave the city under police protection. The result of this was to increase the CDN’s intransigence and to produce complaints from other parties alleging that their campaigns had been disrupted; representatives of these parties later indicated that the problem was reso1ved.s The Cruz-Coordinadora issue was not the campaign’s only rough spot. On 2 1 October, two weeks before the vote, the Liberals announced their withdrawal from the campaign. The fact that the US ambassador’s car was seen in front of the party’s headquarters the day before led to conjecture about payoffs. A calmer analysis might have noted that PLI rallies in the cities of Chinandega and Esteli, both traditional Liberal centres, had turned out crowds of about 300, and concluded the Liberals were looking to avoid an electoral embarrassment. In the end the PLI did not leave the race. They delayed filing their withdrawal notice with the Electoral Commission until after ballots had been sent to regional centres, thus making it impossible to strike the party from the lists; this led the Commission to declare the Liberals still in running. That this might not have entirely displeased the PLI may be inferred from the fact that their advertisements continued to appear in the press and on TV during their ten-day withdrawal. Just a week after the Liberals pulled out, the Conservatives held a convention to see if they, too would quit. They stayed in after the presidential candidate rallied the youth auxilliary to the side of participation, intimidating his pro abstention opponents in the process. Moving from the campaign’s crises to look at the differing tactics adopted by the seven parties in the race, one sees the FSLN taking advantage of its organizational depth and status as leader of the revolution. The Sandinistas did three things that no other party could. First, it used a houseto-house canvass to enlist support instead of relying entirely on mass rallies and media spots. Second, its campaign was not as executive centred as those of other parties; the FSLN had clear leaders for its Assembly ticket in each of the nine electoral districts, and these people had very high profile. Finally, the FSLN ran on its record, spending relatively little time responding to criticisms. In fact, the Sandinistas took some
pains to make the election look like a planned phase of revolutionary development. This is best shown in their slogan, ‘Seguimos de frente con el Frente’: ‘Let’s keep moving ahead with the Front ’ The rightist parties set themselves as lightning rods to attract what they hoped would be a storm of protest votes. Relentlessly attacking the failings of five years of revolutionary government, the right knew that several years of war and a stalled economy produced discontent, but was not sure how to mobilize it. A canvass, even of middle and upper class neighbourhoods, was beyond their human and technical resources, so they were left depending on posters, ads, and rallies to get their names and messages before the people. The flavour of these messages can be got from a couple of PLI slogans painted on walls in the town of San Carlos: ‘No more rice and yes! Communism, beans! ’ and ‘Democracy, for no! ’ The first blamed the government shortages of any but the most basic foods; the second took up the CDN line that the FSLN was building a Cuban-style totalitarian state. The campaigns of the three leftist parties were particularly ineffective. The hlAP and PCN levelled charges of right deviationism against the FSLN, while the Socialists raised the potentially more damaging charges of favouritism and corruption in government. All three parties worked through their unions and rural organizations, and relied on rallies, posters, and media ads. Despite the availability of government financing to all parties in the contest, something that made it possible for even the smallest party to buy advertising space, the FSLN’s advantages in organizational depth showed. Perhaps the others will draw the appropriate lessons from their venture into competitive politics and set up permanent structures to plan future campaigns. Shortly before the election, sources with the FSLN predicted they would take 80 per cent of the presidential vote and 90 per cent of the Assembly. They were wrong. The Sandinistas did very well, capturing 67 per cent of the vote in both races, but they did not bury their opposition. The three parties to their right were chosen by 29 per cent of the voters; those to their left by less than 4 per cent. Turnout was 75 per cent, a good figure for elections where voting was voluntary and over 90 per cent of those eligible were on the rolls. The big winners were the Conservatives and Popular Social Christians. The PCD led the opposition with 14 per cent of the vote, and has received a new lease on life as a political force. The PPSC, though getting only 6 per cent of the ballots, must also be counted winners. Before the
DAVID CLOSE TABLE 1. Results of the 1984 Presidential Election
Nicaraguan
% vote
Party (Candidates)
5.56 1.03 14.04 66.97 1.46 9.61 1.32
PPSC (DiarlMejia) MAP (Tellez/Enriquez) PCD (GuidolChamorro) FSLN (OrtegaRamirez) PCN (Zambrana/Perez) PLI (GodoylPereira) PSN (SanchezlEvertsz)
100‘
Total
’ Total may not equal 100% due to rounding. Source: Report of the Consejo Supremo Electoral de la Republica de Nicaragua, in Emriozda, 15 November 1984. TABLE 2. Results of the 1984 Nicaraguan National Assembly Election Party
% vote
Seats
PPSC MAP PCD FSLN PCN PLI PSN
5.63 1.04 14.00 66.78 1.48 9.66 1.40
6 2 14 61
Total
100’
9’ 2
157
who are not diehard members of the ultra-left can meet their ideological needs by supporting the party in power. A word needs to be said about the electoral system that structured these results. In the presidential race a simple ‘first-past-the-post’ system was used. To allot the Assembly seats a novel representation was mode of proportional employed. The Electoral Act divided the country into nine districts with from one to 25 seats per district; electoral quotas were even assigned in the districts returning one and two members (Art. 144).h Wherever there were remainders of either seats or votes in a district after the first count, these went into a national pool (Art. 125). Although this raised the cost of a seat from 9,868 votes on the first round to 12,351 on the second, it actually helped the smaller parties by giving them a larger pool of votes to work with, and all parties gained at least one seat in the national round. Finally, Article 58 of the Electoral Act provided that losing presidential and vice-presidential candidates would be elected to the Assembly as delegate and alternate, respectively, if their party got at least the national mean electoral quota, about 1 per cent of the total vote. This gave all losing presidential candidates a seat. The electoral system assured representation to the maximum number of parties. Although this could lead to fragmentation and fractionalization in the future, its immediate result was to ensure that a broad range of opinion will be heard in the Assembly and many parties will gain parliamentary experience.
96
’ Total may not equal 100% due to rounding. Source: Report of the Consejo Supremo Electoral de la Republica de Nicaragua, in Barricade, 15 November 1984.
elections started, the PPSC were deemed a spent force by most observers. Having won a foothold in the Assembly with their shift to the right, they will be watched to see if they swing back to their old leftist position or continue in their present trajectory and supplant the PSC as the country’s main Christian democratic party. The 10 per cent vote for the Liberals is probably attributable to their temporary retirement from the race. It is currently open to doubt whether they will be able to build on this base, though, because a split between its abstentionist and participationist wings threatens to destroy the party. Regarding the very poor showing of the Marxist-Leninist opposition, one can only conclude that it is very hard to be a left-wing opposition in a revolutionary regime, for radicals
Conclusion Observers’ reports have declared the Nicaraguan elections to have been free and fair (Central Americu Repoti, 1984). It now remains to be seen whether having successfully conducted elections will consolidate support for the FSLN in Europe and give Managua more diplomatic leverage during what are sure to be four difficult years with Washington. If so, the Sandinista regime should survive to come to grips with the frustrations inherent in using the political machinery of liberal democracy. But if the Reagan administration steps up its military pressure against Managua, President Ortega may feel compelled to declare a state of emergency that could leave representative institutions inoperative. As this is written-January 1985-the 1984 elections form a watershed in Nicaraguan political history. They mark, at least for now, the end of Sandinista experiments with revolutionary political forms, and signal the regime’s entry on a more prosaic path. Should they succeed in
The Nicaraguan Elections
158
wedding radical politics and liberal institutions without seriously debasing either, the Sandinistas will have carried out an exciting experiment in democracy.
5. Interviews with representatives of the six opposition parties, October 1984. 6. Republica de Nicaragua, ‘Ley Electoral’, Art. 144 (1984).
Notes Figures taken from a CBS newscast, 21 December 1984. Republica de Nicaragua, ‘Ley de Partidos Politicos’, Art. 4 (1983). Interview with PPSC officials, October 1984. By 6 August 1984 all that remained of the emergency decree was censorship of military news, but no move was made to amend the decree from 21 February to 19 July.
References George Black, The Triumph of the People, (London: Zed Press, 198 1). Jaime Wheelock, El Gran Desafio, (Managua: Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, 1983). Joseph Collins, What Dr@ence Can a Revolution Make? (San Francisco: Food First, 1982). Central America Reports, 11:46, 23 November 1984.
Indian General Ekction
5. These are unofficial figures for 1984, from Press Trust of India and United News of India. For previous elections, see Myron Weiner, India at the Polk, 1980 (Washington and London: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), pp. 145-53. 6. 1984 figures are from United News of India. For previous elections, see Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., India: GovemmentandPoli~icsin a Developing Nation, third edition (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980), table 7-2. 7. The Congress-I won six seats there, but oniy one of their victors was an incumbent. This was one sign, among many others, that voters were impatient with established politicians and the old politics. 8. The results of state-IeveI elections in March 1985 reiterate this point. The Congress-I won 24 of 28 seats in Karnataka in December, but was trounced by the ruling Janata Party in March. The Congress-I won 43 of 48 seats in Maharashtra in December, but gained only a small majority in March. Indian voters clearly possess the sophistication to distinguish between state and national elections. 9. For more on this, see Stanley A. Kochanek, ‘Mrs. Gandhi’s Pyramid: The New Congress’ in H. C. Hart (editor), Indira Gandhi’s India, (Boulder, Cola.: Westview
The Nicaraguan
IO. Il.
12.
13.
14. 15. 16.
17.
Press, 1976). pp. 93-l 24, and James Manor, ‘Party Decay and Political Crisis in India’, 7%e Wahington Quurierb. 4:3, Summer 1981, pp. 25-40. This estimate is based on calculations by the New Delhi staff of United News of India. This is based on interviews with four fulltime organizers for the Congress-I in New Delhi, Bangalore and Hyderabad. The opinion poll was supervised and designed by David Butler, Ashok Lahiri and Prannoy Roy. Results were reported in Indiz Today, 31 December 1984. The journalist who studied women voters was Shahnaz Anklesaria. whose reports appeared in The Statesman, New Delhi, 2-29 December 1984. Most political analysts and activists from all parties were agreed on this by the end of the election campaign. Rajni Kothari first made the point in Seminar, New Delhi, January 1972, p. 23. Indian National Congress (I) Election Mun~do, 1984, (New Delhi, 1984). This is based on numerous interviews with opposition leaders and middle-level operatives who were engaged in negotiations for opposition unity. Detailed evidence of this is presented in Manor, ‘Rajiv Gandhi and Post-Election India’, op. cit.
Elections
of 1984
DAVID CLOSE
On 4 November 1984, 75.6 per cent of Nicaragua’s eligible voters went to the polls in that country’s first election since the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) overthrew the Somoza dictatorship in 1979. To no one’s surprise, the FSLN, which had governed since the revolution, won the presidency and 60 per cent of the seats in the National Assembly, capturing two-thirds of the vote in both contests. Daniel Ortega Saavedra and Sergio Ramirez Mercado who headed the Sandinista ticket, had both been members of the three-person governing junta that had been the instrument of executive power since 1979. But it would be wrong to say the FSLN’s victory meant nothing had changed or would change in the world of
Nicaraguan politics. At the very least, the election forced opposition parties to mobilize their supporters and demonstrate their strength. More importantly, the elections mark a shift from the radical, experimental political institutions of the immediate post-triumph period to more conventional ones. Background Before 19 July 1979 the Nicaraguan state was the property of the Somozas who, father and sons, had ruled the country since 1934. They kept power by co-opting the upper strata of society and ignoring or coercing the lower levels, all with the unflinching support of the United States. The
DAVID CLOSE Somozas’ downfall was precipitated by the greed of the last member of the line, Anastasia, who wrecked the modus vivendi between the state and the upper class after a December 1972 earthquake that levelled the capital, Managua, created opportunities for profit that the dictator could not resist. He greatly expanded the size and scope of his economic interests and put himself into direct competition with Nicaragua’s upper class. The latter perceived Somoza as a threat to then livelihood, and began to withdraw their support. The elite’s discontent with Somoza mounted throughout the 1970s as he added inability to defeat the Sandinista guerrillas to his list of failings. The FSLN had existed since 1961, yet prior to 1977 it had been little more than a nuisance to the old regime. But a combination of governmental ruthlessness and the Sandinistas’ adoption of a strategy of alliances with all antiSomoza sectors gave them new life and a new outlook. They were transformed from a small, sectarian guerrilla band into the representatives of all who opposed the dictatorship: workers, peasants, professionals, and even big business. This multi-class coalition did not last. By early 1980 its more conservative elements, who wished to be rid of Somoza but who did not want a social revolution, were clamouring for the FSLN to stand down and let the pm-1979 centrist parties start governing. When the Sandinistas announced in August 1980 that they did not plan elections before 1985, a rightist opposition formed around the issues of early elections and the rapid dismantling of the revolutionary state (Black, 1981). Through the next four years this oppositional bloc, most effectively represented by the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinator (CDN) or Coordinadora, made immediate elections a key part of each of the several programmes of political reforms it published. The Sandinista revolution also produced an external opposition. Composed originally of members of Somoza’s National Guard and others who had been close to the old regime, it soon included businessmen and politicians who preferred exile in Costa Rica, Honduras, or the United States to dealing with the revolutionary government. These external forces are the heart of the counter-revolution, the ‘Contras on whom the Reagan administration counts to overthrow the FSLN. Primarily seeking a military victorythe contra had killed over 5,000 Nicaraguan civilians by late 1984l-these CIA-funded armies constituted a sufficiently grave threat that Managua declared a state of emergency in March 1982. The most noticeable effects of the emergency decree, which remains in effect in an attenuated form, have been the prohibition of strikes, media
153
censorship regarding military and economic matters, and requiring a police permit to hold outdoor political rallies. But military pressure from the Contras has also affected the Nicaraguan economy by putting it on a war footing. Resources have been diverted from social programmes and development projects to meet the needs of national defence. Consequently the government has had to adjust its social policy priorities: Schemes for improving public services (health, education, and transport) were set back. Basic foodstuffs had to be rationed and consumer items such as toothpaste and toilet paper have been unobtainable at times. Moreover, military mobilization has taken people from then jobs and into the army. This not only reduces the overall efficiency of the economy but has also forced the government to organize production brigades among public employees and students to help harvest coffee and cotton. The country’s economic problems were not limited to those caused by the war. Like all Central America Nicaragua has suffered from declining world demand for coffee, sugar, cotton, and bananas; but unlike its neighbours in the region, Nicaragua must also contend with Washington’s overt hostility. In 1981 the Reagan administration cut off aid to Nicaragua, and since then has used its influence to ensure that international funding agencies do not grant loans to the Sandinistas. Why should the Sandinistas, faced with a recession-weakened economy, the open enmity of the United States, and a war against an enemy financed and equipped from abroad decide to hold elections? This question is especially perplexing because the FSLN, like most revolutionary groups, claims to derive its legitimacy from the revolution itself, and has scorned electoral mandates (Wheelock, 1983). The explanation has two parts: First the FSLN came under pressure from the Socialist International to hold elections in order to continue receiving that Second, even domestic group’s support. supporters of the revolution (such as the Popular Social Christians) sought reforms that would move the country on to a more conventionally democratic path. Having enough enemies, the Sandinistas decided to compromise with their friends. But before elections could be held it was necessary to create their legal and institutional framework. Forty-five years of dictatorship by the Somozas left Nicaragua without any history of serious interparty competition (the Somozas guaranteed l/4 to l/3 of the legislature to their opponents to give the state an air of ‘democratic legitimacy’) or free elections. These conditions were corrected by two laws, the Political Parties
154
The Nicaraguan
Act of 1983 and the EIectoral Act of 1984, which also reveal something of the FSLN’s political thinking. The Parties Act is important because it saw the Sandinistas move from a position which would have reserved to themselves the right to govern to one acknowledging the right of any legal party (one not proposing a return to Somicism or a similar regime) to contest and perhaps gain power.’ In the case of the Electoral from Law, the FSLN yielded to pressure Nicaragua’s other political parties to replace the Council of State--which represented the FSLN, the army, Sandinista mass organizations, other parties, opposition unions, and business groups -with a legislature elected from geographically defined constituencies. Coming into the election, then, one sees a governing revolutionary party conceding political and legal ground to its loyal opposition to cement their support in the face of external aggression and domestic economic hardship. In doing so, the Sandinistas were able to keep together much of the pluralist anti-dictatorial alliance they brought with them when they came to power in 1979. Parties Political parties in Nicaragua can be put into four groups: the FSLN, the right, the left, and the Coordinadora (CDN). The Coordinadora is not reafly a party but a coalition of opposition forces made up of three parties, the rumps of two unions, and the apex organization of Nicaraguan business (COSEP). It represents the most conservative sectors of Nicaraguan public life, and its degree of opposition to the Sandinista state is surpassed only by the expatriate counterrevolutionaries. The most important parts of the CDN are the Social Christian Party (PSC) and COSEP. The PSC, the second-best organized party in the country after the FSLN, is strong among the middle strata. COSEP gives the CDN a source of funds, but also harms the organization by making its ties with big business patent. The CDN is also strengthened by its close ties with the opposition paper, Lo Prensa, and the hierarchy of the Catholic church. The Coordinadora has taken a peculiar role in contemporary Nicaraguan politics. It limits its participation in state institutions as much as possible, preferring to use La Prenra or, especially, foreign tours by its leaders to air its positions. Its platform calls for an enhanced role for private enterprise, negotiations with the counter-revolutionaries, and the ‘de-Sandinization’ of the state. By ‘de-Sandinization’ the CDN
Elections
means removing the title ‘Sandinista’ from all state institutions, e.g., the armv and the N network. It feels that the constant identification of the revolution with the Sandinistas gives the FSLN an unfair political advantage. Less alienated from the Sandinista state are three parties who espouse positions more conservative than the FSLN, but still accept the principles on which the present regime is founded. Two of the parties, the Lndependent Liberals (PLI) and the Popular Social Christians (PPSC), belonged both to pm-1979 radical coalitions and the post-revolutionary Revolutionary Patriotic Front (FPR) which brought parties supporting the revolution into an informal alliance with the FSLN. The third party, the Conservatives (PCD). had been strongly opposed to the Sandinistas until a 1984 split in the party drove out the right wing, leaving moderates in command. These parties distinguish themselves from the government on several grounds. fn the area of foreign policy they seek to weaken ties with the Soviet Union. Domestically, they would reduce the emphasis placed on military matters, and seek a wider role for the entrepreneur, especially in agriculture. None of these parties is either very well organized or possessed of a sure constituency. The PCD and PLi both compete for the support of professionals and technocrats, a contest in which the more urban-oriented Liberals seemed to have the edge, but neither party developed the structures needed to cultivate this support or mobilize it once present. They were, of course, hampered by the emergency decree that restricted public rallies, but they were even more seriously hobbled by lack of experience in competitive politics and a reluctance or inability to do the grassroots work needed to build a reliable base. The PPSC appears even weaker than the other two. Splitting from the mainstream Social Christians in 1976, the PPSC has promoted the politics of liberation theology. They also claimed to be the organizers of Managua’s street vendors and casual labourers (estimated at 113 the city’s workforce), but it has not had the capacity to really begin this work. The parties to the left of the FSLii are also weak, still, two of them have had extremely bitter confrontations with the FSLN. One of these, the Popular Action Movement (MAP), is a Maoist group that accuses the Sandinistas of selling out the revolution. In the first six months after the FSLN took power, the MAP confronted them directly and violently with its union and party militia. Not quite as radical are the Communists (PCN), but they too have had repeated clashes
DAVID CLOSE
with the Sandinistas. Like the MAP, the PCN sees the FSLN as being insufficiently radical to successfully lead the revolution. The Socialists (PSN) are the third party on the left. As with other Moscow-supported parties in Latin America, the PSN has followed a cautious path avoiding insurrectional politics. Although the party withheld its support from the FSLN until early 1979, it later became a member of the FPR and even proposed an electoral alliance with the Sandinistas. It has criticized the Sandinistas for bureaucratism, favouritism, and inefficiency. The dominant political force in Nicaragua is the FSLN. Its role in leading the revolt against Somoza gives it a legitimacy no other group can claim. Its commitment to a politics of mass participation has meant the creation of many Sandinista mass organizations; these recognize the FSLN as the proper leader of the Nicaraguan revolution, and provide an easily mobilizable cadre of activists. But the FXN is also the government party: What its leaders do make news; its aspirations become policy; and its failures and successes are public knowledge. Programmatically, the Sandinistas attempt to give effect to an ideology that emphasizes national sovereignty, non-alignment, and radical social and political democracy, all mixed with economic and political pluralism. A movement named for a nationalist guerrilla (Sandino) who spent years fighting the US Marines in Nicaragua’s mountains, and whose leaders admire the Cuban revolution must produce different visions of pluralism and non-alignment than a party of businessmen would. Thus the Sandinistas seem dangerous totalitarians when seen through the eyes of the Coordinadora or the White House. In reality the FSLN has been prudent and pragmatic in most policy areas. Not only did it compromise with the opposition in setting up electoral machinery, it has also changed its mind about its agrarian reform programme. This was originally conceived to emphasize state-owned farms and producer co-ops (Collins, 1982), but dissatisfaction among peasants with the policy led Sandinistas to favour granting individual titles to land and promoting buying/selling co-ops. Prior to the election call, the party system of Nicaragua featured the dominant, even hege manic, FSLN, the parties of the centre-left allied with the Sandinistas in the FPR, the parties of the right allied with the CDN, and the ultra-left. Once the campaign started things changed, and the Sandinistas stood against the rest. The Campaign Although the campaign officially lasted from 1 August to 2 November, the race really began on
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21 February when junta co-ordinator Daniel Ortega announced the date of the poll. In some ways the campaign resembled a plebiscite on the revolution, with the Sandinistas being the ‘yes’ option and the six opposition parties the ‘no’. But one could also see the opposition parties scrambling to create a political base on which to build their futures; in this sense, the real race was for second place behind the FSLN and status as leader of the opposition. The most interesting campaign was run by the Coordinadora who decided not to enter a candidate. As was noted above, the CDN has a long-standing set of claims against the government that they also use as an electoral platform. The most important part of this platform contains demands to democratize the revolution by scheduling elections, lifting all state of emergency restrictions on free speech and assembly, and ‘deSandinization’. On learning that elections would be held in eight and one-half months, the Coordinadora decided that this was too soon because the emergency decree had not yet been lifted4 and there had been no steps taken to rename the various Sandinista institutions. The CDN effectively conditioned its participation in the elections on seeing its programme of government enacted. This strengthened the Sandinistas’ conviction that the CDN was less interested in representing conservative interests within the revolutionary framework than in discrediting that framework in the eyes of the world. In late July, just before the deadline for filing nominations, things seemed to change: the CDN named former governing junta member and one time ambassador to the US Arturo Cruz as its candidate. In convincing Cruz to return from Washington, the Coordinadora found a candidate who was as well-known at home as abroad and who, unlike many CDN sympathizers, would not be jailed as a leader of the counter-revolution on arriving in Managua. To put Cruz at the top of the ticket, the CDN bumped Adan Fletes, a PSC leader who held his party’s nomination for president, into the second spot. This suggests that the Social Christians were thinking about running on their own in the elections, but finally decided to stay with their partners in the CDN. Whatever hopes Cruz’s return stirred in the hearts of the Nicaraguan opposition were soon dashed, for the final day for nominations (7 August) passed with the Coordinadora still out. This did not mean that they were finished as a factor in the race, though. The FSLii govemment, recognizing the international weight of the CDN, extended the nomination period to 27 August, the day the ballots had to go to the printer; and the door to Cruz’s candidacy was not finally closed until after talks between the govern-
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The Nicaraguan Elections
ment and the CDN broke down less than a month before the poll. As long as the CDN was not irrevocably out, Cruz continued his campaign. He returned to Managua in mid-September, and was soon going around the country to consult his followers. These trips to the cities of Leon, Boaco. and Masaya produced major confrontations between Cruz’s people and Sandinista supporters that in each case saw the candidate leave the city under police protection. The result of this was to increase the CDN’s intransigence and to produce complaints from other parties alleging that their campaigns had been disrupted; representatives of these parties later indicated that the problem was reso1ved.s The Cruz-Coordinadora issue was not the campaign’s only rough spot. On 2 1 October, two weeks before the vote, the Liberals announced their withdrawal from the campaign. The fact that the US ambassador’s car was seen in front of the party’s headquarters the day before led to conjecture about payoffs. A calmer analysis might have noted that PLI rallies in the cities of Chinandega and Esteli, both traditional Liberal centres, had turned out crowds of about 300, and concluded the Liberals were looking to avoid an electoral embarrassment. In the end the PLI did not leave the race. They delayed filing their withdrawal notice with the Electoral Commission until after ballots had been sent to regional centres, thus making it impossible to strike the party from the lists; this led the Commission to declare the Liberals still in running. That this might not have entirely displeased the PLI may be inferred from the fact that their advertisements continued to appear in the press and on TV during their ten-day withdrawal. Just a week after the Liberals pulled out, the Conservatives held a convention to see if they, too would quit. They stayed in after the presidential candidate rallied the youth auxilliary to the side of participation, intimidating his pro abstention opponents in the process. Moving from the campaign’s crises to look at the differing tactics adopted by the seven parties in the race, one sees the FSLN taking advantage of its organizational depth and status as leader of the revolution. The Sandinistas did three things that no other party could. First, it used a houseto-house canvass to enlist support instead of relying entirely on mass rallies and media spots. Second, its campaign was not as executive centred as those of other parties; the FSLN had clear leaders for its Assembly ticket in each of the nine electoral districts, and these people had very high profile. Finally, the FSLN ran on its record, spending relatively little time responding to criticisms. In fact, the Sandinistas took some
pains to make the election look like a planned phase of revolutionary development. This is best shown in their slogan, ‘Seguimos de frente con el Frente’: ‘Let’s keep moving ahead with the Front ’ The rightist parties set themselves as lightning rods to attract what they hoped would be a storm of protest votes. Relentlessly attacking the failings of five years of revolutionary government, the right knew that several years of war and a stalled economy produced discontent, but was not sure how to mobilize it. A canvass, even of middle and upper class neighbourhoods, was beyond their human and technical resources, so they were left depending on posters, ads, and rallies to get their names and messages before the people. The flavour of these messages can be got from a couple of PLI slogans painted on walls in the town of San Carlos: ‘No more rice and yes! Communism, beans! ’ and ‘Democracy, for no! ’ The first blamed the government shortages of any but the most basic foods; the second took up the CDN line that the FSLN was building a Cuban-style totalitarian state. The campaigns of the three leftist parties were particularly ineffective. The hlAP and PCN levelled charges of right deviationism against the FSLN, while the Socialists raised the potentially more damaging charges of favouritism and corruption in government. All three parties worked through their unions and rural organizations, and relied on rallies, posters, and media ads. Despite the availability of government financing to all parties in the contest, something that made it possible for even the smallest party to buy advertising space, the FSLN’s advantages in organizational depth showed. Perhaps the others will draw the appropriate lessons from their venture into competitive politics and set up permanent structures to plan future campaigns. Shortly before the election, sources with the FSLN predicted they would take 80 per cent of the presidential vote and 90 per cent of the Assembly. They were wrong. The Sandinistas did very well, capturing 67 per cent of the vote in both races, but they did not bury their opposition. The three parties to their right were chosen by 29 per cent of the voters; those to their left by less than 4 per cent. Turnout was 75 per cent, a good figure for elections where voting was voluntary and over 90 per cent of those eligible were on the rolls. The big winners were the Conservatives and Popular Social Christians. The PCD led the opposition with 14 per cent of the vote, and has received a new lease on life as a political force. The PPSC, though getting only 6 per cent of the ballots, must also be counted winners. Before the
DAVID CLOSE TABLE 1. Results of the 1984 Presidential Election
Nicaraguan
% vote
Party (Candidates)
5.56 1.03 14.04 66.97 1.46 9.61 1.32
PPSC (DiarlMejia) MAP (Tellez/Enriquez) PCD (GuidolChamorro) FSLN (OrtegaRamirez) PCN (Zambrana/Perez) PLI (GodoylPereira) PSN (SanchezlEvertsz)
100‘
Total
’ Total may not equal 100% due to rounding. Source: Report of the Consejo Supremo Electoral de la Republica de Nicaragua, in Emriozda, 15 November 1984. TABLE 2. Results of the 1984 Nicaraguan National Assembly Election Party
% vote
Seats
PPSC MAP PCD FSLN PCN PLI PSN
5.63 1.04 14.00 66.78 1.48 9.66 1.40
6 2 14 61
Total
100’
9’ 2
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who are not diehard members of the ultra-left can meet their ideological needs by supporting the party in power. A word needs to be said about the electoral system that structured these results. In the presidential race a simple ‘first-past-the-post’ system was used. To allot the Assembly seats a novel representation was mode of proportional employed. The Electoral Act divided the country into nine districts with from one to 25 seats per district; electoral quotas were even assigned in the districts returning one and two members (Art. 144).h Wherever there were remainders of either seats or votes in a district after the first count, these went into a national pool (Art. 125). Although this raised the cost of a seat from 9,868 votes on the first round to 12,351 on the second, it actually helped the smaller parties by giving them a larger pool of votes to work with, and all parties gained at least one seat in the national round. Finally, Article 58 of the Electoral Act provided that losing presidential and vice-presidential candidates would be elected to the Assembly as delegate and alternate, respectively, if their party got at least the national mean electoral quota, about 1 per cent of the total vote. This gave all losing presidential candidates a seat. The electoral system assured representation to the maximum number of parties. Although this could lead to fragmentation and fractionalization in the future, its immediate result was to ensure that a broad range of opinion will be heard in the Assembly and many parties will gain parliamentary experience.
96
’ Total may not equal 100% due to rounding. Source: Report of the Consejo Supremo Electoral de la Republica de Nicaragua, in Barricade, 15 November 1984.
elections started, the PPSC were deemed a spent force by most observers. Having won a foothold in the Assembly with their shift to the right, they will be watched to see if they swing back to their old leftist position or continue in their present trajectory and supplant the PSC as the country’s main Christian democratic party. The 10 per cent vote for the Liberals is probably attributable to their temporary retirement from the race. It is currently open to doubt whether they will be able to build on this base, though, because a split between its abstentionist and participationist wings threatens to destroy the party. Regarding the very poor showing of the Marxist-Leninist opposition, one can only conclude that it is very hard to be a left-wing opposition in a revolutionary regime, for radicals
Conclusion Observers’ reports have declared the Nicaraguan elections to have been free and fair (Central Americu Repoti, 1984). It now remains to be seen whether having successfully conducted elections will consolidate support for the FSLN in Europe and give Managua more diplomatic leverage during what are sure to be four difficult years with Washington. If so, the Sandinista regime should survive to come to grips with the frustrations inherent in using the political machinery of liberal democracy. But if the Reagan administration steps up its military pressure against Managua, President Ortega may feel compelled to declare a state of emergency that could leave representative institutions inoperative. As this is written-January 1985-the 1984 elections form a watershed in Nicaraguan political history. They mark, at least for now, the end of Sandinista experiments with revolutionary political forms, and signal the regime’s entry on a more prosaic path. Should they succeed in
The Nicaraguan Elections
158
wedding radical politics and liberal institutions without seriously debasing either, the Sandinistas will have carried out an exciting experiment in democracy.
5. Interviews with representatives of the six opposition parties, October 1984. 6. Republica de Nicaragua, ‘Ley Electoral’, Art. 144 (1984).
Notes Figures taken from a CBS newscast, 21 December 1984. Republica de Nicaragua, ‘Ley de Partidos Politicos’, Art. 4 (1983). Interview with PPSC officials, October 1984. By 6 August 1984 all that remained of the emergency decree was censorship of military news, but no move was made to amend the decree from 21 February to 19 July.
References George Black, The Triumph of the People, (London: Zed Press, 198 1). Jaime Wheelock, El Gran Desafio, (Managua: Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, 1983). Joseph Collins, What Dr@ence Can a Revolution Make? (San Francisco: Food First, 1982). Central America Reports, 11:46, 23 November 1984.