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Communist strategy in South Korea
Communist
Strategy
After the April 1960 student uprising toppled Syngman Rhee’s government, Kim 11 Sung, premier of the North Korean Communist regime, did not lose time in exploiting the chaotic political situation in South Korea. Kim proposed in August 1960 “a plan of confederation” (Communist Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 26) and since then on various national holidays, and other solemn occasions, repeated the proposal of “peaceful unitication.” South Korea’s military dictator, Park Chung Hee, admitted in February, 1963, his incompetence to cope with the deteriorated national economy-his absolute power notwithstanding. As if waiting for this opening, the North Korean Communists intensified their propaganda efforts to exploit the sense of frustration prevalent in South Korea. North Korean Communists insisted that “there is only one, the most correct and reasonable way of achieving economic independence in South Korea. This is: to liquidate the colonial, semifeudal economic system . . . by fully mobilizing the inner forces of our Nation through cooperation between the North and South and relying upon the industry of North Korea” (Nodong Shinmoon, organ of the Korean Communist Party, Nov. 17, 1963). They even try to cajole weak-minded nationalist leaders into the Communist propaganda line by saying that “we will join hands with anyone who will fight in defense of the interests of the nation and not ask about his past doings and political beliefs” (Nodong Shinmoon, September 18, 1963). South Korean information sources indicated that this Communist propaganda scheme is being carried out intensively, through various channels, to persuade even prominent national leaders. Kim 11Sung’s “thesis on de Socialist agrarian question in our colmry,” which was approved at the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers (Communist) Party on February 2.5 of this year marks another step in this campaign for “reunification,” In developing the thesis, Kim said that “the might of our industry has grown and the foundation of an independent economy of the country has been laid more firmly than before. We can now take a series of important measures for alleviating the burdens of the cooperative farms and the peasants and rendering them greater state benefits. Such measures are: first, complete abolition of the system of agricultural tax in kind; second, undertaking-with state funds-rural capital construction projects, which have hitherto been financed by the cooperative farms; and third, construction of modern houses for the peasants, at state expense. . .” (Pyongyang Radio, Feb. 26, 1964). At the same time, North Korean Communists made a bold proposal to seduce the hungry people of the South. That is, the Supreme People’s Assembly of North Korea issued a statement which in part read: “We offer to supply to South Korea annually, to begin
8
in South Korea with, two million suX- of rice (three hundred thousand tons), one hundred thousand tons of structural steel, one thousand million KWH of electricity, ten thousand tons of chemical fibre, as well as cement, timber and machinery, by relying upon the solid foundation of a self-supporting national economy in the Northern half. We can also take South Korean unemployed into the Northern half of the Republic and ensure them jobs suitable to their skill and thus assure them a stable life.” (New China News Agency, March 27, 1964.) The free world can hardly ignore this propaganda scheme, even though it is based upon fabrication, not reality, because for the empty stomach of the people in South Korea, any propaganda voice that offers something to allay hunger has almost irrestible attraction. It so happened that the South Korean Govermnent lifted the curtain of censorship at the beginning of this year. A shocking picture of the corruption of the military government during the past two years has now been revealed to the eyes of the people in South Korea. Brutality was taken for granted by the people, but not corruption. The opposition parties’ leaders in South Korea did their best to discredit Park’s leadership and declared that the time had come for all Koreans to make an extraordinary decision in the interests of national destiny. (Kyunghyang Shinmoon, Seoul, April 30, w64,
P. 1.1
Pent-up popular indignation, surcharged with a bursting desire of frustration, found an outlet in the student demonstrations that began to erupt in March. The “straw that broke the camel’s back” and the first pretext and target of these student demonstrations was the decade-old issue of the Republic of Korea-Japan talks. True, the Korean people view with apprehension normalization of relations between Korea and Japan. The Korean people have not yet forgotten how in 1910 Japan had seized their country, nor the effects of Japanese rule in Korea. But the young Korean students actually seem not to have any personal bitter sentiments about those bad times. As a matter of fact, many Korean students actually expressed a desire to see normalized relations with Japan under the government of exKorean President Syngman Rhee. However, when present President Park showed his determination to push through the ROK-Japan talks to the final stage “at any cost,” the students as well as the general public showed distrust of the motivation behind this policy and began to suspect sinister and hidden intentions. They feared that Park’s government was secretly plotting to undermine their national destiny. The causes of the students’ distrust of the government are not always easily defined, but they seem to stem from the military government’s corruption and its ambiguous political philosophy. Frustrated by the corruption and violation of justice of the military government, the Korean students have been bewildered by Park’s political philosophy of “nationalistic democracy.” COMMUNIST
AFFAIRS
Actually, “nationalistic democracy” is more a slogan than a political philosophy. As a political program, it seems illogical and inconsistent. “Nationalistic democracy” has been advocated by Park since his coup d’etat of ( I g6 I ) . Students began to doubt the meaning of “naslogan, because they interpreted the meaning of “nationalistic democracy” as complete independence from all foreign powers. This however indirectly, referred to the presence of the United States. But, when Park began to insist on a quick normalization “at any cost” with Japan, it sounded to the students as an invitation to another foreign power. In this inconsistency and self-contradiction in principle, the students sensed something hidden, some trick, a dubious motivation. At this point, speculation in the world press about the possible unification and neutralization of Korea served only to aggravate the apprehension of South Korean students. For example, The London Sunday Times Tokyo correspondent Richard Hughes’ report of May I 7, I 964, on the feasibility of “neutralized unification” of Korea on the DeGaulle model further served to strengthen the students’ doubts concerning President Park’s actual motives. Hughes reported that “according to well informed Japanese officials, France has promised to secure guarantees from Peking to respect Korean neutrality and to withhold recognition of North Korea while South Korea considers terms and conditions for a national reunification.” South Korean Prime Minister Chung 11 Kwon immediately denied this and said that “the Republic of Korea government has never thought of national unification on the basis of neutralization” and asserted that there were no such talks on neutralization of Korea between himself and French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville. This sort of report nevertheless aroused much speculation in Korean domestic circles. Korean students can hardly ignore the fact that the normalization of relations with Japan “would have opened Korea’s door to badly needed Japanese investments and technical aid.” (The New York Times, June 5, 1964 editorial.) But, they want to have a clear picture of political consequences before they agree to welcome any material benefit. Whatever one may think of the student demonstrations, the South Korean political and economic situation provides the Communists with fertile ground for their propaganda. North Korean Communists immediately voiced “warm support for the patriotic struggle of the South Korean students and people against the criminal South Korea-Japan talks” (NCNA, March 25). North Korean Communist papers carried editorials in support of the demonstrations (NCNA, March 26). Even the Japanese Communists issued an appeal to all students in Japan “to support the presistent struggle of the South Korean students against the talks” (NCNA, April 2). Thus Communist propaganda began to exploit this grave situation in South Korea. As an expert on Korean problems admits, “Korean hopelessness, though partly political, is basically economic.” (Gregory Henderson’s Letter to the Editor, New York Times, June 11, 1964.) Mr. Henderson is one of the few Americans who speaks Korean like a II
3
MAY-JUNE,
1964
native Korean, has concerned himself with Korean affairs for 16 years, was formerly cultural attache and political officer at the American Embassy in Seoul and is at present with the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. A Japanese correspondent reported from the scene of riotous student demonstration in Seoul that most. of those who captured police trucks and jeeps and drove around the city on the day when martial law was proclaimed were not students but unemployed youth. As a Japanese newspaper in Los Angeles asked: “When those who are frustrated at the very bottom of poverty fmd an outlet for their pent-up feelings, what kind of action can be expected?” (Rafu Shimpo, June 19, p. I). The present Korean crisis commands once more the free world’s attention. Although there is no war, its urgent nature is no less than that of the crisis in 1950. There are several alternative lines of attack possible to put the situation under control. The most pressing need seems to be for political stabilization and basic economic reforms. Political stabilization is mainly a problem of Korean political leaders. The Korean people seem to have lost their confidence in the government because of its incompetence to deal with corruption and its self-contradictory and ambiguous political philosophy. At the same time the Korean people are disgusted with the leaders of the opposition parties, their fanatical partisanship, factionalism, disunity and generally irresponsible political conduct. Korean political leaders must work out a viable and practical policy line to achieve some semblance of national unity. Martial law and secret police camot in the long run be an effective instrument of policy. Effective undertal&gs in the economic sphere are beyond the capability of South Korea itself. In the face of the relentless propaganda offensive waged by the North Korean Communist regime and the tangible economic achievements to which it can point with pride, South Korea must perforce turn to the advanced non-communist countries for aid. This assistance would be most welcome, and most effective politically as well as economically, if it were offered within an international rather than a unilateral framework. The inclusion of Japan in such an international consortium would not arouse the apprehension of patriotic Koreans, provided its participation was balanced by the relative influence of other powers. Such an approach seems to indicate the most feasible beginning for relieving the plight of the three million unemployed, mounting inflation, deepening hopelessness and frustration. Unless the present desperate situation is relieved fairly soon, the very same students who have been demonstrating in defense of South Korea’s democracy, could conceivably turn, out of sheer frustration, to the unification program advocated by the Communists. The possibility is not excluded that Kim 11 Sung’s hopes, to win by political strategy and a propaganda offensive what he failed to win by military means in 1g5o-53,maymaterialize within the forseeable future. -Y.H.K.
9
Strategy
After the April 1960 student uprising toppled Syngman Rhee’s government, Kim 11 Sung, premier of the North Korean Communist regime, did not lose time in exploiting the chaotic political situation in South Korea. Kim proposed in August 1960 “a plan of confederation” (Communist Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 26) and since then on various national holidays, and other solemn occasions, repeated the proposal of “peaceful unitication.” South Korea’s military dictator, Park Chung Hee, admitted in February, 1963, his incompetence to cope with the deteriorated national economy-his absolute power notwithstanding. As if waiting for this opening, the North Korean Communists intensified their propaganda efforts to exploit the sense of frustration prevalent in South Korea. North Korean Communists insisted that “there is only one, the most correct and reasonable way of achieving economic independence in South Korea. This is: to liquidate the colonial, semifeudal economic system . . . by fully mobilizing the inner forces of our Nation through cooperation between the North and South and relying upon the industry of North Korea” (Nodong Shinmoon, organ of the Korean Communist Party, Nov. 17, 1963). They even try to cajole weak-minded nationalist leaders into the Communist propaganda line by saying that “we will join hands with anyone who will fight in defense of the interests of the nation and not ask about his past doings and political beliefs” (Nodong Shinmoon, September 18, 1963). South Korean information sources indicated that this Communist propaganda scheme is being carried out intensively, through various channels, to persuade even prominent national leaders. Kim 11Sung’s “thesis on de Socialist agrarian question in our colmry,” which was approved at the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers (Communist) Party on February 2.5 of this year marks another step in this campaign for “reunification,” In developing the thesis, Kim said that “the might of our industry has grown and the foundation of an independent economy of the country has been laid more firmly than before. We can now take a series of important measures for alleviating the burdens of the cooperative farms and the peasants and rendering them greater state benefits. Such measures are: first, complete abolition of the system of agricultural tax in kind; second, undertaking-with state funds-rural capital construction projects, which have hitherto been financed by the cooperative farms; and third, construction of modern houses for the peasants, at state expense. . .” (Pyongyang Radio, Feb. 26, 1964). At the same time, North Korean Communists made a bold proposal to seduce the hungry people of the South. That is, the Supreme People’s Assembly of North Korea issued a statement which in part read: “We offer to supply to South Korea annually, to begin
8
in South Korea with, two million suX- of rice (three hundred thousand tons), one hundred thousand tons of structural steel, one thousand million KWH of electricity, ten thousand tons of chemical fibre, as well as cement, timber and machinery, by relying upon the solid foundation of a self-supporting national economy in the Northern half. We can also take South Korean unemployed into the Northern half of the Republic and ensure them jobs suitable to their skill and thus assure them a stable life.” (New China News Agency, March 27, 1964.) The free world can hardly ignore this propaganda scheme, even though it is based upon fabrication, not reality, because for the empty stomach of the people in South Korea, any propaganda voice that offers something to allay hunger has almost irrestible attraction. It so happened that the South Korean Govermnent lifted the curtain of censorship at the beginning of this year. A shocking picture of the corruption of the military government during the past two years has now been revealed to the eyes of the people in South Korea. Brutality was taken for granted by the people, but not corruption. The opposition parties’ leaders in South Korea did their best to discredit Park’s leadership and declared that the time had come for all Koreans to make an extraordinary decision in the interests of national destiny. (Kyunghyang Shinmoon, Seoul, April 30, w64,
P. 1.1
Pent-up popular indignation, surcharged with a bursting desire of frustration, found an outlet in the student demonstrations that began to erupt in March. The “straw that broke the camel’s back” and the first pretext and target of these student demonstrations was the decade-old issue of the Republic of Korea-Japan talks. True, the Korean people view with apprehension normalization of relations between Korea and Japan. The Korean people have not yet forgotten how in 1910 Japan had seized their country, nor the effects of Japanese rule in Korea. But the young Korean students actually seem not to have any personal bitter sentiments about those bad times. As a matter of fact, many Korean students actually expressed a desire to see normalized relations with Japan under the government of exKorean President Syngman Rhee. However, when present President Park showed his determination to push through the ROK-Japan talks to the final stage “at any cost,” the students as well as the general public showed distrust of the motivation behind this policy and began to suspect sinister and hidden intentions. They feared that Park’s government was secretly plotting to undermine their national destiny. The causes of the students’ distrust of the government are not always easily defined, but they seem to stem from the military government’s corruption and its ambiguous political philosophy. Frustrated by the corruption and violation of justice of the military government, the Korean students have been bewildered by Park’s political philosophy of “nationalistic democracy.” COMMUNIST
AFFAIRS
Actually, “nationalistic democracy” is more a slogan than a political philosophy. As a political program, it seems illogical and inconsistent. “Nationalistic democracy” has been advocated by Park since his coup d’etat of ( I g6 I ) . Students began to doubt the meaning of “naslogan, because they interpreted the meaning of “nationalistic democracy” as complete independence from all foreign powers. This however indirectly, referred to the presence of the United States. But, when Park began to insist on a quick normalization “at any cost” with Japan, it sounded to the students as an invitation to another foreign power. In this inconsistency and self-contradiction in principle, the students sensed something hidden, some trick, a dubious motivation. At this point, speculation in the world press about the possible unification and neutralization of Korea served only to aggravate the apprehension of South Korean students. For example, The London Sunday Times Tokyo correspondent Richard Hughes’ report of May I 7, I 964, on the feasibility of “neutralized unification” of Korea on the DeGaulle model further served to strengthen the students’ doubts concerning President Park’s actual motives. Hughes reported that “according to well informed Japanese officials, France has promised to secure guarantees from Peking to respect Korean neutrality and to withhold recognition of North Korea while South Korea considers terms and conditions for a national reunification.” South Korean Prime Minister Chung 11 Kwon immediately denied this and said that “the Republic of Korea government has never thought of national unification on the basis of neutralization” and asserted that there were no such talks on neutralization of Korea between himself and French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville. This sort of report nevertheless aroused much speculation in Korean domestic circles. Korean students can hardly ignore the fact that the normalization of relations with Japan “would have opened Korea’s door to badly needed Japanese investments and technical aid.” (The New York Times, June 5, 1964 editorial.) But, they want to have a clear picture of political consequences before they agree to welcome any material benefit. Whatever one may think of the student demonstrations, the South Korean political and economic situation provides the Communists with fertile ground for their propaganda. North Korean Communists immediately voiced “warm support for the patriotic struggle of the South Korean students and people against the criminal South Korea-Japan talks” (NCNA, March 25). North Korean Communist papers carried editorials in support of the demonstrations (NCNA, March 26). Even the Japanese Communists issued an appeal to all students in Japan “to support the presistent struggle of the South Korean students against the talks” (NCNA, April 2). Thus Communist propaganda began to exploit this grave situation in South Korea. As an expert on Korean problems admits, “Korean hopelessness, though partly political, is basically economic.” (Gregory Henderson’s Letter to the Editor, New York Times, June 11, 1964.) Mr. Henderson is one of the few Americans who speaks Korean like a II
3
MAY-JUNE,
1964
native Korean, has concerned himself with Korean affairs for 16 years, was formerly cultural attache and political officer at the American Embassy in Seoul and is at present with the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. A Japanese correspondent reported from the scene of riotous student demonstration in Seoul that most. of those who captured police trucks and jeeps and drove around the city on the day when martial law was proclaimed were not students but unemployed youth. As a Japanese newspaper in Los Angeles asked: “When those who are frustrated at the very bottom of poverty fmd an outlet for their pent-up feelings, what kind of action can be expected?” (Rafu Shimpo, June 19, p. I). The present Korean crisis commands once more the free world’s attention. Although there is no war, its urgent nature is no less than that of the crisis in 1950. There are several alternative lines of attack possible to put the situation under control. The most pressing need seems to be for political stabilization and basic economic reforms. Political stabilization is mainly a problem of Korean political leaders. The Korean people seem to have lost their confidence in the government because of its incompetence to deal with corruption and its self-contradictory and ambiguous political philosophy. At the same time the Korean people are disgusted with the leaders of the opposition parties, their fanatical partisanship, factionalism, disunity and generally irresponsible political conduct. Korean political leaders must work out a viable and practical policy line to achieve some semblance of national unity. Martial law and secret police camot in the long run be an effective instrument of policy. Effective undertal&gs in the economic sphere are beyond the capability of South Korea itself. In the face of the relentless propaganda offensive waged by the North Korean Communist regime and the tangible economic achievements to which it can point with pride, South Korea must perforce turn to the advanced non-communist countries for aid. This assistance would be most welcome, and most effective politically as well as economically, if it were offered within an international rather than a unilateral framework. The inclusion of Japan in such an international consortium would not arouse the apprehension of patriotic Koreans, provided its participation was balanced by the relative influence of other powers. Such an approach seems to indicate the most feasible beginning for relieving the plight of the three million unemployed, mounting inflation, deepening hopelessness and frustration. Unless the present desperate situation is relieved fairly soon, the very same students who have been demonstrating in defense of South Korea’s democracy, could conceivably turn, out of sheer frustration, to the unification program advocated by the Communists. The possibility is not excluded that Kim 11 Sung’s hopes, to win by political strategy and a propaganda offensive what he failed to win by military means in 1g5o-53,maymaterialize within the forseeable future. -Y.H.K.
9