The Soviet press and the problem of stalin

JANE P. SHAPIRO

The Soviet Press and the Problem of Stalin

Since the mid-1950s, it has become increasingly apparent that Soviet published materials designed for a wide audience do not necessarily conform to the policy lines set forth in Pravda and Zzvestiiu. Indeed, even these two national dailies have often handled an important issue dissimilarly. The evidence suggests that the less clear the Soviet leadership’s position and accompanying directives on a given issue, the greater the editors’ latitude in publication decisionmaking. In order to demonstrate how varied the press handling of a single issue can be, this paper traces the treatment accorded Stalin in the mass-circulation nonspecialized press during the years since his death in March 1953,’ with particular a.ttention to the post-Khrushchev period. The study covers four CPSU Central Committee journals, Agitator, Kommunist. Partiinaia zhizn’, and Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie 2; Pravda, Zzvestiia, and each of the major Russian1. Thus, the assessment of Stalin by military writers and the military press has not been included. Selections from the relevant literature have been ably compiled and edited by Seweryn Bialer, Stalin and His Generals (New York: Pegasus, 1969). 2. Agitator and Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie began publication in 1956 and 1957, respectively; issues of the latter are available only from mid-1960 to the present.

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language newspapers of the fifteen republics s; and books concerned primarily with Party and general Soviet history which have been published in large quantities.* The correct treatment to be accorded Stalin seems to have been a continuous concern to his successors. During the years under review here, a series of policies regarding the late dictator is discernible 5; four distinct periods emerge, although policy modifications

occurred

within each period as well as between one and the next. It is useful to review the characteristics of each period briefly. (1) March 1953February 1956: reference to Stalin’s name and deeds appeared less and less frequently in the press, but no overt criticism of him was tolerated; this period was terminated by the policy innovations 3. Only material from the main Russian-languagenewspapersissued by each republic Party’s Central Committee has been included. 4. Unfortunately, the specialized historical journals, Voprosy istorii and Voprosy istorii KPSS, which are concerned primarily with events of the Soviet period and carry articles of particular relevance for our purposes, have very limited circulation (consistently well under 100,000 copies per issue). They, therefore, have only a limited influence on the general population. The four Central Committee journals, on the other hand, have a circulation ranging from 300,000-600,000copies per issue in the late 1950s to 600,000-1,400,OOO copies per issue in the mid-1960s. 5. There are a number of studies by Western observers regarding some aspect of Stalin’s treatment in the Soviet press since 1953. Those that consider the problem within the larger context of Soviet historiography in the post-Stalin years include Marin Pundeff (ed.), History in the U.S.S.R. (San Francisco: Chandler, 1967), Ch. VIII; Panas Fedenko, Khrushchev’s New History of the Soviet Communist Party (Munich: Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., 1963),Chs. II-IV; John Keep and Liliana Erisby (eds.), Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror (New York: Praeger, 1964), Chs. II, III, V, VI; Cyril E. Black, Rewriting Russian History, 2nd ed., rev. (New York: Vintage, 1962).

Chs. 1, 3. A few studies have considered Stalin’s treatment in a more comprehensive manner. These include Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1966), Chs. 7-9; and Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin (New York: Viking, 1969), especially Pt. II, Ch. 2; Pt. III, Chs. 4, 5; and Pt. V, Ch. 2. The post-Stalin reassessmentby Soviet military writers and historians of the dictator’s role during World War II has been examined in some detail by Raymond Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, rev. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1962); and Matthew P. Gallagher, The Soviet History of World Wur ZZ (New York: Praeger, 1963). Some recently published articles have been devoted primarily to the Stalin issue: Kurt Marko, “ Ghosts Behind the Ghost?Stalin under Revision,” Survey, No. 60 (July 1966); Thomas B. Larson, “What Happened to Stalin?,” Problems of Communism, XVI, 2 (March-April 1967); Wolfgang Leonhard, “Politics and Ideology in the Post-Khrushchev Era,” in Alexander Dallin and Thomas B. Larson (e&r.), Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968); and Dmitry Pospielovsky, “ Restalinixation or Destalinization?,” The Russian Review, 27,3 (July 1968).

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181

introduced at the Party’s Twentieth Congress. (2) February Z956frequent criticism of Stalin’s “ cult of personality ” and occasional references to victims of the Stalin-directed Great Purge (1936-1938) and the Leningrad Affair (1948-1949) were permitted; after 1957, both derogatory and favorable mention of Stalin was largely omitted. The period was terminated by the new policy line introduced at the Party’s Twenty-second Congress. (3) November 1961-&y 196.5: Stalin was criticized frequently and very rarely praised; his “ errors ” and “ miscalculations ” were often referred to, including the ” mass repressions ” of the Purge era. No Party congress conveniently terminated the period, but a new policy line was introduced by Party Secretary Brezhnev in early May 1965. (4) May Z965-present : criticism of Stalin has been moderated, while recognition of his “ achievements ” has been permitted and perhaps occasionally encouraged. Although a general (albeit zigzagged) policy line can be traced through the four periods, authors and editors often did not adhere to it. This failure seems to have been a consequence of the Party leadership’s inability to establish an unambiguous policy and insist upon conformity to it in all materials approved for publication. No clear-cut permanent policy regarding Stalin was formulated during the Khrushchev regime, evidently because Party leaders were unable to agree among themselves on the nature of that policy. Khrushchev certainly appears to have strongly favored sustained criticism and condemnation of Stalin after the Twentieth Congress; opposition to such a policy within the Party’s Presidium probably was responsible for preventing its promulgation. Indeed, Khrushchev chose to utilize anti-Stalinism as best he could to enhance his personal political power by denigrating his primary rivals, who had been among Stalin’s closest associates during the Great Purge and World War II. The available evidence indicates that the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership has not determined a clear-cut policy, either, although there is no longer anyone in a politically powerful position committed to anti-Stalinism in the way that Khrushchev was. Part of the difficulty encountered in reaching a permanent decision regarding Stalin’s place in Soviet history lay in the leadership’s assumption that it was necessary to review and reassess Stalin’s contributions continually. Virtually from its inception more than a half-century ago, the Soviet political leadership has used past events and policies to justify and legitimize present policy decisions. Since the mid-1950s, most of Stalin’s policy decisions officially have been considered harsh and restrictive. During periods in which less

October 1961:

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restrictive domestic or foreign policies were adopted by the post-Stalin leadership, Stalin typically was criticized harshly; during periods in which more restrictive policies were implemented, he was treated more kindly. Indeed, treatment accorded Stalin within a given time period often serves as a rough index of the relative restrictiveness or leniency of the leadership’s position on major issues. The absence of an official posture regarding Stalin’s permanent place in Soviet history has permitted writers and editors unusual latitude in their treatment of Stalin, and has left prepublication censors confused and often ineffective. Without clear and consistent directives from the Party leadership, it has proved difficult to prohibit publication of material that does not conform to the official policy because the policy is ambiguous, permitting several interpretations.e From Stalin’s Death to the Twentieth Congress Within a few months of Stalin’s death in March 1953, the number of published references to him declined rapidly. In May an editorial in Kommunist suggested that the decline was not accidental and that the political leadership had already begun to consider the problem of Stalin’s treatment in the post-Stalin era. The editorial was critical of the role of the “ single hero in history,” and Stalin himself was quoted as having declared that “ the principle of devotion to a single individual is incompatible with Bolshevism.” 7 As further evidence that Stalin’s successorswere reviewing and downgrading his place in history, no commemorative article appeared in the mass-circulation national or republic press on the seventy-fourth anniversary of his birthday in December 1953 (see Table 1). Yet the first anniversary of his death was noted, albeit inconsistently (see Table 2). Zzvestiia carried commemorative articles both on the anniversary date itself and on the following day, while Pravda noted just the date itself. Of the available republic newspapers, each noted just the date. Kommunist, the only available Central Committee 6. For a discussion of the mechanics of press censorship, see Antony Buzek, How rhe Communist Press Works (New York: Praeger, 1964), Chs. 8, 9; and Studies on the Soviet Union: The Soviet Censorship, New Series, XI, 2 (1971). I am indebted to Mr. Gene Sosin of Radio Liberty for calling my attention to this issue. 7. [Unsigned], “ Kommunisticheskaia Pa&iia Sovetskogo Soiuza-napravliaiushchaia i rukovodiashchaia sila sovetskogo obshchestva,” Kommunist, NO. 8 (May 1953), especially p. 15.

Table OF STALIN’S

PRESS TREATMENT C.P.S.U. C.C. Journal : 1. Agifolor 2. Kommunist 3. Purtiinniu zhizn’ 4. Poliiicheskoe samoobrazovonie Newspaper : 1. Izvestiia 2. Pravda 3. Kommunist (Armenia) 4. Bakinskii rabochii (Azerbaidzhan) 5. Sovetskaia Belorussiia (Belorussia) 6. Sovetskaia Estoniia (Estonia) 7. Zaria vostoka (Georgia) 8. Kazakhstanskaia Pravda (Kazakhstan) 9. Sovetskaia Kirgiziia (Kirgizia) 10. Sovetskaia Latviia (Latvia) 11. Sovetskaia Litva (Lithuania) 12. Sovefskaia Moldaviia (Moldavia) 13. Sovetskaiu Rossiia (R.S.F.S.R.) 14. Kommunist Tadzhikistana (Tadzhikistan) 15. Turkmenskaia iskra (Turkmenia) 16. Pravda Ukrainy (Ukraine) 17. Pravda vostoka (Uzbekistan) Key:

a n.c.

1954 n.c. c c

n.c.

U.C.

1953 ILC.

a a n.a.

1 BIRTHDAY

ANNIVERSARY 1960+ 1969 a a a a a a

1957 a a a

1958 a a a

1959

c c

1956 a a a

ll.C.

n.c.

n.a

n.a.

n.a.

a

a

19.55 ILC.

: a

c

C

C

C

a a

b b

b b

b”

a a

d”

n.a.

C

a

a

a

a

a

a

a

C

C

a

b

a

c

a

a

a

C

C

a

a

a

a

a

a

n.a.

C

a

a

a

a

a

a

a

C

C

b

C

c

C

C

a

a

c

C

a

a

a

a

a

a

n.a.

C

C

a

a

a

b

a

a

n.a.

C

c

a

a

a

a

a

a

n.a.

C

C

a

a

a

b

a

a

n.a.

C

C

a

a

a

a

a

a

n.c.

n.c.

ILC.

a

a

a

a

a

a

a

c

C

a

a

a

a

a

a

n.8.

C

C

a

a

a

n.a.

C

a

a

n-a.

n.a.

C

a

a

*.a.

* Between 1960 and 1969, none of the newspapers noted the anniversary. b-Matter-of-fact or small article about Stalin. a - Date ignored. c-Laudatory article, often accompanied by photograph of Stalin. d-Long article about Stalin, much of it derogatory. nor yet commenced. n.a. - Issues not available. ns. - Publication

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Table 2 PRESS TREATMENT

OF STALIN’S

C.P.S.U. C.C. Journal : 1. Agitator . .. ... . .. 2. Kommunist .. . .. . ... 3. Portiinaia zhizn’ ... . .. 4. Politichcskoe samoobrazovanie Newspaper : . .. ... 1. Izvesfiia 2. Pravda .. .. 3. Kommunist . . .. . (Armenia) 4. Bakinskii rabochii . . . (Azerbaidzhan) 5. Sovetskaia Belorussiia (Belorussia) 6. Sovetskaia Estoniia . . . (Estonia) 7. Zaria vostoka . . ... (Georgia) 8. Kazakhstanskaia Pravda (Kazakhstan) 9. Sovetskaia Kirgiziia . . (Kirgizia) 10. Sovetskaia Latviia . . (Latvia) 11. Sovetskaia Litva ... (Lithuania) 12. Sov&kaia Mbldaviia (Moldavia) .13. Sovetskoia Rossiia . . . (R.S.F.S.R.) 14. Kommunist Tadzhikistana (Tadzhikistan) 15. Turkmenskaia iskra . (Turkmenia) 16. Pravda Ukrainy ... (Ukraine) 17. Pravda vostoka .. .

Key:

DEATH

... ... ... ...

DATE

ANNIVERSARY 1955 n.c. a a n.c.

1956* n.c. a a n.c.

C

a

1954 D.C. C Il.C.

n.c.

C

C

...

*.. ... ...

n.a.

C

a a a

.. .

...

n.a.

C

a

n.a.

b

a

ma.

a

a

ma.

C

C

C

a

a

ma.

a

a

na.

a

a

na.

a

a

n.a.

a

a

n.c.

n.c.

n.c.

... . ..

... . .

...

... .

.. .

. . ...

...

n.a.

C

a

...

...

C

a

a

...

...

n.a.

a

a

n.a.

a

a

...

*After 1956, the anniversary was not noted in the press. a - Date ignored. b - Short, matter-of-fact article about Stalin (or mention of the date). c - Laudatory article, often accompanied by a photograph of Stalin. d - Long article about Stalin, much of it derogatory. n.a. -Issues not available. ns. - Publication not yet commenced.

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185

journal, carried a lengthy and laudatory lead article.s Stalin’s name virtually disappeared from the press during the remainder of the year, but the seventy-fifth anniversary of his birth was celebrated with great fanfare. During late 1954 and early 1955, the brief revival of published complimentary references to Stalin and his achievements coincided with Khrushchev’s successful drive to unseat Malenkov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers by criticizing his “ un-Stalinist ” emphasis on the need to expand consumer goods production at a rate equal with heavy-industrial production. It soon became apparent that Khrushchev’s attempt to legitimize his succession to Stalin on the basis of loyalty to the latter’s dicta was only a temporary maneuver to enhance his personal political power.s The second anniversary of Stalin’s death was commemorated by some (but by no means all) of the leading national and republic newspapers and journals. Pravda took brief note of the date, while Zzvestiia passed over it in silence, as did both Kommunist and Partiinuia zhizn’. Ten of the fourteen lo republic newspapers also ignored the date, and two others noted it only perfunctorily. The anniversary of Stalin’s birth in December, in contrast, was noted universally and with great publicity. Pravda’s lead article, which stressed Stalin’s ideological creativity, was published verbatim in several of the republic newspapers. In the years between Stalin’s death and the Party’s Twentieth Congress, clearly no single decision had been reached or directive issued regarding Stalin’s treatment in published materials. With the exception of the anniversaries of his birth and death, his name had largely disappeared from the mass-circulation press.‘l He had not been criticized for errors he had committed, but he had not been praised for his achievements and contributions either. The Khrushchev-sponsored decision to condemn Stalin publicly and destroy the image of his infallibility was adopted in order both to justify those antistalinist policies that had already been effected (including rapprochement with Yugoslavia, large-scale dismantling 8. Purriinaia zhizn’ only resumed publication in April 1954, too late to celebrate the annivensary. (It had ceased publication in 1948.) 9. See the discussion in Roger Pethybridge, A Key to Soviet Politics (New York: Pmeger, 1962), pp. 43-65; and John A. Armstrong, The Politics of Totalitarianism (New York: Random House, 1961). Ch. XIX. 10. The main organ of the R.S.F.S.R., Sovetskaia Rossiia, commenced publication only in mid-1956. 11. Only a few books concerned with Party history and published during this period are available; in them, references to Stalin have been curtailed.

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of the secret-police apparatus, and adoption of a more conciliatory foreign-policy line toward the West) and to undermine the ideological position of those bureaucrats who continued to cling to outmoded Stalinist precepts.1z In order to shock the bureaucracy out of its Stalinist conservatism, the attack on Stalin had to be much more far-reaching than mere public disapproval of certain of his policiesIs From the Twentieth to the Twenty-second Party Congress The public assault on Stalin was formally launched on February 14, 1956. when, in honor of the opening of the Congress, Pravda published a sketch in which the usual portrait of Stalin with Lenin had been replaced by a single portrait of Lenin. During the public proceedings of the Congress, the “ cult of personality ” or the “ turning of one or another leader into a hero who could work miracles ” was criticized. Although the implication was clear, Stalin’s name was not mentioned in connection with the harm the “cult” had wrought. Khrushchev’s “ secret speech,” delivered to a closed session of the Congress, condemned Stalin and attempted to set general limits on permissible censure of him. No guidelines for the new evaluation of Stalin were issued publicly until the Central Committee’s official decree concerning Stalin and the “ cult of personality ” was published on July 2. After the Congress closed, overt criticism of Stalin began to appear frequently in the press, and references to the “ personality cult ” were common. Both Kommunist and Partiinuiu zhizn’ carried a number of articles and editorials in which the “cult” and its “harmful consequences” were criticized. Moreover, a number of prominent victims of the Stalin-directed Great Purge and the Leningrad Affair began to be rehabilitated posthumously and publicly.14 12. The decision apparently was reached only on the eve of the Twentieth Congress. See the relevant discussion in B. I. Nikolaevsky, “ Problema destalinizatsii i delo Bukharina,” Sotsidisticheskii vestnik, Collection No. 4 (December 1965); and Wolfgang Leonhard, The Kremlin Since Stalin (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 122. 13. Khrushchev’s initial motives have been discussed at length in Leonhard, The Kremlin Since Stalin, pp. 186-187; Boris I. Nicolaevsky, Power and the Sovief Elite (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 33-36; Edward Crankshaw, Khrushchev: A Career (New York: Viking, 1966), pp. 222-226; and Pethybridge, op. cit., pp. 66-68. 14. For a discussion of the relationship between Khrushchevaponsored anti-Stalinism and the rehabilitation of Great Purge victims, see Leopold

THE SOVIET

PRESS AND THE PROBLEM

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187

In the wake of the Hungarian Revolution, however, the Soviet leadership attempted to restrict further overt censure of Stalin. In January 1957, Khrushchev personally modified the official Central Committee assessment of Stalin by declaring publicly that despite errors, Stalin had remained a loyal Communist throughout his life. “ May God grant (so to speak),” Khrushchev cried, “ that each Communist be able to fight as Stalin fought.” l6 Nonetheless, only Zuria vostoka, the Georgian Party newspaper, marked the late dictator’s birth date the previous month. Its commemorative article praised Stalin and noted only briefly that he had made errors during the last years of his life. “ Some people,” it warned, had gone too far under the slogan of criticizing Stalin. Khrushchev’s inept manner of handling the assault on Stalin certainly seems to have figured in the effort of other Party leaders to unseat him in June 1957. Yet, although the First Secretary managed both to retain his position and to effect the expulsion of his opponents (whom he dubbed the “ anti-Party group “) from positions of leadership, he apparently was unable to renew the public assault against Stalin. He did attempt to link the “ group’s ” leaders with Stalin and implicate them in Great Purge decisions, thereby turning anti-Stalinism into a personal weapon which could aid his drive to succeed Stalin as the single ruler. The official Central timmittee resolution, announcing the expulsion of the “ anti-Party group ” from the Presidium and Central Committee, accused its members of having “ stubbornly resisted ” the Party’s efforts “ to eliminate the consequences of the personality cult.” I8 During July, several Party leaders publicly accused members of the “ group” of having participated in the “ mass repressions ” of the 1930s. Although these comments were very revealing, the speecheswere not given much publicity.” From mid-1957 until the fall of 1961, Stalin was criticized less often. His name was either omitted from historical ,accounts or included Perdition,” Problems of Communism, XII, 2 Labedz, “ Resurrection-and (March-April 1963). Also see my “ Political Rehabilitation in Soviet Central Asian Party Organizations,” Central Asian Review, XIV, 3 (1966); and my “Soviet Historiography and the Moscow Trials: After Thirty Years,” The Russian Review, 27, 1 (January 1968). 15. Pravda, January 19,1957 16. Ibid., July 4, 1957. 17. See General A. V. Gorbatov’s speech in Riga, published only in Sovetskaia Lutviiu, July 5, 1957; N. M. Shvernik’s speech in Leningrad, published in Pravda, July 7, 1957; and Marshal G. K. Zhukov’s speech in Leningrad, excerpts of which were published in the same newspaper on July 16, 1957. (The regional Party paper, Leningradshiu pruvdu. carried transcripts of the Shvernik and Zhukov speeches.)

188

STUDIES

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without accompanying comment. The anniversary of his birth was recalled publicly in some manner until 1960. In December 1958, Pravda and Zzvestiia each carried a short news item from Gori. Stalin’s birthplace, while only two of the fifteen republic newspapers recalled the date. On the eightieth anniversary of his birth in 1959, Pravda carried an article duly critical of the errors of the “ personality cult.” Izvestiia carried only a short news item from Gori once again, and a majority of the republic newspapers failed to note the date at all. only the Georgian paper ran a commemorative article the following year. The Central Committee journals consistently ignored the date each year; only Kommunist carried a commemorative article in 1959. The article was predominantly critical of the “ personality cult,” however, and found nothing praiseworthy to include about Stalin’s activities after 1934.‘* During the same period, the decision of whether or not to include a reference to Stalin in an appropriate historical context seemsto have been left mainly to the discretion of authors and editors; if any policy regarding Stalin was issued, it must have been very broad and vague, permitting quite different interpretations. Thus a widely circulated history .text, published in 1957 in connection with the fortieth anniversary of the Revolution, Zstoriia SSSR. Epokha sotsializma (1917-1957gg.), was critical of much of Stalin’s activities, barely referred to his Civil War or World War II role, and greatly emphasized the harm his “ personality cult ” had wrought after 1934. In contrast, Stalin was mentioned rather frequently in the last three volumes (published after mid-1957) of the five-volume official history of the Civil War, Zstoriia grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR. Moreover, several speeches he had delivered and telegrams he had composed were quoted verbatim. In the last volume, published in 1960, Stalin was ~treatedmost favorably: his activities were described in greater detail than they had been in any of the previous volumes. Yet the Kratkaia istoriia grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR, published the same year, referred to Stalin only briefly, and scarcely praised his Civil War achievements. The Central Committee journals’ handling of Stalin varied throughout the period (see Fig. 1). Kommunist maintained the most unfavorable assessmentof Stalin: from March 1956 to the following spring, articles and editorials critical of the “ personality cult ” were carried regularly. After mid-1957, restrained criticism of Stalin was 18. [Unsigned], “I. V. Stalin,” Kommunisf, No. 18 (December 1959). pp. 47-56. The article was so critical of the ” personality cult ” that it could almost be construed as a revival of the assault against Stalin.

Unfavorable

I-

-4

Favorable Tmatment -5

I-

-3

+1

$2

+3

4-4

Trratment +5

L

(March)

I

1951

I

1956

Fig. l-Treatment

I

1959

I

AgifaIor

1958

---,,,-,Kommunist

-.-.-

I

1961

I

samoohzovwu~e

1960

Pdticheskoe

of Stalin in Four CPSU Central Committee Journals, March 1956-October 1961

I October

190

STUDIES

IN COMPARATLVE

COMMUNISM

occasionally included, although by 1959, references to him had become infrequent. Shortly before the Twenty-second Congress opened, several issues carried articles critical of his theoretical positions.lD Partiinaiu zhizn’ handled the Stalin issue most inconsistently. Between March and July 1956, articles harshly critical of Stalin can be found in virtually every issue. Indeed, Partiinaiu zhizn’ was the first Party journal to carry an editorial critical of the “personality cult “; it appeared in the issue passed for publication the day prior to the opening of the Twentieth Congresszo In the August issue, however, an article included some of Stalin’s works as suggested readings for the study of the Party’s history,21 as did subsequent articles published during the following spring and summer. In November 1957, the journal advertised a collection of Stalin’s writings, Ob Oktiabr’skoi revoliutsii, which had been published to help celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the revolution. The following February, a lead article criticized “ some propagandists ” for their incorrect assessmentof the “ personality cult and its consequences“; they “ have stopped paying attention to I. V. Stalin’s works. This is of course an error,” because Stalin had contributed a great deal in the course of building socialism and defending Leninism from its enemies.** From mid-1958 to the Twenty-second Congress, however, references to Stalin appeared only rarely. Agitator, which began publication in the fall of 1956. carried articles which only occasionally referred to Stalin, often not in a derogatory manner. Typically, Stalin’s name was included without comment in a listing of leaders who had participated in a significant historical event. The journal’s cautious handling of the issue suggests that the editors preferred not to become involved in the Stalin issue if they could avoid it. Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie (whose issues are available only from mid-1960), too, scarcely referred to Stalin until just before the Twenty-second Congress convened. In its October 1961 issue (passed for publication on September 26), both the editorial 19. See, for example, A Butenko, “ Istoricheskaia missiia diktatury proletariata,” Kommunisr, No. 14 (September 1961), in which Stalin’s assessment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the nature of the class struggle during the 19309 in the U.S.S.R. was criticized and declared incorrect. 20. [Unsigned], ‘ Nasha velikaia partiia,” Portiinaia zhizn’, No. 3 (February 1956), especially p. 5. 21. [Unsigned], ” Primernyi tematicheskii plan zaniatii kruzhkov i seminarov po izucheniiu istorii KPSS. na 19X-1957- uchebnyi god,” ibid.. No. 16 (August 1956), especially pp. 38-39. ibid., 22. Ye. Bugaev, “ Partiinoe prosveshchenie vo vtorom polugodii,” No. 4 (February 1958), especially p. 13. l

THE

SOVIET

PRESS

AND

THE

PROBLEM

OF

STALIN

191

and a leading article were harshly critical of Stalin, suggesting that interest in the Stalin issue might be revitalized at the Congress, as indeed it was. The renewal of anti-Stalinism, undertaken at the Congress, was designed primarily to enhance Khrushchev’s prestige as the single leader who was determined to repudiate all that was harmful of the Stalin era and to guarantee that no recurrence of Stalinism would be permitted.2s It also served to discredit more completely those conservatives who continued to oppose his policies, as well as the former leaders who had tried to depose him in 1957. The Last Years of Khrushchev’s Rule Prior to the Congress, harsh criticism of Stalin’s activities had been restricted generally to the period from 1934, after the assassination of Kirov, until his death. After the Congress, Stalin the ruler was censured more severely than Stalinism the system of dictatorial, arbitrary rule. Stalin’s errors committed prior to 1934 and the development of the “ personality cult ” were emphasized, including his misdirection of agricultural collectivization between 1929 and 1932, and his failure to understand how the nationality question properly ought to be resolved after the conclusion of the Civil War. His military contribution to that war was reassessedagain : historians described his miscalculations and ignorance of military strategy and disclosed that he actually had caused unnecessary losses. He was blamed personally for the country’s lack of preparedness at the time of the Nazi attack in June 1941, for failing to heed warnings and unmistakable signs of the impending invasion, and for *theheavy losses sustained by both the military and the civilian population during the first months of the war. A comparison of the first two editions of the Central Committeeauthorized lstoriia Kommunisticheskoi Purtii Sovetskogo Soiuza demonstrates well the official change in the assessmentof Stalin. The first edition, published in 1959, was restrained in its criticism, although it acknowledged that errors had been committed. The second edition, 23. An authoritative (unsigned)Pravda editorial publishedshortly after the close of the Congressnoted that the Stalin issuehad been raised again “in order to fully excludeevery possibility of a repetition of such mistakesand perversions[as had existed during the ‘ cult’ era] in the future . . . and to guaranteeno recurrenceof these errors.” [Unsigned], “=I S” ezd KPSS o likvidatsii posledstvii kul’ta lichnosti.” Pravda, November 21, 1961. Also see Linden, op cit., pp. 117-l 19.

192

STUDIES

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published three years later, censured Stalin severely for his errors and miscalculations.24 It established the current (and least ambiguous) guidelines for ‘the treatment to be accorded Stalin, as the third, revised edition was to do in 1969. Khrushchev was clearly the driving force behind revitalized antiStalinism and the effort to establish clear Party directives for handling the Stalin issue. He personally sanctioned the publication of Yevtushenko’s anti-Stalinist poem, “ Stalin’s Heirs,” as well as Solzhenitsyn’s powerful narrative of life in a Soviet forced-labor camp during the Stalin era, One Day in the Life of Zvan Denisovich. The latter established the precedent for the publication of numerous labor-camp memoirs, although the theme had been touched upon earlier. The First Secretary strove to continue and intensify antiStalinism until he was removed from political office in late 1964; he succeeded, with the exception of a few months during the late winter and early spring of 1963, when he clearly was on the defensive regarding the Stalin issue. In March, at a well-publicized meeting of artists and writers, he declared that the Party “ pays credit to Stalin’s services both to itself and the Communist movement. We continue to maintain that Stalin was devoted to Communism. He was a Marxist, and this cannot and should not be denied.” 25But four months later, having regained the offensive, the First Secretary publicly described Stalin as one of the tyrants of history who was able to retain power only with the aid of the axe. “ No one,” he cried, “ will be able to whitewash Stalin, no one. A black dog cannot be washed white.” 26 There was notably more uniform treatment of Stalin in published materials during the last years of Khrushchev’s rule. Virtually all of the books concerned primarily with the domestic history of the Stalin era published between 1962 and 1964 included references to Stalin’s “ errors and miscalculations ” and to the “harm wrought by the personality cult.” 27In published biographies of already rehabilitated 24. B. N. Ponomarev (ed.), Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza (Moscow: Gosizpolit, 1959) and ibid., 2-oe izd. (Moscow: Gosizpolit.. 1962). Pedenko, op. cit., Ch. X, briefly compares the two editions. 25. Pravda, March 10, 1963. See the discussion of Khrushchev’s backtracking on anti-Stalinism and a translation of his speech in Priscilla Johnson and Leopold Labedz (eds.), Khrushchev and the Arts (Cambridge: MIT, 1965), especially pp. 24-26, 157-163. See also Linden, op. cit., pp. 158-161, 174-182; and Tatu, op. cit., Pt. III, Chs. 4-6. 26. Moscow Radio, July 19, 1963. The published version of the speech in both Pravda and lzvestiia on July 20 deleted these remarks. 27. Typical references to Stalin are found in Kratkaia istoriia SSSR. Chast’ vtoraia (Moscow: Izd. ‘ Nauka,’ 1964), especially pp. 268-271, 299-300, 439;

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victims of the Great Purge, Stalin and his “ cult ” almost invariably were blamed for each victim’s untimely death. These biographies appeared in national and republic newspapers and journals, usually on the victim’s birthday anniversary. They also were included in several multivolume encyclopedias issued during the early 1960s. (A number of purge victims’ biographies had been published prior to 1962, but no reason had been offered for the premature death.) None of Stalin’s writings was published (or republished) in book form after 1961, according to the two national bibliographic listings, Yezhegodnik knigi SSSR, issued annually in two volumes, and Knizhnaia letopis’, issued weekly. Moreover, a policy decision regarding the number of Stalin’s works to be published clearly was adopted around the time of the Twentieth Congress, for each year after 1956 a decreasing number of his works was issued, and virtually none was printed in Russian. A policy directive regarding the classification of Stalin’s works in bibliographic listings must have been less clear.2* Prior to the Twentieth Congress, the Yezhegodnik generally listed Stalin’s works in the section entitled “ Literature about Lenin and Stalin.” In Volume I. 1955 (passed for the press in May 1956). and in all subsequent volumes, the section title was changed to “ Literature about Lenin.” Only a few of Stalin’s works were listed in this category after 1956. Knizhnaia Ietopis’ included Stalin’s works prior to 1956 in a section devoted to “ works of and literature about Lenin and Stalin.” In issue No. 14 (passed for the press in early April 1956). Stalin’s name was omitted from the section. Yet, the pre-1956 form was reinstated in issue No. 21, 1957 (passed for the press on May 15). and remained in effect until the end of 1958. Thereafter, once again only Lenin’s name appeared in the section title. In further contrast to the manner in which the Yezhegodnik categorized Stalin’s writings, Knizhnaia letopis’ listed several of his works in the category of Marxist-Leninist classics during late 1957 and 1958, as had been done typically in both bibliographies before the Twentieth Congress. Not surprisingly, the Central Committee journals treated the Stalin issue variously, but the treatment was not so notably divergent as it had been earlier (see Fig. 2). Generally, censure of Stalin began and gained momentum in 1962, reached its climax during 1963, and and Zstoriia SSSR. Epokha sotsializma. Vchebnik (Moscow: Izdpolit, 1964). especially pp. 4X-437.563-565. 28. The treatment of Stalin’s writings in Soviet national bibliographies is discuased in Peter Berton, Soviet Works on China (Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1959), pp. 15 et seq. c.c.-7

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declined during 1964. Kommunist and Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie published stronger and more sustained criticism of Stalin during 1962 and 1963 than did the other journals. A lengthy article by Party ideologist Ponomarev in the first issue of 1963 seemed to set the tone for Kommunist’s treatment of the harm inflicted by Stalin’s “ personality cult.” 2s In polemical articles dealing with the Chinese Communist Party, published during that year, long and bitter attacks on the “cult” were included. Even more consistently than Kommunist, Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie carried unfavorable criticism of Stalin in almost every issue published during 1962 and 1963, and emphasized his errors, particularly those in economic theory.aOThe unfavorable treatment of Stalin was continued into 1964. In contrast, Partiinaia zhizn’ and Agitator treated Stalin much more kindly during 1962, at most carrying articles that referred generally to “ overcoming the consequences of the personality cult.” During 1963, however, Partiinaia zhizn’ undertook sustained and sharp criticism of Stalin’s methods of leadership and decisionmaking, as well as the harmful and erroneous decisions that he had made.s1 The criticism was continued but restrained during 1964. Agitator consistently treated Stalin most leniently. In its January 1963 issue, an article thoroughly and sharply critical of Stalin was published, the zenith of criticism in the journal’s pages. Written by Marshal V. Chuikov. the article assessedStalin’s contributions during the Civil War, his errors prior to World War II and during the early months of that war, as well as the repressions of the 193Os,for which Stalin was held responsible. 52During the remainder of 1963, only an occasional brief criticism of Stalin appeared in Agitator, and even less was included during 1964. Thus, although a general line can be discerned. the intensity of 29. B. Ponomarev,“ Istoricheskaia nauka i obrazovanie-na uroven’ zadach kommunisticheskogo stroitel’stva,” Kommunist, No. 1 (January 1963),especially pp. 15-17. 30. See, inter alia, S. Sdobnov, “ Ot sotsialisticheskoi sobstvennosti k kommunisticheskoi,” Poli&eskoe samoobrazovanie, No. 1 (January 1962); M. Il’in, “Zhiznennaia sila leninskogo kooperativnogo plana,” ibid., No. 10 (October 1962); and G. Platonov, “Lenin i sovetskce estestvoznanie,” ibid., No. 3 (March 1963). 31. See, as typical examples, M. Lomakin, “ 0 leninskikh normakh partiinoi zhizni.” Parriinaia zhizn’, No. 7 (April 1963); G. Shitarev, ” Kollektivnost’vysshii printsip partiinogo rukovodstva,” ibid., No. 9 (May 1963); and N. Aleksandrov,“ Diktatura proletariata i obshchenarodnoe gosudamtvo,” ibid., No. 18 (September1963). 32. V. Chuikov, “ Sozdannye i vospitannye partiei,” Agi~or, No, 2 (January 1963).

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anti-Stalinism, both in the sharpness of the assault and in the frequency with which articles critical of Stalin were published, seems once again to have been left to the discretion of each journal’s editorial board or, ultimately, to the chief editor. Khrushchev’s handling of the Stalin issue, particularly his insistence that anti-Stalinism be harsh and sustained, was certainly relevant to his removal from political office, although, from what is known of the proceedings of the Central Committee plenum at which his political future was determined, there was no specific reference to that issue.8s Unlike a number of Khrushchev’s policies which were revoked soon after he was ousted, the first change in the Party leadership’s official attitude toward Stalin did not occur immediately, but became evident only during the following spring. Since then, two policies ,seemto have been adopted. One, lasting for about a year, prohibited unrestrained criticism of Stalin and encouraged limited praise of his activities where relevant. The second, adopted in mid-1966, and generally still in effect, has restricted both praise and criticism of Stalin. Emphasis on erroneous or harmful policies adopted during the Stalin era is no longer permitted; if incorrect policies (such as overzealous collectivization) are referred to they have not been attributed directly to Stalin. Most signilicantly, Stalin has been exonerated of his miscalculations prior to and during World War II. Yet no clear policy has been enunciated, for during each of these periods the treatment of Stalin was inconsistent, indicating once more a significant lack of agreement within the political leadership and resulting in the absence of a binding directive. From Khrushchev’s

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The first clear indication of the post-Khrushchev regime’s attitude regarding the Stalin issue came in March 1965, when Moscow Party Secretary N. G. Yegorychev publicly expressed the apparent concern of many Party leaders that past criticism of Stalin had led to a general rejection of all that had been accomplished during the 1930s and 194Os, decades when the “ personality cult ” had flourished. Addressing the Second R.S.F.S.R. Congress of Writers, he declared that 33. Martin Page and David Burg, Unpersoned: The Fall of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev (London: Chapman and Hall,_ 1966), Ch. 7. See also William Hyland and Richard W. Shryock, The Fall of Khrushchev (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968), Ch. 4.

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we . . . see much in past years that could have been done better. But when the criticism of certain shortcomings degenerates into blackening the glorious history of the Party and the people and when in this a shadow is cast on . . . ,the general line of the Party, such views must meet resolute resistance.=

The Party leadership’s official position regarding Stalin was revealed two months later, during the twentieth anniversary celebrations of the Allies’ defeat of Nazi Germany. Portions of Stalin’s broadcast to the nation on July 3, 1941, were included in a documentary film prepared especially to commemorate the anniversary. During the demonstrations in Red Square in honor of the event, First Secretary Brezhnev delivered the main address, referring directly to Stalin but neither praising nor condemning him.SsIt is noteworthy that no other Soviet leader referred to Stalin either directly or indirectly in speeches celebrating the victory. By autumn 1965, historians were being urged publicly to “ render the complete historical truth ” and include in their writings instances in which Stalin had held correct theoretical and political positions and had supported Lenin. P. N. Pospelov, director of the Party’s Marx-Lenin Institute, declared that “ Party history must be completely free of any exaggerations regarding the positive as well as the negative role of Stalin in the life of our Party and our country. . . .” s8As if to demonstrate how a balanced treatment of Stalin could be achieved, Volume VII of the Sovetskaia istoricheskuia entsiklopediia, passed for publication the following March, included both a photograph of 34. Vecherniuiu Moskva, March 5, 1965. He reiterated this theme in an article published in Kommunist during the same month. Komsomol ,Secretary S. P. Pavlov voiced similar views in a Pravda article of August 29. The period of the 1930s has been depicted somberly, he wrote. But this period was also one of industrialization, mass labor enthusiasm, the Stakhanovite movement, etc., experiences that are “ rich and interesting.” The following January, a Pravda article stressed this view, warning that “ the exaggeration of the role of a single person . . . led to the belittling of the heroic efforts of the Party and the people in the struggle for socialism and to the impoverishment of history.” See Ye. Zhukov, V. Trukhanovsky, and V. Shunkov, “ Vysokaia otvetstvennost’ istorikov,” Pruvdq January 30, 1966. 35. Brezhnev recalled that “in the emergency situation of 1941 . . . the State Defense Committee was formed under the leadership of I. V. Stalin, General Secretary of the All-Russian Communist Party (B), to guide all operations in organizing the rebuff of ,the enemy.” The speech was published in Pravda, May 9,196s. nanka,” Komnunist 36. P. Pospelov, “ V. I. Lenin i istoriko-partiinaia Ukrainy, No. 9 (September 1965), p. 21. c.c.-7*

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Stalin among the leaders of the Comintem and an article critical of his policy of forced collectivization during the fall of 1929.57(In early 1969, this article was criticized in Kommunist because its author failed to see the “ real significance ” of the collectivization movement.5*) Numerous reviews of books published before Khrushchev was deposed were critical of the emphasis on the “ personality cult ” and the exaggerated assessment of the great harm it had inflicted upon the country.sg Reviewers stressed that the “ cult ” was not responsible for all the failures of the 1930s and the immediate prewar years, and that, moreover, a great deal had been accomplished during those years. Yet A. M. Nekrich’s 22 Ziuniu 194Z, highly critical of Stalin’s prewar role, was published in August 1965. Infer da, the Soviet leader was accused of having made disastrously incorrect decisions regarding military preparation and general mobilization for war, for having ordered so extensive a purge within the military ranks during 1937-1939 so that “by the summer of 1941 about 75 percent of the commanders . . . had not been in their jobs for more than a year,” for having failed to heed the many warnings both from Soviet intelligence agents abroad and from other sources regarding the impending German attack, and for having ordered that military commanders on the western front refrain from strengthening their defenses.4o Initially, the book was reviewed favorably in the press; it was not criticized severely until the fall of 1967, more than two years after it first appeared.“’ Moreover, during 1965 the “ cult ” was still being cited frequently in Great Purge victims’ biographies as the cause of untimely death, although by the end of the year it was referred to less frequently and was superseded by the phrase “ illegal repressions,” usually without any direct reference to Stalin. Some kind of limited rehabilitation of Stalin seems to have been considered by the Party leadership in the months just before the 37. Sovetskaia istoricheskaia entsiklopediia, Vol. VII (Moscow : Gos. nauch. ixd., 1966), pp. 768-769, 489-490. 38. V. Golikov, S. Murashov, I. Chkbikvishvili, “Za leninskuiu partiinost’ v osveshchenii istorii KPSS,” Kommunist, No. 3 (February 1969), p. 79. 39. See, for example, M. Naidenov’s review of tie Kratkaia istoriia SSSR, Chast’ II, published in Kommunist, No. 17 (November 1965); and Vs. Surganov’s review of G. Baklanov’s ZiuP 41 Goda in Literaturnaia gazeta, April 13, 1965. 40. Nekrich’s book and some commentary regarding it have been translated by Vladimir Petrov, “June 22, 1941”: Soviet Historians and the German Znvas$on (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1968). The quotations have been taken from this translation. See especially pp. 129-136, 164-181. 41. Ibid., pp. 277-302.

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Party’s Twenty-third Congress opened in March 1966.‘2 Speaking to the Georgian Communist Party Congress in early March, D. G. Sturua, a Secretary and Presidium member of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, warned that the struggle against the consequences of the “ personality cult ” had been too unrestrained and had gone much too far.4a At about the same time, twenty-five prominent intellectuals addressed a letter to Brezhnev, indicating their concern that Stalin might be rehabilitated, and stating unequivocally their wholehearted disapproval of such an attempt. The twenty-fivewriters, artists, and scientists-wrote of the “ tendencies [which] have appeared lately in some public speeches and articles in our press which are in fact directed at a partial or indirect rehabilitation of Stalin.” The signatories warned that “ no explanations or articles will make people believe in Stalin again; on the contrary, they will simply create disorder and anger.” 44 Whether a “ partial or indirect ” rehabilitation of Stalin had indeed been planned for inclusion in the Congress’s proceedings remains a matter for conjecture, in the absence of any solid evidence.4s At the Congress itself, Stalin’s name was not mentioned by any of the speakers. Several speakers did recall the achievements of the 1930s despite the “ cult’s ” harmful effects, and criticized those who “ preached pessimism, skepticism, and defeatism ” of that period.4e 42. See the discussion on this point by Leonbard, “Politics and Ideology . . . ,” pp. 48-49; and Tatu, op. cit., pp. 483-490. 43. Zuria vosroku, March 10, 1966. Sturua declared that tbe struggle against the “ cult ‘* bad led some people to “ attempt to rehabilitate Trotskyism, right deviationism, and other anti-Leninist ideological tendencies in our Party.” 44. According to the New York Times, March 21, 1966, the letter was sent to Brezhnev sometime in February. What is pmported to be the full text was published in Statist (London), September 23, 1966. Tbe letter is said to have been circulated widely in Moscow between the time it was sent to Brezhnev and tbe opening of the Congress. 45. Leonbard, “Politics and Ideology . . . ,” p. 49, believes that the Party leadership decided only a few days before the Congress not to include a ” reaffirmation of the Stalin’ tradition ” in the work of tbe Congress. He cites no evidence for this, other than the fact that a Central Committee session was convened “suddenly,” just before the Congress opened. Pravda, March 27, 1966, declared that the purpose of tbe plenum was to review and approve tbe Central Committee report to be made at the Congress. A decree approving tbe report was issued at tbe conclusion of the plenum. 46. See the speech by Yegorychev, Pravda, March 31, 1966; and that by First Secretary of tbe Moldavian CP, Ivan I. Bodiul, ibid., April 3, 1966. It is interesting to note that Yegorycbev, an outspoken proponent of the termination of overt criticism of Stalin, was rebeved of his position as Fist Secretary of tbe Moscow City Party Committee in June 1967 (ibid., June 28, 1967). He has been identified subsequently as a Deputy Minister for Agricultural Machinery

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The official attitude regarding the correct treatment of Stalin remained unclear.47Both limited praise and criticism were permitted, but newspaper and journal editors preferred to avoid the issue by omitting as far as possible all references to Stalin. Thus, national and regional Party histories have provided the most useful material for our purposes until the publication in the fall of 1969 of the third, revised, edition of the Ponomarev-edited lstoriia Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza. 1966-1969: Again Ambiguity By late summer 1966, laudatory treatment of Stalin was being curtailed in published materials and the “ personality cult ” was being criticized more frequently. Criticism of the “cult ” usually was accompanied by emphasis on the achievements of the Soviet people despite the “ difficulties ” it had engendered.4a During 1967, there was ample opportunity for the political leadership to indicate that it favored and intended to encourage greater recognition of Stalin’s achievements; throughout the year the fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution was celebrated with great fanfare. The leadership’s latest assessmentwas provided in the Central Committee’s theses regarding the event, published in June and given enormous publicity. Stalin was mentioned only once, as head of the State Defense Committee during World War II. Reference to his “ personality cult ” was included in connection with a review of the accomplishments of the Twentieth Congress. According to the theses, the “cult ” was expressed “in unwarranted reprisals and other violations of socialist legality which inflicted harm on our society, [but] these distortions, for all their seriousness, did not alter the (New York Times, January 1, 1968). He is thought to have been demoted for his disagreement with the political leadership’s handling of the June 1967, Arab-Israeli crisis. His well-known position on the Stalin issue may have been another .relevant factor in his demotion. 47. Leonard Schapiro has assessed Stalin’s treatment at the Congress in his “The Twenty-Third Congress of the CPSU (I),” Survey, No. 60 (July 1966), pp. 81-82. 48. See, for example, [Unsigned], “ Geroicheskie budni stroiki.” Izvestiia. August 11, 1966; [Unsigned], “Soiuz set-pa i molota-osnova sotsializma,” ibid., September 15, 1966; and Institnt istorii partii MGK i MK, KPSS, Ocherki Ctorii Moskovskoi orgunizatsii KPSS (1883-136.5) (Moscow: Mosk. rab., 1966), p. 539.

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nature of socialist society nor shake the foundations of socialism.” 40 Treatment of Stalin in numerous speechesdelivered by Party officials in November and in historical works published in connection with the anniversary was restrained indeed. In newspaper and journal articles devoted to the events of 1917, Stalin’s role was almost invariably minimized. Indeed, F. V. Konstantinov, a prominent Party ideologist, wrote in Zzvesriiu on November 2, 1967, that “ Stalin’s personality cult inflicted great damage on us. It halted our theoretical thinking. . . . The Party itself has severely criticized it and is doing everything to overcome its consequences.” Yet Stalin had progressively been treated more kindly in the official multivolume Zstoriia Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo So&a, commissioned by Khrushchev during the early 1960s. Volume I of the Zstoriiu was published during the last year of Khrushchev’s rule, and it is interesting to compare the treatment of Stalin there with the treatment in the later edition of the volume issued after Khrushchev’s removal, as well as in subsequent volumes. In the original Volume I, concerned with the years 1883-1904, Stalin’s name was mentioned only in the introduction, where his “ grave errors ” were stressed.5o The later edition omitted all laudatory references to Khrushchev but did not tamper at all with the harsh treatment accorded Stalin. Volume II, published more than two years later, covered the period 1904February 1917. It did not refer to Stalin’s “cult” and only mentioned Stalin in connection with his election to Party organs, where relevant. Volume III, covering the years March 1917-1920, also referred to Stalin’s elections to Party and state organs. Moreover, it included his photograph among those elected to the militaryrevolutionary council created just prior to the November Revolution 51 and among those “ military-political workers ” of the Red Army active during the Civil War.e2 A number of instances can be cited in which Stalin has even been mentioned favorably. A Pravda article of November 5, 1966, recalled the Revolution Day parade of 1941: 49. Pravda, June 25, 1967. 50. Institut Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS, lstoriia Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, Vol. I (Moscow: Izdpolit., 1964), pp. vii, xxxvii, xxxviii, and xl. 51. Ibid., Vol. III1 (Moscow: Izdpolit., 1967), p. 307. 52. Ibid., Vol. III2 (Moscow: Izdpolit., 1967), p. 321. Only these three volumes have been published and distributed to date.

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The fact that exactly at the appointed time the leaders of the Party and the government, with Stalin at their head, appeared again on the reviewing stand was intended to play, and did play, the greatest possible psychological role. . . .

Speaking to the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee plenum in June 1967, First Secretary V. P. Mzhavanadze recalled Stalin’s views on Party membership. Stalin “ said that there was nothing higher than the title of a member of the Party. . . . He also said, ‘ It is not given to everyone to be a Party member. . . .’ ” 5s Stalin was described in Volume II of the official Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoi Partii Belorussii, published in late 1967, as having been elected General Secretary “ in accord with Lenin’s proposal.” He was also given credit for “ having played a big role in the ideological defeat of Trotskyism and the defense of Leninism.” Moreover, the Great Purge was not blamed on Stalin but on Yezhov, the NKVD chief at the time. Stalin was treated very favorably in the history of the TransCaucasianCommunist Party organization, which covers only the years 1883-1921. He was described variously as a “revolutionary,” as an “ outstanding Party activist,” and as “ highly valued by Lenin.” He left the organization well before 1917, evidently before he had begun to commit “ errors.” 54 He was treated kindly in I. I. Mints’s threevolume Zstoriia velikogo Oktiabria, too, of which two volumes have been published to date. He was mentioned more frequently and more favorably in Volume II (published in 1968) than in Volume I (published the preceding year).5a Yet other official Party histories have treated Stalin less sympathetically. In referring to the Great Purge, the history of the Krasnodar Party organization, published in 1966, notes that “ Stalin’s personality cult ” resulted in the “ illegal repression ” of many eminent workers, 53. Zariu vostoka, June 16, 1967. Mzhavanadze is also a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. It should be noted that, since his death, Stalin has consistently been treated more kindly by the Georgians. A New York Times correspondent in Tiflis in April 1967 was told by several local citizens that the long-time custom of toasting Stalin had not been given up. (The dispatch was published on April 9, 1967.) 54. Institut istorii partii pri TsK Azerbaidzhanii, Armenii, Gruzii, Ocherki istorii kommunisticheskikh organizatsii Zukavkaz’ia, Chast’ I, 1883-1921 gg. (Tbilisi: Izd. TsK KP Gruzii, 1967). 55. Vol. II covers the period March-November 1917, during which Stalin played a greater role than in the pre-March 1917 events, covered in Vol. I.

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some of whose names are listed.5BHistories of the Ore1 and Yaroslavl Party organizations, both published in 1967, refer less directly to Stalin, mentioning only the “ personality cult ” and “ insticiencies in internal Party democracy ” which existed during the purge period, but do not name any purge victim!’ The history of the Voronezh Party organization, published the same year, however, speaks of Stalin’s “ personality cult ” and the “ repressions and very serious disturbances to socialist legality ” which occurred during the 193Os, including illegal arrests of Party and Soviet leaders as well as of highly qualified specialists.6sSimilarly, in the revised edition of the Tadzhik Communist Party history, published iu 1968, Stalin is blamed for having violated Leninist norms of Party life and the principles of socialist legality, and is held responsible for the “mass repressions of [Tadzhik] Party and Soviet cadres,” although Yezhov and Beria are blamed too.sv Since 1965, the Central Committee journals have been notably cautious in their handling of the Stalin issue. For about six months after Khrushchev’s removal, no change in their attitude toward Stalin was discernible. Thereafter, however, references to Stalin and his “ cult ” have disappeared uniformly from the journals’ pages. Politicheskoe sumoobrazovanie carried the most unfavorable references to Stalin during 1965,80and only began to omit references to the “ personality cult ” in 1966. None of the journals referred to Stalin or the “ cult ” at all during the fiftieth anniversary year, except in an infrequent article which included a listing of those elected to the Central Committee in 1917 or 1918. 56. Ocherki istorii Krasnodarskoi organizatsii KPSS (Krasnodar: Kras. knizh. izd., 1966), pp. 391-392, 490. In contrastto regional Party histories published during the last years of the Khrushchev regime, however, it was noted that Stalin had also made a number of correct decisions during the “ cult ” period (p. 392). Similar treatment is accorded him in the above-cited Ocherki istorii Moskovskoi orgunizatsii KPSS. p. 539. 57. Ocherki istorii Orlovskoi partiinoi organizatsii (Tula: Priok. knizh. izd., 1967), p. 192; Ocherki istorii Yuroslavskoi organizatsii KPSS (Yaroslavl:

Verkhne-Volzh.knizh. izd., 1967),pp. 353-355.

58. Ocherki istorii Voronezhskoi organizaisii KPSS (Voronezh: Tsent. knizh. izd., 1967), pp. 325-326. 59. Institut istorii prtrtii pri TsK KP Tadzhikistana, Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoi Partii Tadzhikistana, 2-oe izd., dopl. (Dushanbe: Izd. ” Ifron,” (1968), especially pp. 177-179. 60. See G. Kravchenko, “ Ekonomicheskie osnovy pobedy SSSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine,” Politicheskoe samoobrazovunie, No. 4 (April 1965); and B. Leibzon, K. Shirina, “ Vazhnoe sobytie v istorii mezhdunarodnogo kommunisticheskogo dvizheniia,” ibid., No. 7 (July 1965).

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In early 1969, however, Communist carried several review articles that praised Stalin and criticized historians who “ overemphasized the errors and shortcomings of the personality cult.” In an assessment of several World War II memoirs, which had been written in recent years by prominent military officers, Stalin is described as “ emerging as an outstanding military leader . . . for all the complexities and contradictory qualities of his character.” 81 The Latest Line The third edition of the official lstoriia Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, which was passed for the press in August 1969, constitutes the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime’s first clear position on the entire span of Stalin’s career. Not unexpectedly, Stalin is treated more kindly in it than he was in the second edition, issued seven years earlier. In that edition, Stalin’s many errors were catalogued in detail; in the third edition, most of those errors have been retained, but they have been criticized much less harshly. In particular, Stalin’s major errors, committed during the collectivization drive, the Great Purge, and the immediate prewar period, have been minimized. Thus, the official attitude seemsto support a deemphasis of Stalin’s errors while not singling out his correct policies for praise. Almost nowhere in the third edition is Stalin lauded, although the authors point out that in reviewing Stalin’s activities during the period of the Twentieth Congress, the Party saw two sides, that which was valuable and that which had to be criticized and rejected.BZ In late November, a revised version of the Zstoriia was issued with a change in cover, suggesting that the authorities wanted to be certain that libraries and bookshops would not confuse the two versions.63 While a number of modifications were incorporated into the text, the only one regarding Stalin occurs in the description of Soviet 61. Ye. Boltin, “ Volnuiushchie stranitsy letopisi velikoi otechestvennoi veiny,” Komrmmist, No. 2 (January 1969), p. 127. 62. B. N. Ponomarev (ed.), Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, 3-0~ izd. (Moscow: Izdpolit., 1969), p. 578. 63. A sketch of Lenin’s bust appeared on the cover of the original third edition; only the title appea,rs on the revised version’s cover, a curious change, for the country already was in the midst of preparations for the celebration of the 100th anniversary of Lenin’s birth. Three hundred thousand copies of the third edition were planned; it appears that 200,000 copies of the August and 100,000 of the November version have been printed.

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military activities during the first months of World War II. In contrast to the August edition, no mention is made of military losses sustained early in the war, nor of the loss of “ experienced cadres who were repressed groundlessly ” just prior to the Nazi attack. Rather, the experience of Hitler’s armies, gained during 1939-1941, and the relative lack of such experience on the part of Red Army commanders are stressed.e4Discussion of Stalin’s role as Supreme Commander during the war has not been altered. Both versions of the third edition of the Zstoriiu emphasized the achievements of the Stalin era but credited “ the Party and the people,” not Stalin, for them. Stalin was treated similarly in the most recent volumes of the still-incomplete six-volume Zstoriiu of the Party, referred to earlier. In both Vol. IV, Par.t I, and Vol. V, Part I. approved for publication in 1970, Stalin is not credited personally with the Party’s achievements; except for a reference to his “personality cult,” he is not blamed for failures, either. The regime clearly had difficulty in determining how the Great Purge years (1936-1938) should be handled, and ultimately directed that no reference at all be made to them. (Volume IV, Part II, which covers the years 1929-1937 was not approved for publication until September 1971,65almost a year after Vol. V, Part I, covering the years 1938-1945 was approved!) In late 1969, Pravda recalled Stalin’s achievements and errors in a prominent (unsigned) article commemorating the ninetieth anniversary of the dictator’s birth. Stalin was praised for his “important role ” in the struggle against ideological opponents of the Party line during the 1920s and for his “leading role ” in helping to strengthen the country militarily on the eve of the war. He was criticized harshly for his theoretical and political errors, however, and altogether the article laid significantly more stress on his mistakes and miscalculations than on his contributions to the Soviet cause. Izvestia and each of the republic newspapers ignored the anniversary, as did the four Central Committee journals: the purpose of the article’s publication in Pravda merits consideration. Clearly, the decision to publish it was approved by the CPSU Politburo, which 64. B. N. Ponomarev(ed.), Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, 3-oe izd., dopol. (Moscow: Izdpolit., 1969), pp. 478-479. 65. Volume IV, Part II, is not yet available here. Further evidenceof the regime’s failure to issue a clear directive on how the Purge and its victims should be handled is evident in two commemorative articles about M. D. Orakhelashvili, a Party leader who was shot in 1937. No reference was made to his death in the Izvestiia article, which appeared on June 11, 1971; on the same day, Zaria vostoka recalled that “in 1937, he was slandered by enemies of the Party and put to death.”

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may have believed that some public statement regarding Stalin was in order and utilized a commemoration of the birth date toward that end. The decision may have been reached only on the eve of the anniversary, too late to permit inclusion of a commemorative article in any of the Central Committee journals, whose issues are approved for publication and sent to the printer several weeks before they reach the newsstands. The absence of any other commemorative article and the failure to reprint the Pravda article elsewhere suggest that the regime did not wish to attach undue publicity to the Stalin issue. The issue was brought dramatically to public attention six momhs later, however, when a granite bust of Stalin was set over his grave behind the Lenin Mausoleum.66 No official announcement of the bust was issued, and no reference to it appeared in the press. Lack of publicity in the mass media indicates that the political leadership did not wish undue attention to be focused on the monument, whose installation must be viewed as yet another effort to assessequitably Stalin’s contributions to the growth of the Soviet state. Why the regime chose to so honor Stalin at this particular time is unclear; it was a convenient time, for a bust of Old Bolshevik Kliment Y. Voroshilov (who had died the previous December) was unveiled at the same time. This was the first opportunity available to the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership to install a monument for Stalin together with one honoring another deceasedleader; it is unlikely that the bust would have been installed by itself. The most recent evidence demonstrates that the regime continues to struggle with Stalin’s specter. Volume XIII of the Sovetskaia istoricheskaia entsiklopediia, which includes i’tems starting with the letter “ S,” was published in early 1971. The fact that i,ts publication was delayed for more than two years suggests that the editors and censors were having difhculty with some portion of the volume, very likely the article on Stalin. The latter was not treated very kindly, for a number of paragraphs examined the “ cult of personality ” issue, and recognition of Stalin’s achievements was limited to the period prior to 1934 and the wartime years. Stalin’s numerous policy errors were detailed. In all, the article presents Stalin in a rather unfavorable light, and features his errors more prominently than his achievements.6’ 66. The New York Times, June 26, 1970. 67. Sovetskaia istoricheskaia entsiklopedii?, XIII (Moscow : Gos. nauch. izdat., 1971). columns 780-785. The volume was sent for typesetting in November 1969, but was not passed for the press until late February 1971.

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The Stalin Zssueand the Soviet Press A content analysis of Stalin’s treatment in the Soviet masscirculation press provides some useful insights into the degree of control and conformity imposed upon those responsible for publication decisions when the Party leadership fails to provide clear and consistent directives. Evidently authors, editors, and censors seldom knew precisely what the correct assessmentof Stalin was at any given time, particularly after 1956. As a result, the treatment accorded him varied widely, even in the four major journals issued by the Party’s Central Committee. Despite occasional changes in editorial board membership, Kommunist and Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie consistently treated Stalin more harshly than Partiinaia zhizn’ did, and much more harshly ,than did Agitator. The latter, which carries shorter, less specialized articles and has a more colorful and pictorial format, seems designed for a rather unsophisticated audience in comparison with ,&at of the other journals. This may help account for its more moderate treatmem of Stalin, although it should be noted that Agitator’s circulation is not significantly larger than that of several of the other journalsBE On the *basisof available information, it is difficult to tind an explanation for the differing treatment accorded Stalin in Kommunist and Partiinaia zhizn’, which have a similar format, have similar circula.tion figures, and would seem to appeal to similar segments of Party mem’bership. 68. A sampling of circulation figures for each of the journals reveals (in numbers of copies printed): Jan. 1957 Jan. 1961 Jan. 196.5 Jan. 1969 Agitator 300.000 559,600 731,600 1,015,Wo Kommunist 700,000 525,600 720,000 760,000 Partiinaia zhizn’ 500,000 500,ooo 645,000 920,ooo Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie ll.C. 403,600 1,125,200 1,420,OOO The only correlation that format comparisons offer is that those journals with a larger number of pages per issue tended to treat Stalin more harshly; it seems unlikely that the bulkier journals appeal to selected strata of Party membership and the less bulky ones to others. Average number of pages per issue Jan. 1957 Jan. 1961 Jan. 1965 Jan. 1969 Agitator 64 64 64 64 Kommunist 128 128 128 128 Partiiinaia zhizn’ 80 80 80 80 Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie n.c. 160 144 144 In both tabulations, “ n.c.*’ signifies publication not yet commenced.

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Little is known about the decisionmaking process of newspaper and journal editorial boards, particularly in regard to the inclusion of articles for publication. It is reasonable to assume, however, that the chief editor makes many of the important decisions: major newspapers are published daily and their chief editors must make decisions quickly; chief editors of journals have large editorial boards to work with (composed often of a dozen or more men), which must present difficulties in communication and agreement. Yet, there seems to be no correlation between changes in chief editors or editorial board membership and changes in a journal or newspaper’s position on the Stalin issue. For example, S. B. Abalin,” who served as chief editor of Kummunist during 1953 and 1954, was replaced in November 1955 by A. M. Rumiantsev, considered much less liberal than Abalin. Yet Kommunist carried articles in which Stalin was referred to very unfavorably during 1956 and 1957. Rumiantsev was replaced by F. V. Konstantinov, also considered an ideological conservative, in mid1958. Under Konstantinov, however, the journal published articles critical of Stalin during 1960 and 1961, years when other journals ignored the Stalin issue. Similarly, A. G. Yegorov, chief editor of Politicheskoe sumoobruzovanie, permitted articles unfavorable to Stalin to be published in the journal just prior to the opening of the Twenty-second Congress in October 1961, which he had not done previously.” Moreover, the journal’s treatment of Stalin was not modified after his removal in December of that year. While editorial board membership occasionally changes, there is only one known instance during the 1953-1969 period when several members of a board were removed at about the same time as the chief editor. This occurred in the spring of 1966, when E. I. Bugaev was replaced as chief editor of Partiinuia zhizn’ in March; almost half of the editorial board’s members had been replaced by June. If the chief editor and editorial board members had adopted an incorrect position on some issue, which occasioned their removal, it was not about Stalin, for he was handled no differently after June from the way he had been handled in previous months. Neither changes in chief editors nor major changes in editorial board membership coincided with Khrushchev’s removal from political office, which suggeststhat if the chief editors were supporters 69. I am indebted to Professor David L. Williams of Ohio University for kindly providing me with biographical information and an assessment of career patterns for each of the chief editors in the following discussion. 70. He was replaced by A. S. Vishniakov, about whom little is known. Yegorov became the chief editor of Kommunist four years later.

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of Khrushchev, they were also acceptable to the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime.” In codrast, the chief editors of both Pravda and Zzvestiia were replaced soon after Khrushchev was removed; both were considered his supporters. A. I. Adzhubei, Krushchev’s son-in-law, had been chief editor of Zzvestiiu for more than five years; P. A. Satiukov had served as chief editor of Pravda since 1956. Each of their replacements served for less than a year. Since 1965, L. N. Tolkunov has been chief editor of Zzvestiiu and M. V. Ziiianin the chief editor of Pravda ‘2; both are considered ideologically more conservative than their predecessors, but Stalin has not received better treatment since their appointmentT3 In the absence of unambiguous guidelines for editors and censors, the old cliches regarding rigid, highly centralized control and supervision over the Soviet press are no longer accurate. Newspapers and journals do not “ repeat day after day the political themes set by Pravda . . . and Zzvestiia,” as prominent observers of the Soviet system have long ,asserted.74Regional Party histories often do not reflect faithfully the line established by the official CPSU history of the moment. Indeed, in the years since Stalin’s death, the official history has been subjected to numerous revisions, and new editions are issued wi,th confusing frequency. As this article has sought to prove, issues on which the Party leadership fails to maintain a clear and consistent policy are handled in the mass-circulation press in a varied and often surprisingly contradictory fashion.

71. Indeed. the chief editors of Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie and Agitator have not been replaced since the Khrushchev era. 72. Zimianin’s career has been primarily in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and diplomatic service, while Tolkunov worked for a number of years in the Central Committee department of relations with Communist Party-ruled states. Their relationship with any of the present Pa.rty leaders, with the possible exception of M. A. Suslov, with whom Tolkunov probably worked, is unknown. 73. See the comments in Tatu, op. cit., pp. 467-474. 74. Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, 2nd ed. [rev. by C. J. Friedrich] (Cambridge: Harvard, 1963, p. 144. Comments of a similar vein are found in Herbert McClosky and John E. Turner, The Soviet Dictatorship (New York : McGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 546-550; Buzek, op. cit., Ch. 6; and W. Phillips Davison, Internafional Political Communication (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 109.