The role of the communist party on the Soviet Shopfloor

PETER RUTLAND

The Role of the Communist Party on the Soviet Shopfloor

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union attaches great importance to the activities of its Primary Party Organs (PPOs) inside industrial enterprises. The party sees itself as the guardian

and guarantor

deliver improved legitimize

economic

its monopolistic

of economic performance

efficiency

in the USSR,

has been an important

political role in the post-Stalin

and its ability to

part in its attempts to

era. J. Hough’s

pathbreaking

study of the role of local party organs in industry argued that the party does indeed serve as a promoter compensating

of greater

efficiency

and rationality

for the rigidities and inefficiencies

in economic

of the command

decision-making,

economy.’

Our study suggests, however, that the political activities of the CPSU on the shopfloor may not always be conducive to greater economic efficiency. On the contrary, we argue that the activities marginal

of the PPOs

influence

have a political

on improved economic

logic of their own which has only a

performance.

PPO officials and activists are

members of a distinct political organization and are held accountable by higher party organs for their activities. The criteria used by these higher organs in judging the political efficacy of PPOs do not fully coincide with criteria of economic efficiency as perceived by managers and workers. The PPO will find itselfjudged in terms of its level of activism, as measured by number of meetings held, number ofworkers involved, and range of organizational innovations and initiatives introduced.* Evidence of responsiveness to central directives is a key criterion

in assessing PPO performance.

evidence that these political activities have a positive impact on enterprise Soviet

writers

unequivocally uncritical,

assert

organic

from Soviet

a priori that

to improved economic sources

political

performance,

model of the functioning as to how PPOs

activities

contribute

There is little performance. directly

and

3 but one is not obliged to accept this

of Soviet society at face value. Evidence

actually

carry out their economic

functions

in

practice points us towards the opposite conclusion, suggesting that there is a radical separation between the CPSU’s political activities and the normal functioning of the shopfloor. Within the confines of a single article one cannot review the whole range of this evidence,

so we will focus our attention

on two activities which have been highly

prominent in PPO work over the past decade: the movement to promote socialist competition between various work collectives as a stimulus to greater efficiency, and the campaign to promote the brigade system as a source of improved labor productivity. We

1. J. F. Hough, The Soviet Prefects: theLocal Party Organs in Industrial Decision Making (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969). 2. V. Iu. Bondar’, “0 politicheskom kharaktere partiinogo rukovodstva,” Voprosy is&i KPSS, no. 2 (February 1984). 3. S. I. Surnichenko, Politizdat, 1979), p. 20.

Lcninskie printsipy pmtiinogo rukovodstua khoziaistvmnym stroitcl’stuom (Moscow:

STUDIESIN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM, 0039-3592/88/01

0025-19

$03.00

VOL.XXI,

No.

~,SPRING 1988, 25-43

@ 1988 U mversity of Southern

California

SI.UDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM

26

also briefly review the party’s education

and mobilization

work. This work is very time

consuming for party activists, but it is difficult to establish its true political or economic significance. The evidence for socialist competition and the brigade system is more conclusive. In distinguishing

between political and economic

activities on the shopfloor we do not

mean to suggest that there is a direct clash of interests between managers and party offtcials. Rather, the impression we have is of a division of labor between the two sets of officials, with managers and workers regarding party actions as somewhat irrelevant to their own daily concerns. The two groups also share many areas of overlapping interest. For example,

an important

measure of PPO success will be whether its plant is success-

fully meeting its plan targets. The central importance relations between party officials and managers

of plan fulfillment

will mean that

are those of close cooperation

rather than

hostility. It would appear that when problems arise in the workings of an enterprise in the overwhelming majority of cases party officials and economic managers act in unison. This even applies where corrupt or illegal behavior is involved. Cases where PPO officials take the initiative in exposing illegal behavior by managers are extremely rare.4 Despite this underlying

unity of interests between political and economic

officials

inside the factory, it remains the case that they are performing different functions on a routine basis. In trying to understand the dynamics of the CPSU as a political organization it is important not to lose sight of its distinct role. Even though this division of labor may not be a source of overt social conflict, it has important implications for the way Soviet party leaders view the functioning of Soviet society, and for the CPSU’s capacity to promote reforms or otherwise improve the functioning of the economy. This is, to reiterate,

only a selective examination

of certain key aspects of the CPSU’s

shopfloor role. In practice its range of activities extends beyond those investigated here, including, for example, an influential role in the selection and promotion of economic officials; coordination work when plant expansion is to take place or when new technology is being introduced; responsibility for the running of specific campaigns such as for the conservation of energy and raw materials; and general supervision of the operations of their enterprise. Critical evaluation of this array of operations is beyond the scope of this article. Socio-political

Mobilization

PPOs

a vast array

conduct

political propaganda

Work of mobilization

on national

work in Soviet

and international

factories,

ranging

from

themes down to specific programs

of economic education and training.5 It is virtually impossible for an outside observer to assess the significance of this activity or to try to establish whether it is primarily political or economic in nature. This mobilization work is studied extensively by Soviet sociologists, but given (as was noted above) that it is an article of faith that political work merges imperceptibly into economic work it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions from Soviet sources. 4. A careful reading of Partiinnia zhizn’ and Kommunist between 1976 and 1986 turned up only a handful of cases of PPO off%als acting against their plant managers. One example is a letter from a deputy party secretary in a design bureau in Dnepropetrovsk, complaining that the director monopolizes party meetings and refuses to accept criticism. (In K~~~isf, no. 15 (August 1982), p. 87.) 5. Fo . an overview, see the round table discussion “Ideologicheskaia rabota KPSS,” V@rq irtorii KPSS, no. 10 (October 1983.)

The Role of the Communist Party on the Soviet Shopfloor On one hand,

mobilization

programs

of one sort or another

27

do seem to reach all

Soviet workers on a regular basis. Data testifying to the number of workers reached by various campaigns is frequently cited in Soviet sources, although the data are often vague and occasionally

contradictory.6

Second, it is worth noting that, whatever the true extent of this mobilization work, it has not withered away with the passage of time. Each published report of a PPO election-reporting tion work;

meeting invariably

and Central

Committee

includes a paragraph (CC CPSU)

or two devoted to mobiliza-

resolutions

of the 1970s and 1980s

formally increased the demands placed on party organs in the ideological arena.’ Third, one must give due credit to the fairly rich array of forms of mobilization work, tailored to meet particular put managerial

problems.

For example,

universities

officials through two to four year part-time

of Marxism-Leninism

political training programs;

while at the other end of the scale the problem of dissolute youth is tackled by allocating a mentor (nastavnik) to each young worker from among the ranks of his senior colleagues. Many of these programs may, in practice, be highly formal in nature, with little more than a paper existence. Evidence to the low impact of mobilization work occasionally surfaces in Soviet sources. One survey of 12,500 discipline offenders in the Gor’kii area in the 1970s found that only 12 per cent of them had been spoken to by a party or Komsomol worker.8 Another study in Krasnodar showed that 75 per cent of propagandists avoided discussing

discipline in their lectures (presumably

to avoid alienating

their audiences).g What contacts there are would appear to be with the lower ranks of the party organization. For example, one survey of two collectives found that only 13 per cent of workers had ever talked to their PPO secretary,

whereas 28 per cent had talked to

the chief engineer. lo Even if they may not in practice work directly with discipline offenders on the shopfloor, party officials are still expected to gather data on labor turnover

and absenteeism

in their

committee (raikom). 11 Of the various mobilization

plant

and forward

drives running

from our point of view is the “economic

them

to their

in Soviet factories

education”

movement,

local district

the most significant

in that this is designed

to directly improve work organization and labor productivity. Since 1971 there has been a concerted effort to provide economic training and re-training on a systematic basis to all categories

of production

personnel,

in recognition

of the fact that in the past they had

little such training in their own secondary and tertiary education. l2 Some 20 per cent of employees are enrolled in some sort of economics program each year (although this may

6. Figures for participants in economic education vary from 30 million to 60 million for 1976, and 38 million to 78 million for 1980-with no explanation as to what precisely is included in this category. Data from Ekonomicheskaia gareto-henceforth Ekon. gaz.--no. 16 (April 1981), p. 13; no. 30 uuly 1976), p. 5; no. 16 (April 1981), p. 13; no. 6 (September 1980), p. 12. Even the more specific “schools of communist labour” were described as including 20 million workers in 1976 and 10 million in 1977, with no suggestion that numbers had actually dropped-Ekon. gaz., no. 30 uuly 1976), p. 5; no. 15 (April 1977), p. 4. 7. See the collection Ob idcologicheskoi rabotc KPSS: Sbomik dokummtou (Moscow: Politizdat, 1983)-for example, CC CPSU decrees of 26/4/79 (pp. 316-26) and 27/10/81 (pp. 352-55). 8. G. M. Podorov, Distsiplina tnrdo (Gor’kii: Volga-Vyatskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel’stvo, 1979), p. 115. 9. Voprosi istorii KPSS, no. 12 (December 1985), p. 29. 10. A. G. Kovalev, Kollcktiu i sotsial’no-psikhologicheskie problmy mkovodrtva (Moscow: Politizdat, 1975), p. 129. 11. A. V. Cherniak, Tovarishch instmktor (Moscow: Politizdat, 1984), p. 210. 12. V. Ya. Morgunov, “Vazhnyi faktor povysheniya effektivnosti proizvodstva,” Voprosy istorii KPSS, no. 5 (May 1984.)

28

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

be nothing more than a course of weekly lectures). l3 Each enterprise must have a council coordinating the programs,14 and the ministries are responsible for helping draw up schemes of study, l5 but party organs (up to regional or obkom level) also carry direct responsibility for seeing that the programs are faithfully executed.“j Party organs are presumably made responsible because these programs would never be given the requisite attention if left in the hands of factory management. There can be no doubt that party organs do take economic

education

seriously.

The

author studied all references to party work in the main CC CPSU economic newspaper, Ekonomicheskaia gazeta, for the 1977-86 period. Of 644 major articles authored by party officials of one sort or another,

105 were on the theme of economic

education

(16 per

cent). l7 Of 98 conferences organized by various obkomy (jointly with Ekonomicheskaia guzeta) 32 were devoted to economic education. The paper also prints letters from party officials in reply to previously published criticisms of their factory or district (“nam

otuechaiut'‘). Of 417 such letters, 50 (12 per cent) were responses to failures in economic education

work.

However,

as with all mobilization

the true significance

work, it is difficult for the outside observer to assess

of all this apparent

activity.

Vague

general

claims

as to the

economic savings directly accruing from these programs can be discounted. la Criticisms of “formalism” in economic education are legion: I9 it could be that the impressive statistics are describing programs with a mere paper existence. And even if the lectures are taking place, who is to say that the audience stays to the end-or are not reading novels throughout the proceedings? (Common enough behavior, as the author can testify from having attended a few such meetings.) Also, within this program one can detect the tension between the economic and the political which we alluded to above. The curricula and model lectures are overwhelmingly

political in character, involving the study of the latest party documents and the speeches of top Soviet leaders. z” Even with the best will in the world, it is difficult to credit these studies with a direct positive impact on worker productivity. The Soviets themselves

recognize

this problem,

many of the study programs,

with frequent

and numerous

criticism

exhortations

of the abstract

nature

of

to link the studies to practical

economic problems.21 On the other hand, some factory study programs are criticized for being too practical, in that they become fora for the discussion of routine production problems (for example, foremen

meeting

to discuss

quality

control)**

and lose their

educative

character

13. See above, note 5, for the data problems. The 20 per cent estimate comes from Ekon. pz., no. 7 (February 1984), p. 11. 14. Ekon. ~a., no. 14(April 1985), p. 12. 15. Ekon. gar., no. 29 fJuly 1985), p, 11; no. 44 (October 1983), p. 10. 16. See for example a Cherkass city party secretary criticizing his own obkom for poor assistance with this work-Ekon. gar., no. 1 Uanuary 1984), p. 10. The senior party official in charge of economic education is the head of the Sector for Party Studies and Economic Education, in the CC CPSU Propaganda Department. In 1984 it was N. Ya. Klepach-Ekon. gaz., no. 15 (April 1984), p. 10. 17. For an example of an article, see Ekm. gu., no. 36 (September 1984), p. 11; of a conference see Ekm gnr., no. 34 (August 1983), p. 4; of a reply to criticism see Ekon. pz., no. 51 (December 1985), p. 15. 18. For example, 100 million rubles in a year in Belorussia, 74 million rubles in Bashkir ASSRVo/msy istorii KPSS, no. 12 (December 1982), p. 76. 19. Ekon. gaz., no. 3 uanuary 1982), p. 11; no. 28 (July 1984), p. 5; no. 38 (September 1984), p. 5. 20. See for example the study plans for 1984/85, in Ekon. pz., no. 25 (June 1984), pp. 11-14. 21. fikon. gnr., no. 12 (March 1983). p. 11; no. 10 (March 1984), p, 10; no. 6 (February 1985), p. 11; Par~iinaiazhtin’, no. 19 (October 1978), pp. 60-68. 22. In a Frunze factory-Ekon. gar., no. 47 (November 1978), p. 11.

The Role of the Communist Party on the Soviet ShopJoor

29

altogether. It is difficult to judge to what extent there is a middle ground between the Scylla of political rhetoric and the Charybdis of daily routine. If it is difficult enough to assess the importance of economic educationwork, it is still more problematic to evaluate the ideological mobilization campaigns. The ideological fervor may unlock greater economic efficiency is rather curious to ear-but it should not be dismissed without consideration. After all, theories a prominent motivation in the West have ranged far and wide *3-according

idea that a Western of worker place, for

example, to religious belief as a motivating factor at various stages of historical development. The Soviets themselves see a place for both “moral ” and “material” incentives in the stimulation

of greater effort and efficiency

on the part of the workforce,

logical surveys purport to show a high correlation

and their socio-

between good political understanding

and socio-political activism on the one hand and good labor discipline, plan fulfillment and labor productivity on the other. 24 (Our scepticism stems from the asumption that surveys showing the contrary would never have their findings published.) Western students of the Soviet workforce tend to emphasize the role of informal, almost unspoken values (for example, a loose “social contract” involving such factors as guaranteed employment and managerial tolerance of indiscipline in return for worker loyalty) rather than the abstract, explicitly political values transmitted through party mobilization work. And if one looks closely at, for example, recent discipline campaigns, one finds that despite all the ideological oratory the campaign relies heavily on material entitlements, Socialist

incentives

and penalties

lost bonuses,

to encourage

good behavior-lines,

lost holiday

etc.26

Competition

Socialist competition

is an economic mechanism

which has no clear Western equivalent,

and therefore remains somewhat puzzling and enigmatic for outside observers. There have been virtually no scholarly studies of the phenomenon by non-Soviet scholars, except for historical studies of socialist competition movements of the 1930s. In fact, socialist competition is of central importance in the Soviet theory of economic organization,

and in the CPSUs

strategy

for intervention

The official Soviet view is that socialist competition tionally important

in industrial

management.

(sorevnovanie) “occupies

place in the life of the Soviet people;“*’

an excep-

and that “none of the other

forms of worker participation in management can compare with sorevnovanie in terms of their level of participation and degree of adoption. “*s Estimates of worker involvement range as high as 94 per cent of the total Soviet workforce.2g In May 1986 the Politburo argued that sorevnovanie “must become the most important means of ensuring taut plans.“30 23. P. D. Anthony, The Idmloty of Work (London: Tavistock, 1977). 24. A. L. Zhuravlev, et. al. Ceds.). Indiuidwl’nvi stil’ rukovodstva tmizvodrtvcnnvm kolbktiuom (Moscow: Institut Narodnogo Khoziaistva, -1978j, p. 13. z 25. V. And&, Manape& Power in the Soviet Union [New York: Saxon House, 1976); D. Lane and F. O’Dell, The Souicf Indust& Worker (London: Martin Robertson, 1978). 26. Ekvn. pz., no. 33 (August 1983), pp. 3-4; no. 3 Uanuary 1980), p. 4. 27. V. Paputin, Pwtiinoe rukvvvdstvo sorevnovaniem (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1973), p. 3. 28. E. I. Kapustin (ed.), Organizatsiia sorcvnovaniia i sovmhmtvvvanie kho.ziaistvmnogo mekhanizma (Moscow: Profizdat, 1982), p. 165. 29. Ekon. gaz., no. 41 (September 1983), p. 4. 30. Ekon. gar., no. 22 (May 1986), p. 3.

30

STUDIES

Our central concern

IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

is to investigate

the economic

impact of sorevnovanie, in view of

the party’s claims that it is an activity of vital importance in promoting economic efficiency. We will show that in practice sosevnovanietends to function not so much as a tool for promoting efficiency, but as a routine chore which party organizations must undertake to display their assiduousness and vitality to their political superiors. Sorvenovanie gives the party a sense of purpose and an opportunity for promoting the economic well-being of the Soviet people.

to display its concern

Socialist Competition and Soviet Economic Theoy Marx,

Engels and even Lenin never spelled out in detail how a socialist economy would

actually work. It was clear that the economy would lose many of the features extant under capitalism (prices, profit, etc.- at least to a significant degree)-but what would come in their place? On what basis,

and through

what sort of mechanisms,

would

decisions be made? The Bolsheviks came up with their own answers to these questions in the course of the 1920s through a combination of political expediency (central planning, collectivization) developments in capitalism

and mimicry of what they perceived to be progressive (German wartime planning, Taylorism.) However, many

links in the socialist economic chain remained unresolved. One major problem is how to ensure uniformity in conditions and mode of operation across different factories. (Why is it, one Soviet journalist

asked, that an identical newsprint press produces 128,000 tons

of print per year in one plant and only 98,000 in another?)31 Marxists influenced by “technological determinism” may assume that this must not be a major problem-that machinery of a given type will be diffused evenly throughout the economy, and will innately guarantee equality of performance. This is sheer Utopianism. In capitalism, the forces of competition serve (however imperfectly) as a mechanism forcing the less efficient plants to bring their productivity up to average-at the risk of entry of new competitors, withdrawal of capital, takeover or bankruptcy they fail. What is to perform this task of equalization in a socialist economy? The central planning organs can try to ensure uniformity formulation

and enforcement

of performance

if

through the

of sectoral norms, rates of return and so forth. However,

perched at the top of a massive hierarchical functions they can perform effectively.

pyramid,

Ensuring

there is a limit to the number of

efficiency

in resource use has not been

their top priority: their hands are full drawing up and implementing the annual plans which keep the wheels of industry turning. They cannot familiarize themselves with conditions in each and every local plant. Sorevnovaniewould appear to be the organizational device which the CPSU has hit on to replicate the drive for greater efficiency provided in a capitalist economy by market competition. What precisely does the technique involve. ?32 The official definition is that it is “a particular form of social activity and workers’ consciousness, in which participants in the labor process strive to achieve the highest individual and collective economic and social results.“33 Work collectives at various levels (from individuals up 31. Ekon. gar., no. 8 (rebruary 1978), p, 16. 32. Soviet works on sorevnovanieinclude: V. G. Smol’kov, Sorevnovanie ikommuntim (Moscow: Izd. MGU, 1970); V. M. Platonov, Sorevnovcmie o kollcktiuakh promyzhlennykh predpriiatii i souershenstuooanieego organizatsii u urlooiiakh razuitogo sotsiaitima (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola VTsSPS, 1979); and N. E. Gubanov, 06 e~~rnjc~s~i sucftnosti~o~~u~~s#t~cbes~go soreo~ooanjia (Moscow: Vysshaia Partiinaia Shkola, 197 I, dissertation

avtoref~at).

33. N. A. Lobanova (ed.), Normirooanie i NOT: Spraoochnoeposobie (Leningrad:

Lenizdat,

1978), p. 162.

The Rok of the Communist Party on the Soviet Shopfloor to whole

cities

competitions

or provinces,

but mainly

between themselves

at brigade

for the realization

31

or shop level)

will organize

of certain specified economic

goals.

This is intended to be a locally generated, ho~zont~y structured movement which will supplement the regular vertical channels of command leading up to the ministries and Gosplan. Through encouragement of direct comparisons between individual plants it should serve to expose “lagging” (otstaiushhie) enterprises to “the experience of leading collectives” (peredouiki). This may amount to the functional equivalent of share listings,

normal

designed

profits,

to ensure

individuals

etc. which we see under

that the subjective

and groups)

elements

grow to conform

capitalism.

In Soviet

in the economy

to their “objective”

terms,

(differences potential.

it is

between

In concrete

terms, this means uncovering under-used reserves and spreading state of the art technologies and work methods. Soviet writers shy away from the direct comparison between sorevnovanie and capitalist competition

(which

they

term

konkur~ts~~a).3~ They

takes place in a spirit of mutual help, is voluntarily driven

by moral

as well as materialistic

argue

and consciously

considerations.35

that

sor#~o~an~e

entered into, and is

In all these respects

it is

thought to differ from capitalist competition. The leading Soviet authority, Smol’kov, traces back the principles underlying sorevnovanie to the notion of mutual aid developed by Utopian thinkers such as Fournier. 36 In contrast, bourgeois theories of competition involve individuals acting as free agents, divorced from any social links with their competitors (as described-with very different conclusions drawn-in the writings of Durkheim and Spencer.)37 There are some unresolved theoretical

disputes between Soviet scholars on the subject

of sorevnovanie.38 Should competition be seen as a permanent and necessary feature of the division of labor, showing up in a different guise in all modes of production? Or should one completely divorce sorevnovan~e from other forms of competition, seeing it as a unique

product

“superstructure”

of Soviet

socialism. 2 Does sorevnovanie reside

of the Soviet social formation?

Proponents

in the “base”

or the

of the former view tend to

treat it simply as an economic device, while those favoring the superstructure

interpreta-

tion are more likely to wax lyrical as to the political and moral virtues of the system. These debates are important because they alert us to the fact that the political functions of sor~n~~an~e may in practice outweigh its economic role. This feeds into the broader political debate between reformist inclined scholars who want to see a greater role for money-commodity relations in the Soviet economy, and conservatives who stand fast behind the idea of “politics in command.“3g The latter

34. Smof’kov, op. cit., p. 17. Unfortunately for Soviet Marx&, neither Marx nor Engels made use ofthe distinction between “competition” and “emulation”-Engels only used the latter term once, Marx not at all. 35. N. V. Radostovets, Problmy otsenki i pouyshmiia napriarhennosti sotsialirticheskikh obiazatel ‘stu i vstrechnykh planov (Alma Ata: Akademiya Nauk KazSSSR, 1981, dissertation ovtorejrat), p. 17. 36. Smol’kov, op. cit., note 32, pp. 6-10. 37. Smol’kov, ibid., pp. 21 ff. For a discussion of Proudhon’s vision of non-capitalist competition, see E. T. Comisso, Workers’ ControE Uruier Plan ad Market (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19791. 38. For a statement of the controversy, see V. K. Fe&in, Swcunovanic: Politckonon;icheskicarpcktyiMoscow: Politizdat, 1978), pp. 19-25; and for a literature review see M. G. Valitov, Sotsiaiistiche&oe sorevnovanie u s&me prrA.modrlumnykh otnoshenii (Moscow: Akademiia Obshchestvennykh Nauk, 1973, dissertation avtoreferat). Smol’kov, op. cit., note 32, the most respected theorist, falls into the “superstructure” school. 39. I. I. Konnik, “Leninskie idei o khoziaistvennogo mekhanizma i ix razvitie na sovremennom etape,” V~p~osy is&ii KPSS, no. 4 (April 1981), p. 56.

32

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

group are keen to defend sorevnovanie as “an important feature of the socialist mode of production, no less universal than the principle of planning” (planomeTnost’).40

Socialist Competition in Practice Sorevnovaniedates back to the first free Saturday worked at the Moscow tram repair depot back in 1919: the first subbotnik. Since then its importance has waxed and waned, peaking in 1929,1935,1942 as the listless Soviet economy

and 1959. 41 Brezhnev put renewed emphasis on sorevnovanie failed to respond to the planning and incentives reforms

advanced

by Kosygin in 1965 and 1973 .42 Since 1973, competitions have once more been run on a national scale;43 and the movement was deemed sufficiently important to merit mention in the new 1977 Constitution (Article 15). A new monthly journal entitled Socialist competition was launched in 1976,44 and the movement peaked in 1978/79, with numerous articles in the party press,45 and a speech by Brezhnev to an allunion conference on sorevnovanie in Leningrad.46 Sorevnovanietakes a variety of forms. All should conform to the principles of publicity, comparability (sravnimost ‘) and repeatability laid down by Lenin.47 Publicity refers to the idea that information about what is going on should be clearly communicated to all involved: sorevnovanie is not merely an administrative device, but is a tool for mobilization. Comparability means that there must be some equity between the various competitors; and “repeatability” means that the losers must be given a chance to catch up7 since there should not really be any losers, only an all-round striving for improvement. The basic idea is that the competition should provide a stimulus to greater productivity over and above existing plan targets. Despite the heavy political overtones of the movement, it is viewed as proper and necessary to accompany the moral praise with monetary bonuses, gifts of household goods, priority allocation of housing, and grants of free holidays (120,000 per year).48 Starting at the level of the individual

worker,

employees

will be encouraged

to set

targets for themselves, to be accomplished by a set future date. The tasks can be chosen from virtually anything of economic relevance, from overfulfillment of output targets to an improvement in job skills. Some 113 million employees are reported to have taken on such

“socialist

written

obligations”

(sotsialisticheskie obiazetel’stva) in 1983;4g in many

up into more elaborate

“personal

plans”

(lichnye plany).50 Workers

cases

can also

40. Kapustin, op. cit., note 28, p. 24. 41. For a history of the movement, see L. S. Rogachevskaya (ed.), Roblmty sotsialisticheskogo soreunounniiat Teoriia i ofiyt(Moscow: Nauka, 1984), pp. 47-61; and Zstoriia sofsialisticheskogo soreunovaniia SSSR (Moscow: Profizdat, 1980). 42. G. W. Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev a~ Leaders (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982), p. 208. 43. Kapustin, op. cit., note 28, p. 191. 44. Ekon. gar., no. 16 (April 1976), p. 8. 45. For example, leading articles in Partiinaiazhim ‘, no. 3 (February 1978), pp. 3-l 1; no. 6 (March 1978). pp. 3-7. According to the annual index, the number of articles on the sorewmmnie theme in Ekon. gu. rose from 48 in 1974 and 1975 to 84 in 1978, and back to 54 in 1984. 46. Partiinaia zhizn’, no. 9 (May 1979), pp. 14-24. 47. M. I. Voeikov (ed.), Soreunovanie u sirtcmeproizuo&vmnykh otnoshenii i ekonomichcskikh zakonou sotsializma (Moscow: Akademiya Nauk, Institut Ekonomiki, 1978), p. 78. 48. Kapustin, op. cit., note 28, p. 202; Ekon. gaz., no. 4 Uanuary 1977), p. 7. 49. Ekon. gaz., no. 41 (October 1984), p. 12. 50. S. I. Shkurko, Stimulirounnie kachestua i effektivnostiproitvodrtva (Moscow: Mysl’, 1977), chapter 5.

The Role of the Communist Party on the Soviet Shopjoor strive for certain grades of professional

recognition,

33

such as “master-golden-hands”

or

“shock worker.“51 On a mass scale, one of the most visible forms continues to be all-union subbotniki, which involved 140 million people in 1975 and 154 million in 1985.52 They are held on days of symbolic political importance-there

is one every year on Lenin’s birthday,

and

also special ones recognizing the 40th anniversary of the end of the war, the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR. 53 Participants put in an extra day at their place of work without pay, and the proceeds are contributed to state funds, or to some worthy cause, e.g. 75 per cent of the proceeds from the Lenin subbotnik in 1979 went to Vietnam in the wake of the Chinese invasion.54 Brigades, shops and enterprises can also take part in competitions as collective entities. These competitions may be organized by local party organs, by ministries, or be part of the annual all-union competitions. 55 The latter receive extensive coverage in the national press, with targets being set at the start of the year by the CC CPSU and other national bodies, and results announced and prizes awarded after the year’s end.5s Competitions

are usually organized

level, labor productivity.

around the principal plan targets-output,

Sorevnovanie can also be focused on a contemporary

quality bottleneck

-for example, a special all-union competition to promote consumer goods production in heavy industry plants in 1986. 57 Projects are often organized to expedite construction projects-for example, the Urengoi-Uzhgorod pipeline, or the drive to construct fertilizer facilities (the “workers’ relay” or rabochaia estafeta).58 Competitions organized between supplier and purchaser enterprises can be used to strengthen horizontal links between them-the cotton producers of Tashkent and the textile mills of Ivanovo have been running such a contest since 1929.5g One of the most important organizational forms of sorevnovanie is “counter planning” (vstrechnoeplunirovanie), which emerged in the 1930s (but soon lapsed) and was revived in 1972 .60 It was designated ‘ ‘to be the most important form of sorevnovaniein the tenth five year plan” (1976-80). 61 Counter planning is a device for locking sorevnovanie into the regular planning process, the intention being to overcome the supply and transport shortages that may result if sorevnovanie runs ahead of planned operations. Since 1978, the planners have attempted to build counter plans into the regular annual p1ans.Q Under counter planning, collectives submit bids for production in excess of the original plan, for which they will receive additional bonuses-although not any additional resources.

The theory is that counter

planning

provides a channel

for initiative

from

51. Listed in Lobanova, op. cit., p. 174. 52. Ekon. gar., no. 41 (October 1984), p. 12; no. 21 (May 1985), p. 3. 53. Ekon. gu., no. 21 (May 1985), p. 3; no. 3 Uanuary 1983), p. 3. 54. Ekon. pz., no. 17 (April 1979), p. 3. 55. On party-run competitions between plants, see Ekon. gaz., no. 22 (May 1976), p. 5; for an account ofa competition run by the textile ministry, see Ekon. gar., no. 20 (May 1976), p. 3. 56. For example, the 1984 results were reviewed by the CC CPSU in Ekon. !a,~., no. 7 (February 1985), p. 2. For 1984 the Politburo had set a target of a one per cent overfulfillment of planned output and a 0.5 per cent cut in planned costs. Ekon. gar., no. 4 (January 1984), p. 9. 57. Ekm. gaz., no. 27 (July 1986), p. 2. 58. Ekon. gar., no. 13 (March 1982), p. 9; no. 8 (February 1978), p. 4. 59. Ekon. gaz., no. 8 (February 1981), p. 15; also Ekon. gaz., no. 24 (June 1985), p. 5, for general application. 60. N. V. Radostovets, Vslrechnoeplanirouanic~ tmriia i praktika (Moscow: Ekonomika, 1984). 61. A secretary of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, in Ekon. gaz., no. 8 (February 1977), p. 8. 62. Ekon. pz., no. 10 (March 1978), p. 16.

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

34 below,

and if incentives

are high enough

managers

may be persuaded

to use their

hidden reserves in launching counter plans, rather than hoarding against future uncertainties. We shall assess how successful this and other forms of ~or~v~ou~n~~ have been in the following section.

Evaluation of Socialist Competition In practice, the operation of soreu~ovanie is far less economically effective than Soviet ideologues would have us believe, and it in no way lives up to the hopes placed in it as a political substitute for the capitalist market. Despite this, we will argue in the following section that its economic weaknesses do not cause it to lose its value as a politicalorganizational vehicle for the conduct of party affairs. There is ample evidence to suggest that workers and managers regard sorevnovanie with scorn and indifference, as a superfluous addition to their main duties under the annual plan. At factory level, managers are aware that it is performance on primary plan targets which determines the size of their “fund of material incentives,” the principal source of monetary bonuses for themselves and their workers. Victory in sorevnovanie is likely to bring a trickle of new monies to the factory social consumption fund, at best. Within the plant, sorevnova~i~schemes tend to get lost among the 30-plus varieties of bonus schemes in use in Soviet factories under the regular planning procedures.(j3 Thus, overall,

the

monetary

sums

distributed

to

competition

participants

amount

to

something like three to ten per cent of total bonuses, with the all-union average lying at the bottom of that range.6* As total bonuses amount to around 15 per cent of total pay, the implication is that sorevnovanie will provide the average worker with something like six to 20 additional rubles per year (i.e. roughly one day’s pay, or the price of a bottle or two of vodka). A standard textbook on work organization in that its methodological

confirms these paltry figures,

schema for sorevnovanie rates as “excellent”

those plants which

disburse two per cent or more of total wages fund as part of the competitions.65 This all implies that workers will be relatively indifferent to competitions. Surveys conducted by Academy of Sciences sociologists in Perm’ and Ivanovo showed that one third of all workers were not aware of having taken part in competitions until the results were announced!@ A study of textile workers in Kazakhstan found that 2 1 per cent had no idea whatsoever and a further 39 per cent only a vague idea of their “socialist obligations.“67 Confusion as to bonus schemes extends beyond sorevnovanie. There are so many schemes rewarding high quality work and doubling up professions that most workers are only aware of the end of year bonuses which depend on the plant’s overall production volume .68 63. L. E. Kunel’skii, Povyshenie stimuliruiurhchei roli zarabotnoi platy i optimimfsiia ec struktury (Moscow: Ekonomika, 1975), p. 71. 64. Ekm. gar., no. 8 (February 1979), p. 15; Kapustin, op. cit., note 28, p. 80; and Radostovets, Bob&my, op. cit., note 35, p. 20. 65. Lobanova, op. cit., note 33, p. 172. 66. A. A. Korobeinikov, “ideologicheskii kompleks,” ~~5jolo~c~e~~je issledooaniia, no. 3 (March 1984), p. 25. 67. 68. award oennogo

Radostovets, Problmy, op. cit., note 35, p. 21. Eighty five per cent of one sample of Ukrainian textile workers were unable to specify the criteria for of bonuses-R. F. Konopleva, Sotsialisticheskoe sorevnovanie i ego roli o povyshenii a effektivnosti obshchestproizvostva (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola pri VTsSPS, 1980).

35

The Role of the Communist Party on the Soviet Shopjoor If the incentives

for competition

are weak for the individual

worker,

they are even

more opaque for the manager or economist. “In most sectors there are no instructions nor regulations governing the procedures for spreading leading experience.“6g The bonuses awarded under competitions are not planned in any systematic fashion, and the various sorevnovanie target indicators are just heaped on top of the existing 30-plus plan target indicators which the typical factory manager has to juggle. The result is confusion. Commentators

suggest that results will frequently

be calculated

“by eye,”

or “with a

pair of scissors” (i.e. arbitrarily), or they will “lie in a drawer” until the time comes around to announce what purport to be the results. 7o In theory, trade union officials are supposed to be responsible for running the competitions, gathering the data and issuing the rewards. In practice, there is so much overlap with regular plan activities that the job usually chore, shunned by compiled by a single To complete the

is done by line managers. It tends to be regarded as a low-grade managers, specialists and foremen, and ends up being routinely engineer or clerks in the plant’s office of labor and wages (OTZ.)71 circle, sosevnovanie is also seen as an unnecessary complication by

many ministry-level officials: witness the fact that the initial decree on building counter planning into the annual plans issued in 1977 got such a lukewarm response from ministry

officials that another

along.72 The planner’s

decree had to be issued a year later to try to prod them

job is difficult enough with additional

the energy crisis of 1981/82 officials virtually disregarded the counter plans fell from 37 per cent in 1977 revitalize counter planning, with,

worries:

for example,

in

concentrated on trying to salvage the main plans and plans. 73 The number of plants submitting counter to 6.6 per cent in 1981 .74 (There were later moves to for example, a 50 per cent increase in the bonuses

allotted for counter plans for 1985.)75 The uneasy relationship between sorevnovanie and the regular

planning

procedures

extends beyond the poor record of counter planning. The more tinkering there is with the overall economic mechanism-reorganizations here, experiments there-the more confusing the sorevnovanie situation becomes. For example, in the aftermath of the grouping of enterprises into industrial associations in the early 197Os, sorevnovanie was largely overlooked, and only half of the funds allocated to them to be used in competitions

were actually used.76

The confusion and uncertainty regarding sorevnovanie is also visible if we look at the moral as opposed to material rewards issued. A survey of Ukrainian textile workers concluded that 30 per cent of those designated “shock workers” had done nothing to earn the title.77 Another

commentator

suggests that the title “shock

worker”

out to all and sundry because in order for a plant to earn the appellation

is doled

“collective

of

69. Ekon. gaz., no. 27 CJuly 1976), p. 7. See also on this theme: Fedinin, op. cit., note 37, p. 76; Paputin, op. cit., note. 27, p. 53. 70. Fedinin, op. cit., note 37, p. 13; Kapustin, op. cit., note 28, p. 120; Ekon. gaz., no. 52 (December 1985), p. 10. 71. Radostovets, Rob&y, op. cit., note 35, p. 19. There were some fairly sharp exchanges on this problem at a round table in Tula--P&in& zhim’, no. 21 (November 1976), pp. 45-52. 72. Ekon. pz., no. 10 (March 1978), p. 11; no. 7 (February 1977), p. 7. 73. Ekon. ~az., no. 47 (November 1983), p. 19. 74. Pravda, 1211182, p. 2. 75. Ekon. gaz., no. 44 (October 1984), p. 14. 76. N. A. Safronov, Nouyefomy upraulmiiaproiruo~tvom iproblcmy stimulirouaniia truda (Moscow: NII Truda Goskomtruda, 1977), p. 27. 77. Konopleva, op. cit., note 68, p. 14.

36

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

communist

labor”

at least two-thirds

of its workers must be shock workers.78 Another

study found that 60 per cent of discipline

offenders

were shock workers-although

most of them had not met a single one of the prerequisites

for the honor.79

One economics text went beyond these pragmatic failings, and raised some guarded criticisms of the logic behind these “moral” campaigns.80 They argued that the moral emphasis was prominent in the 1930s simply because the economy was in no position to offer monetary incentives; that the subbatnikz’of the civil war period “did not have a permanent

and mass character”

because

only the most politically

conscious

workers

were involved; and that the shock workers of the pre-Stakhanov period tended to ignore technical factors and relied simply on an intensification of work. Although the argument is couched in historical terms, it does not require too much imagination to perceive its implications for the present day. All of these failings are amply documented in the Soviet press. Party leaders often lead the critical attack: for example, Brezhnev once pointed out that sorev~Qva~~e is often not used for its principal economic purpose-to help the lagging plants catch up with the leaders. “There is a lot of noise when duties are accepted, but silence when the results are announced, especially when they are not very good. This is why it happens that we know the victors, What running

but not the losers. “m

particularly

attracts

paper competitions

the wrath of party leaders with much trumpeting

is the danger

of formalism:

of the illusory results for the sake of

higher officials who do not know the true situation on the ground.82 Gorbachev

himself

raised this issue in a speech commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Stakhanovite movement.83 Criticisms of formalism have become so routine that the Politburo felt obliged

to take a stand criticizing

formalism

in the criticism

officials!8* This situation leaves Soviet scholars in some disarray.

of formalism

E. I. Kapustin

by party

goes so far as to

argue that the confusion over the criteria underlying samnovanie is such that “it has now become a major bottleneck in the improvement of the overall economic mechanism. “85 Some writers make a virtue out of necessity, arguing that it is a good thing that there are so many indicators, since this enables a multiplicity of objectives to be realized.@j Others suggest that there are too many competitions paralleling plan tasks and advocate the organization of more inter-regional competitions, although these are more difficult to run than competitions between plants in the same ministerial branch.87 Thus it can be seen that socialist competition in the USSR is a rather muddled movement which does not seem to be living up to the economic tasks placed before it. Notwithstanding these difficulties, it remains a central plank in the CPSU’s economic 78. Pravda, 619183, p. 2. 79. V. V. Vasil’ev, Sotsial ‘no-ekonomicheskie problmy ukrcpleniia sotsialisticheskoi distsipliny truda (Moscow: Akademiia Obshchestvennykh Nauk, 1980, dissertation autorefemt), p. 16. 80. Ekonomika truda (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1976), pp. 172-74. 81. L. I. Brezhnev, Leninskim kursom: Rechi i stnti (MOSCOW: Politizdat, 1974), vol. 4, p. 92. 82. There are numerous examples: Ekon. ,m.z, no. 20 (May 1976). p. 9; no. 4 (January 1979), p. 5; no. 18 (April 1981), p. 14; no. 26 Uune-1984), p. 9; no. 12 (March 1985), p. 5. An ironic case is the uncovering of “dead souls” written into the competition at the “Stakhanov” mine in Karaganda-Partiinaiazhi%~‘, no. 15 (August 198i), p. 37. 83. Ekon. {a.~., no. 39 (September 1985), p. 4. 84. Ekon. gar., no. 51 (December 1985), p. 3. 85. Kapustin, op. cit., note 28, p. 30. 86. S. I. Shkurko, Sorevnouanie u novykh uslslouiiakhkhoziaistuouaniia (Moscow: Ekonomika, 1981), p. 40. 87. Point made in review by L. K. Semenov, 0bshchestumnye nauki SSSR, no. 4 (April 1984), p. 72.

The Role of the Communist Par& on the Soviet Shopfoor strategy.

In order to understand

its endurance

37

we must turn from the economic

side to

the political forces brought into play in the sorevnovanie movement.

Socialist Competition and the Communist Party Our basic argument

in this section is that socialist competition

channel-perhaps the most important supervision of industry.

single channel-for

provides an important

the public display of party

This display is partly for the benefit of the Soviet public itself. Sorevnovanie provides the most frequent opportunity for the publication of stories showing that thanks to political zeal over and above their routine plan duties work collectives are increasing product and improving

the lot of the Soviet consumer.

the national

Massive publicity surrounds the

subbotniki-for example, articles about a forthcoming city-wide subbotnik began to appear in Moscow newspapers no less than three months before the event.ss Sorevnovanie is often directly tied to political events which the CPSU wishes to publicize: for example, a subbotnik to welcome the opening of the 26th Party Congress;8g or a pledge by Electrostal (Leningrad) to put in 15 above-plan output weeks in 1972 in recognition of the 15 republics, to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the founding of the USSR.sc’ This publicity may be purely political and ideological in character, some pragmatic,

economically

relevant elements.

For example,

or it may also have

it may be used to draw

attention to a shift in the political priorities of the center as regards economic policy, or it may be used to alert the public to a particular problem or crisis. There is nevertheless a distinct tension between the political and economic the economic

elements,

for as previously

role of sorevnovanie does not live up to the expectations

shown

placed in it.

The second political function of sorevnovanie pertains not to the public at large, but to the party itself. It provides a medium for intra-party communications and debate. Sorevnovanie provides opportunities for the centre to check up on the activism of local organs, and it gives local officials a chance to display their earnestness. Economic supervision is an important part of the CPSU’s raison d’itre: what else is there for the party to do, given the ban on debates on political philosophy, or on political maneuvrings to win a place in a competitive election for your favored candidate (either in public or party elections)? An organization of 19 million members and four million elected officials needs something to do, to prevent (or limit) organizational entropy, to provide some means of judging who should be promoted. One solution would be to let them take over the running of the economy directly-a tendency which exerts a powerful pull over party officials, but one which is officially castigated as the sin ofpodmena (displacement) of state officials.g1 Not only would extensive podmena lead to a deterioration in economic performance, as the 1957/62 period suggests, with its tale of a sharp rise in regional party influence after the sovnarkhoz reform, and resulting economic chaos, it would also lead to a deterioration

in the party’s

integrity

as a separate,

political

institution.

Regionalist tendencies would be likely to increase dramatically. Sorevnovanie provides a way for the party to intervene in economic life, or perhaps merely to appear to intervene. The central party authorities can use sorevnovanie to keep

88. 89. 90. 91.

The day in question was 18/12/82, and an article appeared in Moskmskaiapravda, g/10/82, p. 1. Ekon. gnr., no. 31 uuly 1980), p. 3. Paputin, op. cit., note 27, p. 30. For examples of the struggle against podmma, see Cherniak, op. cit., note 11, pp. 15, 31, 184.

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM

38

local off%Gls on their toes, issuing commendations (odobreniia) to the deserving and lambasting the unworthy for formalism. Poor sorevnovanie work is regularly subject to critical scrutiny in the election/reporting conferences of PPOs and other local organs.g2 From the fishing fleet of Kamchatka to the steel mills of Donetsk, sorevnovanie provides material

for self-publicizing

articles by party officials.g3 Out of the 644 major articles

authored by party officials in Ekonomicheskaya gazeta during 1977186, 54 had sorevnovanie as their major theme, while many others also mentioned it. Of 98 regional conferences organized during that period, 10 were devoted to sorevnovanie. Regional political leaders can use sorevnovanie as a way of attracting

attention

to their

region and themselves. For example, a competition was launched at Uralkhimmash (a chemical engineering plant in Sverdlovsk) at a meeting attended by the local obkom first secretary B. El’tsyn and officials from the CC CPSU. g4 The most widely publicized selfaggrandlsement was the Rostov initiative “working without laggers,” which took off in 1978.g5 The general idea was for regional party officials to coordinate the despatch of specialists to lagging enterprises to ensure that no one missed any major plan targets. The published accounts are completely involving The

unconvincing

from the economic

point of view,

some thinly disguised statistical juggling.

political

dimension

to sorevnovanie directly

contributes

to the

widespread

formalism, in that party leaders will go for the easily graspable targets (one million tons of coal a year!) rather than more substantial but complex economic problems.g6 Publicity also goes to the original and innovative, whether real or apparent. Hence the proliferation of new local initiatives, with few discernible practical differences from others operating elsewhere. g7 Officials may cheat in order to produce spectacular “victors. ” As noted in Partiinaia zhizn ‘, “It still happens that in the race for a record managers arrange special conditions for an individual or brigade. “g8 The Brigade Form of Work Organization Sceptics

may argue that, despite its prominence

in party life, socialist competition

is

merely an anachronism left over from the time past when the political pressure on the shopfloor was more intense. This is not a very convincing counter argument. Moreover, if we turn our attention to other campaigns designed to boost industrial productivity, we find that the competing logics of the party and the economy are still visible. Let us take the brigade movement

as our example. gg This is a useful counterpoint

to

no. 3 (February 92. Ekm. gaz., no. 47 (November 1985), p. 3; no. 5 (January 1979), p. 3; Partiinaiadizn’, 1979), p. 28; for examples. 93. Ekon. enr.. no. 16 (April 1982). p. 5; no. 41 (October 1980),, -p. 5. 94. Ekon. &z.; no. 38 (Sdptember’1984), p. 10. . 95. Historv summarized in L. A. Bondarenko, “Rabotat’ bez otstaiushchikh,” Vopr~s~islorii KPSS, no. 5 (May 1979). The political capital gained from the initiative did not save the author-of [his piece-the first secretary of Rostov obkom-from dismissal (Pmvda, 26/7/84, p. 2) for what was later revealed to be corrupt practices-P&in& rhizn’, no. 4 (February 1986), pp. 54-57. 96. A coal mine in Rostov-Partiimzia rhizn’, no. 10 (May 1980), p. 56. Gorbachev himself condemned leaders who speak in “tons’‘-Ekon. guz., no. 26 (June 1986), p. 8. 97. List of various slogans used in Belorussia can be found in Pa&in& rhim’, no. 8 (April 1978), p. 28. initiatives (i.e. from another region) as well as B. N. El’tsyn proudly boasts of following “their” “ours’‘--which implies that some leaders do not-Ekon. gnr., no. 1 Uanuary 1977), p. 5. 98. Patiiimia zhim’, no. 9 (May 1981), p. 32. 99. For surveys, see A. V. Akhumov and S. A. Kharchenko, Shagi brigadnogo pdriada (Leningrad: Mashinostroenie, 1984); V. A. Mironov, Effeklivnost’ brigudmgopodriada (Simferpool: Izd. Tabriia, 1981); D. Slider, “The brigade system in the USSR,” So~iel &u&s, vol. 39, no. 3 uuly 1987).

The Rob of the Communist Par9 on the Soviet Shopfloor sorevnovanie as, originally by ideology;

at least, it seemed to be motivated

and because

it is a recent phenomenon.

39

more by pragmatism

(While

brigades

than

of one sort or

another have been a feature of Soviet industry for decades, a new form began to emerge in the late 1960s.) Pay and task allocation have traditionally been on an individual basis in Soviet industry, and have been governed by an elaborate and fairly rigid system of job definition and skill classification. These traditions inhibited flexibility and cooperation on the shopfloor, and the late 1960s saw a variety of local initiatives promoting teamwork and group incentives. The new brigades were varied in size and type, ranging from construction (the Zlobin method, introduced in 1970) to specialized engineering works (such as the Kaluga turbine factory, which went over to a radical brigade system in 1967). loo The average brigade has 11 workers, in some cases rising beyond 50. lo1 When we referred to these initiatives as more pragmatic than ideological, we meant that in at least some of these cases the people pushing the innovation through were managers or ministry officials rather than party activists. In these cases political rhetoric was muted or absent in the initial published accounts.i02 (Of course, there were also cases where politics was involved from the outset, with plants promoting their initiative so as to attract attention The

brigade

and praise from the media and political leaders.)lo3

experiments

of the late 1960s had mixed

success,

but stimulated

a

vigorous debate among management scientists and economists as to the pros and cons of the various types of brigade being introduced. The debates ranged over a number of substantive and fairly technical issues, reflecting the realities of shopfloor life. For example, consider the following three areas of debate. First, on the work study front conservatives argued that individual never be beaten given

as the most effective

the requisite

technical

piecework

can

stimulant to maximum productive efficiency, lo4 In certain technical circumstances (for

conditions.

example, batch production), there may be a case for group incentives. The major advantage of a brigade truly working as a team is that you may cut down on individuals’ idle time-a major problem, given the erratic nature of supply deliveries in the typical Soviet plant. On the other hand, workers in a brigade will lose time moving between work stations and may be doing jobs which a less-skilled worker could be doing. Machinery may be used less efficiently in a brigade, since it is labor intensity and not capital utilization which is being rewarded. (The brigade will want more work stations even if they are periodically idle.) This is an important disadvantage, as capital productivity growth in the USSR has been even more sluggish than labor productivity growth. Second, from a managerial point of view the introduction of brigades complicates the chain of command. On the positive side, one can expect to see increased worker involvement in decision making; usually

by appointment)

and the brigade leaders (chosen from the ranks of the workers, can

share

in supervisory

work.

However,

although

the

100. V. Ia. Vozniak, “Brigadnyi podriadv sistemeupravleniiastroitel’stvom, ” in Tmdovoi kollcktiu u sistm upruulmiiaproiruodrlvom (Moscow: Akademiia Obshchestvennykh Nauk, 1980). On the Kaluga case, see A. I. Levikov, Kaluhskii variant (Moscow: Politizdat, 1980); plus his articles in Litnafumaiagaze~a, 27/2/80, p. 11; 12/l l/80, p. 10. 101. Calculated from Narodnoc khoriaistvo SSSR 192242 (Moscow: Finansy i Statistika, 1982), p. 162. The Volzhskii car plant, a well-known brigade innovator, has brigades of 50-60-Patiiinaia zhim’, no. 7 (April 1978), p. 36. 102. For example, the Kaluga variant was adopted by the shipbuilding ministry and trade union without political fanfare-Ekon. gar., no. 45 (November 1980), p. 7. 103. For example, the Svetlana plant in Leningrad-Solsinlislicheskii trud,no. 6 (June 1976), pp. 45-55. 104. See Shkurko, Stimulirouanie, op. cit., note 50, p. 158 ff.

40

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

foreman may find less paperwork crossing his desk, he may find his authority being challenged by the brigadier, who is likely to enjoy a better relationship with the workers and at the same time be less accountable

to higher management.

lo5 The position of the

foreman, already precarious because of the conflicting demands he is subjected to from above and below, and the low compensation for his responsibilities, would seem to worsen

after the introduction

of the new brigades.

This has deepened

the foreman

recruitment crisis. Finally, on the sociological dimension, commentators note that the transition to the new system can be a trying process, leading to considerable social tensions on the shopfloor. Any change in work organization can disturb the psychological climate of the workforce, and the brigade system holds out the prospect of radical changes in working methods and income. In particular,

it has been suggested that high-performance

workers

fear a loss in pay if they are forced to eat “from the common pot” (edinnyi hotel) and “work for others” (obrubatyvat’ drugikh.)1o6 The conclusions we would draw from these debates is that a sensitive, differentiated approach would appear to be the wisest course of action for Soviet managers contemplating work organization reform. The new system should only be introduced where conditions However,

are favorable, the CPSU

and where careful preparatory has cut through these managerial

study has been undertaken. and economic ambiguities

and

has decided that the brigade system is a good thing. Central Committee decrees 1972-75 approved the formation of new brigades in construction, ports and coal mines; by the end of the decade targets were being set for the introduction

of brigades over a

three- to five-year period. lo7 The new brigades received unequivocal commendation from the Politburo and Central Committee in 1983, and the campaign reached a crescendo in that year as it dovetailed with the new Law on Work Collectives. lo8 (The latter was a purely political operation, called for by the enhanced political role accorded to “work collectives” in the 1977 Constitution.) Thus what began under the rubric of a “brave social experiment” became almost mandatory for large chunks of Soviet industry. log PPOs were recommended to set up special commissions to oversee the formation of brigades in their plants. Party organs from PPOs up to obkomy were criticized for lethargy in the introduction of brigades.“O By 1986, some 72 per cent of industrial workers were, on paper at least, enrolled in one of the new brigades. 111 In the course of this “chasing after numbers” there was little room left for managers

to carefully

assess the advantages

and disadvantages

of the

brigade form for each individual workplace. Soviet scholars themselves noted that, “practice shows that many ministries worry more about forming brigades than about improving

the effectiveness

of the way they operate. li2 Even a CC CPSU

decree noted

105. Ekm. gaz., no. 24 (June 1983), p. 8; no. 12 (March 1983), p. 6. 106. Levikov, op. cit., note 100, p. 19; Mironov, op. c&t., note 99, p. 13; Pravda, 28110182,p. 2 and 18/11/82, p. 2. 107. K. K. Kuznetsov, “Nekotorye voprosy partiinogo rukovodstva vnedreniem BFOT v promyshlennosti,” Vofmv isforii KPSS, no. 9 (September 1983), p. 30; and EKO, no. 11 (November 1980), p. 55. 108. Pwdo, 12/11/83, p. 1; 4/12/83, p. 1; 19/6/83, p. 1. 109. G. N. Cherkasov and A. Kogout, Sotsial’nye problemy upradeniia trudouymi kollektmmi (Moscow: Protizdat, 1978), p. 42. 110. Ekm. gu., no. 49 (December 1985), p. 3; Partiinaia zhim’, no. 15 (May 1981), p. 14; no. 9 (March 1980), p. 43. 111. Pwtiinaia zhim ‘, no. 4 (February 1986), p. 31. 112. Akhumov, op. cit., note 99, p. 55.

41

The Role of the Communist Party on the Soviet ShopJoor that “in a number character.

of sectors the formation

of brigades

has a formal,

campaigning

“*13

Why did the CPSU

seize on the brigade system in this fashion? Was it because the

leadership were thoroughly convinced of its impact on labour productivity? This was no doubt an element in their calculations, but in adopting the method as universal, the campaign took on a political logic of its own. We would suggest that party leaders at various levels were motivated by the desire to be seen to be doing something to improve economic

performance,

and

the brigade

system

happened

to come

innovation into which party organs could throw their energies. The the additional advantage of ideological reliability with its emphasis collective self-management (unlike the “link” brigade system in smacked too much of a return of the land to private cultivation acceptable). 1l4 A further aspect of the brigade implications for party monitoring

along

as an

brigade system had on cooperation and agriculture, which to be ideologically

system which attracted the party’s attention was its of workplace activity. The party was concerned to

control possible clashes of interest which may emerge between and inside brigades;

and

to counter the emergence of autonomous work units beyond the network of party supervision.115 According to one report, one third of all brigades are without any communist member. l l6 Penetration of, for example,

by party members is a particular problem in the shifting world brigades. 11’ Factories brigades may unite workers on

construction

different shifts, making it even less likely that there will be a party member group on each shift. 118 In response to these potential

problems,

in the work

the party has urged the formation of active l lg In brigades without a party cell

party groups in brigades with sufficient communists.

(i.e. with less than three members), a network ofpartorganizdory (party organizers) has been established; and there has been a growing role for the more numerous Young Communist League members in supervising brigades without party members. 120 What is it exactly that the CPSU fears from having brigades without political supervision? greater

The more autonomy that is granted to these workplace organizations, the the danger that they will start to function in their own self-interest, in ways which the party might not approve. lzl Sociologists have noted that brigades may be taken over by informal leaders, and that this informal group leader is “by no means always” the designated foreman or brigadier. l** These worries over party penetration have probably been a factor encouraging party officials to press for the formation of larger brigades. A brigade with 50 members is almost certain to have an active party cell, but it is unlikely to enjoy the advantages of close mutual

trust and cooperation

with those economists

Ekon. gaz., no. 50 (December 1983), p. 5. 114. A. Yanov, The Drama ofthe So&-t 1960s: a Lost Reform (Berkeley:

who promoted

the system

113.

Institute of International Studies, 1984). 115. Ekm. gaz., no. 10 (March 1984), p. 14. 116. Povyshmie rolipmuichnykh partiinykh organizatsii (Moscow: Politizdat, 1983), p. 52. Kuznetsov, op. cit., note 107, gives a figure of 40 per cent for industry in the Perm’ region (p. 34). 117. Partiinaia zhizn ‘, no. 15 (August 1980), p. 50. 118. N. Belikov, “Partiinye gruppy v khozraschetnykh brigadakh,” Partiiwiazhim’, no. 6 (March 1982), p. 47. 119. Ekon. gaz., no. 32 (August 1984), p. 5; Padinaia zhirn’, no. 18 (September 1978), p. 35. 120. Spmvochnikparigmporga (Moscow: Politizdat, 1982), p. 157. 121. Akhumov, op. cit., note 99, p. 20. 122. Cherkasov, op. cit., note 109, pp. 233, 143.

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

42 envisaged. Western

The formation industrial

of tightly knit informal

sociologists

groups has long been recognized

as a possible path to increased

shopfloor

Soviet scholars, however, have shied away from this line of argument, of fears that social relations in these groups-towards

outsiders,

by

efficiency.lz3

probably because

towards management,

and towards party officials-may develop in directions not officially condoned. Thus political worries may have prevented the brigade reform from realizing its full economic potential.

Conclusion This article has argued that the extensive activity by party officials and members on the Soviet shopfloor is not motivated purely and simply by a desire to promote economic efficiency, but that it has a distinct organizational and political logic of its own which frequently clashes with what managers and workers perceive to be economically rational. We briefly reviewed the party’s ideological mobilization work in the factories, but remain agnostic as to the extent to which this activity has a positive economic payoff. There is a broader and more convincing range of material available on the subject matter of our two case studies: socialist competition and the brigade system. Socialist competition is the major organizational vehicle for party intervention in industrial life. In theory it has the potential to replicate the horizontal, effciencyproducing

tendencies

of free market

competition.

In practice,

however,

its economic

impact is questionable: what comes across most clearly is the utility of socialist competition for the CPSU. It provides a conduit for publicity about the party’s economic policy, and it represents a range of activities which have now become an integral part of the CPSU’s life as a political organization. Without socialist competition, demonstrate

we suggest, the CPSU would have to come up with something else to its contribution to Soviet economic progress; and to keep its own members

and officials active, on their toes and responsive to central authorities. Even with the brigade system, which started as a grass-roots innovation to improve labor productivity, one can trace the politicization of the movement. It became a tool for higher party bodies to stimulate activism at lower levels, and a tool for local officials to display their loyalty and assiduousness. How do these findings relate to our understanding of the dynamics of the Soviet political system? First, it should be made clear that the clash between politics and economics in the Soviet system has been analysed in terms of roles or structures, rather than in terms of personnel. It is tempting to assume that one can identify two discrete sets of individuals-the managers representing the economic tendency, and party officials representing the political tendency. One could then proceed to analyse these relationships in terms of a straightforward political struggle between the “partocracy” and an incipient “technocracy.” Unfortunately, as J. Azrael argued two decades ago, the battle lines are not drawn so neatly in practice.lz4 Many of the managers will have fully internalized the political values of the party; some of them will themselves cross over into the party apparatus, or will have served in a party position in some prior period. Moreover, many of them will 123. Particularly in the 1950s “human relations” school-for example, L. R. Sayles, The Behaviour of York: Wiley, 1958). 124. J. R. Azrael, Manage&l Power andSoviet Polifics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966).

Indu.strial Work Gmu~s (New

43

The Role of the Communist Patiy on the Soviet Shop$oor be keen to play political games with their enterprise, more resources

for themselves.

since this is a way of obtaining

Thus we are not seeking to portray the managers

as the

personification of economic rationality within the command economy. (Part of the problem with such an economy is precisely that nobody personifies economic rationality.) The reverse also applies: some party officials may come to identify closely with the economic fate of their enterprise. Conflicts between PPO secretaries and plant directors are indeed rare. Thus what we are analysing is not a struggle between two groups, but a conflict in roles which both managers and party officials will experience to a greater or lesser extent. Second, this analysis does not have any apocalyptic implications: it does not mean that the Soviet economy is incapable of functioning as an economy, or is on the verge of collapse. On the contrary,

there would appear to be a fairly stable symbiosis between the

political machinations required to satisfy the higher levels of the party apparatus and the routine functioning of the economy. However, the relative separation of the party’s economic

interventions

producing

things does not augur well for the type of sweeping reform

from

the way

managers

and

workers

actually

go about

reputed to be

considered necessary by Gorbachev. Party leaders may come to believe that the party has a more effective purchase on economic reality than is in fact the case. Thus there must be a question

mark over the par;y’s

changes in economic

behavior.

ability to actually

deliver any substantial