Communist alignment in Sino-Soviet dispute

Communist alignment in Sino-Soviet dispute

CHARfi Communist Alignment In view of the acceleration recently of polycentrist trends in the World Communist movement-among them, the strong possibi...

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CHARfi

Communist Alignment In view of the acceleration recently of polycentrist trends in the World Communist movement-among them, the strong possibility that the Chinese Communist leaders are preparing to announce the foundation of a Fourth Communist International, in an all-out effort to forestall unification of the World Communist movement under the “monolithic” leadership of the CPSU-we present in this issue of Communist Again, in place of the regular biographic feature, the following break-down of the position and allegiance either to Peking or Moscow, or to neither, of communist parties and groups throughout the world. This table is based on the latest available information as we go to press. Much is still unknown of the behind-the-scenes maneuverings among contending communist leaders. But there are straws in the wind that have aroused intense speculation, among them the joint and most uncommunicative communique issued in Warsaw at the end of talks July 2 between Yugoslavia’s Marshal Tito and the Polish Communist chieftain Wladyslaw Gomulka. The latter, deviating from his policy of keeping the world communist movement loosely organized, the better to preserve the relative independence of his own party and country from domination by Moscow, in his report to the Fourth Congress of the Polish United Workers’ (Communist) Party on June 18, seemed to be yielding to Khrushchev’s call for a world conference. That could well excommunicate the Chinese Communist and other “heretical” parties and reimpose Moscow’s domination, by suggesting the possibility of “unity” under the aegis of Moscow even without the Chinese Communist Party. On July 22 Khrushchev is expected with a large Soviet delegation in Warsaw to celebrate the 20th anniversary of Poland’s liberation from Nazi occupation. Such occasions had previously been used for important conferences by the world’s Communist leaders. But the occasion will also coincide with the 20th anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising

A.

Communist

thWltty

Parties

in Sino-Soviet

Dispute

(August I-October 2, 1gM) against their German conquerors and with the tacit Nazi-Soviet collaboration in exterminating the Polish national armed forces, the Armia Krajowa. The whole Polish nation, including right-wing Roman Catholics, who had acknowledged Gomulka’s “realism” in resisting a Moscow “big-brother” set-up, is deeply concerned about Gomulka’s apparent support for Khrushchev’s determination to force a showdown with Mao. There is similar concern in other East European countries. It will also be interesting to note whether the Chinese Communists will repudiate organizationally the support they have had from Trotskyist elements. In 1933, after the advent of Hitler to power in Germany, the followers of Leon Trotsky throughout the world responded to his call for the formation of a Fourth International, because the Third, pursuing a policy based on Stalin’s doctrine of social-fascism, had presumably gone “bankrupt” in so far as it had failed to stop the rise of Hitler with a socialist revolution in Germany. Five years later, September 3, 1938, the Fourth Intemational was organized at Perigny, a village near Paris. Will the Chinese Communists, in organizing their own Fourth International, absorb the Trotsky&s, or ignore the existence of the Trotsky& Fourth, which is influential in such countries as Ceylon in Asia and several countries in Latin America? One of the key issues, moreover, is how these developments may affect Communist China’s strategic capabilities -especially as these are related to the Sino-Soviet military treaty of 1950. With this treaty operational, Peking has been able to conduct a militant and aggressive policy against its neighbors in Asia with a minimum risk of all-out retaliation. In the July-August issue of Communist Aflairs we expect to report on these developments. We shall also resume the publication of our regular biographic feature, with a biography of Wladyslaw Gomulka.-The Editors.

in Power

Pro-Soviet

C.P.s

Albania

Pro-Chinese

Albanian

C.P.

Spltnter C.P.s and Groups Outside the C.P.

Comments

Firm in its position.

Bulgaria

Bulgarian

Czechoslovakia

C.P. of Czechoslovakia

In April, 1964 agreed to international conference.

East Germany

Socialist Unity Party (SD)

Supports CPSU without reservation. Insists on early conference. Hermann Mater-n, fraternal delegate at IV Congress of Polish United Workers’ (Communist) Party in June 1964 strongly urged same.

Hungary

Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party

Poland

Polish United Workers’ Party

14

C.P.

C.P.s

Firm in its position.

After prolonged reluctance agreed to international conference on specific conditions. COMMUNIST AFFAIRS

Country

-

Pro-Swl*t

C.P.r

Pro-Chinese

Rumania

Rumanian Party

Mongolia

Mongolian Peoples’ Revolutionary Party

C.P.s

Splinter C.P.s and Groups Outside thm C.P.

Commonh

Exploits dispute for national economic aims in relations with U.S.S.R. and COMECON.

Workers’

Firm

in its position.

North Korea

Korean Workers’ Party

Firmly pro-Chinese but, in attacking CPSU policy, refrains from mentioning it by name.

North Vietnam

Vietnam Party

Apprehensive of Chinese takeover, maintains “correct” relations with CPSU and Soviet govexmment.

Workers’

Cuba

United Party of Socialist Revolution

From neutral position, because of enormous Soviet aid, moved toward endorsement of Soviet view, but its leadership includes supporters of China.

Yugoslavia

League of Communists of Yugoslavia

Firmly opposed to international conference because excommunication of China would restore monolithic control by Moscow and thus jeopardize own position. Very firmly opposed to the political position of the Chinese Communists. Veljko Vlahovic, Politburo member and leading ideologist of the League, at a symposium in Novi Sad (June I-S) on “Marx and the Contemporary World,” observed that “a new dilemma has emerged . . . a new split is taking place within the workers’ movement concerning the question of how man should be treated. . . The Chinese, and not only the Chinese, theories of extolling the state which have turned back on the individual, obscure the horizon of socialist construction. . . We must rehabilitate some old Marxist theeretical truths . . . indicate what are the problems of the individual in contemporary society.” Other speakers, moreover, boldly raised the problem of alienation in socialist society and the problem of “peaceful revolution,” criticising Khrushchgv as well as Stalin.

II

3

MAY-JUNE,

1964

15

spllntw COUllt~

B.

Communist

Austria

Prp-Sovi*t

Parties

:Pro-Chime

C.P.s

of Western

C.P.r and Groups Ouhldo the C.P.

Commonts

Europe

C.P. of Austria

Belgium

C.P. of Belgium

cYPI=s

AKEL-Progressive Party of the Working People (see: C.A., Vol. II, No. I, p. 13)

Denmark

C.P. of Denmark

Finland

Finnish

France

French C.P.

16

C.P.s

The Anti-Revisionist Communists of Austria (ARCA) firmly opposed to intemational conference; official publication: Die Rote Fahe (Red Fhz), mimeographed. Group of Revolutionary Communists of Austria maintains same position as ARCA but suspected of Trotskyist leanings; no official publication (as we go to press). Rival C.P. of Belgium, since Dec., 1963, unites bilingual Brussels Federation, founded June, 1953, Walloon C.P., French-speaking, founded Nov. 1963, and Flemish C.P.; official publication, the weekly Lu Voix du Peupb (circulation 35,000)) distributed in North-Eastern France as well as in Belgium; 2 smaller newspapers of same tendency exist since middle of 1963.

The Brussels office of the New China News Agency (Hsinhua) is Western European headquarters for Chinese Communist propaganda, supplemented by dozens of newly-opened Chinese restaurants there.

Pro-Chinese: “The Communist Study Circle” Because of eagerness to win Social-Democratic collaboration in support of Soviet foreign policy objectives, firmly opposes Chinese Communist militancy and supports CPSU’s position on international conference. During meeting of June 5-15, Party condemned Chinese for their anti-Marxist and secessionist attitude.

C.P.

Pro-Chinese: “Association Populaire FrancoChinoise” and groups that publish La Voie Communiste, and L.e Communiste

Firm supporter of U.S.S.R. but includes some supporters of proChinese trends.

COMMUNIST

AFFAIRS

SplIntor C.P.r and Groupr Outsid. the C.?.

country

Pro-Sovi*t

Great Britain

C.P. of Great Britain

Greece

C.P. of Greece (K.K.E.)

Iceland

United Party

Ireland

Irish Workers’ Party in Eire; C.P. of Northern Ireland

Italy

Italian

Luxembourg

C.P. of Luxembourg

Apprehensive about further sharpening of dispute.

Netherlands

C.P. of the Netherlands

(As above)

Norway

Norwegian

Portugal

C.P. of Portugal

Clandestine C.P. is split both in Portugal and in emigration.

San Marino

C.P. of San Marino

Has pro-Chinese faction

Spain

C.P. of Spain

Clandestine C.P. is split Pro-Chinese groups are stronger both in Spain and abroad. among exile Spaniards than in the underground C.P. in Spain. Have several publications. Headquarters of pro-Chinese are in Brussels, Belgium.

II

3 MAY-JUNE,

1964

c.r.s

Pro-China

C.P.s

for the Strugthe Revisionthe Defense of Unity (very

Commonts

More important pro-Chinese Communists have deliberately remained inside the C.P. of Great Britain. Chinese sympathizers reported, among rank and file. Central Committee condemned the “dogmatic” line of C.C.P. and supported international conference (L’Hurnunit~, 20. June)

Socialist

One small group of intellectuals, led by Kristhm Andresson.

Italia-Gina Society. Association of Friends of China, active primarily in Padua and Milano.

C.P.

Committee gle Against ists and for Communist small).

C.P.

Tends to impartiality in dispute and includes pro-Chinese elements. Both support CPSU on intemational conference.

Group published biweekly Ritomiamo a Lenin, designated “Internal Bulletin of the Opposition,” appeals not only to all “honest fighters and revolutionaries” in Italian C.P. but also to Nenni Socialists and pro-Communist trade unionists to form a united front for a new communist international based on “revolutionary Marxist principles.”

Small pro-Chinese group led by Jorgen Vogt. Uncommitted group led by Peter Mosebekk condemns the “dirty conflict between

Originator and main force of polycentrism. Opposed to international conference because of desire to maintain maneuverability and promote the socalled “Italian way to Socialism” as a “third force” in world communism.

Membership of Norwegian C.P. favors non-involvement in dispute.

17

Country

Pro-S0vl.t

C.P.s

Pro-Chinese

C.P.s

Splinter C.P.s and Graupr Outsido the C.P.

Comments

Sweden

C.P. of Sweden

Splinter group: “Swedish Communist Workers’ Association” (SKA), 4000 members.

Switzerland

Swiss Party of Labor

Pro-Chinese elements joined the very small Buillard splinter group in Veve y.

Swiss Party of Labor careful in dispute. Praised at VIII Party Congress “the merits of the C. C.P. in the struggle against the misery of the Chinese people.” Chinese Embassy in Berne finances pro-Chinese activities throughout Western Europe, publishes pro-Chinese publication R&olution.

West Germany

C.P. of Germany

Rank and file responsive to pro-Chinese theses.

Firmly

C.

Parties

Communist

of the Middle

(KPD)

Adopted national form of Communism, which maintains that the socialization already achieved in Sweden is in advance of Soviet Socialism, let alone the Chinese, and hence closer to true Communism. Hence, rejects international conference. Close contacts of Swedish C.P. with Italian C.P. at last Swedish C.P. congress. Concluded that CPSU and Chinese C.P. have “nothing to teach about Communism in Sweden.”

supports CPSU position.

East

Tudeh Party

Communist-front party; but firmly supports CPSU position.

C.P. of Iraq

World Marxist Review accused the Chinese of trying to split the C.P. of Iraq.

Israel

C.P. of Israel

Has pro-Chinese supporters in its ranks. Position on Sino-Soviet dispute non-committal.

Jordan

C.P. of Jordan

Leading Arab Communist, Fuad Nasser (exiled Sec.-General of Jordan C.P.) openly toed the Soviet line in the March issue of World Marxist Review, criticizing Chinese policy.

Lebanon

C.P. of Lebanon

Syria

C.P. of Syria

Iran

18

China seeks to form rival parties in the Middle East (Arab News Agency, April 7). Khalid Bakdash denounced the Chinese in the Beirut paper Al Akhbar, April 11/12. COMMUNIST

AFFAIW

Splinter Country

D.

Pro-Soviet

.

Communist

Parties

C.P.s

of

C.P. of Burma; “White Flag” C.P.B., pro-Chinese since 1962.

Ceylon

Ceylon C.P.

India

C.P. of India

Indonesia

P.K.Z. (C.P. of Indonesia)

3

C.P.s

MAY-JUNE,

1964

C.P.s and Groups Outride the C.P.

Commen?r

Asia

Burma

II

pro-Chinwe

Trotsky& “Red Flag” C.P.B., fanatical extremists, opposed to both Moscow and Peking. United Workers’ Party used to be pro-Soviet but since all political parties were banned in March, applied for membership in Burma’s Socialist Programme Party, which is the only legal party in Burma.

Lanka Sama Samaja Party; Lanka Sama Samaja Party (Revolutionary Section) ; C.P. of Ceylon (organized Jan. 1964)

The L.unh

Sama Samuja (Cey-

State C.P. of West Bengal

Strong pro-Chinese elements in Andhra, Kerala, Punjab, and Madras sections of the C.P. of India.

lon Equal Rights) Party has been a member of Trotsky&t Fourth International since its formation. Its Left Wing walked out after, by majority vote, the party approved on June I I, that Dr. N. M. Perera and two others accept offer of Ceylonese Prime Minister to join her cabinet. It then took the name Lanka Sama Samuja Party (Revolutionary Section). Two of its leaders previously rejected a similar offer to join the cabinet, in line with traditional Trotskyist (Bolshevik-Leninist) policy.

Follows closely the Chinese line, collaborates in the establishment of international Communist front organizations in opposition the existing pro-Soviet ones. At the same time, reserves the right to maintain so-called national character. General-Secretary D. N. Aidit considers P.K.I. in category I, in accordance with the definition of the four possible types of Communist parties, made by him Dec. 23, 1963: 1) Genuine Marxist-Leninists (pro-Chinese) ; 2 ) Controlled by “revisionists” elements but cont~~~~~ ine Mar&t-Leninist (pro-chinese faction); 3) Controlled by “revisionists” from which “genuine Marxist-Leninists” have been expelled; 4) Those from which “genuine Marxist-Leninists” have broken away, to form new and separate pro-Chinese Communist Parties.

19

Counhy

Pro-Soviet

C.P.5

Pro-Chinesa

Splinter C.P.s and Groups Outsida the C.P.

C.P.s

Pro-Soviet dissident groups

Comments

Pro-Chinese leadership is in control but there are pro-Soviet elements inside the party; expelled two pro-CPSU C.P. parliamentary deputies in May, 19% In addition, eight Communists, who supported the Test Ban Treaty, were excluded from Party leadership.

Japan

Japanese C.P.

Laos

Neo Lao Hak Xat (legal C.P. front)

Follows line of N. Vietnam C.P., to which some of its leaders belong.

Malaysia

Malayan

Clandestine organization

C.P.Pro-Chinese

Nepal C.P.

Nepal

faction

Communist in Sarawak.

front

The Nepal C.P. denounced the pro-Chinese faction as “a factionalist group of Left adventurists in the Nepal Central Committee” that “convened a Third Party Congress unconstitutionally.”

Pakistan

C.P. of Pakistan

C.P. of Pakistan, clandestine since 1954, has small membership and functions mainly in East Pakistan. Has penetrated the National Awami Party.

Philippines

Filipino

Very small membership. FCP most isolated in the world. Both CPSU and CCP seem to have little contact with it. Sec.-General Jesus Lava was arrested in Manila, May 21, 1964.

South Vietnam

National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (C.P. front)

Thailand

Thai C.P.; Chinese C.P. (Thailand)

E.

Communist

Australia

Parties

Communist

C.P. of Australia (Marxist-Leninist

C.P. of Australia

New Zealand C.P. Parties

of North

C.P. of Canada

U.S.A.

C.P. of the United States

Communist

Argentina

20

Parties

Vietnam

Financial and political Peking.

guidance

from

of Latin

)

Both C.P.‘s very small yet very influential in trade unions. Blames rift on CPSU.

America

Canada

G.

Directed from North whose line it follows.

of Australia

New Zealand F.

C.P.

Socialist Workers’ Party (Trotsky&t)

Several of, but not all, very splinter groups of both CPSU and SWP are pro-Chinese.

small

America

C.P. of Argentina

Workers’ Revolutionary Party (Trotskyist)

There within

is a pro-Chinese the CPA.

faction

COMMUNIST AFFAIRS

Country

c

Pm-sovi*t

Pro-ChIneso

C.P.r

Comments

BCP firmly in dispute.

Moscow

Bolivian

Brazil

Brazilian

Chile

C.P. of Chile

Marxist National Vanguard (Trotsky&)

C.P. demands conference soon as possible.

Colombia

C.P. of Colombia

Workers’, Peasants’ and Students’ Movement (MOEC) ; Revolutionary Socialist Party (PRS)

There is a pro-Chinese faction within the CPC, which condemns “sectarian dogmatism,” but has taken no position on proposed conferences.

Costa Ricxl

Popular Vanguard Pam

Dominican Republic

Dominican Popular Socialist Party

Ecuador

C.P. of Ecuador

Pro-Chinese elements within Pa*Y*

El Salvador

Salvadoran C.P.

Backs conference.

Guatemala

Party of Labor

Backs conference.

Haiti

Parti d’Enten.te Pop&ire; Parti Pop&ire de Liberation Nationale

Both clandestine parties support the CPSU but disagree with each other.

Honduras

Honduran

Backs conference.

Mexico

Mexican

Nicaragua

Socialist Party of Nicaragua

Panama

People’s Party of Panama

Paraguay

Paraguayan

Peru

Peruvian

Puerto Rico

Puerto Rican C.P.

Uruguay

C.P. of Uruguay

Venezuela

C.P. of Venezuela

West Indies & Martinique

C.P. of Martinique

3

MAY-JUNE,

1964

Revolutionary Workers’ Party, POR (Trotsky&)

supports

Bolivia

II

C.P.

Splintor C.P.s and Groups Outside the C.P.

C.P.,

C.P.

C.P. of Brazil

Supports issue.

C.P. C.P.

C.P.

Bolshevik C.P. of Mexico; Spartacus Leninist League; Communist Workers’ Front

Mexican ence.

-as

CPSU on conference

C.P.

favors

the

confer-

Backs conference.

Leninist C.P. of Paraguay (Trot&&) Rival Peruvian C.P. has two factions: MIR (Fidel&t) and FIR (Trotskyist-dominated)

C.P.

Movement of Revolutionary Action (MAR)

New China News Agency on May 13 describes the emergence of a separate pro-Chinese Communist Party, rules out possibility of compromise between the two party lines.

C.P.U. called for Conference May 13.

on

Militant and Pro-Chinese elements determine internal party tactics. Non-committal in dispute.

21

Country H.

Communist

Algeria

Pro-Sovlat

Parties

C.P.s

Pro-Chinese

of North

Algerian WA)

C.P.

Libya

Sudan

Sudan C.P.

Morocco

Moroccan WW

22

C.P.

C.P.s

Splinter C.P.s and Groups Outsida th. C.P.

Comments

Africa

Algerian Federation, founded by French C.P. in 1921, became C.P. of Algeria in 1936; banned by French, together with its official organ Alger Re’publicain, in 1955, it surfaced after settlement of Algerian conflict, but was banned by Algerian Government Nov. 29, 1962, though Alger Rdpublicain continued publication until shortly before President Ben Bella’s trip to Soviet Union, April 25-May 6, 1964. Even prior to establishment of the United Kingdom of Libya as a federal constitutional monarchy Dec. 24, 1961, attempts to establish a communist party were frustrated by authorities. Libya’s leading communist Enrico Cibelli, who supported Basbir Bey al-Sa’dawi, leader of the National Congress Party of Tripolitania, which was strong during national elections of Feb. 19, 1952, was deported in Nov., 1951; al-Sa’dawi, not a Libyan national, was also deported and his party outlawed after the elections, when riots broke out in and around Tripoli, resulting in I 10 wounded and 8 dead. + Founded in 1943, the PCM, which for years was a branch of the French Communist Party, was banned in Dec., 1952. But it continued to function semiclandestinely even after Morocco gained its independence (March 2, 1956) and in 1959 applied for legal status. The government then took action, and in Feb., 1960 an appeals court sustained the government’s ban. Secretary-General Ali Yata reported on PCM’s activities at XXII congress of the CPSU (Oct., 1961). It publishes weekly organ Al Mukajih, theoretical organ AZ Mabadi irregularly, has a militant membership that fluctuates between one and two thousand. Notwithstanding ban, its activities are tolerated, provided they are not identified by party label. COMMUNIST AFFAIRS

Countl-y Tunisia

Pro-Soviet

C.P.s

Pro-Chinese

C.P.s

Splinter C.P.r and Groups Outside the C.P.

Comments

_

Tunisian WT)

C.P.

Even after it developed from a branch of the French Communist Party into the independent Parti Communiste Tunisienne, in 1934, its membership was predominantly French and it was regarded by most Tunisians, Jews as well as Moslems, as an alien body. At its 7th Congress in May, 1962 PCT pledged absolute allegiance to the CPSU and veiled its criticism of “Bourgibism” to preclude possible ban. It was nevertheless banned, together with its bi-weekly organ Al-Talia in Arabic and irregular French periodical La Tribune du Prog&, early in Jan., 1963. Its total membership of less than one thousand consists nowadays of Moslem and Jewish Tunisian intellectuals who also provide most of the membership of its most active front organization, the Tunisian-U.S.S.R. Friendship Association. Commtist influence in youth and student organizations is barely perceptible, and non-existent in labor unions, federated in the UGTT (General Federation of Tunisiaan Workers), strongly antiCommunist and aftiliated with the ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. PCT Secretary-General Mohamed Ennafa is assisted by Mohamed Harmel y Habeul.

United Arab Republic (Egypt)

Egyptian

C.P.

Founded in 1920, and always proscribed by authorities, the Egyptian Communist Party was from its inception divided into rival factions that militantly claimed to represent the %ue” Party. Having finally achieved unification under direction of Italian Communist leader Vello Spano in Jan., 1958, it split again two weeks later. Membership has varied, according to different estimates, between three and eight thousand. No si,titicant or lasting front groups. In addition to Party leaders sentenced by courts, others were deported to concentration camps in repeated police raids without trial; the latter were released prior to Khrushch&v’s visit to the UAR in May, 19%.

II

3

MAY-JUNE,

1964

23

country

I.

Communist

Pro-Soviet

Parties

C.P.s

of Tropical

(Believed

Basutoland

Pm-Chinos.

C.P.s

Spllntor C.P.s and Groups OutsIde the C.P.

Commonts

Africa

pro-Soviet)

(Believed

pro-Chinese)

(Orientation

Unknown)

Contributes to the World Marxist Review and receives favorable treatment in Soviet press.

C.P. of Lesotho

Congo (BrazzaGlle)

Trade union and student groups susceptible to Communist influence.

Congo (Leopoldville)

Pmti National d.e la Convention du Peuple

*

Malagasy

Malagasy

Chinese propaganda is being directed to Malagasy, which has an overseas Chinese community.

C.P.

Chinese propaganda is being directed to Mauritius, which has an overseas Chinese community.

lM3UIitiUS

Nigeria

RQLUliOIl

C. P. of Nigeria

Very small ence.

Contributes Review. South African

and has no intlu-

Traditionally pro-CPSU but has shown signs of inclining towards C.P. of China.

C.P. of RCunion

Senegal

South Afkica

l

to World

Marxist

*

C.P.

Swaziland

Swaziland Movement

Zanzibar

Zanzibar

Communist

C.P.

l

l

B. W. *No recent information

available.

NOTE Of the nearly loo communist parties in the world, 37 are banned-15 in Asia, (Germauy, Greece, Portugal, Spain). In some of those countries, however, activities of even unto participation in open political agitation and elections, provided they are not Saudi Arabia, Yemen and a few other states, though there is no formal ban, communist

24

II in Latin America, 7 in Africa, 4 in Europe the proscribed communist parties are tolerated, identified as communist. In Bahrein, Kuwait, parties are not allowed to organize. COMMUNIST

AFFAIRS