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The Sicilian mafia: The business of private protection
292
Current
Publications
years of experience are much more likely to drop out of crime. Both low-rate and highrate offenders are less likely to drop out of offending than those with moderate offense rates. Some offenders are particularly liable to be arrested for each crime they commit. Other offenders learn to avoid capture by the police as they gain experience in lawbreaking. In contrast, others are seemingly inherently adept at avoiding arrest Spelman suggests that police and prosetutorial efforts focused upon frequent offenders may be more effective and more equitable than selective sentencing and parole schemes. Hc concludes that the present incarceration rate, estimated at 6- 12 percent of all active adult offenders. reduces aggregate crime rate by an estimated 16-28 percent. A I percent increase in overall jail and prison population would probably produce a 0.12- to 0.20-pcrcent reduction in crime. Selective sentencing of predicted frequent offenders can lead to reductions of I-3 percent without increasing prison populations. Spelman estimates that its use in conjunction with selective policing and prosecution efforts aimed at the most active 4 percent of all offenders could reduce aggregate crime rates by 4-8 percent. The implications of such a policy are examined. (JAA)
The Sicilian Mafia: The Business vate Protection by Diego Gambetta
of Pri-
Harvard University Press (79 Garden Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02 138). 1993, 335 pp., hardcover-$39.95. Although often associated with violence, Diego Gambetta theorizes that the Sicilian mafia is a business like many others. He rejects theories that the mafia is comprised of entrepreneurs who deal in illegal goods or hold violently the production of legal goods. Instead, he contends that private protection is the mafia’s main commodity. The need for this commodity revolves around trust, or lack
Abstracts
thereof, believed by many to be manipulated by the mafia for the purpose of profit. As a result, some believe they are victims of extortion, while others find it in their best interest to pay for protection. Gambetta devotes his book to exploring the internal mechanisms of this phenomenon, based upon the evidence produced in the Sicilian antimafia campaign headed by Judges Paolo Borsellino and Giovanni Falcone. Gambetta explores a relativist theory, as popularized by Sicilian scholar Santi Romano, that associations for criminal purposes could be deemed analogous to the state based on similarities in legislative and executive authorities, courts for disputes, punishment, agents for punishment, and complex and precise statutes. He challenges those who endorse Romano’s relativist view that separate institutions safeguard “the independence of civil society against the risk of an overpowering state” by indicating that this antiliberal thinking “gnaws at the legitimacy of the Italian state and colludes in the destruction of southern society” (7). Gambetta argues that the parallel between the mafia and the state has clear limits and the view of the mafia as a legal system in its own right does not actually hold. The author claims that, unlike the state, the mafia is not centralized, has variable prices for protection based on wealth, lacks undisputed control over the use of force in a certain territory, and is not accountable to its subjects. Instead, the Sicilian mafia is more closely equated with businesses such as the automobile, insurance, and advertising industries. He asserts that the mafia is an industry that is managed with its own requirements and constraints and, in a sense, can be viewed as a rational entity that runs its business with efficiency. Without implying that becoming a mafioso is a rational concept, Gambetta demonstrates how a recognized evil can perform a real service and how, in turn, such a service can inflict great harm on society The author concludes by rejecting the common explanation that human behavior invokes subcultural values as the force which
Current
Publications
pushes agents toward certain courses of action and instead prefers to view “cultural” characteristics as skills acquired through generations and expectations about life and others. These skills and expectations, unlike
Abstract
293
norm, form part of a conceptual world where “individuals are seen as at least tentatively rational and responsible for their deeds, and in which rational reform is thus not inconceivable” (11). (DLS)
Current
Publications
years of experience are much more likely to drop out of crime. Both low-rate and highrate offenders are less likely to drop out of offending than those with moderate offense rates. Some offenders are particularly liable to be arrested for each crime they commit. Other offenders learn to avoid capture by the police as they gain experience in lawbreaking. In contrast, others are seemingly inherently adept at avoiding arrest Spelman suggests that police and prosetutorial efforts focused upon frequent offenders may be more effective and more equitable than selective sentencing and parole schemes. Hc concludes that the present incarceration rate, estimated at 6- 12 percent of all active adult offenders. reduces aggregate crime rate by an estimated 16-28 percent. A I percent increase in overall jail and prison population would probably produce a 0.12- to 0.20-pcrcent reduction in crime. Selective sentencing of predicted frequent offenders can lead to reductions of I-3 percent without increasing prison populations. Spelman estimates that its use in conjunction with selective policing and prosecution efforts aimed at the most active 4 percent of all offenders could reduce aggregate crime rates by 4-8 percent. The implications of such a policy are examined. (JAA)
The Sicilian Mafia: The Business vate Protection by Diego Gambetta
of Pri-
Harvard University Press (79 Garden Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02 138). 1993, 335 pp., hardcover-$39.95. Although often associated with violence, Diego Gambetta theorizes that the Sicilian mafia is a business like many others. He rejects theories that the mafia is comprised of entrepreneurs who deal in illegal goods or hold violently the production of legal goods. Instead, he contends that private protection is the mafia’s main commodity. The need for this commodity revolves around trust, or lack
Abstracts
thereof, believed by many to be manipulated by the mafia for the purpose of profit. As a result, some believe they are victims of extortion, while others find it in their best interest to pay for protection. Gambetta devotes his book to exploring the internal mechanisms of this phenomenon, based upon the evidence produced in the Sicilian antimafia campaign headed by Judges Paolo Borsellino and Giovanni Falcone. Gambetta explores a relativist theory, as popularized by Sicilian scholar Santi Romano, that associations for criminal purposes could be deemed analogous to the state based on similarities in legislative and executive authorities, courts for disputes, punishment, agents for punishment, and complex and precise statutes. He challenges those who endorse Romano’s relativist view that separate institutions safeguard “the independence of civil society against the risk of an overpowering state” by indicating that this antiliberal thinking “gnaws at the legitimacy of the Italian state and colludes in the destruction of southern society” (7). Gambetta argues that the parallel between the mafia and the state has clear limits and the view of the mafia as a legal system in its own right does not actually hold. The author claims that, unlike the state, the mafia is not centralized, has variable prices for protection based on wealth, lacks undisputed control over the use of force in a certain territory, and is not accountable to its subjects. Instead, the Sicilian mafia is more closely equated with businesses such as the automobile, insurance, and advertising industries. He asserts that the mafia is an industry that is managed with its own requirements and constraints and, in a sense, can be viewed as a rational entity that runs its business with efficiency. Without implying that becoming a mafioso is a rational concept, Gambetta demonstrates how a recognized evil can perform a real service and how, in turn, such a service can inflict great harm on society The author concludes by rejecting the common explanation that human behavior invokes subcultural values as the force which
Current
Publications
pushes agents toward certain courses of action and instead prefers to view “cultural” characteristics as skills acquired through generations and expectations about life and others. These skills and expectations, unlike
Abstract
293
norm, form part of a conceptual world where “individuals are seen as at least tentatively rational and responsible for their deeds, and in which rational reform is thus not inconceivable” (11). (DLS)