From stalin to gorbachev: the role of the Soviet communist party in the implementation of agricultural policy

STEPHEN K.

WEGREN

From Stalin to Gorbachev: The Role of the Soviet Communist Party in the Implementation of Agricultural Policy

Cynthia

S.

Cornell

The Party and Agricubura/

Kaplan,

University

Daniel

Press,

Thorniley,

York:

St.

1987),

Press,

Some

eighteen

at the

March,

months

Union

is proceeding

1989,

1988),

after

slowly,

received

much

built

for a new agrarian

if at all, in some into

less attention

economist the

is the way

But

Party

light are: has the role of the Soviet

Stalin

to Gorbachev, reform

basic

reform

questions

hindered

or

facilitated

flaws”

(New

Party And

undoubtedly, which

by the role this essay

changed role

“wittingly

reason

second,

the

formalized

in the Soviet

which

another

on which

by

were

reform

is effected

Communist

and if so, how and why?

policy

1927-39

of the reason,

package.“”

shed further contemporary

The

Part

“design

in which

policy

agricultural

regions.2

Communist side from

that

has termed

reform

in the countryside.

Party,

pp.

I it is now clear

has to do with what one western are

246

the foundations

plenum,

(Ithaca:

in the USSR

The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Rural Communist

Martin’s

or unwittingly,

Crisis Management

203 pp.

has

of the

intends

to

in the country-

to what the

party

degree

is

plays

in

agriculture? Although

it is still too early

in agriculture by the authors ofthesouiet

to write

for the Gorbachev whose

books

period,

are under

a definitive

analysis

fortunately review

here.

Rural Communist Party, looks at the years

of the communist

a large historical Thorniley’s 1927 to 1939;

party’s

role

void has been

filled

book,

The Rise and Fall

and Kaplan’s

The Party

I. The basic decision to adopt leasing as the primary form of labor organtzation was taken at a CPSU CC conference (soueshchnnzje) in May, 1988. See Prauda, May 15, 1988. At the end ofAugust, 1988, Gosagroprom published its recommendations on leasing arrangements, suggesting a term of up to 50 years. Seiikaya z/&n August 27, 1988. Those recommendations were followed by party conferences in October and November, 1988, at which leasing contracts were formally discussed within the Central Committee. Prauda, October 14, 1988, and ibzd., November 4, 1988. See Prauda, March 16, 1989 for Gorbachev’s report before the March, 1989 plenum on agricultural reform. 2. A one month research trip sponsored by the Center on East-West Trade, Investment and Communications, Duke University, to Kostroma, RSFSR during March-April, 1990, influenced many of my views and provided material for this essay. The purpose of the trip was to examine how agricultural reform was progressing. 3. Ed. A. Hewett, Reforming the Soviet Economy: Equalily menus Eff’ tcwncy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1988), p. 24. Swtxes

IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM, Vol..

0039-3592/90/02

0177-14

$03.00

0

XXIII,

1990 University

No. 2,

SLIMIER1990,

of California

177-

190

178

STUIHESIN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

and Agricultural 1953.

Taken

in agriculture Both

from

authors

questions

the late

join

is that even during

1920s

a host

lacked

manipulating owing

internal

until

Stalin’s

of other period

examination

death

scholars

model.

the Soviet

A primary

leadership,

was not efficient,

population

at will.

to the

and

nature

received

treatment

used

neither

of these

in a comparative

relevant

was not monolithic. was weak

the

raised

to the situation and

authors

may have envisioned

their

with

period,

investigated

by both

departure,

in the final

role of the party having

Determinants

section

of Party the respective

important

theoretical

have

rural

of

fundamental

party

than

differed

in

did the urban

In short,

from

the Gorbachev

for each

which

both

author

these

are

books

somewhat

raise

Party

level

of development

pertains

of socio-economic

critical

local

throughout lence

the first

production

the party

quarter

to deliver,

were

Because

characterized

local

party

quotas,

often

times

quently

supplanted

In addition to which

the

mentation

leaders

agricultural party

measures

purpose

there should

but

successfully exercised emphasize,

was at times

ambiva-

play in the countryside. abilities

of the agri-

of economic

organs

and the substitution

which

functions.

were

full command

and The

unrealistically

for meeting

agriStalin high.

agricultural

for production

by

of party

economic

production

responsibility

to take

Kaplan

supplanted

over

demands

ultimate

plan

and conse-

leaders.

officials

replaced

Because

to subjugate

quotas,

local

Thorniley

the countryside

regarding

to establish

the

development,

to the actual

officials

of high production

and plan fulfillment?

quantitative

and

the supervision

control

production

bore

they felt pressured

was first trying

political

by

officials

between Here

is the level of control

fulfillment,

party

day-to-day

to the pressure rural

compared plan

whereby

and assumed

party

role the party

between

of overseeing

the most

in agriculture. to penetrate

Thorniley

collectivization,

by the center, led to tension

plays

and its ability

As

after

different,

of society.

production.

century

for the purpose leaders

years

over

over the most propitious

for economic

cultural

Party

and all sectors

demands

sector

organs

of the Communist

officials

by the center

cultural

not only to the level

issue over the role of the communist

party

the

this role is

is the relationship

and the role the Communist

The

of

by examining

in the Countryside

emphases

of the economy

are

as a point

era and the effect

of development

all branches

are

and thus

books

the analysis

to be

books

the questions

today

these

level

also the development

of these

reform.

Involvement

question

examination

both

application

the findings

I shall update

during

agrarian

historical

agriculture.

continued

Using

of this essay

to implement

Although

Gorbachev Soviet

books

analysis.

in the countryside

on efforts

the

in contemporary

for a comparative

party

For

and under-

was not capable

in many

by the center

fashion

well-suited

The

further

of the party.

While

by

the war years). of each author

that

of its composition,

different

to

which

party

argues

1946

argument

and certainly

Kaplan

from

evidence

for collectivization,

quality

primarily

in 1953 (excluding

communist

was not prepared

years

of the role of the party

in presenting

the rural

behavior

branch

party

the post-war

offer a detailed

of the totalitarian

the Stalin

the rural

manned, ways,

these two books

the applicability

Thorniley,

in the USSR examines

Crisis Management

together

party

party

growth.

influence

and

what factors

agricultural

was examining to communist Given control

explain

leaders

that more

a period rule,

the degree

in policy

imple-

in which

his emphasis

collectivization firmly

had

the is on the

in the country-

The Soviet Communist Party and Agricultural side,4

and

prior

given

that

the rural

to collectivization,

countryside,

the growth

number

of party

function

of the rural

branch

of the Communist

the size of the rural

cells

of Machine

Tractor

in kolkhozy

also

communist

party,

party

Party

the degree

Stations

were from

Policy was weak

of party

(MTS),

important

179

and

elements

the onset

in the years

saturation the

in the

growth

in the

in determining

of collectivization

the

through

the

1930s. For Kaplan, countryside, was

by

then

emphasis

party

quiescent

element

objective

was to re-establish

a new generation and

is on the level

primary depth

the primary and resocialize

collectivization

of education

influencing

already

and

the party’s

party

of farm leaders. firmly

expertise

role.

her

agricultural

factors

in the

the peasantry

established,

of rural

These

institutions

But because

major

leaders

will be explored

as a

in greater

below.

Prelude to Collectivization:

The Role of the Party in the 1920s

Throughout

the

192Os,

countryside.

Not

only

party

saturation

1924,

only

peasant

was

12 000

also

were

households

the komsomol.

the

weak.

Of

remained

the

152 993

member,

party

rural cells.

ofrural

branch

party In

and just

membership

percentage

substantially

in the rural

or sovkhoz

a party

rural

the relative

Party

membership

in kolkhoz

included

Although

of 1929-1930,

Communist

was overall

members

1927

over

less

in the low,

but

in September,

than

1 per cent

of

1 per cent had a member

increased

membership

weak

relatively

from

1924

until

of

the purge

to total membership

actually

fe11.5 In

the

mid-1920s

rural

cells

instead

devoting

attention

of rural

life. The

fact that rural

before

collectivization,

to conclude sector.

that prior

inadequate

expanse

of the Soviet

it”

(Thorniley,

numerically Union,

initial

During

The

through

a burgeoning

production

deployed

were so few kolkhozy

questions,

and educational

aspects

on a territorial

and sovkhozy,

basis

led Thorniley

“the party had few deep roots in the collective in numbers

and cells,

qualitatively

and unprepared

when

the rural

faced

for the exigencies

party

remained

with

the

geographical

soon

to be made

upon

1929-1933

distinguishes

period

with social,

cells were primarily

growth and

concerned financial,

p. 17).

administration. continued

seldom

to collectivization the rural

“Face to Production”: Thorniley

party

and that there

Notwithstanding

in 1928

were

to administrative,

between first

1933.

The

were collectivization urban

this period

economic

affairs

respective

geographic

population) the rural

and was held area.

two main

period

The

began

main

tasks

periods with

in the role of the party

the

First

for the party

Five

and

“dekulakization” was required

responsible demands

of sufficient

in economic in

1929

and

during

this

harvests

to feed

of the countryside.

to maintain

for the economic of collectivization

Plan

in the countryside

(and with it procurement party

Year

general success led local

supervision or failure rural

party

over in their leaders

4. See Stephen Merl, “Did the Kolkhoz System Really Fulfill the Initial Aims of the Party in the 193Os?” in Josef C. Brada and Karl-Eugen Wadekin, eds., Sxialist A~riculfure in Transition: Orzp~izational Response to Failing Perrfomance (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 77-97. 5. A year before collectivization was to commence, in July, 1928, the rural branch of the communist party comprised approximately 22 per cent of the total party, down from its high of 29 per cent in January, 1924. Overall, rural party membership increased from 136 996 in January, 1924, to 358 936 in July, 1929.

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE

180 to get as closely

involved

never

sanctioned

officially

Thorniley designed

First,

purge

party

overall

at large,

party.”

recruitment.

rural

1928

22 per cent

party

1930,

1, 1930.

to 700 000

The

1932,

the party The

demands

communist

created

In particular, doubled

their

deployment

allowed For

In addition,

the rapid

expansion

in the greater

in kolkhozy; Thorniley

of party

of the the

whole

declined rural

party

July,

1929,

to 339 201.’

growing party

Rut

to 377 714

two years,

of 832 000

increasing

membership);

by July

1, 1932,s

and a general

by July, points

innovations

were

designed

duction

procurement over

local

cells

In

purge

of

production

about

out that several

other only

party

32 per cent

this percentage

party

in the party

concerning

in day-to-day

rural

features touch

supervision

significant

attempts

and

Soviets.

functions

here;

participation

by the center

by local cells

83).

party but

at This

party

to 70 (p.

of internal

upon

1932.’ cells and

especially

and

of all rural

had risen

of the

of party

and July,

at the site of production,

which represent

1930,

at villages

we can

presence degree

membership

April,

located

1930,

to maximize and

between

of cells

1932,

an increased by a higher

transformation”

of rural

number

required attended

of kolkhoznik

cells

radical

in April,

restructured

controls

358 936

rapidly,

for the next

high

was

involvement

example,

were

stringent

from

between

23 per cent oftotal

quotas

and

countryside and

membership

hard

were

than

of the

outstripped

was announced,

countryside

was the increase

reorganization located

to grow

and to its pre-purge

the “most

a decline

communists.“’ were

to total

to expand

represented

of all recruitment

the number

to Thorniley, and

continued

harder

as a percentage

recruitment

dropped

As a result

somewhat

particularly

began

by collectivization

in the

more

kolkhozy,

membership

party

1932,

saturation. According

ranks

party

increased.

relative party

which

in the production

in 1933-1934.

party

than

total

trends

leaders

party

decreased

hit the rural

a cessation

occurred

hit the rural

membership

1931 (which

several

in the countryside

the rural

rural

witnessed

out that they were

management).

of communist

which

and

rural

he points

of one-man

Plan

membership

rural

when 1930,

in January,

December,

party

purge

to 516 897 in January,

Year

membership

to 1930

in January,

by April

Five

to 20 per cent,

The

and January, starting

party

(although

the principle

involvement

1928 and 1930,

the

From

from

the First

the direct

between

as possible

to breach

that

to facilitate

process. party

argues

in production

COMMUNISM

life in the

all of these in proto impose

officials

6. FI‘tleprimary reasons for the purge were that a high percentage of rural party members were of the NH’ gcncration, that is, they were recruired during the heyday of NEP and held attitudes that were favorable towards the state’s pro-peasant policy, Second, and following from the above, the central party was intent on removing those who were less than enthusiastic about supporting collectivization. Towards this end the central party attempted to magnify class divisions with the rural party and to ally itself with those who would support its policy. “Thus, the purge rid the party ranks of many of those who had prospered in the NEP years, those most likely to disapprove of the regime’s new course” (Thorniley, p. 33). 7. Moshe Lewin claims that in 1929 alone somr 13 per cent of all rural communists were purged, and in some areas the level reached 25 per rent M. Lewin, Russian Peasanls and &met Power- A Study qf Colleclroizalion (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968), p. 434. was primarily composed of urban workers, including the 8. The recruitment during 1930-1932 “25,OOOers” who were recruited into the countryside to provide mostly temporary work with harvests; batraks, who were to comprise 40 per cent of all rural recruits according to a January, 1929, resolution; and kolkhozniks, of whom most were poor peasants. 9. The number of rural cells increased from 29 204 in April, 1930, to 63 135 on July 1, 1932 (Thornilry, p. 83). 10. At the beginning of the Five Year Plan only 2 per cent of kolkhozy had a party cell; by June 1932 this had mcreased to 20 per cent of all kolkhozy. Despite the large increase in the number of rural party memhcrc and cells, the rural party did not come close to achieving its goal of a cell or even a single communist in every kolkhoz. Thorn&y states that in fact this goal was not met until 1962 (p. 85).

The Soviet Communist Par9 In

March,

1931,

reorganized lished

cells

in MTS, the

support

points

support

were

troikas

cells.

The

to usurp abolished

memo

were

from

for

personally

of supplies

would

to meet

realized MTS

that

in the entire

Soviet

commandment”

and

Thorniley

it seems

at

the

terized primary

November,

a system

the

were intro-

“The

that out

level”

and (p.

message for any

argues 1934,

involvement

to Fainsod

about

and

This

a

juris-

situation

was

as part of an independent

of the raikom.

more

plans. created

responsibility,

of the raikom staff

coaxing

was the the “first

departments

oflicials.‘4

158

to 2466

of procurement

political

department

to 1228,

of the MTS

According

was

were only

In some in rural

were

expected

and threatening

regularly

cases

than

it seems

administration. to tour

the

as they went,

the

ordinary

confusion

numbered

the days

of political

that by the end of 1933 they were already

plenum

they

affairs activities in and

was the planned responsibility

in the countryside

party

128).

in the period

of personal

or transfers

responsible

In 1930 there

functioned

propagandising,

we have

factor

raikom

procurements

theft

had increased

raikom

the authority

over

detailed

and

departments

states

that

production

overlapping

the activities

of political

seen

grain

oblast

the

and the secret

was the fulfillment

directors

in the reshaping

director

included

personally

system.

points,

friction,

given jurisdiction

causal

as

Later

that in the western

with the development

supplanted

Thorniley

be held

the MTS.‘”

support

MTS

were

Furthermore,

by

link

though,

cells.

which

were to oversee

over

departments

due to jurisdictional

a new deputy was only

they

the raikom

however.

structure.

the

Any unauthorized

MTS

in hand into

the

frequently,

that

from

Inefficiencies

Thus,

l2 Hand

both

would

ofthe

organizational

with

and kolkhozy

ments, and

of

departments

example,

workers

friction

troikas

and the courts;

control

departments

and thus did not fall under

the political

which estab-

an intermediary

over

reveals

but by 193 1 this number

by the fact that political

hierarchy

MTS

Troikas supplies.

party

predecessor

conflict

complicated

plan were

quotas.”

for the political

their system

dictional

points

departments,

These

by the OGPU

Union,

of political

confusing

raikom

archives raions.

OGPU.

development

and to 29 16 in 1934.

to

to provide

by political

its

secretaries

grain

the rapid

Similar

of a general

support

organizational

of the

for grain

of increased

through

in 1933,

with

raikom

planned

aspect

introduction

For

responsible be dealt

reiterated third

authority

the Smolensk

established

and the head of the raion

The

created

and replaced

and were

failure

as part These

as an attempt

plan

the

secretary

further

introduced

and kolkhozy.

181

Policy

1933.

a secret

1932

were

and kolkhozy

and

began

points

Second, in

raikom

in early

points sovkhozy,

sovkhozy,

between

duced

support

at MTS,

and Agricultural

were

merged

of the rural

party

was created

within

within 1929

for grain

over

all

deliveries

existing

raikom

at this plenum,

the MTS,

and this deputy

not kolkhoz

1933

by the central

the

organization

the MTS,

through

control

quotas

into

depart-

in decline,

cells

party’activity stages

of production.

authorities,

by local

as before.

was charac-

rural

compounded party

leaders;

The by in

11. SeeThorn&y, pp. 1 lo- 11. 12. Robert F. Miller, One Hundred Thousand Tractors: The MTS and the Development of Controls in Soviet Axriculture (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 43. 13. Political organs were introduced into the MTS in order to consolidate party control over the kolkhozy. According to a Central Committee decree, the political departments were to serve as “a party eye and control in all branches of the work and life of the machine-tractor stations and state farms and of the kolkhozes served by the MTS. ” Cited in Lazar Volin, A C&q of Russian Agriculture: From Alexander II to Khrushchev (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 240. 14. See Merle Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), pp. 280-93.

182

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE

addition

a politically

cultural

suspect

leadership

economic

structures.

growth

came

made

This

the end,

to achieve

fact that

the use of urban and Thorniley

workers

would

“Face

Par9 “: 1934-1939

to the

Thorniley

have

been

distinguishes

a second

In contradistinction

party

to modify

on party in

shift

January-February,

activities meddling party

party

during

in production

in the party’s

Thorniley

example,

could

saw

sell their

were stabilized

payments

to MTS

legalization privately

became

based

planned

If Thorniley

success, burdened leaders

starting

and more

party

interference

was placed

notes

they

that

production were

were

from

not

to

to

avoid

involvement

in 1938

encouraged

Congress

in

Raikoms

but

in the

in 1934 the central emphasis

of this withdrawal

was again

of

in agricultural

at the 17th Party

that

Thorniley

and

to adopt

is correct

Five

Year

of factors activities witnessed with

what

1939,

as

a larger

role

by

the

the

famine plans

in the and

for the debacle.

from role.

Ukraine

expectations

during

than

could

activities direct Plan

leaders,

all party

sell

trend

of

I6 during

Thorniley Year

a fixed zakupki,

a general

193 1-1932.

by central

procure-

the peasants

the

Five

1932,

rather

evident.

First,

circumvent

1933,

introduced,

production

which

of that year kolkhoz

1932

occurrence?

the First

In December,

after

became

this

new

was

and MTS

Finally,

withdrew

during

and in June

For

through

In January,

of the harvest

to the state

party’s

system

of collections

the countryside

leaders

the peasantry.

and in this way they could

sown area,

for

by a few measures

and

market

by the state.

to the state.

accounts

to explain

unrealistic

were blamed

from

by local

paid

deliveries

that the party

Plan,

kolkhoz

system

prices

chairmen

the regime

on a percentage

another

procurement

was accompanied

produce

on a known

meeting

kolkhoz

raised

and based

after

at above

production

height

of the prices

whereby

number

Plan,

be tolerated.

between

procurement

1934,

Second

party

on a number

realized

outsiders.

altogether,

in the countryside

In January,

promoting

The

as a “thaw”

amount. grain

no longer

1937.

the rural role

the

the disadvantageous ments

stated

matters

and into

interprets

1932

peasants

Five Year

was

to by the

activities.

shift

which

would

economic

resumed,

were

of these

progress

was testified

was introduced

agriexisting

and with this

much

in the role of the communist

Kaganovich

1936,

party

was first articulated

management.

1934-

recruitment

The

of

While

which

in the economy,

in emphasis

leaders

supervision in day-to-day

occurred

to the First

1934.

by local

outsiders

period

educated

to bypass

in the countryside,

of the rural

in the absence

main

leaders

control.

any successes

its involvement

work. l5 The

discontinue

that

difficult

countryside. sought

weakness

poorly

party

growth

complete

and other

argues

production

an inexperienced, for rural

of party

more

the continued

occasions,

and

to the need

was a period

an attempt

towards

peasantry

contributed

COMMUNISM

points

the to a

involvement

in

did not lead

to

Even local

recruitment

rural

though party ceased,

placement, and education of party 15. Thorn&y defines “party work” as referring to the recruitment, personnel; the development ofeffective party organization and the monitoring ofperformance ofvarious party units; and “inner party work” refers to all operations having to do with party purges, verification, and exchange of party cards (p. 180). 16. Prior to 1932 most kolkhoz chairmen were ofworker background and alien to rural life. Jerry F. Hough, “The Changing Nature of the Kolkhoz Chairman,” in James R. Millar, ed., The Soviet Rural Community (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971), pp. 104-05. With stronger ties to the land comes greater understanding and sympathy for the peasant and his burden. Fainsod discusses this phenomenon in Smolensk Under Soviet Rule, op. cit., note 14, pp. 265-79.

The Soviet Communist Par9 and Agricultural

and 1933 witnessed the beginning

Policy

of a purge which was followed by another,

183

separate,

purge in 1934, a verification of party cards in 1935, and an exchange of party cards in 1936. The party purge in 1933-1934 again hit the rural ranks disproportionately hard. Regions for which data were available suggest twice the rate as the rest of the party. Thorniley previously has not been given sufficient weight party members were due to alleged failures in The results of this four year operation

that rural expulsions occurred at about argues that an underlying reason which is the fact that many expulsions of rural the realization of economic plans.

was that the size of the rural party membership

declined from 848 000 in October, 1933, to 255 852 in January, 1938 (p. 200). Once again the rural party was hit disproportionately hard: whereas the membership of the whole party never fell below 50 per cent of its 1932 level, the rural party membership dropped to a third of its 1932 size by the beginning of 1938. In short, through the purges, the rural party was both restructured and emasculated. The percentage ofkolkhozy with communist cells dropped from 70 per cent to 50 per cent. Not only rural party leaders were replaced and rural communists expelled, but collective farm chairmen also experienced rapid turnover. Interestingly, the proportion of kolkhoz chairmen who were communist members declined throughout the 1930s.17 Thus, as a result of the purge of rural party ranks, the communist presence in the countryside diminished, leading Thorniley to conclude that “this paucity of rural communists was bound to have a profound effect on the way the party and state approached the collective farm structure; the rural party would have to adopt new methods of working in the countryside” (p. 150). Thus, for Thorniley, the primary causal factor in the party’s role in the countryside concerned the size of the rural membership, and more importantly, the degree of party saturation. The role of the rural party was then linked to the penetration of rural society. In the Second Five Year Plan, as the purge resulted in the reduction of the communist presence in the countryside, a concomitant withdrawal from production activities was necessary.

The Post- War Years: 1946-1953

Kaplan

argues

that the post-war

years witnessed

a return

to an emphasis

on party

involvement in production. The decree in September, 1946, set the early tone for postwar agrarian policy as violations of the socialist system which had occurred during the war would no longer be tolerated. Central interference in agricultural production was on the rise, as every kolkhoz was to receive plans not only for each category of crop but even for each type of grain.i8 Once again planned delivery targets were both high and susceptible to change (for example the Fifth Five Year Plan-1951-1955-was not presented until the 19th Party Congress in 1952). Rural party leaders were given increased responsibility for production but were granted only limited increases in state investments; the major dilemma which confronted rural leaders in the post-war period was how to implement central policies and fulfill plan targets. The goals of the central party in agriculture during the post-war years included the recovery of production to pre-war levels; the re-establishment of communist institutions in the countryside; and the resocialization of the agrarian sector. A number of objective 17. Hough, op. cit., note 16, p. 105. 18. Alec Nave, An Economic History ojthr USSR (Middl esex, England:

Penguin

Books, 1982), p. 299.

184

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE

factors

frustrated

Kaplan’s First,

industrial

to the east.

million

rubles

capital

For

were

investment

investment From

one western

Given

officials

developed

based

industry,

totalled

situation,

by political

communists,

especially in the USSR

program

in 1950

among

was

into

chairmen

had

larger

farms;

and 80 per cent

In addition

there

well-educated program, and pp.

or

nearly

by

1953

74-75).

rapid into very

(Kaplan,

were

18

cent

to improve

which

higher

the

had

1950,

chairmen

a secondary

education

to increase Year

increased

from

of

in 1948

only 37 per cent of The

amalgamation kolkhozy

dropped

from

were

236 900

70 per cent of kolkhozy leaders

even and

after

to

had a

who were either

the

higher

chairmen

amalgamation

the

were

(Kaplan,

frustrated and

of agronomists

number

8506

education;

education

demobilization

the number Plan

concerned a shortage

still only had a primary

the post-war

Five

in

to be

communists.

following

efforts

that unlike

example,

as smaller

agricultural

of kolkhoz

Fourth

For

(PPO).

have

continued

and in 1949

the quality

occurred

Moreover,

During and

per

were

argues occurrence

that

by

relationship

was first

chairmen.

states

In

for production

There

problems

of rural

specialists.

was determined

for this

of kolkhozy

chairmen shortage

low

in 1952

by the

continued proceeded

of agronomists

in 1946

to only

and

expertise

8765

with in

1950

p. 73).

These severe

of all kolkhoz

well-trained

only

1950s.23

secondary

Kaplan

was a general

Efforts

slowly.

By 1953

88 per cent of all kolkhoz

turnover the

number

the state’s

extremely

Agriculture

reason

these

of state

to industry.20

the

if Stalin

Kaplan

organization

the

with

responsibility

chairmen.

of kolkhoz

to address

devoted

an interdependent

strengths?

party

been 535

per cent

and pigs were lower

in agriculture.

primary

had

(1946-1950)

7.7

to this

reconstruction.“”

were communists,

a primary

designed

beef,

the shared might

industry

In comparison,

that it was “as

kolkhoz

the ranks

a paltry

made

considering

Plan

combined

post-war

and respective The

while

of the sum

for grain,

leaders,

among

123 700 by the end of 1950.50 PPO

which

were

hard

Year

rubles).”

15 per cent

did not evolve

only 40 per cent of kolkhoz

amalgamated

6.9 billion

concluded

authority.

war

Five

by the state,

and given

need

in particular

kolkhozy

to use

of the Soviet

allotments

doubly

the

in agriculture,

and agricultural

on mutual

personnel,

some

economist

such a relationship

dominated rural

during the Fourth

pay for the necessary

this economic

party

management,”

was on the revitalization

agriculture

in agriculture

of investments

than

rural

during

paid by the state,

the peasants

of “crisis

and monetary

hit

was less than

prices

in 1940,

which

devastation

(which

low level

years

resource

greater

to agriculture

the

to a system

example,

invested

procurement to make

Greater

a situation

experienced

moved

led

in the post-war

capacity.

sector,

had

and

leaders.

emphasis

industrial

sector

goals

by rural

Stalin’s

Union’s the

these

term,

COMMUNISM

shortcomings among

party

sovkhoz

members

in party and

MTS

in the USSR

membership, directors. in 1952,

education, More

than

and levels

99 per cent of education

were

not

of MTS

directors

exceeded

those

as of

19. Volin, op. cit., note13, p. 349. During this period investments by kolkhozy exceeded stafe investments, so that if the former are included the percentage of total investments to agriculture comprised 15 per cent of total capital investments in the economy. (Chapel Hill: University of North 20. Eugene Zaleski, Stalinis1 Planning jar Economic Growth, 1933-52 Carolina Press, 1980), p. 404. 21. Nave, op. cit., note 18, p. 300. 22. Sel’skoye khozraistuo SSSR; statisticheskzy sbornik (Moscow: Statistika, 1960), pp. 484-5. 23 Kaplan reports that the average national turnover rate was slightly under 25 per cent among kolkhoz chairmen during the early 1950s (pp. 79-80). In addition, see Hough, op cit., note 16, pp. 107-16.

The Soviet Communist Party and Agricultural kolkhoz

chairmen.

education, (Kaplan,

pp.

Similar

1952

rates

the

which high

over

The Post-Stalin During

led

level,

billion

Moreover, to the local

rural

rise

regime and

832 000

the

gap

other

By

169).

a higher

Kaplan

First

Five

a harsh

and

higher

education

Year

policy

poorly

Plan,

the

environment

trained

and educated

who also experienced

where

political

high

authority

argues

that gave

in

expertise a pool

were

pre-

level

1982,

99

most

prominent

Grain

harvest

that even

among

92 per

kolkhoz cent

cent

holdover

rise to post-war

party

chairmen

and

directors

had

agricultural in kolkhozy, increased

to

in 1985.25

Further-

sovkhoz

directors

were

agricultural

while that was only true of 67 per cent of sovkhoz

directors

were

agricultural

and 97 per cent of kolkhoz features

in particular

with a change

number

kolkhoz

was also on the

trained

million

more 1982.24

and stability

specialists

this

of sovkhoz

educations, targets

1965

and to 2.1

and

among

leaders

of professionally

educations, per

even continuity

increased,

In fact,

1966

increasing,

above,

at the local

were

lent more

of agricultural

By

in 1980,

described

in 1982.

between

280 000 agricultural

enterprises.

1.6 million 1965,

was which

been

agriculture

Brezhnev

agriculture

saturation

to create

have

in production

in

under

declined

there

which

involvement

investments

technical

and specialized

The

detailed

rates

and specialized

chairmen. with higher

the factors

had

chairmen

agriculture

invested

In 1957

In

ally high plan targets. theless,

in

party

in educational

with higher

p.

sector,

investments

agricultural

specialists

(Kaplan,

The

by 1970,

significantly.

specialists

were

attempted

decreased of kolkhoz

the

targets,

kolkhoz

example,

it, turnover

and leaders.

sovkhozy, more,

during

of the conditions

state

Khrushchev scene.

339 000,

many

For

rubles

under

specialists

among

to the party’s of total

and with

as the

existed production

a situation

years

ameliorated.

chairmen,

had a specialized

directors

Years

27 per cent

500

directors

of MTS

the agricultural

to

contributed

were

reaching

of sovkhoz

expertise.

the post-Stalin

which

than

against

particularly

turnover,

dominated

a third a quarter

conditions

leaders,

of

nearly

almost

of unrealistically

discriminated

agricultural

and

in

75-76).

to

combination which

By 1953

and

185

Policy

in these

behavior

chairmen

from the past were unrealisticremain objective

continued

unattainable.26 conditions, in existence

None“many

through

of the

1970s.” At the same

time

Kaplan

notes

pressures

for change.

With

the mechanization

of agri-

24. Narodnoye khoriairtuo SSSR za 70 let. yubileynyy ztatistccheskiy ezhgodntk (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1987), p. 276. 25. Narodnoye khoeiaistuo SSSR II I963 g., p. 365; Narodnoye khoriaistno SSSR u 1965 f., p. 437; Narodnoye khoziaistvo SSSR ZII 70 let, p. 302. 26. For example, the 1 lth Five Year Plan called for an average of 239 million tons of grain per year; in reality the average harvest attained was 180 million tons. The 12th Five Year Plan called for an average harvest of 250-255 million tons, instead the harvests have averaged 206 million tons through 1989. Narodnoye khorzaixtvo SSSSR u 1988g., p. 454. As the annual plan for 1990 was being drafted one did not see evidence of any abatement of the practice to set targets too high. For example, in Kostroma oblast, in the non-black earth region, since 1985 grain harvests have ranged from a low of 268 thousand tons (in 1988) to a high of 455 thousand tons (in 1986). Nonetheless, the draft plan for 1990 called for a harvest of600 thousand tons of grain. Seuernaya Prado, November 28, 1989. More generally, the production goals by 1990, published as part of the Food Program in May, 1982, are not likely to be realized. Of the ten basic product targets listed, only the targets for milk, eggs, and sugar will be met. See EkonomisheskayaSrareta,no. 45 (November 1988), p. 13; and compare with Narodnoye khoriaistvo SSSR u 1988g., p. 118. The 1990 plan is explicit in admitting that planned targets will not be reached. Pravda, September 26, 1989.

186

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE

culture

there

expertise important

rural

is the

may

particular

she views

optimistic

note,

replacement with

the

in fact

educations Thus,

relies whom (p.

they

increasing

as pivotal.

with

the

Kaplan

and

Another

younger, party

concludes

better

personnel

probability

that

autonomy”

leaders could match the educational

Indeed,

many agricultural

regime

no longer

authority,

local

form

management

could

costly.”

of younger

professional

leaders

may now be more knowledgeable

if the

on political

cadres

presence

knowledge

more

(p.

agri-

176).

In

on a hopeful

and

that:

their local party cohorts. cultural

and

political

“the

greater

years

technical

desirable

thereby

exercise

the Brezhnev

claiming

that

past,

leaders’

less

of older

argues

By the late 197Os, agricultural

parts.

agricultural

methods

Kaplan

a break

leaders

on

“political

leaders.

facilitate

cultural

premium

makes

factor

educated [may]

is a new

which

COMMUNISM

prefers

party

of rural

now have

teams

in

of agri-

than their local party counter-

a system

leaders

qualifications

with specialized administration

agricultural

a system

that

partners

of dual

with

administration

180).

It would

appear

question

is whether

economic

administration.

of the party

then,

that

Soviet

there

in policy

agriculture

is continuity In other

is at a critical

or change

words,

implementation?

juncture,

in the

has there

been

We explore

role

and the pressing

of the

a significant

this question

rural

party

change

in greater

in

in the role

detail

below.

The Role of the Rural Party Under Gorbachev Today, pool

the party of expertise

specialists

with

kolkhozy

and

secondary

in the

secondary

and higher

cent above

Virtually

for

high

as state

during

a reduction

education,

28 The

Gorbachev,

appropriations

with

There

more

than

of whom

all kolkhoz

education.

under

in the countryside.*’

countryside,

and higher

the level reached

called

economy;

established

sovkhozy.

has continued plan

is firmly working

1.5

chairmen level

million

and

of capital

agricultural

are working

sovkhoz

directors

investment increased

more

the last year of Brezhnev’s

tenure.

While

billion

to agriculture

rubles

in state

at the same

time

capital were

in have

in agriculture

have

of 23.4

investments

is now a significant 2 million

than

20 per

in 1990 the

investments

in the

due to increase

10 per

cent.2g Notwithstanding

the increase

rural

leaders,

the

place

in agriculture

economic If this turnover personnel

there

since

in party

investment Stalin,

is much

more

administration view among

is correct, personnel

turnover

and

continuity

and policy one

and

education,

the other

expertise which teams”

in the immediate

change

in the

role

among

have

future.

of the

taken

or “dual In other

rural

party

in

lack

of

implementation.

of the level

and

changes

of “management

is not likely than

at the raikom

at the raion

saturation,

levels,

the development

has yet to evolve

administration” words,

higher

reasons

for

this

occurrence

level and below. and below,

it very

While well

may

be the

we lack definite may

be that,

data on

unlike

the

27. Just under 20 per cent of the party in 1989 was engaged directly in agriculture. Spravochnikpurfjynogo mbotnika 1989 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1989), p. 597. This does not include those working in transport, construction, and light industry in the countryside. In 1987 there were 2887 rural raikoms and 49 000 party organizations in the countryside, an average of about one per farm. All told more than six million communists worked in the countryside. P. A. Rodinov, ed., Rol selskikh raikomou partii u osushchestvlenii qmmoy politiki KPSS IJ sovrmennykh uslouzjakh (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), p. 6, citing Partiinaya rhizn, no. 14 (1986), pp. 26, 28. 28. Ye. I. Kholostova, “Rykovoditel v selskom khoziaistve,” Selskoye khoziaistuo (Znamje series), No. 2 (1990), p. 4. 29. Prauda, September 26, 1989.

The Soviet Communist Party and Agricultural upper

levels

cultural

of the party

credibility

when

in the fourth of other

difficulties

reason yet

Moreover,

the

that

Gorbachev

posed

rural

to

very

essence

of perestroika

though

in a new

asked

step

to

easiest have

to the

and and best

always

During correct

known

been

1987

June-July,

to them,

party

of substituting

party

slowly.

to remove

But

involved concluded

between

farms

subordinate the reform operate.“37 occurred

beset

only

with

a host

perestroika itself.

Local

to rely

daily

plan

on party

simultaneously.

those

means

members

as the is being

confronted

behaviors

doing

in

quotas.31

the party

When

exhibit cases

interference

fulfilling

form. 32 In essence

widespread

with

which

things

early

a significant

1990 change

than from

production.

is little

itself

are

the way they

passed

words

United

indication

of a serious

hierarchy.

The

the possibility

the This

a resolution

which

called

in the economy,

In April,

slogans,

States

and

change

is little

director-

on norms

interference that

or

of Agri-

in the relationship

traditional

reliance

1990,

there

administration Department

ofthe

heavy

to demonstrate role.

economic

the oblasts planted.

economic

nature

of administrative

existed

in the party’s

over

“in

is firmly

and party

The

in the

articles.36

overseeing

itself.

Conference concerning

control

involvement

The

to assert

press

that

leaders

in subsequent

Other

evidence

34 Party

for example,

detailed

of the party

continues

wide open

from

the 19th Party

in the Soviet

for economic

support

change?

“there

noted

19th Conference

in agricultural that

occurred

administration.

committees

and the administrative

leaves

for

up to and following

it was

themselves

retreat

relationship By

but

“35 The

really

of a general

becoming culture

received

did anything

evidence

responsible

in most

in economic

on party

approach

rear

within from

continues

discussion

criticized,

flaw is changing this

leading

an extensive

was

organs

to agriculture

has been

themselves

bureaucracies

which

of agri-

additional

nationalities.

improved

to the

orders

levels

gains

done.33

of the

administration practice

and

and the period

1988, role

front

contradictory

thesis

his attention

thereafter

remain

of society,

187

the lower

This

contradictions

remove

leaders

above),

turned

by various internal

vanguard confusing

and

perestroika.

and immediately

admonished local

secretaries

to undergo

has to do with

are

production,30

first

yet

of his tenure,

pressing leaders

have

one considers

year

A second party

(oblast

administration

Policy

there

under

in how farms still

the Marxist

had

not

platform

30. This has been a very popular theme during the Gorbachev years and here we cite just a few examples. See the editorial on the role of RAPOs in Prauda, May 13, 1987; V. Uzun, “Upravlyat-ne komandovat,” Pravda, June 2, 1987; and XXVII s’ezd KPSS o rukovodyashchey roli partii u uskorenii rarvitiya strany (Moscow: Moscow University, 1988), pp. 27-42. 3 1. Party scaurces reflect the ambiguity on this point. On the one hand “raion committees do not directly manage (upravlyaet) the economy, this falls within the competency of state and economic organs. But raikoms direct its development.” On the other hand ultimate responsibility has not changed: “The fulfillment of the Food Program remains the main direction of activities by rural party raikoms.” Rodionov, op. cit., pp. 13, 6 respectively. 32. A. G. Seregin, “KPSS: Roli mesto v perestroike,” Istorzjaipolitika KPSS, no. 11 (1989), pp. 31-54. 33. SeeGraham T. Allison, The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), chap. 3. 34. In the agricultural realm Vladimir Tikhonov has been one of the most forceful and radical spokesmen for agrarian reform. Already in 1987 he was attacking the “command-administrative system” which in subsequent years would become a COIII~O~ theme in the press. See V. Tikhonov, “Kontseptsiya radikdnoy perestroiki khoziaistvennogo mekhanizma APK, ” Planouoye khozaistuo, no. 4 (April 1987). pp. 12-22. 35. This was noted at a plenum of the Rostov obkom party. See “V plenu zastoya”, Pravda, March 22, 1988. 36. See for example, N. Travkin, “Davayte khoziaistrvovat’ bez komand,” Prauda,.ful~ 22, 1988; and A. Shinkin, “Rukovodit, a ne komandovat, Prauda, July 28, 1988. 37. Economic Research Service, USDA, USSR: &iculture and Trade Report, RS-88-2 (May 1988), p. 15.

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE

188 of the CPSU tenets

was published

of the

economy;

to fully

platform from

“to

transfer

the

on local

power

power] lack

leaders

were

created

production

display techniques The reform leasing

have remained

pressure

to implement

leasing

has been

“There

are

by mid-1989 Commission Deputies

“voluntary” economist purpose to convert

regime

on party

and economic efforts

one

must

look

on party

leaders

remain they

changed

of this pressure

draft

to “refrain at the

members

additional

of reform, have

the

organs

development,

if rural

of the of the

management.“3g

to do so,

As perestroika called

goals

Evidence

such

“formalism.“40

to

pressures

responsible

are

more

for

likely

to

but

the methods

and

for greater

involvement

can

symptoms Thus,

of the farms

6600

farms

1989) kolkhoz

that “in

where

introduction

of leasing

“Zarechnyy”

of strengthening to the leasing

two-thirds

was

a number

turned

of raions

leasing

100 per

for example,

state and collective

Chairman

down

an

already

of oblasts,

ofall

for

that

into

in Kazakhstan,

In the Ukraine

nominee

Agri-

recently

of leasing

of

that

of the

State

by the Congress relations

of

were intro-

and sovkhoz.“43

in some areas at the

data

mode

Lenin

wrote

and in a number

first

first

is evidence

of the All-Union

as well.

or almost (who

There

Miloserdov,

to Gosafroprom

Ryzhkov’s

of agricultural

The

the introduction

elsewhere

Procurements

boasted

V.

had leases,

had leases,

Kalashnikov, and

A member

according

the realm

of behavior.

implementation.

of transforming

“symptoms”

V.

and within types

(VASKhNIL),

these

in July, to every

of state despite

In short,

finds

on Food

Moreover,

Further,

called

implementation

78 per cent almost

And

organs.“38

of successful

Sciences

campaign.

One

farms.42

of

appearing

1988,

cent.“41

soviet

has led to two main

the appearance

has encountered

extraordinary

and Congress

perestroika in general,

in particular,

Academy

duced

similar.

management

and economic

Thus,

One

its direct

by reform.

of social

for reform.

from

behavior.

cultural

in June

for that

and the successful

in actual

behavior

Party

created

involvement.

a set of proposals

CPSU

to state

for increased interference.

greater

be seen

the

of change

the way to a new level

both

contained free

for the 28th

[their

understand

pressures

which

was

of the CPSU

substituting

To lead

platform

COMMUNISM

conversion sovkhoz

the cost accounting contract.

to leasing

is not

“44 There

even

in the

has occurred,

attempted. Stavropol

mechanism is no mention

For kray

the pretense example, wrote

in the sovkhoz of who made

that

the

ofthe main

“For

the

it was decided this decision.

38. Pravda, April 17, 1990. 39. Pravda, June 27, 1990. 40. Soviet surveys indicate that by mid-1989, over 21 500 kolkh oz y and sovkhozy had incorporated leasing operations, with leasing especially popular in Kazakhstan, Belorussia, the Ukraine, and certain oblasts within the RSFSR. This number constitutes about 43 per cent of all farms. In the non-black earth areas about oneotnosheniya v novykh usloviyakh,” quarter of all farms use contracts on the basis of land leases. “Arendnyye APK. ekononika, upraulenzje, no. 6 uune 1989), p. 9. 41. V. Miloserdov, “APK: Problemy staryye i novyye, ” Kommunirt, No. 4 (March 1989), p. 19. Emphasis added. 42. Pravda, May 21, 1989. 43. V. Kaslahnikov, “Razvitiyu arendy-tvorcheskiy podkhod, ” Ekonomicheskaya gaz&, No. 14 (March 1989), p. 5. This formalism, as well as continued party interference, is illustrated by the following data. In a survey of 420 agricultural enterprises in 11 oblasts in the RSFSR, 93 per cent of the managers expressed the still was not established. The most common reason cited for this belief that “the new economic mechanism” occurrence was “slowly changing relations between the farm and higher organizations” (32 per cent). In the opinion of 45 per cent of the managers, planning still came “from above” as before; and 62 per cent of the respondents believed that independence in planning was “a fundamental precondition for increasing the effectiveness of agricultural production. ” Vestmk sta&iki, No. 10 (October 1989), p. 56. “Nash opyt organizatsii arendnogo podryada v sovkhoze,” APK: ekonomika, 44. G. Solodnovikov, ufmwfenzye, No. 2 (February 1990), p. 97.

The Soviet Communist Party and Agricultural The

pressure

results, tinuation down the

of detailed

to the farm.

point.

revealed very

to implement

First,

involved

introduce

whatever

cases

comings

of the

newspaper

pressures

delivered

to farms.

also

peasants

and the emphasis of the

implementing raikom

raions

of detail

involved

for purchases

emanate (and

varied

in production from

to leasing

with

in which

party

has

of the “political

meeting

radical

the

discussed

reform

in agriculture.

The

the raikom a form

agrarian

and organizational

the shortcomings

a;e

visited

of mobilizaleasing.

reform

work”

of the obkom

An

is seen

of rural

of the Krasnoselskiy

bureau

For

plots which

to introduce

approached

short-

that as part of an effort

were

duty

for

to incident.45

implementation.

from

meetings

to In

officials)

with private

officials

These

secretaries the obkom.

incident

and

peasants

relations,

peasants.

from

raion

from

was on how it was the peasant’s

example

obkom

specific

Pravda) remains

the implementation

for raikom

I was told by two farm directors

meeting

way

a concrete

out

remains

to convert

tion,

on the agenda,

the level

Furthermore,

and held

One

singled

set plans

farms

cadres.

is currently

The obkom

and in ensuring

level

substantiate

(Severnaya

affairs. and

is a con-

the obkom

in Kostroma

in Kostroma

to produce,

production

of behavior

be seen from

my research

production

positive

type

by agricultural

chairmen

although

their

through

overseeing

actions

the raikom

oblast

is dominated

for farm

program

the raikoms

party

raikom

noted

that

in the

was not conducting

work on the propaganda

farming and

forms of these

paper

farming,

and of

Program.

4h

instead

social

has been

incentive towards

structure

leasing.

It is no wonder

Prices

the

the

the above

to achieve

rural has

that peasants

countryside,

and

not

changed fixed

raikom

is insufficiently

aktiv,

for the successful

of the raion the

are

terms

and

that

peasants

at low levels

view exhortations

of

part

political

is treated

of the the

are

more

not

as

equation;

authority

because

officials

Food

the

and production

by party

of

the actual

of leasing

not

is precisely

of the

methods

about

realization

the introduction

It

of

and leasing

fully the possibilities

incentives

in political

methods

contracts

of economic

the workers

reform.

remain

used

propagandizing

passage,

issues defined

ideological

are not being

for in

perestroika

The the

or to inform

Economic

the problem upon

radio

of economic

of family

organization

There

local

and introduction wide dispersion

organizations,

technology,

campaign.

relied

economic inclined

party

as can be seen from

a political being

progressive

tasks. the

intensive

problems

Thus,

of

the primary

resolution raion

are not receiving

Farms

other

directing

buyer.

agenda

189

to show

second

and may

a reading

example,

illustration

in production from

obkom

to convince

and then This

of experiences

in production,

Second,

reform,

of behavior.

A number

in the details

The

form

involvement

that the obkom

of policy. most

agrarian

has led to a corollary

Policy

is still

underlying favorably

has only

one

with disinterest

45. At one end ofthe scale the attention to detail was very great. In February, 1988, A. Elshin was criticized for shortcomings in production and purchases from peasants with private plots. Half of the families in Galichisky raion hr?d no livestock at all. Elshin was told to increase the number of horned cattle to 2400, COWS to 1650, and pigs to 4000. He was to report back by July 1, 1988, as to what supplementary measures he had taken to achieve these targets. Severnaya Prauda, February 6, 1988. At the otherend ofthe scale the level ofattention was more routine. First Secretary ofthe Ostrovskiy raikom, N. N. Nikitov, was criticized “for not adopting necessary measures for fulfilling the resolutions adopted by the obkom.” In particular “the raikom of the KPSS has weakly increased responsibility for introducing leading experience. There is also a weak avant-garde role by communists in production. Less than one half of the farms are using advanced experience to increase productivity.” Seuernaya Pravda, September 5, 1989. 46. Sev~rnaya Prauda, June 29, 1989.

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE

190 and distrust: Finally, the

the campaign pressure

farm

director.

sovkhoz, products

The

these

to sources

other

aspects

of production

the burden

state

than

agrarian

was

saturation

presence

on

the

correct

from

when

he

equals

support

exists

for

and as long as party that party remain

the

yet

role

the

that

party

These

and grow must

to sell his

contract

prices

to sell his

on the farm

assistance.

for feed,

Thus,

many

and in essence

there

political

party

campaign

leaders

has

to be found

questions

policy.

played

in nearly

Party

every

policy

and

As long as high

in agriculture

at the 28th

and in rural

party

A strong

in production,

so too will the latter.

traditionally

in the

members.

between

in rural

over and participation exists

and

is a correlation

involvement

by his comments

continue

in production

director

is not allowed

conditions,

another

of local

control

and represented

leasing

the

must

to the lessee.

condition

organizations

involvement

under

authority

party

lessee

by

“Borovikskoye”

by contract

is also dependent

and the level of party

significant

by Ligachev

even

implied

The

and mechanized

resembles

political

and

is set by the farm.

lessee

the farm

reform

the

as the lessee

is obligated

prices.

changed.47

involvement

will be used for leasing,

infrastructure,

support

controlled

that as long as the former

embodied

The

at

is restricted,

lessee

for this output

the farm.

in the countryside

it is likely

the

have

to detailed

director

on his farm

farm’s

procurement

remain

based

Thorniley

(as

Congress),

farm,

it is likely

implementation

will

high.

Perestroika remains as Moscow the party

an urban

and Leningrad. is distorted.

provinces. very

to the

of risk has shifted

countryside

level

to grow

as well as technical

Contemporary

party

land

what

the goals

leads

the

what

and the price

and seed,

with

Furthermore,

only

reform

to choose

to exceed

fodder,

the same,

interview

“correspond”

to the farm,

output

an

decisions.

are not allowed

remain

agricultural

he decides

freedom

which

approve output

During

I was told that

how much.

methods

to implement

COMMUNISM

Despite

strong,

Economic

of Soviet

to play

a dominant

in the

agriculture

one that is most our perception

perestroika has

the portrayal

especially

features

phenomenon,

For that reason of the party countryside. have

changed

role in production

not yet begun

by the western Thus, since

functions

visible

we may Stalin,

in large

of its success in most media, conclude

the party

and policy

cities

such

and the role of of the outlying

the party that

continues

remains

while

many

to attempt

implementation.

47. During an interview, Doctor of Economic Sciences and Professor at the Kostroma Technological Institute Matvey I. Skarzhinskiy noted that real leasing does not yet exist in the Soviet Union. In most cases what has been introduced are leasing contracts. In his opinion real leasing assumes market relations with the freedom to select among competing buyers.